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THE EMPIRE AND THE CENTURY

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THE EMPIRE AND THE CENTURY

A SERIES OF ESSAYS ON IMPERIAL PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES BY VARIOUS WRITERS

EDITED
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN, AUTHOR OF 'WITH GENERAL FRENCH AND THE CAVALRY IN SOUTH AFRICA,' AND A POEM BY RUDYARD KIPLING, ENTITLED 'THE HERITAGE'

WITH SEVEN MAPS

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET
1905

TO

THE FUTURE OF

ENGLAND

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INTRODUCTION

'As it was in the beginning . . . it shall be . . .'

If there is any truth in Schiller's saying, 'Men rise by their higher purposes,' it is as applicable to nations as to individuals. In no period in history has it fallen to the lot of mankind to witness a greater Empire than the British Empire of to-day, and it follows as a logical conclusion that the administration of such an Empire must needs imply a heavy weight of responsibility. Are we conscious of these responsibilities, and is the nation rising to meet them? Surely, on no occasion is the question of its future more vital, is, in fact, the duty of reflection and examination more in keeping with national rejoicing, than on the centenary of the great naval battle which determined the future of the Empire and laid the foundations of modern Europe. To serious men Trafalgar should be considered in the light of a national sacrament. The lessons of the past are weighed, our vows for the future renewed. Rejoicing must be combined with national self-examination, and the conditions of our success in the past used as a guide to our conduct in the future.

As in the realm of thought and of matter, organic and inorganic, forms and conditions show an evolutionary progress, so with the forces and ideals which create and

maintain Empire. It is our first business to consider the many and various ideals which together produce the modern Imperial ideal in order to understand the true nature of a creed which to many of us is the one living creed in current politics. Montesquieu truly remarked that three qualities above others distinguished the English from any other nation—the qualities of Liberty, Piety, and Industrial Ambition. One great feature in England's history is that her political and social conflicts were never barren of results. In France the Wars of Religion left only a bankrupt society and an effete autocracy. The Imperial ambitions of Spain left only a wearied and reactionary State. The Thirty Years' War in Germany took its toll of bloodshed without bequeathing as a recompense any real political or moral blessing. In England, on the other hand, it is hard to point to any struggle in which the soul of the nation was engaged which did not end in a vast and far-reaching reform. This is true of our religious strife, and it is equally true of our political and social revolutions. The three great qualities which Montesquieu noted, and which may be taken as the different forms of the national ideal, complementary to each other, and each forming in its special way the ideal most needed by its age, were developed in three separate and distinct epochs.

Political liberty, the first of these ideals, was won in an early stage of our history, at a time when England took small part in international affairs. While the rest of the world was groaning under the tyranny of absolute rulers, the spirit of individual liberty had already permeated our masses, certain substantive rights had been won as against autocratic power, and when the ultimate crisis arose, and the fleet of the greatest nation of the day threatened her coasts, the country armed as a whole

in its defence. The defeat of the Armada was not the work of a mercenary levy, but of the spirit of the people in arms. From Gravelines onward England lost her insularity, and became a factor of deep importance in the affairs, not only of Europe, but of that wider world which was already dawning upon the horizon of her settlers and pioneers.

One part of the battle having been won, the war is carried to another sphere. England accepted a Reformation that, for logical completeness, can be paralleled nowhere else in Europe. Her spiritual conflict, bitter as it was, did not rage round the débris of the Church: it sought the essential principle of spiritual liberty and inner reformation. After a short destructive period the nation produced a man who, while vindicating that liberty of conscience which England has never since lost, at the same time refused to seek a barren liberty, but joined a moral reformation to patriotic ends, and welded the whole into one national ideal.

With Oliver Cromwell we come to the third of Montesquieu's characteristics—Industrial Ambition. With the practical insight of an experienced statesman he recognised the fact that England's future must be based upon a solid economic foundation. Puritanism at its best refused to allow the individual to live his moral life apart from the world of men. The medieval Church could not rise above a negation, and the formula, *Deo placere non potest.* It was a system of taboos and restrictions, and not of definite commands. True Puritanism urged that faith without works is dead, and that the glory of God was equally achieved in practical life as in the hermit's cell. The service of God in the world, and not out of it, in an active life of enterprise, and not in a passive mood of religious contemplation, became the standard of a new régime growing up under

Cromwell's example and with the memory of Bunyan's hero, who was not a priest, but a pilgrim. Material well-being was regarded as an ideal to which the nation as a whole, and each man in it, might aspire—not only as something which was not wrong, but as something which opened up a wider range of virtue. On one side was the vice of asceticism, the life apart from the world; on the other, the vice of hedonism, the life in the world and only for the world. The true Puritanism steered the middle course, using the world as a gift of God wherein to work out the Divine purpose. Looking back over the course of history, we cannot avoid being struck with the fact that zeal for political liberty, religious freedom, and industrial ambition were coeval, and combined in all great epochs. The Elizabethans, the Puritans who founded the New England States and gave the first impulse to English industrialism, and, at a later date, the people of the North of England, who combined Methodism and a zeal for political reform with an unfailing practical instinct, seem to prove that Montesquieu's diagnosis is the correct one, and that the English racial ideal at its best, whether we call it Nationalism or Imperialism, combines these three attributes.

Our national ideal, then, properly considered, must combine all three aims. When it is shorn of its practicality it will become the creed of dreamers and doctrinaires; if it is bereft of its spiritual side it will become the dogma of a hard and narrow class of utilitarians, such as Bentham and Mill; if it is shorn again of its political aspect, we get the commercialism of the Manchester School in its decadence, where the individual was looked upon as apart from society, where money-making was regarded as *per se* a religious and moral act, quite apart from the ends for which money was sought. Ideals were sunk in

the race for worldly goods, and their place was taken by a growing luxury, extravagance, and quest for pleasure. Even the elementary duty of the citizen in defence of his country was lost sight of, and our Colonies and the great deeds which had won them were forgotten. Hence arose the school of 'Little England'—a school which contained many diverse thinkers, from the serious philosophic insularism of those who disbelieved in oversea possessions to the vulgar self-satisfaction of the class who were convinced that their own narrow view represented the last word in political development. Fortunately for England, leaders in the persons of Carlyle and Ruskin in the theoretical, and Beaconsfield in the practical, spheres arose, and preached a new doctrine, restated the old ideal, roused the nation from its sluggishness, and stimulated it towards a higher purpose. Once more the old doctrine was preached that works were valueless without faith, and that politics, unless inspired by a true social faith, were only a blind stumbling among precedents. Men began to realize that the nation could not shirk its responsibilities without the degradation of its moral life, and that the truest national well-being lay in great tasks and grave difficulties honestly and fearlessly faced. Such, with all its defects, was the creed which Imperialism attempted to expound. Taking as its axiom that it was desirable to maintain England as a great nation, it argued that no national life can develop without a material foundation. To use the jargon of philosophy, all qualitative development must have a quantitative basis. It sought this basis in the development of that oversea Empire which had been won by its forerunners. The rise of other nations, the growth of armies and navies, the dawn of colonizing ambition among other European Powers, might well make such a development a bare necessity in self-defence; but Im-

perialism sought to base it on higher grounds. It desired to make the Empire a united and self-subsistent whole, not merely on the ground of safety, but on the wider ground of the richer life which it would afford. Seeing in England an old, crowded, and complex society, with little room for internal development, it sought to open a wider horizon to its view, and to remedy some of the greater evils of the social organism by means of the wide, untried territories at its command. At the same time it transmitted to the daughter States those very principles which had contributed to England's undisputed naval and commercial hegemony in the world—the principles of religious and political liberty, the spirit of commercial enterprise based on the Puritan maxim of self-development and self-reliance to which she owed the foundation and growth of her Colonial possessions. The creed has found many detractors. Some have labelled it 'Jingoism,' and defined it as a hectoring and braggart attitude towards other peoples. Some have called it Chauvinism, and described it as an extreme self-satisfaction, the glorification of our own merits at the expense of all the world. But the truth is that such hostile definitions are irrelevant. They have no relation to Imperialism, even on its least worthy side; indeed, they are far more descriptive of the vices of the opposite school. For the true Imperialist, so far from seeking war, seeks a security for peace by remedying the weakness and isolation which are the primary causes of war; and so far from being a Chauvinist, he implores his people to believe that they have not necessarily said the last word on all things, and that it is their business to learn from and, if necessary, to follow the methods of other States. In a practical sense we have seen its working in the South African War. Far from producing evil qualities,

it has brought to light the noblest and highest virtue of the nation—that of self-sacrifice. Imperialism, as defined by its opponents, contains no ideal worth speaking of; in the eyes of its votaries it embodies the ideal which, according to Montesquieu, has made England great. Political liberty—that is, a circle of autonomous nations, united by the bonds of race, and owing a universal allegiance to one Crown and one law; piety—that is, a national inspiration towards a fuller and richer life; a patriotism in which the nation takes the place of the old medieval Church; and, lastly, industrial ambition—that is, the desire of each man to develop the heritage which has been given him, and to put out his talents at interest—these may be taken as the forms in which that Imperial ideal appears to-day.

The day of the individual and the small nation has gone for England with the advent of rivals. In any era of competition Providence is on the side of the bigger social battalions. As in commerce we see every day new trade combinations, so also in politics the future is for the State which can unite and consolidate. Happily, the conditions of such Imperial consolidation exist within the Empire to-day. A feeling of greater community between the Mother Country and her Colonies has emanated, as we have seen, from the conception of Greater Britain. It found its most powerful expression in the day of great national rejoicing at the celebration of the late Queen's Jubilee, no less than in the period of national depression during the South African War, and it is this strong sense of a community of interests based on mutual protection and security which must become a vital power in the history of the future. We find that the ideal of unity which prevailed in Italy and served Cavour in giving reality to Dante's and Rienzi's dreams occurred again as a great motive power in

Bismarck's consummation of a United Germany; and seeing that the tendencies and forces of the present day are all converging towards the dream of a United British Empire, it is surely not too much to predict that means will be found to focus this impulse towards unity into a definite and practical form of Imperial union.

It may seem a long step from Cromwell to Rhodes, and yet the two men are spiritually akin. Both in their own way sought the glory of God and the glory of their people. Both were intolerant of the 'fugitive and cloistered' virtues, and believed that ideals were but dim lamps unless they were used to light the work-a-day world. Both earnestly sought the greatness of England, and sought that greatness over sea. Both were 'practical mystics'; in Lord Rosebery's words, that 'most formidable of combinations.' Their constructive imperialism widely differing in scope, was inspired with the same creed. The taunts levied at the earlier statesmen were blood-guiltiness and fanaticism. The latter-day statesman was similarly labelled a self-seeking capitalist. Strange as it may seem, the accusations were similar in kind. Both were practical men using the best weapons for achieving their ends, and if Cromwell is now remembered as the man who had to crush and stamp out great evils, and did so by methods which a weaker man would have feared to use, in the same way we may regard Rhodes as one who took the most prosaic and most suspected of all methods, and used it for the furtherance of an ideal. He will be regarded, we believe, in future ages as a living proof of that stage in which capital becomes transformed and loses all its vices—a potent instrument towards the dissemination of high and noble principles. He was the true child and product, and therefore the type of his age, just as Cromwell in his person summed

up the diverse and conflicting strivings of an earlier England.

The present volume is intended to give, within the compass of a single book, the current views of representative men and women, upon those special departments of Imperial development with which they are severally qualified to deal. Its purpose is to give an authoritative account of the Empire, as it appeared to contemporaries at this particular moment of its history. It is in no sense a propagandist work. Full liberty has been given to every writer, and it is to be regarded as a collection of expert opinion rather than as a methodical treatise. Though the majority of the contributors are in favour of Mr. Chamberlain's policy, several are not, and there is the same divergence of views on non-Imperial questions. The one link of connection is that all are believers in constructive Imperialism. In their view of the Empire they represent the revolt from the old unfruitful attitude of apathy, ignorance, and vague sentimentality. They desire to see a self-conscious community rather than a collection of indeterminate atoms. They believe that the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, while it may be valuable as a conscious and reasoned policy, is extremely dangerous and futile as a temperamental attitude. They believe that the administration of an Empire is as much a science as any other branch of politics, and therefore demands exact knowledge and serious reflection.

The point of time is important, both to the future historian and to the present generation of British citizens, because it is recognised on all hands that we have reached a critical period of Imperial evolution. In the self-governing Colonies the work of the past century has been that of foundation-laying. This preliminary work may be said to have been formally closed in Canada by

the recent inauguration of the new Provinces in the West. Likewise in Australia, the arrival of the Commonwealth, implying the consciousness of a national as opposed to a colonial destiny, may be interpreted as the closing scene of the old colonial era. The articles, therefore, relating to the self-governing Colonies represent the Empire as it was in the beginning. The foundations have been laid, in some cases they are complete, and the distinctive work of the century before us will be the building of the superstructures, on the nature of which depends the future, not merely of the British Empire, but of British democracy and the world's civilization.

Similarly, in England there are not wanting indications that a national crisis is upon us. The fiscal controversy, with all its Imperial importance, is but one aspect of the larger situation. With the rapid rise of formidable European Powers the period of our insular predominance and 'splendid isolation' has been brought to an end. Once more Little England, intent on her national independence, returns to the tradition of an earlier age, and looks abroad for political combinations. The Japanese Treaty marks the momentous transition.

Yet the problem is not as it used to be. The Empire in its modern form is a factor with which earlier statesmen had no need to reckon, because it did not exist. To-day there is nothing visionary in the conception of a future Imperial organization which shall assure the independence of the several democracies and the safety of our Imperial administration more securely than any foreign alliance. For the time being, while only the foundations are in place, it has been found necessary by us to seek the buttress of a foreign support. But those who know the Empire cannot rest satisfied with that solution of the permanent problem. They apprehend

the imminent questions which will be raised by the growth to maturity of the colonial nations, and they value the pride in British tradition which spreads even to peoples not of our own blood, but living under the flag. It would be strange indeed if the men who have developed the administration of our great Dependencies could readily reconcile themselves to a new order of the world, in which the perpetuation of their life-work would depend upon the support of allies to whom the British tradition would be a mere exotic, possessing only a certain market value in diplomacy.

I cannot conclude without thanking the many distinguished men and women who have collaborated with me in this work.

That so many busy experts in different provinces should have been ready to give their knowledge for the instruction of their country is surely a signal proof of public spirit. I wish especially to thank my friends Mr. John Buchan and Mr. J. L. Garvin for the advice they have given me throughout.

It ought to be said that no attempt has been made to secure uniformity of tone or structure in the articles. Any lack of cohesion which the book may show on this account will, I believe, be more than recompensed for by the full liberty given to each writer to develop the subject according to his own views.

It may be added that the work originated with the idea of an Imperial supplement to the *Outlook*, but the scheme soon grew so much beyond the bounds of such an arrangement, that I decided to make of it a separate volume.

C. S. GOLDMAN.

34, Queen Anne's Gate,
Westminster,
October, 1905.

THE HERITAGE*

By RUDYARD KIPLING

Our Fathers in a wondrous age,
  Ere yet the Earth was small,
Ensured to us an heritage,
  And doubted not at all
That we, the children of their heart,
  Which then did beat so high,
In later time should play like part
  For our posterity.

A thousand years they steadfast built,
  To 'vantage us and ours,
The Walls that were a world's despair,
  The sea-constraining Towers:
Yet in their midmost pride they knew,
  And unto Kings made known,
Not all from these their strength they drew,
  Their faith from brass or stone.

Youth's passion, manhood's fierce intent,
  With age's judgment wise,
They spent, and counted not they spent,
  At daily sacrifice.
Not lambs alone nor purchased doves
  Or tithe of trader's gold—
Their lives most dear, their dearer loves,
  They offered up of old.

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THE HERITAGE

Refraining e'en from lawful things,
They bowed the neck to bear
The unadornèd yoke that brings
Stark toil and sternest care.
Wherefore through them is Freedom sure;
Wherefore through them we stand
From all but sloth and pride secure,
In a delightsome land.

Then fretful murmur not they gave
So great a charge to keep,
Nor dream that awestruck Time shall save
Their labour while we sleep.
Dear-bought and clear, a thousand year
Our fathers' title runs.
Make we likewise their sacrifice,
Defrauding not our sons!

PART I.

THE IMPERIAL ORGANISM

I.—PRINCIPLES OF EMPIRE

THE IMPERIAL IDEAL

By W. F. MONYPENNY

Among the many remarkable changes of the last generation none is more remarkable than the change in the political ideas uppermost in the minds of men, and in the political aspirations to which these ideas give direction and impetus—a change which is perhaps most perceptible in our own country and among our own kindred, but which can also be traced among every other people with any claims to civilization. Thirty or forty years ago the word 'Nation' and its derivatives were on the lips of all. Political enthusiasm was concentrated on the redemption of subject nationalities, or in the bringing together of dissevered national fragments; or, where national unity had already been attained, in the development of political freedom and the extension of political privilege from the few to the many. The national ideal, in fact, was the great formative influence in political thought, the guiding principle of diplomacy, the inspiration of political parties. To-day the words 'Empire' and 'Imperialism' fill the place in everyday speech that was once filled by 'Nation' and 'Nationality.' In the never-ending struggle of political principles authority rather than liberty seems for the moment to have the upper hand; power and dominion rather than freedom and independence are the

ideas that appeal to the imagination of the masses; men's thoughts are turned outward rather than inward; the national ideal has given place to the Imperial.

To analyze and explain the full significance of this remarkable change would be a task far beyond the scope of the present essay—a task requiring for its adequate fulfilment a long historical retrospect, a wide and careful survey of existing conditions, and, it might almost be added, a prophetic insight into future history for many generations to come. But on a lower level of ambition something may perhaps be done; and, as our own political future is so deeply involved in the elucidation of the matter, it is worth while at all hazards to make the attempt.

Now, first of all, what do the words 'National' and 'Imperial' respectively imply? When we speak of a nation, we all know sufficiently well for practical purposes what is meant, though we may not find it very easy to give any precise definition of the term, and historically, as a matter of fact, the conception is comparatively new, and the national State a comparatively modern political phenomenon. The words 'Empire' and 'Imperial' are far more difficult to analyze. They are at once older and newer, less familiar to our modern minds, and at the same time with a longer history behind them and a larger burden of associations to carry. Historically, if not logically, they take precedence, and it may be as well to begin with such a brief survey of the past as may be necessary to their elucidation.

I.

Roman in its origin, the word 'Empire' has retained more than a flavour of association from its original use. The Roman Empire was not only the first in history to bear the name, but also the first to which with any fitness the name can be applied. What we vaguely describe as the Ancient Empires of the East were little more than mechanical aggregates of territory and popu-

lation with no principle of union or assimilative power, and with no real vitality or possibility of endurance. The Roman Empire was on a far higher plane, and had a far higher mission. Bound together not only by a common ruler, but by a highly organized and uniform though elastic system of administration, and as time went on by a common system of law and a common citizenship, it became the most powerful engine of assimilation that the world has ever seen. In the first instance, indeed, Roman Imperialism was little more than an Imperialism of conquest; but it was a conquest that ultimately justified itself as a furtherance to civilization. Historically, the Roman dominion served the purpose of breaking down the barriers of tribe, and race, and city, that separated the various peoples round the shores of the Mediterranean; in widening their horizons, hitherto restricted in a degree which it is difficult for us to realize or understand; in drawing to a focus all the scattered elements of civilization in the ancient world; in evolving for mankind a universal system of jurisprudence; in preparing their minds for the acceptance of a universal religion. In the sense that it united so many diverse elements under the shelter of a common Government, and that it transcended so many forms of polity with its all-embracing organization, the Roman Empire was universal. It was not merely one mighty State surrounded by others similar in kind, though towering above them, but the one and only civilized State beyond whose bounds there was a mere welter of barbarism. In this way the idea of universality, of catholicity, came to be associated with the word Empire, and for more than a thousand years remained inseparable from its meaning; and, though in our own days the word has sometimes been put to strange and degraded uses, there is more than a suggestion of that idea clinging to it still.

II.

As a mere island of civilization, however, amid an ocean of barbarism, the Roman Empire was only universal in a relative sense. It was limited externally by arbitrary boundaries, and such universality as it achieved it achieved only at the expense of internal vitality. The heavy hand of despotism rested upon it and crushed out freedom, both in the individual and in the community. With freedom went energy and resisting power, as was seen when the wave of conquest had spent itself, and the returning tide of barbarism began to press inwards from without. But for the spread of Christianity, the Empire would have fallen to pieces much sooner than it did; but the triumph of the new faith infused into it fresh vitality, gave it a living principle of cohesion, and for a time promised to consolidate its population into one great Christian nationality on the basis of the Græco-Roman civilization. In the East, indeed, some such result was achieved, and the Empire lingered on for a thousand years, largely through the energy it developed as a Greek national State. But in the West, where the barbarians were too strong or the resisting power too weak, the fabric crumbled away, and centuries of confusion followed, during which civilization seemed often in danger of complete submersion.

But in the West the brief experience of the Roman peace—brief as compared with the æons of strife that had preceded, or the long period of confusion that followed—was not forgotten. The idea of the Empire as the central and regulating polity of the Christian world lingered in men's minds, or, rather, became more definite, and gathered fresh significance as time went on. It found embodiment for a moment in the great, if short-lived, creation of Charlemagne; and later again it took visible shape in the Holy Roman Empire of the true Middle Ages, which for three centuries was the leading power in Christendom, and which gave to the

world, in its famous line of German monarchs from Otto the Great to Frederick II., the most splendid procession of kings in all recorded history.

It is, however, through the ideal that inspired its achievements rather than through the achievements themselves that the mediæval Empire appeals to our imaginations. The vision of the Imperator Pacificus which haunted the mind of the Middle Ages was never realized in practice, but the attempt to realize it, hopeless as it may have been, was the most splendid effort of political idealism that has yet been seen. The dream of political unity, the majestic theory of the Universal Empire corresponding to the Universal Church, with its head, the Emperor, the crown of the feudal system and the earthly King of kings, was only perhaps a dream, a theory, an aspiration; but it remains in many ways the noblest, the most coherent, and the most satisfying political ideal yet conceived by the mind of man, and it has invested the Middle Ages with a grandeur to which our modern world, with all its manifest gains and advantages, has not yet attained. No single work of human genius that has since been produced—none, perhaps, that has ever been produced—is to be compared in unity and scale and sustained greatness to the Divine Comedy; and Dante's poem is the epic of the Middle Ages, is based upon its system, is coloured throughout by its aspirations, and inspired by its ideals.

III.

The mediæval Empire maintained itself for a time in defiance of the national feeling that was now asserting itself in various parts of Western Europe. But in the end national feeling proved too strong for it, and in the middle of the thirteenth century it ceased to exist as, in any real sense, an international State. Meanwhile, however, the national unity of both Germany and Italy had been sacrificed, and before long the primacy passed to the great national States, like France and Spain and

England, that had been consolidating themselves outside the bounds of the Empire. From one point of view the history of Europe ever since the downfall of the Empire may be regarded as one great revolutionary movement, one prolonged carnival of destruction. To the sublime system of the Middle Ages there had succeeded a chaos of warring nationalities and warring religions, amid which all hope of unity speedily disappeared. The very ideals of the Middle Ages perished or ceased to be intelligible. With the Reformation the Universal Church was shattered into fragments, and it soon began to be forgotten that the Universal Empire had ever claimed to be universal. When the religious wars were ended, and an appearance of stability had been restored, statesmen were content to aim at a mere balance of power, and during the wars of the French Revolution the small vestiges of the mediæval Empire that still remained were finally swept away.

Yet through all the ineradicable desire for unity survived in the minds of men, and from time to time asserted itself, if only by way of futile protest against the excesses of the destructive movement. When the Reformation seemed to be leading through license to anarchy the Spanish Empire of Philip II. came upon the scene, the product in the secular sphere of the same movement of thought that produced the Tridentine Church in the religious, and threatened the civilized world with subjection. And when in a similar manner the French Revolution had shaken the whole edifice of political order to its foundations, the Empire of Napoleon sprang into being—short-lived, indeed, yet a splendid if premature and ill-directed effort towards the attainment of that political unity which is the essence of the Imperial ideal, and of which mankind has never wholly lost sight since the days of Julius Cæsar.

But though in the aspect we have been considering, that is to say as against the mediæval order and the much grander ideals of which it was such a hopelessly inadequate reflection, the six centuries that followed the

downfall of the mediæval Empire may be regarded as destructive, it would be shallow paradox to pretend that they have not, in a far deeper and more vital sense, been constructive. The reality of the Middle Ages fell far short of its idealism; and, though a system of competing nationalities may be inferior in theory to a universal State, it is a great advance in practice on feudal anarchy. While the old order was being overthrown, or its remains being cleared away, the foundations of a new and fairer and more enduring order were being silently prepared. Only in the fulness of time will the new edifice be revealed in its true lines and proportions, but it is beginning now to be possible to discern, as through a mist, the outlines of its structure.

But that we may be better able to comprehend the point at which we stand in the world's history, and to descry the ideals which are to be our guides for the future, let us look more closely at the political changes and activities that have occupied the four or five centuries since the Middle Ages came to an end. They can be summed up, I think, under two great movements: one intensive in its energy and significance, the other extensive; one affecting the internal organization of the State, or of the European system of States, the other concerned rather with the position and influence of Europe in the world at large, both running throughout the period, and between them exhausting nearly all the political significance of this modern time.

IV.

The former movement is in one of its aspects—what we may call, perhaps, the negative or destructive aspect—the great movement of liberation which, beginning as early as the fourteenth century, reached a culminating point in its progress in the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, and yet another in the political revolution of the eighteenth. In its positive or constructive aspect it is the national movement which reached its full

development only in the last century. For our present purpose no attempt need be made to separate these two tendencies into different currents. The rise of nationality and the progress of human enfranchisement may be taken to be but different phases of the same thing, and it is, in fact, impossible to disentangle their history. Nationality has been at once the product and the instrument of the revolution—if we may use the latter word as a name for the whole great movement of revolt against the mediæval order, and not in its conventional sense as the name for one phase of this movement, the political revolution that began in the eighteenth century. With almost equal truth it might be said that the revolution has been at once the product and the instrument of nationality. As we have seen already, the modern nation State is a comparatively new political phenomenon. It is only with the first beginnings of the revolt against the mediæval order that national feeling in its modern sense first appears on the scene. It is only towards the close of the Middle Ages that anything that can really be called a nation begins to emerge; only at the end of the fifteenth century that the newly-formed national Powers distinctly take the lead in Europe, and only much later that national patriotism can be matched against religion as a political force. Indeed, it was only during the nineteenth century, after the storms of the French Revolution had awoke the peoples of Europe to a consciousness of their corporate existence, that the principle of nationality gained that complete ascendancy which has put an end for ever to the dream that one nation State can really absorb another or any essential portion of another.

We are now, accordingly, in a better position to understand the meaning of the national ideal. With the progress of the long revolution it has gone on growing in power and depth and significance. Each step of enfranchisement has increased the facilities for the formation and expression of the national will, and given clearness and intensity to its volitions, till, in its modern form, the

nation State is a moral and intellectual whole, whose unifying principle has something of the force of personality. And, just as the metaphysicians have found that, though personality is one of the least ambiguous of words, its conception defies analysis, so, though we all know what we mean by nationality, none of us can define it. It is enough here to say that, in its completed form, the nation State seems to imply three main requirements. In the first place, a continuous territory, substantial in size, though the size may vary from that of Belgium to that of the United States; secondly, that territory inhabited by a people conscious of a certain common tradition, and a certain moral, social, and intellectual unity, which, in its origin, may be derived mainly from race, from language, or from religion, though nearly always in practice transcending the bounds marked out by any one of these three principles; and, lastly, political unity, embodied in a common Government, a common allegiance, and common institutions. Generally, the common Government has preceded and helped in no small degree to foster the sentiment of nationhood, by which the Government is, in its turn, supported; but occasionally, as in the classic instances of Germany and Italy, the sentiment of nationhood has historically preceded and helped to create the common Government.

V.

Parallel, however, with the process by which Europe has reorganized herself into national States, and with the movement of enfranchisement which has carried us to democracy, another great movement has been in progress, which is rather extensive than intensive in its significance, and which, though it has attracted far less attention than the former, is hardly less important in its bearing on the general political and international conditions of the time, and even more important in its bearing on the phenomenon with which we are primarily

concerned—the British Empire. From the time of the Crusades, or, if you choose to regard the Crusades as religious rather than political in their significance, from the time of Henry the Navigator, Europe has, from small beginnings and, at first, by tentative steps, been overrunning the world: she has been stretching out her hands over the remainder of the globe, and been drawing it under her control or within the orbit of her civilization. In some cases, of which the United States is at once the typical and the most splendid instance, she has planted new nationalities of European origin in what were once waste or thinly-peopled regions of the earth. In others, as in the case of the Russian Empire, she has extended an existing European nationality far beyond the bounds of Europe, In one recent and memorable instance she has, by her influence and example, quickened into vigorous life an old but almost dormant nationality that had long remained stagnant on a lower plane of civilization. Yet, again—and here India is the typical and crowning illustration—where no question of nationality was involved or could for ages arise, she has reduced to a condition of independence an immense population incapable of providing a civilized Government for itself; has established the reign of justice and order, which is the first condition of progress in civilization; supplied the initiative and momentum that could not be found among the governed; and entered on the tremendous task of raising them to her own plane of civilization by an effort which, to be successful, must last for ages.

Now, it might seem that the great change which has come over men's thoughts in the present generation, and which was alluded to in the opening sentences of this paper—the change that was there summed up in the phrase 'the national ideal has given place to the Imperial'—is nothing more than the transference to the movement of expansion of the political interest and attention that had previously been concentrated on the movement of national reorganization. It is that in a

very great degree. In the unification of Germany and Italy the national principle obtained its most signal and dramatic triumphs. Much remains for it, no doubt, to do, but nothing that in interest or importance can rival those achievements; and from the moment that Germany and Italy attained to unity, nationality gradually ceased to be the real dynamic force of European politics. The great European wars of 1859, 1866, and 1870 turned exclusively upon it. The next in order, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, was ambiguous, being partly an affair of the Balkan nationalities, partly an assault by a European Power on an Asiatic Empire. But since then there has been no ambiguity at all. The three great conflicts of the last seven years—the American War with Spain, our own war in South Africa, and the war just concluded between Russia and Japan—have none of them been fought in Europe, and have been wholly concerned with questions of dominion far beyond the bounds of Europe.

It is not, perhaps, an accident that one of the new Powers which owe their existence to the national enthusiasm of the last century should have been a main instrument of the change. No sooner had Germany achieved internal unity than she began to look about in the outside world for fresh fields of activity. The movement of European expansion had by no means been arrested, but it had passed for the time being out of notice; but when Germany threw herself into it, the competition for territory and dominion in the outside world soon became the dominant motive of international politics. The action of Germany led to the scramble for Africa. Asia has succeeded to Africa as the chief field of ambition; all the greater nation States of Europe have joined in the race, and even the United States, the greatest nation of European origin outside the bounds of Europe, has abandoned her traditional policy of isolation, gone outside her natural limits of expansion, and eagerly seized a share of the 'white man's burden.' During the last quarter of a

century the absorption of the unoccupied or weakly-held portions of the earth, and the reduction of the uncivilized or semi-civilized States to a dependent position, have proceeded at such a pace that the end is almost within sight. The partition of Africa is almost complete. Eastern Asia is emerging from the melting-pot, and it is beginning to be possible to foresee the lines on which it will be reconstructed; and it is only in the case of Turkey and the other Mohammedan countries of Western Asia that the future is still wholly dark, and that great conflicts must too probably precede the final solution.

VI.

Now, the Imperialism of the hour is in one sense only the expression of this shifting of interest from the internal problems of Europe to the outward expansion of her influence; and if we are to believe its enemies, who will admit the possibility of no Imperialism but the Imperialism of conquest, it is that in its worst form, and nothing more. But if the Imperial ideal were only an appeal to the lust of conquest, it would not possess the immense attraction it now possesses for the best minds of our generation. It is not the mere glorification of conquest and dominion as compared with internal improvement; it is not the mere preference of power to freedom; it is not the enemy of nationality and liberty. It is not the mere assertion of one of the great principles that have underlain the history of the last five hundred years against the other; it is their combination and fulfilment. In political history, unlike geometry, there are no parallel lines that, being produced, only meet at infinity; and the two great currents which, as we have seen, have flowed through history since the end of the Middle Ages are now joining to form a nobler stream, which may bear us to the promised land of a fairer and larger political order than the world has yet seen.

Taken by itself, the national ideal was limited and

partial. At its best it gave us in the international system only an organized disunion, an ameliorated anarchy; at its worst it tended towards a sort of Chinese isolation. The impulse to expansion, on the other hand, has saved Europe from the stagnancy of isolation; it has brought the civilization she has evolved by a long process of self-discipline within the reach of humanity at large, and has broadened her own horizon till it includes the world in its sweep. This impulse, indeed, has had a certain affinity to the Roman Imperialism of conquest, which, if unchecked, would have led us back to Roman despotism. Yet in their several ways both the expansive impulse and the movement of national enfranchisement have been leading us to a larger atmosphere; both have been preparing our minds for the reception of a broader ideal; both have been clearing the ground for a reconstruction of society on ampler lines than any that were possible in the past. By drawing all classes into a share in the life of the civilized State on the one hand, and drawing all races and countries into the orbit of civilization on the other, they have, at all events, given to the problem of reconstruction a universal statement, and provided us with the broadest foundations for the edifice which future generations will erect. The State is no longer the organ of a privileged few, still less of an intrusive alien element. The system of States is no longer merely European, but cosmopolitan; the field of diplomacy has now become as wide as the world, and problems have acquired a world-wide range and significance.

VII.

Now let us try if we can discover in existing political conditions any germs of the new and more comprehensive order, any faint suggestions of the larger ideal of the future. We see a world practically divided between a few great States—the six so-called great Powers of Europe, the American Republic, and Japan, the Asiatic

Power which has sprung like Pallas Athene in the full panoply of war, and in the full vigour of mature nationality, into the circle of the European nations. We see these eight great Powers endeavouring to group themselves by alliances into a smaller number of systems, so that at the present moment they may be reckoned as four, and not as eight—the United States, England and Japan, the Dual Alliance, and the Triple Alliance. These alliances, though important as indicating a tendency, are too fluctuating perhaps for a serious argument to be based upon them; but if we look more closely we shall see the same tendency to reduction of numbers taking another shape. There are some of these great Powers which as world States are even now great only by convention, and have little chance of maintaining their present rank and position; there are others, again, whose hold on the future is anything but assured; and there are only three great Empire States which, unless they fall to pieces, as we have no reason to expect they will, are, by their population, their resources, and their possibilities of development, secured from the danger of sinking into a secondary place. The three are the British Empire, Russia, and the United States. Time may add to their number. China may awake from her lethargy and take the place beside them to which her population would entitle her, or less probably, if China proves to be not asleep but dead, Japan may become the head of a vast Empire in Eastern Asia, which would add her to the list; Germany, so strong as a national power in Europe, may succeed in winning a place among the world Powers of the future; and in South America a great Latin organization may arise to confront the United States on her own continent. But these things are matters of speculation. The great future awaiting the three world Empires we have named is a matter almost of certainty.

We are trying to discover the germ of a new political organism, to arrive at a new political conception wider

than nationality yet capable of finding a place for nationality, to discern a new political ideal. Now, the very breadth of these Empire States lifts them in a sense above mere nationalism, and gives them a certain universality. In all three there is present, in a greater or less degree, the element of nationality; while, on the other hand, all three owe their present breadth and greatness to the movement of conquest or expansion. Thus in all there is a reflection of both the great political tendencies of the last four or five centuries, though here it is necessary to distinguish. Russia is the one-sided product and expression of the movement of conquest in its most Cæsarian form. She claims to be the heir of Byzantine traditions, and her Empire represents no great advance upon Byzantine Imperialism. She has a certain basis of nationality indeed, but is at best only a nationality in the making; while in her form of government she is a semi-Asiatic despotism, from which there is little probability of mankind being able to draw fresh hopes of progress or new political ideals. In the United States, on the other hand, we can equally see a one-sided product of nationality and democracy. As a nation State on a scale such as the world has never yet beheld, the Great Republic is immensely interesting, and her recent acceptance of a share of the white man's burden is not only interesting in itself, but of immense importance as the recognition of a principle. In practice, however, the share is too small, as compared with the huge and growing mass of the nation itself, to modify in any vital sense the political organism as a whole; and except in scale the United States remains merely a nation State of the older type, supplies us with no new political conception of the kind we are in search of, and contains no suggestion of the new Imperial ideal.

VIII.

There remains the third and last of the three great world States—the British Empire. England has played a leading part in both the great political movements of the last five centuries. She was one of the earliest Powers to stand out before Europe in the full strength of nationality; she anticipated, if she did not inaugurate, the religious revolution; and she not only inaugurated the political revolution, but carried it far on its way to completion. Since the t[illegible]dence of Spain in the seventeenth century, she has also led the movement of expansion, and at times almost monopolized its energy. In the Empire which has grown up around her we shall expect, then, to find the highest product of all these activities; there, if anywhere, we ought to find implicit the Imperial ideal.

At the very outset we meet with a fact of nomenclature that is not without its suggestiveness and promise. The whole vast and complex political system is known to the world as the British Empire, yet we find that one of the political units which compose it is known, and with better legal claims to the title, as the Indian Empire. The latter is a true Empire in the Roman sense; and we are therefore led to suspect that the Imperialism of the larger organization is something higher, more flexible, and more inclusive than Roman Imperialism, and we are not disappointed.

In area and population alike the Empire holds the first place, not only among the political combinations of the world to-day, but also among the political combinations of the world as known to history. That in itself, perhaps, supplies only a base and mechanical claim to greatness. But the fact has more importance when we think of the immeasurable range of interests it implies, of the immeasurable variety of the parts of which the Empire is composed, of the immeasurable complexity of its government and institutions. It includes, besides several free and self-governing nations, a vast and

populous Empire in India, islands in every sea, territory on every continent; among its subjects representatives of every race on the face of the earth, and in its political institutions, in the relations between Government and governed, nearly every mode known to man. This variety alone gives it an unrivalled breadth and spaciousness, and makes it the truly representative State of the modern world, a very microcosm of the world at large.

At the centre, to pursue our examination, we have the nation to whose political genius the Empire owes its existence—a nation renowned, apart from its other achievements, as the parent of free government wherever it exists, and as having carried it in her own case to perhaps its highest pitch of perfection. Yet at the very opposite pole of political development we have in India despotism organized by this same nation with an amplitude and, on the whole, an excellence such as the world has hardly seen before, and providing a shelter from anarchy for hundreds of millions of human beings to whom self-government would be an unthinkable absurdity. Then we have the two great self-governing federations of Canada and Australia, nation States second in possibilities of growth to the United States alone. In the same category there is New Zealand, the island counterpart in the Southern Seas of Britain in the North Atlantic. In another category there is South Africa, the middle term between Canada and India, perplexed by divisions between her two white races, who will one day unite to form a new nationality, and all the sooner because they are only a governing caste surrounded by millions of coloured dependents. Lastly, there are the Crown Colonies, Protectorates, and spheres of influence in every continent, containing the raw materials of many Indias and many Canadas, great and small, and perhaps still more of many South Africas of every intermediate shade between those two extremes.

Now, the most notable fact in this enumeration is the presence, in addition to the parent nation at the centre

of the Empire, of daughter nations at the circumference; and it is this fact above all others that gives a unique interest and character to the strange political organism we are considering. For everything else in the relations between the parts of the Empire we may find perhaps a parallel elsewhere; the existence of a number of national centres and national governments within one political system is an entirely new phenomenon. The younger nations, it is true, if we ignore such minor qualifications as are rendered necessary by the presence of the French-Canadians in Quebec and the Dutch in South Africa, are linked to their parent by ties of blood and speech and moral and social affinity which, though they did not avail in the case of the United States to avert separation, have nevertheless an immense cohesive value and importance. Yet these younger nations have developed or are developing each a true nationality of its own. They are virtually independent in their Governments. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament has lost all practical importance in the present, and does not even appear to contain the germ of any useful development in the future. Their allegiance is not to the parent Parliament, nor even to the parent nation, but to the common throne and Empire in which, indeed, they have a common citizenship of profound significance and value—a significance and value that, with our eyes fixed on the mere machinery of government, we are sometimes too apt to forget.

This Empire, then, is obviously a middle term between the two other great Empire States that are its contemporaries, holding the balance between them, free alike from the exaggerated nationalism of the one and the exaggerated Imperialism of the other. It contains nations in the making, but it is not a nation in the making as a whole, for the welding of the manifold races within its bounds into a homogeneous nationality is as little probable in any time that we need consider as the assimilation of all the races of the world to one uniform type. Thus, by its whole genius, composition,

and character, the Empire is safeguarded from the danger alike of developing national exclusiveness on the one hand, or of degenerating into a Cæsarian despotism on the other. It stands there before us as the living embodiment of a new political conception which transcends nationality without dwarfing or disabling it, which preserves all that is good in it, leaves it all its rights, but makes it subservient to a higher and more comprehensive ideal.

IX.

Will the Empire, however, last? Does it rest on permanent foundations, or is it only a political organism in a certain stage of decomposition? Will the younger nations as they grow to maturity be content to remain within it, or will they ultimately go the way of the American Colonies before them, as was thought to be inevitable a generation ago? Obviously the Empire is in a state of transition, and if it is to endure, its constitution must undergo great modifications. The political ties between the 'five free nations' resolve themselves at present, as we have already seen, into little more than a common throne and a common citizenship; but they have also certain great common interests that must be provided for. They have, in the first place, a common interest in their own defence, and especially in the retention of the command of the sea, and in the safety of their maritime communications. At present, however, the burden of furnishing the fleets by which the command of the sea is held falls almost exclusively upon the shoulders of the Mother Country, and one of the problems before us is how best to enlist the energies and resources of the daughter States in the performance of what should be a common duty. A common policy of defence, moreover, implies a common front towards the outside world, and that, in turn, requires a foreign policy, which, not directed by one of the partners to the exclusion of the others, shall be the reflection of the interests, and the resultant of the influence, of all in their due measure and

proportion. Once more, the free nations of the Empire have all, or if they have not, ought to have, a common interest in the protection and good government of the great dependencies. At present, however, these dependencies, both in Asia and in Africa, are dependencies of the Mother Country alone, and on her shoulders falls practically the whole weight of the white man's burden. Until this burden has become the common duty and privilege of all, until a Canadian or an Australian feels as strongly as an Englishman that his interests and honour are bound up with the security and good government of India, there is obviously a serious flaw in the unity of the Empire.

This is not the place to discuss in detail how these or other such problems should be approached. The hope—nay, the conviction—that they are capable of solution has been growing in the minds of the present generation. The faith that the Empire is not doomed to disintegration, but can be reorganized on permanent lines and preserved to continue its beneficent work for humanity, has become the basis of a new political creed. The vision of a future before it, longer and more glorious than its past, has seized hold of the imagination of men of the British race, and become their main political inspiration. It is in this hope, this faith, this vision, that for Britons the Imperial ideal is embodied; it is in these that it lives again resurgent from the ashes of the past.

X.

There is good reason to believe that the great political movements of the last five centuries have, in spite of the endless struggles and aggressions by which their progress has been accompanied, been gradually working towards a more stable order. The end, indeed, is not yet, but it is less distant, perhaps, than many think. The sharper definition of national boundaries, the extension of European civilization and control to the backward countries of the world,

and the growth of a few vast political systems which begin to overshadow the earth, all tend to reduce the occasions for war, to simplify the problem of maintaining international peace. Now, as Britons who have felt the attraction of the Imperial ideal dimly see, the reconstituted Empire of their dreams would be specially fitted under the new conditions for the office of mediator between the great combinations around it, specially adapted to be the central or regulating State of the world in the coming time. It is here that we begin to perceive a reach of significance in their ideal wider than the merely esoteric, here that we find the connection between the Imperialism of to-day and the Imperialism of Rome in its grander aspects, or the sublime ideals of the Middle Ages. Our Empire could play the part of the Imperator Pacificus for whom the Middle Ages longed, and it could do it, not by holding the nations of the earth in the iron grip of Rome, but while leaving full scope for the free play of the multitudinous forces of humanity in all their legitimate fields of action.

Historically, England has for many centuries played the same part of the regulating Power in the microcosm of Europe. Freed by her isolated position and her interests oversea from the temptation to aggression in Europe on her own account, she has over and over again thrown her weight decisively into the scale against the aggression of any other Power that had grown dangerously strong. Philip II., Louis XIV., and Napoleon, all alike, found England barring the way to a European domination; and it has almost become a tradition in Europe that, when any Power threatens the independence of the others, the weaker States gather round England. A distinguished French journalist, writing in a French paper for the benefit of his countrymen, not long ago described the Englishman as 'the most perfect type of civilized humanity in this twentieth century.' Testimony such as this, if it is used, not to minister to national vanity, but to deepen the sense of national responsibility, need not be ignored; and there

is in truth, with many faults, a certain μεσότης about the English character—in spite of their insularity, a certain Shakespearean breadth about the English people which has peculiarly fitted them for the part they have had to play in Europe in the past, and peculiarly fits them for its continuance under the different conditions of the future. The very things that, up to a certain point, contributed to their insularity, the comparatively isolated course of English history, the national love of the *via media* in politics and religion, the recoil from either of the rival fanaticisms into which our continental neighbours have so often fallen—all these things, corrected by the cosmopolitanism which the growth of a vast Empire has brought with it, have helped to make the English people what they are, in a sense, to-day—the central people of the world. Whether it is owing to the composite character of the English stock itself, or to the political circumstances that have combined English, Irish, Scotch, and Welsh in one national State without entirely fusing them, we seem to have escaped a certain rigidity of political temper and a certain liability to excesses of national Chauvinism, by which more sharply defined nationalities are sometimes afflicted. Even our near kindred, the Americans, are not wholly free from these limitations, and to that extent they have ceased to be the true heirs and upholders of the Shakespearean tradition.

England has been far more successful, however, in communicating her special qualities to the younger nations that still move with her in the same political orbit; and by projecting these qualities into her Empire as a whole she has given it a special fitness for carrying on her own high tradition and fulfilling in a larger sense and on a grander scale the regulating mission she bequeaths to it. Wide and various as the world itself, the British Empire is not likely to employ its collective energies for any merely partial or selfish object. Constituted as it is, or as in any future developments it is likely to be,

it can hardly develop into an engine of aggression. A political system, with four or five different centres of energy, may be strong for purposes of defence; but it is difficult to imagine a policy of aggression that could command the united support of five nations scattered over the world, and all alike devoted to the pursuits of peace. If we look to the special form of military force that they must continue to wield, we are pointed to the same conclusion. With its centre in an island of the sea, and divided into a thousand fragments that communicate only by the sea, the Empire depends essentially upon sea-power; and it is of the very essence of sea-power, above all in these days of steam, to be one and indivisible, and therefore, in the hands of the dominant Power, to be universal. Napoleon, at the height of his military fame, was impotent even on land a thousand miles from his capital. The British Empire, on the other hand, as long as it retains the command of the sea—as long, that is to say, as it exists—can make its presence felt in every quarter of the globe accessible by sea. It holds, in fact, a power whose exercise is in a sense a trust, a power to which every other State in some degree gives hostages, and which is mighty for purposes of defence, but beyond a certain point is impotent for purposes of aggression. If there is to be a regulating State at all in the international system, it is to the State that holds this power that the function must be assigned.

If this reasoning has any force, then the ideal which the British race have placed before them has a certain catholicity, is a truly cosmopolitan ideal—cosmopolitan in the largest and noblest sense. The high hopes, indeed, which the men of our generation have formed may be frustrated. The work of reorganization necessary to fit the Empire for its lofty mission will tax statesmanship to the utmost—the statesmanship not only of leaders, but of peoples—and there is the possibility of failure. There are portents enough to warn us from lapsing into an easy fatalistic optimism—selfishness and parochialism

at the centre, selfishness and parochialism at the extremities of the Empire—

> 'Waverings of every vane with every wind,
> And wordy trucklings to the transient hour.'

Failure, no doubt, would be a great historical catastrophe, but there are, we must remember, catastrophes in history — catastrophes almost unredeemed. It is hard, however, to believe that the long and splendid history of England is to end in purposelessness and disaster; that she has escaped so many dangers to perish miserably of want of faith and courage at the last; that the work of many ages and countless heroes is to be utterly thrown away. Rather will we believe that her work is not yet finished, her mission not yet fulfilled; that all she has yet achieved is but the preparation for the high historic part that still awaits her.

THE CROWN AND THE EMPIRE

By BERNARD HOLLAND, C.B.

The proclamation of the Imperial title at Delhi in 1876, and the Royal celebrations in London in 1887, 1897, and 1902, together with the magnificent ceremonial at Delhi upon the last occasion, are the most striking symbolical manifestations in British history. They were the outward and visible signs of the magnitude and character of the Empire, and of its oneness in connection with the common centre.

In the days of Henry VIII. the King's dominion was confined within the narrow region which lies between the Scottish border and the English Channel, except that beyond the sea there was an English colony round Dublin, and a loose sovereignty over the natives of Ireland not unlike our earlier forms of Protectorates in Africa. Within this narrow sphere the King governed in every sense of the word, appointed and dismissed his Ministers, and was supreme except for the necessity of having sufficient regard for public opinion, or the strongest section of it, acting inside and outside of Parliament. In the days of Edward VII. the responsibility of government rests with a Prime Minister, who virtually holds his place because the temporary majority in the United Kingdom accept him for the chief manager of their affairs. That is the result of English history during the last three centuries. The system may not be the last word in our political life, but it has proved its merits by success. During the

same period the now United Kingdom has become the leading State in the greatest Empire which the world has known. Henry VIII. had fewer millions of subjects than could be counted upon the fingers of one hand. Over four hundred millions in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa, own Edward VII. to be their lord. He is entitled King of all the Britains and Emperor of India. His truest and most all-covering title would be 'British Emperor.' Of this vast population, between fifty and sixty millions live in the home islands or in self-governing States built upon the same model of government. The residue, some three hundred and fifty millions, are governed autocratically—using this word in its correct sense—by Government which, although bound by the laws which itself has made, and although it may, and usually does, take counsel with the governed, does not depend upon their express choice and assent for its existence. Supreme control, in the last resort, rests with the King's Government in London, so that the electorate of the United Kingdom determine by their choice the group of men who not only conduct the internal affairs of that kingdom and manage its forces, but exercise ultimate power over the autocratically ruled part of the Empire.

The King, then, if we compare his position with that in Tudor times, has lost in direct or personal power, but has become the centre point of an Empire of which the area constituting the Tudor's whole domain is, in a geographical sense, but the metropolitan province. In this Empire all power and law proceed in form from the occupant of the throne. It is the English way, as it was the Roman, and as it is that of Nature, to preserve carefully the form of things while the contents change. All legislation in the United Kingdom proceeds in form from the King, and Parliament assents. Monarchy, however much tempered by aristocracy and democracy, is, as it always has been, the essential form of English Government. As Empire has grown, this source of legislation and power has irrigated an increasing

and now vast area. Constitutions or systems of government, themselves local reservoirs of executive and legislative power, have been founded in every part of the globe, and often remodelled and amended, sometimes by Acts passed with assent of the Imperial Parliament, but far more often by Letters Patent and Orders in Council which require no such assent. Newly-annexed peoples are governed by proclamations. At a later stage this embryonic form is replaced by ordinances made by Legislative Councils, themselves established by Royal decree. Everything flows directly or indirectly from the power immanent in the Sovereign. Governors and nominated members of Legislative Councils owe their commissions directly, and officials below them indirectly, to his delegation of power. In all these matters the assent of the King is not absolutely formal. The position has never been accepted that he is a mere 'signing' machine; yet his personal responsibility is disengaged, and precisely for that reason the real greatness of his position has risen.

If Tudor and Stuart Kings had the powers, they also had the cares and labours of Prime Ministers. They needed support in order to carry on government, and were therefore driven to be the leaders of political or religious parties. Charles I. owed his misfortunes to the fact that, in untoward times, he occupied the position of a Prime Minister who was in a permanent minority in the House of Commons, yet could not lay down his office. Now, the Sovereign is above party. If those who hold the reins direct affairs badly, or if, which is more usual, they direct them well but in opposition to erroneous and ill-informed popular feeling, the censure neither of the wise nor of the foolish any longer touches the throne. The monarch, no longer compelled to assert and defend power, can have no object of ambition save the love of his subjects and the good of his country. Should factious violence degrade the tone of politics, the higher by contrast stands that which is above party. The King can speak neither for a majority

nor for a minority; he can and does speak for the nation where it is unanimous, or nearly unanimous, in feeling. Queen Victoria almost created a style for this purpose, combining with singular felicity the personal and the Royal, and she never forgot the Queen in the woman or the woman in the Queen. During her long reign the sphere of the Crown became fully defined. It is easier now to fulfil the character of a 'patriot King' than when it was delineated by Lord Bolingbroke. The part has, as it were, been created by history, and is assumed by the reigning King at his accession. If one side of the King's activity consists of the discharge of official acts whereby the unity, in form, of power throughout the Empire is maintained, on the other side he maintains a unity in personal relations. In touch with statesmen of both parties in England, he insures a certain degree of continuity in the tone of administration; he receives Viceroys and Governors when they leave for their governments or return from them, Colonial Prime Ministers when they are in England, Indian Princes, and great African Chiefs. It is difficult to measure the political value of such receptions by the Sovereign as those given to the chiefs of Bechuanaland, Barotseland, and Abeokuta.

The rise of the British Empire has immensely increased the significance and importance of these functions, formal and personal, of the Crown. This vast aggregation of sea-divided races, religions, languages, degrees of civilization, laws, and customs, does not rest upon those natural foundations upon which States like England, France, or Germany have been built. Force can annex territory or coerce rebellious minorities; it cannot by itself hold together an empire. If a people, or at any rate the great bulk of a people, is descended from the same ancestors, or follows the same religion, or speaks the same language, or is not divided by the sea or by high mountains, it has the something in common upon which a political union may arise. If it has all these conditions, a nation of the

strong kind will be formed. Strong nations arose early in Western Europe because its sea-bounded and well-defined countries were like so many moulds in which raw material could be pressed into shape. The British Empire, regarded as a whole, has none of these bonds of union. There is, indeed, diffused through the world, the race of British breed, settling and colonizing in some lands, ruling and trading in others, and held together by kinship and correspondence and newspapers and literature and societies and sports and temperament. But in lands where it trades and rules, this race is an infinitesimally small part of the population. Where it colonizes it tends to break up, as the British-born grow few in proportion to the colonial-born, into distinct nations, with distinct characters and feelings. Contemporary individuals, as they grow older, grow less like each other, and so do nations. The interest of the Australian in British politics, and even in British sport, becomes dim beside the more vivid interest of the close-at-hand. Churches do something—Anglicans and Wesleyans maintain communications; and there is, indeed, every appearance of the rise of an Imperial Anglican Church, with its centre at Canterbury. Yet no one ecclesiastical organization binds together the British so much as the Orthodox Church holds together the Russian race. A large section of the Christian population of the British Empire—perhaps a fifth—belongs to a Church which has its centre, not in England, but at Rome, and is a bond of union, not between inhabitants of the British Empire, but between sections of all nations, cutting diagonally across every patriotism. Religion is a cause of separation, not of union, between the Christians, Mohammedans, Hindoos, Buddhists, and Pagans, of the Empire. Then, again, the inhabitants of the Empire have but dimly the feeling that they belong to a single political organization. The native of India sees close at hand the great officialdom by which he is directly governed. The free Colonies have their own legislation, ministers, parties, and questions. Increased rapidity of

communication there is, but this rather breeds an illusion of mutual knowledge than creates it, and, indeed, often leads to dangerous misunderstandings.

Nor do these countries form, like Russia or the United States, a continuous whole, so that an unbroken chain of personal acquaintance binds every part to every part. The waters, even narrow seas, divide the peoples, and a wave of emotion often ends where the land meets the sea as truly as a wave of water ends where the sea meets the land. How much was England moved by the Alaska Award, or Canada by the English Education Act?

In some countries a single and centralized military system has done something to weld together a people. In the British Empire there is no true military unity, except as between England and India. The tendency has been in the direction of withdrawing British troops from the Colonies, and a policy of concentration now also governs the disposition of the Royal Navy.

Here, then, is the importance of the Crown. These nations and races, divided by space and civilization, by religion, policy, language, colour, with no common Church or Parliament or Army, are united by the lines of allegiance which converge from every part to the throne. Not otherwise could such an Empire be held together, any more than the Roman Catholic Church, not being founded upon nationality, could exist without its centre at Rome. To the British the King is the far-descended chief of their race; to Asiatics and Africans he appears as lord of their rulers, a remote, mysterious, and mighty being. Millions of British subjects have never heard of Imperial Parliament, or Cabinet, or Prime Minister, but there are none to whom the monarch is not a real, if confusedly apprehended, existence. In his name all the acts of rule in their own lands are done; they see his annual festival honoured with solemn ritual at every centre of administration. He gives an intelligible meaning to government in minds incapable of political abstractions.

Equally important on the other side is the existence of the monarchy as a binding link between the free States or nations which contain the bulk of the white population of the Empire. In the view of the Canadian or Australian the King is his King, but the real power of the 'Imperial Parliament,' whatever it may continue to be in theory, 'ends with the boundary of the watery main.' The Government virtually elected by the people of this country is not his Government, although it still, by consent, conducts some of his external affairs. The United Kingdom is far the oldest and still the richest and most populous of the free States of the Empire, yet it is but one of the States. Forms of action and speech still veil this fact, but as the Colonies grow even these forms are threatened with destruction. The Canadian is better aware of this than we in England are, and he knows also that within fifty years his young and vigorous nation, expanding in its wide territory, may probably equal in numbers and in average wealth the population of the United Kingdom, and in a hundred years will greatly exceed it. An eloquent French-Canadian speaker said lately in the Dominion Parliament: 'Nous sommes des adolescents courants vers l'âge viril. Notre état colonial n'est qu'un acheminement vers une existence plus noble et plus digne d'un grand peuple. Nous serons alors de puissants amis, des alliés devoués de l'ancienne mère patrie, mus par les mêmes sentiments de générosité et de loyauté.' Or, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier said in the same debate: 'The British Empire to-day is composed of nations; it is an aggregation of nations all bearing allegiance to the same Sovereign;' and he went on to say that it differed from previous empires because it rested on free consent.

If this 'allegiance to the same Sovereign,' this bond between each individual and a person, and between the Governments of self-ruling States and a common centre, were taken away, the one universally uniting element would be lost, and these nations would be but allies, and soon, perhaps, not so much as that. But because

this allegiance exists, it is possible to contemplate, even if but as a vision of a far-distant future, the rise of a stronger union, and the development of a true Imperial Government and Council, directly representative of the Empire, occupied in its common affairs, and free from the internal business of the United Kingdom or any other State. The English realm, with all its institutions, arose out of the relation of each unit to the King, and the same centre of union may gradually, and as it were by natural force of attraction, draw into a more perfect confederation the free States of the British Empire.

THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION

By JOHN BUCHAN

No policy of Imperial consolidation can afford to disregard the formal aspect of such a union, which is embodied in questions of constitution and law. For one thing, this law and constitution are for the moment the only overt links of Empire, and as such are the first things which a wider development must reckon with. For another, the forms which accompany growth have an organic relation to that growth. If the banks are too narrow, the stream will overflow; and if they are unduly wide, it will be lost among sands and lagoons. If the Empire is destined to grow into self-conscious unity, it is important to see that our theory is adequate to the facts, and that a false constitutional doctrine embodied in too rigid forms does not set a Procrustean barrier to expansion. The pivot of the Empire is the Crown, and the peculiar interpretation of prerogative which is enshrined in our constitutional law. Our constitution, with its elasticity and generous recognition of local freedom, has alone made the Empire possible. To-day, in the absence of other supports, it is still a stalwart bulwark against disintegration. Our law, again, has either been bodily taken over by the daughter nations, or, through the medium of the ultimate appeal court, embodies and interprets not only the constitutional charters of the Colonies, but several alien legal systems which survive within their borders. Whatever the defects of these controlling agencies, it is impossible

to deny that they are profoundly vital to the present facts of union and to its future ideals.

If the Crown is the pivot in theory, in practice its functions are delegated to the British Cabinet, and indirectly to the British Parliament. The last has two separate aspects: it is a local parliament for the British isles, and an Imperial body acting as trustee for the Empire. This doctrine of trusteeship is historically correct, and it has the merit of exactly covering the existing practice. But obviously the dualism has its drawbacks, since only the first duty is seriously recognised in the election of Parliament, and the growing mass and complexity of the work are apt to give a perfunctory character to the execution of one duty, or the other, or both. An Australian or Canadian attending a debate in the Parliament which ultimately controls his destinies may spend days listening to the discussion of local questions before one Imperial consideration emerges; he may hear men without a suspicion of accurate knowledge pronounce glibly on matters of vast Imperial moment; he may see the Government which defends his shores and dictates to him on many essential questions turned out of office over some matter of English education or Irish land. And who will blame him if he reflects that this is a very negligent and ill-equipped trustee, and that

> 'The glories of our blood and state
> Are shadows, not substantial things,'

when they are so cumbrously directed? If, again, an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council brings him to town, the majesty of the Imperial law will seem poorly recognised in the shabby room up a stair in Downing Street. And the ordinary Englishman, on the other hand, may complain with equal logic that matters of great importance to himself are hurriedly discussed, because the men who were elected to look after them have to give their attention to Indian

frontier defence or South African labour. The home reformer and the overseas Imperialist will tend to be equally dissatisfied with a constitutional doctrine which imposes upon certain old-fashioned machinery a task apparently too complex for its performance.

From these obvious anomalies has sprung the dream of federation—an old dream as Imperial politics go, but still rather a dream than a policy. If it were possible, it would afford the most satisfactory solution for an Empire with strong divergent local interests, and no less insistent common problems; for all schemes of federation provide for complete local autonomy—home rule in its truest sense—and a common legislature and common executive for Imperial affairs. If we may borrow the usual metaphor of writers on federation, there are many centripetal forces at work. The old sentiment of kinship has been revivified by partnership in war, and the course of foreign affairs and the rise of other empires is increasing the sense of mutual dependence. Our people travel further, have wider interests, know more of the life of their relations oversea. Most significant of all, the vision of a united Empire is ceasing to be the perquisite of a few theorists, and is slowly penetrating local politics, so that in some form or other it is becoming, like the monarchy, a presupposition of all parties in the Colonies and at home. But though the leaven is at work, the time for actual union is still far distant. It may be doubted, to begin with, whether the federal ideal is the most suitable for an Empire which contains self-governing Colonies on the one hand, and on the other lands where autonomy is eternally impossible—dependencies which must always be directly administered by the Crown. The problem of our tropical possessions will always raise difficulties in the way of a type of union which in essence belongs to white men and the temperate zones. Again, federation means the creation of a new representative body, either out of the British Parliament, by adding to it colonial representatives, or independent of it, but on analogous lines.

And the main political fact of recent years has been the growing unimportance of representative assemblies, constructed on the old lines, and a tendency to delegate power to the executive, without requiring a constant oversight by an elected body. The tendency has dangers as well as merits, but it is impossible to deny its reality; and in such circumstances it would scarcely be wise to add to existing anomalies by the creation of another impotent legislature. But even granting the value of the federal ideal, we are faced with two potent centrifugal forces—distance in space and disparity in development. Before federation or anything like it is possible, certain conditions must be present. There must be a comparatively uniform development throughout the Empire, the different parts which make the federal units showing a certain level of civic well-being. One State may be richer than another, or may base its wealth on different grounds; but all must have attained to a certain height of self-conscious national life, otherwise they will enter the federation on different terms, and instead of harmony will find abiding discontent. Some speedy means of transit, again, is necessary between the units of so vast an Empire, otherwise the federal machinery will break down from sheer exhaustion. To be compelled to come at the present rate of travel from Vancouver, or Wellington, or Johannesburg, to attend a common council, would strain the loyalty of any statesman. More vital still, the population of the Empire, and notably of Britain, must become more mobile and elastic, shaping their daily interests to accord with the wider conception of patriotism. Till a man sends his son as readily to a post at Melbourne or Ottawa as at Sheffield, till we see a continual coming and going between English and colonial society, till the rich man has his country house or shooting-box as naturally in the Selkirks or on the East African plateau as in Scotland, we shall not see those common interests which are necessary for a common administration. The impulse to federation

exists, but it must be a thousandfold stronger before we can talk about the fact. Unity, in a word, must precede union. For the Empire is an organic growth, and any form we impose upon it must be adequate to its living movement, otherwise, instead of chain-mail, we shall have a strait waistcoat. Supineness is bad, but in this connection it is infinitely less dangerous than haste. The South African Federation Act of 1877 fell still-born, because South Africa was not ripe for any such development. The incident has a moral in connection with any scheme for the federation of the Empire. A rigid system applied prematurely will either be inoperative, and so bring the ideal into discredit, or it will curb and choke the life, and produce monstrosity instead of growth.

But the movement towards unity is there all the same, and conditions are beginning to adapt themselves. Distances grow less yearly, and the insularity of both England and the Colonies becomes daily weaker. The centrifugal forces are slackening, and the centripetal are increasing. It is important to provide channels for the new current to flow in, for though, if it be a real current, it will sooner or later make a course for itself, yet the breaking down of barriers means delay, and involves a waste of energy which might have been better expended. It is an encouraging sign of the times that some of our foremost constitutional lawyers, such as Mr. Haldane and Sir Frederick Pollock, should have devoted much thought to devising methods of constitutional union. We have also taken certain tentative steps in practice. The Defence Committee has power to call colonial members to its deliberations; and, moreover, by cutting into the old autonomy of the Cabinet, it has paved the way for a further reform. More important still is the Conference of Colonial Premiers, which a resolution, passed at the last Conference in 1902, decreed should assemble at least every four years. Colonial contributions to Imperial defence, and the practice of communicating certain treaties to

the Colonial Governments before signature, are instances of the new principle in our administration. All such developments are just and wise, because they proceed naturally from our present practice, and involve no crude departure. As I have said, if we are to retain the merits of an elastic constitution, we must introduce formal changes only when the reality has become adequate to the forms. The time may come for a clear break with the past, but it is not yet; all we need for the present is a development to correspond with new requirements, and capable in itself of a further extension. 'The vice of the phrase "Imperial Federation,"' in Mr. Haldane's words, 'is that it ignores and contradicts the working hypothesis of the Imperial constitution. It is not to some new kind of written constitution, with a new description of common Parliament, that we have to look, but to gradual and cautious changes in the modes in which the Sovereign takes advice.'

It is tolerably clear, then, what any experiment towards constitutional unity must not do. It must involve no break with the past, no new constitutional doctrine, but must adapt the existing theory, which is more than adequate, if properly applied, to cover all the material we are likely to get for a generation. A brand-new Imperial constitution, disregarding the long-descended and delicate organism which we already possess, would be like a harsh chemical suddenly introduced into the system, and would prove a most potent means of dissolution. Nor must we disregard the elements of union we have ready to our hand. Because federation implies home rule, we must not begin by decreeing autonomy to localities which do not need it. To disjoin in order to unite may be metaphysically justifiable, but it is apt to be politically ruinous. It is also fairly clear what we must aim at. Our practice must be squared with our constitutional creed, and the Crown, which is the Imperial Executive, must be given such advisory assistance and such an extension of the area of its delegation as will increase its practical

efficiency. The 'trustee' doctrine of the British Parliament may well be allowed to stand for the present, till facts compel a change. In effect, the self-governing Colonies are even now independent in their legislative powers, and there is no desire in the British Parliament to tamper with their freedom. It is only on the executive side, in the administration of services common to the whole Empire, that the 'trustee' doctrine might break down from sheer inadequacy of knowledge. This danger seems to demand some kind of advisory council as its remedy; but a mere consultative body of colonial statesmen, summoned to act as assessors to the Cabinet on certain questions, is scarcely the true solution. For it is essential that any council should have within itself the capacity for extending its functions when occasion arises; it should contain in its constitution the nucleus of wider powers. It must, therefore, have a share in executive control—a small share, necessarily, for the man who pays the piper calls the tune, and in most Imperial questions Britain, as financially responsible, will have the determining voice. But this state of affairs may change; it is even now in process of change; and any Imperial council should provide for the colonial members the rudiments of a share in the actual executive, which could be increased as the Colonies accepted a larger share in Imperial burdens. Further, it is important, if such a council is ever to grow into a real Parliament of the Empire, to see that the colonial members shall really represent their Colonies. If they are nominated by the Crown, they may be a most competent and valuable element, but they will not be representative. They will be unable to claim any mandate from the people. The advice we take, the share in the executive power we grant, will not be the advice or executive acts of the Colonies, but of a few independent colonial statesmen, whom their countrymen are not unlikely to regard, in Mr. Reeves's phrase, as 'fussy absentees.'

Advisory and executive functions, and a quasi-

representation, seem to be three essentials in any experiment. Till the principle has been generally accepted, detailed schemes are simply a waste of time, but it is worth while to get our minds quite clear on the necessary elements of any plan. From the discussions on the subject in recent years three separate proposals have emerged. The first is for the creation of a permanent Imperial Committee, a Committee of the Privy Council, to which the Crown, in the exercise of its prerogative right, could add such new Privy Councillors from the Colonies as it thought fit. This body would be purely advisory, and would at the same time have under it a permanent Bureau of Imperial Intelligence, which could amass and codify the kind of information in which we are all too deficient. The second is for an enlarged Cabinet, a kind of second Cabinet, for Imperial questions. The Crown can summon whom it will to its Cabinet, and in the old days it used its prerogative in the choice of its advisers. The same power could now be put into force, on the advice of Ministers, to enlarge the Cabinet by the addition of colonial statesmen. Such a body would have both advisory and direct executive powers, and would have the merit of possessing an infinite capacity for development should an altered relationship between the Mother Country and the Colonies make it desirable to separate the two Cabinets. But it would have no representative character, and no chance of acquiring one. This defect is remedied in a third scheme, the periodical Conference of Colonial Premiers. Its drawback is found in the fact that it has no permanent organization, no executive powers, and that it is quite unconnected with our constitutional machinery, a sporadic institution whose effectiveness depends mainly upon accident.

All three schemes are imperfect, but in combination they seem to supplement each other. The most promising nucleus is the Conference of Premiers. For this is, in a true sense, 'representative'—it is the Colonies in person, and of their own initiative, coming to our

councils. Let us assume that such a conference took place every second year. The Premier of a Colony would attend it as representing the party in power for the moment; the Imperial questions which he would be called upon to discuss would already have been submitted, in some form or other, to his people—would possibly have been at issue in the last election, or the subject of debate in his last Parliament. Instead of a 'fussy absentee,' we would have an authoritative exponent of colonial feeling. His 'terms of reference' would be wide enough to permit him to assent on behalf of his people to any Imperial scheme. The conference, on its assembling, would be merged in the Cabinet, who would, for the occasion, hold an Imperial session. As things stand, few Imperial questions are so urgent that they could not be postponed till such a session. The work done would include the devising of schemes of Imperial defence, possibly experiments in commercial federation, and the adjustment of the whole host of minor matters — shipping, copyright, naturalization, marriage laws, admission of aliens, postal arrangements, reciprocity in legal privileges—for which at present there is no workable machinery. At first it would probably have only such executive powers as the British Cabinet could confer upon it, but it would contain within itself the capacity of becoming an executive on a wide basis. Imperial Defence would mean, in time, increased colonial contributions, followed by a voice in the disposition of moneys, and followed, no doubt, in time by the appointment of colonial officials as Imperial executive heads. We cannot reasonably expect such contributions unless the contributors are sure that their own representatives will have a share in the management of them. At first the Imperial Cabinet would be only the British Cabinet with colonial members added for a special purpose; but, as the Empire developed and the centre of gravity changed, the two things would be able to separate, if necessary—the Imperial Cabinet remaining the right hand of the Crown for the

administration of the Empire, and its parent, the old Cabinet, narrowing its functions to the government of these islands.*

Such a scheme would provide a kind of Imperial Executive, unambitious at first, but capable of infinite development. But more is wanted. A background is needed to the episodic Cabinet, and this might be afforded by a permanent Imperial Committee of the Privy Council. It could consist of ex-members of the Imperial Cabinet, and such other Privy Councillors as it might be desirable to add. The body would be wholly consultative, discussing from time to time, between the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet, the same class of questions as would be dealt with there, and giving assistance to the British Cabinet on any matters which might require summary treatment. As a staff to assist the Council in its deliberations, Sir Frederick Pollock's suggestion of a continuous Imperial Commission is most valuable. A permanent Intelligence Department is one of the crying needs of the Empire. Such a body need not be composed only of officials. All who have any expert knowledge, and the desire to use it for Imperial ends, could contribute to the work. It would coordinate itself with other similar agencies, and its secretary would be a sort of permanent head of a new Imperial department.

Our machinery is, therefore, (1) an Imperial Cabinet, consisting, to begin with, of the British Cabinet enlarged by colonial Premiers, and meeting at stated times in an Imperial session; (2) an Imperial Committee of the Privy Council, advisory in its functions, and sitting more or less continuously. This, in turn, would be fed by (3) an Imperial Commission, or Intelligence Department, organized on a broad basis, and directed by a per-

* Such an Imperial Cabinet would, of course, account to the British Parliament, though indirectly, by means of its colonial representatives, it would account also to the colonial legislatures. If legislative federation ever came into being, it would be responsible to the federal legislature.

manent secretary. The proposal is closely akin to one existing organization—the War Office and Admiralty, the Defence Committee, and the Secretary's Department—which promises to work harmoniously enough, though it is that most difficult structure, an old institution shaped into conformity with a new theory.

No scheme, to be sure, is of any value at present, save as a basis for argument; but, if the underlying principle is accepted, it is not beyond the ingenuity of man to work out the details. And the cardinal point is that any constitutional union must proceed on the executive side, and not on the legislative. We must begin humbly with small emendations, waiting to see what new conditions the centripetal forces will create. Provided we have the rudiments from which unity can spring, we may well be content to move slowly, since 'the counsels to which Time hath not been called, Time will not ratify.' The 'trustee' doctrine is sufficient for our present needs, and by the time it is too narrow we shall have got enough material wherewith to fashion a new one. But it is also worth remembering that it is a very hard-worked doctrine, and that it will not always be equal to the strain. It is the part of wisdom, therefore, to lay down in good time the keel of the vessel into which we mean to change; for state-building, like shipbuilding, is a slow matter, and the man who waits without preparation till the end comes is apt to find himself in the water.

'The Crown,' said Coke in *Calvin's Case*, 'is the hieroglyphic of the laws.' If that hieroglyphic is the constitutional foundation-stone of our Empire, those laws which expound it are an integral part of the basis. We in England, accustomed to regard English law as an amorphous historical growth applying only to England and Ireland, are slow to realize the way in which our insular system has spread its roots into the remote places of the globe. Our Colonies took it with them, and in most cases it is their domestic law, amplified by their

own legislation; while in lands such as Canada and South Africa, where other codes were already established, it has absorbed such codes and moulded them by its own principles and canons of interpretation. It has spread its shadow over the old systems of India, and over the customary law of native tribes, until it is possible to-day to say that we have one great Imperial law, though many codes are included within its borders. The secret of this solidarity is the fact that there is in the last resort one appellate court for all. The House of Lords, indeed, is the final court for the British Isles, but for the Empire beyond the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the ultimate appeal. The value of this legal uniformity is beyond estimate. It is open to our self-governing Colonies to relinquish their right of appeal, but they do not want to. For, however English statesmanship may be discounted by them, they have never shown a trace of contempt for English law. Indeed, on more occasions than one, it is the Appeal Court rather than the Cabinet which has been held in respect. Much is due to a succession of judges who showed in their work a breadth of outlook and a grasp of essentials which is not always associated with the legal profession. Men like Lord Cairns and Lord Watson were Imperial statesmen in the truest sense, and though there have been mistakes, no suspicion has ever entered the mind of our Colonies and dependencies as to the unswerving fairness and the complete efficiency of the tribunal. The legality of an order of the King in Council and the title of some Bengali native to land are submitted to the same impartial scrutiny. 'Servatur ubique jus Romanum non ratione imperii, sed rationis imperio.'

The only drawbacks to the tribunal are that it is not complete and that it is externally unimpressive. We have no real Judicial Council of the King, since the House of Lords clings to certain appellate functions usurped far back in English history. Moreover, the House of Lords sits in an historic chamber with all the

pomp and circumstance of a great court, whereas the other tribunal holds its session in the dingiest surroundings that ever belonged to a judicial body. Moreover, since the members of both courts are largely the same, the second is constantly depleted to make up the quorum in the first, and appeals of great importance to India and the Colonies are heard by a weak tribunal. More judges are needed, and some amalgamation of functions. As it stands, the Judicial Committee has the broadest basis of any court in the world. During Mr. Chamberlain's tenure of the Colonial Office the three great colonial units—Canada, South Africa, and Australasia—accepted our offer to send to the Council three representative judges, who sit at the hearing of such cases as specially concern their Colonies. But this is only the beginning. The court is still understaffed, and might profitably be reinforced by further Indian or colonial appointments. Indeed, there is no reason why a colonial lawyer should not regard a seat in the Council as the ultimate object of his ambition, just as the career of a Scottish lawyer culminates naturally in a law peerage. Such a *carrière ouverte aux talents*, combined with the revising powers of a strong court, would keep the colonial and Indian benches at a high level. At the same time, the Judicial Committee should be merged in the House of Lords, and the whole Appellate Court given the prestige of name and environment which at present pertains only to a part. Such an Imperial tribunal need not always sit in full session, for special work might reasonably be delegated to special Committees. But all sittings should be in the House of Lords, and all members of the court have the same status.

How vital a matter is this enlargement and perfection of our great Appeal Court one can only realize by reflecting what the law means to the Empire. Here we have one strong and unquestioned ground of union. We have the rudiments of a common council, and the ability to complete the system without any of the diffi-

culties which attend legislative federation. Moreover, it is the courts which have the power of smoothing over the little roughnesses, and healing the breaches in the fabric of empire. The Scottish feudal tenure and method of construction of wills were harmonized and brought up to date without need of legislation by a long series of decisions in the House of Lords from Mansfield downwards, and certain disruptive elements in the Canadian constitution were counteracted by judgments of the Judicial Committee. To have the power of construing colonial laws and customs is to have the power to guide and restrain—to have, in effect, control of development. New constitutional experiments become safe and normal when interpreted in the last resort by a strong central court. Mistakes can be corrected or ignored, antiquated débris cleared away, laws extended to correspond with changed conditions. And it is all done without noise or advertisement, and therefore without the popular clamour which attends self-conscious change. Such a task is surely worthy to be entrusted to the most splendid and representative court we can create, the more because such splendour and comprehensiveness are factors on which depends its success.

These few notes have been set down not as a new contribution to the question, but as an indication of the kind of solution of the problem to which the country seems to be feeling its way. Happily there are many able workers in the field, and in a little we may look to find English political thought impregnated with similar conceptions, for in our politics an idea must first become a truism before it can hope to be given effect to. It is necessary to steer a delicate course between the two dangers of undue haste and undue apathy. I have said enough, I trust, to show the reality of the first peril. But the second is equally worth remembering. We are changing rapidly both as a nation and as an Empire, and while our present forms do well enough for the

moment, because of their traditional elasticity, they will not last for ever, and the time will come when we must look for others. It is surely the part of wisdom to keep this in mind, and endeavour, while we have yet ample time, to prepare the way for a gradual revision. It is difficult to create armies and navies in the hour of need, and it is no easier to improvise a constitution.

II.—MECHANISM OF EMPIRE

IMPERIAL TRADE

By HENRY BIRCHENOUGH

It is my wish in this article to present, not a commercial conception of Empire, but an Imperial conception of trade, by pointing out some of the facts which show the great part trade is playing in building up and binding together, through the steady growth of common commercial interests, the scattered States of the King's dominions.

There used to be, and perhaps still are, economists and politicians who maintain that trade does not follow the flag, but the price-list. It is possible that in a world of economic automata everyone would resign himself cheerfully to buy only in the cheapest and to sell only in the dearest markets. The British Empire is not, however, composed of economic automata, but of men and women who are influenced in all their business transactions by circumstances and conditions far more numerous and complicated than can be taken into account in any price-list. What strikes one most in studying Imperial trade is that all through its varied activities, its thousand changing forms, it reflects the mind and the character of our race. And if it mirrors Anglo-Saxon human nature, its movements are likely to be as sensitive to prejudice and to sentiment as they are to calculation. Experience confirms this supposition,

for the vitality and progressiveness of our trade are most clearly indicated in those Colonies and possessions which are inhabited by people of our own race, whose habits and prejudices are very like ours, among whom fashions follow the same course, and popular demand is much the same as at home.

Why should commerce be regarded as an exceptional branch of human activity, standing, as it were, in a watertight compartment apart from the rest of life? It is affected, and to a large extent guided, by the same motives, considerations, and feelings as all other forms of human activity. It would, therefore, be a matter for surprise if, when we were dealing with Imperial questions, we did not find Imperial trade show signs of exactly the same movements of opinion and sentiment which we see at work in Imperial politics. There can be little doubt that the deep-lying causes which are bringing the Empire into closer political relations are also slowly driving it in the direction of closer commercial relations. And the reason is not difficult to find. The changes of the last twenty years in the commercial policy of our European neighbours and their new colonial activities have modified our position as Empire-builders and as traders in a closely parallel manner. In each case rivals have come into a field which was almost exclusively our own. In each case they have deprived us of our monopoly, but they have not, so far, succeeded in ousting us from our predominant position. It is probably the consciousness of these facts, the sense that we are face to face with competition, political and commercial, more severe, more far-reaching, more dangerous, than at any previous period, that is impelling us to take more careful stock of our own Empire, its commercial as well as its naval and military possibilities, its commercial as well as its naval and military future.

I am not particularly concerned to prove here how far trade follows or accompanies the flag, but I do wish to show what Imperial trade actually is, and what it is doing, or may be expected to do, for the Empire. In

dealing with this question it is important to arrive at a larger conception of Imperial trade than can be conveyed by any statement of figures, however elaborate and varied such a statement may be. Statistics have their proper use. They should constitute the solid groundwork of our conceptions; they should control and set a definite limit to the play of our imagination. But what it is important to realize and to exhibit clearly, are not the figures which measure trade, but the living, life-giving thing itself, which with a thousand threads knits the Empire together in a solidarity of mutual interests and obligations that an alert and wise policy ought to make indestructible.

It is necessary at the outset to give a few figures in order to convey a definite notion of the magnitude of the external trade of the Empire. In the year 1903—the last for which complete figures are available—the combined imports and exports of the British Empire were valued at £1,520,000,000. These figures, of course, include the trade of the different States of the Empire with each other as well as with foreign countries.

The following table shows approximately the relative contributions to this enormous total:

	£			
The United Kingdom	903,000,000	or 59	per cent.	
Canada and Newfoundland	100,000,000	„ 6½	„	
The Commonwealth of Australia (excluding inter-state trade)	86,000,000	„ 5½		78½
New Zealand	28,000,000	„ 2		
South Africa	83,000,000	„ 5½		
India, Straits Settlements, and Ceylon	293,000,000	„ 19½	„	
West Indies	12,000,000	„ 1	„	21½
Miscellaneous Colonies	14,000,000	„ 1		

Let us examine first of all that portion of our Imperial trade which appeals particularly to us at home, the trade which Great Britain carries on with her Colonies and dependencies.

What is the amount of the trade we do with our

Colonies as compared with the trade we do with the rest of the world? Of all the things we buy from the world rather more than one-fifth comes to us from the Empire, and of all the things of our own manufacture and production we sell to the world, considerably more than one-third goes to the Empire. Taking imports and exports together, the colonial trade represents rather more than one-quarter of our total external trade. Moreover, upon the export side it has grown, and still continues to grow, more rapidly than our trade with foreign countries. Indeed, as has frequently been pointed out, it is the expansion of our exports to colonial markets which has of late years compensated us for the shrinkage in our dealings with European markets. Looking back over a period of years, our colonial trade has developed with remarkable steadiness. Its expansion has not, of course, been uniform, but its fluctuations have been less violent than those of our export trade to foreign countries, and its general tendency has been to consolidate and steady the business of the Mother Country just when it most needed such assistance.

It is certain that this comparatively steady growth of business with markets within the Empire must have added enormously to the prosperity of the manufacturing population of Great Britain during the last half-century.

Looking now at the same imports and exports from the colonial side—

Canada sends 56 per cent. of her total exports to the Mother Country, and receives 25 per cent. of her imports from the Mother Country; that is to say, she does fully 40 per cent. of her total external trade with Great Britain.

Australia sends 50 per cent. of her total exports home, and receives 50 per cent. of her total imports from home; she therefore does half her total external trade with Great Britain.

New Zealand sends 75 per cent. of her exports home, and takes 60 per cent. of her imports from home, so that just two-thirds of her external trade is done with the Mother Country.

South Africa sends 80 per cent. of her exports home, and takes more than 60 per cent. of her imports from home; 70 per cent. of her total trade, therefore, comes to Great Britain.

India and the Straits Settlements send 25 per cent. of their exports home, and receive about 50 per cent. of their imports from home.

The Miscellaneous Colonies do about half their total external trade with the Mother Country.

Taking all the Colonies and possessions together, rather less than half of their total external trade falls directly to the share of Great Britain.

But the Mother Country's share is far from exhausting Imperial trade, for the various States and groups of the Empire carry on a great and increasing trade with each other, and this trade is bringing about an interdependence between different parts of the Empire, which is full of promise and hope for the future. In 1894 intercolonial trade only amounted to 15 per cent. of the total imports and exports of the Colonies and possessions; ten years later, in 1903, it had risen to 20 per cent. Instead of the Mother Country supplying the whole Empire with produce and manufactured goods, one part of the Empire is now directly supplying another. Colony after Colony, with the increase of its population and the development of its resources, is entering into the great industrial competition for the world's trade.

Canada exports largely to Newfoundland, to Australia, to South Africa, to the West Indies, and to British Guiana, and receives imports from British India, Newfoundland, the West Indies, and British Guiana.

Australia and New Zealand every year send more food-stuffs and raw materials to India, Ceylon, South Africa, and Fiji, and receive imports from India, Ceylon, and Hong Kong.

British India exports to the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, Mauritius, Australia, South Africa, Canada, East Africa, Aden, and takes imports from most of them in return.

Already Australia and New Zealand supply the South African demand for frozen meat and butter, and in normal seasons Australia can secure the market for wheat and flour. At no distant date we may look forward to her providing the Eastern possessions of the Empire with most of the commodities they now buy from the foreigner.

There are, moreover, numerous cases where Colonies have wrested back from foreign countries trade that had been captured from Great Britain and temporarily lost to the Empire. In fact, we begin to see the natural and industrial resources of the Colonies contribute to the defence of the trade of the Empire exactly in the manner we all desire that their financial resources should, in course of time, contribute to its naval defence.

In order to add a touch of human interest to these lifeless figures and percentages, let us inquire for a moment of what Imperial exports and imports consist.

Great Britain circulates through the Empire everything which new countries require for their development and protection, and which people in new countries need for their maintenance and comfort—arms and ammunition, machinery and tools of all kinds, railway material, telegraph and electrical appliances, steel-work for construction, bridges, water and gas pipes, ready-made clothing, cottons, woollens, soap and candles, carriages and saddlery, books and pictures, glass and china, household furniture, tinned and preserved provisions in infinite variety, patent medicines, stationery and musical instruments—in fact, all the thousand necessaries and luxuries of civilized life.

In return the Colonies send us all the 'wealth of Ormuz and of Ind,' as well as food-stuffs and raw material for our manufactures.

Canada and Newfoundland send us meat, corn, flour, cheese, bacon and hams, salt-fish, eggs, apples, furs and skins, leather, and timber.

Australia and New Zealand send us wool, gold, corn,

wine, butter, skins, mutton, timber, leather, silver tallow, beef.

South Africa sends us gold, diamonds, feathers, wool, goat's hair, skins, and hides.

India and Ceylon send us wheat, cotton, silk, indigo, gums, hides, jute, rice, timber, seeds, tea, coffee, gold, and precious stones.

For the *Miscellaneous Colonies* one would need to offer some such list as the Old Testament gives of the treasures which were poured into the lap of Solomon during the brief period of Israel's prosperity.

Imperial trade is, however, something far wider, far larger than all these movements of exports and imports, these operations of barter and exchange. The British Colonies and possessions not only depend upon the Mother Country for the supply of their industrial wants, they also lean upon her financially, and look to her for the provision of capital for all their great public and private undertakings; and capital is as vitally necessary for the development of new countries as are men and women.

Great Britain is the banker and financial agent of most of her Colonies and possessions. They are bound to her by financial obligations and the daily need of financial facilities. All their public loans are floated, and most of their large private enterprises are financed, in London. The whole fabric of colonial external trade rests upon London as its financial base. In an Empire such as ours London may be compared to the heart. She pumps the life-giving stream of capital through a thousand arteries to every limb of the Imperial body. Great Britain is not only a great trader but the greatest money-lender in the world. And, as is the case with smaller money-lenders, her clients generally take their loans partly in cash and partly in goods. For instance, if a colonial Government borrows in London for any great public works, or if a company raises capital for any large enterprise, a portion of the loan goes out to the Colony in the form of the materials and machinery which are necessary for the execution of such work; it

may be in locomotives, railway plant, steel-work, mining machinery, water-pipes, or electrical equipment. This brings home to our minds the true Imperial meaning of many exports which seem dull and lifeless when grouped in lists and valued in pounds, shillings, and pence. Here we see they are the things which make life possible in new countries; they are the visible signs and accompaniments of Imperial expansion. In a thousand ways they are imparting new life to an Empire which covers one quarter of the earth's surface. We call them loans from England to Greater Britain, and are sometimes alarmed at the great debts the Colonies have piled up during the last fifty years. And yet this is the branch of Imperial trade of which we have, perhaps, the best right to be proud; for debts such as these are not like the old-world national debts—the outcome of destructive wars—they have left the Colonies something tangible and solid to show for them, thousands of miles of railway, deepened harbours, roads and bridges, waterworks, Government offices, courts of justice, schools, libraries, universities, museums, lighthouses, and innumerable other public, municipal, and private works. In the words of a colonial statesman, 'They are a solid investment of capital applied to eminently reproductive purposes, yielding not only in most cases a substantial monetary return in the shape of interest actually earned, but yielding also, in a measure that cannot be expressed by figures, benefits of incomparable value to the Empire at large.'

Enough has been said to show the power which Great Britain's possession of vast loanable capital has given her in the work of Empire-building. In the modern world, with its large affairs, its immense undertakings, finance often plays a decisive part. What is above all to be desired is that British finance should always go hand-in-hand with British industry, that the one should consciously support the other, and both should, as far as possible, be guided in the interests of a great Imperial trade policy. Probably

no material ties are stronger to bind the scattered States of the Empire together than the close financial relations existing between the Colonies and the Metropolis. It was largely due to financial considerations that, until quite lately, all colonial produce came to England for distribution to the rest of the world; it is financial dependence in many cases which keeps the Colonies our customers in spite of temptations from our foreign competitors; while on the side of the Mother Country widespread investments in colonial securities, public and private, associate the interests of thousands—and indirectly of millions—of people at home with Imperial stability, to whom it might otherwise be a phrase, or, at most, an aspiration. By all means let us value every tie of sentiment, and cherish to the utmost moral as distinct from material ideals of Empire; but if these can be fortified by common interests and mutual obligations, we shall not fail to strengthen, and perhaps make indestructible, the bond that unites us.

So far only the centripetal aspects of Imperial Trade have been dealt with. The picture would not be complete if some of the centrifugal tendencies, which undoubtedly exist, were not briefly indicated.

At one time the colonial markets were almost entirely supplied from home, even foreign goods finding their way to them through London, and in return practically the whole of the produce of the Colonies came to the ports of the Mother Country. In recent years a change has taken place. Our foreign competitors have made a resolute attack upon the markets of the Empire, and have succeeded not only in supplying a large share of their wants, but in obtaining directly an increased proportion of their produce. During the last ten years the imports into our Colonies and possessions from foreign countries have increased by 125 per cent., while British imports have only increased by 75 per cent. In the case of exports from the Colonies, those to foreign countries have increased by 85 per cent. against only 35 per cent. of an increase to the United Kingdom. All

the figures are large, so that the usual criticism as to increase of mere percentages is not applicable.

What are the causes or reasons which explain the progress of our rivals, and in what manner can they be met?

In the first place, the scattered character of the Empire in itself exposes our trade peculiarly to foreign competition. The geographical proximity of highly industrial countries to parts of the Empire gives them great material advantages, and by this fact alone makes them most formidable rivals for the trade of the Colonies they are near. Thus the United States have quite naturally obtained a large share of the trade of Canada, Newfoundland, and the West Indies, while Japan will in the future play a rôle of increasing importance in the trade of our Eastern possessions. There is, indeed, a kind of law of gravitation which tends to cause distant Colonies to revolve in the industrial orbit of the nearest great commercial community rather than in that of the Mother Country. Obviously, we cannot hope to deprive our rivals of these geographical advantages; we can only endeavour to create counter-attractions in order to keep such Colonies within our own trade system.

There are, however, several foreign countries which, quite apart from any natural advantages, have shown themselves most dangerous competitors even in those Colonies where we meet them on equal terms, or where the advantage is all on our side.

So much publicity has been given to the alleged superiority of foreign methods of conducting and pushing trade that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to the indictment here. We have been told almost *ad nauseam* of the activity, alertness, and adaptiveness of the Americans and of the irrepressible enterprise of the ubiquitous German. I believe that all the public attention which has of late been directed to foreign competition, and even the somewhat exaggerated alarm which it has excited, are extremely salutary, and must have the effect of arousing us from any apathy into which we may have

fallen. Traders are at last beginning to learn the lesson, even if politicians are not, that a system which is adequate when you have the field to yourself is entirely inadequate when you are face to face with rivals; that, in a word, the methods of monopoly are not the methods of competition.

To this end the study of German methods and German policy is perhaps more likely to prove immediately fruitful than the study of American methods, although of the two nations America is by far the more formidable rival in Imperial trade. It is impossible to withhold our admiration from Germany for the thoroughness with which she has prepared herself for her industrial career. She has neglected nothing to insure success. At home she trains physically, intellectually, and morally her whole working population. She provides, indeed, for them an education which excites the admiration and almost the dismay of foreign observers. She protects her manufacturers in their own markets so that they may be able to submit to sacrifice in foreign markets. She subsidizes lines of steamers to carry German exports cheaply and directly, and authorizes her State railways to make special, and often nominal, rates of freight for oversea trade. Her whole public policy is deliberately directed towards the encouragement and extension of foreign trade.

Another danger that lies in wait for Imperial trade is the continuous extension of direct shipping services between foreign countries and the Colonies and India. The growth of trade between Germany and Australia, South Africa, East Africa, and the Indies is largely due to the regular services which have been established between German and colonial ports, supported as they are partly by direct bounties and still more by indirect bounties skilfully engineered through the State railways. One has only to see the rapid increase of foreign tonnage entered and cleared from colonial ports to realize what a vigorous assault is being made upon England's position as distributor of colonial produce to the rest of the

world. And this extension of foreign shipping is certain to go on and even to become more accentuated. The vital importance of sea-power is only now being realized by the great nations of the world; just as last century witnessed the competition of land armaments, so this century will certainly see the rivalry of great navies. Sea-power, to be secure, must rest upon a large mercantile marine, so that, whatever be the cost, the growth of merchant shipping must be fostered by any country which looks forward to a great political and industrial future. France, Germany, and Japan realize this, as is shown by the various forms of subsidies which they grant. Russia and the United States have awakened to it, and in order to encourage shipping have confined their coasting trade to their own ships, even to the point of interpreting a coasting voyage as extending from Riga to Vladivostok, or from Boston to San Francisco or the Philippines.

A further very obvious and very real danger to Imperial trade arises from the similarity of the fiscal systems of the self-governing Colonies to those of foreign countries, and their dissimilarity from that of the Mother Country. The larger States, such as Canada and Australia, are in a position, and will in the future be increasingly tempted, to make reciprocity treaties with foreign countries, which may prove as injurious to inter-Imperial trade as they are certain to prove dangerous to Imperial unity.

What are the means by which these centrifugal tendencies can be neutralized, if not actually annulled?

We have seen that they involve questions of personal or commercial fitness, of geographical position, and of divergence of fiscal policy.

If we are to retain our position in the trade of our own Empire—not to speak of the trade of the world—we must take a leaf out of the book of our most successful competitors. The wonderful industrial progress of Germany during the past twenty-five years is by common consent in great part due to the admirable

ladder of education she has constructed for her whole people. Those who have most carefully studied the German educational system, physical as well as intellectual, while fully acknowledging its drawbacks and its imperfections, are most impressed—it might almost be said are most depressed—by its marked superiority over our English system, if system it can be called. No doubt much is being done for secondary, for technical, and for commercial education in England; but, in spite of efforts for which we are all grateful, we are still at an enormous disadvantage as compared with Germany, America, and even with France and Switzerland. It is however, no use copying German or American methods unless we can acquire the spirit which underlies them. It has been said of the Americans that they are taught from their earliest years that whatever is being done can, and ought to be, better done. That is the attitude of mind which makes a people efficient and progressive.

What we are wanting in is not so much the actual instruments of education as the zeal and determination which in other countries are making such instruments effective. There is already an Imperial patriotism which rallies men to the ranks in defence of the Empire; there should be a like patriotism which would fill our schools now that danger threatens Imperial trade.

In saying this I have no desire to attach exclusive importance to education as a preparation for trade. Other elements count for much in the commercial success of a nation—natural aptitudes, inherited predispositions, and most of all, national character. The political and commercial fabric of the British Empire was built up by men and women who had to depend on character and not on book-learning to guide them. But, when all is said, it remains true that in these days of fierce international competition, no people, whatever its natural gifts may be, can afford to neglect systematic professional training.

From this point of view educational training in all its

branches becomes one of the determining factors in the future of Imperial trade.

Then it is of paramount importance not only to trade, but to the whole future of the Empire, that we should improve all means of communication necessary to develop and facilitate transport from one part of the Empire to another. We noted in passing the tendency of distant Colonies to gravitate towards the nearest great industrial community, and it is easy to see how dangerous this tendency might become to Imperial trade, and even to the Imperial connection, if it were left unchecked. One of the ways to meet it is to reduce the distance that separates us from our Colonies by shortening the time of transit between us. The problem before us in the immediate future is to annihilate distance, to bring it about that produce can be poured from distant possessions into the home markets, and *vice versâ*, along the great Imperial trade-routes more easily and more rapidly than into markets that lie geographically thousands of miles nearer to them. Every time the period of transit is shortened even by a few hours the field of trade is widened. Something can be brought or sent which the few hours of delay, with its risks of deterioration in transit, made it not worth while to send before. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of communications to Imperial trade. The best hopes for the future lie in the development of direct telegraphic cables, great linking lines of railway, and, most of all, regular services of steamships between the different States of the Empire.

Sea communications, of course, stand upon a different footing from any others. Their maintenance and extension are absolutely vital. Attention has been called to the benefits which immediately accrued to both the export and import trade of Germany through the establishment of regular services of steamers between German and British colonial ports, and certain causes have been indicated for the probable rapid growth of

foreign shipping in the immediate future. Those causes are not so much economic as political. No modern State is in future likely to leave the development of its mercantile marine to the free and unaided play of economic forces. We did not do so ourselves, for our marine was fostered and built up under the *régime* of the Navigation Laws. In view of a situation which is changing under our very eyes, we shall, sooner or later, be compelled to adopt a definite policy with regard to shipping. In the interest not merely of Imperial trade, but of the Empire itself, we cannot continue much longer to leave the maintenance of our supremacy in shipping to the free play of purely economic forces. The most ardent advocate of *laissez faire* would admit that, situated as we are, shipping must always be considered and treated as a vital Imperial interest, and not as a private industry. The reservation of the coasting trade of the Empire to British ships is a weapon we can in extremity forge and make powerful use of by agreement with the self-governing Colonies. A short time ago Sir George Sydenham Clarke suggested the imposition of a small revenue duty upon all foreign imports entering the Empire, the proceeds of which would be used for subsidizing and developing means of communication within the Empire, and such a proposal is worthy of serious consideration. The direction, however, which State interference will take must depend upon the character of the competition we have eventually to meet.

While these are some of the main lines upon which centrifugal forces may be counteracted, in a lesser sphere much may be done to consolidate and simplify the conditions of Imperial trade by identical legislation and uniform administrative practice with regard to patents, trade-marks, bills of exchange, company law, bankruptcy, merchandise marks, and many other kindred questions.

Another suggestion of great importance is the formation of an Imperial bureau of commercial intelligence, which would bring into a common stock, and

place at the disposal of all the sister States of the Empire, practical information as to their respective industrial conditions and commercial requirements.

I have endeavoured throughout this article to indicate briefly the part trade is playing in the evolution of a united Empire. Attention has been called to the steady growth of common obligations, to the close dependence—largely, but not wholly, financial—of most of the Colonies upon the Mother Country, to the vast fabric of reciprocal interests which not only unite the Colonies to the Mother Country, but are binding them with increasing strength to each other. The old simple trade relationship of Mother Country and Colonies, in which the one supplied practically all requirements of manufactured goods and the other paid for them in raw materials, has passed away, and has been replaced by something far more highly organized and complicated. One by one the great Colonies are ceasing to be dependents, and are taking their places as allies of the Mother Country in the struggle for the world's trade, bringing to her aid all the wealth of their natural and developed resources. It is clear that in the variety of its commercial activities, in the multiplicity and abundance of its products, the British Empire is rapidly becoming a self-sufficing commercial State.

Is it destined to fulfil its great possibilities? Will the elements of solidarity or of separation prove the stronger? The answer, in my opinion, rests with us. The forces which tend to divide us can, with care and forethought, be weakened, while those which draw us together can be increased in strength. Political and commercial influences act and react upon each other. As was said earlier, all the deep-lying causes which are drawing the Empire into more intimate political relations are also bringing it into closer commercial relations, and *vice versâ*. We actually see the political concentration of the Empire taking place before our eyes in the gradual federation of the great groups of self-governing Colonies. The North American Colonies are already merged in

the Dominion of Canada; the Australian Colonies constitute a united Commonwealth; at no very distant date South Africa will be a federated State from the Zambesi to the Cape. It cannot be questioned that this political concentration will facilitate, if it does not actually bring about, a corresponding commercial *rapprochement* throughout the Empire.

The chief immediate difficulty lies in the fact that the different States of the Empire have no common fiscal policy, and that differences of opinion, of practice, and of revenue requirements make the adoption of any such common policy seem well-nigh impossible.

The problem of 'preference' is undoubtedly extremely complicated. Nothing is to be gained by refusing to recognise its difficulties, the large concession of principle at the outset, the delicate adjustment of interests, the thorny questions which might arise in the early days of its application. It is not my business to discuss them here. I cannot, however, admit that, where the interests at stake are so vital, where the actual circumstances are so favourable, where the ideal is in itself so fine, a satisfactory solution is beyond either the courage or the political gifts of our race.

THE MAINTENANCE OF EMPIRE:

A Study in the Economics of Power

By J. L. GARVIN

'Lords and Commons of England, consider what Nation it is whereof ye are and whereof ye are the governors: a Nation not slow and dull, but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit, acute to invent, subtle and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to. . . .'—Milton's *Areopagitica.*

'*Le Revenu c'est l'État.*'

I.

Will the Empire which is celebrating one centenary of Trafalgar survive for the next? It is a searching question, and, despite the narcotic optimism which is the fashion of the hour, national instinct recognises that the answer is no foregone affirmative. In the opinion of nearly all foreign observers, and of some sincere thinkers of our own, the British political system represents an extent and magnificence of dominion beyond the natural, and unlikely to be permanent. To consider what it embraces and implies is to restate those commonplaces of our politics daily repeated which remain above the grasp of imagination. It comprises a fourth part of the habitable globe and almost a third of the estimated numbers of mankind. Its existence implies even more than this, for it depends upon the control of all the sea communications of the world and the possession of a naval superiority, as generations

of continental critics have reminded us, which is nothing less than the dream of universal monarchy realized on one element. Were that Empire not already in being it would be impossible, under present conditions of international policy, for any conceivable Power to create it.

We acquired what we have when the whole energies of one insular people alone were free to concentrate upon the 'sea-affair' and to overbear the partial and irregular energies directed towards the same object by a single rival—France. France was distracted and exhausted on land by her secular conflict with the German races; and when accounted for at sea, all political danger and commercial opposition in the colonial world was at an end. The Continent was convulsed by religious, dynastic, revolutionary, and national conflicts in every alternate generation from the Thirty Years' War to Sedan, and incapable of full commercial development before the introduction of steam and the invention of railways. In Europe at that time all real maritime rivalry was extinguished, and no strong economic competition could arise. And beyond Europe existed neither one nor other. America was unploughed and Asia dormant. We settled at will, annexed to our liking, and were everywhere unassailable. These conditions alone enabled an island people pre-eminent in vigour but not in numbers to engross so large a portion of the territory and trade of the world. But England in turn did more than all other countries together to change the conditions under which her dominion and commerce were impregnable. Whether that fact will rank among the moral triumphs or the supreme ironies of history the future will record. We invented machine-industry and steam-communication; the Stockton and Darlington Railway was the 'short model' of the trans-Siberian; before the War of Independence, and indirectly even afterwards, our sea-power sheltered, as our later economic policy nourished, the growth of the United States; British capital went far to provide

both hemispheres with the modern apparatus of production and transport; we were the original creators of that technical spirit of Western civilization which has resulted in the awakening of Japan.

Whether an Empire which could only have reached its present extent under political and commercial conditions that have passed away can be maintained under the conditions now prevailing—this is the large question of our national policy. That question governs more or less every other domestic and external issue. It raises a problem admitted at the outset to be at least equal in magnitude and difficulty to any task ever yet presented to constructive statesmanship. Opinion, even amongst ourselves, is not unanimous in believing that a solution can be found. Foreign judgment, until recently, was almost wholly adverse, nor is this scepticism altogether prompted by hostility to the ideal of British Federation. Let us state the main elements of the problems in moderate terms.

The difficulties most usually dwelt upon are, as a rule, exaggerated. What we may call the mechanical difficulty—distance between the Mother Country and the greatest of her Colonies and possessions—remains considerable, but it is the least serious impediment. Objections as to the infinitely heterogeneous character of the races of the Empire are rather abstract than substantial. Practically that aspect of the problem, confused as it appears at first glance, narrows down to the large and complex, but after all limited and definite, business of reconciling the interests of the Mother Country with those of the three great self-governing colonial groups and of India. To extend any arrangement effected between these main portions of the Empire to the various minor portions would be an interesting but secondary and perfectly manageable question. The real difficulties, then, which must be surmounted if the Empire is to be consolidated and held, are questions of man-power and money-power, questions of defence and trade. The more thought-

fully the subject is examined upon this side, the more clearly will it appear, in the present writer's judgment, that the economic factor in its reaction upon every other factor of the Imperial problem must prove decisive.

II.

The security of the King's dominions would be best based upon the power of a white population, proportionate in numbers, vigour, and cohesion to the vast territories which the British democracies in the Mother Country and the Colonies control. That surest of all guarantees is obviously lacking. Although we hold a quarter of the world, we are not more numerous than Americans or Germans, and we cannot safely believe we are more efficient. At the present moment, the white populations of the three great countries competing for trade and sea-power compare as follows: the United States, about 73,000,000*; that of Germany, nearly 61,000,000; and that of the British Empire, not more than 54,000,000. These are remarkable figures as they stand. To any thoughtful mind they must appear disquieting figures. But they by no means express the whole force of the case.

The colossal burthen of British sea-power rests exclusively upon the shoulders of the British democracy at home. Sea-power has become fundamentally a question of finance in an epoch when Germans, Americans and Japanese can build and manage battleships as well as ourselves (for we can base no policy upon presuming the contrary). Every witness competent to speak for colonial opinion agrees that without a radical alteration of our economic policy we can never hope to secure an Imperial Federation for defence purposes. Canada and Australia will not contribute to a naval expenditure which, for all the purposes of war and peace, would give precisely the same protection to

* Excluding negroes, who number another 10,000,000, and ought, perhaps, to be more properly reckoned as an integral part of the productive force of the Republic.

food-supplies and raw material from the United States and Argentina as to those from the Dominion and the Commonwealth. War is an occasional episode in the life of nations. Commerce is its constant element. At present Canada gains nothing from the navy that is not gained also by a competitive agricultural country like Argentina, developing by the use of the British market almost equally fast. If the Colonies are to enter into a fast partnership with regard to the navy, they will require a commercial as well as a strategical inducement. Thus the finance of sea-power under the existing fiscal system—and the probable bearing upon Imperial defence of an alteration of that system will be considered later—must continue to be supported by the population of the Mother Country only. English trade, still taxed through the National Debt for the past struggles by which the Empire was won, as well as for the fleet which retains it, enjoys—apart from the preference movement as already applied—no advantage in the Colonies and India that American and German trade does not enjoy. This is a case of special taxation without special advantage where the most austere of the classical economists might consistently have supported a policy of preferential tariffs as a practical measure.

Meanwhile, however, we must consider the conditions not as they may be or ought to be, but as they are. For all vital purposes of the competition for trade and sea-power we have but a population of 43,000,000 in the Mother Country, as compared with one of 61,000,000 in Germany and about 83,000,000 in the United States. But the Kaiser's subjects increase more than twice as fast as ours; the population under the American flag grows more than three times as rapidly. The stream of emigration flows towards the Republic in broadening rather than diminishing volume, and even in Germany the rate of acceleration in numbers is increasing. In a dozen years from now—how swiftly such a period passes in politics we know—the United States will have a population of 100,000,000; that of the German Empire will

be over 70,000,000 (no conceivable emigration or reduction of the birth-rate will much abate that figure); and the population of these islands cannot be expected to exceed at the outside 48,000,000. It is already late in the day for any attempt to redress the balance, and we do not realize how decisively the scales are turning against us. President Roosevelt and Congress are spending upon the fleet with both hands. Germany's National Debt is but a fraction of ours,* and her army costs no more; the increase in her wealth and productive power more than keeps pace with the growth of her population; and every augmentation of her resources will now go to strengthen the navy. It is a perfectly fair and well-reasoned calculation on the part of Americans and Germans alike, that when the former, in another ten or twelve years, have 100,000,000 of inhabitants and the latter over 70,000,000 (against only 48,000,000 or less in the British Islands), an overshadowing preponderance in numbers and industrial strength will enable each of these Powers, however comparing with each other, to support a larger navy than we shall be able to afford. Our sea-supremacy, and inevitably with it our present

* An article in the *National Review* recently gave the following figures, which seems to stand investigation:

	England.	Germany.	France.	United States.
Population -	43,000,000	61,000,000	39,000,000	83,000,000
	Million £	Million £	Million £	Million £
Debt charge -	27·0	5·2	48·8	4·8 28·0[1]
Army - -	29·4	28·9	27·1	24·0
Navy - -	36·9	11·7	12·7	24·0
	93·3	45·8	88·6	80·8

[1] Pensions.

Imperial position, would pass away before the end of another generation under conditions of peace and by the natural operation of economic and social forces.* Unless the Mother Country and the Colonies can unite their energies at no distant period and help each other to develop their resources, there is unfortunately little likelihood of any flaw being found in this argument. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, speaking as an orthodox economist, and with unrivalled authority as an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, has recently warned us that it will be absolutely impossible for the Mother Country to sustain alone the future burthen of Imperial defence. The opinion of observers like Mr. Leonard Courtney, that 'our supremacy must pass away,' is determined by the same considerations. The general disbelief of foreign observers in the permanence of the British Empire rests upon like reasons. They still agree with Turgot that 'Colonies are fruits which cling till they ripen'; and anticipate in our case, after the dropping of the fruit, the decay of the tree. Even a not unfriendly observer like the German economist, Professor Fuchs, of Freiburg, whose exceedingly far-sighted book† anticipated many of the commercial arguments for fiscal reform so far back as 1893, writes in the special preface to the recent English translation of his work: 'The statesman of whom I spoke twelve years ago seems to have come at last. The future must show whether it is not already too late.' It is a pregnant reflection when we remember the immense extent of relative ground we have lost in the intervening period.

It will be objected at once that numbers are not everything. They are not everything. But they are

* Germany is already spending upon her navy as much as we spent in any year up to Queen Victoria's first Jubilee; the United States naval estimates are already as large as ours were in any year up to the outbreak of the Boer War.

† 'Die Handelspolitik Englands under seiner Kolonien,' von Dr. Carl Johannes Fuchs ('Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik,' Leipzig, 1893).

much, and, other things being equal, they are decisive. There has never been a greater example of moral force than that given by Japan in the late war. But our allies needed also the whole of their local superiority in material force upon both elements. They realized as well as Napoleon the value of the 'big battalions,' and as well as Nelson that 'only numbers can annihilate.'

Those who find sufficient encouragement in the reflection that numbers are not everything are usually influenced by mistaken impressions of the successful struggle of this country against the power of Napoleon. Then we had only half the population of France. But we at that time owed to machine industry (multiplying our numbers for economic purposes) an unparalleled productive force. We paid to raise against France the allied armies of the rest of Europe, and Napoleon was in the long run beaten by numbers, nor could have been beaten otherwise. Again, while Europe was passing through the political revolution, we were passing through the industrial revolution. With a monopoly of machine-power and a monopoly of the sea, wealth and trade were increased faster in this country than in all the rest of the world put together. As an island we can have no similar compensation in the future. In the United States and Germany money-power now increases as man-power increases.

III.

Leaving aside every issue of economic controversy for the moment, and pursuing our investigation into the state of the facts, let us endeavour to acquire at the outset a clear view of the commercial progress of Great Britain and its principal competitors. For this purpose I have constructed from the official statistical publications of the countries concerned* a table exhibiting the com-

* 'Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom'; 'Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsch Reich'; 'Statistique Générale de la France'; 'Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom,' 1904; Inquiry Blue-books, Cd. 1761 and 2337.

parative exports of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the United States during the last twenty-five years. The figures are arranged in accordance with the wishes expressed by Free Traders at the opening of the fiscal controversy. No single year is taken as a point of departure. To avoid all disputes as to the significance of 1872 and the exceptional character, as it is contended, of the inflation and reaction following the Franco-German War, the seventies are altogether excluded. No attempt is made—for the present—to go below the surface of the totals, to distinguish coal from manufacture, or to examine the morphology of the trade. New ships are included, and the figures are made up in quinquennial averages. Every concession being made that Free Trade statisticians can demand, the result appears as follows :*

COMPARATIVE EXPORTS OF THE FOUR PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL COUNTRIES DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY, 1880-1904.

	Average, 1880-84.	Average, 1885-89.	Average, 1890-94.	Average, 1895-99.	Average, 1900-04.	Increase, Per Cent.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	
England ...	234·3	226·2	234·4	239·6	289·2	23
Germany ...	155·4	153·5	155·1	184·4	239·6	54
France ...	138·3	132·3	136·8	144·3	168·8	22
United States	165·4	146·2	184·7	212·6	292·3	76

We shall have to make further reference to this table; but it is at least clear, when the figures are arranged for

* NOTE UPON THE TRADE RETURNS FOR 1905.—The latest figures would make no material change in these calculations. For the nine months ending September 30, 1905, British exports were no less than £21,000,000 higher than in the previous year. (1) This amount *averaged* makes little difference to the percentage; (2) the great bulk of the increase this year has been with the neutral markets, especially China and Japan, and affects no argument as to the state of our relations with the 'chief protected countries.'

Free Traders with scrupulous fairness in a light the most favourable to their case, that the exports of all our principal and protected competitors are increasing even more rapidly than their population increases. France has an almost stationary population, but, even upon the surface of the figures, her exports show a vitality equal to ours. When we remember that the British returns for the last quinquennium include new ships, not previously reckoned, it becomes obvious that our rate of growth is the lowest in the list.

The detailed statistics for the last lustrum only are instructive, and will perhaps satisfy Mr. Chamberlain's opponents that the most recent movements of British commerce are not so much in their favour as they suppose:

EXPORTS OF THE FOUR PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL COUNTRIES DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, 1900-1904.

	1900.	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.	Increase Per Cent., 1904 over 1900.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	
United Kingdom ...	291·2	280·0	283·4	290·8	300·7	3
Germany ...	230·5	221·5	233·9	250·7	261·2	13
France ...	164·3	160·5	170·1	170·1	179·0	9
United States	285·6	304·3	282·4	290·0	299·0	4

It will be shown more and more clearly as the present examination progresses that the latest statistics of international trade do not in the least impair the solidity of Mr. Chamberlain's foundation arguments. Since the movement in favour of Imperial union upon a commercial basis was launched two years ago, Germany, for example, has been gaining upon us more rapidly than before. German exports for 1904 were actually larger than British exports were in any year up to 1899!

We hear of her augmented efforts to ruin herself by Protection, of her dear food and her meat famines, her socialism and her militarism. *Eppur si muove.* In the close race for commercial supremacy her shadow already falls before us and lengthens as we run. And Germany, let us remember, keeps her agriculture intact, and improves with every year the yield of her soil. When we remember the degree to which the latest British returns are swollen by the temporary circumstances of the cotton boom (where the rise of values represents no real extension of trade), it will already appear probable that this country, should the processes revealed by the above table be continued, will be reduced to the third place as an exporting Power before the present generation is out. We must, in any case, become gradually weaker and weaker by comparison in man-power and money-power.

'Power' is a purely relative conception. Upon that simple and fundamental truth Mr. Chamberlain has from the first based his position. Since the Birmingham speech of May 15, 1903, nothing has occurred which impairs the force of his contentions.

Finally, if anything were required to fortify this exposition of the case, it will be found in the important, though incomplete, evidence of the two volumes known as the Inquiry Blue-books. Of such increase as has been shown in the total value of British exports during the last quarter of a century, much more than half must be set down to the vast development of our coal shipments. But England must stand or fall as a manufacturing nation. How is it with us in that vital matter? From the statistics contained in the Inquiry Blue-books (completed by the later returns of the countries concerned), I have compiled a separate table showing once more by quinquennial averages the comparative progress of this country and its protected competitors in the export of manufactures only:

MANUFACTURED GOODS. — COMPARATIVE EXPORTS OF THE FOUR PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL COUNTRIES DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY, 1880-1904.

	Average, 1880-84.	Average, 1885-89.	Average, 1890-94.	Average, 1895-99.	Average, 1900-04.	Increase, 1880-1904.	
						Absolute	Relative
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill £	Per Cent.
England	206·4	196·9	199·0	199·5	225·3	18·9	9
Germany	92·8	99·6	100·2	114·8	149·9	57·1	61
France...	73·1	69·9	73·6	79·5	94·5	21·4	29
United States...	25·9	28·7	34·2	55·0	87·8	61·9	239

Here, with respect to the most vital department of our trade, we have an unmistakable picture of decline in our international position. We are beaten absolutely and relatively alike. We are beaten by every one of our protected competitors. France beats us.

What is the reason? We have our Colonies, where our traditional pre-eminence, as we shall see, is not yet forfeited—where the same language, similar tastes, and a common Imperial citizenship still help to retain for us the advantage we nowhere else enjoy. We have the richness of our coal deposits and their unique proximity to the factory and the wharf. We have still a geographical position more favourable than that of any of our competitors with regard to the world's markets as a whole. We have our unapproached facilities for shipbuilding and shipping.

Nor are we told why we are beaten when we inquire into the question of our relative industrial efficiency. Every improvement in technical education must be valuable, but it is certain that on the whole we do not fail for want of skill. In the greatest of our trades, the Lancashire cotton operative does twice the work of the German cotton operative in a given time, and does it better; while British ships, British locomotives, British

machinery generally, can still hold their own for workmanship. Our wares are more usually reproached for superfluous excellence, by comparison with some cheaper and poorer foreign product, than for intrinsic inferiority.

But why are we beaten? We have an altogether unmatched combination of natural resources, acquired skill, accumulated capital, and commercial connections. We have also had, throughout the whole of the generation in which our rivals have made the greatest comparative strides, the celebrated possession of cheap food. But, as a manufacturing country, we are not only outstripped in extent and rate of progress by the United States and Germany. We do not quite hold our own even by comparison with France—which works on imported coal, which has a stationary population, with conscription in its severest form, and a national debt half as large again as ours, which in the eyes of our orthodox economists is loaded with every fiscal disadvantage the human imagination can conceive.

One conclusion emerges clearly from this preliminary study. It is that Protection is no preventive of progress, and that a policy of tariffs may be accompanied by competitive success. The money-power of France is marvellously sustained under the commercial policy she has pursued with little swerving for two centuries and a half since the time of Colbert. Germany and America absorb into their industrial system year by year a number of new workers twice and three times as large as we can find employment for. These States, therefore, gain upon us in man-power and money-power alike; in fighting-power and budget-power; and, in strict consequence, sea-power itself must ultimately be shared between them, unless we can call in the Colonies to redress the balance, and can maintain as an Empire what as an island we should lose.

IV.

Military and naval federation with the Colonies, even if we could secure it, would not people our territories or extend our trade. Protection was adopted in the United States and Germany as a doctrine of development. It has been brilliantly successful for that purpose in both instances. Our competitors have unquestionably made the most of their opportunities; of ours we as unquestionably have made the least. What the British Empire needs in its turn is a policy of practical development meant to develop as well as to unite the human and financial forces of the Mother Country and her Colonies. If we succeed in that end we shall maintain the Empire; if not, it will be impossible to maintain it; and the economic issue is the primary, the vital factor of the whole problem. 'Commercial union,' says Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 'must precede political and military union, and we cannot wait for ever.' But Sir Michael Hicks-Beach points out, what no one else has yet attempted to deny, that it will become absolutely impossible for us to sustain alone the burthen of Imperial Defence, and that unless we can obtain the financial cooperation of the Colonies, 'our Imperial power must go.' The Colonies are willing to approach the question on the commercial side, they are not willing to approach it on any other; and since they will not federate with us upon Free Trade terms, we must federate with them while yet we have the opportunity on other than Free Trade terms. We have no alternative. A definite union of interests in this respect may be safely trusted to develop subsequently, and of itself, the necessary financial and, in Captain Mahan's sense, 'military' organization for the protection of those interests. Preference, as the biologists say, will prove to be the true 'growing spot' of Imperial Federation.

We have no alternative. Persistence in a policy of free imports is not, as a matter of fact, whatever may be desired, a practicable course. That would mean, as

will be shown in more detail in subsequent pages, the further closing of markets against us throughout the world. It would mean that the competitive power of the protected countries would be further promoted by free access to our market, while our manufacturing position would be further weakened by more effectual exclusion from theirs. It would mean their more rapid attainment of supremacy in man-power and money-power. It would mean that the example of our European rivals would be imitated elsewhere. What may still be called the neutral markets, like Japan and Argentina, would model their commercial policy upon that of the United States and Germany. Above all, it would mean in the Colonies the rise of McKinleyism pure and simple, and the gradual development of a definitely separatist ideal, with the rejection by the Mother Country of the only condition upon which a closer union with the Colonies is possible.

Nor is there any reason why Free Traders in principle should not be supporters in practice of constructive Imperialism in the only possible economic shape. It is of the first importance to make this clear. It is still generally assumed that Adam Smith and Cobden must be accepted or rejected together. No opinion could be more profoundly or more demonstrably mistaken. The question of the maintenance of the Empire is a politico-economic problem which, if it is to be usefully treated, must be regarded neither from the point of view of the ordinary party-political controversialist, nor from that of the doctrinaire economist of any school. No rigidly pedantic theories of any kind will help us in dealing with the most complex and plastic political organism the world has yet known. The English spirit of compromise, which has contrived to steer a clear course between the falsehood of extremes in every other relation of life, has never yet found its economic expression. To arrive at this expression we have not to abjure the teachings of Adam Smith: we have only to return to them. We have not to reject Cobden and Adam

Smith together. We have strictly to choose between them.

Cobden believed and hoped that Free Trade would be the dissolvent of Empire. He conceived that it was as much to the interest of this country to develop the United States as to develop Canada or Australia. Expecting and approving the dissolution of the Empire, anticipating the universal prevalence of free exchange and the end of war, he was logically a Free Trade extremist in theory and practice. Adam Smith's position was quite opposite. Desiring, like all good men, the political and the economic millennium, his far more circumspect and penetrating mind made him differ from Cobden in thinking neither form of the millennium to be attainable. He did not overlook the supreme significance of national identity. Believing absolute Free Trade to be a perfect policy for an ideal world, he did not hold it to be a practicable policy in the real world. Unlike Cobden, he desired the British Empire not to be dissolved, but to be strengthened and perpetuated, and did not believe that absolute Free Trade was the right means to that end. He desired, on the one hand, Imperial Federation; he thought, on the other hand, that the Navigation Laws were the sinews of sea-power, the necessary economic nexus of the Empire, 'the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England,' and he advocated the continuance of those laws as the concrete foundation of our economic policy.

In other words, the position held by the father of Free Trade as an economic theorist was one thing, but quite another his position as a political thinker and robust citizen—far from regarding, with Cobden, British power as a bad fact and the British Empire as a wicked acquisition. Advocating the closer union of the Empire and the maintenance of the Navigation Laws, the greatest of Free Traders was for all concrete purposes in favour of a federated Empire upon a protectionist basis. The course of events is compelling us once more to stand where he did. Mr. Chamberlain has not

repudiated the politico-economic ideas of Adam Smith; he has returned to them.

V.

At this point it is our business to examine in more detail and as fairly as may be the position of British trade under the present policy, and the prospect before us should that policy remain unchanged. For this purpose it will be well to follow the simple classification suggested by the Inquiry Blue-books, and to divide the markets of the world into three groups: (1) The chief protected countries, (2) the neutral countries, and (3) British Colonies and possessions. We shall see what has happened in the first group, and we shall also see that history must repeat itself in the other two, unless the country resorts, without undue delay, to a radical alteration of its fiscal system.

Free imports have permitted the most rapid and complete closing of the continental markets, where our trade in manufactures is declining; they must facilitate and encourage the closing of the neutral markets, where our trade is still increasing; and must lead to the loss of the colonial markets, which a generation ago were the least, as they are now the most, valuable of the three great groups, and where alone we have the opportunity of making our position secure for as long as there is any need to look. Had Cobdenism been less blindly followed and Adam Smith better studied, we should long since have had preferential arrangements with the Colonies. No Free Trade thinker, on the other hand, can deny that free imports in this country have enabled hostile tariffs abroad to develop with impunity. Free imports have been of the greatest practical disadvantage in the foreign and colonial spheres alike. An Imperial tariff would improve our position in all of them.

We proceed to obtain a more definite view of the cooperative movements of trade in the three great groups of markets. Adopting the classification of the Inquiry Blue-book, we find that the Board of Trade

includes in the *first group* the following ten countries: Russia, Germany, Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and the United States. The *second group* includes all other foreign countries—called with more or less accuracy the neutral markets. The *third group* includes British Colonies and possessions only. As the basis of further analysis let us now take the following table, constructed from the 'Statistical Abstracts' and the 'Annual Statements.'

TOTAL VALUE OF EXPORTS TO PROTECTED, NEUTRAL, AND COLONIAL MARKETS, 1880-1904, IN QUINQUENNIAL AVERAGES.

Period.	To Principal Protected Countries.	To other Foreign and Neutral Countries.	Total to all Foreign Countries.	To British Possessions.	Total Exports.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.
1880-1884	99·6	53·9	153·5	80 8	234·3
1885-1889	92·0	54·9	146·9	79·3	226·2
1890-1894	95·0	60·8	155·8	78·6	234·4
*1895-1899	94·7	61·9	156·6	81·1	237·7
*1900-1904	103·4	74·0	177·4	105·3	282·7
Increase, 1880-1904, in Mill. £	3·8	20·1	23·9	24·5	48·4

This table shows much, but by no means enough. It proves. indeed, that the increase in Imperial trade is greater than the increase with all foreign markets put together. It suggests that the growth of British exports to the principal protected countries has been insignificant, even when we take these exports as a whole, and do not inquire into their character. But in the period of twenty-five years covered by the table our coal exports to these markets have increased, as a matter of fact, by 200 per cent., while our manufacturing ex-

* Excluding new ships, not returned for previous periods.

ports have shown a heavy decline. This result will be most clearly shown as follows:

EXPORTS TO PRINCIPAL PROTECTED MARKETS (DISTINGUISHING COAL). 1880-1884 COMPARED WITH 1900-1904.

	Total Exports.	Coal.	All other Exports.
	Million £.	Million £.	Million £.
1880-1884 ...	99·6	5·9	93·7
1900-1904 ...	103·4	16·0	87·4
	+3·8	+10·1	−6·3

The point may be clinched by putting together two sets of figures compiled by the Board of Trade officials, appearing in the second of the famous Blue-books. In column A the compilers deduct not only coal, but all other articles not wholly or mainly manufactured.

	A. Exports of Articles wholly or mainly manufactured in the United Kingdom to the principal Protected Foreign Countries, 1870-1904.	B. Imports of Foreign Manufactures into the United Kingdom, 1870-1904.
	Million £.	Million £.
1870	80·7	52·5
1880	81·9	76·4
1890	87·2	89·9
1900	80·3	128·3
1904	72·1*	135·2*

It is a contrast for thought. To all the chief continental countries and the United States we are exporting products of British manufacture to a less amount than we did more than a generation ago. Their exports of finished articles to us have risen by leaps and bounds.

* Estimated from 'Annual Statement for 1904,' the official Inquiry Blue-book figures for 1902 and 1903 being million £ 71·6 and million £ 73·4 respectively.

In 1880 we still retained our leadership. The character of the exchange has so altered that while the value of our manufactured exports to the *first group* of countries has absolutely decreased, they send us nearly twice as much as they sent us then—and nearly twice as much as we send them now. In relation to the *first group* of markets our commercial supremacy has totally disappeared already. It will not, presumably, be denied by any orthodox economist that hostile tariffs have driven down our trade in manufacture in the principal protected countries. It will not be denied that free imports have enormously increased the influx of foreign manufacture from these same countries. This process seriously weakens ourselves and sensibly strengthens our rivals—so much will be admitted—and must, therefore, reduce our relative competitive vigour.

The average mind does not readily grasp the meaning of very large figures. But let us look again, with a little exertion of the imagination, at the enormous totals concerned, and endeavour to realize the political as well as the economic significance of the contrast given.

What does it mean? It means that the trade taken away from us by hostile tariffs means profit taken away and employment taken away. It means a positive loss in man-power and money-power. Simultaneously the continual and huge increase in the business of manufacturing for our market directly enables our competitors to maintain a larger industrial population—to make still stronger, therefore, the home market they monopolize; to accumulate capital at a faster rate; to raise a greater revenue; to build more formidable navies. Our own policy has nourished the agricultural prosperity of the United States and the manufacturing power superimposed upon it. Our own policy has stimulated the manufacturing, maritime, and naval development of Germany. Foreign tariffs touch our financial resources and our ability to support population, wherever they touch our trade, and they hurt us politically—ours is the only country in which it would be neces-

sary to emphasize the fact—wherever they hurt us economically. They directly attack the very sinews of Empire. Free import without reciprocity strengthens the fibre of the competitive Powers in every element, human and financial, of their political as well as of their economic strength. This is why the problems of our commercial dealings with foreign countries and the Colonies respectively are not separate, but one. We cannot part the retaliation issue from the preference issue. Hostile tariffs on the one, free imports on the other, acting together, the former to diminish British manufacturing trade, the latter to increase foreign manufacturing trade, cut at the root of our relative power and work against the maintenance of Empire.

While we have kept an unconditionally open market for all comers, the tariffs against our own trade have risen with impunity. Under the same circumstances they will continue to rise. Foreign producers enjoy a system of privilege in their home market and equality in ours which enables them to make the best of both worlds; only a very credulous mind can expect them to abandon, and of their own initiative, a position by which their manufactured exports to us must continue to flourish, while ours to them must continue to decline. We have lately reached another well-marked stage in this process. The continental treaties pivoting on the new German tariff come into operation next year. They will put up a higher wall round the Central European markets, containing four-fifths of the population of the Continent; and, in spite of the nominal equality supposed to be secured by the 'most favoured nation' clause, we shall find that as British trade was unrepresented in the negotiations it will be hardest hit in the result. We cannot doubt that much of our improved trade with Germany this year means an anticipation by importers in that country of the inevitable consequences of the tariff. Our European trade in British manufacture is, in short (this has been shown beyond any possibility of challenge), a withering branch,

and the increased continental duties to be enforced from 1906 will hasten decay.

Mr. Cobden's dogma offers no prospect in that direction. The change on our part to an active commercial policy might even yet do much. Just as throughout the Continent tariffs are the only check upon tariffs, a British tariff—threatening the penalty of exclusion from the greatest consuming centre in the world—would be the most powerful of all restraining and reducing influences.

We shall never get Free Trade, or anything approaching Free Trade. The continental Powers cannot sacrifice their agriculture. France, for instance, is governed by an agricultural majority; and, in spite of the devoted efforts of the foremost German Free Trader, Professor Lujo Brentano, to prove that Germany might safely trust her national fate to street-bred armies, the Kaiser's Government have reasons overwhelming in their view—reasons dynastic, military, naval, social—for believing that the maintenance of a large rural population parallel with the swarming industrial growth of the towns is the vital interest of the State. In America, even the recent Reciprocity Congress at Chicago began by declaring its undiminished adherence to Protection as the basis of national life. The meeting then declared in favour of a maximum and minimum tariff on the German plan. To countries with which the Republic might have any commercial quarrels, duties amounting to prohibition might be applied. 'Most favoured nations' would enjoy the benefit of the minimum scale; but that scale would in any case, it was unanimously agreed, be higher than any tariff existing in Western Europe; and so prominent a member of President Roosevelt's administration as Mr. Shaw, Secretary to the Treasury, would make the existing Dingley tariff the 'minimum' which the 'most favoured nations' are to enjoy under the soothing name of Reciprocity!

Nothing will give us back our old hold upon the principal protected markets. Our competitors can concede us no such drastic abatement of duties as would

justify us—even if purely Imperial interests allowed it—in giving absolutely free import to manufactured articles from countries which would continue to discriminate more or less severely against British goods. But, like Clara Middleton, we have 'a dreadful power.' Out of a total export last year of £261,000,000, Germany sent no less than £50,000,000 to our market, or nearly one-fifth of the whole. France sent us £51,000,000 out of £179,000,000, or much more than a quarter of the whole. The United States, out of an entire export of £299,000,000, sent us £112,000,000, or considerably over a third of the whole. These are great interests, and the countries concerned cannot lightly jeopardize them. Let us remember that in the whole world there is no substitute for this market. To the 'most favoured nations' we should offer in return for appreciable concessions far better terms than they will concede to us or enjoy elsewhere. To other nations we should apply a sharp penal tariff, to be kept in reserve for purely retaliating and negotiating purposes. There can be no reasonable doubt that we should secure in this way somewhat fairer conditions of entry into the principal protected markets than we can hope to obtain in any other manner.

But this is *Zukunftsmusik*. The new continental treaties are concluded for a term of twelve years. A Radical Government is in all probability about to obtain office in this country. Under these circumstances free imports will be continued for a further period—'the last phase'—and our finished exports to the first group of countries* will continue to decline, while all classes of their trade will make further progress in the open island. In 'man-power' and 'money-power' our position by so much will be comparatively weakened, while their relative strength will be simultaneously enhanced. Casting about for means to maintain our commercial supremacy,

* France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and the United States.

it is clear that we have no prospect in the 'principal protected countries,' and must look elsewhere.

VI.

We turn, then, to the next question, Whether it may be possible to find a firm basis for the maintenance of our commercial and Imperial position in our trade with the other foreign countries?—those which are classed by the Board of Trade, not in all cases correctly, as 'neutral' markets. In the year which has seen the close of the Far Eastern war—under circumstances emphasizing as nothing previously had done the new position of Imperialist America in matters affecting the policy and commerce of the world, and especially of that portion of it to which we are now about to direct our attention—we stand in relation to the neutral markets where we stood in 1870 in relation to the chief European markets. We shall be fortunate if the experience of a generation in the latter forewarns us and forearms us for the conditions we shall have to encounter during the coming generation in the former.

Under Group B are included the Scandinavian countries, the markets of the Near East, including the Turkish Empire; those of the Middle East, including Egypt; those of the Far East, including China and Japan; those of Mexico and Central America, and those of South America, including Argentina. The rest are negligible. In each of these geographical divisions there are one or two dominating countries (so far as British interests are concerned), like Turkey, Egypt, China and Japan, and Argentina. Our future in these countries will obviously determine our future in the regions to which they belong. The subject, therefore, is less complex than would at first sight appear, and lends itself to an extremely interesting and significant investigation. Repeating figures we have already glanced at, let us exhibit the not inconsiderable progress of British trade during the last quarter of a century in these markets as a whole.

TOTAL EXPORTS TO NEUTRAL MARKETS DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY (1880-1904).*

	Million £ (Quinquennial Average).
1880-1884	53·9
1885-1889	54·9
1890-1894	60·8
†1895-1899	61·9
†1900-1904	74·0
Increase, 1880-1904 in million £ ...	20·1

Even these figures do not mean all that they suggest on the surface. By far the largest part of the increase, it will be observed, has occurred during the last decade only. It will be sufficient, therefore, and much simpler, to take for analysis the result of the two quinquennial periods 1895-1899 and 1900-1904. In the first place, it is to be noticed that a large proportion of our exports to the neutral markets consist not merely of coal, but of coal sent to bunker British vessels abroad. In the last few years a 50 per cent. larger quantity has been shipped for that purpose than in the previous period. This, of course, does not mean gain in our manufacturing trade with the neutral markets. Secondly, Group B is a great Lancashire interest; and another important proportion of the increase in the 1900-1904 average over the 1895-1899 average is accounted for by the temporary circumstances of the cotton boom and the higher price of cotton. Thirdly, if the returns are dissected—the assertion is made with confidence, though the statistical proof is omitted here, to avoid encumbering the argument with detail—the largest percentage increase will be found to have occurred in our dealings with 'the Portuguese Colonies,' which in its turn is mainly accounted for by the fact that 'the Portuguese Colonies' include Delagoa Bay. The next largest proportional

* It is probable that our trade with these countries in the present year will be nearer £90,000,000 than £80,000,000; just as trade to the 'chief protected countries' went up immensely after the Franco-German War.

† Excluding ships, not previously returned.

increase is presented by our trade to Egypt, which is as much an Imperial asset as our trade to India. In short, the whole rise of value shown by our exports to all the neutral markets in the quinquennium 1900-1904, as compared with 1895-1899, will be found to be about £12,000,000 sterling, and fully half that sum is derived from bunker coal, from the nominally foreign but really Imperial trade to Delagoa Bay and Egypt, and from the inflated prices of cotton. Let us, however, exclude coal only, and we have the following summary:

BRITISH EXPORTS TO NEUTRAL MARKETS (EXCLUDING COAL). 1895-1899 COMPARED WITH 1900-1904.

	Mill. £.
1. Average 1895-1899	54·9
„ 1900-1904	64·2
Increase	9·3
2. Details of the increase in the various geographical divisions of the neutral markets:	
Far East (China, Japan, East Indies) ...	2·7
Egypt	1·8
Argentina	1·8
Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway, Denmark) .	1·0
Near East, Middle East, and North African markets (other than Egypt)	1·2
Portuguese Colonies	0·8
Mexico and Central America...	0·6
Miscellaneous	0·1
	+10·0
3. Deduct decrease in South American markets generally, apart from Argentina	− 0·7
	9·3

Can we build our commercial security upon our relations with any of these markets? Let us see. In Egypt we are for all practical purposes in possession. The special progress we make in that country is entirely due to our special political position. Were the representative of any other European Power in Lord Cromer's place, the commercial returns would show a much less encouraging result. As regards Portuguese East Africa,

the question is entirely one of the development of the Transvaal. Our commerce towards both markets ought to be reckoned with Imperial trade, augmenting by another £10,000,000 our total exports to Imperial markets.

Examining, then, the genuinely foreign markets of the second group, let us now secure the plainest view of the distribution of our trade to neutral countries by looking at the ensuing table:

BRITISH EXPORTS TO THE NEUTRAL FOREIGN MARKETS.—ANNUAL AVERAGE DURING 1900-1904.

	All Exports.	Coal and Ships.	Other Exports.
	Million £.	Million £.	Million £.
1. Scandinavia	11·6	4·1	7·5
2. Near East, etc.:			
Turkish Empire	6·2	0·3	5·9
Morocco, Arabia and Persia	1·0	...	1·0
Smaller Balkan States ...	2·8	0·6	2·2
Total	10·0	0·9	9·1
3. Far East:			
Japan	6·5	1·3	5·2
China	7·0	0·1	6·9
Siam	0·3	...	0·3
Dutch East Indies ...	2·8	...	2·8
Philippine Islands ...	1·0	...	1·0
Total	17·6	1·4	16·2
4. South and Central America (except Argentina) ...	17·0	1·9	15·1
5. Argentina	7·7	0·8	6·9
6. French, German, Spanish, and Portuguese Colonies and Congo	4·4	1·4	3·0

The Scandinavian Countries. — With this tableau before us, let us take the enumerated divisions in their order. It is difficult to understand upon what principle the Scandinavian countries are classed by the Board of Trade as neutral markets. If we open the second of the Inquiry Blue-books, and turn to the valuable table calculating the various degrees of severity with which foreign duties press on British goods, we find that the Swedish tariff is practically as high as the German. Denmark is generally discussed by orthodox writers in this country as though it were a Free Trade State. As a matter of fact, its duties against the principal manufactures of the United Kingdom amount on the average to 18 per cent. *ad valorem;* a rate, therefore, nearly twice as high as the 10 per cent. general tariff which Mr. Chamberlain has suggested for this country. But Norwegian shipping flourishes, we are told, because Norway, at least, is practically a Cobdenite nation. Nothing of the kind. Norway also has a scale of duties higher than Mr. Chamberlain proposes (an average 12 per cent. *ad valorem* upon manufactured imports), and her tariff is equivalent in nominal severity to that of Belgium, though less effective as her internal competitive power is less developed.

On the whole, it is clear that our prospects in this direction are not good. Germany's geographical position helps her in dealing with these markets, and she is extending her grasp upon them, while our commerce thither in the last few years has shown the same symptoms of arrest as in all protected Europe. Germany exports twice as much as we do to Denmark (despite the immense advantage of our free imports to the agricultural produce of the latter country); she sends a far larger amount of manufactured goods to Sweden; and she already runs us rather better than neck and neck in Norway. We see, therefore, that the Scandinavian countries in the first place are not neutral, but are protected countries; and that, so far as their markets may remain open to foreign goods (though recent

political developments are more likely to tighten than relax the Protectionist policy of the two peninsular States), Germany has a strong geographical advantage in dealing with them. We can only hope for an improvement in this direction upon one condition. With a tariff in this country enabling us to make reciprocity treaties, we should secure better terms of entry into the Scandinavian countries than Germany enjoys, for the simple reason that we should on our side be giving them incomparably better terms than Germany could offer. The case of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark is an admirable example of the fantastic pedantry of a system which prevents our obtaining any commercial concessions whatever in return for the unique privileges we concede.

The Near East, Middle East, Morocco.—We turn next to the equally important group of States, including the little Balkan countries, the Sultan's dominions, and the 'Mohammedan belt' (except Egypt), stretching from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf. Upon political and economic grounds alike it must appear that there is scant scope for British progress in this direction, and that we cannot obtain there what we are now compelled to seek throughout the world—security. Italian competition, now entering actively into the field, enjoys in the Mediterranean the same geographical advantage that Germany enjoys in the Baltic. German and Austrian commerce prevails more and more in the Balkans. Our trade with the Turkish Empire, as a whole, has been stationary or shrinking, while that of Germany has doubled since the Kaiser's accession and the policy of friendship with Stamboul. While the open door is nominally maintained, the success of the Wilhelmstrasse in securing commercial concessions from the Porte for railways, harbour works, and armaments is equivalent to a preferential position for our chief continental competitors throughout the Sultan's dominions. Above all, we have to remember that the whole of this region must undergo sooner or

later profound political changes. Whether these changes will be to the advantage of Russia, of Austria-Hungary as now existing, or of a 'Greater Germany,' we cannot tell. The alteration may occur, for all commercial purposes, without any formal alteration in the present lines of the map, by an extension of the German Zollverein principle to the Austrian Empire, the Balkan Peninsula, and Asia Minor. This is not merely a Pan-German dream entertained exclusively by Imperialist politicians. Even the Socialist deputies to the Reichstag would be as much in favour of it as are the German capitalists and professors—a fact which will be fully grasped by readers of the remarkable article contributed by the well-known economic writer, Herr Richard Calwer, to a recent number of the *Sozialistische Monatshefte.*

Morocco is included in the group of markets we are now discussing, and though the open door may be nominally secured there for a period, we concede to France in that country (and for undoubtedly good reasons) a position equal to that which we occupy in Egypt. France will either obtain the 'concessions'—that is, the trade—by enforcing the joint treaty, or Germany will obtain them by thwarting it. In any case, if we continue barely to hold our own throughout this region we shall be fortunate. We cannot expect extension or count upon security.

VII.

The New Far East.—Passing to the far more momentous issue of our commercial prospects in the Far East, we approach a problem of which the future is still veiled in a mist. No man living can pretend at the present moment to dogmatize upon it, but it is sufficiently certain that the results of the Asiatic renaissance—though for some period to come we may appear to reap our profit from it—cannot be permanently to the advantage of British trade. The rise of Japan in the Far East, regarded as a purely economic phenomenon, cannot be more favourable to our interests

in that sphere than the commercial rise of Germany has been upon the Continent. The nation which is happily our ally in arms must be our rival in trade, the most formidable of all competitors in the East Asiatic market, and eventually elsewhere. Henceforth the Japanese are bound to concentrate every effort upon the work of economic expansion, and the coming generation must make as vast a difference in their industrial position as the generation since Sedan has made in that of United Germany.

Japan's object in the commercial struggle, as in the military, is to achieve supremacy within her sphere. Her aim—and from her own point of view her just and necessary aim—is not to promote European or American trade, but to displace it. And her object in the first case must be not to develop too rapidly the independent and potentially competitive energies of China, but to strengthen her own power and to obtain the same commercial predominance in the Middle Kingdom which we formerly possessed upon the European Continent. There is every reason to expect that the awakening of China will be gradual and probably slow. The complete transformation of that market will hardly occur before Japan has placed herself in a position to supply it. The vision of a vast export of cotton, machinery, and 'buckwheat cakes'—to recall one expression of that sanguine enthusiasm in which Americans no longer indulge—flowing from all the centres of Western commerce through the 'open door,' is extravagant, perhaps altogether delusive. The tolerable certainty, on the other hand, is that Japan will increase her proportion of Far Eastern trade faster than that trade as a whole develops. The 'open door' is there indeed, but even 'open doors' are sometimes blocked by that portion of the crowd which is in front. Our allies are so near the open door that their geographical proximity is as great a factor in their favour as would be tariff discrimination in the interest of any other and more remote country.

There is even yet little conception of the thorough and systematic boldness of Japan's preparations for commercial conquest. We are about to see what the world has never seen before—economic competition organized by the State with the same weapons of national revenue and universal training which the Western nations, less logically, have hitherto wielded in full efficiency for the sole purposes of war. Japan is about to create industries just as she creates battleships. She is about to purchase and construct the economic apparatus of a great Power, just as she acquired the fighting apparatus of a great Power. She did the latter part of the work in a single generation; she will do the former part within another generation; and she has not the slightest intention of leaving her economic future to chance and circumstance, and to what are called, in the language of Horatio's philosophy, 'the slow processes of natural growth.' The war has lifted Japan into the saddle, and she means to ride. She proposes to train bankers, engineers, mechanicians, factory managers and mining experts, exactly as she has trained soldiers and seamen. And while she must not obstruct the foreign trade passing through the 'open door,' she can and will secure the same comparative advantage by subsidizing her own.

What we have at stake in the Far East in respect of the cotton trade we know; Japan's activity as a competitor in that field we are beginning to know. Woollen goods are an important part of our total trade to the Far East. The Japanese are convinced that they have all the climatic and other conditions requisite for that manufacture; they believe that no country is better fitted than their own to excel in the woollen manufacture. 'We import the raw material of this manufacture,' says Count Okuma, 'to the value of 10,000,000 yen. For the future we should be able to procure our raw wool from Manchuria, and to create there in return a rich market for the finished article.' It is said—upon good authority—that the Japanese Government proposes

to invest several millions in the purchase of industrial machinery. This, if we can rid ourselves of Western habits of thought, will appear a proceeding as natural and efficient as the investment of money in ironclads after the Chinese War. The ships were most needed then; the machines are most needed now. Let us be certain that they will be placed in competent hands and well utilized.

The case of Formosa is an interesting object-lesson. That island has been admirably developed. Japan levies no import duties against foreign trade. But she does levy taxes upon exports to foreign countries, and, as a result, Formosan exports flow through the free channel to Japan. Imports flow back by the same route; and the result of the awakening of Formosa—a very proper result in an island which is part of the Japanese Empire—is that foreign trade is stationary or dwindling, while Japanese commerce grows with the most striking rapidity, and is now more valuable than the exchanges of Formosa with all other countries together.

The strengthening of the industrial efficiency of our allies rather than of the consuming power of China is what it would be wisest to prepare for in the near future. Japanese competition will trench deeper into the present margin of trade, and the opportunities are hardly likely to widen faster than Japanese ability to take increasing advantage of them. China herself, anciently partial to walls, may not prove averse from McKinleyism, and in the long run she must become the most self-sufficing of nations. Less than half a century has witnessed the vast change from the agricultural America of Cobden's time to the industrial United States of to-day. It is not impossible that as great an economic revolution may be effected in the new Far East within as short a period. British industry may profit for a time by supplying the apparatus of later competition. But Japan, we repeat, after her war of existence, stands where Germany did after 1870. The one Power must make her commercial career as the other has made it. It is most reasonable

to expect that results in the Far East will repeat our experience upon the Continent—that British trade in manufacture will be arrested at a certain point, and will have increasing difficulty thereafter in holding its ground.

VIII.

Commerce and the Monroe Doctrine.—To complete the survey, we turn to the next and last great sphere of our neutral trade. We now export to all the States of Central and South America more than twenty millions annually. With Argentina, by far the most valuable single market of the group, we have, as will be explained, special relations, and we shall reserve them for separate consideration. The dominating fact with which we shall have to reckon in all the remainder of this region is that the United States will assuredly concentrate the chief force of its commercial energy and financial research upon the business of securing the mastery of these markets. Americans are perceiving after the war that their future in the Far East is unlikely to be all they hoped. They will return with the more vigour and singleness of purpose to the original idea of achieving commercial supremacy in South America—the 'prolongation of our own continent.'

From the three volumes containing the 'Report and Evidence of the Merchant Marine Commission'* one fact pre-eminently emerges. It is the conviction of witnesses and Commissioners alike that the United States only needs to establish subsidized lines of steamers down both coasts of the double continent to secure the bulk of the trade of South and Central America. At present American passengers almost entirely, and American goods to a large extent, have to follow what is called the 'triangular' route: they go to Europe—to Liverpool or Hamburg—and thence to the South American ports. 'The great need of South America,' declared one witness, 'is agricultural

* Washington: Government Printing Office, 3 vols., 1905.

machinery; yet every American reaper and every American harvester must first be dumped on the Liverpool docks before it can reach the South American consumer.'* It is little less certain, in the present writer's opinion, that the subsidized American steamship lines will be established than that the Panama Canal will be built.

That America's commercial future lies chiefly in her own hemisphere few thinking minds can doubt. Her commercial predominance in that region must extend with her political. Let us firmly grasp this point. America is much in advance of Mr. Chamberlain and the supporters of Imperial preference in this country. The fixed policy of the United States endeavours to establish preferential relations wherever they can be arranged. Let us see what has already happened. In Cuba the preferential rebate upon imports from the United States ranges from 20 to 40 per cent. Washington has just blocked the proposed Anglo-Cuban treaty upon the significant ground that it might in the future act in such a way as to prevent the conclusion of another Cuban-American treaty providing for reciprocal shipping privileges.† There is a measure now before the Congress of Havana—and the point is well worthy of Lord Curzon's attention—to kill the rice-trade from India in the interest of the rice-growers in Louisiana and Texas. 'The present duty on rice,' says the latest report of the British Minister at Havana, 'is 1 dollar 20 cents per 100 kilos, the preference to American rice being 40 per cent., or 48 cents per 100 kilos.'‡ The proposal now under discussion is to increase the duty to 2 dollars 75 cents (an increase of nearly 130 per cent.), which would raise the preference on American rice to 1 dollar 10 cents per 100 kilos, 'enabling it,' adds the report mildly, 'to compete on very favourable terms.' It may be well to mention here, as throwing

* Vol. ii., p. 872.

† The *Times*, September 12, 1905.

‡ Diplomatic and Consular Reports; Cuba, No. 3,484.

a suggestive sidelight on the working of preference in colonial interests, that a special reduction of duty by America on Cuban tobacco has created a new trade in a cheaper article, and 'the result has been an increase of exportation to the United States of 16,000,000 cigars.' In the Philippines we have already, to begin with, an export tax upon hemp.

More significant still is the fact that the Republic already has a preferential treaty in operation with at least one independent South American nation—Brazil. The coffee-trade of that country being dependent upon the United States, it has no effective choice in the matter. The Brazilian Government granted last year a special tariff reduction of 20 per cent. on certain articles imported from the United States. To extend reciprocal relations upon this model is the evident effort of American commercial policy. With what results can only be shown in the future. But it is certain that the commercial struggle with the United States in South America, which is now in its day of small things, is about to develop in earnest. Indeed, our trade with this group of markets—with the exception of Argentina—seems already to have reached a period of stagnation, if not of decline (1895-1899 average, minus coal, £15,200,000; 1900-1904 average, minus coal, £15,100,000).

Argentina: the Relation of Trade to Power.—In this survey Argentina, as we have said, stands apart. It is a developing country. Our recent commercial relations with her have been of a very encouraging character, and her present economic connection with us is next to that of a British self-governing colony —exception being made of the fact that German trade to Buenos Ayres is increasing faster than our own. The United States, which taxes raw wool as well as wheat, is perhaps more embarrassed in its dealings with the Argentine than with any other country, and American trade accordingly exhibits but feeble progress. Our own dealings with Argentina during the last quinquennium may usefully be shown as follows:

British Imports from Argentina.		British Exports to Argentina.	
	Million £.		Million £.
1900	13·1	1900	7·1
1901	12·4	1901	6·8
1902	14·0	1902	5·9
1903	19·1	1903	8·0
1904	23·0	1904	10·8

—figures which closely resemble those of our trade with Canada during the same period.* They are, however,

British Wheat Imports, 1904.

From Foreign Countries.		From British Possessions.	
	Million Cwt		Million Cwt.
Russia...	23·5	India	25·5
Argentina	21·4	Canada	6·2
United States... ...	7·1	Australia	10·3
Other foreign countries	3·4	Other countries ...	0·4
Total	55·4	Total	42·4

less favourable; and it is vital to the argument to draw a close comparison between the two cases.

We give every advantage to Argentina that we extend to the Dominion. But Canada gives us a preference and Argentina does not. British goods entering the latter market pay duty at the *ad valorem* rate of 28 per cent. (the most severe rate levied in any neutral market), while in Canada, under the preferential tariff, the same goods pay at the rate of 17 per cent. only. The distinction is trenchant. Pursue the comparison further. Argentine wool enters our ports upon the same terms as Australian, and

* Last year Argentina came third on the list of wheat-growing countries shipping to the British market. But we also received 8,000,000 cwt. from the United States, and 2,000,000 cwt. from Canada.

Argentine wheat upon the same terms as Canadian. But here comes the direct bearing of our trade relations upon the problem of Empire. In the Boer War the Dominion and the Commonwealth gave us of their manhood and means; and everything we had ever done to develop their national life—and how little we had done: no more than for any foreign country with which we had a similar cash nexus—came back to us. Their man-power was our man-power; their money-power was our money-power. But Argentina, though an excellent market, was a foreign country, no more prepared than any other alien nation, to spill either blood or treasure in our cause. More still. Argentine wheat in our ports is free; in the German ports it is, or is about to be, taxed to the tune of 11s. a quarter. But German trade competes with us in Argentina on a precisely equal footing, and progresses, on the whole, more rapidly than ours.

Our Argentine trade, therefore, is an absolute asset, and special arrangements might be made under any alteration of our fiscal policy for a reciprocity with that Republic, which would secure our position in its market. But under present circumstances even that trade does not conduce to the maintenance of our relative power, nor, therefore, to the maintenance of Empire. The Canadian preferential tariff, on the contrary, means preferential employment for British workers against German workers; preferential profit for British capital as against foreign capital; it works directly, so far as it operates, to the relative increase of the trade and revenue, the man-power, money-power, and sea-power of these islands, and makes no less for the security of our commerce than for the strength and permanence of the King's dominions.

IX.

This point goes to the root of the matter. It brings us at once to the crux of Imperial economics and to the political argument under which the whole theory of Free Trade breaks down. We come, in other words, to

that vital question of the relation between population, commerce, and power which no Free Trade writer since Adam Smith has fairly faced.

Adam Smith himself, as we have already shown, had a strong national spirit, an invigorating sanity, and a scorn of pedantries which helped him to get over the difficulty. Where he clearly saw that his theories would clash with Imperial interests he held, without hesitation, that economic methods should subserve political ends Universal Free Trade, remaining now as remote from realization as when the 'Wealth of Nations' was published, he rightly believed to be Utopian, like the dream of a universal religion or a universal language. A few years after the appearance of his masterpiece, England, following the loss of her American Colonies, was attacked by the greatest naval coalition ever formed. She fought in that crisis not only for the remains of her Empire, but for life; and Rodney's victory on April 12, 1782, saved her from destruction and made Trafalgar possible. In the sphere where the facts before his eyes convinced him that political interests demanded maritime protection, the father of Free Trade declared, without hesitation, that economic dogma must go to the wall. The Dutch had lost their naval supremacy, but they still kept the lead in the carrying trade outside the pale of our Navigation Laws. The cause of immediate cheapness—a quite different cause from that of continuous economic progress—would have been solved by declaring Free Trade in shipping and allowing British tonnage to be partially displaced by Dutch. That would have been, for the moment, a sound stroke of pure economy, but it would have been fatal in politics, and in the long run fatal in economics also. Here was a case where displacement from one particular trade could have been followed by no economic compensation whatever. That mercantile ascendancy should remain in our hands was, as it still is, the condition of our existence. The Navigation Laws secured the power of the nation, and no naval officer was stricter than Nelson in enforcing them; they were the nerves

of Empire; they led through the sacrifice of immediate cheapness to an unparalleled development of national wealth; and in drawing into the hands of this country the undivided sovereignty of the sea, they were —with the possible exception of American Protection— the most powerful economic instrument ever applied to political purposes.

We have now to face the problem in a larger shape. Sea-power has become a highly specialized form of force, far less intimately connected than in Nelson's days with the merchant marine, and depending more generally upon the financial and constructive resources—the taxable and technical capacity—of the whole nation behind it. The United States, for instance, has, by comparison, no merchant marine, yet the enormous estimates her internal wealth enables her to vote must make her, at least, the second naval Power in the world. German commercial tonnage is only one-fifth of ours, but her naval budget is already nearly a third as large. Even if the Navigation Laws could be revived in all their old stringency—and this is an impossible supposition—they would be a minor factor in the wider economic struggles now determining the ability of great maritime States to equip fleets and to support the financial strain of modern war. We have half the merchant shipping of the world. In that respect we have reached our maximum, and our percentage is now beginning to show a faint and slow, but unmistakable tendency to recede. But under Protection our chief commercial competitors abroad have developed a financial and technical capacity which enables them for the first time to challenge our naval supremacy in earnest. It is perfectly conceivable that we might retain our present proportion of the world's mercantile tonnage and might, nevertheless, lose our naval supremacy through the eventual ability of some other Power or combination of Powers, increasing more rapidly in population, commerce, and wealth, to create larger fleets than we could afford to sustain.

Success in merchant shipping will no longer suffice unless we can keep pace with our greatest competitors

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in the growth of population and of total productive power. What the Navigation Laws did in Adam Smith's days only the policy of Imperial preference as applied to the Colonies—in addition to fiscal reciprocity as applied to foreign nations—can enable us to do now. If Sir Michael Hicks-Beach is correct in his opinion, that a small island with no continental hinterland cannot hold its own—in spite of its unique enjoyment of free imports—against countries which succeed under other economic methods in supporting a far larger number of inhabitants, it follows that we must seek to obtain the cooperation of the Colonies by the necessary change in the existing system of fiscal separatism.

For even if we could secure the assistance of the Colonies as they stand (which would mean the imperfect and scattered federation of some 54,000,000 of white people in the British Empire against the complete and compact federation of over 60,000,000 of inhabitants in Germany and over 80,000,000 in the United States), it would not be enough. The inadequacy appears on the face of the figures. We have still time to make up the ground we have lost, but the problem so long neglected when far simpler of solution has become a question of the first urgency. We have not only to federate with the Colonies. We have to develop the future strength of that federation to the utmost by directing British emigration and attracting foreign emigration to the lands under the British flag, and filling up the empty places of the Empire as the United States peopled the Far West.

This is where the Free Trade theory at its best gives neither help nor light to constructive statesmanship. Free Trade, we are told, means equal benefits—an equal development of power, wealth, and population on both sides. Where one of the sides is foreign, the doctrine of economic equality means clearly a doctrine of political checkmate. In war this means that each country, so far as material forces can decide, has an equal chance of destroying the other. An exchange, for instance, which meant an equal development of German wealth and

strength on one side, and of British man-power and money-power upon the other, would obviously add nothing to the security of this country. But a transaction with the Colonies means the double development —the development *which is British on both sides.* The Empire, as Adam Smith would say, gets both the benefits. The fate of the British Empire is a matter of comparative indifference to the farmer in the United States or Argentina. But every man employed in raising a quarter of wheat on colonial soil, instead of on foreign soil, will be a man who can fight, a man who can pay. He is a civic as well as an economic asset.

Adam Smith failed to do justice to a profound idea when he said that a home transaction, from a purely economic standpoint, is twice as valuable to a country as a foreign transaction. In pure economics that is unquestionably an overstatement; and, nevertheless, the instinct of that sagacious mind was far better than the formula. A transaction in Imperial trade, and, above all, with our white Colonies, gives undoubtedly at least twice the political strength derived from a transaction in foreign trade. For in war with a foreign State, that part of the reciprocating mechanism of Free Trade ceases to act at once, but all the reciprocating mechanism under the same flag goes on working, and in all probability at still higher pressure. If we have used our consuming power to increase the number of settlers under the flag, rather than to support population under other flags, the British man beyond the seas will be a man of the Empire, like the man at home.

We see at once that, though trade with Canada, let us say, and with Argentina might be of nominally equal worth on the cash-reckoning of the orthodox economist, there is no comparison in the political value of the two. With the one we establish a cash nexus; with the other we have the cash nexus also, and, behind that, the nexus of nerve and sinew, 'the tendrils strong as flesh and blood,' binding us to the heritors of the glory that is ours, to the sharers of all the hopes we cherish, to the men who will have to be counted before the flag

goes down. 'We have brothers there.' We have only not enough of them. The main end of policy, aiming to establish the only basis broad and firm enough for the British Empire to rest upon, is to see British settlers spreading where was none before. Their hand-clasp will be the 'sordid bond.' It would be difficult to characterize the imbecility of that phrase. Citizens of the same State, unless that State is in decay, are promoting each other's interests every day of their lives. They take the national sentiment for granted, but they know that the worth of it depends upon a mutually helpful activity. As walking is a series of little falls, the progress of national prosperity in any country means the continued interweaving of an infinity of 'sordid little bonds.' If the phrase had any meaning, it would be a strong argument for low wages. Imperial trade promotes the growth of British population and power upon both sides of the exchange; our foreign trade promotes it only upon one; the former—transactions being nominally equal—is twice the political value of the latter. And upon the decision with which we grasp and the vigour with which we apply this principle the future of the British Empire depends. We have now to examine in this light the present situation and further possibilities of British trade in the third sphere of our commerce, and to show that the parallel increase of home production and colonial population under preferential arrangements now forms the only possible solution of our politico-economic problem.

It is essential that the reader's mind should have at this point a perfectly distinct impression that, as regards foreign trade pure and simple, British supremacy is not a thing in jeopardy, but a thing which has already disappeared. The leading nation in foreign trade is Germany, and without our Colonies we should be at the present moment a bad second. In 1904, exceptionally favourable to our returns owing to the inflated values of cotton, British exports to the chief protected

and the neutral countries taken together amounted to £188,800,000. German exports to the same countries were £201,000,000, and, in addition, our chief continental competitor exported to the British Empire (Mother Country, Colonies, and dependencies together) to the enormous value of £63,000,000. Both facts give most furiously to think; the second fact particularly showing the immense degree to which German ability to rival us in financial power and to threaten our position at sea depends upon the preservation of present fiscal conditions throughout the British Empire. *Le revenu c'est l'État;* and we may safely add to that celebrated maxim: Commerce means revenue.

Free Traders must admit that the Power which, on the whole, is bound to become our chief naval competitor between the present and the next Trafalgar Centenary could hardly enjoy more favourable conditions for the growth of her trade and revenue than those with which we present her. The facilities enjoyed by Germany in this country under free imports promote her power to build battleships. Our disabilities in the German market in checking our trade injure our finance, and decrease our power to build battleships.

But while fiscal reform would indirectly strengthen our naval power by enabling us to obtain reciprocity from foreign countries, it is in the highest degree improbable that our lost supremacy in purely foreign trade can be under any circumstances regained. In a world of closing markets, where our commerce, as has been shown in detail, must arrive sooner or later in the neutral markets at the point of arrested development long ago reached in the protected markets, the only part of our trade which we can make relatively secure is our trade under the flag. Preference with the Colonies offers the only guarantee for the progress of our commerce and power. Those who say that preference is impossible mean nothing, unless they mean also that the preservation of the British Empire is impossible. 'You have an opportunity; you will never have it again,'

As showing how the vitality of our exports has been nourished by Imperial markets during the last decade, let us first recall the figures given upon a previous page, and presenting a general view of the movement of our outward commerce during the last quarter of a century:

TOTAL BRITISH EXPORTS, 1880-1904, IN QUINQUENNIAL AVERAGES.

1880-1884.	1885-1889.	1890-1894.	1895-1899.	1900-1904.
Million £.	Million £.	Million £.	Million £.	Million £.
234·3	226·2	234·4	239·6	289·2

Almost the whole increase has been gained in the last five years only. Yes; but let us see how the various markets have contributed to that increase. The following table (from the 'Annual Statements') proves instructive:

WHERE BRITISH TRADE HAS INCREASED, 1895-1904.

A. *Exports to Chief Protected Countries.*

	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.	1899.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.
Total exports	96·4	92·0	92·8	89·1	106·0
Coal and ships	9·5	9·5	10·5	11·0	16·8
Net ...	86·9	82·5	82·3	78·1	89·2

Quinquennial net total: 419·0 mill. £. Average: 83·8 mill. £.

	1900.	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.
Total exports ...	119·5	100·7	103·5	104·7	102·7
Coal and ships ...	28·6	20·9	18·8	17·0	15·8
Net	90·9	79·8	84·7	87·7	86·9

Quinquennial net total: 430·0 mill. £. Average: 86·0 mill. £.

Increase in annual average—Absolute: 2·2 mill. £. Relative: 2¾ per cent.

B. *Exports to Neutral Markets.*

	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.	1899.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.
Total exports ...	59·0	63·8	60 0	59·9	70·3
Coal and ships ...	5·5	5·7	6·0	7·0	14·4
Net	53·5	58·1	54·0	52·9	55·9

Quinquennial net total: 274·4 mill. £. Average: 54·9 mill. £.

	1900.	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.
Total exports ...	77·1	74·5	70·4	74·6	85·9
Coal and ships ...	15·5	14·6	10 6	10·4	10·4
Net	61·6	59·9	59·8	64·2	75·5

Quinquennial net total: 321·0 mill. £. Average: 64·2 mill. £.

Increase in annual average—Absolute: 9·3 mill. £. Relative: 17 per cent.

C. *Exports to British Possessions.*

	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.	1899.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.
Total exports ...	70·0	84·1	80·7	83·4	87·6
Coal and ships ...	1·6	1·5	1·4	1·6	2·1
Net	68·4	82·6	79·3	81·8	85·5

Quinquennial net total: 397·6 mill. £. Average: 79·5 mill. £.

	1900.	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill £.	Mill. £.
Total exports ...	94·4	104·9	109·1	111·1	111·9
Coal and ships ...	3·8	2·7	3·4	2·9	3·5
Net	90·6	102·2	105·7	108·2	108·4

Quinquennial net total: 515·1 mill. £. Average: 103·0 mill. £.

Increase in annual average—Absolute: 24·5 mill. £. Relative: 31 per cent.

We deduct new ships because we must, since they were not shown in the returns until 1899, and to include them would vitiate all comparisons. We deduct coal because it is equally necessary, if we are to arrive at any clear conception of the movement of our manufactured exports. We see that the growth of our commerce with the Colonies has been much greater relatively and absolutely than the progress in all foreign markets put together. Were it not for our predominance in trade under the flag, Germany would have shot up by now very nearly to our stature.

If this point needed any further demonstration, the conclusive argument would be found in what is undoubtedly the most significant set of statistics given in either volume of the Inquiry Blue-books.* The next table shows the export of articles wholly or mainly manufactured (excluding ships) in certain years since 1870. It is to be regretted that the Board of Trade officials, in an investigation of so much importance, have not worked out the results in quinquennial averages for the whole or part of the period. But as the figures stand, there can be no mistake about their significance.

EXPORTS OF BRITISH MANUFACTURE ONLY, SHOWN AT INTERVALS OF DECADES FROM 1870 TO 1904.

	To Principal Protected Countries.	To Neutral Countries.	Total to Foreign Countries.	To British Possessions.	General Total.
	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.	Mill. £.
1870 ...	80·7	55·5	136·2	44·9	181·1
1880 ...	81·9	47·4	129·3	67·6	196·9
1890 ...	87·2	60·3	147·5	78·3	225·8
1900 ...	80·3	58·8	139·1	81·1	220·2
1904 ...	72·1	70·0	142·1	97·2	239·3

We need not squander comment upon as plain a tale as statistics can tell. We see that British manufacture in protected markets is a wilting plant, which shows

* Completed from the Annual Statement of Trade for 1904.

every sign of dying down to the root. Had the price of cotton been normal last year, our whole export of manufacture to foreign markets throughout the world would have been rather less than was the same trade thirty-five years ago. Even with inflated cotton values we see that the increase in our whole export of manufactured articles to foreign countries since 1870 has only been £6,000,000 sterling, or under 5 per cent. The parallel increase in our finished exports to the Colonies has been over £50,000,000, or 116 per cent. Were it not for this one fact, Germany would at this moment be within easy reach of the first place as an industrial Power manufacturing for export.

In the face of these figures no rational argument can be held with Free Traders who deny that our position and prospects in the world's trade now depend upon the retention and improvement of our position in Imperial markets. Any Free Trade economist, however, who admits that fact may be very safely challenged to show whether there is any conceivable alternative to Mr. Chamberlain's policy. There is, in truth, none.

XI.

For let us see what will happen if we lose our present position in the colonial trade, and what, on the other hand, may reasonably be expected if the preferential policy is adopted. The present writer has repeatedly declared that the alternative to a preferential system of commerce with the Colonies will be the rise of a system of colonial McKinleyism against the Mother Country and foreign States indifferently. In that deplorable habit of 'crabbing the Colonies' which Free Traders have formed since Mr. Chamberlain launched his great agitation, they have failed to do justice to the extent of the advantages we have enjoyed in Imperial trade up to the present point. It is sometimes assumed that the average colonial tariff is as severe as the average foreign tariff. There is no comparison between the two. We

do not enjoy Free Trade with the Colonies; but the conditions of intercourse are not so far removed from that ideal as many suppose. Take, for instance, the following remarkable comparison from the second Inquiry Blue-book (p. 292):

ESTIMATED AVERAGE 'AD VALOREM' EQUIVALENT OF THE IMPORT DUTIES LEVIED BY THE UNDERMENTIONED FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND BRITISH POSSESSIONS ON THE PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURES EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Foreign Tariffs.	Per Cent.	Colonial Tariffs.	Per Cent.
Russia	131	Canada (preferential tariff)	17
Spain	76	New Zealand (preferential)	9
United States	71	Australia	6
Austria-Hungary ...	35	South Africa (preferential)	6
France	34	India	3
Argentine Republic ...	28		
Italy	27		
Germany	25		
Sweden	23		
Greece	19		
Denmark	18		
Roumania	14		
Belgium	13		
Norway	12		
Japan	9		
Turkey	8		
Switzerland	7		
China	5		
Holland	3		

All our Colonies, except Canada, give us better treatment than we receive from any great civilized State, and Canada gives us better treatment than we get from Argentina or Denmark. By these special facilities the Colonies give indirect assistance to our commerce, revenue, and fleet. They make, as it were, an invisible contribution to the maintenance of Empire. But unless a preferential system prevails, the process of strangulation will eventually be felt in the Colonies them-

selves. They are free. They will put up their tariffs as the European countries have done and as the neutral countries are beginning to do, unless we can give them some sufficient inducement to act otherwise. It is a matter of life and death to British commerce that some means should be found to preserve for the manufactures of the Mother Country a preferential passage through the barriers of Inter-imperial Protection. Mr. Chamberlain's most bitter opponent would hardly deny, it may be supposed, that since Free Trade throughout the Empire is not attainable, the main aim of the fiscal movement—keeping itself within the bounds of possibility, reckoning step by step with the concrete, and losing sight of no single interest as it goes—is to establish throughout the Empire *the freest trade attainable.*

The choice is not between fiscal reform and the *status quo*, but between an extended preferential system and something far worse than the *status quo.* That is the fact to be faced, and Mr. Cobden's disciples have never yet faced it. Let us observe the actual working of preference during the seven complete years in which it has been in operation. England and Germany are at a tolerably equal geographical disadvantage in competing with the United States upon the other side of the Atlantic. We have the following comparisons:

British and German Exports to Canada under the Preferential System, 1898-1904.

British Exports.		Germa	
	Million £.		Million £.
1898	5·8	1898 ...	1·2
1899	7·0	1899 ...	1·2
1900	7·6	1900 ...	1·0
1901	7·8	1901 ...	1·3
1902	10·3	1902 ...	1·9
1903	11·1	1903 ...	1·8
1904	10·6	1904 ...	1·2

German trade remains where it was when preference in Canada was first adopted; British has doubled.

Canada is the only market in the world where German trade during the last few years has lost relative ground. Nothing, we should have thought, but the sheer mania for 'crabbing the Colonies' could dispute the force of this contrast or disparage the Dominion for considerably swelling, by the evident action of preference, these recent Board of Trade returns in which Free Traders so eminently rejoice. Of the economic potency of preference as a general principle there could be no more forcible suggestion. No one, however, supposes that the Colonies will permanently concede privilege to the Mother Country in their markets without some reciprocity in ours. Preference means relative advantage under the British flag for British as against foreign producers. Free Trade in this market for colonists and aliens indifferently is not preference: it gives no more advantage to Australians and Canadians who fought in the War than to Argentine citizens who, as far as we are concerned, are simply political bystanders, or to Russian mujiks, who might be mobilized against us.

If we give exactly the same support to the Argentine Republic as we do to the Australian Commonwealth, upon what intelligible principle do we expect that Australia shall make special sacrifices to help us? For sentiment? Armaments are not created nor wars waged for sentiment. Were the Colonies prepared to tax themselves for Imperial purposes, to fight under the Imperial flag, for reasons no more urgent than those of sentiment, they would not be patriotic, but insane. Do we expect the Colonies, then, to combine with us for the joint defence of equally vital interests—for the maintenance of the whole vast maritime Commonwealth in whose undiminished and increasing power resides the sole security of its confederate nationalities and fiefs? The Colonies may well question whether we possess even now, when our relative naval strength has unquestionably reached its maximum, a more powerful fleet than the protection of our insular existence demands. If the King possessed not one inch of territory overseas,

we should still have to remain the leading naval nation, or cease to be an independent Power.

Whether the British Empire stands or falls, Canada, Australia, the West Indies, perhaps South Africa, could insure the safety of a subordinate existence by entering the American Union, and making their preferential trade arrangements with the United States upon the Cuban model. This Country, her day of glory gone, might be taken into the same system on terms. In such an Anglo-American conception of Imperial destiny painlessly extinguished by Republican patronage, some excellent Free Traders profess to find a comforting reassurance. Do they leave a veil of vague optimism floating across the background of their reflections, or do they think the question through? Their solution means the death of the English idea. The American idea is potent, but it is not the English idea. The two things are as different as was Shakespeare's London from Modern Chicago. Slav and Italian emigration is pouring into the United States a tide of alien blood, diluting more and more the original spirit of that society. Nelson's name means less to the Great Republic than does the name of Admiral Dewey, and the centenary of Trafalgar is not so moving as the anniversary of Manila Bay:

> 'It is not to be thought of that the Flood
> Of British freedom, which to the open sea
> Of the world's praise from dark antiquity
> Hath flowed "with pomp of waters unwithstood,"
> Should perish, and to evil and to good
> Be lost for ever.'

The life of the English idea depends upon the maintenance in separate identity and power of the Imperial Commonwealth under the Crown. Sentiment and interest in the case of nations we can no more separate than soul from substance in a living body. If we wish the Colonies to desire with sufficient intensity this future, and no other, we must give them a far more direct and

tangible interest in the support of the fleet and the preservation of the whole fabric of Empire than they now possess. And if we believe with Sir Michael Hicks-Beach—as the overwhelming majority of Englishmen, whether as yet fiscal reformers or not, do believe—that the continued safety and greatness of our Imperial existence depends upon securing the cooperation of the Colonies, the refusal to make a special use of our present economic power for the purpose of developing population in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Transvaal, rather than in the United States and Argentina, can form no part of any intelligible system of politics.

XII.

That preference would actually develop the Colonies is a point not susceptible of dispute. Mr. Chamberlain's opponents concede that point by each of the mutually-destructive arguments they advance against shifting the food-taxation which we have always had, and cannot dispense with, from tea and sugar to wheat and meat. They admit (1) that the Colonies would be developed when they declare that it would raise the price of agricultural produce, since in that case emigration would flock to the Colonies to share the benefit, and also when they declare (2) that preference would complete the ruin of the farmer by flooding the home market with an increased supply of still cheaper corn. For, again, the Colonies could only cheapen supply to that degree by enlarging their agricultural population.

Let us repeat once more that there is no substitute for this market. Foreign growers attempting to find compensation elsewhere for the operation of preference in this country would still find themselves confronted in every other important consuming centre in the world by agrarian tariffs many times as high as any duties that Mr. Chamberlain suggests or democracy would ever tolerate. Foreign countries now sending us our food supplies would either have to sell cheaper or to reduce production. That they would be gradually elimi-

nated as the productive power of the Colonies expanded there can be little doubt. The following figures, showing the change in the origin of our wheat supplies during the last few years, have a force of their own :

WHEAT IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND BRITISH POSSESSIONS, 1900-1905.

	From Foreign Countries.		From British Possessions.	
	Million Cwt.	Percentage of Total.	Million Cwt.	Percentage of Total.
1900 ...	58·5	84	10·2	16
1901 ...	52·9	76	16·9	24
1902 ...	58·3	72	22·7	28
1903 ...	60·2	68	27·9	32
1904 ...	55·4	57	42·4	43

That the Colonies and the Punjaub together are capable of furnishing our entire wheat-supply there is no doubt. As little that they could send us all the meat that we now purchase from the foreigner, to the tune of nearly £20,000,000 annually. As little that our tropical possessions could produce all the cotton now imported from foreign countries (including Egypt), to the amount of more than £40,000,000 annually.

And the people who grow the raw cotton are the people who wear the cotton manufacture. When Lancashire draws the crude staple from the United States, the successors of Alexander Hamilton take excellent care that Lancashire does not send back the finished goods. But when we develop within the Empire a field for the raw growth, we develop simultaneously a new market for the manufacture, and set up the reciprocal mechanism of exchange that Cobden intended and McKinleyism prevents. It is not, indeed, proposed (as it might be were Lancashire sufficiently far-sighted and bold in its commercial thinking) to put a preferential duty upon cotton as the most efficacious means of developing the British cultivation. But in confining ourselves to the food supplies upon which

Mr. Chamberlain and his supporters have definitely proposed that preference shall operate, it may be said without exaggeration that if the great self-governing Colonies were now engaged in supplying the vast bulk of our imported grain and meat, they would possess double their present white population. Preference would turn the flow of agricultural emigrants—the stream of human irrigation—towards the uncultivated tracts of the Empire. If combined as it must be with adequate support of enterprises like that of the British Cotton Growing Association, it would enhance the value of every tropical dependency we possess. These neutral markets within the Empire would of course remain neutral and become continually richer, increasing their capacity to consume finished articles parallel with their ability to supply raw produce.

Our commercial competitors would still enjoy fairer treatment in our market than we have had for many years in their markets. Our predominance in maritime trade would be secure for as long as there is need to calculate. And with commercial security would come political security. Preference would so accelerate the filling up of the Colonies that within half a lifetime we might expect their combined population to equal that of the Mother Country. Their national self-consciousness would be intensified with their growth. None of them under the modern conditions of *Weltpolitik* would be strong enough to stand alone.

Linked with the Mother Country and with each other in an Imperial Sea League, financed in every portion of the Empire by a small taxation of imports, as Mr. Hofmeyr suggested at the first Jubilee Conference, their position would be once for all unassailable. The unpeopled parts of the King's dominions will be to the twentieth century what the Far West of the United States was to the nineteenth, and the relative political and financial strength of the Britannic Commonwealth could only increase with time. Upon some similar basis alone is the permanence of the Empire thinkable. For Colonies, in Turgot's phrase, are no

longer to be regarded as fruits which cling till they ripen. The Asiatic renaissance; the Russia of a generation hence, counting well-nigh two hundred millions of people; the United States, which is tolerably certain of reckoning a hundred million inhabitants within a dozen years—not to speak of that possible pan-German Empire which would nearly double the strength and numbers of existing Germany—these influences will bring into play the economic, military, and naval power of such vast organisms all over the globe that we may lay down a new maxim as a fundamental truth of future politics —henceforth separatism must reduce security.

XIII.

The age of separatism is over, because the organization of the world proceeds. The great races are rapidly plotting out their definite boundaries. The possibilities of conquest will become more and more strictly limited; the equipoise of human forces more stable; the margin for dispute narrower; the prospect more distinct of an Areopagus of all civilization 'striking a universal peace through sea and land.' The break-up of the British Empire would overturn the existing equilibrium throughout the globe and plunge the world in war upon the greatest question of redistribution known to history. The final consolidation of the British Empire would be by far the greatest step ever taken towards the ultimate integration of mankind. Only imaginations prone, in Lord Beaconsfield's words, 'to make themselves miserable in the anticipation of evils that never happen,' can sincerely suppose that definite arrangements between the Mother Country, the Colonies, and India for mutual economic support as a means to political security would result in antagonism rather than cohesion.

Upon such a contention all organization should develop friction in multiplying points of contact—all order should mean disorder. It is the very argument of anarchy. Nor is the cause of 'freedom' at stake in the attempt to marshal a voluntary combination of free

communities for the more certain defence of their freedom, and for the maintenance of that dominion only won by the triumph in arms of a people nourished upon national liberty over forces that were then less free. Phrases must be scrutinized as well as repeated. We cannot assume without reflection that there is more inherent virtue in the adjective of 'free' imports than in the adjective of 'free' love. To assert that the abstract idea of unrealized 'Free Trade' is identified with our concrete system of fettered exchange is the abuse of words. To protest that fiscal separatism between the Mother Country and her colleagues is indispensable to their political agreement is the last abuse of paradox.

XIV.

The real argument against preference is of another character. It does not deny that the Colonies would benefit, but asserts that they would enjoy the sole benefit, that our general trade connections would be impaired, and that the English working classes would be unduly burthened. Let us briefly examine these contentions, and attempt clear answers to them.

1. *That the Colonies would be developed at our expense, the Mother Country enjoying no reciprocal advantage.*

To make this assertion is to confess that one has not studied the Inquiry Blue-books. Let us repeat some of the figures.

ESTIMATED 'AD VALOREM' EQUIVALENT OF THE IMPORT DUTIES LEVIED BY THE UNDER-MENTIONED FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND BRITISH POSSESSIONS ON THE PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURES EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Foreign Tariffs.	Per Cent.	Colonial Tariffs.	Per Cent.
Russia	131	Canada	17
United States	73	New Zealand	9
France	34	Australia	6
Argentina	28	South Africa	6
Germany...	25	India	3

Examine that list. Remember that, with immense territories and thin population, making the collection of direct taxation disproportionately expensive and difficult, the Colonies must depend in the main upon import duties for their revenue. It will then appear that the Mother Country could not expect better tariff treatment than she gets. Nor does all the burthen even of these low rates fall upon us. So far as the Colonies have not yet got competing manufactures of their own—for they are still largely without them, and it will take a very long time to establish them—the colonists themselves pay the tax. The tariff does not fall on British goods at all. But, in any case, compare the 17 per cent. rate in Canada with the 73 per cent. rate in the United States. Compare the Australian and South African 6 per cent. with the Russian 131 per cent., or the Argentine 28 per cent. We keep India to the 3 per cent. by force, and by force alone, and we give her no equivalent, but tax her tea exactly as we do Chinese. In India the very name of Free Trade, as Lord George Hamilton has admitted and every Anglo-Indian knows, 'is loathed' accordingly, and that condition of things, if unaltered, will eventually prove the greatest danger to our dominion.*

In short, it must appear that to give wheat, meat, and wool from Russia, the United States, and Argentina the same treatment that we extend to Canada, Australia, and South Africa in return for their much more favourable treatment of our manufactures is a singularly inverted idea of reciprocity. By the tariff conditions obvious upon the face of the figures, every development of population and cultivation in the self-governing Colonies must be from fivefold to tenfold and twentyfold more favourable to the expansion of British trade than any similar extension of population and cultivation outside the flag. Preference, even upon the present basis of colonial tariffs, or upon anything like that basis, could not benefit colonial production without benefiting to an equivalent extent the

* It is in this sense that the Bengal boycott shows the danger-signal to Lancashire.

return trade of the Mother Country. But it is said that colonial manufacturing interests demand more protection against the Mother Country. It is true that this movement exists; equally true that only preference can restrain it, by increasing the agricultural vote, which in new countries is always for relatively low tariffs; absolutely true that without the restraining influence of preference the process of tightening the tariff in all the great Colonies must become nothing less than fatal to British trade.

Even if colonial rates upon our manufactures became rather less favourable than now, they would remain far more favourable than they otherwise could be. This at least will be admitted, by anyone who knows the Colonies, to be as certain as a result in mathematics. Yes, but preference, by its very meaning—relative advantage—will bring another factor into play. Whatever the absolute rates in the Colonies may be, we shall always enjoy under them a relative advantage over our foreign competitors. The higher they are, *the greater* will be the extent of our advantage over all foreign competitors. Instance the working of the American preferential tariff with Cuba. The duty against Indian rice is that of the general tariff, 1 dollar 20 cents per 100 kilos, with a preference of 40 per cent. upon that rate in favour of Louisiana and Texas rice-growers. Their advantage, therefore, over Indian competitors is 48 cents per 100 kilos. But to make the preference more effective it is proposed to more than double the general rate. Rice from the United States will pay more than double what it does now, but still 40 per cent. less than Indian rice, so that the absolute advantage per 100 kilos over the British product will be raised from 48 cents to 1 dollar 10 cents, and America, though paying heavier duties than before, will get the whole trade. We could hardly have a more opportune illustration of the effective working of 'relative advantage,' no matter what the absolute rate may be.

With a fixed percentage of deduction in our favour, the higher the Colonies made their general tariffs the more decisive would be our advantage in their markets

against foreign goods. This would act as an automatic compensation for every new development of colonial manufacture. What is meant may be still more clearly explained. Even the most highly protected States have still a large import of foreign manufactured goods. As their primary industries arise their wealth increases, and import continues—supplying social luxuries by the more refined forms of foreign manufacture, and more complex economic needs by the machinery of more advanced production. Finished imports never perish under Protection, they only change their character; and if in the United States, the French, and the German and other markets we had a preference over all other outside competitors, our now declining trade with what the Inquiry Blue-books call 'the chief protected countries' would be greater than ever. It does not so much matter, if preference prevails, what the Colonies do with their general tariffs. We hope they will keep them low. But so long as we enjoy a substantial relative advantage over all foreign competitors—'preference' pure and simple—our trade with the colonial markets must remain secure and progressive.

XV.

2. *That preference to the Colonies would injure our foreign trade connections.*

How? Has American Protection injured its foreign trade, which is expanding in all directions? Is it not the fact that the exports of France under the Méline tariff have been advancing, in spite of her stationary population, at a more rapid rate than our own? And has not Germany increased her export of manufactured goods by 50 per cent. in the last twenty years? Is there any protected country to be named in the world whose foreign trade under the tariff is receding? Is Japan declining under the low average tariff which is almost exactly what Mr. Chamberlain proposes? If he proposed twice that rate our foreign competitors would

still have the benefit of milder treatment in our market than they experience from each other.

They would still have no substitute for this market, and they would still be bound to give us 'most favoured nation' treatment in return for the same. Imperial preference would not injure our general trade connections. A judicious national tariff, with a low scale for all who gave us reciprocity and a high scale for those who refused it, would improve our foreign connections by reducing somewhat the present level of hostile duties.

XVI.

3. *That preference would entail disproportionate burthens upon the working-classes of the Mother Country.*

This proposition, like most of the fundamental questions of politics, resolves itself into a battle of belief. The rival prophets cannot argue; they can only disbelieve each other. All great legislation is adopted or rejected in advance of the results that refute or justify. Proposers claim that results will be beneficial, opponents that they must be mischievous. The working out of events is commonly somewhat different from the anticipations of either. In the present case we are not wholly without scientific light, and we have additional suggestions that would carry, on the whole, conclusive weight with a jury.

It has been shown that colonial preference cannot benefit the Colonies without increasing the demand for British goods and for the British labour embodied in them. To the consequent improvement of exchange and enlargement of output, wages as well as profits must respond. But it is further contended that a general and serious rise in prices must swallow up any benefit of that kind. Let us consider. We have already had the proof that a shilling tax upon all wheat imports did not raise the price of bread. That a two-shilling tax upon little more than half those imports would raise the cost of the quartern loaf at all is in the highest degree improbable.

Production in the Colonies would be stimulated, and the amount of foreign wheat available for export to this country would have nowhere else to go, the tariff against it being fivefold as high in all other wheat-consuming markets of consequence. The food-supply could not be restricted, and might be sensibly increased. No competent economist will declare that under these circumstances any rise of price whatever is certain. No competent economist will say that the rise could be in the worst case serious or more perceptible than those trivial fluctuations due to varying harvests and freight-rates which are of constant occurrence. In the end, the colonial producer, having a constant relative advantage, would drive all alien competitors well-nigh out of the market. But this adjustment would be gradual, and need have no particular effect upon prices. Reference to p. 122 will show that the process of substituting Imperial wheat for foreign wheat is actually taking place now without exerting any particular effect upon prices. In 1900 the Colonies and India supplied no more than a sixth of our food-supply. Last year they supplied nearly half. But the cry of dear loaves, though heard from political platforms, was not otherwise audible.

We can only gain by a preference which will accelerate this process—securing colonial produce in the Mother Country and British manufacture in the Colonies. The orthodox importers, who may perhaps be called so without offence, have already half surrendered the position which it was originally thought might be defended by sangars of dear loaves. Lord Rosebery and Lord Ripon do not now expect little loaves to occur under preference. They warn the farmer that the cheapness of wheat under preference will accomplish his ruin. When casuistry becomes so flexible, honest minds will agree that, although the effect of a two-shilling duty upon that moiety of our food-supplies coming from foreign sources may be an interesting speculation, nobody can seriously expect that the loaf in the worst event, so far as the working classes are concerned, will be smaller by any visible fraction of an ounce.

A much graver matter is the possibility that the stimulation of colonial production might further injure the position of agriculture in this country, and reduce still more the diminished numbers of our agricultural population. For such a result nothing could really compensate, and it must at any cost be prevented. For this purpose it would be better, in the present writer's conviction, to reimpose the registration duty of one shilling upon every quarter of wheat imported, whether from the Colonies or elsewhere. Above that limit colonial corn should be free, and the duty upon foreign breadstuffs might well be made three shillings. There would be no objection from the Colonies. They do not care what absolute rates we fix. They wish to retain their liberty in that respect, and to leave us ours. They desire nothing but the relative advantage in our market over foreign agriculture that they are ready and eager to concede to us in their market over foreign manufacture. They cannot give us absolute Free Trade, and do not expect it in return. They understand our wish to encourage what remains of home agriculture, and they will respect us for doing it. The advantage of restoring the registration duty on all imported wheat, abating all duty over and above in favour of the Colonies, is that it would enable fiscal reform to give home agriculture the definite guarantee it has a right to expect, would secure a permanent revenue, and, it may be useful to add, would cause less soreness in the United States than a preference solely discriminating between Colonial and foreign produce. The probable cheapening, and not the dearness, of the loaf is the real problem raised by preference as hitherto proposed.

XVII.

The Duke of Devonshire, though head of the Free Food League, was a member of the Cabinet which imposed a shilling tax on all wheat imports, and expects the working classes to be injured not so much by any increase in the cost of food as by the higher price of manufactured articles under a 10 per cent.

tariff. To this it may be directly replied: That at least half the value of all manufactured goods is represented by the remuneration of labour; that wages in this country follow prices; that the strength of the trades union organizations makes it quite certain that employers will be compelled to divide fairly with their workmen any larger profits which increased command of the home market may give them; that the power of the trusts established in America upon the basis of a practically prohibitory 70 per cent. tariff cannot be repeated in any way in this country under an average 10 per cent. tariff, checking foreign competition, but by no means high enough to exclude it; and, finally, that the control of the Legislature by the people in this country is direct and absolute to a degree unknown in America; and an abuse of the tariff by capital would mean an end of the tariff, which, when adopted, will only be retained if democracy finds by actual experiment that it prospers better than it did before. And all the argument of orthodox importers enormously exaggerates the nature of the change which Mr. Chamberlain actually proposes. The economic difference between simple free imports and an average 10 per cent. tariff is less in degree than the difference between that scale and the average German rates of duty upon foreign manufactures. Mr. Chamberlain's policy would be nearer free imports than to any important continental system of Protection, and in this respect it promises well as representing the final application to practical economics of that distinctive spirit of constructive compromise in which all the greatest measures of English statesmanship have been achieved.

XVIII.

There is no alternative in trade. There is none in policy. Under the present system the relative decay of our commerce must begin at no very distant date to sap the foundations of our power. We shall remain without means to negotiate for reciprocity with our foreign competitors, or to check the steady decline of our trade

in the protected markets of Europe and the United States. We shall be helpless to prevent the repetition of that injury in neutral markets, like those of the Far East and South America. In any case the natural development of increased competition from the United States and Japan, possessing geographical advantages and political facilities we cannot equal, must arrest our progress in those regions, as we have seen it arrested during the passing generation upon the European Continent.

The Colonies will join one and all in the world-wide process of closing markets. Instead of possibly tighter tariffs with considerable compensation under preference, we shall have even higher barriers, without any compensation in the shape of preferential scaling-ladders. Secure of free imports in this country under all circumstances, the Colonies would simply be encouraged towards McKinleyism by the system of unconditional free imports, which to all outside the island means Protection with impunity. German and American competition will extend its inroads into the home and colonial markets alike, and British industry, unable to threaten foreign rivalry at the base in any way, will continue to show less vitality in enterprise under the fatal sense of being upon the defensive at all points. Free imports can only end in reducing an island with a comparatively small population, and without a hinterland, to the same position as if it had never founded a colony or possessed one acre of Imperial territory oversea. Our population must become stationary like that of France, and then it must decline, as it depends for its present state of numbers and prosperity upon the exterior trade, which might be diminished indefinitely with lapse of time, and is not adjusted, like the population of France, to the inexhaustible productiveness of the soil.

There can be no political substitute for the unifying influence of preference. In Germany the Zollverein had to precede the *Kriegsverein* and the restoration of the Reich. In the American Colonies, after the

War of Independence, the genius of Alexander Hamilton used the tariff as a means of evoking order out of chaos, and moulding the jarring fragments of a broken Empire into a new nation. 'Whatever we may think of it now,' said Daniel Webster in a celebrated passage. 'the Constitution was the child of pressing commercial necessity.' Every attempt to bring the revolted Colonies into harmony for other purposes had failed, and Webster continues, in words which have an extraordinary aptness to the case of the Mother Country and her Colonies to-day:

'The exigency of the case called for a new movement, for a more direct and powerful attempt to bring the good sense and patriotism of the country into action upon the crisis. A solemn assembly was therefore proposed—a general convention of delegates from all the States. And now, sir, what was the exigency? What was this crisis? Look at the resolution itself. There is not an idea in it but trade. Commerce, commerce, is the beginning and end of it.'

The passage is an almost startling tribute to the political efficacy of 'sordid bonds.' Similarly, in the British Empire preference must precede federation. Its case appears, at a superficial view, more complex and unpromising than that of the thirteen Colonies, but is in reality less so. We have, for all practical purposes, but six great units to coordinate. Let Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the South African Colonies, and India frame an agreement upon the principle of relative advantage in Imperial markets for all the members of the group as against foreign competition, and the work is done. A task of its nature difficult and delicate indeed, but, with the predisposition to agreement, manageable. The Colonies will assuredly not enter at first into a Kriegsverein. They are not represented at Westminster or in the Cabinet, they have no voice in British foreign policy, and they will make no agreement to give definite military or financial support for purposes over which they have no control. And if, on the other hand, representation means taxation, as it must, the Colonies at present are not ready for federation upon that basis.

They are under no compelling sense of necessity. We of the Mother Country believe in the overwhelming advantage of naval centralization. The Colonies believe that even greater importance attaches to the principle of preferential commerce as a means of strengthening the financial basis of sea-power. If we cannot come to an understanding with them upon the economic question — which in its ultimate bearing upon Imperial finance is the problem underlying every other—they cannot come any nearer to us upon the naval question.

But if the imperfect Zollverein of a preferential system is once formed, it is certain that the defensive strength of the Empire will be augmented by an imperfect Kriegsverein. The enthusiasm of the Colonies may easily be aroused on behalf of Australian and Canadian navies. The principle is in theory vicious, and would be in practice wholly bad, were the question one of the faulty distribution of a given force. But if it means a positive and considerable increase of naval force beyond what the Empire as a whole would otherwise possess, the gain will be real, and ultimately very great, though still less, from an Imperial point of view, than if the Colonies were willing to put the funds required for the development of their navies at the disposal of the British Admiralty. With the new pride and interest which distinctively Canadian and Australian squadrons would awaken, the Dominion and the Commonwealth would pay more money and build more ships than under any other conditions. A small tax might be levied for purely naval purposes upon all imports throughout the Empire. Though the distribution of its forces would not be the best, the Empire would dispose of more ships, and of more money for ships, than under any other circumstances. The necessity for consultation between the Mother Country and her maritime Colonies upon questions of naval development and strategy would arise; foreign policy would have to be discussed in that connection; and an Imperial Council of Trade and Defence would inevitably emerge. But preferential commerce for the purpose of acceler-

ating the growth of the Colonies and strengthening the foundations of our own national finance and trade-supremacy is the primary essential. Preference, in a word, is the point from which all further evolution must unfold. Repeating the expressive biological term, it is the 'growing spot' of Imperial federation.

XIX.

Le revenu c'est l'État. That maxim has been ignored in one vital respect by the framers of our commercial policy. Modern British statesmanship seems to have overlooked the fact that such a problem as that of relative power exists, and that the most important changes in relative power occur most usually in peace through the operation of economic causes. The bearing of this reflection upon free imports and the future of national finance is profound. It is not paradoxical, but simply true, to say that, within the British Empire, the people of the British islands are the only class of mankind who do not enjoy commercial equality. Home enterprise may be as efficiently repressed by domestic taxation as by tariffs abroad. The classical economists agreed that the former factor should be taken into account in considering whether absolutely open ports should be conceded. A merchant must allow for his taxes. Compared with his competitor abroad, he does not get the same benefit from nominally equal profits unless he is as lightly taxed. A foreign rival less severely burthened than is the British taxpayer may be enabled by that fact to undersell the latter in his own market.

Follow out this thought. The Trafalgar Centenary reminds us that we are still carrying the immense financial weight of the wars that won the Empire. In the Napoleonic struggle, under Pitt's blindly heroic system of war finance, we pay not only for the defence of our own liberties, but for the freedom of Europe. The subsidies to our allies, though their own interests were more imminently at stake than ours, form part of the heavy heritage which presses upon us. While Napoleon waged his wars without leaving a penny of debt, and

Bismarck waged war at a profit, we not only received no indemnity, but we mortgaged our resources to put countries like Prussia, Austria, and Russia in a position of increased power. They fought for us, it is true, but they also fought for themselves. We ran into debt to a considerable extent in order to induce them to fight for themselves. We loaded our posterity to spare theirs.

It is only since 1870 that we have been able to appreciate fully the element of celestial irony in that fact. The Iron Chancellor wrung the five milliards from France, and his ruthlessness meant one of the most effective achievements in the whole history of the economic competition of nations. The result of the contrast is as follows: that the service of the British National Debt is £27,000,000 a year; of the German Imperial Debt, little more than one-fifth of that amount, or £5,200,000. We pay £29,400,000 for our army, and Germany supports the first army in the world for less, her military estimates amounting to £28,900,000; while we find nearly £37,000,000 for the navy, Germany provides at present rather less than £12,000,000. But if she had a fleet larger than ours, her total charge for debt and the two services would be many millions less than our present total charge for these items. Let us keep, however, to the comparison between existing facts. For Imperial Debt and armaments we pay £93,300,000; Germany £45,800,000, or less than half our burthen.

In this respect alone a German trades in these islands upon more favourable terms than our own people. They are handicapped by the financial services they rendered him in Nelson's and Napoleon's era, while his tariff, in return, forces the British manufacturer to contribute more or less to the cost of his navy. The contrast can be even more forcibly expressed. For the cost of the struggles which made the Empire the British people must pay out of their profits and earnings £27,000,000 a year to the State. Their German and American competitors enter the home market, the Indian market, and the South African market without paying one farthing towards this burthen, and enter,

therefore, not on a free and equal, but on a privileged, footing. We bear, as it were, all the foundation expenses of the markets we keep open for their benefit. We bear all the cost of our own wars, and part of the cost of their wars; for we still pay, generations afterwards, income-tax towards the expense of driving the French out of the United States as well as out of Germany.

This is the aspect in which our fiscal system least resembles sanity. It works most directly to increase the relative power of our competitors. *Le revenu c'est l'Etat.* The more we facilitate their trade, the more their revenue is assisted, and as it rises, in the case of Germany, it goes straight into battleships. The more our trade is restricted by foreign tariffs, on the other hand, the more our revenue is injured. Since we must provide for a certain expenditure, by so much as we exempt foreign trade from indirect taxation, by so much do we increase the burthen of direct taxation upon ourselves. Free imports in this market do not mean equality. They act as a continuous discount upon national resources, and under the peculiar conditions of our historic indebtedness they involve a species of discrimination against the British citizen. Preference for the King's subjects throughout the Empire, in the home market no less than in the Colonies, is no less just than desirable. The system of relative advantage in Imperial commerce would enhance our relative power in international politics. The agreement of Mr. Chamberlain's foreign opponents on this point is one of the facts which should decide us in favour of his policy.

The Spectator, for instance, recently recommended* its readers to study, as the best refutation of fiscal reform arguments, Dr. Pierre Aubry's comparatively recent book.† The present writer has given due attention to a volume worthy of some respect. Stiffly dogmatic in opinion, and far from showing the very widest acquaint-

* In a review of 'Compatriot Club Essays.'

† 'Étude Critique de la Politique Commerciale de l'Angleterre à l'Égard des ses Colonies,' par Pierre Aubry (Rivière, Toulouse, 1904).

ance with modern economics and politics, the book is admirably clear from its point of view. But that point of view is purely anti-Imperial. Here is one of Mr. Chamberlain's most intelligent and temperate opponents in Europe, whose treatise is recommended by the principal Free Trade organ in this country. Yet Dr. Aubry admits fully, without reserve, that Mr. Chamberlain's policy would succeed in its purposes. It would maintain and develop the political power of the Empire; but that is not to our economic Girondin a proper economic aim. 'Mr. Chamberlain's projects of reform aim at constituting the British Empire into a complete self-sufficing organism, and are consequently in perfect harmony with the prevailing conception of political interests. But the great error lies in thinking that these reforms could have any other result than to preserve political interests or interests of domination.' Dr. Aubry distrusts Imperialism in itself, and thinks its progress would lead to aggression. Owing, apparently, to the increased armaments we should be compelled on this assumption to support, we should suffer economic losses, 'but they would be compensated for by an increase of political power.' The author of 'La Politique Commerciale de l'Angleterre' concedes the political argument of these pages—which have already answered his purely economic contentions—that preference would conduce to the maintenance of Empire. Upon the basis of his plea for the Navigation Laws, Adam Smith himself would be compelled to arrive at the same conclusion as the French Free Trader.*

* Since these pages were written there has appeared during the last few weeks another noteworthy German study of the Preference Policy—'Chamberlain's Handelspolitik,' von Marie Schwab—with a remarkable preface by Professor Adolf Wagner. The celebrated veteran of German economic science writes: 'the fate of Holland which so many Britons fear will happen to them, though not so soon. As a means of staving off the evil day the Chamberlain plans deserve the support of all Britons.... The Chamberlain policy keeps power and security no less than welfare in sight, and is thoroughly in Adam Smith's manner' (Gustav Fischer, Jena).

XX.

The orthodox economy has failed in action, and its influence upon practical statesmanship throughout the world has disappeared, precisely because its disciples, while zealous for humanity, have been deficient in the organic sense of national life. They attempted to study the wealth of nations, while ignoring, as Adam Smith never entirely did, the higher laws governing the power of nations. Even from the point of humanitarian—yes, and of purely economic—ideals this was a profound error. Humanity can only be served through strong nations. What we have from the Greek spirit and the Roman mind we derive in the main from the epochs of their political greatness. In later times, Spanish wit and eloquence shone and were extinguished with Spanish supremacy. In thought, art, letters, France achieved in her ages of victory the best she has done. From the Thirty Years War to the period of Bismarck, the force of German intellect marched with German strength in arms. The Elizabethan genius flushed the dawn of England's rise to power; it is not altogether fanciful to think that with Milton the spirit of the New Model touches literature; and with the struggle against Napoleon came another phase of supreme psychological vigour. And Holland, having her Grotius, her Spinoza, and her Rembrandt while she held the sea, produced no men like them afterwards.

'Humanity' is nothing but the individual men and women composing it, and the worth of the aggregate is determined by the value of the units. But the soul of a whole people seems to strengthen or decay with that sense of national vitality and national achievement which—like the electric helix, giving energy to what was before the dead weight of a soft iron bar—raises to a higher power the faculties of its component individuals. 'Humanity' can do nothing for 'humanity,' and races do most for other races by the example they give and the ideals they pursue in the process of their own development.

But, even from the purely economic point of view,

the same consideration holds good. All wealth is a result of mind applied to matter. The matter is always there. The factor of human capacity is exceedingly variable. The quickened sense of relative power in a nation acts, and can only act, through its individuals. It means more initiative, more enterprise, more inventiveness, more energy. It constitutes one of the strongest economic forces by which the wealth of nations can be promoted. A sound economic policy will always be directed towards the increase of relative power.

Isolated free imports lend no assistance to that aim, but, on the contrary, defeat it. That they promote the expansion of manufacture and population in foreign countries, and advance all the interests of those countries, no one disputes. That the tariffs of the same countries restrict our own manufacture, and are injurious to all our interests, no one disputes. That free imports and foreign tariffs must therefore work together towards the decrease of our relative power and against the maintenance of Empire is a proposition of which the truth must appear self-evident. Habit may continue to dispute it, reason cannot. It is, indeed, if we look into the matter, the single point upon which the two schools of controversialists are already, without knowing it, in agreement. For Mr. Cobden's disciples and Mr. Chamberlain's supporters are wholly at one in believing free imports to be a blessing to foreign nations—and they are again at one in holding that foreign tariffs are prejudicial to ourselves. But even if our foreign commerce could be carried on under improved conditions, no conceivable extent of success in that sphere could now solve our Imperial problem.

It is not enough to stop the process by which we have helped our competitors to gain upon us. The Empire needs to make up leeway. Trade in which we divide the benefits equally with Germany, Russia, or the United States is only half the political value—transactions being considered as economically equal—of the trade which strengthens the wealth and population of the Empire on both sides of the sea, and works absolutely

for the increase of relative power. Citizens of different States associated in commerce may conflict in politics. The benefits they have respectively received in trade may be applied in war to the purpose of destroying each other. This is not the statement of a perverted principle. It is simply the brief and comprehensive description of the frightful realities underlying international life. If England at some future period were to perish at sea in that 'Trafalgar reversed' to which a vigorous portion of the Kaiser's subjects aspires with methodical enthusiasm, the accumulated effect of all the benefits that Germany had ever received in trade with us would directly contribute to our overthrow.

But citizens of the same Empire, even if they compete in commerce, cooperate in politics. Every transaction between them means a double contribution to the common safety. As taxpayers they mutually lighten their burthens as they mutually increase their resources. The State to which they belong gets both the benefits incident to every transaction between them. The British Empire has the opportunity to apply this principle with unprecedented effect. Alone among all States now or formerly existing, it includes nations and possessions upon many sides of the sea. It is capable of creating a predominant ocean traffic within itself The Mother Country and her great Colonies are one people. The vigour nourished in the new communities under the flag can never under modern conditions be used against us. Our Colonies are no longer 'fruits which cling till they ripen,' but banyan-shoots spreading with repeated root from the parent-trunk to strengthen the system they extend.

British fiscal reformers are the victims of no phrase, the slaves of no dogma. They preach no universal panacea. Their ideals are not projected into the vague. They know no identical solution for the economic problems of all countries and all ages. They are convinced that humanity at large is best served in the long-run by those who best serve their own country. They are content to advocate a policy no less distinct in

its limits than splendid in its scope, which seeks to secure the existence and progress of Greater Britain under the conditions of the time in which we live. Fiscal reformers in this country are as free as at any time to condemn the extravagances and absurdities of American Protection and German agrarianism. Seeking to promote the definite interests of the Empire under definite conditions, they would oppose the abuse of the Protectionist idea as they resist now the perverted application of the Free Trade theory. They are prepared to stand against the falsehood of extremes upon the right hand and the left hand. To say that the tariff principle cannot be introduced without being carried ultimately to excess, is like Mr. Lowe's argument that the ten-pound franchise could not become a seven-pound franchise without precipitating the nation into anarchy.

British fiscal reformers believe, on the contrary, that they are about to establish a new economic model, equally free from the abuses of continental agrarianism and American trusts, which will form yet another example of the practical genius of the English people for constructive compromise, and will result in moderating extreme Protection throughout the world. The foundation principle of that policy will be preference—preference in every market under the flag, at home, in the Colonies, and in the dependencies alike, for those members of the Imperial State who bear its burthens, increase its resources, strengthen its defence, and whose morale and organization, whose sufficiency in numbers and efficiency in spirit, can alone perpetuate its existence. The increase of Imperial trade means the simultaneous increase on both sides of the sea of all our political resources for peace and war; relative advantage for all the members of the State in commerce under the flag is the economic condition vital to the interests of relative power; and nothing can secure the maintenance of the British Empire through the generations lying immediately before us but the progress under preference of those new nations of our race whose strength, wealth, numbers, in some ultimate crisis, may double our own.

FREE TRADE AND THE EMPIRE*

By J. St. LOE STRACHEY

I.

The subject of the following chapter can be summed up in a sentence. Free Trade is the only secure foundation for the British Empire. My object is to show not only that Free Trade is a better foundation for Empire than Protection, but that no lasting Empire can be built upon a policy of commercial exclusiveness—that is, I meet Mr. Chamberlain's declaration 'No Preference no Empire' with the contra declaration 'No Free Trade no Empire.'

The maxim 'No Free Trade no Empire' is no mere assertion of a personal opinion, but a statement which can be made good by an appeal to the teachings of history. It is a fact, not a theory. While we possessed a system of preference the Empire flourished neither commercially nor politically. Trade was not helped, but hindered, and at the same time the political relations between the Colonies and the United Kingdom were far from satisfactory. When, however, we abandoned the attempt to establish special trade privileges within the Empire, and instead allowed trade to follow its own

* Though portions have been rewritten and some omissions made, the bulk of this article appeared in the *Monthly Review* in 1904. I have also made use of a letter on Colonial Preference contributed to the *Spectator* in February, 1904, and have resumed portions of an article by me in the *Spectator* of January 28, 1899.—J. St. L. S.

interests, the Colonies became a source of pride and strength to the Mother Country.

But this is no isolated example. History shows that the States of former days which tried to maintain oversea Empires based on exclusive trading perished, largely owing to such exclusiveness. They withered away because they insisted on acting on the belief that an Empire cannot be kept together on sentiment and on the ties of race, language, and common institutions, but must have the material bond of preferential trading.

The evil effects of a preferential system, as exhibited in the case of the British Empire, are patent to all who will examine the facts. That system led not only to bad trading, but to political relations which were full of friction and of danger. As a nation we are apt to forget our failures, whether in battle, in diplomacy, or in business. Hence it happened that very few people were aware till the fiscal controversy overtook us that only sixty years ago we had a complete system of Colonial Preference. We greatly favoured colonial products in our markets, while they gave us a position of privilege in theirs. The results were as deplorable from the commercial as from the political standpoint. So completely forgotten, however, was this fact that when the new Preferential policy was first launched it was held to be a completely new and original Imperial device. We can hardly wonder, however, that the nation chose to forget its original Imperial fiscal policy. An incident so eminently unsatisfactory, and so full of friction and confusion, was naturally ignored. In endeavouring to trace the evil effects of the preferential system which once ruled the trade relations of the Empire, I shall not go so far back as the period when that system was in full force, and when we enjoyed 'the monopoly of colonial buying and selling,' and maintained the principle of 'the prohibition and discouragement of colonial manufactures.' Mr. Chamberlain no doubt hinted to the Colonies that it would be a friendly act if they would be content with such manu-

factures as they have already created, and would leave what remains to the Mother Country in exchange for a preference from her. *Still, I do not suppose that anyone now seriously desires to go back to the old plan*—the plan under which the Colonies were veritable 'tied houses' in all particulars. Our Tariff Reformers only wish to make them 'tied houses' in certain trades. I shall, therefore, not examine the Navigation Acts and other Acts in restraint of colonial trade at the time of their full severity. I shall deal rather with the later period, and when the Navigation Laws had been greatly relaxed, and something closely resembling Mr. Chamberlain's system of Preference was established throughout the Empire. During that period—*i.e.*, from the close of the French war up till 1845—the absolute prohibition of many articles from entry into the Colonies had been abandoned and *ad valorem* duties were imposed instead, but at the same time Colonial Preference in the English market remained intact. Let us look at the actual working of this system of Colonial Preference.

II.

I will take first the timber trade. Till the beginning of the nineteenth century we drew all our supplies of timber from the North of Europe. After our quarrel with the Northern Powers, and our seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807, our policy was altered. Mr. Vansittart, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, devised a plan similar in intention to that of the Preferentialists of to-day. He argued that as there was plenty of timber to be found in the British Empire it would be wise to use the Tariff to render the Empire self-supporting in the matter of timber and free from the danger of relying upon foreign sources of supply. Accordingly, he almost entirely repealed the duties on timber coming from our American possessions, and placed an enormous duty on North European timbers. The immediate result of the policy was that we were flooded for years with inferior

timber from Canada, the good, cheap timber from the North of Europe was shut out, and we were compelled to use for building purposes wood particularly subject to dry-rot. But there was still a demand for Baltic timber, and thus there followed one of those absurdities which always track the course of Preference. It actually paid to ship wood from Northern Europe to Canada in order that it might come in here as colonial timber. In consequence of this artificial stimulus, large vested interests grew up in Canada in connection with the trade. When, then, preference was withdrawn, first partially and then entirely, as it became absolutely necessary in the interests of British trade, these interests not unnaturally held themselves to be deeply aggrieved. They were, they declared, certain to be ruined. The sufferers threatened secession and an agitation in favour of annexation to the United States. But, though the timber merchants suffered, the small farmers rejoiced, for they had resented the preference. Agriculture had been neglected in the Colony for the benefit of a few great capitalists. Canadian millers also suffered when we ceased to give a preference to Canadian flour. The discriminating duty on colonial flour had allowed Americans to import their wheat into Canada, where it was ground up, and then exported to England as Canadian flour.

The results of preferential treatment in the case of sugar were even more preposterous than those in that of timber. The duties on sugar in 1836 were 36s. a hundredweight on colonial and 63s. on foreign sugar. They were regulated anew in 1842, owing to the depression produced in the West India Islands by the abolition of slavery, and stood then at 14s. for colonial brown sugar, 63s. for foreign sugar produced by slave-labour, and 23s. 4d. when produced by non-slave labour. This distinction was really an absurdity, for we allowed other slave-made commodities to enter without any differential duty. In consequence, the average loss to the British public was enormous, and the Revenue lost

also. The talk, too, about slave-grown sugar was absurd, for we did not hesitate to trade largely in it with the Continent. On the other hand, we had prevented the legitimate development of our West India Colonies by forbidding them to set up sugar refineries to compete with our own refining trade. Thus we managed, by our double system of preference, to confer a double injury on the nation and on the West Indies, in the hope of benefiting two selected industries.

But, bad as were the results of attempting to make the Empire self-sufficing in the matter of timber and sugar by preferring colonial products, they pale before those achieved in the case of coffee. The argument for preference looked at first sight as good, and proved in the long-run even more fallacious. We consume a great deal of coffee. Coffee can be grown in the Empire, and coffee is a very profitable crop. Therefore, let us encourage coffee-growing in the Empire by giving it a preference in our markets. In this way we can secure the profits of a very lucrative trade for ourselves. So ran the very plausible argument in favour of preference. Let us look at the facts. Before 1842 the duty on foreign coffee was as much as 1s. 3d. per pound. On coffee imported from any British possessions within the East India Company's charter the duty was only 9d. The result of this was that the coffee-producing foreigner shipped his coffee to the Cape (which was within the charter), and it came in here at a 9d. duty. The importation of coffee from the Cape rose, therefore, from 189 pounds in 1830 to 6,149,189 pounds in 1842. At that date the duty on foreign coffee was placed at 6d. per pound, and on colonial at 4d. per pound, and ultimately the difference disappeared altogether. We had done very little good to the colonial grower, though we had placed a heavy tax on our own consumers without raising any large amount of revenue. The only persons who really benefited were the fraudulent importers of foreign coffee.

The astonishing position produced by Colonial Pre-

ference in the case of coffee is so well summed up in the evidence given before the Select Committee in 1840 that I cannot resist quoting a portion of it. The witness under examination was Mr. McGregor, one of the joint-secretaries of the Board of Trade. The chairman was Mr. Hume.

'887. *Chairman.* Will you state what has been the effect of the high differential duty on coffee?—The effect of the high differential duty on coffee has been the legal evasion of the law, in principle, as to the way of bringing coffee to this country.

'888. Is there any coffee produced at the Cape of Good Hope? —No, I believe not; 57 out of every 100 pounds which were imported to England by way of the Cape of Good Hope was carried in the first instance to that colony from Brazil; 8 from Cuba; 12, I think, were sent from England of foreign coffee to the Cape, to be reimported to England; 6, I think, from Java; and 6 or 8 sent from Holland to the Cape of Good Hope, and the remainder from other countries.

'889. *Mr. Thornely.* From your evidence it appears that cargoes of coffee have been sent from the United Kingdom and from ports on the Continent of Europe, to be landed on the Cape of Good Hope, and to be brought back to the United Kingdom for the purpose of supplying the necessary consumption here?—Yes; from the 26th of April, 1838, to the 24th of March, 1840, it appears by the returns that eighty-one cargoes, importing more than 21,000,000 pounds of foreign coffee, had arrived in the United Kingdom from the Cape of Good Hope, the duty being on that mode of carrying coffee 9d. a pound; that is, 6d. less than if imported direct from foreign countries; the duty, if imported from the country of the growth of the principal part of the coffee, would amount to £1,750,000; the duty saved by the indirect importation would be £750,000, supposing all to be entered for consumption.

'890. *Chairman.* Then, is it to be understood that merchants, in order to evade the discriminating duty, have been to the expense of sending coffee from those different ports, and even from England, in order to obtain admission at the reduced rate? —Yes, and also upon other articles which pay differential duties, such as spices and nutmegs.

'891. In fact, does the Cape of Good Hope reduce the duty upon all those prohibitive articles?—Yes, from its being retained as within the limits of the East India Company's charter.

'892. *Mr. Thornely.* Has it not been absolutely necessary, for

the supply of the consumption of coffee to this country, that we should resort to this mode of indirect importation?—There is no doubt of the fact of it being imported to England in that way to supply consumption; the consumption is evidence of the fact.

'893. *Chairman.* Do not those greatly increased expenses keep up the price of coffee in this country?—They have two effects. The expense of sending coffee to the Cape of Good Hope is about 1d., and consequently it arrives in this country at about 5d. less duty than if it came direct from the countries of its growth; but if the duties were reduced to an equitable fiscal principle, the article would be cheaper and the consumption of coffee in this country would no doubt increase enormously.'

Another striking example of the absurdity of preference is to be found in the preferential treatment accorded to Cape wines. Here is a lesson which I hope will be borne in mind by those who are inclined to lend a favourable hearing to any scheme for giving Australian wines a preference over foreign wines. During and after the Napoleonic war we thought it better to make the Empire 'self-sustaining' in wine as in other things. By an Act passed in 1813 Cape wine was admitted here at one-third the duty on Spanish and Portuguese wines. The result was, of course, a great stimulus to the Cape wine trade; and even in 1846, when the duty on Cape wines was only half that on foreign wines, the importation of Cape wines almost equalled that of wines from France. But the trade was a purely artificial one. When differential duties were abolished and the importation of Cape wine fell to its natural level, the trade almost disappeared. This was in fact the most ridiculous preference of all. It chiefly benefited the fraudulent wine merchant in Britain, for it supplied him with cheap and inferior grape-juice wherewith to adulterate good foreign wine. It did not really benefit the Cape wine-grower. It did not encourage him to improve his methods of manufacture. It only gave him a safe market for a bad product.

Before leaving this part of the subject, it may be worth while to give the actual figures of the Colonial Preference as they stood in the year 1840. Here is the list quoted verbatim from the Blue Book of 1841:

	£	s.	d.
Sugar—colonial duty:			
On muscovado -	1	4	0
On foreign -	3	0	0
On molasses -	0	9	0
On foreign -	1	13	9
Coffee—British possessions per lb.	0	0	6
Foreign growth, except from British ports, within limits of East India Company's possessions, where it pays 9d. - -	0	1	3
Distilled spirits, colonial - - -	0	9	0
Foreign - -	1	2	6
Wines, colonial -	0	2	9
Foreign - -	0	5	6

	£	s.	d
Timber, colonial *:			
Hard wood, per load - -	0	5	0
Pine and fir of all kinds -	0	10	0
Foreign - -	2	15	0
Cotton-wool per cwt.	0	0	4
Foreign - -	0	2	11
Wool, sheep's, colonial - - -		free	
Foreign - -	0	9	4
Fish, free; foreign nearly all prohibited.			
Tallow - per cwt.	0	1	0
Foreign - -	0	3	2
Rice, colonial per cwt.	0	1	0
Foreign - -	0	15	0
Rough rice per qr.	0	1	0
Foreign - -	1	0	0

Spices and all tropical colonial productions have high differential duties.

	£	s.	d.
Fish oil, Colonial per tun	0	1	0
Of foreign taking - -	26	12	0
Hides and skins about 100 per cent. protective duty. On some the duties are equal. Furs are protected if from North America, chiefly from Hudson's Bay.			
Bark from British possessions per cwt.	0	0	1
Foreign - -	0	0	8

	£	s.	d.
Honey - per cwt.	0	5	0
Foreign - -	0	15	0
Soap - per cwt.	0	1	8
Foreign - -	0	4	10
Wax - per cwt.	0	10	0
Foreign - -	1	10	0
All seed oils per tun £39 18s.	0	1	0
Ashes - - -		free	
Foreign - -	0	6	0
Copper and metals of all kinds, high protective duties.			
Bark - per cwt.	0	0	1
Foreign - -	0	3	0

* Being a differential protection of 450 per cent., taking the various rates of duty on colonial and on foreign deals, staves, spars, masts, battens, hoops, and all kinds of timber, there is much about the same differential duties to protect the colonial.

III.

No doubt the colonists throughout the Empire were at first annoyed by the abolition of Preference, but soon they began to suit themselves to the new and healthier conditions, and it is not too much to say that they owe their commercial prosperity to the abolition of Preference. The effects are so well summed up by Professor Davidson in his admirable little book, 'Commercial Federation and Trade Policy,' that I cannot do better than quote his words:

'The repeal was probably what the Colonies needed most. It threw them on their own resources, and made them realize the duties as well as the privileges of responsible government. The ruin that was imminent did not come, because they set to work to avert it; and the threat of ruin was ultimately the industrial salvation of the Colonies. When they (the colonists) found that their appeals and protests were disregarded, and that the English market was no longer to be their preserve, they began to set their house in order and to accommodate their business methods to the new conditions. The possession of Preference had encouraged unbusinesslike ways and a spirit of dependence on Government. Henceforth they talked less politics and devoted themselves to trade.'

All this is still true. The readoption of Preference would bring back unbusinesslike ways, and recall a spirit of dependence on Governments. Indeed, as Professor Davidson says, 'the whole history of the preferential duties is one long warning against an attempt to give an artificial direction to industry.'

But bad as were the commercial results of Preference, the political results were even worse. The colonists, instead of trying to develop their industries by improving them, were always trying to get better preferential treatment, and when they could not get it, naturally grumbled, and thought they were not sufficiently considered. Also, strange as it may seem, though they apparently benefited by having Britain as a kind of tied house, the Colonies were not nearly so loyal under

Preference as they are to-day. The best men did not, as now, look forward to an Imperial union in which the British communities oversea would some day claim an equal share with the Mother Country, but to complete independence like that of the United States.

IV.

Still greater political harm was done in the Mother Country by the system of Colonial Preference. All true Imperialists must have deplored the harsh and pessimistic things said about the Empire by our public men in the past—by Conservatives as much as by Radicals. During the period of Colonial Preference there was no public sympathy with the Colonies, and though the bulk of the people may have been, and I believe were, determined to maintain the Empire, almost all the audible voices were raised against its continuance. The Colonies, that is, were profoundly unpopular. Sir Spencer Walpole, in the last two volumes of his admirably fair and lucid work, has brought together a number of expressions of opinion hostile to the Empire, which I will quote to show how deep was the feeling. For example, Lord Beaconsfield, writing in 1852, told Lord Malmesbury: 'These wretched Colonies will all be independent in a few years, and are a millstone round our necks.' The Duke of Newcastle declared that he should see a dissolution of the bond between the Mother Country and Canada with the greatest pleasure. Sir Henry Taylor wrote: 'As to the American Provinces, I have long held and have often expressed the opinion that they are a sort of *damnosa hereditas*.' Even Lord Salisbury, when Lord Robert Cecil, said in the House of Commons that 'it might be fairly questioned whether it had been wise originally to colonize the Cape and New Zealand, and whether, looking back on all the results, we have been repaid for the great cost and anxiety which they had entailed.' Sir George Cornewall Lewis was even more pessimistic:

'If a country possesses a dependency from which it derives no public revenue, no military or naval strength, no commercial advantages or facilities for emigration, which it would not equally enjoy though the dependency were independent; and if, moreover, the dependency suffers the evils which (as we shall show hereafter) are the almost inevitable consequences of its political conditions, such a possession cannot justly be called glorious.'

This view lingered on even into the sixties, and in 1867, when it was proposed to guarantee the Canadian Pacific Railway, Mr. Cave, the member for Barnstaple, remarked that 'instead of giving £3,000,000 sterling with a view to separating Canada and the United States, we ought to give £10,000,000 to unite them.' As Sir Spencer Walpole comments, such a remark would now be regarded as treachery. When said it did not elicit a single protest. Such was the feeling in regard to the Colonies that possessed statesmen who had been reared in the period of Preference. To them the Colonies were an incubus.

Contrast this feeling with that which prevails to-day. Not only would no statesman who wished to remain in public life dare to express such sentiments, but the great majority, whether Tory or Radical, would never dream of entertaining them. They have been banished from the mind of the nation by the epoch of Free Trade. That, and not Protection, has proved the soil in which the Imperial sentiment can best grow.

A very little reflection will show whence arose this unfavourable feeling towards the Colonies, which, remember, was specially strong in the commercial class, and was reflected from it into the minds of our statesmen. I believe it came from the system of Preference which oppressed our trading and commercial classes at every turn. The merchant who was forced by it to buy bad, dear, and unsuitable colonial timber or sugar, coffee or wine, naturally resented the necessity, and vented his resentment on the Colonies. They were a stumbling-block in his path, and people never love stumbling-blocks. The Colonies were unpopular, and with those persons

who declared that they would soon be independent, the wish was father to the thought. They longed to get rid of the burden of preferential trade, and believed that it would only disappear with independence. Hence the men who belonged to, or who were brought up in, the preferential period tended to become Little Englanders. As soon, however, as Colonial Preference was abolished, and instead of relying on the dangerous bonds of so-called commercial interests, we relied on the nobler *nexus* of a common race, a common language, common institutions, and a common loyalty to the Empire, our relations with the Colonies at once began to improve. The statesman who grew up under these conditions, and who did not find the supposed interests of the Colonies impeding commerce at every turn, became Imperialist in the true sense.

Perhaps the most striking example is that offered by Lord Beaconsfield himself. With his usual quickness and agility of mind, he was able to throw off the effects of the epoch in which he grew up. While England and he were Protectionists, he believed, as I have shown, that the Colonies were nothing but a burden. After the nation had adopted Free Trade and he had acquiesced in the change, he became an Imperialist who did not wish that the 'wretched Colonies' should become independent.

V.

I cannot, I regret to say, find space to deal except very slightly with my contention that the colonial Empires of the past, such as Spain, Holland, and Portugal, withered away because they persisted in treating their Colonies as tied houses, and could not realize that the only true foundation of Empire is liberty, commercial and political. I must be content to record the opinion that the attempt to establish a system of commercial exclusiveness within those Empires greatly helped to produce the decay from which they suffered. Other causes, no doubt, contributed, but this

was among the most effective in the work of destruction. Another very important point in regard to the influence of the policy of Free Trade on Empire deserves to be noticed. That is the attitude of the rest of the world towards the British Empire. No doubt continental statesmen are jealous of our success, but the British Empire as a whole does not anywhere excite that sense of widespread jealousy and hatred which is so dangerous to the State which inspires it. Recall for a moment the intense feeling of hatred which existed in regard to Holland and to Spain during the time of their greatest wealth and prosperity as Imperial Powers. This hatred was due to the policy of exclusion and of privilege enforced by either Power. Every individual trader not a Spaniard or a Dutchman was bound to be the enemy of Spain or Holland, for every trade-door was closed against him. It was indeed a double hatred. The colonists, whose very blood was sucked by the Imperial Power, felt almost as aggrieved as the excluded foreigner. Their colonies were the tied houses of those Empires. How different is the case with the British Empire! The foreigner may hate us in the abstract, but when it comes to business he cannot feel very angry with a nation which not only allows him to come freely and sell what he has got to sell here, but does not claim extra privileges over him in any of the colonial markets that are controlled directly by the Imperial Government. Thus our Free Trade policy has given us a world-wide Empire that excites the minimum of popular hatred and jealousy. Each Power might like to get our Indian or our African possessions for itself, but if that is not possible it would prefer the *status quo*. No other Power would be so good to trade with as England. It was very different in the case of Spain and Holland. Any change seemed then a change for the better.

The policy of unrestricted Free Trade has helped us even more inside our Colonies and dependencies. Turgot's saying that colonies always dropped off the parent tree like fruit when it was ripe was true under

a system of extorting special privileges for the Mother Country. By allowing the Colonies to manage their own fiscal affairs without restriction, and by giving them just as good treatment in the home market when they tax our products as when they do not, we have given the colonists a confidence in the Mother Country that no other scheme of action would have been able to give. Every colonist instinctively fears being exploited by the Mother Country. How is it possible for Australia to say we are making use of her when she taxes our goods and we do not tax hers? The Free Trade policy of a free market—*i.e.*, the policy of allowing all men to come here and sell freely whatever they have to sell without question asked or hindrance given—has alone, I believe, enabled the Empire to develop without any sense of injury or injustice growing up among the Colonies. Think for a moment what would almost certainly have been the result if we had tried to develop our Empire on Protectionist lines—had tried, that is, to make every colony and dependency give us a 'privileged position.' In that case every fresh acquisition of territory would have been met with a cry of alarm from the rest of the world. 'Here,' the nations would have said, 'is another piece of territory passing into the sphere of British exclusiveness. How long is this to be borne?'

Next, is it possible that a protective policy applied to the Colonies, even though intended to do them no harm, would not have ended in constant squabbles and disputes? Some Colonies would have wanted more Protection and some less, and none would have been really satisfied. Lastly, our own trade, debilitated by close markets, would never have taken the place it now has. As it is, our vast, free, and expanding trade helps to maintain the Empire, for all people like to be connected with a flourishing firm. Can it be contended that this feeling would be as strong with a narrower and more jealously conducted business? Depend upon it, the British Empire as we know it could not have

been built up and could not now be kept together under any system but a system of Free Trade.

VI.

I shall be told, no doubt, that the old Free Traders certainly never thought that Empire and Free Trade had any connection. Instead, it will be argued, they admitted that they were antagonistic. I grant the truth of this assertion in respect of many of them. The old Free Traders were not as a rule aware that Free Trade would prove the best possible foundation-stone for the Empire. They builded, that is, better than they knew. And herein we see an example of the good results that may incidentally arise from laying hold of and following out a really sound principle. Probably Mr. Cobden would have rejoiced in an Empire such as we have to-day, but, if not, and if it could be proved that he would have been annoyed at its persistence, it troubles me very little. Free Trade is far too great and vital a matter to be pinned to any one man's coat-tails. We should always refuse to allow the policy of Free Trade to be tested by what Mr. Cobden or Mr. Bright would have thought of its most recent developments. They did not discover the doctrine of Free Trade, and it is not subject to any limitations that may be found in their writings. Hence I feel perfectly entitled to proclaim myself both an Imperialist and a Free Trader, or, indeed, an Imperialist because I am a Free Trader.

VII.

There is not only no antagonism, but an essential connection, between a sound and reasonable Imperial policy and the policy of Free Trade. The one thing that can and would ruin the Empire would be the abandonment of Free Trade in any shape or form. Once give up the principle that, subject only to the needs of the revenue, all men may resort to our markets

and sell what they have to sell, and substitute the principle of restriction and exclusion, of trade jealousy and special privilege, and the ruin of the Empire will have begun. The policy of the open market is a policy from which we cannot afford to budge a single hair's-breadth. I hold, then, that it is the duty of every true Imperialist to combat with all his heart and all his strength the proposal to revolutionize our policy of Free Trade and to adopt the policy of Preference and Protection. He must insist on falsifying the prophecy of Robert Lowe, who in 1867 said: 'In the time of the American Revolution the Colonies separated from England because she insisted on taxing them. What I apprehend as likely to happen now is that England will separate from her Colonies because they insist on taxing her.' God forbid! We will neither tax our Colonies for our benefit nor tax ourselves in the vain hope of benefiting them thereby. What we will do is to insist that the tie which unites us in one mighty State shall be the tie of freedom—freedom political and commercial. That is the motto which we must blazon on the banner of Empire. In that sign we shall conquer.

EDUCATION AND IMPERIAL POLICY

By the RIGHT HON. R. B. HALDANE, K.C., M.P.

In a book recently published in Germany, where it has gone through many editions, but which has not attracted in England the attention which it deserves, the author, Dr. Ludwig Gurlitt,* discusses with great frankness the contrast between the educational systems of the two countries. He gives the preference in the main to that of England. He is aware of its defects, of its want of science and of system; but he lays stress on a great merit which he considers that our system possesses: it produces character, and a love for the school as a sort of second home of the spirit. He describes the arrangements in the English public schools, under which the boys are encouraged to rule themselves, and the masters to become their friends and advisers rather than their governors. This, he says, produces the true foundation of a love of fatherland, and contributes to make the boy who leaves England remain an Englishman. Character and public spirit are developed, according to this writer, in a fashion which has no parallel in Germany, where the method is pure intellectualism, and the aim standards of mere knowledge. Some of us may think that Dr. Gurlitt is too much in love with certain good features of our English educational methods to appreciate their obvious shortcomings. The power of getting on with men and of ruling them is no doubt of a very high value; but it is not so obvious that we do not in

* 'Der Deutsche und sein Vaterland. Politisch padagogische Betrachtungen eines Modernen.' Berlin, 1903, 8 auflage.

this country pay too great a price for it. If Germany lays too much stress on system in the acquisition of learning, we seem here to lay too little stress on it. Probably the truth lies where the present Emperor of Germany, in a remark attributed to him at p. 144 of this very interesting essay, places it: 'The right kind of education lies midway between the German and the English.' It may be true, as one of the authors quoted by Dr. Gurlitt says, that 'while the Englishman always and everywhere grasps what is actual, and from this point, and as far as this basis extends, builds further, the more reflective German gets away into the distance, and so loses his hold upon what is present.' But in method, and in the knowledge of science and of its application to industry, we Englishmen have to-day good cause to regret that we have not cultivated something of the German passion for thoroughness in the art of imparting knowledge in our schools. No wise man wants to Germanize English educational institutions; but there is much that can be done for them, far short of Germanizing them, by the introduction of certain features which are best studied in the German schools and colleges. The close of the nineteenth century has brought us in England some cause for reflection. Our Empire has continued to grow, and our trade has continued to expand; but everywhere, abroad and at home, we are faced by a competition of which our forefathers knew nothing. Differing from a good many people whose opinions I hold in respect, I see in this fact a balance of good over evil. Nothing so stimulates to energy and the adoption of better methods as competition. Competition there must be, and it is better, not only for the world, but, as it seems to me, for individual nations, that they should constantly have the stimulus of keen competition. For the struggle they have constantly to be training themselves. If they are to hold their own they must be ever laying aside antiquated methods and devising new ones. Now, the foundation of success in this endeavour is education—education in the widest

sense and in all its branches, but founded on the cultured mind which only general study can give. All over the Empire this truth is penetrating its rulers, just as it has done in Germany, and is rapidly doing in the United States. Canada possesses at least one University which, in certain of its faculties, puts most of ours to shame. Australia and New Zealand have long since turned their attention to the development of University teaching in their great cities. India and South Africa are at this moment agitating for improved institutions of a University type. Not long ago there was held in London a remarkable conference of representatives of the Universities of the Empire. In the speeches there were many expressions of a desire for something like federation of the teaching power of the highest schools of the various dominions of the Crown.

The idea may well bear fruit. In mining and metallurgy and in engineering there are branches of applied science which may best be studied in the neighbourhood where the science is applied. The industrial development of Canada, for instance, has enabled the McGill University at Montreal to specialize in certain branches of this kind of teaching, with advantages that are almost unique, and already young men are going over from the Mother Country to get the benefit of these advantages. On the other hand, the attempt is in progress to create in London, the heart of the Empire in the organization of its industry as well as of its Government, a new school where the highest training may be given in the science and art of obtaining the precious metals from the mines where they lie hid—not too soon, those may think who have read Mr. Birchenough's recent report on the industries of the Transvaal, and his description of the tendency of the Americans and Germans, whose superior training has led to their employment in the gold-mines, to purchase their machinery in the countries from which they came. That we, the foremost nation in the world in the production of gold and silver, should hitherto

have had no central school on the level, in point of equipment, of those abroad is indeed matter for serious reflection. Everywhere we are deficient, not in certain kinds of technological training—for to our workmen we offer in a multitude of splendid evening schools opportunities that are nowhere surpassed—but in the highest kinds. And this is in some measure due to the excessive dislike of theory in this country. The more one examines the facts, the more clearly is the conviction borne in on one that the condition on which alone a nation can give the highest technological training to its captains of industry is that it should first have provided for them general culture. This need not be the study of Latin and Greek, but it ought to be a liberal education, such as tends to broaden the mind and develop the capacity, both for acquiring special knowledge and for giving it its right place. With all their faults, it is the strength of Oxford and Cambridge that they have held firmly by this truth. Yet it is a truth that, while it is the beginning of wisdom, it is only the beginning for a colonizing and commercial nation like ours. The place of science nothing can take, and more science we must have if the close of the twentieth century is to find us still occupying the position which we now hold.

The Mother Country ought to be a great and sufficient educational centre for the Empire. The time has come when we shall do wisely to devote money and time and energy to making it so. The great self-governing portions of the King's dominions may be able to provide for themselves in highest education, as in other things; but for them and us alike it will be well if there is linkage of organization and interchange of students and professors. Others of our Colonies must depend on us in an increasing degree for a long time to come. I have for long thought that the educational link might be made a very real one in the organization of the Empire. This will be especially so if we can adhere to the tradition which Dr. Gurlitt admires, and keep our students rooted in a deep

personal attachment to their schools. What such an attachment means Mr. Rhodes knew when by his will he founded the scholarships at Oxford which are associated with his name. I hope that, in any policy of coordinating the University teaching of the Empire, the importance of a scholarship system which may encourage students to go from University to University throughout the Empire, just as they do in Germany, will not be overlooked. I can see great uses in it, and from more standpoints than one.

Such a policy as I have tried briefly to indicate in outline does not present any great difficulties. The first requisite to its realization is that it should be borne in mind in the course of those developments of our system of highest education in this country which are near at hand. In Germany the so-called 'Technical High School' is really an institution on a level with the University, and gives an education in applied science to students of University standing and age who have such a general education as has enabled them to obtain the leaving certificate of the secondary school. In this country we have hitherto had no institution of this kind, but there are indications that its equivalent is likely soon to be developed. In the arrangement of the courses of instruction the opportunity will arise for bearing in mind the requirements of those whose lives are to be lived in the Colonies. If Germany had possessed our colonial possessions, beyond doubt close attention would have long since been paid to this matter. Not only the new technical institutions in this country, but the Universities themselves, may well make it a feature of their development. The study of tropical medicine is already set on foot both in London and in Liverpool. The investigation of colonial products, with a view to giving accurate scientific information which may lead to the development of new regions, such as already takes place at South Kensington; education in Roman-Dutch law; schools of Oriental languages—these and the like afford possibilities of strengthening

the Empire by making England a common centre. It is wonderful to watch at Lincoln's Inn the multitude of coloured students of law who come here and frequent the common-rooms and the libraries with a view to getting called to the Bar, and then returning to practise before the tribunals of the distant places from which they have come. To watch them excites still more wonder when one knows the littleness of the provision which the authorities here make for them.

And this brings me to the other point I wish to emphasize. There is much talk to-day of increased conference with representatives from the Colonies. An admirable plan this, but let the conferences be not limited only to statesmen. The conference, to which I have already alluded, of representatives of the Universities of the Empire, which took place in London three years ago, showed how easily this kind of meeting can be brought about. I do not see why such conferences should not be held at regular intervals, and I do see that great use may come of them. Not only have we all a good deal to learn from each other, but, if I am right, there is in addition exchange of ideas wanted, with a view to the coordination of the educational system of the whole Empire.

It is true that these things grow, and that they cannot be called into existence before their time, or artificially. But their time seems to have come, and the demand is already beginning to show itself. Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, perhaps Japan also, are making us feel uncomfortable about shortcomings in our educational system, the existence of which its good side cannot excuse or make up for. In every department of life more science is called for, and our competitors are becoming daily better equipped. Surely the day has arrived when statesmen need not fear to be thought to have their heads in the clouds if they put forward a greater provision for the highest education as a leading part in a programme of home and Imperial policy.

THE EMPIRE AND THE CHURCH

By THE RIGHT REV. THE BISHOP OF STEPNEY

The Editor of this volume has asked me to write a short chapter on the relations between the Christian Church and the development of the Empire. It is obviously a subject more fitted for a volume than a chapter, and the time assigned to me is too short to enable me to treat it freshly as well as shortly. The fact that a place should be given to it in such a book as the present is, at least, a sign of the increasing seriousness with which Imperial problems are approached. The development of the Empire is felt to be something more than a theme for perorations and patriotic songs—rather, a task which demands fixity of purpose, vigour of thought, and strength of character. It is a task which must profoundly influence the religious, as well as the political and commercial, outlook of the British nation. The Imperial spirit in the State calls for an Imperial spirit in the Church.

Here two preliminary explanations must be made:

1. First, an Imperial spirit in the Church must be clearly distinguished from a spirit only too common which identifies the providence of God and the extension of the British Empire. We are all familiar with the sort of language—specially offensive to other nations—which implies that the acquisition of new markets for British goods, or the annexation of new territory to the British Crown, must be acts not only of the British Government but of the Divine government of the world.

A true Imperial spirit in religion does not seek to claim God for the Empire, but rather to claim the Empire for God ; it does not wish to make 'the Empire' a religion, but to make the Empire religious. Put bluntly, we can only be sure that God is on the side of the extension of the British Empire if the extension of the British Empire is proved by its ideals and methods to be on the side of God.

2. Secondly, in the present context the word 'Church' is used in no strict or technical sense, but simply as the whole company of professing Christians organized in different religious bodies. What is said is meant to apply to the influence and policy of every Christian body. But it is only natural that the present writer should think mainly of the responsibilities and opportunities of the Church to which he belongs, and which he knows. It is the more natural because the English Church, which is older than the English nation, which has been for long centuries bound up with its development by a thousand ties of association, influence, and constitution, has obviously a special responsibility to the nation in its new stage of Imperial expansion.

What, then, is the place of the Christian Church in the building up of the Empire ? To this question only four answers can here be given, and these very shortly. We look to the Church to strengthen the moral force of the Empire, to give a true ideal to its development, to counteract the destructive forces which it brings, and to deepen the unity which holds it together.

1. First and foremost, we look to the Church to strengthen the moral force of the Empire. After all, the strength and permanence of our Empire depends upon the *character* of its citizens. This is a commonplace so obvious that its importance is very generally ignored. We take, and rightly take, immense pains to open out new channels of trade, to develop new material resources. We are apt to suppose that the development of character can be left to take care of itself. Yet the minds of many readers of this book as they read of

the problems and the opportunities of Empire will probably be haunted by the question, 'What about the moral character which is to carry through this momentous business? Have we as a race, here at home and in the Colonies, the moral as well as the mental and physical strength to face these problems and use these opportunities?' He would surely be a very easy optimist who felt no trouble about the answer. On September 6, 1905, a long and striking letter appeared in the *Times*, under the signature of 'Vidi'—an obviously able and competent observer of his own and other nations—from which I quote these words:

'It is discouraging to see the lessons of the ordeal of the South African War still unlearnt, the warnings in great part unheeded, and all classes of the nation bent on gratifying an un-English passion for luxury and excitement. Large ideas seem to be tabooed, and empty "cleverness" exalted; responsibilities to be ignored; a hand-to-mouth happy-go-luckiness to be the prevailing mood. . . . I should scarcely have cared to trust my own impressions had they not been confirmed in a dozen quarters by men whose hands are on the public pulse. One such said: ". . . Underneath we are still sound, but we have run to seed, and want two or three years of good stiff adversity to lick us into shape." And yet another complained: "Despite the Japanese example, we cannot generate any real spirit of everyday devotion to the common good. We lack 'drive' and deep conviction. We have some patriotic instincts and prejudices, but prejudice is a bad makeshift for reasoned purpose." The names of the men who spoke thus would startle many of your readers.'

If there be any truth in all this, it is plain that the moral fibre of our race stands in need of strengthening. The business of Empire cannot be done without the capital of character, and in that capital we are not too rich. It is, therefore, of the utmost Imperial importance that the forces which make for moral character should be kept fresh and strong. It will not be denied

that the most potent of all these forces is Religion. What a man really believes as to the ultimate meaning of the world and of his own place within it must be the most decisive power in determining the conduct of his life. Looking at the matter in a purely practical aspect, there can be no question that belief in God—the faith that the ultimate meaning of the world is the will and love of an Infinite Person, and that man's place in it is to obey that will and respond to that love—is the belief which, if it be honestly held, does produce the strongest and most durable stuff of character. Without some such controlling faith, character tends to follow the lines of least resistance, to be weak—weak not perhaps in single points, such as personal bravery or resourcefulness or cleverness, but weak in its total consistency and force. And for most men, to be effective when it is most needed, this faith must be a sort of instinct, wrought into the very texture of their life. Now, it is the very primary work of the Christian Church to surround a man's life from the cradle to the grave with the influences of this faith. If the Church is kept ever alert and vigilant in the foreground of Imperial expansion—sounding on the veldt of South Africa, the fields of Canada, the pastures of Australia, the plains of India, its persistent reminder, 'Remember the Lord thy God'—then it will preserve beneath the fabric of Imperial development the indispensable basis of strong and durable character.

2. Secondly, we look to the Church to keep a true ideal before the development of Empire. Few of us would be cynical enough to say that the mere instinct or impulse of expansion carried its own justification with it. Like other natural forces, it must be controlled by some moral principle. We feel that no nation has a right to roam over the world like an overgrown bully forcing elbow-room. Hence we ease our national conscience by claiming that the development of Empire brings 'the blessings of civilization.' But we are not always clear as to what we really mean

by the phrase. We sometimes speak as if it meant the extension of our trade. But the extension of trade is not necessarily a blessing if it only means the creation of artificial wants in native races in order that we may make money by supplying them. Even just and orderly government may not be *in itself* an altogether unmixed blessing, for we may by firm government destroy not only disorder but vitality. We owe something more to the races whom we govern than merely to keep them in order. The truth is that, in speaking of 'civilization,' we are apt to confuse means and end. The end of all civilization is surely the increase of the opportunities of noble living. Commerce, government, education, are only means to this end. But, unless there be some effective and continuous reminder of the true end, then the means become ends in themselves. It is for the Church, for religion, to prevent this tendency—to witness to the duty which we owe to all the subjects of the Empire—a disinterested desire to strengthen the resources of noble life; and to supply a succession of men in every part of the Empire who will keep this ideal steadily in view.

3. This second point leads to a third. We look to the Church to help in counteracting the dissolving and disintegrating influence with which our Western civilization inevitably affects the races whom it touches. A mummy in the British Museum, if left untouched and secure from the outer air, may defy the ravages of time for thousands of years; but let the air enter, let a living hand only touch it, and it crumbles into dust. So systems of religion and conduct, preserved by the traditions of centuries, dissolve at the touch of the white man's hand. If they are to be preserved, it is not the missionary but the trader and the teacher who must be kept out. Take as a single illustration the European education which we offer to the natives of India. In the words of a distinguished civil servant, 'the effect inevitably is that in proportion as these young men have been trained in English-speaking

schools and colleges, in that very proportion their old faith and their old creeds grow weak; in that very proportion all the old morality based upon their old creeds loses its binding force. So far as the spiritual and moral side of the young man's character is concerned, English education is absolutely and solely negative and destructive.' It is not contact with Christianity that destroys, but contact with civilization. But can civilization of itself rebuild the moral basis which it destroys or substitute another for it? Christianity can and does. It is no paradox to say that Christianity preserves whatever truth and worth there may be in native moral and religious systems from the destructive influence of civilization. Christian missions are now, at least, learning to commend their religion not by merely overthrowing others, but by liberating what is best in them, and claiming its true fulfilment in Christianity. At the very least they offer some religion and some morality to fill this blank created by the inevitable effects of civilization. The Church can build up just in that region of life where the Empire can only destroy.

4. Lastly, we may look to the Church to strengthen the political unity of the Empire by the spiritual unities which it creates. For the permanent incorporation of the native races, can there be any influence comparable to that of a common religion? Racial and social barriers cannot, indeed, be suddenly removed without the gravest danger. There was point as well as wit in the saying, 'I will accept the black as my brother when I can accept him as my brother-in-law.' But these inevitable divisions can be enormously mitigated by community of spiritual position. Long before common citizenship in the Empire may be either possible or desirable, there may be common citizenship in the Church. But it is as a unifying power within the English race throughout the Empire that the Church may play a specially valuable part. In the history of old England the unity of the Church in the midst of tribal divisions prepared the way for the unity of the nation.

Under the changed circumstances of the newer England of the Empire, may not the strength of a common religion still help to promote the strength of a common civic spirit? Powerful as the bonds of mutual interest may be, the bonds of common sentiment, of common traditions, memories, ideals in the most enduring part of man's life, must be, if not more powerful at some particular moment, at least more permanent. The influences of common religion not only turn the minds of men towards 'home,' and warm their feelings towards the old country, but also bind them together by a tradition which runs deep into the bases of life and far back into the bases of history.

The Christian Church has its own course to take, its own destiny to fulfil; but if there be any truth in the positions thus briefly summarized, the relations between it and the Empire ought to be those of close cooperation. On the one hand, the Empire, if it is wise, will learn to value, for the sake of its own welfare, the work of the Church. So far as it can, within the limits of public policy, it will encourage and facilitate the development of religious influences throughout the Empire. It will not look askance at the missionary, but regard him as in the truest sense an Imperial force. But, on the other hand, the Church must learn to adapt itself to the new responsibilities of Empire. It must learn to think and plan Imperially. It must adjust its point of view to the perspective of a new and wider horizon. It must regard not the nation here at home but the Empire as the real sphere of the future. It must prepare for that future by adopting Imperial problems as its own, and willingly sending out its ablest men to meet them. It must put its best brain and spirit into this wider work. It must do all it can to prevent our own local religious controversies from crossing the seas. It must, by patient foresight, prepare native Churches to develop on their own lines, untrammelled by the limitations of merely British religious history. While retaining its own definite faith as a trust which it holds for posterity, it

must have the largeness of mind and breadth of spirit to adapt it to new conditions and wider issues. Thus, not only may the Church be a power in the true development of the Empire, but the Empire may be a power in the true development of the Church.

But I return to the main point of this brief paper. The fabric of our Empire rises with ever expanding responsibilities. How are we to maintain the foundation of moral character on which it must rest? The State cannot ignore the question. The Church exists to give an answer.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE AND NATIONAL POLICY

By L. S. AMERY

THE subject of Imperial Defence is one that is being continually discussed in magazine articles and in the columns of our daily newspapers. Schemes of army reform without number, controversies between naval and military experts as to the possibilities of invading England, are worn threadbare with discussion. The intention of the present article is not so much to go into any of these detailed questions, as to consider some of the main factors involved in the problem of defence, and the manner in which that problem is affected by Imperialism; in other words, by the conception of the Empire as our national unit.

Defence, rightly regarded, is an essential aspect of national life, and bears on every manifestation of that life. Unfortunately, in this country the fatal habit of thinking in compartments—begotten of intellectual weakness or sloth—has grown so strong that we habitually think of defence as a separate problem, entirely disconnected with the general problem of our national life, and with our political and social system. So completely, indeed, have we, as a nation, been dominated by this slovenly habit of thought, that even the most obvious external elements of our machinery of defence have been considered absolutely without reference to each other. It is only lately that we have even begun to acknowledge that naval and

military defence are only parts of one problem. We are still very far from having translated that acknowledgment into practice. As for making our foreign policy and our political negotiations fit in with our defensive measures, that is a conception of peace strategy which we are still a long way from attaining to. Our own experience in South Africa, and that of Russia in the Far East, have provided us with signal examples of the results which may follow from neglecting to make political negotiations and military preparations fit in with each other; but there are no indications, as yet, that we intend to benefit by them. It is essential that we should get rid of this vicious attitude of mind, and endeavour to realize that not only our naval and military preparations, but our foreign and domestic policy, our political and social customs, our industries, the distribution of our territories, of our population, and of our trade, all have their defence aspect, and form part of the general problem of defence. It is no less essential, of course, to recognise the converse of this assertion. We must remember that defence has no purpose and no meaning apart from the other aspects of national life. The object of defence is to preserve our territories, to protect the growth of our material wealth, and, still more important, to secure the maintenance and development of our social and political well-being, of our national traditions, and of our national character. The truth is that between the different factors of national life it is impossible to draw hard and fast partitions. Each is continually interacting upon the other. The territory and wealth that need to be defended are, from another point of view, but the instruments with which defence is carried on. The political and social freedom and stability which we prize, and for the sake of which our State is most worth defending, are, at the same time, the most effective means of securing the full development of national power in time of war. The recent war in the Far East has brought out clearly the intimate connection between these two aspects of the same question.

Russia's weakness in the field was but the reflex of the internal weakness of her constitution. The efficiency and devotion of the Japanese army were but the outward signs of a nation that was well governed and inspired by patriotism. Again, the moral qualities most valuable for the purposes of national defence—*i.e.*, self-sacrifice, courage, constancy—are, from another point of view, just those essentials of national character which make a nation worth preserving. And regarding the problem of defence from this point of view, we begin to realize that defence need not be a diversion of the national energies from higher and better aims—a mere payment of insurance, necessary, perhaps, but essentially undesirable—but can be used as a motive power and a stimulus in the development towards a higher form of national organization.

This truth was more fully realized by the original builders of the British Empire than it is to-day. For them foreign relations, defence, and industrial and commercial development formed but one single policy—a policy of which each part was intended to support and stimulate the other. Our ancestors fostered trade and industry deliberately for the sake of national security. But they were not content with fostering it in a general haphazard fashion. They regulated it strictly, regardless sometimes of immediate commercial profit, but always with an eye to the main objects of national greatness and national security. The real motive of the navigation laws was not shipping trade, but naval supremacy. To that object of naval supremacy, again, our whole trade with Northern Europe was subordinated. Subsequently, when we began to find that it was not altogether safe to rely upon the Baltic for our naval stores, we deliberately encouraged in our American Colonies the industries that, in those days, were essential to shipbuilding. In the same spirit, too, the whole of our export and import trade was regulated in order to secure an excess of exports, and thus accumulate the precious metals in this country. This policy was not the out-

come of mere mistaken economics, but the result of intelligent preparation for war. It was that policy which enabled us to carry on wars on a large scale in Europe. In the days when all armies were hired, we hired not only the raw material of armies, but the finished article—the whole military strength of a state like Prussia, the military genius of a Frederick.

All these measures, whose primary object was national defence, tended no less towards national prosperity, even though, at any particular moment, they may have seemed to restrict the freedom of economic development. The navigation laws created British shipping. The desire to force exports led to the continuous concentration of thought upon the fostering and stimulating of new industries and the improvement of old ones, and thus laid the foundations of England's industrial greatness. The desire to secure the control of the raw materials of those industries, and to develop new and sure markets for their products, led to the acquisition of our Colonial Empire, and stimulated its development. It has often been said that the British Empire sprang up unconsciously, as a result of British trade, that our defence policy was based on our trade interests, and that our wars were the outcome of trade disputes. But it is at least equally true that British trade and the British Empire were created for the sake of national defence. It was from the desire to protect England—English liberty and English Protestantism—against the greater wealth and power of the Continental States, more especially France, that our statesmen looked abroad and ahead, and, in a far truer sense than Canning, called a new world into being to redress the balance of the old—a new world of colonial expansion, naval power, and industrial development.

In their actual conduct of war, no less than in their peace strategy, the clear grasp of the statesmen of those days can be seen. No 'blue water' doctrinairism, no theory of passive defence, blinded them to the great fact that wars to be fought successfully must be fought

offensively, and cannot be confined to one element alone. The intimate interaction of naval and military warfare in England's wars is often obscured from us by the fact that most of the work on land was done by our allies. Skilful foreign policy, helped by liberal subventions, enabled us to get the heavy and comparatively unprofitable work of continental fighting done for us. Our own little army was kept, as a rule, for the amphibious work of acquiring our Colonial Empire.

Not that the policy of the eighteenth century was in any way perfect. Far from it. The system of subventions was not so much a matter of choice, as, in a large measure, a matter of political necessity. The result of the long civil conflict of the seventeenth century had been to inspire the English nation with an intense jealousy and distrust of the army. But for that we can well imagine that the assistance given to our continental allies might have taken the form, not of money, but of men. We should in that case have been in a far stronger position. To use the industrial metaphor, we should have kept the military industry within our own borders. The hired foreign armies were not available everywhere or always, and the military skill evoked by the great struggles on the Continent did not inure to our benefit. It was the neglect of our army, the reckless cutting down after the Seven Years' War, that was the prime cause of the loss of the American Colonies. Had our army been only a little larger or a little more efficient, it could have crushed the American revolt at the outset. We should then still have had an opportunity for correcting our political errors in our treatment of the Colonies, as Rome had an opportunity for correcting her mistaken policy towards her Italian allies after she had crushed them in the Social War. Again, even in Europe, the policy of hiring continental allies came to grief when revolutionary France suddenly brought into the field that new engine of war—the nation in arms. Our victory at Trafalgar was largely neutralized by *our* defeats

at Jena and Austerlitz; and ten years of war, adding an enormous and crushing burden of debt, had to pass before Trafalgar was consummated by Leipzig and Waterloo.

With Waterloo began a new phase in our national history. New external conditions and new internal developments necessarily altered the whole national attitude towards the problem of defence. We had emerged from a great war in complete command of the sea. No other nation seriously thought of disputing our naval supremacy. The security of our oversea trade, the possession of the oversea Empire we had won, and the power of expanding it indefinitely, followed as a matter of course. Our industry was full of strength and vitality. During all the troubles and uncertainties of the Napoleonic wars, England's security from invasion had caused a steady influx of accumulated capital. At the same time we had emerged exhausted. The necessity of finding means for carrying on the struggle had burdened our industries with innumerable taxes, in which the original object of stimulating industrial development and safeguarding national defence had been almost wholly lost sight of. A tremendous reaction set in against the militarism which had necessitated these burdens, and against the selfish political oligarchy into whose hands the defence of the country had fallen. New classes without political experience or political traditions came to power, displacing the old ruling classes. These new classes regarded the whole political attitude of their predecessors with suspicion —a suspicion of which traces still linger among us. Cobden's continual denunciation of the Colonial system and of militarism was deeply imbued with social prejudice. He looked upon the army, the navy, and the Colonies as aristocratic preserves, mere instruments of social influence and social intrigue. The connection between industry and defence, between trade and the Empire, was wholly lost from view. Each of these things seemed so secure by itself, that their underlying

historical and vital unity was forgotten. The whole higher unity of national life fell to pieces, and for two generations Englishmen were taught to regard that national life under a single aspect—the aspect of unregulated commerce, safeguarded by the policeman and the law courts. For the first time in our history we really had become a nation of shopkeepers, with all the narrowness and short-sightedness the epithet is held to convey.

The result was very much what might have been expected. There was a very great increase of trade in every direction. But not all of that increase was secure. To a great extent we lost the political control of our commerce; and that commerce existed—and still exists, to a large extent—only in so far as other States chose to let it exist. The industrial development naturally produced an enormous increase of population. But the greater part of that went outside our own political borders. The population of the United States was, to a large extent, stimulated by the overflow from this country, and was actually built up in America itself by the sustaining power of the British market. That population was lost immediately as far as defence was concerned, and was gradually lost for economic purposes as well, as it began to learn to manufacture for itself, and refused to keep its market open to British goods. It is no exaggeration to say that we lost a greater colonial empire to the United States in the nineteenth century than we did in the eighteenth. Even as regards the population which remained within the Empire, it was bound to the Mother Country by the weakest of political ties, and allowed to move away towards complete economic separation. Outside of England the economic development of the British Empire was very slow. Taken as a whole, there can be no doubt that the expansion of wealth and population in the British State was far less under the policy pursued than it would have been under a policy which looked to national greatness and security as a whole.

About twenty years ago we began to enter upon a new phase in our national life. The change had been partly internal and partly external. There had been a gradual intellectual reaction against the Little Englander and the Cobdenite school of thought, which first asserted itself in the national attitude towards the political unity of the Empire, and towards naval and military defence. The Home Rule agitation may be said to have marked a turning-point. In the next ten years the idea of Imperial unity developed mightily. The Diamond Jubilee, the South African War, the Imperial Conference of 1902, and the present movement for commercial unity, marked the further stages in that development. The new ideal of Empire is, however, not the same as the old one. It is a loftier and nobler conception, corresponding to the wider outlook and broader humanity of advancing civilization. In the first British Empire England was the only part which counted. The rest of the Empire had only been created for the sake of England's economic and defensive strength. The other parts of the Empire were but buttresses intended to prop up the parent stem. None was really considered essential. If one was lost, another could be created to fill its place. The sentiment and aspirations of the population which was growing up in the Colonies were not regarded. Of this disregard the American Revolution was but the natural fruit. In the next phase England again was still the only object of political solicitude. But now the value of buttresses was no longer believed in. The Colonies were regarded as elements of weakness rather than of strength. It was supposed that if they could be encouraged to develop as independent States, England would be free from the responsibility of defending them, and yet enjoy all the advantages of trading with them. Fortunately, these short-sighted views never wholly prevailed. The Empire has remained, disunited indeed and undeveloped, but still substantially intact. The new ideal which has meanwhile grown up and

gathered strength is that of the Empire as a single united whole, a great world-State, composed of equal and independent yet indissolubly united States. Every unit of this great federation is as essential to the whole as any part of the United Kingdom. To the true Imperialist Canada and South Africa are in every sense as real and essential parts of his country, of the State which claims his patriotic allegiance, as Scotland, Wales, or Kent. Each State of the British Empire is as essential to the whole as are the States of the American Union. This may not yet perhaps be the attitude of every Englishman, or of every Canadian, or South African, but it is an attitude which is becoming more general, and one that is growing in strength. How rapidly it has grown is shown by the South African War. That war was in its essence a war of secession, an attempt on the part of certain semi-dependent States to wrest themselves, and not only themselves, but the whole of South Africa, out of the Imperial system. The Colonies sent their contingents to oppose that attempt, not so much from any affection for the United Kingdom, as from the determination that the British Empire should be preserved intact.

Closely connected with the internal change in the Empire have been the changes in its external surroundings, which have again made the question of defence vital, and through the aspect of defence have helped on the movement for unity. Europe took much longer to recover from the great crisis of the Napoleonic wars than England. A constant series of conflicts between the different States, and between the different classes in those States, retarded their economic development. Gradually, however, a measure of internal and external equilibrium was arrived at, and was followed by a stage of rapid economic development. Prussia, pursuing a policy in its spirit closely akin to that of England in the eighteenth century, made defence—through education, through efficiency of administration,

and through the fostering of industry—subserve the purposes of national development, and in the last generation has reaped the fruits of her policy in an expansion of national strength, with which our expansion in recent times can bear no comparison. Russia, too, is gradually becoming a modern State, and though internal misgovernment and disastrous wars abroad may retard, yet they cannot in the long run check her economic development, or the growth of her power. The United States after a long period, during which all their energies were turned inwards, are now looking without, and entering into the competition of the world not only as an industrial, but also as a military and naval power. With all these States industrial development has led to the desire to control markets and the sources of raw materials in other words, to a policy of expansion. That same industrial development has provided them with the wealth which makes that expansion possible, which enables them to maintain great armies and build great fleets. We have gradually come back to the situation of two centuries ago; only now what is threatened is not so much England as the British Empire as a whole, and England herself mainly in so far as she is dependent on the Empire and on her trade for holding her own. The new danger can only be met in the same spirit as the old. No army reorganizations or naval schemes, no mere increases of our defence budgets will permanently solve it. We must go back to the old view, and remember that defence is an essential part of the national life, a thing which must be kept in mind in everything that we do or leave undone, a part to which every other must, in a sense, be subordinated for the development of the whole.

With this view before us, let us now consider what the defence of the British Empire involves. To do this we must first have regard to its extent and position, to the distribution, total volume, and economic strength of its population on the one hand, and on the other to the position of its principal rivals. The British

Empire covers the largest area of any Empire in the world, and has the largest gross population. But that population is of very unequal political, economic, and defensive value. Only the white population in it can be reckoned fully efficient in any of these respects. The white population of the British Empire is only a little over fifty millions. If we set against that figure the sixty millions of the present German Empire, the eighty millions of the united Germany towards which Pan-Germanism is working, or the seventy millions of the white inhabitants of the United States, and also consider the extent and configuration of the territories to be defended, the weakness of the material basis on which that vast Empire is built at once becomes evident. Moreover, that efficient population is most unequally distributed. Four-fifths of it are concentrated in these islands. This, no doubt, is an advantage in so far as islands are difficult to invade or to conquer. Unfortunately, the islands in question are much too small even to support their existing population, and the need of securing free access of supplies from oversea is a serious strategical weakness. Besides, the comparative security of one part of the Empire is of little advantage if other parts, no less essential to the whole, are insecure. The Empire possesses two enormous land frontiers bordering on the territories of two of the greatest world States. Behind neither of these frontiers is there a sufficient development of economic and national strength to ensure the safety of our position.

The defence of an Empire whose parts are divided by the sea demands first and foremost a supreme navy. That supremacy is more essential than ever, now that the outlying parts of the Empire are regarded not as dependencies, but as integral portions whose maintenance is essential to the existence of the whole. On the other hand, the oversea possessions of the other Powers are only dependencies in the sense that the British Colonies once were, and not integral portions of themselves, and for that very reason the loss of naval supremacy means

more to us than to any of them. That supremacy must, therefore, be secure, not only against the most imminent risks, but against any risks that are even remotely probable. The maintenance of the two-Power standard is the very lowest measure that we can allow ourselves. Our navy is our very existence. We can allow no State, or pair of States, however seemingly well-disposed, to outbuild us at sea.

At the same time, a supreme navy alone will not suffice. In the first place, a purely naval war cannot crush a continental enemy. It may be prolonged indefinitely, and cost enormous sums, which will cripple the whole power of the nation, and thus in the long-run endanger naval supremacy itself, for naval supremacy must be based on national wealth. Moreover, even to purely naval success, military success is sometimes an essential factor. Without the army which captured Port Arthur, the Japanese would have found it more difficult to establish their naval supremacy in the Far East. The Battle of Mukden has probably prevented Russia from ever again becoming a dominating Power on the coasts of the Pacific, and has, therefore, greatly weakened her chances of becoming a dominant Power on the waters of that ocean. Again, the navy, to make sure of success, must be absolutely unhampered in the pursuit of its strategical objective—the enemy's fighting fleets. It must not be tied down to local defence. The object of our fleets is not to prevent an invasion of England, but to destroy hostile fleets. Lastly, a navy cannot defend a continental State. But the British Empire is, as regards Canada and India, at least, a continental Empire. Nothing that we can do at sea could ever recover either Canada or India if they had once come under the grip of the great territorial empires whose frontiers march with them. But the defence of Canada and India is as essential to the existence of the British Empire as the defence of England.

The defence of India is, indeed, the first and most pressing military problem to which we must attend.

When we conquered India it was practically an island. Even now it is still separated by an enormous gap from the effective centre of Russian power. At the same time, Russia—the real Russia, not the boundary on the map—is steadily advancing towards the Indian frontier. That advance will only be delayed, but not stopped, by defeat in the Far East, or a revolution at home. The completion of strategical railways towards Afghanistan has been going on steadily, in spite of the war in Manchuria. Russia believes, and correctly believes, that she can concentrate quite as large armies in Afghanistan as in Manchuria, and she also believes—and again, unfortunately, with reason—that we cannot bring against her nearly as large or as well-trained forces as Japan has done. Whatever may be the situation at the present moment, the general trend of events is certain. Europe, with its economic and industrial development, its railways, and its military power, is slowly advancing across Asia, and will bring the whole weight of the European state, organized on modern military lines, against an Asiatic empire, based on primitive agriculture, and defended by a small standing army, partly native and partly European, with no adequate reserve behind it. This state of affairs is supremely unsatisfactory, and must be altered while Russia's present exhaustion gives us the time to do so. In the first place, we must create in this country a really adequate reserve for a great war in Asia. That reserve is not to be found in our existing military system, nor will Mr. Arnold-Forster's scheme, whatever its merits in some respects, provide it. The defence of India will require something much more powerful than Mr. Arnold-Forster's short-service reserve army. We require something in the nature of an Imperial militia, an organization that will enable us to put a really large and effective force, reckoned not in tens, but in hundreds of thousands, into the field in front of India, and to maintain and increase that force during a long war. How that force is to be raised and trained, and how it is to be paid for, is a problem that presents the very

gravest difficulties. At the same time, it is a problem which must be faced. But even if we have a great reserve in this country, its distance from the Indian frontier constitutes a serious danger, especially in the case of a war fought on sea as well as on land. The creation of a reserve nearer to the Indian frontier than these islands is very desirable. Sooner or later it will be essential to organize something in the nature of an effective Imperial militia in the Colonies, of which both South Africa and the Australasian Colonies are much nearer to India than this country. But such a militia can only be raised in sufficient numbers and maintained effective if the population of those parts of the Empire is increased very largely beyond what it is at present. In the meantime, we can do something by keeping as large a proportion as possible of our regular army in those Colonies, though that can only be regarded as a temporary measure. Lastly, India herself must also be enabled to play her part more adequately in her own defence. The economic development of India, the building up of a great industrial community on the basis of the present purely agricultural India, is an essential element in Imperial Defence, and no considerations of the selfish interest of the English export trade can be allowed to stand in the way of that development. Ultimately, too, the political evolution of India will be necessary in order to enable her fully to carry out her part in defending her own frontiers. Nothing would be more unwise than to attempt suddenly to introduce the English political system into India—to adopt the panaceas of the Indian National Congress. At the same time, things cannot remain for ever as they are now, if, for no other reason, simply because a state governed and administered on the lines of the India of to-day cannot hold its own militarily against states in a higher condition of political development.

The problem of Canada may seem less pressing from the immediate military point of view, but it is even more vital than that of the defence of India. The defence of

Canada is a question of principle and of national self-respect, rather than of immediate danger. It is the very touchstone of Imperialism. Unless we are prepared to defend Canada to the utmost, to put our last man into the field, and spend our last shilling, all our professions of belief in a united Empire are mere verbiage. That our existing military system, or Mr. Arnold-Forster's modification of it, meets the demands of the Canadian problem even less than it does those of the Indian problem, is obvious; for Canada, even more than for India, a large Imperial reserve is a necessity. But even more essential than the creation of a reserve in this country for the defence of Canada is the creation of such a force in Canada itself. To build up a population in Canada is the only effective means of securing the defence of that portion of the Empire. As long as we have less than six millions on our side of those 4,000 miles of frontier, and the United States have eighty millions on the other, so long our Empire exists only on sufferance, and so long our relations with the United States can never be thoroughly friendly or thoroughly satisfactory. To build up the population of Canada to at least twenty or thirty millions is the most pressing need of Imperial Defence; to that every other consideration must give way.

The defence of the United Kingdom is a matter which requires but little consideration. Its solution is included in the solution of the greater and more vital problems already dealt with. With a supreme navy capable of maintaining the connection between the different parts of the Empire, with a military system which provides a reserve force sufficient to cope with the demands of the Indian or Canadian portion, the security of the heart of the Empire will be almost impregnable. The very essence of any military system such as our Imperial necessities demand must be absolute elasticity, a capacity for almost unlimited expansion. With such a system there will always be a surplus available for local defence, even if we lose 500,000 men in India and the whole of the navy in the Mediterranean.

The conclusion we have arrived at, then, is that the defence of the British Empire demands, first and foremost, a supreme navy, and secondly an efficient army, capable of indefinite expansion, and available at the exposed frontiers of the Empire. How are these to be maintained? Whence are we to raise the revenue, and where to find the population to maintain them? It is perfectly clear that in the long run the United Kingdom, which maintains the whole burden of our present very inadequate defence, will be unable to meet these larger demands. As an industrial unit, the United Kingdom has long ago been outstripped by the United States. It is at this moment being outstripped by Germany, and may even, in a future not so very remote, be outstripped by Russia and Japan. With the economic development of our industrial rivals their aggressive with it. The burden of maintaining the two-Power standard at sea, as against France and Russia, and keeping up an army sufficient for the policing of the Empire, has already proved heavy enough. At the present moment we pay something like seventy millions a year for Imperial Defence. We have, indeed, for the moment, been able to make a considerable reduction in our naval expenditure, partly as the result of internal reorganization in the navy, which is all to the good, partly power will steadily grow, and their ambition will grow owing to the temporary disablement of Russia. This may or may not be sound policy, but, at any rate, is not a permanent saving. The question is, What are we to do when the United States and Germany seriously begin to compete with us for naval supremacy, and when at the same time Russia, recovered from her present misfortunes, begins to press close on our Indian frontier? The naval ambitions of the German Emperor are too well known to need more than a passing reference here. But it is equally clear that of late years President Roosevelt has deeply stirred the American nation with the same idea of oversea Empire and naval power. The United States are our friends—and long

may they continue to remain so—but they have not always been so in the past, and there is no guarantee that they will remain our friends for ever. So vital is naval supremacy to us that we cannot tolerate any nation or pair of nations, however friendly at the moment, being stronger than ourselves at sea. Once we allow that to happen, the whole framework on which our Empire is built will fall to pieces. Admitting that, then we are bound to keep up the competition. Whatever naval programme they fix upon, we have got to surpass. If their naval budgets rise to fifty millions, we shall have to follow suit; and if they raise them again to sixty, seventy, or eighty millions, we still can do nothing else but follow. But in a competition of this sort with States growing so enormously in industrial strength, and established on so broad a basis of territory and population, we cannot hope in the long run to succeed. The burden will press more and more heavily on our narrower shoulders, and sooner or later we shall come to grief. Whether our downfall will take the shape of financial exhaustion, or of displacement from our position; whether it will be by war, or by the menace of superior force in peace, is immaterial.

There is only one way out of the difficulty—that is, to find the material basis of our defence policy, not in the United Kingdom, but in the British Empire. At present that Empire is unorganized and undeveloped; but if we can unite its scattered components, and develop its vast territories and immense natural resources, then we may hope to build up an industrial power, and to create a population fully capable of providing for the needs of Imperial policy without fainting beneath the burden. How are we, then, to secure that union and foster that development? Immediate political union presents many difficulties. There is at present no sufficient unity of interest on which a political constitution can be based. Neither we nor the Colonies are ready for it, and it can only come gradually, along with, and as the result of, other forms of the union.

The same difficulties stand in the way of any common military system. That, again, can only be organized by slow degrees, and in proportion as community of interest and community of danger develops. The form in which at present assistance from the Colonies is most frequently demanded—that of money contribution to Imperial Defence—is the one from which least is to be expected. It is, moreover, the one which is in itself the least desirable. The Colonies do make certain money contributions at the present moment towards the upkeep of the Imperial navy, but those contributions are valuable mainly as signs of their goodwill. Their total amount is insignificant compared with the total of our expenditure. Yet there is very little hope of getting that amount increased. The fact is, and we must not lose sight of it, that the Colonies are comparatively poor countries. They are rich in land, rich in boundless possibilities for the future, but they are poor in ready money Every penny they can raise is required for their internal administration and for their development. It is impossible for them to make any large contribution in money without seriously crippling their own growth, and consequently delaying the general development of the Empire. The economic development of the Colonies, the building up of their populations and industries, and the creation of surplus wealth, are indispensable conditions precedent to any substantial financial assistance from them towards the burden of Imperial Defence.

Furthermore, before we can arrive at any common system of defence, we must Imperialize our policy, the attitude of our Government departments, and the personnel of our services. Our foreign policy is still to a very large extent English rather than Imperial. The trade interests of England bulk in it much more largely than those of other parts of the Empire. The defence of those interests continually brings the Imperial Power into strained relations with other Powers. Those strained relations may involve the whole Empire in wars in which great parts of the Empire have had no interest. No

doubt the Imperial forces would defend India and the Colonies from harm during such a war; but it would be open to India and to the Colonies to retort that, as far as they were concerned, such a war would never have come about. That English interests should be defended by the whole Empire is only right and natural. But if it is desired that the whole forces of the Empire should be organized for the defence of English interests, it is essential that those interests should be as far as possible assimilated with those of other parts of the Empire. Economic unity must be regarded as an essential step towards unity of defence. When our economic system has so developed that it will be impossible, in most cases, for an outside Power to interfere with English interests without at the same time interfering with Colonial or Indian interests, then we may hope to enlist the serious and permanent attention of the Colonies in the problems of Imperial Defence. What applies to the general policy of the Foreign Office applies no less to the details of its departmental work. The Imperializing of our consular service is perhaps the first and most pressing necessity, unless we wish, before many years are out, to be faced, in the case of Canada, with the same unpleasant demand for a separate consular system that has severed Sweden and Norway. Our navy, our army, our Colonial and Indian administration must also be thrown open to the whole Empire. Without it we cannot secure that personal interest, that sense of full and equal participation, which is necessary to bring every part of the Empire into line, ready and anxious to do its share in the common work.

At the same time, we must develop as well as unite. However closely the existing Empire were united, it would yet not be equal to the burden of its own defence. What was said of Canada and India a little earlier in the present article is equally applicable to the Empire as a whole. The economic development of the Empire, the increasing of its efficient population, and the raising of the efficiency of its less efficient population, are the

really wider problems of Imperial Defence. It is only by enlarging the material basis that the burden of defence can really be made lighter, and prevented from weighing unduly on the other elements of the national life, and hampering their full development.

But political unity and economic development are not in themselves sufficient to meet the needs of Imperial Defence. They form the material basis. But they will not by themselves insure that that material basis is efficiently utilized. What is essential is not merely a recognition on the part of statesmen of the relation between defence and the other factors of the national life, but the realization by the whole body of the citizens of the Empire of the importance of defence, and of the duty of taking a personal interest and a personal share in it. Without that personal interest, defence in a self-governing community is bound to be inefficient. The present efficiency of our navy is a direct result of the revival of interest in naval matters, and of the recognition of the essential importance of sea power, which was stimulated by the writings of Captain Mahan, Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, and many others, and which, indeed, has never entirely died out in this country. Our army system, on the other hand, is inherently inefficient, because it has never really formed a part of the national life, because the ordinary citizen, or the ordinary politician, has no idea of the purpose for which he wants an army, or of what constitutes military efficiency. It is from that lack of national interest and national understanding that all the defects of our military system flow. An indifferent nation means an indifferent Parliament, and an indifferent Parliament means an indifferent Cabinet, and an indifferent Prime Minister. Under such circumstances the Secretary of State for War is usually a nonentity, or, if not, he wears himself out by his vain efforts to force through his schemes against the passive obstruction of his colleagues and the indifference of the nation. Behind the Secretary of State there stands the War Office disorganized and emasculated by

the hopelessness of ever getting anything done, or ever finding out what it is wanted to do, and from the War Office hopelessness and indifference spread throughout the army.

The South African War brought out the defects of our military system in the most striking fashion. Not only the nation and the Government, but the army itself, apart from its inadequacy in numbers, was completely unprepared for war. There was hardly a single officer or soldier who was really trained for war, who knew what war meant, who realized the intellectual and physical preparation required for it, or the energy and the sacrifices demanded in waging it. Our military failure in South Africa was not merely that of antiquated tactical methods, and insufficient bookwork or defective maps, though all these features played a part in it; it was also a failure in the military spirit. The attitude of the army was as unwarlike in its essence as the attitude of the nation. The absurd fear of casualties, the hysterical excitement about the Boer artillery, the exaggeration of the depth of rivers and steepness of mountains, which were so conspicuous features in the reports of press correspondents, were but the reflection of the attitude of the officers from whom those correspondents derived their impressions, and who censored their despatches.

To secure an efficient defence we must have a nation interested in defence, and fully cognizant of its meaning and of its methods. The study of military problems ought to form an essential part of the citizen's education in his political duties. Military history ought to be included in the curriculum of our public schools and Universities. It is a national disgrace that there is no Chair of Military History or of Strategy at either Oxford or Cambridge. In a country like Germany, where the leading of the army is intrusted to a military class largely separate from the body of the nation, it may do to have military history confined to a section of the General Staff. In a democratic nation like ours,

that study must be spread through all the more intelligent sections of the community. At the same time, it is no less essential that the army itself should be educated in the broader meaning of Imperial Defence, and in the fuller understanding of its own profession. The educational apparatus of our army is ridiculously inadequate. The enlargement and improvement of our military colleges, the creation of an adequate historical section, are the first and most essential steps towards army reform. At the same time, we have to provide not only for the politicians and for the leaders of armies, but also for the ordinary voter and for the common soldier. Some form of military education which will make the ordinary man realize something of the general meaning of Imperial Defence, and acquire something of the spirit which is essential to the effective conduct of war, must be brought to bear upon the whole body of citizens. Some form of national service is essential to national military efficiency, quite apart from the length of the training given, and from the direct usefulness of the army thus created. Given a nation in which every citizen possesses a certain proficiency in the use of arms, and is accustomed to the idea that it is his duty, if need be, to sacrifice even his life for the public good, and it will be possible to raise an economical and efficient voluntary army in peace, and to furnish a boundless reserve in time of war. On that reserve a nation interested in its military security, and aware of the means necessary to secure it, will be able to draw to whatever extent is necessary. How the Empire can be defended without that reserve against nations that possess it is a question that we are bound to ask ourselves, and to which there can only be one answer.

It may be objected that the national ideal sketched out in the preceding pages is the mere perversion of an imagination fevered by militarism. It will be said that, in order to make the Empire secure, I am proposing changes which will destroy its whole character, and the justification of its existence—its personal liberty, its

material well-being. This I would entirely and absolutely deny. In the earlier portion of the present article I pointed out that defence, when treated as an essential element in national policy—not as a mere isolated department calling for money, and withdrawing strength from the nation—in the long-run only stimulates and increases the other factors of national life. A really serious and unflinching consideration of the great problem of defence will inevitably lead to measures that, in the long run, are bound to benefit our population, our trade, our social well-being, our education. The Imperial unity necessary for defence will quicken our whole political and social life. The fostering of trade within the Empire, and the building up of population in the Colonies, will in the end mean not a mere diversion of the total wealth and population of the Empire, but an enormous aggregate increase. National service will not only provide the reserve for our armies, and increase the efficiency of the voluntary armies raised in the midst of a warlike nation, but it will benefit us in innumerable other ways. It will infuse a spirit of discipline and organization into our masses; while it will at the same time be democratic, bringing every class together to the same common work, and inspiring them with a common sense of duty. It will afford an opportunity for raising the standard and prolonging the period of the national education. It will give a healthy physical training to the mass of our people at the time of life when such training is most needed, and thus, by conducing to healthier and longer life, increase our sum-total of man-power. It will enable anything like physical degeneration to be at once noted, and will call for its instant cure. In fact, if only we take the defence aspect of our Empire seriously, we shall solve all the other problems connected with it, because they will one by one force themselves upon our serious attention, and we shall have to give the best of our mind and the whole of our determination to solving them.

THE NAVY AND THE EMPIRE

By CARLYON BELLAIRS, R.N.

In dealing with naval policy and strategy in a work appearing near Trafalgar Day, one is forcibly reminded of two memorable sayings. In one Nelson laid down a maxim for Cabinet Ministers that battleships 'are the best negotiators in Europe.' In the other he gave us the whole duty of a naval officer in what he called 'the Great Order,' which was that the destruction of the enemy's fleets is an object to which every other consideration must give way.

Since all the initial stages of a great British war must be on the sea, and the security of the United Kingdom, its Empire and its trade, depends on the ability of the Royal Navy to defend the sea communications, the policy of a British Government derives a unity of purpose which is the envy of European Powers forced to regard their land frontiers as exposed to the eruption of great conscript armies. The course of a diplomatic contest in which Great Britain is engaged must, therefore, largely depend upon the relative sense of power derived through the estimate framed of the strength of the respective navies. Organization, coal, and ammunition necessarily play their part as bearing on the training of the personnel, but, other things being equal, it is the battleships which are chiefly regarded. The standard of strength in battleships laid down by successive Cabinets since 1889 has been equality with the two leading Powers with 'a considerable margin

of reserve.' Though it would be easy to ridicule this condition as a mere rule of thumb, in practice it has proved an efficient working instrument for Parliament.

In the case of India it is sometimes held that the situation is far more complicated, but if it be conceded for the sake of argument that India cannot be adequately defended on its land frontiers by the existing British and native garrison, it must also be acknowledged that the ability to send reinforcements depends absolutely on the adequacy of the Royal Navy. In this connection the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is a factor of considerable importance. In Eastern waters, where the sea power is divided between the United States, Japan, and Great Britain, the sea transport of Japanese troops is safeguarded by the activity of our ships in the Mediterranean. The latter would prevent the passage of hostile ships through the Suez Canal. The alliance directly increases our strength for such purpose to an extent we have never before had experience of, for all our battleships are now concentrated at home, whereas in 1796 we had thirty-six abroad to twenty-five for the allies.

It is, of course, assumed that the case of a war with the United States lies outside the range of discussion. British and American interests have so much in common in the Far East, as elsewhere, that the proposal has been made that America should safeguard the Monroe Doctrine for all time, while Great Britain might obtain economies on her navy estimates by a treaty binding each to go to the assistance of the other if attacked by a coalition of three, or even two, Powers. The advance of the American navy is, therefore, a matter of dispassionate interest to the British Empire. The United States is rich. The aggregate wealth more than doubles in twenty years, while the population has exactly doubled in thirty years, or advanced by an amount over three times as great as that of the United Kingdom. In addition, the naval forces are bound to become more cohesive after the completion of the

Panama Canal. The opinion has, therefore, been expressed to the writer by more than one very high authority that the United States is destined to become the first maritime Power in the world. The solution, in all probability, lies in the future of Greater Britain. The wealth of America is the result of internal development, the annual ton-mileage of its railways being over six times as great as that of the United Kingdom. This development was very largely the result of the outward flow of British capital. I once asked the President of the New York Chamber of Commerce what would happen when the rate of interest in the United States settled down to a safe and low basis. His reply was that capital would flow outwards—history would repeat itself; so that the present population, wealth, and progress of the British Colonies are no measure of the rapid increase which may be destined to come when capital flows in more and more from America and the older countries.

There are two things which turn a nation's eyes away from the sea. The one is concerned with building up, the other with pulling down. Both internal development and internal dissensions have the effect of absorbing the national energies to the exclusion of maritime affairs, and this consideration of internal dissensions should be especially noted as one in which the outlook for the British Empire is more favourable than for a long time past. Historically, the Colonies have always had a keener sense of the value of naval strength than the people of these islands. The American colonists were at one with us on the necessity of maritime predominance, however much they differed from us on matters of policy such as military garrisons and enforced contributions. Men like Mr. Hofmeyr, again, who have vehemently opposed our internal policy in South Africa, have been enthusiastic adherents of a strong British navy.

The present naval contributions of the Colonies, amounting to about 1 per cent. of our naval expendi-

ture, do not even cover the cost of squadrons which could be distributed on a sounder basis if the contributions did not exist. This last condition was fulfilled in the case of Canada. We were thus enabled to withdraw ships from both sides of North America, and to reduce Halifax and Esquimalt to inexpensive cadres. As nations become richer, they act very much as individuals in devoting more attention to insurance. The advantage of a common navy over separate ones, both from the point of view of efficiency and economy, are so obvious that there need be no fear of a permanent tendency to create separate navies. The future might be safeguarded if far-seeing statesmen will bring colonial representatives more and more into our councils. At present the Colonies resemble the past history of the United States in looking inwards to internal development. The time, surely, will come with them also when their eyes will turn outwards. Their markets and sea communications will appeal to them with a more insistent force. They will see how useless is a weak detached force, and how strong is a combined one. 'Only numbers can annihilate,' said Nelson; and even when the Colonies are as rich as Holland, Denmark, Spain, or Belgium, they cannot hope to do better than those countries which are unable to afford battleships.

The so-called battleships of Austria are quite unfit to lie in the line of battle, while to build a *Dreadnought* outside Great Britain or Germany would probably cost about two and a half millions sterling, or nearly as much as we raise by a penny on the income tax. Indeed, one of the most significant changes since Nelson's time, when we found it indispensable that we should deal with the battleships of the Portuguese and Danish navies, is that the business of owning battleships has become far too expensive for any but the seven great maritime Powers, and of these Italy, in spite of spasmodic programmes, tends to drop out of the race. For the cost of one *Dreadnought* we could have obtained about eighteen of Nelson's *Victory* type, or

eight of the steam line-of-battle ships of the *Duke of Wellington* type of less than fifty years ago. The expense does not end with the mere building of a large ship, for, apart from the trained complement, stores, and coal, docks have to be adapted both in length and breadth for cruisers 500 feet long or battleships 80 feet broad. In 1848 there were no ships in the navy over 210 feet long, and in 1890 none over 400 feet. Thus Germany, in the attempt to build ships fit to engage vessels of the *Dreadnought* type, must necessarily enlarge her existing docks and the accommodation of the Kiel Ship Canal.

The path chosen, however, is one along which Germany will be forced to follow Great Britain with much reluctance. She is bound to involve herself in a very large expenditure, which is merely accessory to fighting strength, and not the provision of fighting strength itself. This expense was certainly not foreseen when the second German Navy Bill was passed in 1900 for an extraordinary expenditure of £94,000,000 by the year 1920 as regards works, and the year 1916 as regards ships. This great effort is being made under the grave disadvantage of heavy expenditure connected with the defence of three important land frontiers, and a drain on resources through the military campaigns in the colonies. Great as are the advantages derived by Germany through the concentration of her navy, it involves the sacrifice of both colonies and distant commerce in face of a Power which can more than hold its own in home waters, and is in a position to attack elsewhere. The present programme of two battleships a year can easily be rivalled by Great Britain. In a few years Germany will cease to enjoy the advantages a new navy confers of a small pensioner or ineffective list, and but little wastage of ships to replace. For fifteen years Great Britain has nearly averaged a programme of three battleships and four to five cruisers, and could have obtained the same results with a smaller programme if the wise, economical method had been

adopted of building a ship as rapidly as possible. Apart from the low national debt, the best German assets in this rivalry are the cheapness of the personnel, as compared with our own and the American, and the good administration, which has never wasted money in copying the crazes to which France has so often been subjected. As compared with the United States, France, and Russia, the German building resources are cheaper in their work and more efficient, but they cannot be compared with those of Great Britain, which exceed all Europe combined. In 1901 the United Kingdom built 983,133 tons of shipping as compared with the record output for Germany of 132,873 tons in 1903. The United States has a higher output than Germany, but it is almost exclusively for the coastal, river, and lake trades, which are a national monopoly.

However unpalatable the policy may be to Germany, in view of the shallow nature of her coasts, any attempt to rival other Powers must involve her in following their designs of larger dimensions for battleships. The experience of France shows that every attempt 'to turn' the position of the battleship, if we may use a military expression, has resulted in complete disillusionment. The French Parliament has now passed a vote which practically pledges the Government to build ship for ship against Germany, a course which, if pursued for a generation at the present rate of German shipbuilding, would entail, under the two-Power standard, a programme of four battleships a year for Great Britain. Under the spell of the submarine, France neglected to build battleships, with the result that the new Minister of Marine, M. de Lanessan, found that in 1908 France would possess twenty-eight battleships, of which only seventeen would be modern. He contrasted this with twenty-two modern battleships for Germany and fifty-two for Great Britain. 'It would be an act of folly,' he added, 'on the part of France to attempt to rival England in the number of her battleships; no nation has maritime obligations which are at all comparable

with those of Great Britain.' This testimony from one of the most thoughtful of the great European administrators is of especial value, if it moderates certain pleadings for Great Britain to take the initiative in demanding the reduction of naval armaments. Such a course would carry with it the danger of placing the maritime policy of our Empire under the domination of a committee of foreigners meeting at the Hague.

The gravest reasons can be urged against any measure which might fetter this country in adjusting its principal naval defence of battleships, not solely in accordance with the variations of her policy and the number of probable battleships which may threaten her, but also in the provision of the requisite margin of safety against the accidents of navigation and possible successful operations on the part of torpedo vessels, submarine boats, and submarine mines. To state that naval campaigns are decided by battleships does not preclude the possibility of some losses through other causes. The Japanese lost two out of six of their battleships through automatic mines, while a third was accidentally sunk shortly after the peace. If a war with France and Germany were unhappily to break out in 1908, the British fleets could be threatened by twice as many torpedo craft as they possess themselves. The operations of the destroyer class would rapidly thin out the 450 torpedo craft of France and Germany; but prudence dictates that some margin of safety should exist, so that we can face the loss of a few battleships with equanimity. In the war period 1793-1802, while our losses from causes other than fighting amounted to eighteen sail of the line and forty-six frigates, the allied nations of France, Spain, and Holland only lost ten sail of the line and nine frigates. The losses were therefore as three to one.

Of the methods for trying to circumvent the tyranny of the battleship, there remains only the *guerre de course* so frequently formulated by French statesmen and admirals. The most formidable example in history was

the French wars of 1793-1815, when we lost through war 2·36 per cent. of our shipping, without deducting large corresponding gains we made from the enemy. Such a risk is no more than one incidental to ordinary navigation, and to-day, allowing for neutral shipping, would represent $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of our total supplies. The only triumph over British commerce was when Sir John Jervis evacuated the Mediterranean before the superior fleets of France and Spain. From that moment to the Battle of the Nile British commerce with the Mediterranean entirely ceased. It was the action of a fleet of battleships which a few years later negotiated the opening of the Baltic again to British commerce. Then came Trafalgar, and the security afforded by that battle to commerce was such that insurance rates tumbled down 18 per cent. I would hesitate to labour the point were it not that these familiar lessons have to be learned over and over again. If Russian battleships were injured at Port Arthur by Japanese torpedo craft, how came they to be at anchor in an open roadstead? The answer is that they were afraid to put to sea because of the Japanese battleships. If battleships were again sunk by torpedo craft at Tsushima, the immunity the latter enjoyed was due to the beating down of all power of defence by the Japanese battleships. Certain Russian vessels fortunately escaped the attentions of the torpedo craft, and, in consequence, became by capture a part of the Japanese navy.

Two modern instances lend point to Nelson's saying concerning battleships as 'negotiators.' In the Panjdeh crisis confidence was so lacking that we spent several millions in a hurried and wasteful manner. In the Fashoda crisis we experienced the effect of past great naval efforts, so that only a few thousands were spent on mobilization. The preparation of armaments must always be the work of time, and Nelson only referred to battleships which could immediately exert their strength, as was done when, without any reduction of our blockading forces, Sir Hyde Parker's fleet was sent to conduct

the negotiations where Nelson added Copenhagen to the laurels he had won at St. Vincent and the Nile. In the recent war, it is clear that diplomacy and preparedness, which were closely coordinated by the Japanese, had no intimate relation whatever in Russian polity. In the case of Japan at the outbreak of war, we find that the shipbuilding programme was completely finished and the fleet concentrated at sea, whereas in Russia nine battleships were still building, and the commissioned ships badly divided in various harbours. The Japanese triumphantly vindicated Nelson's saying by showing to the world the close connection between the soft words of diplomacy and the hard knocks of gunnery. It is equally true that Admiral Togo, who paid us the compliment of hoisting his flag on Trafalgar Day, bore out in practice the truth of the Great Order which thoughts of that day induced us to refer to at the beginning of this article.

If the Great Order had inspired our policy during the past fifty years, it is difficult to believe that so large a proportion of expenditure and men would have been tied up in what Sir George Clarke has christened sedentary defence, involving as it has done dispersion of effort away from mobility, which latter is the essence of a field army and of a navy. For the work of an Empire of over 12,000 square miles, with 43,000 miles of coastline and a vast trade, mobile forces are most essential, for they only can cope with the whole of its multitudinous requirements. Yet, systematically, up to the time of the formation of the Defence Committee the war problems were faced piecemeal. There was no finality to the demands which could thus be formulated on purely imaginary hypotheses. In the words of the Esher Committee, 'It would be easy to show that unnecessary weakness, coupled with inordinate waste of national resources, thus results.' It is also beyond dispute that after the Peninsular, Crimean, American Civil, and Franco-German Wars we lived under the spell of military operations which had no parallel to

purely British wars, so that we tended to lose our sense of the value of battleships as 'negotiators.' Three years after the Crimean War a Treasury Committee found that our relative strength to that of France had so far diminished that the prospect before us was that, in 1861, France would possess forty-four steam line-of-battle ships, of which four were iron-plated, as compared with forty for Great Britain, of which none were iron-plated. In 1860 the First Lord of the Admiralty stated in the House of Commons that 'we had no Channel Squadron whatever, that we had no naval defence of our own coast.' Four years after the American Civil War there was again a scare about our naval strength, and two years after the Franco-German War the First Lord of the Admiralty described our navy as existing largely on paper, many ships being mere dummies. Even so we continued to build muzzle-loading guns for our ships up to 1880, while every European navy had adopted the breechloader. The result was that at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the exception of four guns in the Italian Navy, Great Britain was the only nation with muzzle-loading guns, and of these she possessed over 300 in battleships and coast-defence vessels. In the present year it was discovered that many of the existing heavy guns of the navy were defective, and the Admiralty decided to increase the reserve of guns, which only amounted to 25 per cent. of the armament, as compared with 100 per cent. provided by Japan. These sorry results will always follow when attention is absorbed by minor details instead of vital requirements, and when statesmen quit the sure arguments of history and experiments for plausible guesswork. No more baneful conjecture was ever made than when Peel coined the phrase that 'steam had bridged the Channel,' and Palmerston passed it into the currency of our thoughts.

In the early days of steamers an Admiralty memorandum in reference to the mails had laid it down that it was the bounden duty of the Government to discourage

steamers as calculated to strike a vital blow at our naval supremacy. The Admiralty Committee on manning, in 1858, discovered that future wars would still be fought under masts and sails, as the supply of coal would not be enough for a steam war. Cardiff alone exports in a year more than the navy uses in thirty years. Battleships fell in the estimation of all but the historical school, and, therefore, tended to be neglected. The powerful influence of the aged Duke of Wellington was used in favour of shore preparations for defence, and it was inevitable that the War Office should overlap naval functions by sedentary defences to resist invasion or coastal attacks. The military forces became less and less mobile, losing altogether the amphibious power, conferred by maritime strength, of being able to choose their striking point, or to assist the navy to capture ships protected by fortifications. In the House of Commons these considerations are seldom alluded to, for the practice is to forbid references to the navy and army estimates, and *vice versa*, while only last session £50,000,000 was voted under the guillotine rule, without any discussion at all, in the space of one minute.

In the strategical wilderness in which we wandered we worshipped many strange gods, whose costly tabernacles are to be found dispersed over the Empire. The fortifications of the dockyards and of Dover cost £12,000,000; and those at Bermuda have been described on the highest authority to be monuments of misapplied ingenuity. The evidence everywhere of worship of bricks and mortar, such as the Alderney Breakwater, Wei-Hai-Wei, the budding scheme of Rosyth Dockyard, and deserted 'tabernacles,' such as Halifax, Jamaica, Esquimalt, and Trincomalee Dockyards, afford matter enough to the curious student of the strange worship. The erroneous conclusions of this school as to the ability of the Russian Armada to reach the Far East, or to steam at all, unless the ships were docked, shows how strongly the idea of bases, coaling-stations, and docks had possessed their minds. Very typical of the priesthood set up by these

new cults was the Royal Engineers Submarine Mining Corps, now in process of disbandment. No more costly affair has ever been devised. The moment it was placed in its proper perspective by Sir George Clarke and others it was bound to be revealed as more dangerous to friend than to foe.

The Royal Commission on the war showed that if we could have sent a striking force of a single brigade to Natal when war became inevitable, the whole course of the war would have been altered. We see from this instance that the National Debt is swollen by costly wars that might have been avoided by convincingly adequate organization, or, at any rate, curtailed by rapid blows at the outset of the war. The policy which devotes one-half the expenditure, and nine out of eleven soldiers—whether regulars, militia, yeomanry, or volunteers—to the work of passively waiting for the blows of an enemy, can only be compared to that of a football team which ties up nine out of eleven of its men in the goal. The comparison is unfair only in respect of the fact that the goal in football is really liable to be threatened, whereas in strategy the British goal is already covered by the operations of a strong navy.

The Cabinet's policy was outlined in the Stanhope memorandum of 1891, which formed a written constitution for the army. It showed that we no longer enjoyed the power of thinking in battleships which characterized Louis XVI. of France, who used to justify his economies by saying: 'Hush! it will give us a ship of the line the more.' It is clear that we have to educate our statesmen into the way of thinking in battleships, for the alternative is to drift into a bankruptcy both of strength and resources. Given the problem as stated in the now abandoned Stanhope memorandum, there could be no finality to expenditure, and so the credit of the country was threatened. Financial credit is closely related to naval supremacy, for the latter enables London to become the banking

centre of the world. On the other hand, the distress in England after 1797 arose mainly from the depreciation of the currency, so that in 1812 it was 21 per cent. below par value.

To think in battleships it is necessary to show the cost of purely passive defence in this country, and its equivalent in battleships of the latest type estimated to cost £1,800,000. For this purpose I use an official return, giving the net army estimates of 1903-1904 as £28,995,000. Of this sum £14,540,000 was devoted to the field army available for general service, including troops in South Africa and Egypt, and all regular units at home, except those in depots. This left for immobile or sedentary defence £14,455,000. To obtain the equivalent in *Dreadnoughts*, with twice the armament of former battleships, I submit the following table to criticism as the annual cost of such a vessel:

	£
Interest on first cost at 3 per cent.	54,000
Depreciation for a life of twenty-five years ...	70,000
Cost of crew	45,000
Victualling	16,000
Coal	25,000
Stores of all kinds and repairs	20,000
Annual cost of one *Dreadnought* in full commission	230,000

Dividing this total into the sum annually devoted to the passive defence, which can do nothing towards the winning of wars, we find that in 1903-1904 we were spending the equivalent of sixty-three *Dreadnoughts*, or of a number of fleets in full commission, probably over three times as formidable as the ones we now rely on to win command of the sea. This is not only, as the *Times* has rightly called it, 'the ruinous system of double insurance,' but it is insurance in the wrong office. We have by no means, however, laid bare the full extent of the evil. A very large part of the £34,000,000 being spent on naval works out of loans, and of the £18,000,000 on military works, is for purely sedentary

purposes. These sums represent an annual tax, for expenditure sanctioned during the last ten years, of £1,500,000. That great repairing establishments are absolutely necessary to the navy is a self-evident proposition, but to disperse the facilities of these establishments by a multiplication of dockyards in different parts of the world may easily result in loss rather than gain, and when done at the expense of fighting strength it is as if a general, having asked for reinforcements, is sent ambulances. With navies it is very much as it is in business—the large establishments win the orders. We may, by good luck, have a Gibraltar with a small dockyard as close to a battle as it is to Trafalgar, but the repair work might well be far more efficiently done if the vessel spent three or four days in steaming back to England. Thus, when the *Howe* lost her rudder in the Levant, it was found to be the speediest and most efficient course to send her to England and back, rather than to the dockyards at Malta and Gibraltar, which we have so assiduously nursed at the cost of many millions. As for the mere provision of docks, it will generally be found that at any port on a great trade route, private capital is only too anxious to provide those accessories to commerce and navies without any cost to the taxpayer, or, as at Colombo, with the assistance of a small subsidy. Much the same consideration should induce us to regard with suspicion the policy of shipbuilding in the dockyards, since it is notorious that the work is more cheaply performed by private firms.

Many conclusions follow on a policy of sea supremacy, which lead to vast economies. The distribution of the fleets for war purposes instead of police work is a case in point. Sea supremacy means safe communications for the predominant Power. We can, therefore, rely on merchant vessels to carry the bulk of our naval stores and coal. The very reverse has always been argued and carried out in practice. Our ships have been enlarged, and engines required to do much more work in driving

an unnecessarily heavy displacement. The following table of the tonnage launched in two periods for the navies will show that we should have been easily able to have attained better results:

	Launched in Ten Years ending March 31, 1900.	Launched in Nine Years ending March 31, 1904.
	Tons.	Tons.
Great Britain	1,182,000 ...	933,000
France, Russia, and Germany	1,058,000 ...	847,000

If a thorough knowledge of strategy had been brought to bear on both the class of ships built and their designs, a smaller building programme would have left us in an equally unassailable position. If it were realized that the battleships of a predominant Power always afford a secure base of refuge to the cruisers, which, even when out of sight, can communicate by wireless telegraphy, we should hardly be building hybrid cruiser-battleships to do the work of scouts and look-out vessels. It is a significant commentary on the endeavour to obtain great strength of units rather than the requisite number of units that Sir Compton Domvile, in the 1903 manœuvres, lost half his cruiser force through ordinary accidents. Like Nelson, he wanted eyes, not fists, in his scouts. On the other hand, the battleships are based only on their own strength. They must always be our first care. With them we obtain security, so that we can adjust and augment our forces during war, and, working to standard patterns, all types of vessels could be built in a year instead of sixteen to eighteen months, as is now estimated, or over three years, as has hitherto been our average for battleships. In the war of American Independence we replaced all the waste of war, and increased the navy from 133 battleships to 173, and from 97 frigates to 201. In the succeeding French wars we increased the battleships from 141 to 248, and the frigates from 157 to 323.

It must still remain true, however, that expenditure during peace is of far more value than any undertaken during war, always provided the Solomons control it, for otherwise much of it, as we have seen, had far better have been left to fructify in the banks of the nation. No ability and no exchequer can retrieve grave administrative blunders. The training of the personnel is, for instance, the work of years. At Trafalgar the training revealed inestimable advantages on the side of Nelson's fleet, for the mere enumeration of guns shows a superiority of 22 per cent. for the allies. In his progress to Tsushima, the Japanese engineer pursued his ideal of mechanical efficiency from early youth upwards no less relentlessly than did the sucking Togos on deck that of fighting efficiency. Perfection it is given to no system to attain; but, by concentration and coordination of efforts, each in his proper sphere, we can come as near to it as is possible to those 'who are neither children nor gods, but men in a world of men.'

No man can forecast the will of a many-headed democracy. Alarmists can play on its nerves as orators do on its passions. The one makes fools rush in where angels fear to tread; the other shouts 'Fire!' to an excitable crowd. Scare has succeeded to scare, and the psychological factor in strategy plays a definite part as it did with the Americans, when a squadron was officially stated to have been stationed at Hampden Roads to calm the fears of the sea-board. To feed the symptoms of panic in democracy is to give it a strong drink, for which it will cry out the more. The remedy for democracy, and for its representative orators, is to educate them. The orator has pleaded for efficiency, and candidates have inscribed efficiency on their election addresses again and again. It has been my endeavour to strike a new note by going back to those simple first principles which came to us from the times of Drake, and which are capable of being understood by the man in the street. Efficiency will follow when simplicity is attained.

THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES

By THE RIGHT HON. SIR JOHN COLOMB, K.C.M.G., M.P.

If statistics of wars are to be trusted, the century which closes on October 21, 1905, has the worst record. While it is undeniable that aversion to war is more prominent as an international sentiment in 1905 than in 1805, yet it was the later part, and not the earlier portion of the century, which earned for those hundred years a dismal and bloody distinction. The last half has been most remarkable for the magnitude of the operations by which the more highly civilized nations have inflicted upon each other, chiefly by land, misery and loss. While every continent has been a theatre of carnage since the great Peace Exhibition of 1851, it is the American which furnishes the most conspicuous proof that common faith, language, and history provide no certain guarantee of peace, even between two sections of the same people, when excited by antagonistic claims of self-interest. It may be that the prominence of aversion to war as an international sentiment is due, not to any higher standard of national ethics, but to the proportions to which operations of war have grown, and their cost increased, by science applied to methods of destruction. In any case, however, the history of the last fifty years shows that organized and perfectly adapted physical force, and not pious beliefs, makes and unmakes Empires and States.

There is, however, a brighter light in the picture the history of the century presents, for when we turn to the sea aspects of the retrospect, we find a singular absence of great maritime wars, which so constantly recurred

in preceding centuries. The general peace of the sea is a characteristic feature of the hundred years which followed Trafalgar, and the great product of that long maritime peace is the British Empire. Though its seeds were sown in that long series of maritime wars which closed with Trafalgar, it owes its spontaneous and luxuriant growth to that quietude at sea secured and maintained by the Royal Navy. It is to the prestige and acknowledged power and efficiency of the British fleet that the commerce of the world owes its peaceful progress, our Empire its magnitude, and our Colonies their wonderful development, which in a few score years has changed them from unexplored wildernesses to prosperous, wealthy, and self-governing States. Our Empire to-day is the result of that all-pervading and silent influence of predominant sea-power, which is greatest in effect while dormant, yet ever ready to pounce upon and destroy disturbers of the maritime peace of the people whom it serves.

Now, Trafalgar marked the culminating point of the prestige of the Royal Navy, and nothing has since happened in the world to justify questioning it. The acknowledged power of the fleet is due to sacrifices made by the people of the Mother-land. Beginning with extraordinary and special expenditure for increasing the fleet a few weeks after Trafalgar (though at the moment the power of maritime rivals had been shattered) the sacrifices made ever since to retain that superiority in ships and armaments at sea which the great battle off the coast of Spain incidentally gave us have been immense and continuous. No part of our vast outlying Empire has shared these sacrifices, so the Royal Navy is the navy of the United Kingdom; its prestige is the precious heritage of its people. It was their daring which created it, and their sacrifices alone and unaided which have maintained, and still maintain, its acknowledged strength and power.

The essential condition of the existence of the whole fabric of Empire, the pride and boast of all its citizens, is predominant sea-power, but the burden of maintain-

ing it is left to those who live in the Mother-land to bear. To give a plain illustration of the effects of this existing arrangement — any man who lives at home and pays taxes bears his share of the cost of the fleet; but if he transfers his abode to Canada, for example, he continues, of course, to be a British citizen and as such entitled to the same naval protection for his oversea trade and business as at home, but he at once ceases to pay one farthing toward the provision of the fleet, and so gets all the advantages of predominant sea-power for nothing.

The Colonies are cities of refuge for those who desire to belong to a great Empire free of the cost necessary to provide, not only for its security, but for the protection of their trade and commerce on any and every sea in which they choose to do business. At Charing Cross the Canadian Government have an office, and the passers-by can read in the windows that a great attraction offered to induce people to transfer themselves from the United Kingdom to the Dominion is 'Light Taxation.' That is a perfectly true statement, because a Canadian citizen of Empire pays nothing towards the upkeep of Empire, such as the diplomatic, consular, and naval or military services, while sharing equally with those at home, who bear the whole cost, all the security and advantages these services confer. There is no other empire or nation in the world where the resources of only a part bear the entire cost and responsibility of providing what is necessary to secure against attack the existence of the realm as a whole, or the retention of any one of its several component portions.

This is so extraordinary a feature of the internal arrangements of our Empire that it is most desirable to understand the main causes which have led up to such a singular state of things.

When Nelson died, British outlying possessions were few and far between. In the temperate regions there was a small penal settlement at the Antipodes, and in America a small community, mostly French, settled in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Quebec. There was nothing else in temperate zones. In the tropics

and subtropical regions—notably in Hindustan and in the Caribbean Sea—British power had established itself mainly for commercial purposes; but these places, though extremely important to Britain, were then without self-sustaining capacity. In addition there were a very few isolated naval and trading ports, which were of importance as places where war and merchant ships could obtain necessary stores to enable them to keep at sea. Of course Gibraltar was pre-eminent in importance in the Atlantic basin; beyond that area, except in a limited portion of the Indian Ocean, established ports of call were not needed, the operations of war and mercantile fleets not embracing the larger portion of the water world beyond the Atlantic. Such was the position in the year of Trafalgar.

Between that date and Waterloo the naval efforts and expenditure of the United Kingdom were greater and more continuous than in any period of its previous history. It was this policy, involving as it did huge sacrifices—in addition to the cost of great military expeditions and campaigns beyond sea—which placed the fleet of the United Kingdom in such a position of overwhelming superiority as to defy all thought of contesting its sea supremacy. Thus, from the overthrow of Napoleon an epoch of maritime peace was secured to the world, for Navarino and Algiers, etc., were but incidents of police supervision and action executed by naval force. Uninterrupted opportunity was thus afforded to science and civilization for the development of means and methods to increase the power of international interchange by the application of steam to navigation, land transport, factories, and mills. Naturally, an island rich in coal and iron, at no point far from the sea, and having a population largely in excess of agricultural requirements, took the lead. Thus, near the close of the period of forty years of peace, pre-eminence in trade and manufactures came to be regarded as certain to continue, and, relying on its permanency, a new policy was demanded and inaugurated by the people of the United Kingdom. It was a complete

reversal of the long-established system under which the outlying possessions of the United Kingdom were strictly reserved for the commercial benefit of its people, and from which foreign competition was practically excluded. Relatively, except in the case of India and the West Indies, the trade of possessions abroad with the United Kingdom was insignificant. It is no matter of surprise that, in days when a purely commercial instinct dominated policy, the importance of these possessions was measured by the immediate cash value of their custom. No oversea possession was then a going concern wholly independent of aid from the Mother Country in its local requirements, so the ledger account between the two was, in the view of the more powerful politicians at home, all on the wrong side. Possessions beyond sea were therefore looked upon as a liability of the United Kingdom, not as a potential asset of an Empire. Indeed, in those days the Empire itself came to be almost regarded as an unclean thing, and ideas of British Imperialism as a noisome pestilence. Except two provinces in North America, the affairs and local government of oversea territories were directed from an office in London, which from 1801 to 1854 was a part of the War Office. India occupied a wholly different position under the limited control of a chartered company. There were no Colonies in the true sense of the term, but a varied assortment of mere dependencies and scattered settlements lying outside the charmed circle of those great commercial activities of which Great Britain, by fortuitous circumstances, was then the centre. Following precipitately upon the renouncement of the old and the inauguration of the new policy, the World's Fair in Hyde Park of 1851 gave dramatic expression to the dreams of British politicians and the hopes of the people of these islands of that day. In this artificial atmosphere of commercial imagination that the old men of the present generation were brought up and the middle-aged were born; and it was but a natural result that many people in the United Kingdom should have come to regard friendly disintegration as the easiest

way of escape from inconvenient responsibilities which did not pay. In every British possession beyond sea this deliberate policy made itself painfully felt. Surprise and astonishment at existing relations of the Colonies to the navy, upon which their peace and prosperity depend, must be tempered by remembering that their older men were brought up, and their middle-aged men were born, in the cold shade of their Mother Country's disregard. At home all idea of building up and consolidating, however slowly, a British Empire, embracing all its infinite and varied resources for common security in war and mutual advantage in peace, was openly spurned and deliberately repudiated. British communities abroad consequently became persuaded that the old Imperial spirit of Britain was dead, and they were driven from conception of Imperial duties and obligations towards an exclusive provincial patriotism, offering the immediate prospect of becoming a series of separate and glorified municipalities. The belief in assured peace spread to the Colonies, so possible interference with them by foreign Powers was ignored. At home the brotherhood of nations was affirmed to have begun, and the superiority of Manchester soft goods and Birmingham hardwares accepted as a perpetual guarantee for Britain's permanent monopoly of the manufactures of the world under conditions of general disarmament. The infant Britains beyond sea formed a different idea of their own future, being confident in the knowledge of their unlimited natural resources, which were freely conferred upon them by the Home Country, and of their ability to develop vast wealth and commercial greatness to rival in the future the position of the United Kingdom itself. In the calm sunshine of universal peace, the huge foreign lions, with their teeth and natural appetites, were to lie down with these colonial lambs, and wag tails of approval at their rapid and successful development of power. This may appear to many readers an exaggerated view of the situation in those days; but at all events the feeling that the Mother Country had

become 'chicken-hearted' tended to produce in the Colonies 'swelled heads.' When, therefore, ghastly proof was given that wars had not ceased, and international antagonisms, prompted by self-interest, were as rampant as ever, colonial attention turned towards precautions for defence of a purely local and sedentary form. These general considerations must be borne in mind, for they indicate the genesis of the present relations of the Colonies to the navy.

It now remains to examine more closely their special bearing on the problem of Imperial defence.

The concentration of an army at Boulogne for the declared purpose of invading England produced a variety of purely military efforts to improvise local means of resistance to the attempt, if really made. These temporary and purely military measures were contrary to the teachings of insular experience of wars, which in effect were that when fighting had to be done, success lay not in accumulation of means of sedentary defence at home, but in active and combined offensive operations abroad. The fact that our fathers immediately increased the fleet—at the very moment when a decisive victory had left maritime rivals impotent for harm—had its corollary in the cessation of efforts, and expenditure on passive and purely military defence at home. Trafalgar was the necessary prelude to that long series of purely military operations by which alone decisive results can be achieved and peace secured to any nation. Owing to this policy, the sea-power of Britain was, subsequently to Trafalgar, so effectively operative by moral influence alone, that down to the close of the Napoleonic War the navy had no opportunity of further illustrating its dramatic power of destruction. Popular interest, therefore, focussed itself upon the army, and during the long peace the memories of the great war were prominently military. Then came the Crimean War, where an alliance between the two greatest maritime nations of the world left nothing for the Russian Navy to do but to sink their ships, and little for the

allied fleets to do but to scan Russian coasts. Bitter is the remembrance of those days when England was rudely awakened from the vision of perpetual peace to contemplate the starving, tattered remnant of an army of heroes, sacrificed by her folly and neglect. Hardly had that war closed when the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny occurred. Here again sea-power found no visible expression, for the sea-line of communication was not in any shape or form even threatened. The sympathy of the civilized world was with us then, while France generously facilitated the transport of our troops. So the impression in the popular mind by the splendid achievements of our troops in India naturally and necessarily confirmed, in the mind of the public, a purely military conception of war. Next came the descent of Napoleon III. on Italy, followed by an invasion panic in England. In the excitement of hysterical commotion a new theory determining principles guiding preparations for war was suddenly developed. That the navy was 'the first line of defence' remained still a pious opinion, but that this first line of defence could be relied upon was officially and deliberately denied. A new national policy was thus led up to, and became inevitable, by popular misconception of the method and manner by which sea-power operates. Having now sketched minor causes producing this result, it remains to draw attention to a still more potent influence, less discernible on the surface of our modern history.

The spirit of compromise is the characteristic and the strength of popular civil government. It is the great contributor to British political stability in everything but preparation for war, which is the inexorable and uncompromising teacher of realities. The fear of facing necessities honestly by attempting compromises with hard facts and rugged truths has, when put to the proof by war, to be paid for in human life and national disaster.

Now the obvious failure of Britain's great peace programme compelled attention to things appertaining to war. Unhappily, as already mentioned, it was born of

panic when political necessity demanded precipitate action. To return to the old policy of our fathers by strengthening the means for 'offensive defence' would have insulted the cherished hope of the people for that peace on earth, which the great revolution of the British commercial system was deemed so certain to secure. A new doctrine of 'Defence, not Defiance' expressed the nature of the inevitable compromise. It found embodiment in immense and immobile fortifications, costing millions, and a host of armed citizens constituting a cheap force which could hurt nobody's feelings, for its functions were limited to sitting down behind hedgerows waiting for the attack of a great hostile army crossing the sea, and landing for the deliberate purpose of destroying us! This great political compromise was the eclipse of national confidence in the fleet, and in the darkness and confusion so caused, the key to the perspective of British defence was lost. The result may be thus summarized:—

(1) A negation of Imperial patriotism by the Mother Country; and

(2) A recantation of principles of policy by which our Empire had been won, for it was the repudiation of the influence of sea-power on Britain's history as the determining factor in the security of her home and foreign dominions alike.

From that time until a few months ago, it was on such blurred lines British preparations for war were run by successive Governments.

It would occupy too much space to trace the perpetual increase of expenditure, the comic contradictions, and the confusion of waste and weakness, inflicted upon the nation by the attempted compromise between political expediency and the arbitrary requirements of real preparations for war. It should, however, be noted that a contingent consequence was the growth of undue influence upon the policy of the country by a purely military department—the War Office. Thus it happened that the policy regulating the Empire's safety in war

came to be moulded in the narrow channels of departmental pedantry, and not in the free atmosphere of statesmanlike investigation and common-sense.

But in the 'eighties' circumstances, which it is not necessary here to mention, aroused the nation to an appreciation of impending naval peril. Common-sense asserted itself at last, and the old spirit of the Mother Country revived. Naval knowledge has since become more general, emphasized as it was by the object-lessons of the wars between China and Japan, the United States and Spain, and, still more recently and powerfully, by the war between Japan and Russia. The first-fruits of this change in the public attitude were the reform of the War Office and the creation of a Committee of Imperial Defence, presided over by the Prime Minister. In this latter important step a guarantee is offered to the Empire that its security is to be no longer treated as a departmental matter, but scientifically examined and have principles formulated by a Committee composed of Cabinet Ministers and their official naval and military advisers, presided over by the first Minister of the Crown himself and calling to its councils any experts required; while, as Mr. Balfour, its creator, has said, its door is open to welcome to its deliberations colonial representatives. The Mother Country now begins to see her past errors in principles of defensive policy, and has set up the framework of consultative machinery to endeavour to avoid a repetition of her own extravagantly costly blunders in preparations for war. The difficulties in her way of extricating from a network of military confusions, prejudices, and vested interests, a rational and businesslike military system adequate to fulfil the obligations of war are immeasurably great. The burden of cost to provide an adequate army for the general service of the Empire, added to the ever increasing weight of expenditure necessary to maintain predominant sea-power in the world, suggests the question, How long can the resources of these islands discharge the general naval and military obligations of a world-spread State? The warnings of succes-

sive Chancellors of the home Exchequer are sufficiently ominous to make it impossible to believe the present rate of expenditure can much longer continue. If that be so, there are but two alternatives:—either the outlying parts of Empire must equitably share with the Mother-land the cost and responsibility of providing what is essential for general security; or the task of furnishing sufficient force and armaments to protect the Empire in war must be left unfulfilled, which, in plain English, means an attempt to continue its existence on sufferance. This last alternative can only present itself after all hope is extinguished of the adoption of the first, so the immediate question is, What, if any, are the prospects of acceptance by the Colonies and possessions abroad of any such proposition? India already bears so great a share of the military burden of an Imperial character that this great dependency does not come so directly within the purview of this momentous question.

The most discouraging feature in the prospect of transmarine possessions cooperating with the Mother Country for the maintenance of the navy is the effect of the policy and example pursued for over forty years by the Mother Country herself. The reflex action of what is above described as the 'negation of Imperial patriotism' has strongly impressed the colonial mind. It was the Mother Country, not the Colonies, which dethroned the ideal of an Empire bonded together for mutual advantages and for the discharge of common obligations. It was the Mother-land that taught the Colonies to discard reliance upon sea-power as the real security from military descents by sea, and it was by her example and by the explicit advice of her War Office that any measures taken by Colonies to prepare for war were conceived in the spirit of a selfish isolation. They were to prepare for war by locking themselves up in watertight compartments sealed by fortifications, expecting no military help from, and giving none to, the Mother-land or each other.

The circumstance of the South African War and the failure of the War Office theories of British defence

touched the hearts of all men under the British flag, and aroused from its long sleep the sense of responsibility and duty to the Empire. It had no means of expression except by spontaneous individual action of patriotic men volunteering to serve the Empire beyond sea. In the absence of any organization prepared for the discharge of military obligations to the Empire oversea, the help given by colonial (as well as by home) volunteers was fragmentary, though valuable, while the significance of the spontaneous sentiments so represented can hardly be over-estimated. But the real great lesson taught by this gathering of military units, drawn by war from all parts of the Empire to South Africa, was naval, not military. It was not naval guns on shore, but ships at sea and in reserve in home dockyards, that secured the military situation in South Africa from the beginning to the end of the war. It was the all-pervading and almost mysterious influence of sea-power, expressing itself silently in moral effect, which made that concentration of military units in South Africa possible. Foreign Powers violently hostile to our proceedings in South Africa made no attempt to interfere because the predominance of Britain's naval power defied them, and so the external peace of the Empire and the quietude of the sea for the world was preserved.

The recognition by British communities of the paramount duty and obligation that rests upon each and all to maintain a free sea, is the primary condition of the consolidation of their Empire. The combination of their world-spread resources to provide the only means of guaranteeing that freedom would make for peace, not war. The greatest traders in the world have the greatest interest in the preservation of maritime peace.

The total aggregate annual value of the maritime trade of British States and territories, even now, amounts to some fifteen hundred millions sterling, only two-thirds of which represent that of the Mother-land. The aggregate annual public expenditure, under all heads, of the outlying Empire now exceeds that of the United

Kingdom, the aggregate annual revenues of Greater Britain being greater than that of the Mother Country. Now 24·26 per cent. of the home public expenditure is devoted to the purpose of providing that naval security for the Empire essential to all its parts, while only ·25 per cent. of the total aggregate public expenditure of the dominions beyond sea is appropriated to precautions for their Empire's maritime security.* The percentage proportion which expenditure on the Navy bears to the value of imports and exports by sea of the United Kingdom and the outlying Empire respectively is as follows:- -United Kingdom 3·81 per cent. Dominions beyond sea ·07 per cent.

The broad conclusion which forces itself to the front by the contemplation of facts and figures such as these is of a twofold character:

1. That our Empire has outgrown its organization.
2. That the view taken by Captain Mahan of the British situation is a true one, viz., that 'Imperial federation in action will manifest itself pre-eminently along ocean and naval lines.'

The meeting of the next Colonial Conference may finally determine the future of the Empire, for in truth and in fact we have, in matters concerning Imperial defence, arrived at the parting of the ways, and the decision which road is to be taken in order to find security cannot be much longer deferred.

This question of the Colonies and the navy as one demanding primary attention at the next Colonial Conference was pressed upon the attention of the Prime Minister by a most important deputation under the auspices of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee on December 10 last.† In his reply Mr. Balfour struck

* See Parliamentary Returns, No. 308, Session 1904, but this Return include India.

† The full and authorized report of the proceedings at the deputation will be sent free on application to the Hon. Secretary, Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, 11A, Prince's Street, Westminster, S.W.

the true keynote of Imperial harmony in the overture to combined efforts in these words:

'I earnestly trust that the temper in which it will meet will not be, How much can each fragment of the Empire get out of the other fragments of the Empire? but, How much can each fragment of the Empire give to the common whole? It is not what we are to get each for himself; it is not what we are to give to this or to that self-governing element within our borders; it is what every self-governing fragment of this great whole can itself contribute for a common object; and the common object of defence certainly stands in the very first rank. Everybody must admit that a Conference such as I have adumbrated, and such as I hope to see, will have before it a task of almost unexampled difficulty in the history of the building up of empires. Those difficulties ought not to deter us, and, I am convinced, will not deter us. If they prove insuperable, let it at all events be through no fault of ours; let it be because the inherent difficulties in the problem are such that no human wisdom, no patriotism, however unselfish, is able to surmount them, But I, for my own part, am unwilling—indeed, unable—to contemplate so fatal, so serious an outcome. I believe if we can raise ourselves—I am not talking of this country alone; I am talking of every part of the Empire—if we can raise ourselves to that high level of unselfish patriotism of which I have spoken, in which men shall not consider merely their own particular community or their own particular industry, but shall consider the common needs of this great and varied Empire; if indeed we can raise ourselves to those heights—and I think we can—I feel confident that the experience and the wisdom which have been born of centuries of free government will not be at fault, and that in the building up of empires we shall prove ourselves in the future, as we have shown ourselves in the past, pioneers of enlightenment which the world may well be content to follow.'

THE BOND OF MILITARY UNITY

By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR EDWARD HUTTON, K.C.M.G.,
Late Commanding the Military Forces of Canada (1898-1900), and of Australia (1901-1904)

'Shoulder to shoulder, all for each, and each for all.'—Rt. Hon. J. CHAMBERLAIN, Guildhall, May 13, 1902.

THE question of Commercial Unity has for the last two years, in the masterful hands of Mr. Chamberlain, so filled the public eye as the basis for consolidating the Empire that the earlier proposal for the much-to-be-desired Military Unity has in a large measure been relegated to the background. Yet signs are not wanting to show that if the conditions of the War Office administration three years ago had possessed the confidence of the Mother Country and her Colonies, a National Defence System would have formed the primary element in that consolidation of the Empire which all now recognise as the question of the hour.

Mutual defence has from the outset of human existence been the keystone of the social arch. It has bound at all times in the past, as it assuredly will in the future, individuals as well as nations together by ties at once of mutual sentiment, sympathy, and self-interest. Who is there who will deny the fact that mutual protection is the primary factor which binds man to man? It would be regrettable indeed if an element in the building-up of a great Empire so wholesome and so invigorating to patriotism and self-discipline should be even temporarily abandoned for an element which is secondary only in the primitive instincts of mankind.

Necessity, however, governs all our actions. The South African War had clearly shown the yearning of the whole Empire for some means by which to consolidate the ties which up to that time had been more sentimental than real. The moment had arrived for action. If 'the sons of Britain throughout the world were not then to stand shoulder to shoulder to defend their mutual interests and their common rights,'* some other means must be found for effecting a result which all alike recognised as paramount.

Doubt now obscures the future of Commercial Unity, and it is opportune to consider whether Military Unity may not, even yet, be effected under a rejuvenated War Office. There is on the part of the great Colonies an unmistakable aspiration towards a closer union and for a broader citizenship.† There is on the part of the Mother Country a feeling, more and more intense each year, that the future successful maintenance of the Empire, vital to all concerned, is to be found only in a closer union with her children. That union is strength is more true now than ever before! Under modern conditions war assumes gigantic proportions; hundreds of thousands are and will be necessary where thousands and even hundreds have in past times decided the fate of Empires. By combination alone can nations now hope to defend their rights and guard their independence.

What could Canada hope to effect with her 3,500 miles of frontier, unaided by the other members of the British family? How could Australia expect to keep inviolate her 8,000 miles of seaboard, and to maintain for her future generations the heritage she possesses from the grasp of the teeming millions of China and Japan without the aid of her partners in the Empire? What hope has South Africa of consolidation and development without the *Pax Britannica* under the British flag?

* Mr. Chamberlain, January 18, 1898.

† Sir Wilfrid Laurier, at Liverpool, June 13, 1897.

All agree that it is incumbent upon all portions of the Anglo-Saxon race owning allegiance to the King to draw closer the bonds of unity, and within our own social family to seek that strength and support which we can never hope to find from alien nations.

The Military Obligations of the Empire.

The necessity for a Military Unity may therefore be regarded as universally acknowledged, and it will only be necessary to consider in its turn the military obligations of our Empire for which this unity is so desirable. These may be divided as follows:

(*a*) The maintenance of order and of our sovereign rights in all parts of our world-wide dominions, and the conduct of those military operations necessitated from time to time by the natural expansion of our trade and commerce.

(*b*) The defence of the Empire in whole or part from foreign aggression and the fulfilment of our treaty obligations.

It is obvious that for (*a*) we have, in addition to our great fleets, the Regular Army of 197,389 men (*vide* table on p. 248), which, with the garrison of India, 74,450, gives in all a total of 271,839 of all ranks. Of this number, however, it is estimated that no less than 40,953 are under twenty years of age, and therefore ineffective for war. The Reserves will accordingly, when called out, do little more than make up wastage and complete the existing peace establishments. It was found in 1899 that with forces similar to those now in existence a field force from the Regular Army at home of more than 70,000 was not procurable.* In the event of a war with a European Power, or combination of Powers, it is doubtful if even this number would be available for a field army.

* Report of the Royal Commission on the South African War. Sec. 59 and 60.

To consider the military obligations comprised under (*b*) it is necessary to carefully consider the principles recently laid down by the Prime Minister, in an answer given to a question in Parliament on March 7 last, as follows:

'The governing considerations which, as it seems to us, ought to determine the number of troops to be maintained depend not so much on considerations affecting Home Defence as upon the claims which colonial, and still more Indian, needs may make upon our military resources.'

The North-West Frontier of India.—One of the most important lessons taught us by the recent war is the comparative ease and relative simplicity with which Russia massed and maintained a vast field army of not less than 600,000 men at the end of 6,000 miles of a single line of railway. An authorized statement was recently published to the effect that 775,000 of all ranks had been sent to Kharbin since the beginning of the war. This number added to the troops already in Manchuria makes, says the well-informed *Times* correspondent in St. Petersburg, an aggregate of not less than 820,000 men (*Times*, March 26, 1905). If Russia can place so large an army in the field at such a distance from its base, and can maintain it effective for so long a period by only a single line of railway, what could she not effect in Afghanistan with two lines of completed railway, and with a far less distant base? Our requirements for the defence of our North-West Frontier, at a modest calculation, can not be estimated under such circumstances at less than 500,000 men. Towards this number India can only at present provide, exclusive of Imperial Service troops, a total field army of 139,000 men (Military Member, Indian Council, *Times*, March 30, 1905).

The Southern Frontier of Canada.—It is customary to forget the treaty obligations, apart from sentiment, which we have accepted in holding inviolate the 3,500 miles of the Southern Frontier of Canada. Nine years

have not elapsed since we were on the verge of war with the United States, and, however reluctant we may be to recognise it now, the truth still remains that a positive war frenzy seized at least the Western States of America, which threatened at one time to force hostilities upon our more sober-minded kinsmen.

The military force required to hold Canada, with its population of 6,000,000, against the resources of a great nation numbering not less than 70,000,000, cannot be computed at less than 500,000 men.

Integrity of Belgium. — Our treaty obligations as regards Belgium, shared though they be by other European Powers, may at any moment force us to take active military measures for which a large army would be required.

We have, moreover, only recently emerged from a war within the Empire which necessitated 448,400 men being placed in the field; and the 'North Sea incident,' so lately as October last year, brought us within measurable distance of war with a first-class European Power.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War have, moreover, definitely adopted the principle that the defence of England is not the passive military defence of English shores, but the active offensive defence by a powerful navy. Naval and military strategists have always held this view, but the corollary of this principle must equally be remembered, that it is not possible for any navy, however invincible, to defeat and destroy the fighting power of our enemies by land as well as by sea. It has been truly said that war can only attain a successful end by the annihilation of our enemies, and annihilation by a navy alone is impossible. The real defence of England, Australia, and all the component parts of our vast domain, must therefore be in the future, as it has been in the past, by a vigorous offence, by a policy of war forced upon our enemies, and fought out to a finish upon other than English soil. Thus did England defeat Napoleon in the nineteenth

century, and thus only can the British Empire defeat its enemies in the twentieth.

Having the foregoing obligations in mind, it is surely not wrong to say that we require a field army of not less than 500,000 men, or at least the organization by which such an army can be brought into existence rapidly and effectively.

The Creation of a Field Army of 500,000 Men.

The Anglo-Saxon race has declared against conscription upon the European model, and it is impracticable under the conditions now prevailing to expect any change in public feeling. The ingrained and not unnatural dislike of the Anglo-Saxon for standing armies is a factor which must always be borne in mind and cannot be disregarded, and a decrease rather than an increase of our own Regular Army is not unlikely to be demanded by Parliament and by public opinion. It is, at any rate, useless to suppose that by any possible process a regular or standing army can be created or maintained which will provide the troops shown to be necessary.

It is, at the same time, a significant fact that the liability to military service is generally recognised as one of the obligations of citizenship, and a general feeling is showing itself that the solution of the problem will be found in the further development of that ancient and constitutional force the Militia, 'whose theory,' as described by Mr. Cardwell, 'is conscription, but whose practice is voluntary engagement.' A Militia system is common to all the great branches of the Anglo-Saxon people, and is generally acknowledged as being the form of military service at once applicable and sufficient to the requirements of national defence. Evolved from early times, when, under the guiding hand of King Alfred the Great, a system of universal military service first took definite shape, this Anglo-Saxon form of military service has slowly but surely matured with the growth of the race itself. It is to this form, therefore, of military

service that we must look for that bond of Military Unity which is to provide the field army required, and thus to form the true basis of our Imperial defence system.

The principles included within the present Militia Act of 1882 are largely accepted in their general bearing by other parts of the Empire, and are embodied in the Militia Act of Canada, 1867, the Defence Act of Australia, 1903, and the Defence Act of Natal, 1903. Legal powers for an extension of Militia service beyond the limits of the United Kingdom are alone required to make the existing Acts of Parliament sufficient for the present requirements. Legislation in this regard has already been undertaken by the Imperial Government, and it is safe to assume that the various Colonial Governments will come to see the necessity of following suit.

No military system can be put into effect which is not in accord with the natural instincts of the people, and as Anglo-Saxondom is practically unanimous in regard to the soundness of a Militia system of military service, if carried out upon the thorough and effective lines demanded by modern developments, it is to such a system that we must look. The Commonwealth of Australia, the latest born of the British Sisterhood of Nations, has recently adopted a Militia Army System, which, it is urged, best fulfils the conditions for national defence imposed by the Anglo-Saxon form of constitutional Government and by the radical developments of modern democracy.

Militia System adopted by Australia, 1903.

The Commonwealth military system was drawn up in accordance with certain defined strategical considerations which were embodied in a special minute on the subject, and laid before the Australian Parliament in April, 1902. It provides :

1. A *Permanent (or Regular) Cadre Force*, consisting of the General and Instructional Staff, a regiment of Artillery, small detachments of Engineers, Army Service

Corps, Ordnance Corps, and of Army Medical Corps, for partially garrisoning the naval strategical bases, for technical duties, for maintenance of valuable stores and equipment, and, above all, for the instruction of the Militia and Volunteer forces during peace and for stiffening them in times of war.

2. A *Field Force* of Militia troops for the purpose of carrying out active operations in the field in defence of the Commonwealth as a whole. This force consists of six light horse brigades and three brigades of infantry.

3. A *Garrison Force* of Volunteers combined with Militia for the local defence of each State.

The permanent or regular force, consisting of 91 officers and 1,204 other ranks, bears only a small proportion to the Militia and Volunteer troops, which together form the real defence forces of Australia.

The numbers are as shown in Table I. (p. 235).

Each brigade is organized upon the principles shown in Tables II. and III. (pp. 236, 237).

It will be seen that a field force of six brigades of light horse and three brigades of infantry is provided for the defence of the Commonwealth within the limitations imposed by the Defence Act. Each of these brigades is complete in itself, with the proportion of all arms and of those administrative departments which are essential for a mobile force in the field. Each of the six States contribute their quota to the field force in proportion to their population.

Garrison troops for local or State defence, comprising garrisons for the defended ports, and a small district reserve or movable column, are also provided. The numbers allotted for this purpose to each State vary in proportion to the local requirements of defence and to the willingness of the inhabitants to engage in voluntary military service.

While the field force is composed entirely of Militia, paid at the market rates of labour, with a nucleus of permanent officers and men, the garrison troops are primarily Volunteers. The yearly cost is estimated at

TABLE I.

THE FIELD FORCE AND GARRISON TROOPS ON PEACE AND WAR ESTABLISHMENTS.

Detail.	Peace.		War.	
	All Ranks.	Field, Mountain, and Guns of Position.	All Ranks.	Field, Mountain, and Guns of Position.
Field Force.				
Six brigades of light horse ...	6,445	24	12,996	36
Three brigades of infantry ...	7,377	36	14,733	48
Staff of three field companies of Engineers	9	...	24	...
Total field force... . .	13,831	60	27,753	84
Garrison Troops.				
Total garrison troops ...	11,752	26*	11,752	26*
Ordnance Department.				
For duty with both field force and garrison troops ...	117	...	117	...
Total field force and garrison troops	25,700	86	39,622	110
Strength of reserve of officers, rifle clubs, cadets, etc., on May 1, 1904	38,654	...	38,654	...
Grand total	64,354	86	78,276	110

* Exclusive of guns allotted to fixed defences.

£609,400, when the organization is carried into effect in its entirety.

It is obviously impracticable to carry out successfully and economically any military organization suited to rapid expansion and mobilization in time of national emergency unless the units of the various arms are

TABLE II.

FIRST LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE.

(SOUTHERN AND WESTERN BRIGADE, NEW SOUTH WALES.)

Permanent, Militia, Volunteer.	Detail.		Establishment.	
	Arm of Service	Units.	Peace.	War.
M.	Staff	... ...	10	23
M.	Light Horse ...	1st Australian Light Horse Regt. (N.S.W. Lancers)	294	581
		2nd Australian Light Horse Regt. (N.S.W. Mounted Rifles)	294	581
		3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment (Australian Horse)	294	581
P.	Artillery ...	'A' Instructional Cadre, R.A.A.	36	181
M.	Engineers* ...	No. 1 Field Company (Mounted Section) ..	29	55
M.	Army Service Corps	No. 1 L.H. Supply Column	44	77
M.	Army Medical Corps	Officers attached to Regiments and Units	4	4
		No 1 Mounted Bearer Company	25	50
		No. 1 Field Hospital (half)	15	30
M.	Veterinary Department	Officers attached to Regiments	3	3
		Total	1,048	2,166

* Staff field company not included.

organized upon a defined and uniform basis. Each unit, therefore, of the field force has a peace as well as a war establishment. The peace establishments which have been adopted are based upon the present possibilities and funds available. They are numerically small, but provide for nearly a full complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, with approximately one-half of

TABLE III.

FIRST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

(New South Wales.)

Militia, Volunteer.	Detail.		Establishment.	
	Arm of Service.	Units.	Peace.	War.
M.	Staff	. ...	10	27
M.	Infantry ...	1st Australian Infantry Regt	509	1,010
		2nd Australian Infantry Regt.	509	1,010
		3rd Australian Infantry Regt.	509	1,010
		4th Australian Infantry Regt.	509	1,010
M.	Artillery ...	Brigade Staff	4	17
		No. 3 Battery Australian Field Artillery	76	171
		No 4 Battery Australian Field Artillery	76	171
		No. 5 Battery Australian Field Artillery	76	120
M.	Engineers ...	No. 1 Field Company (dismounted half)	57*	118†
M.	Army Service Corps	No. 1 Infantry Supply Column	38	81
M.	Army Medical Corps	Officers attached to regiments and units ...	5	5
		No. 1 Infantry Bearer Company	50	100
		No. 2 Field Hospital ...	30	60
M.	Veterinary Department	Officers attached to units	1	1
		Total	2,459	4,911

* Staff field company not included. † Includes staff of field company.

the rank and file laid down for the war establishments. Thus a squadron of light horse and a company of infantry are constituted as follows:

Unit.	Peace.					War.				
	Officers.	Sergeants.	Artificers.	Rank and File.	Total.	Officers	Sergeants.	Artificers.	Rank and File.	Total
Squadron of Australian Light Horse ..	5	6	3	58	72	6	10	5	114	135
Company of Australian Infantry	3	4	...	53	60	3	5		108	116

The peace cadres by this plan, with practically their full complement of trained officers and non-commissioned officers, can be completed upon mobilization in time of national emergency by partially trained or even untrained men to the requirements of war without serious difficulty. The degree of training to be given to officers and non-commissioned officers in peace is solely governed by expense. The formation of schools of instruction has been carried out, but they must be still further elaborated by the Commonwealth if they are to be really effective and to successfully achieve the desired result. The expenditure necessary is relatively insignificant.

The system of instruction and the periods of training for the whole force thus organized are made as elastic as possible, and have been so arranged as to give ample latitude to meet local requirements, and to interfere as little as may be with the civil occupations of those professional men and of those well-to-do and intelligent individuals of the community who are found, as a rule, in the ranks of the Volunteers, and but rarely in the ranks of the Militia of the United Kingdom. The result is that the rank and file in Australia, as in Canada, are far superior in intelligence, physique, and in social status to the rank and file of the Regular Army or Militia at home. Military knowledge and instruction are consequently absorbed more readily, and under

officers who are well trained, experienced, and tactful, a very high standard of discipline can be maintained. The individuality and self-reliance so essential in modern war need no encouragement. The Corps of Engineers, the Supply and Transport Corps and the Ordnance and the Army Medical Service, are recruited from those classes who exercise in civil life the functions which they are required to discharge in war. Little difficulty is found in obtaining men experienced in supply, in transport, and in medicine, to fill the ranks of the departmental corps charged with such work, so that automatically, and without special departmental training, recruits for these essential and technical services can be obtained, which at home in the Regular Army are created with much difficulty, and only maintained by a system of laborious and expensive training.

It was generally admitted that no administrative unit in the South African War was more effective or complete than the New South Wales Army Medical Corps, which was organized in 1893 upon the principle described.

A complete military organization has thus been created in Australia, which, while capable of expansion, forms a carefully constructed framework into which the additional and necessary fighting material can be fitted when the time of action arrives. A military system, therefore, suited to the modern requirements of a self-governing and democratic community has been brought into being, which has satisfied all shades of opinion. There can be no better test of the unanimity of feeling in this regard than the fact that the military system of the Commonwealth now adopted was evolved in less than three years out of the motley defence forces previously existing in the six States of Australia, in spite of drastic retrenchment,* and in spite of the halting administration of three successive Governments so widely divergent in

* A reduction of no less than 22 per cent. of the military estimates was effected in 1902.

their views as those of Sir Edmund Barton, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Reid.

Militia System of Canada.

The organization of the National Militia Army adopted by Australia followed closely the plan adopted in 1867 for Canada by that able and accomplished soldier General Sir Patrick MacDougall. Political exigencies, however, caused the excellently conceived Militia system of Canada to lapse, and its governing principles to be forgotten. It was not until the rude shock which Canada experienced in 1895 during the strained relations with our kinsmen of the United States over the Venezuela Boundary Question that public attention was directed to the discreditable condition of Canadian defence. Large sums were then hurriedly laid out in arms and equipment, and belated efforts were made to improve the standard of military training. It was, however, 1898 before the essential equipment arrived, before money was provided for the complete training of the whole of the Canadian Militia, and before measures were adopted for improving and completing the all-essential administrative organization. The stimulus thus given to the natural military spirit of the Canadians, the consequent improvement in military training and knowledge, and, above all, the vastly improved military organization, showed its value and result in the relative excellence of the representative units contributed by Canada to the South African War.

The keynote, however, of the success of the National Militia System, adopted by Canada in 1867 and by Australia in 1903, is the organization in complete form of the larger military units, and the allotment of complete brigades to defined districts, together with the association of the smaller military units of regiments, squadrons, batteries, and companies within certain allotted areas in these districts. The districts, be they the provinces in Canada, the States in Australia, or the

counties in the United Kingdom, are thus identified with their representative contribution to the defence of the whole nation. Officers and men organized on this principle bring to their corps all the cohesion, feeling of comradeship, and local association, which are so essential for insuring the highest standard of discipline in the field and of gallantry before the enemy. Each corps is thus not only representative of its own province, State, or county, but also of its own special district and of its own particular community. Each individual soldier feels that upon him rests, in bivouac and in battle, the responsibility of adequately representing his friends and kinsmen, and of doing honour to his own name and to the fair reputation of his own countryside.

Military Value of Militia.

There will be many, no doubt, who will question the military value of a Militia thus raised, who will query their cohesion and discipline, will query their degree of training and efficiency, and will even query their steadiness and gallantry in action. To such a careful study, among others, of the War of the American Revolution (1776-1783) is suggested. 'Taking into consideration,' says Sir Charles Trevelyan, the latest historian of this period, 'the quality of the regular British Army opposed to them, some of their feats have seldom been surpassed except in legendary warfare.' When they failed, a want of a satisfactory organization, an absence of qualified leaders, and a deficiency in equipment, will usually be found to be the causes. It was the Canadian Militia in 1812 who almost single-handed, in the absence of the Regular Army, not only held the Southern Frontier successfully, but carried the war into the enemy's country. The fighting value of the vast armies engaged in the American War of Secession, more closely resembling a National Militia than a Regular Army, has never been questioned. Their early failures were due to lack of initial organization, of military training, and

to the absence of a sufficient number of qualified leaders, but never to a lack of military spirit or of soldierly qualities in the troops themselves.

The Militia of the United Kingdom, raised by voluntary enlistment, with the ballot in reserve in case of national emergency, has been frequently embodied, but has never, except on two minor occasions, taken any direct or leading part as distinct military units in any war until the late South African campaign. The Militia contributed largely to the Peninsular Army; and it was stated by Mr. Sidney Herbert in Parliament that at Waterloo, of 18,000 line soldiers, the majority were volunteers from the Militia. If in the recent campaign the Militia, taken generally, did not realize the expectations formed of its value, the reasons are that the force has for years received little encouragement, has had few advantages as regards training and instruction, and has been consistently emasculated by the annual transfer of officers and men to those regular battalions to which it is affiliated. It would be unreasonable to expect a high degree of fighting value from a force thus sorely tried.

It is beyond all question that the Colonial Militia from Australia and Canada contributed largely to the success of the campaign in South Africa. The excellent service rendered by the Royal Canadian Infantry Regiment at Paardeberg will always be a well-remembered feature of Kronje's surrender; while mounted corps from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, did excellent service, and are conspicuous examples of what Militia troops can do. The later irregular corps were not Militia; and, suffering from the disadvantage of inadequately trained officers, insufficient previous military knowledge, and defective organization, they in many instances left much to be desired. It is safe to assume that the defects revealed will be largely removed by the improved methods of instruction, and by the defined organization now adopted in both Australia and Canada.

National Militia Army of 500,000 Men.

Following the principles above explained, the Militia and Yeomanry of the United Kingdom could jointly, with the Militia of Australia, Canada, and the self-governing Colonies, provide the field army of 500,000 men which has been shown to be required.

Having in view the population and resources of the various portions of the Empire, the following proportion might well be alloted :

	Establishment on Basis of Population and Local Circumstances	
	Peace.	War.
United Kingdom	250,000	425,247
Canada	15,000	30,000
Australia	13,831	27,753
Cape, Natal, and New Zealand ...	10,000	17,000
Grand total	288,831	500,000

Note.—In regard to the great difference in numbers between the peace and war establishments above quoted, it has been shown in the preceding pages that the numbers given are the minimum cadre peace establishments. The officers and N.C.O.'s are intended to be practically complete in peace to the strength required in war, and an increase in the personnel of the rank and file can always be made gradually as funds admit and as circumstances render desirable.

The difficulties in providing the peace establishment of 250,000 men allotted to the United Kingdom are not so great as may at first sight appear. There already exist 133,091 Militia, of which approximately 80,000 should be available for a field army and 27,290 Yeomanry. A balance of approximately 90,000 men will thus have to be gradually raised, which, divided upon a population basis between the different counties in accordance with the system adopted by Australia and

Canada, could be obtained without serious difficulty. It only remains to act upon the plan announced by Lord Lansdowne as the policy of the Government, that 'the Militia should retain its identity, and that it should not be merged into the short-service army, but that, on the other hand, it should be so framed, so equipped, and so officered that it should be fit, when occasion arises, to take its place alongside the best troops of the line for the purposes of foreign service' (House of Lords, March 30, 1905). A considerable reconstruction of the existing Militia units will, however, be necessary, and their reorganization into brigades, complete in all arms and in administrative departments, must be undertaken in a bold and businesslike spirit. 'The possibilities of that admirable body [the Militia],' wrote Mr. Arnold-Forster to the *Times* on November 30, 1897, 'will never be properly utilized until it be taken seriously by some energetic War Minister. Instead of being the drudge of the army, the despised channel through which officers and men may pass to the line regiments, the Militia should be organized as a self-contained and self-respecting force.'

Legislation would be required in the case of the Yeomanry, so as to place them upon the same footing as the Militia in regard to their service. This has been frequently urged, and would, it is believed, be welcomed by the Yeomanry themselves.

The expense entailed by the increase thus indicated, by the improved instruction of officers and non-commissioned officers, and by an increase in daily pay, could be covered by a reduction of the number of immature youths, unfit for service, who now in so large a measure fill the ranks of the Regular Army. It is stated in the Report of the Royal Commission upon the South African War that in April, 1900, of the Regular Army at home, no less than 37,333 men were immature and not fit for active service. It is certain that at least this number of lads unfit for war are still

to be found among the regular force now serving at home. The elimination of this number of youths will at once give the saving required.

It is obviously impracticable within the scope of this paper to deal in complete detail and in exact figures with the plan thus outlined; it has been sufficiently described to show the facility with which a defined military system, based on the cooperation of Great Britain and her Colonies, could be adopted. The time has not yet arrived for riveting closer the bonds of union and for accepting upon hard-and-fast lines a too sharply defined system of Imperial defence. 'There is nothing more dangerous,' said Lord Salisbury in alluding to Imperial Federation on May 7, 1902, 'than to force a decision before a decision is ready, and therefore to produce feelings of discontent, feelings of difficulty, which, if we will only avoid, if we will only wait, will of themselves bring about the results that we desire. There is no danger that appears to me more serious for the time that lies before us than to attempt to force the various parts of the Empire into a mutual arrangement and subordination for which they are not ready, and which may only produce a reaction in favour of the old state of things.'

The leading statesmen of Canada and of Australia similarly deprecate the forging of 'indissoluble ties,' but would assuredly cooperate in a system of joint defence upon which to organize and maintain their military forces. There would thus be instituted a bond of Military Unity, elastic it may be, and suited to political freedom of action, which, founded upon sound strategical lines of mutual defence, would grow with the growth of the Empire, and form a solid asset for the security of our joint commercial and national interests. It is our duty as a practical people to organize now in time of peace those mighty forces of the Empire which tend to the maintenance and solidity of the British race. It will be too late when the moment of national danger arrives. It would be

but to court disaster and national disgrace to engage an European army of equal numbers with troops so ill organized, with men so untrained, and with officers so inexperienced as those which composed the majority of those hastily-raised corps during the recent war in South Africa. Men in a mass are much what an organization makes them. The National Militia Armies here advocated provide at least a framework capable of almost indefinite expansion and a complete military organization; it will enable the training of the requisite officers and non-commissioned officers to be effected, the administrative departments to be created, and the stores, guns, and equipment to be purchased. Thus might be gradually evolved at small cost and with slight dislocation of existing institutions a military force which will prove a bond of Unity more consistent with our national sentiments and more universally acceptable than any bond of Commercial Unity, however sound and however plausible.

The writer is deeply conscious of his inability to do full justice to the value and power possessed by a National Militia Army thus organized. He has, however, endeavoured to set before the reader the result of his personal knowledge of, and experience in, the organization and command in peace and war of the Militia of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain, extending over a lengthened period of service. It is only by an intimate and personal acquaintance with the excellent military qualities possessed by such troops that their real value as a reliable and fighting element can be correctly gauged. The writer will always look back with pride, pleasure, and profit to his association with the Militia troops of the Empire, and is absolutely convinced that a National Militia Army, with a complete and homogeneous organization, with improved training, and with effective arms and equipment, will prove, when the time of trial comes, not unworthy of the best traditions of the British Army.

TABLE SHOWING THE MILITARY EXPENDITURE FOR 1903, AND THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Colonies.	Area.	Population, 1894.	Military Expenditure, 1903 (including Armed Police).	Number of Troops, 1903 (including Armed Police)
EUROPE:	*Sq. Miles.*		£	
Gibraltar, Malta, etc. ...	3,702	402,681	Nil.	2,580 (loc. forces)
ASIA:				
Ceylon, Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Borneo, etc. ...	127,442	4,705,386	147,000	7,550
AFRICA:				
Cape, Transvaal,* Orange River Colony	225,328	1,711,487	3,190,025	18,850
Natal and Zululand ...	20,851	560,000	436,000	4,355
Mauritius	705	376,219	27,000 (Towards mil. expen.)	No local forces.
Sierra Leone	4,000	126,835	24,000	540
Gold Coast, other Dependencies and Protectorates	2,346,774	2,088,955	727,632	18,000
Total	2,597,658	4,863,496	4,404,657	41,745
AMERICA:				
Canada	3,456,383	5,021,476	628,000	33,600
Newfoundland, British Guiana, Honduras ...	283,281	537,465	53,200	1,500
Total	3,739,664	5,558,941	681,200	35,100
WEST INDIES.				
Jamaica	4,282	653,000	61,000	1,385
Bahamas, Trinidad, etc. ...	7,764	745,782	98,600	3,600
Total	12,046	1,398,782	159,600	4,985
AUSTRALIA:				
New South Wales ...	310,700	1,251,450	616,000	9,027
Victoria	87,884	1,179,103		5,710
Queensland	668,497	445,145		2,480
West Australia	975,876	82,072		1,276
South Australia	903,690	347,720		1,588
Tasmania	36,215	157,456		1,541
Total	2,982,862	4,189,074	616,000	21,622†

* S.A. Constabulary cost £2,505,523 in 1903

† To this may be added for Reserves and qualified members of rifle-clubs, 29,341; grand total, 50,963.

TABLE SHOWING THE MILITARY EXPENDITURE FOR 1903, AND THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE—*Continued.*

Colonies.	Area.	Population, 1894.	Military Expenditure, 1903 (including Armed Police).	Number of Troops, 1903 (including Armed Police).
PACIFIC :				
New Zealand	104,471	726,128	222,000	15,000
Fiji, New Guinea, etc....	97,975	421,867	5,000	470
TOTALS :				
Colonies	9,665,822	21,540,227	6,134,457	129,052
India and Burmah	944,489	300,000,000	12,603,070	264,080
Indian Feudatory States	589,122	72,000,000	Not known.	146,000
United Kingdom† (1903)	121,562	39,734,166	34,245,000	853,234†
GRAND TOTAL FOR EMPIRE	11,320,995	453,274,393	52,982,527	1,392,366

* Exclusive of 17,400 Imperial Service troops. † For details, *vide* below

UNITED KINGDOM, ETC., MILITARY FORCES, SHOWING NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND MEN ON THE REGIMENTAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE ARMY, ARMY RESERVE, AND AUXILIARY FORCES.

	Establishments, All Ranks, 1903-1904
Regular forces (regimental), home and colonial ...	197,389
Colonial and Native Indian corps (includes Malta Artillery, Sierra Leone Artillery, Chinese, two West African Regiments, and eight Native Infantry Regiments)	14,086
Army reserve...	70,000
Militia, (including permanent staff)	132,447
Militia Reserve Division (new)	50,000
Militia, Channel Islands	3,289
Militia, Malta and Bermuda	2,707
Yeomanry (including permanent staff)	35,196
Volunteers (including permanent staff)	348,120
Total home and colonial establishments	853,234

NOTE.—Regular forces (regimental) on Indian Establishment, *not* included in above, 74,450.

THE NERVES OF EMPIRE

By THE HON. GEORGE PEEL

'These submarine lines are the true nerves of the Empire; they are the nerves by which all these Colonies are brought into simultaneous action with ourselves.'—Secretary of Treasury, Speech in House of Commons, May 22, 1900.

EVERYONE agrees that the telegraphic communications of the Empire should be as cheap as the circumstances of the case allow, should be efficient in point of speed and accuracy, and should be controlled by ourselves. It would be a waste of words to establish these obvious propositions, and accordingly I shall confine the following observations to a consideration of the Imperial policy best calculated to preserve, or to secure, such desirable results. Let me examine, then, the connections between Great Britain on the one hand, and the most important of her Colonies and possessions on the other; the connections between these Colonies and possessions, *inter se;* and also the connections between the British Empire as a whole and foreign nations. From the mere statement of the facts, certain conclusions will suggest themselves naturally, while hasty and ill-considered opinions will similarly disappear. There are twenty British cable companies. They own about 121,000 miles of cable. The market value of their capital is £22,300,000. I touch, therefore, upon a great and weighty subject.

Great Britain and Canada.

Europe, including Great Britain, is united to the North American continent by no less than sixteen cables. The actual cost of the most recent British cable laid across the Atlantic from Ireland to Newfoundland was £450,000, which works out at a cost of £220 per mile. This was, indeed, a somewhat expensive cable. The Pacific Cable Committee of 1897 reported that the average cost of cable in round figures was £200 a mile (Blue-book C. 9247; Report of Pacific Cable Committee, paragraph 54, dated January 5, 1897). But prices fluctuate, and the figures are only quoted with the object of showing how great a capital outlay is entailed in cable enterprise.

Besides the initial cost of a cable, there is the cost of its maintenance, repair, and replacement. We have to consider not only the natural causes of decay, but also damage from external causes. No doubt the causes of faults and breakages, as well as the cost of repairs and maintenance, vary in every sea and with every cable. In the deep waters of the Atlantic 'the cost of the repair of a submarine cable may be from £20,000 to £80,000.'* For, though the bed of that ocean is usually of a nature favourable to cables, yet there is a danger arising from banks, due to the deposit of great blocks of rock brought down from Greenland into the North Atlantic by the icebergs. As the icebergs pass Newfoundland they sail into warmer waters and melt, so that for hundreds of miles a new Ireland is being formed down below.† To give, however, a general figure, the cost of maintaining and repairing a deep-sea cable was put by the Pacific Cable Committee at £70,000 a year

* Paragraph 5 of précis of evidence given by the Anglo-American Telegraph Cable Company before the Committee on Cable Communications, 1902, Blue-book, p. 150.

† *Cf.* evidence of Sir W. Preece, answer 1331, before Pacific Cable Committee, November 24, 1896.

for a cable 8,000 miles long.* This works out at £8 15s. per mile. That is a somewhat high figure, since it makes provision for two ships, when perhaps only one may be sufficient. Perhaps £6 per nautical mile is a safe figure.† Of course, all such figures are somewhat speculative. I give them merely as warnings to those who forget what a vast expense is incurred in laying and maintaining cables, and what enormous risks have to be run by private persons who embark on that business.

The reason for the singular multiplication of sixteen cables in the North Atlantic is mainly, of course, the profit to be obtained by conveying the immense volume of commercial messages passing between the United States and the European world. This accounts entirely for the five British and the seven American cables. Of the remaining four cables, two are French and two are German. The reason for the laying of these four latter cables has been rather political than commercial. In other words, the Governments of France and Germany have heavily subsidized these cables, in order to provide that their communications with the United States shall be independent of any landing-place within the British Empire.

The point, then, which merits attention here is that of the sixteen North Atlantic cables only five are British, and that these British cables have to encounter a severe competition from American, French, and German enterprise, aided in the two latter instances by the funds of the State.

The next important point is as regards the landing-places of these sixteen cables. No less than twelve of them start in Great Britain and land on the shores of Newfoundland or Canada. Of these twelve, all go

* Paragraphs 54-60 of Report.

† I take this figure from answer 1931 by Sir J. C. Lamb, formerly the chief executive officer of the Telegraph Department of the General Post Office, given before the Cable Communications Committee of 1902.


direct from Great Britain to Canada except one of them, which lands at the Portuguese islands of the Azores on the way. Five are owned by two British companies, and the remaining seven by two American companies.

The further point, then, which merits attention is that the telegraphic communications between Great Britain and Canada are singularly ample and direct.

The question naturally arises, Why are American cables allowed to unite Canada and Great Britain in competition with British cables? The answer is threefold: (*a*) American cables landing on British shores fall, *ipso facto*, under British control in case of war, and therefore can only add to our strategic resources. (*b*) Our five British cables, though landing in Canada instead of the United States, only do so because the speed of a cable varies inversely as the square of its length. Stated mathematically, if a cable of 500 miles gives a speed of 120 letters a minute, the same cable prolonged to 1,000 miles would only give a speed of 30 letters a minute. Hence the cables are landed in Canada or Newfoundland, as constituting a convenient half-way house on the road to the rich American traffic centres. It is by being allowed to collect a portion of that traffic in the United States by the agency of their American connections that our five British cables chiefly maintain their power to live. In return for this privilege allowed us by the Americans, we must grant the Americans the privilege of landing their cables in Canada on the way to Europe. (*c*) No doubt if the American-owned cables were beating our cables out of the field, it would become a question whether, in spite of the above observations, our Government should allow such cables to utilize British territory for that purpose.

The next point worth noticing is as regards the tariff charged over the Atlantic cables. A message from London to Montreal costs 1s. a word. Of this the Government of this country receives about ½d. per word for transmitting the message from London to

MAP I.



GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA.

Ireland, and for rental of land-lines leased to the companies. The Canadian land-line rate is about 2d. per word, and thus 9½d. is left as the amount actually received by the Cable Companies out of the total 1s. rate.

Cable tariffs, like other things, have their history and evolution. Although the permanent connection with Canada was established in 1866, it was not till 1872 that the system of charging so much per word was introduced. The tariff then fixed was 4s. per word. From 1872 up to 1888 the changes in the tariff were most bewildering; in those sixteen years there were no less than thirteen changes of tariff. But at last, in 1888, it was fixed at 1s., and there it has remained ever since.

The cause of these frequent fluctuations has been the more or less fierce struggle waged in the Atlantic, with some intermissions, since 1868, when the French entered the field in rivalry with the British. In 1881 American rivalry began under the auspices of Mr. Jay Gould, and became formidable in 1884, when the Commercial Cable Company, also of America, began operations. Finally, in 1896, the first really serious State competition was inaugurated by the German Government, though the German cable was not opened until 1900. Under stress of competition the rate fell to 6d. in 1886 until 1888. But this was found to be ruinous, and the rate was raised to 1s. in the latter year. Moreover, to mitigate the undue competition a 'pool' was formed, and still exists, between the two English companies and one of the American companies.

On the whole subject of our connection by cable with Canada there seems no reason for disputing the conclusion of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Cable Communications, which sat in 1902 under the presidency of Lord Balfour of Burleigh. 'The Atlantic companies,' it stated, 'have received no subsidies; they provide, under the influence of competition, an efficient service at a low rate, which they have attempted,

though unsuccessfully, to reduce still further, and no complaints against them have been laid before us.'*

It has, indeed, been suggested recently by the advocates of State enterprise or State socialism that the Imperial Government should lay its own cable or cables across the Atlantic to Canada. This singular proposal, if adopted, would play directly into the hands of the foreigner—*e.g.*, of Germany. For, if our existing British-owned cables are to be competed with by our own Government as well as by Germans and others, their profits would entirely disappear. The cables would be taken up or abandoned, the British capital would be lost, and British private cable enterprise would vanish from the North Atlantic. The German companies, who live on their State subsidies, would occupy the field abandoned by ourselves. I cannot imagine, therefore, a more ill-judged proposition.

My conclusions on this branch of the subject, accordingly, are that British private enterprise—(*a*) at no inconsiderable risk to itself, and (*b*) in the face of a severe and increasing competition, has provided (*c*) a reasonably cheap and efficient cable connection with Canada, (*d*) receiving in return a not undue remuneration.

Great Britain and India.

Turning next to our connections with India, it is clear from the map that the most direct route to India is by land-line across Europe to Constantinople, thence across Turkey in Asia to Fao, at the head of the Persian Gulf, and thence by submarine cable to Karachi in India. This route actually exists. The latter section of it consists of cables owned by the Indo-European Telegraph Department of the Indian Government, running from Fao to Karachi. This route to India was opened as long ago as February, 1865, when the first telegram reached our great dependency; but owing to the peculiarities of Turkish administration,

* Second Report, paragraph 60.

'it has never proved a really effective route.'* It is the dream, or perhaps more than the dream, of Germany to make it effective. But let us pass to the really operative routes.

The first really operative route to India is a cable running from Lowestoft to Germany; a land-line across Germany to Russia, and across Russia to Teheran in Persia; and thence a land-line to the sea, and a cable to Karachi. This route was opened in 1869. Though managed as far as Teheran by an English company, the Indo-European Telegraph Company, and from Teheran to Karachi by the Indian Government Department, it is owned in its German section by Germany. The Russian section is controlled by Russia. Thus, of the two direct land-line routes to India, the first is ineffective, and the second, though well managed, is at the mercy in time of war of two powerful rival Governments.

Clearly, the only solution of this problem was for British enterprise to construct a line of submarine cables to India. Private citizens proved enterprising enough to attempt the task. It was accomplished in 1870. The first cablegrams were transmitted to India in June of that year. But no sooner had the route been established than a serious difficulty arose. How could the cable compete with the land-line? The land-line is 4,300 miles long.† The route by cable through the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean is 6,700 miles long. To build the land-line costs about £680,000 with new poles,‡ or, assuming poles to exist already for half the way, £435,000—that is, £100 per statute mile. Against this, to lay a single line of cable by the sea route mentioned would cost, with

* First Report of Committee on Cable Communications, 1902, p. 5.

† *Cf.* answer 2258, Minutes of Evidence of Committee on Cable Communications, 1902; see also answer 2814.

‡ *Cf.* answer 1738 of Minutes of Evidence of Committee on Cable Communications, 1902.

expenses of insurance, stations, apparatus, and maintenance ship, about £1,500,000, or about £220 per knot. Thus the land route is immensely cheaper to construct, besides being about five times as cheap to maintain. Clearly, then, from a purely financial standpoint, a cable to India could be put out of existence by the land-line. Accordingly, between the Eastern Telegraph Company and the Indo-European Company a severe competition arose. The fortunes of the fight were various. In 1875 the cable route was totally interrupted in the Red Sea, and the land-line had won for the time. In 1876-1877 the land-line was totally interrupted, and victory inclined to the cable. But commercial as well as Imperial interests demanded the existence of both lines, and in 1877-1878 what is known as a 'joint purse' arrangement was established between the two routes. According to this agreement the gross receipts of the Indian traffic, whether earned by cable or land-line, less outpayments, are paid into a common purse; the sum thus obtained is then divided. Nearly 60 per cent. goes to the cable, and the balance to the Indo-European Company and the Indo-European Telegraph Department of the Indian Government. Competition ruinous to the shareholders, which in no short time would have become ruinous also to efficiency, has thus ceased, to the advantage of all parties concerned.

The advantage of the joint purse was that, thus guaranteed, the cable company could live, and Britain could begin to command her own communications. Consequently, between that day and this, a splendid system of cables has been built up between ourselves and India. At first, in 1870, it was a single line, except that it was duplicated between Malta and Alexandria. Serious breaks occurred, and for safety it became necessary to duplicate the line. So cables were laid in 1873 from England to Portugal, and in 1877 from Port Said to Bombay. The line, which had thus been mostly duplicated for safety, had now to be triplicated to cope with the growth of traffic, and not only triplicated, but

quadruplicated, by cables laid in 1883 from Port Said to Aden; in 1887 from England viâ Portugal to Malta; in 1891 from Port Said to Bombay; in 1897 from Vigo in Spain to Gibraltar; in 1898 by a direct cable from England to Gibraltar; and in 1899 from Gibraltar to Alexandria. This constitutes a line, if we are to omit indirect connections, triplicate in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, but quadruplicate in the Atlantic and Red Sea.

There was another remarkable feature about this line of cables: it became progressively under British control So long as Egypt was in hands other than our own, Egypt was its weak point. Time and Lord Cromer have brought a remedy. Again, up to 1898 all our cables landed either at Vigo in Spain or at Carcavellos in Portugal. There was little reason against this arrangement, certainly so far as Portugal was concerned. For we should not go to war with Portugal, and if we went to war with any other Power, Portugal, being a neutral Power, might preserve the cables landed on her shore intact against a belligerent. Nevertheless, for further security, a special cable, as mentioned, was laid in 1898 direct from here to Gibraltar and thence to Malta, at a cost of £306,000, while a land-line across France, over which the bulk of the Indian traffic used to pass to Marseilles, and thence by cable to Malta, was given up. An all-British connection was thus successfully established.

Against these high advantages conferred by the joint purse arrangement, there was a drawback, however. In the closing years of the nineteenth century, the time appeared to have come for reducing the rate to India. The system of charging so much per word had been established in 1876, the rate fixed being 4s. 6d. per word. In 1886 it was reduced to 4s. 0d., and remained at that figure. The number of words constituting the Indian traffic was singularly stable: 2,077,000 words in 1880, and 2,111,000 words in 1899. But about 1897 a certain increase began to appear in the number of

words, which had risen to 2,457,000 in 1900. The prosperity of India was the cause of this growth. The companies thereupon agreed to reduce the rate to 2s. 6d. per word, and on May 22, 1900, the Secretary of the Treasury announced in the House of Commons that 'it is practically arranged that there should be at once a reduction to 2s. 6d., and if the 2s. 6d. rate brings in a certain number of messages, that rate will shortly be reduced to 2s. 0d.' It was, however, not until March 1, 1902, that this reduction was effected. What was the obstacle?

A certain article in the joint purse agreement provided that no alteration of tariff was to be made without mutual consent of the three contracting parties, one of which was the Indo-European Company. It now appeared that, under the terms of its concessions from Russia and Germany, that company cannot consent to any alterations of tariff, except with the consent of those Governments, and as these consents were withheld, Germany and Russia blocked the way to any reduction of rate between Britain and India. After long and complicated negotiations, the opposition of Russia and Germany was overcome by their being, broadly speaking, guaranteed against any loss in which they might be involved owing to the reduction of the rate, and finally, in March, 1902, the rate was reduced to 2s. 6d.

The receipts from the traffic between India and Europe and America, which in 1879 had been about £320,000, had risen very slowly up to an average of £352,000 by 1900. In view of the great capital outlay involved in the laying of new cables during that interval, this was not a high return. The reduction of tariff then arranged might mean a considerable reduction—at any rate, for a term—even in this revenue, such as it was. So the Indian Government agreed that if the receipts now fell below the 'standard revenue' of £352,000, India would make up one-third of the deficiency, provided this one-third did not exceed about £40,000 in any one year. If, however, the standard

revenue was maintained, then the rate in due course was to be further reduced to 2s. 0d. This was done in the autumn of 1905. The rate to New York, which has been driven down to the lowest payable point by competition, works out at 3·4d. per 1,000 miles, while the cable rate to India, deducting the terminal rate paid to the Indian Government, works out at 2·55d.

The seas through which the cables pass from England to India are, on the whole, fairly well adapted to cables. Reckoning anything over 1,000 fathoms as deep sea, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean are deep seas in the parts mostly traversed by this route. Deep sea suits cables, because the globigerinous ooze deposited in those depths covers and protects the wire, though faults and breakages are by no means unknown n such depths, the causes of which are somewhat obscure. On the other hand, the Red Sea is shallow, and so are the waters near Malta and Gibraltar. The danger of a shallow sea is that tides may reach the bottom, scour the rocks, and chafe the cable till it is broken. Besides, the anchor is the enemy of the cable laid in a shallow sea. Another danger is the south-west monsoon blowing for several months each year in the Indian Ocean. This prevents the mending of the cable during that period.

Meanwhile, subsidiary to this main line, a multitude of short cables began to radiate from the trunk route, uniting every important European nation. 'Concessions from foreign Governments and understandings with foreign companies were obtained which the Imperial Government could never have secured.'*

From 1870 to the present time, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Tunis, France, Italy, Austria, Greece, Tripoli, Crete, Cyprus, Turkey, and Russia have allowed British capital and British enterprise to connect them with our system, in complete reliance upon the proved international uprightness and fair dealing of our citizens. It is sometimes said that the Imperial Govern-

* Second Report of Cable Committee, paragraph 67.


ment should buy up British cables and manage them itself. But, obviously, if the main route were State-owned by us, foreign nations would seek their own connections, to the detriment of the British capital sunk in all these subsidiary cables, and to the detriment also of the important influence indirectly entrusted to us under the present system. Indeed, the talk and writing in this strain indulged in occasionally here has already had a bad effect abroad. Germany, becoming anxious for an independent connection, has established a land-line route to Kustendji on the Black Sea, and has laid a cable thence to Constantinople. From Constantinople she has planned a route across Turkey in Asia to the Persian Gulf, and so on to the East. Similarly, France has contemplated a line from Marseilles to Jaffa in Syria, thence to the Gulf of Akabah, and so down the Red Sea to Madagascar southwards, and Cochin-China in the East. 'We wish to say,' said the Cable Committee of 1902, 'that we are strongly opposed to any scheme for the general purchase of private cables by the State. . . . No serious attempt has been made to prove that submarine cables would be more efficiently managed by the State than by private companies, and we ourselves are decidedly of a contrary opinion. Many of the cables touch on foreign territory, and it is evident that serious difficulty might arise if the British Government endeavoured to work them by its own operators.'*

Nevertheless, the same Committee felt it to be its duty to add that the cable communications between Britain and India are not strategically satisfactory, as long as a cable is not laid by the Eastern Telegraph Company from Southern India to Cocos, a British island south of India. From Cocos a cable runs to Australia in one direction, and to South Africa in the other. Thanks to these all-British routes, India would escape being cut off if both the European land-lines and the cables in the Mediterranean were cut.

It should, however, be added that India is already

* Second Report, paragraphs 96 and 98.

MAP II.



BRITAIN TO INDIA.

CABLE AND LANDLINE ROUTES.


the commercial situation is not. The West Indian Islands, stretching like a twisted cord from the point of Florida to the mouth of the Orinoco, are owned by several nations. But their resources, with the exception of those of Cuba, are so limited that one set of cables under one control would amply suffice for them, uniting them to each other and to the North and South American continents. Instead, there are four companies, or six, if the two companies working the Halifax-Bermuda-Jamaica line be included.

The only line, however, which needs our attention is that duplicate sequence of cables, given on the accompanying map, owned by the West India and Panama Company, and running from Jamaica right through our British Islands to Demerara on the South American continent. It is a British company, and unites all our possessions with Jamaica through the medium of Porto Rico, owned by the United States, and of a pair of small Danish islands. It also touches at the French islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. A few words must be devoted to its manifold misfortunes. It is the Job of cable companies.

To begin with, Cuba provides the bulk of the West Indian traffic, but Cuba is now a republic under the dominion of the United States, so that the West India and Panama Company has never benefited from the Cuban traffic, because the natural outlet for that traffic is through Florida. Next, there is French competition. A line of French cables, largely subsidized by the State, unites New York to San Domingo, and from San Domingo radiates on all sides, south, east, and west to Venezuela, Cuba, and the French possessions of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Such, to begin with, is the serious competition with which the West India and Panama Company has had to contend since it linked up our islands in 1871.

But these evils from outside sources are as nothing compared with the domestic evils from within. The cables from Trinidad to Demerara are constantly de-

George Teal



BRITAIN AND THE WEST INDIES.

teriorating in the peculiar mud of that sea-bed. Elsewhere the sea-bed is volcanic and destructive to cables. The cable-ship was lost in the cataclysm of St. Pierre. The West Indian Islands, themselves impoverished, constantly diminish the subsidies which they pay to the Company. The French Colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe have transferred their subsidies, naturally enough, from the British to the French cable company. The traffics are miserable—15s. a day to and from St. Vincent, and 50s. a day to and from Grenada.

The action of the State in causing a heavily subsidized cable to be laid in 1898 from Bermuda to Jamaica not only deprived the West India and Panama Company of a large part of its Jamaica traffic, but also penalized it in another manner, in virtue of its existing traffic arrangements with the companies carrying traffic to the United States. The company pays nothing on its ordinary stock, and only part of the dividend on its preference stock.

There is a good deal of instruction to be drawn from the above facts. People who urge the State to compete in laying cables against its own private citizens forget that this may result in the ruin of the private enterprise, already hard pressed by foreign rivals; so that the State itself will have eventually to embark upon that business at great expense. It is to be hoped that such an outlay of public money may be avoidable in this case. 'We do not think,' said the Cable Committee of 1902, 'that the remedy lies in Government intervention. The real obstacle to the prosperity of the West Indian companies is the lack of through traffic, and we anticipate that the problem will ultimately be solved by treating the West Indian cables as part of a larger whole.'*

* Second Report, paragraph 46.

Great Britain and Africa.

East Coast.

No sooner had the cable route to India along the north coast of Africa been established in 1870 than British enterprise began to turn its attention southward to the problem of communication with our African Colonies. But the risks and cost of that enterprise were so serious, and the traffic likely to be obtained so small, that it was found impossible to act without State assistance. Years passed, and nothing could be arranged. At last, at the crisis of the Zulu War, the Colonial Minister, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in February, 1879, announced 'the excessive and urgent importance upon political and military, as well as commercial grounds,' for cables to Natal. He added that 'it is useless, and would be wrong, for us to wait in the hope that such communication should be established by private enterprise, and it would be right for the country to take some share in the burden of establishing it upon itself.' A line of cables was accordingly laid in 1879 from Aden down the East Coast of Africa to Natal, touching on the way at Portuguese stations. The Imperial Government agreed to pay £35,000 a year for twenty years, receiving in return a rebate to the extent of one-half the ordinary tariff on its official messages. The Governments of Natal, Cape Colony, and Portugal also gave subsidies on similar terms. As an instance of the risks of cable-laying, it is worth mentioning that the section between Zanzibar and Mozambique had to be duplicated at the cost of £117,000, owing to breaks constantly caused by the Rovuma River.

To confine attention to the East Coast, this line, so far as regards the portion between Zanzibar and Durban, was gradually duplicated. In 1893 a cable was laid under subsidy from Zanzibar to Seychelles, and thence to Mauritius; and next Mauritius was united to Durban in 1901. Thus, the line is duplicated, except from Aden to Zanzibar, and is entirely all-British, viâ Durban-

Mauritius - Seychelles - Zanzibar - Aden. Branch - lines unite certain French and German possessions in those regions to our main line, and the international character of our cable enterprise is preserved, while all-British communication is also provided.

West Coast.

The growth of the cable system on the West Coast of Africa has been somewhat complex. By 1870, as already stated, Lisbon had been united to Britain. By 1874 a line of cables had been run from Lisbon to the Portuguese stations of Madeira and St. Vincent, and so on to Brazil.* Thus by 1874 we had cable communication already well advanced down the coast of West Africa from Britain to St. Vincent. The next step was to unite St. Vincent with our Colonies on the West Coast of Africa, but this was not so easy as might appear.

On the shore immediately opposite to St. Vincent the Colonies of Portugal, of France, and of England lay almost inextricably intermixed. By the year 1886 these Colonies were joined up to each other, and the whole united by cable to St. Vincent. But to us this was unsatisfactory on two grounds: this system was mainly controlled by France and Portugal; and, next, it was so arranged that our Colony of Sierra Leone, for instance, could only communicate with the outside world through Conakry, a French possession. The situation called for the exercise of the powerful will or genius of the late Sir John Pender, who now secured the interests of England on this, as on so many other occasions.

Under his direction a transformation-scene occurred in 1886. The cable uniting St. Vincent to the mainland was bought and taken direct into our Colony of Bathurst, and forthwith a British cable was laid, under

* I have not dealt with the important British system of cables connecting South America and Britain, because South America is not a part of the British Empire.

subsidy, from Bathurst to Sierra Leone, thence to Accra, and thence to Lagos, Brass, and Bonny. All these were British Colonies, and the question had thus been solved.

If the first transformation-scene in the West African system occurred in 1886, the second occurred in 1889. Bonny, as already stated, was the British station nearest to the Cape, and the cable had reached it already. But in 1889 a cable was laid thence to Principe, a Portuguese island to the south. From Principe a cable already ran to St. Thome and Loanda, and the control of this latter line of cable had already been acquired by us. Finally, from Loanda, in the same year (1889), a line of cable was laid viâ the Portuguese possessions to Cape Town itself. The great achievement had now been executed of a duplicate line, laid on either side of Africa, to Durban on one side and Cape Town on the other.

To revert to our West African Colonies, the rates to these have been high. The Cable Committee of 1902 reported against these rates, and these alone in the whole British Empire: 'We are not prepared to say that any of the existing rates are excessive, with the exception of those to the Gold Coast and Nigeria.'* These, however, have now been reduced. For instance, the rate to Sierra Leone, originally 6s. 9d., has been reduced by successive stages till it stands, according to the reduction of July, 1904, at 3s. 6d. Correspondingly with other rates.

There were two main reasons for these high rates. The expenses on that coast are heavy. Owing to its terrible climate, three operators have to be provided where two would suffice elsewhere. Then the cables lie near the shore, and are liable to be broken or to deteriorate more readily than deep-sea cables. The Congo River has constantly broken the cables, like the Rovuma River on the East Coast. Finally, though there was a brief-lived gold boom in 1901, the traffic

* Second Report, Summary, Section XI.

of a country so undeveloped and so deadly to the white man is necessarily of a limited character. So, in spite of these high rates, the dividend on the ordinary stock of the West African cable companies averaged only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for the last five years of the nineteenth century.*

Here, too, foreign competition has shown its strength. France, anxious, like ourselves, for an independent connection with her Colonies, has laid a cable direct from Brest to Dakar, whence a cable runs to Conakry. From this point there is internal communication by land-line to her other West African possessions. This is not all. France has planned a line of cables viâ Marseilles, Oran, Tangier, Cadiz, and Teneriffe to Dakar and St. Louis. The section from Cadiz to Teneriffe, however, is Spanish.

Nevertheless, though the line to South Africa had thus been duplicated in 1889, even this position, as time passed, began to appear inadequate to the organizers of British cable enterprise. Should they duplicate the existing East Coast or West Coast route? In either event, at any rate, the cable, however expensive, would run into existing stations, and could be served and repaired by the existing ships. But, after mature deliberation, strategical conquered commercial considerations, the needs of the public, however costly, outweighed private interests, and they resolved to undertake the vast expenses of a new route. In 1899-1901 they laid a line direct from England viâ Madeira, St. Vincent, Ascension, and St. Helena to the Cape in time to meet the requirements of the South African War. I well remember when in Ascension and St. Helena, shortly before that date, the enthusiasm with which the inhabitants of those remote outposts received the news that they were to have a cable. This line was nearly 7,000 nautical miles in length, and cost £1,400,000, or about £200 a mile. For a small subsidy a cable was laid to Sierra Leone from Ascension, thus

* Appendix G to Report of Cable Committee, 1902.

providing another independent connection with our West African Colonies.

The African Connection.

About the same time (in 1901) the cable was laid from Durban to Mauritius, and thence continued by an all-British route to Australia, thus furnishing another strategic route home from the Cape. Broadly speaking, therefore, South Africa is now possessed of four good routes to Britain, namely, two on the West Coast, one on the East Coast, and one viâ Australia.

Simultaneously with this large capital expenditure efforts have been made to reduce the rate to South Africa to the lowest possible figure. From its old figure of 8s. 11d. it has been reduced by successive stages to 2s. 6d. per word. Resort has been had in this case, as in that of India, to the system of 'standard revenue.' In other words, it having been decided that £300,000 was a fair return on the capital expended on African cables, it was settled that, subject to that receipt being realized from the messages, the rate should be reduced by successive stages to 2s. 6d. This latter figure is the actual rate. A subsidy was arranged at the same time, but this has not been operative since the last revision of the agreement in 1901.

My conclusions upon this part of the subject are as follows: (1) Originally the risks of joining up South Africa were so great, and the derivable profits so small, that the State had to help with subsidies. These subsidies, however, are soon expiring. (2) Then the famous gold boom began, and the expansion of traffic thus caused has enabled a splendid quadruplicate system to be built up, uniting South Africa with the outside world. (3) In the future, foreign competition from Germany and France may be expected on both sides of Africa, and, indeed, has already begun on the West Coast. (4) In the future also South Africa may enter, as already appears to be the case, upon a period of stagnation, as is the case with Australia. (5) In all the circumstances,

the time may be approaching when, in the words of the Cable Committee of 1902, private enterprise 'may require support,' although at present 'the competition to which we have alluded has not yet reached an acute stage,'* and although, I may add, it is to be hoped that South Africa may recover her prosperity.

Great Britain and Australasia.

But perhaps the greatest achievement was to connect Britain with Australasia. In 1870, while India was being joined up to Britain, a single line of cables was laid from Madras to Penang and Singapore, and thence to Batavia, in Java. In 1871 a cable was laid from Banjoewangie, in Java, to Port Darwin, on the north coast of Australia, completing the connection. This was a length of 3,500 miles, and cost slightly over £1,000,000, or about £280 a mile. Unfortunately, the centres of Australian population are in the south, and so a land-line of 2,000 miles had to be laid overland, across the deserts, from Adelaide to Port Darwin, in order to unite the principal capitals of Australia with London. This was accomplished in 1872, and Sir Charles Todd, the Postmaster-General of South Australia, deserves great credit for the resourcefulness and perseverance which he displayed in overcoming the many difficulties and delays encountered during the construction of this long land-line. I have seen him at one end of his land-line in Adelaide, and sent him a message from Port Darwin at the other.

No duplicate cable was laid as yet from Madras to Penang, but the sections from Penang to Port Darwin were duplicated in 1879-1880. There were two reasons for this duplication. The land-line across Java from Batavia to Banjoewangie worked badly, so that an alternative line had to be laid direct from Singapore to Banjoewangie. Next, 'between Singapore and Penang

* Second Report, paragraph 52.

there were frequent interruptions,'* as well as in the volcanic region between Banjoewangie and Port Darwin. Such are the dangers and expenses of cable enterprise. These cables, however, fortunately cost less than the former ones, or at the rate of under £220 per mile. This duplicate line was subsidized by some of the Australian Governments most concerned.

As time passed four important further steps were taken to strengthen the connection between India and Australia. First, in 1889, after negotiation with the Colonial Office, the section between Java and Australia was triplicated by a line to Roebuck Bay. Next, in 1891, the Madras-Penang section was duplicated. Then, in 1892, the line was triplicated between Penang and Singapore. Lastly, in 1894, the Netherlands-India Government assigned a special wire, worked by British operators, between Batavia and Banjoewangie for the special service of the international traffic.

Much had thus been done, but more remained to do. As time passed, the originators of this enterprise felt their work to be incomplete. There was the long land-line through Australia. All traffic had to transit Java, a Dutch possession. The existing route was not only circuitous, but passed over a volcanic region, so that in 1888, and again in 1890, communication with Australia was wholly cut off. For these and other reasons they proposed, in March, 1897, to lay a cable from South Africa direct to Australia. This would bring in no fresh traffic. It would be immensely expensive. It would need costly stations to be built at Mauritius, Rodrigues, Cocos, and Perth on the way. It would require a considerable additional staff of highly-trained operators. It would necessitate the proximity of a ship to effect repairs. But, against all this, the Admiralty recommended the route strategically, and efficiency demanded it. It was laid, without subsidy, from Durban to Perth, in West Australia, in 1901; and in March, 1902, a cable was carried from Perth to Adelaide, right

* Answer 1749, Pacific Cable Committee, Blue-book, 1899.

into the heart of Australia. The total cost was £1,750,000.*

It was at this juncture that a most severe blow was inflicted upon British cable enterprise. The British Government, in combination with the Governments of New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, initiated, in December, 1902, a State-owned cable running from Australia to Canada, viâ Brisbane, Norfolk Island (whence a branch ran to New Zealand), Fiji, Fanning Island, and Vancouver. The length was nearly 8,000 miles, and the cost nearly £1,800,000, or at the rate of £225 a mile. The capital was raised at a cheap rate by the British Government, and the four Governments concerned agreed to share the loss or profit of the undertaking among them. It was decided to run it as 'a competitive line'† against the existing British private enterprise; and a Government Committee, composed of four Colonials and only two Englishmen, declared that, 'actuated by extreme caution,' they hoped to abstract upwards of one-half of the entire Australasian traffic from those British citizens who, during thirty years, had risked over £3,000,000 of British capital in obtaining it. No wonder that in June, 1901, the British Treasury declared itself 'opposed to the venture.'‡ Nevertheless, to quote the same authority, 'opposition was overcome by various other countries interested.'§ At this point I must make a digression as to the Australian rate. It has a considerable bearing on the sequel.

As regards the rate to Australia, the system of charging so much per word was introduced in 1876, and fluctuated at first between 10s. 6d. or 10s. 8d. per word. In 1886 it was reduced to 9s. 4d., and thence to 4s. in 1891. Most of the Australian Governments, together with New Zealand, united to guarantee one-half of any

* Report of Cable Committee, 1902, Appendix F, p. 59.

† Report of Pacific Cable Committee, 1899, paragraphs 68 and 77.

‡ Evidence of Cable Committee, 1902, answer 3119.


§ *Ibid.*

loss of revenue which might arise from this latter reduction. The loss was, in fact, heavy, since it is but seldom that the telegraphing public responds early and adequately to reductions of rate. Consequently, in 1893, at the urgent instance of the guaranteeing Governments, who smarted under their share of the loss, the rate was raised to 4s. 9d. At that point it remained till 1900, when it was reduced to 4s. At the same time, further future reductions were arranged, subject to the continued receipt of a minimum or standard revenue, as in the case of India and South Africa. Accordingly, at the opening of 1901 the rate was reduced to 3s. 6d., and to 3s. at the opening of 1902. This is the existing rate.

There is an instructive lesson to be derived from the facts of the Australian traffic. In 1896 the total number of words passing between Australasia and Europe and America was 2,225,000, and the yield to all parties concerned £383,000. In 1899 the rate had not been changed in the interval, and the words were 2,149,000, or practically the same. In 1902 the tariff had fallen from 4s. 9d. to 3s., or a reduction of 37 per cent. It might have been expected that this would have immensely stimulated the number of words sent. By no means. In 1902 the number of words was 2,358,000; the yield in 1902, owing to the reduction of rate, being only £246,000, as against £383,000 in 1896. This demonstrates that reductions of rate do not necessarily produce increases of traffic. It was in December, 1902, after these serious reductions and losses, and when great increase of capital outlay had been undertaken by private enterprise, that the British Government entered the field against its own citizens.

The result was, of course, disastrous. In 1903 and 1904 almost all the profit from the Australasian cables owned by private persons, and constructed after thirty years of labour and thought, was swept away. On its side, the British Government, with the Colonial Governments concerned, realized a loss of upwards of £200,000 on the working of its Pacific cable. Such are the

MAP V.



George Peel

Great Britain and the Far East.

By the words 'Far East' I mean ten political aggregates: the Malay Peninsula, the Dutch Indies, Siam, North Borneo, Indo-China, China, Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and the Pacific Islands. It is impossible to explain the cable position in that vast region without a few words upon the factors governing its trade and politics, for trade feeds and politics regulate the number and nationality of the cables.

(*a*) Viewed very broadly, the foreign trade of the majority of those countries is less expansive than enthusiasts suppose. As the best authority, Sir Robert Hart, has said, 'China needs neither import nor export . . . the sanguine expectations . . . have never been realized.'* The Chinese have the best food, rice, the best drink, tea, and the best clothing, cotton, silk, and fur, so that foreign trade is not a necessity to them. Similarly with several of the other Eastern peoples.

(*b*) Another great obstacle to trade expansion has been, and still is, currency. I find that the gold exchange of the silver Haikwan tael fell steadily, with the exception of five short upward fluctuations, from 6s. 6d. in 1870 to 3s. 3d. in 1894. In the next ten years, up to date, it has fluctuated violently, but, on the whole, in a downward direction, attaining its minimum of 2s. 4$\frac{3}{4}$d. in March, 1903. If silver, the wholesale currency, thus varies in relation to gold, so copper, the currency of the people, varies in relation to silver. Hence a double-lever state of disturbed equilibrium exercising a prejudicial effect on foreign trade.

(*c*) Against this, no doubt, is the miraculous expansion of Japan with her gold standard. It would seem from the Japanese trade returns that her foreign trade doubled decennially from 1868 to 1888, and septennially since then. Thus her trade, which was £2,700,000 in 1868, was £54,000,000 in 1902, and, reckoning at the same

* 'China and her Foreign Trade' (chapter ii. of 'These from the Land of Sinim,' p. 60, 1903).

ratio of progress, will be £109,000,000 in 1909. But here, again, the adverse point for Englishmen is that Asia will deal principally with the Asiatic. Dividing up the Japanese imports and exports into Asiatic, European, and American, the Asiatic come easily first, while the American and European about balance each other. But how, in the long-run, can we compete against the Americans, with their Philippine base, their Pacific seaboard, and their boundless resources?

(*d*) Assuming, however, that China and Japan, together with the other Eastern nations, do maintain a fair trade with ourselves, the telegraphic route from the East appears to be either across the Pacific to America and thence to Europe, or else across Siberia by land-line and thence to Europe. But neither of these through routes is controllable by us. We can only run our cables down the coast of China to Singapore, and so home viâ India, a circuitous route.

(*e*) So far, then, the conditions of trade and the facts of geography in the Far East appear to suggest that (1) the expansion of its European trade may be limited and slow, and that (2) whether expansion be slow or fast, the nearest telegraph routes homeward are otherwise than British.

(*f*) The politics of the Far East point in the same direction as regards British cable enterprise. During the decadence of the Ming Dynasty two European nations established themselves in the Far East—Spain, since succeeded by the Americans, in the Philippines, and Holland in the Dutch Indies. The succeeding, and still reigning, Manchu Dynasty stopped further European aggression for two centuries, until the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. By the latter date the Manchu Dynasty, which had been, in the persons of Kangshi and Kienlung, more politic than the Moguls and more successful than the Cæsars, was decadent. Since then feeble Princes have sat on the dragon throne. So France seized the south and Russia the north, and Germany acquired her existing possessions of 30,000,000

inhabitants in the centre of China. But Americans, Dutch, Germans, Russians, and French all want their own cables and telegraphs. Japan, and China herself, naturally emulate these exemplars. How was it possible for British citizens, now actively attacked and depleted by the Pacific cable enterprise of their own Government, to make headway against the conditions of trade, the facts of geography, and the ambitions of foreign nations thus briefly enumerated above?

Nevertheless, they have made a good struggle. It was in 1871 that British cable enterprise entered the Far East. In that year a cable was laid from Singapore to Cape St. James, near Saigon, in French Indo-China, and thence carried to our possession of Hong Kong. From that date till 1883, however, no more cables were laid by us on the coast of China, for at Hong Kong our passage up the coast was barred by a formidable rival, the Great Northern Telegraph Company of Denmark.

As soon as the Trans-Siberian route had been finished, connecting Russia by land-line with Vladivostok, this Danish company undertook to unite Vladivostok by cable with Japan, and Japan with Shanghai. This was done in 1871. As if this was not enough, they laid cables in the same year from Shanghai to Amoy, and thence to Hong Kong. The Asiatic coast was thus linked up continuously in 1871 from Vladivostok to Singapore, and the Danes had filled the area north of Hong Kong. In 1883 they duplicated their Vladivostok-Japan-Shanghai cables.

But as the years passed after 1871, it became more evident that, as the seat of government was in North China, the Danish company could not fail to exercise a preponderating influence with the Son of Heaven. Accordingly, in 1883-1884, the British company decided at all hazards to make a move north, and laid cables from Hong Kong to Foochow, and thence to the Danish stronghold of Shanghai. I remember, when proceeding on the magnificent waterway of the River Min to

Foochow, seeing the place where our cable, when first laid, had to be worked from a hulk in the river, owing to the refusal of the Chinese officials to provide a landing-place for so mysterious an intruder. In the same year, 1884, some cable-laying of minor interest was done by us for Portugal at Macao, and for France —Tonquin to Saigon.

Ten years again passed away, and meantime it had begun to be felt that Hong Kong was only imperfectly united to Singapore by a single line of cable, touching at the French possession of Saigon; so in 1894 a line was laid from Singapore to the British island of Labuan, off North Borneo, and thence to Hong Kong, providing a splendid all-British route.

So much for the main British cables on the actual coast of China. But this account does not quite exhaust the matter. In the year 1900 the Chinese Government became anxious to possess a line of cables from Taku, the port of Pekin, to Chefoo, and thence to Shanghai. The root of their anxiety was that foreign nations would lay those cables if they did not undertake it themselves. British interests coincided at this point with the interests of China, so we laid those cables on behalf of the Chinese Government. This was not an insignificant service. The Chefoo-Taku section was duplicated next year. Hardly had this been done in 1900 than Chefoo became a most important centre, significantly enough, of foreign activities. Russia procured a cable from Chefoo to Port Arthur, and Germany a cable from Chefoo to Kiau-Chau, and thence to Shanghai. Britain herself arranged for a cable under subsidy from Wei-Hai-Wei to Chefoo.

So far I have dealt with the great struggle which has been in process since 1870 for predominance on the coast of China and possession of the China traffic. Great Britain has not been beaten, though, of course, an overwhelming victory was impossible without more State support than that afforded by the British Government. But let us now step from the coast eastward

into the waters of the Pacific. Here British private enterprise, now so sorely bestead by the competition of its own Government cable, has had to cope also with the strenuous rivalry and national ambitions of Holland, Germany, France, and America.

In the Dutch Indies Holland possesses one of the finest empires in the world. It was acquired by the Dutch early in the seventeenth century, when they evicted us wholly from that vast region, inflicting a blow from which we have never recovered in the Far East. Since that date they have always looked suspiciously on England, and opposed her progress in those waters. It was this deep-seated feeling, stimulated by the Boer War in South Africa, and skilfully fomented by Germany, which has induced Holland to obtain cable connection with her Indies viâ America and the Pacific, in assertion of her independence of the British cables viâ India.

In accordance with this design the Dutch have laid cables from Java to Banjermassin, in Borneo. Borneo is traversed by land-lines, and thence another cable runs to Kwandang and Menado, in the north of the Celebes. Up to Menado these cables are wholly Dutch. At Menado, however, Holland has combined with Germany to lay cables to Yap, and thence to Guam, where a junction is effected with an American cable, to be mentioned later, which runs to San Francisco. Thus the much-desired independence of Holland has been effected, but only by exchanging the control of one nation for the control of two. These two, however, were, in her view, her friends.

From Yap, again, a German-Dutch cable, so-called, but purely devoted to German interests, runs to Shanghai. Thence a German cable, laid in 1900, goes to Kiau-Chau, the headquarters of the German Empire in Shantung. Thus Germany, too, has accomplished her desire of obtaining cable connection with the Far East independently of British cables.

The reason for this considerable success of Germany

lay in her statesmanship. While the British Government is busy in competing with its own citizens, who in reality are fighting our battles in the Far East, Germany steps forward with a guarantee of traffic for the German-Dutch line of £76,250 a year, and persuades Holland to add another guarantee of £18,750 a year, making a total of £95,000 a year. I do not know whether those 'publicists' and 'Imperial thinkers,' of whom we have so many at home, realize that in urging our Government to lay cables against its own citizens they are, unconsciously no doubt, merely echoing the policy most desired at Berlin. For, clearly, every stroke at British enterprise, whether in the Atlantic or the Pacific, accrues to the profit of the Fatherland.

The next nation which cast eyes across the Pacific was France. The foundations of her Far Eastern Empire were laid in the eighteenth century. In the middle of that century we had evicted her from India after a struggle of a hundred years. Now she was determined to recoup that loss, and to find her Indies in the Far East. So, in 1787, Louis XVI. tried, by treaty, to acquire the protectorate of Cochin-China, and in 1789 a French army, commanded by a Bishop, invaded that country. After a struggle of another hundred years, the Franco-Chinese treaty of 1885 ratified her in possession. In the preceding year, to strengthen her strategy, she had procured a cable from Tonquin to Saigon; but from Saigon homewards the communications of her new Empire rested wholly in the hands of her old rival, England.

In order to remedy this danger, she built a cable from Tourane, in 1901, to Amoy, her policy being to proceed thence northwards and join hands with Russia. But this action was stopped by China, whose rights it infringed, and accordingly she now is turning her attention eastward across the Pacific. Her plan is to lay a cable from Indo-China to the Dutch Indies, and so home viâ the German-Dutch and American cables to America and France.

But our most energetic rivals of all have been the Americans, who occupied the Philippines in 1898. That archipelago had previously been occupied for three and a half centuries by the Spaniards. In 1880 the British Cable Company arranged with the Spanish Government to lay a cable from Hong Kong to Cape Bolinao, near Manila, the capital of the Philippines. In 1897 a further step was taken. Immediately to the south of the great island of Luzon lie a number of smaller islands, the chief being Panay, Negros, and Cebu. These islands in that year were connected with the island of Luzon. I remember, when visiting those stations, in the profoundest depths of the Pacific, feeling that here was the utmost boundary and frontier, the *ultima Thule*, of British private enterprise.

But in 1898 the scene totally changed. For twenty years previous—since the negotiation of the treaty of 1878 with Samoa for an American coaling-station in the Pacific—the United States had been looking, ever more ambitiously, to the Far East. In 1848 she had evicted Spain from the Pacific slope: now she evicted her from the Philippines. Cable communication with the new American Empire was indispensable. Should the State undertake it, or should private persons? Her statesmen decided for private enterprise, and, accordingly, in 1903 the Commercial Pacific Company laid cables from San Francisco to Honolulu, thence to Midway and Guam, and thence again to Manila. The Philippine traffic, which previously had to pass wholly over the British cable to Hong Kong, now found an independent route direct to America. To tap the China traffic, the Americans further laid a cable from Manila to Shanghai.

Last new rival of all, Japan intends, naturally enough, to seek an independent connection in the direction of America. She has already her own cables to Formosa, and thence to Foochow. She is laying a cable to connect herself with Bonin, and thus with America.

Prior to 1890 the China rate was from 7s. 1d. to

8s. 9d. per word, according to the different places touched on the coast. Now it has been reduced to 4s, 5d. uniformly, having fallen by three different stages. Of course, the British company carrying the traffic from China to Madras receive only a small proportion of this amount. The Chinese take the large average terminal rate of 11d., and the Cis-Indian administrations take 2s. 2½d., whilst India's share is 3½d., or a total of 3s. 5d. Thus 1s. is left to the British company.

The lesson of the Far East is surely too obvious to need repetition. In that region, as elsewhere, British cable enterprise is rivalled and assailed on all hands and in every quarter by foreign nations. It will survive if the British Government is reasonably friendly and helpful to its own citizens. But if the latter are to be competed with by their own Government, then our position, such as it is, in the Far East, will be fatally compromised. Our cables, become unprofitable, will be sold to our American and German rivals, and British enterprise will vanish from that ocean, which now, in the phrase of Gibbon, is the scene of the world's debate.

Commercial Codes and the 'Social Code.'

In discussing all questions of rates, it should be borne in mind that over 90 per cent. of messages transmitted by cable are commercial messages, and also that of these commercial messages 'something like 95 per cent. are carried on by code.'* Taking one of the small private commercial codes actually in use, I find that the whole code gives an average of 27·93 plain language words represented by one code word. Therefore, if the published rate, *e.g.*, to India, is 2s., the actual cost to the merchant is only $\frac{7}{8}$ of 1d. per word. For instance, the five code words, Crampoon, Acacia, Spring, Polvorillar, Rahtfen, represent a message which, if expressed in

* Speech of Sir John Wolfe Barry, Chairman of the Eastern Telegraph Company, July 17, 1901.

plain language, would consist of no less than 139 ordinary plain language words. This important fact should go far to modify criticisms as to the nature of rates.

As regards social messages, codes have hitherto been far less in use. An examination of ten pages of one of the most popular public codes of this nature, the A.B.C. code, shows that, on an average, nearly 5·95 plain language words are represented by one code word. But Sir John Wolfe Barry, Chairman of the Eastern Telegraph Company, decided a few years ago to afford the public considerably greater facilities than they had hitherto enjoyed as regards social messages. Accordingly he has arranged for the preparation of a social code of 16,000 words. A copy has been placed at each of the offices of the companies, in towns at home and abroad, in which they are permitted to deal directly with the public; and the officers of the companies have received instructions to assist the public in coding and decoding their telegrams. Also, wherever the companies deal directly with the public, receivers of telegrams are able to register their names and addresses free of charge. The full title of the volume is 'Viâ Eastern Telegraphic Social Code.'

Cable Finance.

The principles regulating the financial management of cables have almost always been widely misunderstood by the popular writers on such subjects. Indeed, I have heard an eminent statesman gravely rebuke the practice of maintaining large Reserve Funds. The maintenance of apparently large Reserve Funds is, however, absolutely vital. So far from existing Reserve Funds being too large, when, in 1902, the Government inquired into the subject, it found that, taking the three leading cable companies, the reserve of one was 'about the right amount,' that of the next was 'considerably below what it should be,' while that of the third and leading com-

pany was 'barely half what it should be.'* What, then, is the use and necessity of Reserve Funds?

Reserve Funds have three grounds of existence: The constant repairs in cables must be defrayed out of them. Next, after a certain number of years of life, a cable becomes unworkable, and, repairs being no longer available, must be renewed out of the Reserve Fund. Thirdly, modern trade and strategy cry out for alternative routes of cables between points of importance. But alternative routes of cables create no fresh traffic between the points thus additionally connected. Hence, the new cables should be charged not to capital, but to reserve.

But a practical illustration is better than abstract statement. Let me construct from experience the finance of a cable system.

Certain cables were laid. Their length was 5,800 miles. The cables cost £1,154,000. The cost of the five stations on the route was £126,000. The total cost of laying was thus £1,280,000, or an average of £220 per mile.

No sooner was this done than it was found essential to duplicate this route. The new cables cost, like the first, £1,154,000. By a fortunate and unusual economy it was found possible to use all the existing stations of the first cable. They had to be enlarged and refitted at a cost of £32,000. Thus the total cost of the second cable was £1,186,000. The grand total for the two cables was thus nearly £2,500,000.

The annual outlay on the working of these two cables was as follows: Cost of working the five stations was, for the one cable, £33,700; add £8,000 for working the second cable. Total working cost £41,000. But to maintain a cable in good repair, experience directs to lay aside annually in reserve $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the original cost of the cable. This, for two cables, comes to an annual allocation to reserve of £57,680.

* Answer 3170 of Representative of Treasury before Cable Committee of 1902.

Next, the cables will probably perish altogether in thirty years. Hence the need to carry to reserve another $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. annually, calculated to replace the capital in thirty years. This means a further allocation to reserve of £52,550 annually. Total allocation to reserve £110,200.

Lastly, on a capital outlay of £2,500,000 a return of interest is necessary; otherwise no one would engage in so serious an enterprise. 'We remain firmly convinced,' said the Cable Committee of 1902, 'that it is of paramount importance to the country so to direct its telegraphic policy that the great network of British-owned submarine cables which extends over the world shall continue to be remunerative to those whose enterprise has created it.'* For the elementary fact is that otherwise business men would not lay new cables, but would take up and sell their existing ones. A fair figure for interest would be £150,000.

Thus we finally arrive at the conclusion that the two cables cost annually, and must earn accordingly: For working, £41,700; for reserve, £110,200; for interest, £150,000—total, £301,900; or, say, £300,000.

As regards the rate, let us assume, as the route is 5,800 miles long, a rate of 2s. per word. That means that to earn the above £300,000 a year there must be traffic over the cables to the extent of 3,000,000 words. This is an amount of words greater than the entire Australasian traffic with Great Britain, Europe, and America. Thus it is evident that if cable enterprise is to be conducted on anything approaching business principles, reductions of rate are not to be accomplished by a mere stroke of the pen, and are, in fact, largely dependent on the prosperity of the communities connected by cable.

The only safe and practical method to reduce rates systematically, apart from any question of Government assistance, is for arrangements to be made that, subject to earning a fair return on the capital outlay, or in this

* Second Report, paragraph 50.

case £300,000, the rates shall be reduced at stated periods. This method is already in satisfactory working order, as already shown in the case of South Africa, India, and Australasia. Under it great reductions of rate have been effected.

The Right Imperial Policy and the Wrong.

From this somewhat long and complex narrative the reader will now have been able to form his own opinion as to the real position of British cable enterprise in every region of the world. Without presuming to dictate to others, let me say that all the facts radiating and converging, as it were—whether from Canada, or the West Indies, or India, or Africa, or Australia, or the Far East—point to one and the same conclusion of the most vital import. That conclusion is that, whereas formerly British cable enterprise had to contend with few rivals, now it is actively assailed, and will undoubtedly be still more actively assailed in the future, by a host of able and ambitious competitors. That stern fact must dominate and direct our views as to what the policy of this country should be in this connection. I must state with the utmost deliberation and the utmost emphasis at my command, that if British cable enterprise is to be further competed with by its own Government, it will disappear from the oceans. If, while Germany and France use the funds of the State to subsidize and support German and French cables, Great Britain similarly uses her national credit, as in the case of the Pacific cable, against her own people, then British enterprise, hopelessly overweighted by such an overwhelming combination, will roll up its cables and sell them for what they are worth.

Turning from that policy as being utterly disastrous, there is a second policy to be considered—namely, that the State should acquire the cables of the Empire by purchase. The committee of 1902, presided over by

Lord Balfour of Burleigh, after careful inquiry into that proposal, came to the conclusion that 'we are strongly opposed to the general purchase of cables by the State.'* The reasons for that opinion apparently were that private companies do business 'more efficiently' than Governments (paragraph 98); and also that in the innumerable dealings with foreign nations, private British citizens being relatively unhampered by negotiations other than those of their own business, and being of necessity experts, are decidedly more effective than ambassadors and plenipotentiaries. Thus a purchase of the cables by the State would result inevitably in a deterioration in the cable service and in a diminution of the international influence of Britain.

There is a third policy to be mentioned, and this is the right one. Clearly, though the State should not itself compete with, or embark upon, cable enterprise, yet, on the other hand, that service is of such extreme importance to the Empire that the State cannot stand aloof from its supervision. On the contrary, it has two instruments in its hand capable, if moderately employed, of controlling the cable companies with complete effect. When it grants landing rights, or when it grants a subsidy or guarantee of revenue, the State has a right to stipulate, among other regulations:

(*a*) That the cable shall be of an agreed efficiency as regards specification, construction, and power of transmitting words.

(*b*) That the landing-places in British dominions shall be approved by authorities specified, and shall, where thought necessary, terminate within the circle of the local defences.

(*c*) That the staff shall be controlled by competent British subjects.

(*d*) That the line shall be worked subject to the provisions and regulations of the International Telegraph Convention.

* Second Report, Summary, Section X.

(*e*) That the rates charged to the public, when sufficient for a proper return on the capital at stake, and the provision of a proper reserve fund, shall not exceed a specified maximum, and that Imperial and Colonial Government messages shall have priority, and be sent at half the ordinary rates.

(*f*) That in case of war, rebellion, or other emergency, the Government shall have power to take possession of and work the line on its own account for so long as it shall see fit, paying compensation.

(*g*) That the agreement shall not be assigned, or underlet, without the consent of the Treasury.

These powers, judiciously and temperately exercised by a committee of all the Government departments concerned—viz., the Treasury, Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, India Office, Colonial Office, Board of Trade, and Post Office—are ample to secure the interests of the public against the interests of any section of the community.

Conclusion.

Such, then, is the marvellous and world-wide system organized, in somewhat more than a generation, by private citizens of Britain. Viewed in its broadest light, their enterprise has been during modern times the prime agent in that adjustment of men's passions which is called diplomacy, and in that equilibrium between the works and wants of man which is called trade. So much the world owes them. But if the nation asks what they have done for her, they can say that, annihilating time and space on behalf of her, they have given unity to the disunion of her unfettered peoples, and substance to her dream of an Imperial commonwealth; and that, identifying our own good with the good of others, they have served all nations for the sake of their own.

IMPERIAL POSTAL SERVICES

By J. HENNIKER HEATON, M.P.

Prefatory.

It may be well to explain that no attempt is here made to give a complete and connected history of our inland and foreign mail services. But a selection has been made of the leading facts on the subject, especially such as relate to communication with Britons beyond the seas, and accordingly possess some interest for students of Imperial questions.

The germ of the modern post may be traced back to the earliest times. Hezekiah sent round his royal letters by the 'posts.' The late Max Müller lectured on correspondence of Egyptian Kings with Asia, scratched on tablets, 3,400 years ago, and doubtless enjoyed it more than the brightest pages of Lady Mary or Horace Walpole. The Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans all had horses or footrunners stationed at regular distances for conveying messages. The distance was ascertained by King Cyrus in this practical way. He despatched a mounted messenger, who rode as far as his horse could run without baiting, and at that point a 'post' with a relay was placed. Thus, provided the beasts were not defrauded of their corn, a rough timetable could be kept. Cæsar had a service of footrunners in Gaul, and two of his letters reached Rome in twenty-eight days. Charlemagne also established a post.

But in all countries, including our own, the ancient

post was an organization for conveying the royal missives only; the private letter-writer was not thought of, perhaps because he hardly existed. Learned individuals, however, continued to exchange notes by uncertain means, and finally the University of Paris, perhaps as early as the eleventh century, established a post for carrying the students' letters to their families—doubtless narrating wonderful progress in study, with postscripts requesting cakes and pocket-money, like students' 'letters home' in more recent times. The service was a popular one, as the messengers were exempt from wine duty; but whether this exemption tended to foster speed and safe transmission is more than questionable.

As other Universities imitated Paris in the matter, Oxford, no doubt, maintained a special messenger service in very remote times. Otherwise the postal service in England was for centuries still very much what it was when the last Roman Legion crossed over to Calais — an establishment of royal couriers, forerunners of the modern 'King's Messengers.' So far back as 1250, as we find from the Royal Wardrobe Accounts, these couriers were paid. They must have worn the royal livery of scarlet, and have been familiar figures on the roads of the time. In 1481 Edward IV. was kept advised of events in Scotland by relays of horsemen, each of whom rode a stage of twenty miles.

But postal revenue came in those days from the Crown, not the people; and the Crown sometimes forgot to pay. In August, 1533, Thomas Cromwell wrote sharply to Sir Brian Tuke, 'Magister Nunciorum, Cursorum, sive Postarum,' complaining of 'great default in conveyance of letters,' and signifying the King's pleasure 'that posts be better appointed.' Sir Brian replied with a few eloquent facts:

'The King's Grace hath no moo ordinary posts, ne of many days hathe had, but between London and Calais. . . . For, Sir, ye knowe well, that, except the hackney horses between Gravesend and Dovour, there is no such usual conveyance in post for men in this

realme as in the accustomed places of France and other partes, ne men can keep horses in readiness without some way to bere the charges . . . the constables many times be faine to take horses out of plowes and cartes, wherein can be no extreme diligence,' etc.

Sir Brian's riders were ordered to accept and carry letters for private persons. But near the beginning of Henry's reign the Flemings, probably for good reasons, established their own post to the Continent, and appointed their own postmaster. We may be sure that this undertaking was managed on 'business principles,' and that its usefulness must speedily have become apparent to Englishmen. But even the Dover road was so bad that King Charles I. and his Consort were four days travelling from the coast to London. (The first stage-coaches, which appeared early in the seventeenth century, could only accomplish two or three miles an hour.) In 1603 the King's messengers paid 2½d. per mile for a horse, 'besides the guide's groats.'

Down to 1633 there was but one mail a week between London and Brussels, and this took from four to five days. Subsequently two mails a week were arranged, and the transit was effected in two days. In 1635 the first British public post was established by Charles I. No journey was to exceed three days, and the postage was 6d. per letter. The roads were left *in statu quo*, and even in 1732 the mails travelled but sixty miles in twenty-four hours. In 1637 a proclamation forbade all persons other than those employed by the Postmaster-General, to carry letters, unless to places not served by the King's posts, and with the exceptions of common carriers, messengers, or those carrying letters for friends. By 1644 a weekly service was maintained to all parts of England. At each post the time of the courier's arrival was marked on the letter, so that he could not loiter too long at wayside alehouses.

Witherings (whose name I may be allowed to recall with veneration as that of our first postal reformer) was Postmaster-General in 1635. Before his day a letter

took one month to reach Edinburgh. He accomplished the feat in three days, for a postage of 8d. The post then yielded £5,000 a year. Under the Commonwealth it was farmed to contractors. The second postal reformer, John Hill, of York, placed relays of horses from that city to London, and began to carry letters at half rates. He aimed at establishing a penny post for England, with a 2d. rate to Scotland, and a 4d. one to Ireland. But the farmers complained, and his men were 'trampled down' and hunted off the road by the soldiery of Cromwell. Hill published a spirited protest, a copy of which may be seen at the British Museum.

In 1683 the Merry Monarch had to provide for his brother James, and generously settled the Post-Office on him (having, indeed, very little else to settle). We can understand the illiberal way in which reformers were now treated. One instance will suffice. Two men, Dockwra and Murray, set up a London Penny Post, which ultimately was left in the hands of Dockwra alone. He carried, registered and insured, both letters and parcels weighing less than 1 pound, for 1d. each. He had a chief office, seven sorting offices, and some 500 receiving houses and wall-boxes, with hourly collections, and ten deliveries daily. Just as he had elaborated his system he was pounced upon by the Duke of York, who stopped his proceedings, but continued the penny post for his own benefit.

Charles appointed a Postmaster-General for Scotland. It is curious that, down to 1715, the Scottish mails were carried by foot-runners. In 1711 the Secretary of State was empowered to order the opening of any letter. The rates were then 3d. per letter for eighty miles, 4d. for a greater distance, and 6d. to Edinburgh or Dublin. In 1720 cross-road posts were established by Ralph Allen.

In 1782 John Palmer, lessee of the Bath Theatre, proposed to send the mails by the stage-coaches instead of by postboys. So numerous were highway robberies that an official notice advised people to send banknotes in halves. 'The mails,' wrote Palmer, 'are generally

entrusted to some idle boy without character, mounted on a worn-out hack, and who, so far from being able to defend himself, or escape from a robber, is much more likely to be in league with him.' The boys rode about three and a half miles an hour, and carried immense quantities of unposted letters. Pitt utilized the coaches in 1784. In that year the postal revenue was £196,000, and in 1805 it had risen to £944,000. With the means of sure, regular transmission, correspondence rapidly developed. Above all, letters were safe. The guard's blunderbuss, so much laughed at nowadays, must have been a deadly weapon at close quarters; and when Jerry Cruncher stopped the Dover coach, he knew what would happen if he indulged in any suspicious movement.*

Coaches were also introduced into Scotland, but the tracks were so bad that the horses could only crawl at a snail's pace to their destinations.

In Ireland the roads were still worse; but in 1815 Bianconi introduced his stoutly-built mail-cars in that country, and Thackeray has portrayed himself (paying particular attention to a fair colleen), on one of these vehicles; which are still, I believe, running in some districts.

We come to the greatest name in postal history—Rowland Hill. This illustrious reformer was a born mathematician, with a genius for organization, energetic, indefatigable, and resourceful. He was 'ever a fighter,' and a good hater, as is shown by his remark that there was one thing might be said for the Revolution of 1848, namely, that it had removed M. Dubost, an opponent of postal reform.

In 1837 about 96,000,000 letters were exchanged by the 25,600,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom, or four per head, as against sixty-one per head in 1904. There were forty rates for inland letters. The charge rose from 2d. for eight miles to 4d. for fifteen, and then by irregular gradation to 1s. for 300 miles, and 1d.

* See the 'Tale of Two Cities.'

for each addition of 100. The average postage per letter was $6\frac{1}{4}$d. Extra postage had to be paid on letters crossing the sea, the Scottish border, and certain bridges, and even for delivery; while, if there were an enclosure of a piece of paper, however small, the rate was doubled. The addressees had to pay everything; and Rowland Hill relates how his mother dreaded the advent of a letter, not having always the shilling to pay for it. All sorts of tricks were resorted to in order to escape postage. Rowland, on a journey, would send newspapers marked in a preconcerted way to give news of his health and whereabouts. As all Peers and Members had the privilege of franking for themselves and friends, the upper classes were practically exempt from postage. The working-classes hardly corresponded at all, and the revenue came from the middle, or trading, class. Cobden reported that five-sixths of the letters from Manchester to London were smuggled, and the loss through franking was about £1,000,000 a year.

Rowland Hill proved that the cost of conveying a letter from London to Edinburgh did not exceed $\frac{1}{360}$d. He therefore, in 1837, proposed a uniform rate of a penny, which, to save the cost of collecting, should be prepaid by a stamped cover (or an adhesive stamp, as suggested by David Chalmers). As the Government would not move, he issued his famous pamphlet, setting forth his case, and the public instantly and warmly supported him. A Committee of the Commons was appointed to inquire into the subject. The postal officials were bitterly opposed to the plan, and Lord Lichfield, Postmaster-General, said that 'of all the wild and visionary schemes which he had ever heard or read of, it was the most extraordinary.' The officials gravely argued that the General Post-Office would not contain the number of letters that would be written, and that there were not enough coaches to carry them. In 1839, however, Lord John Russell announced that the reform would be brought forward. On January 10, 1840, Inland Penny Postage came into operation, and Harriet

Martineau neatly summed up the result thus: 'The poor can now write to one another as if they were all M.P.'s.'

From the first postal revenue increased 'by leaps and bounds.' The Post-Office was in 1649 farmed at £5,000; in 1663 at £21,000; in 1674 at £43,000; in 1685 at £65,000.

Rates.

We cannot forbear sympathizing with our forefathers as we recall some of the postage rates that vexed them.

1290. Letter-carrier brought Edward I. a despatch announcing the arrival of the Maid of Norway. For this pleasing intelligence the King had to pay 13s. 4d.

1631. Postage on a letter for 80 miles, 2d.; under 140 miles, 4d.; above that distance, in England, 6d.; to Scotland, 8d.

1677. Beyond 80 miles in England Wales, single letter, 3d., or 1s. an ounce.

1770. In England, 3d. if under 80 miles; 4d. if above 80 miles; 6d. to Edinburgh or Dublin.

In England, from 1797 to 1812, the following rates were charged:

Up to	15	miles,	single letter,	3d.; 1 ounce	1s. 0d.
,,	30	,,	,,	4d. ,,	1s. 4d.
,,	60	,,	,,	5d. ,,	1s. 8d.
,,	100	,,	,,	6d. ,,	2s. 0d.
,,	150	,,	,,	7d. ,,	2s. 4d.
Over	150	,,	,,	8d. ,,	2s. 8d.
Add for	Scotland		,,	1d. ,,	4d.

In 1695 postage from London to York or Plymouth was 3d.; but in 1813, 11d.

In 1812, at the crisis of the Napoleonic struggle, there were increased charges for postage, which were augmented a few years later, and continued in force till 1839. Thus:

Up to 15 miles, 4d.	Up to 120 miles, 9d.
„ 20 „ 5d.	„ 170 „ 10d.
„ 30 „ 6d.	„ 230 „ 11d.
„ 50 „ 7d.	„ 300 „ 12d.
„ 80 „ 8d.	

And every additional 100 miles, 1d. One halfpenny extra on each letter entering Scotland or crossing the Menai Bridge. London to Edinburgh, 1s. 1½d., or for 1 ounce four single letter rates were charged.

1839. A uniform rate of 4d. per letter.

1840. Inland Penny Postage: 1d. per ½ ounce.

1897. Up to 4 ounces 1d.; ½d. for each addition of 2 ounces.

Speed (Inland).

Then in regard to the speed with which letters were carried:

1566. From Croydon to Croxton, 63 miles, took nearly 40 hours.

1635. Edinburgh to London and back, 6 days.

1678. Edinburgh to Glasgow, 44 miles, took 6 days.

1689. News of King's abdication reached the Orkneys in 3 months.

1696. Exeter to Bristol, 65 miles, took 24 hours.

1750. Edinburgh to Glasgow, 44 miles, took 36 hours.

1763. Edinburgh to London, a monthly service, taking a fortnight each way.

1776. The first London stage-coach reached Edinburgh in 60 hours.

1814. Thanks to macadamized roads, the coaches ran 10 miles an hour.

1836. London to Edinburgh, 42 hours.

1837. London to Liverpool and Manchester, 16½ hours.

Foreign and Colonial Mails.

The most wonderful spectacle revealed by the microscope is the circulation of the blood, say in the web of

a young frog's foot. Through the network of arteries and veins flow never-ending processions of corpuscles, swimming in a colourless stream, one following another, two little ones amicably progressing side by side, the big, long ones turning endways to pass the narrowest channels. If the Man in the Moon really existed, and had sufficiently powerful binoculars, he would witness a similar phenomenon on the earth's oceans. He would see long lines of great ships steaming on night and day from one port to another, then turning and steaming back again to the point of departure. We know that the circulation of the blood is an essential condition of animal life; if it were stopped, there would be an end of the frog. And so the Man in the Moon would probably conclude that he had before his eyes evidence of the working of a living organization on a vast scale. We know that if ever the great ships ceased to throb on, under sun and stars, it would mean the end of the mightiest Empire in the world's history.

'Where would your Empire be without an army?' says my gallant friend, General A. 'And navy,' modestly adds—sailors are always modest—my equally gallant friend, Admiral B. 'If you come to that,' cries C., the millionaire cotton-spinner (we will suppose this discussion to take place in a club smoking-room)—'if you come to that, where would your army and navy be without the trade that pays for 'em?' Now, if I were appealed to, I should inquire of C. where trade would be without postal and telegraphic communications. The old type, the one-man Empire, was like the famous chess automaton, which beat and puzzled the players of that noble game, until one day a little man was dragged out of the machine, and the imposture was discovered. So, when Alexander or Cromwell died, or Napoleon was defeated, their elaborate governmental arrangements fell to pieces. In the immediate neighbourhood of the great man, and so far as imperfect communications permitted him to act promptly, there was a sort of unity of administration. Outside of that

zone, justice varied according to the length of the local Governor's foot, and loyalty to the monarch, or a sense of citizenship, must have been of a shadowy character. Any interference with, or unnecessary restriction of, the means of communication, is foolish and dangerous. We all see this in the case of the colossal Slav Empire. But we do not so readily admit that we long blundered as seriously in maintaining heavy postal rates to the Colonies as we still blunder in levying high cable rates.

The Imperial ensign flies on some 561 ships of war (not one of obsolete type), manned by 129,000 brave and skilful sailors. We may add forty-six steam clippers, specially built for use in war-time as cruisers and transports, and meanwhile employed in our colonial and American traffic.

A passenger to Greenwich by one of the London County Council river steamers regards with awe the long lines of huge vessels that fringe the city's stately wharves. He feels a strange, sudden thrill of fellowship with unseen, swarthy millions, a sense of vast, responsible power, a consciousness of dignity, such as he could never gather from cold statistics. If he travelled round the globe he would witness a similar display of maritime activity in a score of spacious British ports; while on the voyage he would constantly see, by day the ensign, and at night the lights, of some passing British steamship. The aggregate of the mercantile marine protected by the navy is nearly 15,000,000 tons.

If we would understand the need of unrestricted Imperial communications, we find it vividly displayed in the returns of exports and imports. Here are some annual totals:

		£
1854	... ...	268,210,145
1884	... ...	685,986,152
1903	... ...	902,973,961
1905	(approximate)	1,000,000,000

The British Empire embraces 11,400,000 square miles, inhabited by 410,000,000 human beings, and divided into sixty colonies and dependencies, beside many protectorates.

These figures are symbols of a nebulous immensity, which must bewilder even a poet's imagination. We have conventional ideas, as we have conventional phrases; the untravelled man speaks of a sunrise on the Alps, or the roar of Niagara, or a battle in Manchuria, with the faintest notion of the awful phenomena indicated by his words. And so, in speaking of the 'British Empire,' we are apt to be content with commonplaces and generalities, having but a bare glimpse of the complexity and diversity of the multitudinous interests and activities, qualities, and forces, involved in that expression.

As early as 1631 the 'Postmaster for Foreign Posts' was directed to open regular communication between London (and Edinburgh) and Ireland: each letter to cost for 80 miles, 2d.; up to 140 miles, 4d.; above that distance, in England, 6d.; in Scotland, 8d.; to Ireland, 9d. By 1635 this officer, the famous Witherings, had established a post to most of the Irish towns. In 1635 he proposed the employment of regularly sailing packet-boats for letters. He paid good wages. In 1639 one of the barque-owners received £10 a month for the Irish service. Those were quiet times at sea. But our continental quarrels under the later Stuarts made it necessary to arm the packets. The common packet-sailor was in 1688 paid up to 30s. a month, was free from impressment, and was allowed a share of prize-money. The armed boats ran from Dover, Harwich, and Falmouth — when the wind and the Dutch permitted.

At first the Postmasters-General built their own packets, expressly for speed. These early 'ocean greyhounds' were intended to show the enemy their heels; but, like our torpedo-boats, they shipped, according to an old report, 'soe much water that the men are con-

stantly wet all through.' A new type of fighting packet was approved.

The instructions to captains of the new vessels were to run while they could, fight when they could no longer run, and throw the mails overboard when fighting would no longer avail. In 1693 such a ship was described as 'of eighty-five tons and fourteen guns, with a crew of twenty-one, and with powder, shot, and firearms, and all other munitions of war.' This was near the end of the seventeenth century. At the end of the eighteenth century, a mail-packet on the Falmouth station, reckoned fit to proceed to any part of the world, was of about 179 tons burthen, with a crew all told of twenty-eight persons, and six four-pounder guns. The victualling was at the rate of 10d. per man daily, and the annual charge for the packet was £2,112 6s. 8d.

To-day a mail-packet is of perhaps 10,000 tons, with a crew of 500 men, and covers some 400 miles in twenty-four hours. And turbine-steamships are expected to develop a speed of 1,000 miles in the same period. One has already crossed the Atlantic in less than four and a quarter days.

In 1654 packets were appointed to ply weekly between Dublin and Chester (the postage being 6d.), and between Milford and Waterford; but these services were soon withdrawn, and not re-established till 150 years later. In 1662 the line of packets between Port Patrick and Donaghadee was established.

In 1690 there were eleven packet-boats—namely, two to France (not running, owing to the war), two to Flanders, two to Holland, two for the Downs, and three to Ireland. At that time Sir Robert Cotton and Sir Thomas Frankland were joint Postmasters-General; the former (according to the late Mr. F. J. Scudamore) controlling inland, and the latter packet business. The following observation in one of their official letters gives proof of their sagacity:

'We have indeed found by experience that where we

have made the correspondence more easy and cheape, the number of letters have been thereby much increased.'

Unfortunately, the true bearing of these words was not perceived till a century and a half had elapsed.

The old letter-books contain several such articles as this: 'Your business cannot be settled until Sir T. Frankland, who hath a fitte of the gout, shall be somewhat recovered.' But when recovered, Sir Thomas was ready to hear everybody, and do what was right for them. Thus, James Vickers petitioned for compensation. As his packet, the *Grace Dogger*, lay off Dublin Bay, she was seized by a French privateer, the crew of which stripped the packet of everything, 'leaving not so much as a spoon, or a naile hooke to hang anything on,' and exacted fifty guineas for releasing the dismantled craft. *Granted.*

Anne, widow of John Paghall, master of the *Barbabella* packet, seeks compensation for the loss of her husband, who died a prisoner in Dunkirk. *Granted.*

The Postmasters-General ordered that compensation for wounds received in their service should be awarded by scale. Amputation above the knee or elbow brought the sufferer, if he survived the rough surgery of those days, a pension of £8 a year; below the joint, a pension of 20 nobles. A man received £5 if he lost an eye, and £14 if he lost both eyes.

The packet-masters were allowed to carry passengers. At the close of the seventeenth century the fares from Harwich to Holland were raised from 12s. and 6s. for first and second class passengers to 20s. and 10s.; but it was ordered that 'recruits and indigent persons shall still have their passage free.' In May, 1695, a Harwich packet had a crew of twenty-one men, all told, and an agent; and the total for wages was £50 a month.

The strangest postal parcels were franked by packets even in war time. We find entries like the following:

'Fifteen couple of hounds for the King of the Romans.' (One can imagine the uproar raised by thirty

bell-mouthed dogs during a storm, and the efforts of master and mate to make themselves heard amid the canine outcry and the howling of the blast.)

'Two servant maids, going as laundresses to my Lord Ambassador Methuen.' (Doubtless a delightful voyage for all concerned, if only the sea was smooth, and we may be sure the gallant Mounseers, in response to the signal 'Women on board,' sheered off without firing, dipping their ensign.)

'Dr. Crichton, carrying with him a cow, and other necessaries.' (Perhaps Dr. Crichton was on the way to some distant spot where milk, cream, butter, and cheese were as yet unknown.) It may be remembered that Jos Sedley complained: 'Our cream is very bad in Bengal. We generally use goat's milk' ('Vanity Fair').

Here is an official letter: 'Wee are concerned to find the letters brought by your boat (from the West Indies) to be so consumed by the ratts, that we cannot find out to whom they belong.'

And another runs: 'The woman, whose complaint we herewith send you, having given us much trouble upon the same, we desire you will enquire into the same, and see justice done her, believing she may have had her brandy stole from her by the sailors.'

The packets were constantly stopped by our own war vessels, and at last each vessel carrying mails displayed a 'postboy-jack'—a Union Jack with the additional design of a postboy blowing his horn—so as to be saved from its friends.

On December 1, 1793, the *Antelope* packet, with twenty men and some passengers, was pursued, caught, and grappled by the *Atlanta*, a French privateer with eight guns and sixty-five men. The Frenchmen, after a sanguinary contest, were compelled to yield.

Another French privateer, in 1807, chased and grappled the *Windsor Castle* packet off Barbadoes, and suffered the same fate as the *Atlanta*.

Between April, 1793, and January, 1798, no less than

nineteen packets, all belonging to Falmouth, had been captured by the enemy.

A mail-packet, from the earliest little sloop down to the stately 'liner,' has always been an object of exceptional interest at sea. Her freight is the thought, the hopes and fears, schemes and wishes, love and tenderness of countless thousands; and for this delicate commerce other thousands, far away on lonely islands, in remote settlements, in great cities by the ocean's verge, are waiting—waiting. One can imagine the intense watch kept on the horizon in olden times, at such stations as Bombay, New York, or Sydney, for the packet from home, and what rapture attended a first glimpse of a white-winged messenger, hailed like the weary dove that descended, leaf in mouth, from the blue, to cheer the prisoners in the ark!

For some time before 1788 the packets belonged either to the Crown or to members of the Post-Office Staff and their friends. The service was (from 1635 to 1837) controlled by the Post-Office; in the latter year it was placed under the control of the Admiralty, and in 1860 the Post-Office resumed control. The first commercial contract for the conveyance of mails was entered into by the Postmaster-General in 1833, with the Mona Isle Steamer Company, which agreed to run steamers twice a week between Liverpool and Douglas.

In 1788 the Commissioners of Fees and Gratuities recommended that the packets should be provided by open tender.

In 1799 the Ship-Letter Act was passed, by which letters were to be conveyed at half packet rates.

In 1835, thanks to Lieutenant Waghorn, letters were, for the first time, sent by the overland route across the Isthmus of Suez to India and Australia. And we all remember how, thanks to M. de Lesseps, our mail-packets were at last enabled to steam right through the Isthmus from the Mediterranean into the Red Sea.

Some of the old charges make one wince to this day. Sir Walter Scott absently opened a bulky letter from

New York, and found it contained a play by a young lady, who requested him to add a prologue, etc., and make arrangements for production. He had to pay nearly £5 for postage. A week later he (again absently) opened a similar package, and found a duplicate copy of the drama, sent in case the first should miscarry. He had to pay a second time. Dr. Johnson was more wary. He received a packet from Lisbon, on which he was invited to pay about £10, but he flatly refused to part with the money.

1797. Postage from Great Britain to:

Portugal, single letter, 1s.; 1 ounce, 4s.
British America, single letter, 1s.; 1 ounce, 4s.
Gibraltar, single letter, 1s. 9d.; 1 ounce, 7s.
Malta, single letter, 2s. 1d.; 1 ounce, 8s. 4d.

In 1825 the postage on a letter was to:

	d.		d.
France	2	Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia	1
Holland	4		
Italy	11		
Spain	2		

The inland rate was also payable on such letters if posted in the provinces.

	s.	d.		s.	d.
Portugal ...	2	6	America	2	2
Gibraltar ...	2	10	Jamaica and Leeward Islands ...	2	2
Malta and Corfu	3	2	Mexico	3	0
Madeira ...	2	7	La Guayra ...	3	0
Brazil ...	3	6			
Buenos Ayres	3	6			

	s.	d.
1837. To France ...	0	10
„ „ North Germany	1	8
„ „ South America	3	6

In 1837 reductions were made in foreign postage; how far required may be judged from the fact that it was notified that letter postage to the Mediterranean would be 'at the rate of only ten shillings per ounce.'

		s.	d.
1853.	Letter to India, over 1 ounce	7	9
,,	,, ,, France, ½ ounce	1	3
,,	,, ,, San Francisco	1	2

		d.
1889.	To Australia .	6
,,	,, India	5
,,	,, Canada .	2½
,,	,, South Africa	4

1890. Uniform Colonial and Indian postage 2½d. per ½ ounce.

1898. Imperial penny postage established.

Here are a few comparative rates:

		1829.		1884.	1899.
		s.	d.	d.	d.
Letter to	France ...	2	1	2½	2½
,,	,, Italy ...	2	10	2½	2½
,,	,, Spain ...	3	1	2½	2½
,,	,, Sweden ...	2	7	2½	2½
,,	,, Portugal ...	2	9	2½	2½
,,	,, Gibraltar ...	3	1	2½	1
,,	,, Malta ...	3	5	2½	1
,,	,, United States	2	5	2½	2½
,,	,, Brazil ...	3	9	4	2½

The farther an Englishman is from home, the keener his interest in mailing matters. It follows that this interest is very noticeable in Australia, the part of the Empire most distant from the Motherland. Old colonists remember how in 1846 their latest news from England was five months old! On January 15, 1849, they had not received the mails despatched from London

on September 1, 1848. At this date the Lords of the Admiralty advertised for tenders to convey the mails viâ Singapore and Torres Straits. Storms and calms, aye, and lurking reefs, had to be reckoned with in those days of sails and spars. But on July 23, 1852, the smoke of the P. and O. steamer *Chusan*, the first steamship from England, was sighted in Melbourne, and on August 3 in Sydney. Since then the marine engineer has been continually improving the service, and now the mails are delivered in from twenty-eight to thirty days after leaving St. Martin's-le-Grand. A few days are saved by sending the bags overland between Calais and Brindisi, or Naples; but the French and Italian Governments exact an enormous toll for this privilege. (It is to be hoped that the happy effects of the *entente cordiale* will speedily extend to postal as well as diplomatic conventions.) At first the authorities thought a monthly service sufficient to meet all requirements, but the mercantile element was no doubt restive, and a fortnightly despatch was organized. Now the mails are sent off weekly, and I trust there will be soon a bi-weekly service.

It is interesting, in view of this wonderful 'shrinkage' of time and distance, to read the well-known letter of Charles Lamb to a friend at Sydney—a letter brimming over with humour, yet vividly reflecting the pathetic sense of separation then experienced.

'It is a sort of presumption to expect that one's thoughts should live so far.

'It is like writing for posterity.

'What security can I have that what I now send you for truth shall not, before you get it, unaccountably turn into a lie? I am going to the play this evening. You naturally lick your lips and envy me my felicity. Think but a moment . . . it is 1823.

'When I revert to the space that is between us, a length of passage enough to render obsolete the phrases of our English letters before they can reach you.'—'Distant Correspondents (1822).'

In 1756 the English packets were due in Dublin

thrice a week. So late as 1829, and perhaps later, voyages to the undermentioned places and home again —'For ever running an enchanted round'—were estimated to take—

Jamaica	112 days.	Brazil	140 days.
America	105 „	Lisbon	28 „
Leeward Islands	91 „	Australia... ...	120 „
Malta	98 „	Buenos Ayres...	154 „

Here are a few records and comparisons of the time taken by mail steamers:

1819.	New York to United Kingdom (*Savannah*)...	25 d.
1860.	United Kingdom to New York (*Great Eastern*)	10½ d.
1890.	Dover to Calais	1 h.
	Holyhead to Kingstown	3½ h.
	To Capetown...	16 d.
	To Australia	27 d.
1894.	Queenstown to New York (*Lucania*)	5 d. 7 h.
1894.	Charing Cross to Bombay	13 d.
	Euston to Dublin	9 h. 29 m.
1905.	Turbine steamship crossed the Atlantic	4¼ d.

It may surprise some readers to be reminded that in 1889 for the first time letters from New York were delivered in London within a week of despatch.

As early as 1816 two steamships, about 65 feet long, and of 20 h.p., were constructed for the Dublin-Holyhead line. In 1818 the *Rising Sun*, a steamship built by Lord Cochrane, crossed the Atlantic. In 1819 the *Savannah* steamship reached this country from New York in twenty-five days. It was in 1821 that the Post-Office first arranged for the conveyance of the mails by steamship. As with sailing packets, the first steam-packets were built by the Government, six

(averaging about 100 tons) being stationed at Holyhead, and others at Dover and other ports. These little ships were valued at from £1,600 to £2,400 each.

In 1822 for the first time the mail was conveyed from Dover to Calais by steamship.

In 1825 Captain Johnson obtained £10,000 for making the first voyage to India by steam in the *Enterprise.*

In 1833 the *Royal William* was said to have crossed the Atlantic in twenty-one days.

In 1838 the *Sirius* left Queenstown April 4, and reached New York April 21.

The Royal Navy, as already stated, includes 561 armed vessels, manned by 129,000 trained sailors. Besides these there is available, in case of war, an auxiliary force of forty-six merchant cruisers, all ocean-going ships of high speed. The value of such a reserve is apparent enough; but it is not quite so clear why the Post-Office should be called on to find the subventions very properly paid to the owners for maintaining a Naval Reserve. These subventions are very large. In 1889-1890 they amounted to £665,375; last year the total was £805,322. The packets run in every direction—northwards to the Scottish Isles, eastwards to Holland and Germany, southwards to France, Portugal, and the Mediterranean. The Cunard, White Star, and American lines communicate with the United States and Canada; and other great lines with the British African Colonies, while the Peninsular and Oriental and Orient companies perform the service to India, the East, and Australia. Finally, there is the service between Canada, Japan, and Hong Kong.

1763. There were four packets at Harwich, six at Dover, and five to New York, the total cost being £10,000 per annum.

1788. Commissioners of Fees and Gratuities reported that in the preceding seventeen years the cost of the packets had been £1,038,133, or about £61,000 a year; that many of the vessels belonged to officers of the

Post-Office; and that the service should be provided by competitive tender.

	£		£
1797 (War time)	78,439	1824	116,062
1810	105,000	1826	144,592
1814	160,603	1827	159,250
1820 (Peace) ...	85,000	1829	108,305
1822	115,429		

1834. The General Steam Navigation Company had £17,000 a year for conveying mails between London and Rotterdam, and London and Hamburg.

1837. £29,000 a year paid for mails to Lisbon and Gibraltar.

1839. A fortnightly mail between Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston established by contract between the Postmaster-General and Samuel Cunard, of Halifax, at £60,000 a year.

1840. A contract made for mail steamers to Malta, Corfu, and Alexandria.

1845. Mediterranean mail contract extended to Suez, Bombay, Ceylon, Calcutta, Hong Kong, and Shanghai.

1850. The Cunard contract renewed at £173,340, and certain contingent allowances in addition; weekly, instead of fortnightly, trips being required, and the ports made Boston and New York alternately.

1853. Loss to revenue by packet service, £325,000.

1855. (War.) The packets numbered 110, and the cost was £800,000 a year.

1889-1890. £665,375.

1905. £720,000.

It goes without saying that shipping subsidies have no necessary relation to the quantity of a nation's mails. The fact that a particular State has little correspondence with other States or colonies oversea is the very reason why it should lavish more and more money in subsidies, so as to create trade. Bearing this in mind, the following figures are significant:

FOREIGN STEAMSHIP SUBSIDIES.

	£		£
Germany pays	417,525	Italy pays	320,000
France	,187,271	Sweden	20,591
Russia	364,756	Norway	28,252
Austria	318,988	Denmark	29,669
Hungary	80,755	Japan ...	745,607(!)

United States: Besides large payments for mails, £1,000,000 a year is proposed to encourage shipbuilding, and, after 1907, £1,600,000.

THE POSTAL UNION.

It was a Swiss, I believe, who was first struck with the absurdity of taxing letters at every frontier, like cigars or potato-spirit. How he reasoned I know not; but he must have perceived that correspondence benefits receivers at least as much as senders; that the post is the driving-wheel of trade; that nothing promotes international understandings like epistolary facilities; and that thought is essentially too subtle and inappreciable a thing to be weighed in scales. The result of his exertions was the establishment of the Postal Union in 1870. It was agreed, at a conference of postal representatives, that one primary charge should suffice to forward a letter, printed paper, or sample, throughout the territories of the States signing the convention, and that this charge should be 2½d. for a letter of ½ oz. in weight. The congress has reassembled at fixed intervals, and sanctioned various changes, but has hitherto steadily maintained this high letter-postage of 2½d. It was provided that any two States, contiguous, or communicating by water, might fix a lower rate between themselves by forming a 'Restricted Union'; and, accordingly, Canada and the United States began to exchange mails at their respective inland rates—1½d. for Canada, 1d. for the United States; and the Americans made a similar arrangement with Mexico, while, in Europe, Germany

and Austria also entered into one of these Unions. It might have been expected that our Government would eagerly embrace the opportunity of forming such a postal federation, embracing the whole Empire. But the authorities seemed to be still under the old delusion that the higher the rate the larger the revenue; and for many years we had to pay more than twice as much as foreigners paid on letters to some of our most important Colonies.

It is not for me to write a lengthy account of the movement for instituting a uniform penny rate for any distance, small or great, throughout the length and breadth of the British dominions. But there are times when a man *must* speak of his work, and Imperial Penny Postage is an essential part of my subject.

In 1886 the following was the state of affairs: The cost of posting a letter from France, Germany, or Russia to India was 2½d., while the charge from the United Kingdom to India was 5d. The Postmaster-General was supplied with a list of forty British Colonies to which the postage from France, Germany, or Russia was half the rate charged from England. We paid 4d. to South Africa and 6d. to Australia. One agent boasted that he saved £1,300 a year by posting in France British letters for the Colonies. At that moment certain foreign Powers were exhausting every device to oust us from the Colonial, African, and Asiatic markets.

Imperial Penny Postage.

In 1886 I moved a resolution in the House of Commons inviting the Government to open negotiations for universal or world-wide penny postage, and 142 members voted for it. The Liberal Government, influenced by the Post-Office, was hostile. But the press of all shades called next morning for penny postage within the British Empire at least. It was like one of those grand passages of Handel where choir, organ, and orchestra give out a phrase in unison, and wood, string, brass, and voices utter a single note. It

was proved that a letter could be carried to the Antipodes for 1d.—indeed, ¼d. would amply remunerate the shipowner. If a letter could be sent by rail from New York to San Francisco (3,000 miles) for 1d., why not from Liverpool to New York (3,000 miles) by sea for 1d.? The charge for conveying valuable goods half way round the world being £2 per ton, why should the Post-Office charge postage at the rate of £1,792 per ton? Why should it charge 1d. for conveying the *Times*, weighing 4 ounces, to Australia, and exact 4s. for a letter of the same weight, and sent in the same bag to Australia?

The explanation was that the Government was paying some £640,000 a year to the steamship companies in subsidies for building and maintaining vessels available as cruisers and transports in times of war; these payments being also intended to encourage British commerce, and to promote the shipbuilding and carrying trades. The ships, however, also served to carry the mailbags, and though these bags occupied but a small fraction of the space for freight, the whole subsidy was charged against the Post-Office. That wealthy and apathetic department thereupon protested that it could not reduce the postal rates.

Up to 1858 the subsidies were charged to the Admiralty. In that year the burden was transferred to the Post-Office, although it was notorious that the packets were not established primarily for postal purposes. Thus the West India packets were to cost £250,000 a year, though the postage was only expected to be £40,000 a year. There was a postal deficit (allowing for subsidies) of £200,000 for India alone.

I am old enough to be suffered to tell one of my favourite stories over again. An M.P., staying in Lincolnshire, saw an old woman come into the local post-office and ask the amount of postage to her son in Australia. On learning that it was sixpence, she said she had not so much, and was tottering away, almost in tears, when the M.P. paid the trifle required.

Three months afterwards (at Christmas time) the postmaster, smiling, informed him that the son had sent his mother £5 in response to her letter, and arranged to pay her passage out to him.

There had long been a steady increase of correspondence with the Colonies, even under the old rates. In 1880 the *Britannia* took a week's mails, 700 bags, to India and Australia. In 1890, 1,200 bags were put on board. In 1880 the weekly average for India was 250 bags; in 1890, 400. In those ten years the Australian receipts showed an increase of 50 per cent. The American service also showed a great increase, and a profit of £100,000 per annum.

Finally, it was shown that as each country pays for the carriage of its outgoing mails, and delivers free the incoming mails; and as we sent far more than we received, our Post-Office was benefiting to the extent of £228,000 a year. As an *argumentum ad hominem*, I at last offered, in conjunction with two wealthy friends, to give the Chancellor of the Exchequer a bank guarantee against loss. He was virtuous enough to refuse.

Our strongest argument, however, though it could hardly be stated in pounds, shillings, and pence, was the sun-browned emigrant, with his dependents here and across the ocean. Long before the Imperial sentiment became fashionable, it was remarkable how a chance allusion to this unseen pioneer of Empire would stir the imagination, the sympathy of an English audience. Hard-headed reactionaries in the House, who yawned at the idea of encouraging Imperial communications, or fostering British trade, would sit spellbound as we pictured our sturdy cousins, hewing tracks in the tropical forest, bridging torrents, draining swamps, planting, building, rearing stock—sheep, cattle, horses—and, above all, that indomitable Anglo-Saxon stock which seems fated to transform the globe. It is calculated that about seventeen million examples of our choicest manhood and womanhood have left these

shores during the past twenty years, never to return. And the dullest, the coldest, could not fail to perceive the wisdom of stimulating and facilitating the only possible intercourse between these exiles and their friends and relatives in the Old Country. The emigrant was, as he always is, silent; but his exalted virtues (to quote a Japanese expression) conquered. The Post-Office gave way.

The Post-Office yielded by degrees, penny by penny, like the miserly outfitter on the Dover road, who purchased David Copperfield's coat, and could not bring himself to pay the price, eighteenpence, by instalments, in less than half a day. First they grudgingly granted us an ocean, or all-sea, service to the Colonies, but made the postage 4d. In 1890 they established a general 2½d. rate to the Colonies; and in 1898, under the stimulus administered by Mr. Chamberlain, they gave us the long-delayed penny rate, to which Australia signified her adhesion in the present year.

The Empire has thus become a single postal 'district, with one flag and a uniform rate of postage, communication between the most distant points being rendered as 'easy as speech, as free as air.' The Colonists, especially the Australians, have from the first warmly supported the agitation. The assurance given on their behalf in 1890, 'Let the parent duck take to the water, and the timid ducklings will quickly follow her,' has been amply fulfilled. As is well known, our cousins in Greater Britain spend £8 a head on our goods as against 10s. spent by the foreigner. Fifteen years ago, addressing the late Lord Salisbury, I ventured to say: 'Business men will appreciate the boon of being able to write to customers and agents at two-fifths of the rate which their foreign competitors have to pay. To Colonial trade, in my judgment, we must ultimately look for the subsistence of our home-working population, for every foreign market is being closed against us in turn by hostile tariffs.' How real and near the danger here indicated was at that moment the most

fanatical Free Traders are now forced to perceive. Thanks, again, to Mr. Chamberlain, the danger is already provided against.

One must not forget that the immense floating British population—say, 200,000 passengers, 200,000 merchantmen sailors, and 150,000 blue-jackets, more than half a million in all—participates. Every British ship, liner, tramp, and coaster, every one of the grim, frowning, fascinating turreted monsters, so inspiring to a Briton, so terrible to the foes of our country, is a British post-office.

It is interesting to take an occasional postal census, as casting a lateral illumination on the growth of commerce and the consolidation of Empire.

In 1897 the Christmas and New Year's mails sent to Australasia, the East, Canada, and the United States, numbered 10,890 ; in 1898, 11,994.

The following table, showing the mails before and after the grant of Imperial Penny Postage, is ample reward for long years of toil. One can almost hear the delighted laughter and see the radiant faces of those who received all this mass of correspondence ; and one cannot forget the vast amount of honest work it represents for our toiling craftsmen.

ESTIMATE OF THE WEIGHT OF LETTERS, POSTCARDS, AND OTHER ARTICLES EXCHANGED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH THE COLONIES.

Despatched from United Kingdom to British Colonies.

Year.	Letters, Post-cards, and other Articles.	Circulars, Book Packets, Patterns, Newspapers.	Total.
	lb.	lb.	lb
1897-1898 ...	431,800	7,006,900	7,438,700
1903-1904 ...	989,000	11,510,000	12,499,000

Received by United Kingdom from the British Colonies.

Year.	Letters, Post-cards, and other Articles.	Circulars, Book Packets, Patterns, Newspapers.	Total.
	lb.	lb.	lb.
1897-1898	373,700	1,637,000	2,010,700
1903-1904	792,000	2,488,000	3,280,000

Number of Parcels Interchanged by the United Kingdom with the British Colonies.

Year.	From United Kingdom.	From Colonies.	Total.
1897-1898	472,613	206,985	679,598
1903-1904	1,177,981	357,835	1,535,816

What will be the future of our Imperial communications? This question must be answered by master-spirits like Edison and Marconi, who are learning to subdue and tame the mightiest, subtlest, and most abundant of natural forces—electricity. So swift flies the telegraphic message that, at first, the written letter seems fated to disappear. My friend, Mr. Leggo, showed me apparatus by which it is possible to send telegrams at the rate of 2,000 words an hour. The message is written on a paper, which is then attached to a kind of cylinder, and the marked surface is exactly reproduced at the other end of the wire. One is, I say, inclined to bid farewell to the pen, which has served our race so long and so well. But a letter has the inestimable advantage of secrecy. Soul communes with soul. Two minds, as far asunder as the poles, can, by the help of a spot of wax or a smear of gum, enjoy a private interview. And a little reflection will show how much

commercial and social business depends on the secrecy of communications. Moreover, the present fancy price put on the electric spark is prohibitive to all but a small fraction of the community.

But the latest invention promises to combine the rapidity of the telegram with the privacy of the letter. A talented Italian engineer is erecting apparatus for propelling a box containing letters in a few minutes from Rome to Naples. He promises to send letters from London to Manchester in five minutes, and to Paris in twenty minutes. At the same rate he will doubtless forward them to New York in less than four hours, and to India during the day. This invention, if successful, promises to be the climax of postal improvement, and will be hailed as a blessing by all but the monopolists who still charge 3s. a word for a cablegram to Australia.

Personally, I am convinced that the solution of the great problem we have considered—how to enable the minds of men to commune together at will while their bodies are separated by vast oceans—is merely a question of time. The day, I believe, is not far distant, though I may not live to see it, when the peasant in Kent, or Surrey, or Kerry will enjoy as a birthright, a precious privilege, electrical communication, at a trifling cost, with his brother peasant in Canada and Australia. Until that day arrives we must be content to speed our splendid mail-packets East, West, and South, and to remember that the many millions still ruthlessly sentenced to mental separation by avaricious capitalists are, none the less, faithful sons of the Empire, true to the old flag, and fondly attached to the old Fatherland.

If I am accused of grumbling over the magnificent results achieved, let me point to the general feeling that still more magnificent achievements are possible, and are, indeed, long overdue. Let me quote the first speech made in London by the distinguished statesman who has recently been appointed American Ambassador

in this country. He said: 'Give us more intimate and constant personal correspondence, and—may I add, without indiscretion—give us facilities for the transmission of our correspondence somewhat less archaic than the two countries now provide (laughter and cheers)—more nearly up to the demands of the wide-awake, active, twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon of either hemisphere.'

In conclusion, and bearing in mind Mr. Whitelaw Reid's eloquent appeal, I would repeat the words of my motion made in the House of Commons, just twenty years ago:

'That, in the opinion of this House, the time has arrived for the Government of this country to open negotiations with other Governments with a view to the establishment of a Universal International Penny Postage system.'

In other words: We have already Universal Halfpenny Postage for printed matter: let them give Universal Penny Postage for written matter.

THE MERCANTILE MARINE

By EVELYN CECIL, M.P.

From the days of Queen Elizabeth our commercial fleet has grown with wonderful regularity, and its growth has been commensurate with, or an indication of, the growth of the British Empire. It is not too much to say that the Empire and our commercial fleet stand or fall together. Dominion in former times depended upon conquest; now, fortunately, it rests more largely upon peaceful expansion and the reciprocity of commercial ties. Commerce cannot be divorced from merchant shipping, and whatever is beneficial to our merchant shipping is also beneficial to our commerce. Any benefit of this nature strengthens that important trade connection between ourselves and our Colonies which mutual regard, affection, and advantage have allied themselves to create.

The origin of our commercial fleet is to be traced, in a very considerable degree, to the period of the predominance in the sixteenth century, and for two hundred years afterwards, of the policy known in political economy as the mercantile system. It was a policy of encouraging shipbuilding, supporting fisheries, and promoting trading companies. The means used would not always commend themselves to modern schools of political economy. Elizabeth and Charles I. gave bounties for the construction of ships above a certain size. Fisheries were stimulated by giving bounties to some of the vessels employed in them, and upon the

taking and curing of various fish, as an incentive to seafaring life. The fleet that harassed the Armada in fact consisted of many merchant ships, fostered, perhaps, by such methods. The promotion of trading companies was steadily followed, but the grant of their charters was regarded with considerable jealousy by some of the merchants of the age. The Eastland Company was established in 1579, and traded with ports in the Baltic, possessing factories in Prussia. The Levant Company was started in 1581, and had factories in Smyrna. The famous East India Company was chartered in 1600, just at the close of the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Though at first it was attacked at home as the monopoly of a few which injured the trade of other merchants, and had to maintain a strenuous competition with the Dutch, it did not cease to direct Eastern affairs until it was able to hand over the sovereignty of India to the British Crown. The Hudson Bay Company dates from the grant of a charter by Charles II. in 1670 to Prince Rupert and seventeen other noblemen and gentlemen, securing to them 'the sole trade and commerce' of a vast undefined tract of land and sea round Hudson's Straits. Though it now only trades as a private corporation, it retained its original possessions till 1869, when they were sold for £300,000 to the British Government, and transferred in the following year to the Dominion of Canada. All these successful trading companies were an immense assistance towards the formation of a commercial fleet. Indirectly they did more, for they may be said to have been instrumental in setting up that line of communications—by ports or islands—which forms a basis of Imperial expansion. Without the distant goals of the trading companies, it is doubtful whether it would have ever been thought worth while to hold Gibraltar, Cape Town, Ceylon, or Hong Kong, or the eastern settlements of Canada, to mention only some of the points or coaling-stations so valuable to British traffic. Thus, the energy of the trading corporations has helped to teach a wider lesson.

A well-known feature of the era of the so-called mercantile system was the Navigation Acts, passed in 1651 and 1660 for the protection of British shipping and commerce as against foreign countries. They prohibited the importation of goods into England or any of its dependencies in other than English bottoms, except only in the ships of a foreign country of which the merchandise imported was the genuine growth or manufacture; and in the case of the English ships it was required that the master and three-fourths of the mariners should also be English. The intention of the Acts, to judge from the preamble, was to encourage, by the exclusion of foreign competitors, the ships, seamen, and commerce of Great Britain; and no departure from this policy took place until the middle of the nineteenth century. It was by no means an ideal policy, for it deliberately cramped the expansion of colonial trade to benefit the Mother Country. But it is admitted by Adam Smith that during the epoch of the mercantile system two foremost objects of English statesmanship were attained, namely, the supremacy of England on the seas, and the furtherance of English commerce, shipping, and manufactures.

The mercantile system or doctrine did not owe its rise to dogmatic theory or scientific speculation. It was rather the outcome of practical activities, influenced by the force of surrounding events and special exigencies. Cromwell was keenly alive to the rivalry of Holland, and Sully and Colbert practised a carefully considered limitation on the importation of foreign goods into France; while the advance of French manufacture was the talk of Europe. The diminution of the commercial fleets of the Italian republics, and the decadence of their trade, owing partly to the discovery of America and of a passage to the East Indies, and partly to internal troubles, had already given openings to other Powers. All these and other circumstances combined to inaugurate the Cromwellian policy of restrictive legislation against foreign ships, during which—whether

because or in spite of it—the commercial navy of Great Britain made such rapid strides.

The increase of the British merchant navy has indeed been remarkable, if it is judged by the standard of continuous growth. Its total tonnage at the time of the Armada in 1588 was 12,500 tons, exclusive of fishing-boats. In 1791, just before the wars occasioned by the French Revolution, it amounted to 1,511,400 tons, including the shipping of the colonies. Half a century later, in 1840, the merchant navy of the United Kingdom and the Colonies reached a total of 3,311,000 tons; in 1880 the total was 8,447,000 tons; in 1890, 9,688,000; in 1900, 10,751,000; and in 1903, 11,831,000. The progress is striking, and the growth is certainly continuous. The figures, so far as they are by themselves a test, give much cause for satisfaction, and are in any case an excellent barometer to indicate the power and importance of the Empire. They have risen with its rise; they have multiplied with its power and position; and they bear witness to valiant and indomitable effort in the past.

There is, however, some reason for not coming to a conclusion too hastily, or, at least, for not assuming that progress, because it has been very good during many years, will spontaneously continue so without great energy on the part of traders and careful attention by statesmen. Comparison with foreign merchant navies is instructive. It has just been mentioned that the merchant navy of the British Empire increased between 1880 and 1890 from 8,447,000 tons to 9,688,000 tons, which is 12·8 per cent. of the total British merchant tonnage in 1890; and between 1890 and 1902 (the last year for which all the comparative foreign figures are available) the growth was from 9,688,000 to 11,566,000 tons, or 16·2 per cent. What are the corresponding tonnages of the combined principal foreign merchant navies? Between 1880 and 1890 they rose from 8,312,000 tons to 8,497,000 tons, or 2·2 per cent., and from 1890 to 1902 from 8,497,000 tons to 11,136,000

tons, or 23·6 per cent.; so that while the British merchant tonnage rose 12·8 per cent. to 16·2 per cent. in the two periods, foreign merchant tonnage made the astonishing rise from 2·2 per cent. to 23·6 per cent. It may be argued that percentages are misleading, that the proportionate foreign rise is much more rapid, because the foreign tonnage starts from so low a figure, and that it was much easier to rise from one ton to two tons than from a million to two million. This is perfectly true so far as it goes; yet, even making all allowances, it does not account for everything. It is a most striking fact that, of all the tonnage entering our own British ports between 1892 and 1902, the foreign tonnage shows an absolute increase much greater than ours. The total of all the tonnage entering British ports in 1892 was 75,000,000, and in 1902 it was 99,000,000, or an increase of 24,000,000. Out of that increase, which has nothing to do with percentages, the British have only ten and a half millions of tons, and the foreigners thirteen and a half.

On the whole, it may be still said that British shipping creditably holds its own. There is no reason for sounding a note of serious alarm, but there is reason for a distinct note of warning. The British flag is a great heritage, and we have been the possessors of the most magnificent mercantile fleet in the world. We are now subject to keener competition than we have ever experienced, and a proportionate increase of effort is necessary if we are to maintain our supremacy. In regions where we were first in the field, where all our agencies were established, where there was ample shipping at our command, there has been striking expansion—but it has not always been British development that has been especially marked. It might have been expected that, with all these advantages of priority of settlement and management, we could have increased our trade and shipping more easily than those who were not on the spot. But to take the instance of Singapore, an important and typical colony, it has been stated by Sir Alex-

ander Swettenham, who was long connected with the government of the Straits Settlements, and has an intimate knowledge of trade and shipping questions, that certain foreigners, notably the Germans and Japanese, have improved their trade very much more rapidly and very much more efficiently than we have improved ours. He adds that these nations, who have had this large increase of trade, at the same time have granted to their merchant shipping a large accession of Government subsidy, and if the increase of trade is not largely due to the accession of subsidy, it seems only explicable by attributing 'want of go' to the British. A reminder of such examples does not seem to be out of place.

Shipbuilding in Great Britain is in a sound position for constructing any class of vessel at very moderate cost, but British shipowners must not rely too much upon present superiority, and must be continually seeking for newer and up-to-date methods, and unremittingly aim at adopting the most scientific principles in the conduct of their business. Practical labour-saving appliances, such as automatic and electric machines, are an immense gain in the long-run, although perhaps naturally they are not always at first acceptable to trades unions, who are sometimes apt to take a short-sighted view of economic development. Shipbuilding materials are duty-free in Germany, as in England, and no stone should be left unturned to keep pace with such honourable competitors as the Germans, or, indeed, such commercial maritime power as may be prophesied for the Japanese.

Turning now to the future, two main questions arise with regard to the steps required to maintain the efficiency of our commercial fleet as a link of Empire. In the first place, what can statesmen do for shipowners and traders? Secondly, what can they do for themselves?

In reply to the first question, statesmen can render material assistance, both by directly encouraging adequate

mail speed by present services, and also by exercising a watchful control of British oversea traffic in view of trade rivalry. The importance of adequate mail speed to Imperial communications cannot be exaggerated, and rapidity of transit largely depends upon the amount of the mail subsidy which is granted. What the precise rate of speed should be must necessarily vary according to circumstances. In some cases high speed is essential, and in general the speed should not be less than that of foreign mail-ships running on the same routes; but no limit should be placed upon the amount of subsidy where, in the opinion of the Government, the needs involved relate to Imperial communication; for the first object of a subsidy is political. Fast mail-steamers of any nation follow the lines of great commercial traffic, and promote trade, whether they are directly subsidized for that purpose or not. In these days of doctrinaire theory, and in order to appear to conform to it, the maxim is too often ignored that aid to postal communication and benefit to trading interests cannot be entirely dissociated. They are mutually auxiliary, and a subsidy to one of these objects is largely a subsidy to the other, however much it may be disguised or labelled as separate and exclusive. The fact is very relevant in considering the value of mail subsidies to merchant shipping, and at the same time shows that it would be foolish to cut down mail subsidies in obedience to a theory, merely on the ground that they gave indirect help to our merchant fleet. Nor can the use of merchant ships in time of war be overlooked. The United States very effectively commissioned the *St. Paul* and other vessels of the America Line during the Spanish-American War in 1898. If, however, the British Admiralty is satisfied that it can build thoroughly efficient ships more economically than it can subsidize the mercantile marine for Admiralty requirements, it seems likely that merchant ships may in future have little use in time of war except so far as they are employed to carry food-supplies. In

the latter capacity we depend on them much. In the words of the recent Royal Commission, though we look mainly for security to our navy, we rely only in a less degree upon the widespread resources of our mercantile fleet, and its power to carry on our trade and reach all possible sources of supply wherever they exist. A guarded scheme of national indemnity, which the Commission advocates against loss from capture by the enemy, is also within the sphere of statesmen to furnish. It would steady prices, moderate the cost of transport, and encourage the maintenance of trade and regularity of sailing in time of war.

Another aim which statesmen should endeavour to secure as far as possible is that British regulations as to seaworthiness, overloading, and the like, should be enforced against foreign ships equally with British ships. Otherwise it is plain that foreign ships in our ports will have an undue advantage. Many cases are on record of a British ship being sold to a foreign owner, and returning to this country loaded far more heavily and hazardously than would have been permitted had she started from a British port. As at present a foreign ship is seldom marked with any load-line, the overloading is by no means always easy to detect at sight. The result is a serious handicap to the British shipowner and to British trade in its Imperial aspect. Every available means, therefore, must be taken to bring the foreign ship under the same regulations. The question has recently engaged the attention of two Committees of the House of Commons, and recommendations have been made in favour of giving power to take more stringent action at British ports if negotiation with foreign nations fails. It is much to be desired for public safety that an international load-line should be agreed upon.

In other directions British shipowners complain that they are unfairly taxed or improperly restricted. They demur to paying light dues—that is, dues charged upon all merchant ships entering British ports in respect

of lighthouses, lightships, buoys, beacons, and fog-signals, and for removing dangerous wrecks, on the ground that these should be a public charge, like highways. It is stated that Great Britain and Turkey are the only countries which levy light dues, although possibly other countries raise dues of this kind under other forms. There are signs that the abolition of these dues will come, though hitherto every Chancellor of the Exchequer has consistently opposed it.

Perhaps the most deliberate method by which some countries put a restraint upon British shipping is what is called the reservation of coasting-trade. This is simply the reserving, by certain nations, of the trade between their own ports exclusively to their own ships. Nearly half the countries of the world have adopted this system, and the tendency appears to be growing, so that the area for British trading is being slowly but surely reduced. What makes matters more noticeable is the extended interpretation which the United States and Russia give to the term 'coasting trade.' They do not consider it only to mean steaming from one of their ports to another along the coast, but from one of their ports to another anywhere in the world. Thus, it is a coasting journey from New York to Boston, or from Odessa to Sebastopol; but it is also a coasting journey, prohibited to foreign ships, from San Francisco to Honolulu, or from Riga in the Baltic to Vladivostok in the east of Siberia. France adheres to the same doctrine in connection with French ports and Algeria. In another particular, peculiar to France, British ships are at a further disadvantage. This is the *surtaxe d'entrepôt*, which is a double duty charged on all goods sent to France from abroad and transhipped in a non-French port on their way. For instance, a large ship coming from Bombay, with 5,000 tons of cargo for London and 100 tons for Havre, could only tranship in London these 100 tons into a steamer plying to Havre by paying double French duty on every ton. Failing that, the large steamer must first call at

Havre and become liable to heavy port dues and charges, and then proceed to London. But this is only another example of the disposition among foreign nations to restrict operations to their own ships, of which the reservation of coasting trade is the chief illustration.

Is there any step which the British Empire might take to protect itself in such matters? It would be a useful subject for discussion at the next Colonial Conference. The reservation of British Imperial coasting trade to British ships, if adopted at all, should be reservation in the broadest sense—to British and colonial ships between one portion of the British Empire and another, between the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Australia, and South Africa, and so on. But complete reservation would be contrary to the spirit of government often described as the 'open door,' and would not be justifiable against foreign Powers who admit British ships to their own coasting trade. The wiser course would be a qualified reservation of the coasting trade of the British Empire, exercised only against foreign vessels belonging to those nations which did not grant reciprocal treatment to British shipowners abroad. It may possibly be urged that, as the tonnage of foreign nations trading between British ports is comparatively small, it is not worth risking reprisals by them against us with our extensive merchant fleet as a target. But we need not fear reprisals, for several reasons. The nations in question already do what it is suggested the United Kingdom should do, and would therefore have no cause of resentment; the United Kingdom has a latent strength for effective retaliation, because the coast-line of her Empire is the greatest of any country in the world; and even if the tonnage of foreign vessels trading between British ports is comparatively small, it is not so insignificant that it ought to be ignored. It has been calculated to be 9 per cent. The qualified reservation of British Imperial coasting trade, as above indicated, deserves the careful consideration of the Imperial Government. Complete reservation is very

undesirable; but qualified reservation, in the sense explained, is supported by most British shipowners.

Statesmen, therefore, can help to maintain the ascendancy of our commercial fleet as a link of Empire in respect of speed, the equal application of shipping regulations to British and foreign vessels, the promotion of international agreement with regard to these regulations, the incidence of light dues, and, if need be, the qualified reservation of British Imperial coasting trade.

The other question is, What can shipowners and traders do for themselves? In the past they have done a great deal. For proof it is only necessary to look at the history of some of the famous steamship lines to see how much has been achieved. Although the first receipt of a mail subsidy from the Government generally marks a rapid stride in their development, it has been in the main due to individual effort.

The steady advance of British merchant shipping during the nineteenth century is undeniable, but the progress of one or two foreign steamship lines should not be forgotten. The Hamburg-American is a remarkable case. It was founded in 1847, and possessed in 1851 six vessels, amounting together to 4,000 tons. Its present tonnage consists of 331 vessels with 764,000 tons, including the *Deutschland*, which so far holds the record of the Atlantic with a speed of 23½ knots. The North German Lloyd, which was founded in 1857, has passed through immense financial obstacles, and has now a world-wide reputation. And last, but not least, the Japanese Nippon Yusen Kaisha, or Japan Mail Steamship Company, is a marvel of modern success. It dates from the amalgamation of two smaller companies in 1885, and now owns about 220,000 tons.

All these facts ought to stimulate British shipowners and traders to continued zeal, honourable competition, and a reciprocally advantageous understanding between the Mother Country and her Colonies. Shipowners and traders can mutually help each other in the future in

several ways. In the first place, where there is a good opening in the Colonies or abroad for British manufactures, or where there is a good market in the United Kingdom for colonial produce, rail and steam carriers can develop them by establishing low through rates. The art of this method has been well studied in Germany, where railway and steamship lines are largely under Government guidance and management, and oversea trade is often assisted by Government subsidy. A special low through rate may be quoted from the German inland town of manufacture to the region or town abroad, so as to encourage export trade and cut out foreign competitors. This would be done, for example, from Berlin to the Levant, or from Leipzig to East Africa. The effect is first to create an attractive channel for the export of German goods; then by skilful calculations to enable the exporters just to undersell their foreign rivals; and finally to obtain a firm footing in a fresh and congenial market, where, owing to the natural conservatism of merchants, the trade remains with the original exporters to the exclusion of latecomers. If this can be achieved by Germany, why not by Great Britain, and especially within her own Empire? The initiative for such a patriotic move lies largely with British steamship companies, since by far the longest distance to be traversed in nearly all these cases is by sea.

In the next place, shipowners and traders could help each other if they were more often able to come to a better understanding about ordinary shipping rates. These are sometimes unduly raised or depressed by the action of shipping 'conferences' or rings, formed by combination of two or more shipping companies trading on the same routes. There is nothing harmful in this in itself, and it is perfectly justifiable, but the harm arises if the rings abuse the situation which they are generally in a position to create. Sometimes, in order to undercut rivals, so-called fighting rates are fixed. Thus, for some years the rate of freight for paper between

New York and Australia was on an average about 20s. per ton of 40 cubic feet. From London to Australia during the same period the rate was about 42s. per ton. And this is by no means an isolated occurrence. It is needless to point out that the British paper manufacturer was so severely handicapped that Australian orders for paper always went to the United States. Even if fighting rates are inevitable for a time, it is highly undesirable that they should go on for years, to the immense detriment of the trade between Great Britain and Australia. Surely shipowners sufficiently realize the importance of inter-Imperial communication to strain every nerve to come to a better agreement in this and many similar cases.

There is one means by which, probably, British manufacturers can still both increase the output of their own factories and also assist our commercial fleet by supplying more freight for transport—namely, by taking pains to provide the exact pattern of article asked for in a colonial or foreign order, rather than the pattern of the article which they themselves consider best. It is obvious that a colonist is likely to know, and thinks he knows, most accurately what kind of plough or machinery, for example, will suit his particular soil, or crop, or mine. Many cases could be recalled where British manufacturers have lost an order, and British steamship companies the freight, through indifference of this character. The neglect causes loss to British oversea trade, and therefore indirectly weakens the importance of the commercial fleet as a means of inter-Imperial communication.

Two or three considerations regarding our commercial fleet stand out clearly from a review of its past and present history. Foremost among these is the fact that its prosperity is inextricably intertwined with that of the Empire. If its prosperity diminished, it is probable that the Empire would diminish too. Heralded or pioneered by trade corporations like the East India Company, it has risen from small beginnings to become

the gauge of the uniting strength of British sovereignty and of the extent of British trade. Long may it remain so. Foreigners, we have been told by an eminent German writer, desire to cultivate trade relations with British Colonies in order to prevent a British Customs Union. Our commercial fleet will be the best mainstay of such a union if it is established, and it is the best substitute for it if it is not. But if it is attacked from abroad, in time of peace by means of foreign reservation of coasting trade and foreign subsidies, and injured at home by misdirected shipping regulations or self-inflicted disabilities as to rates, or is ill-sustained through want of specified manufactures, its value must be impaired. When these things happen, shipowners must either submit to loss, and all British traders with them, or else they may be tempted to transfer their vessels to a foreign flag under which the conditions are less adverse. There is no real reason why these disasters should overtake us, and any revival of industry would at once animate our mercantile marine with fresh vigour, and give an impetus to shipbuilding both at home and in the Colonies. If due precaution is taken and constant watchfulness exercised, there need be no fear for the future of the British commercial fleet.

IMPERIAL ORGANIZATION

By RICHARD JEBB

'Mr. Jebb [in his work on 'Colonial Nationalism'] traces a distinction between "federation" and an "alliance" within the Empire by defining these words in a manner which, from my standpoint, appears arbitrary. There is no real opposition in the ideas sought to be distinguished by him, though there may be a sequence. A federation is a particular form of such an alliance. Apparently what he favours should be styled a "confederation" of States within the Empire, each of them a unit, dealing with its fellow-States as units. This would not permit either a common citizenship or a federal legislature chosen directly by all the people of these States, endowed with plenary powers within certain clearly-defined limits. A true federation would. The difference between confederation and federation is real—so real that the kinds of alliance they represent may be dealt with as mutually exclusive. They are not necessarily to be so treated, or to be opposed as antagonistic, during our growth. As a league we favour federation in some form. That is the ultimate goal of our ambition, though there are patriotic alliances which may anticipate and prelude it. The strongest and most intimate "alliance" will always be that of people with people, citizen with citizen directly and on the same footing, instead of their external junction in masses as separate States, indirectly through their Governments. It is quite possible that our existing confederacy may last for some time to come, and may have to suffice pending the adoption of federal principles. There is not yet a rigid antithesis between them, and we need not create one. We must wait, and must be content to wait, without dogmatizing. A formal and complete constitution of the Empire may not come into being for a long time to come. No artificial bonds can satisfy us. We start with a magnificent patrimony, desiring to see a natural development from the present loosely-associated and imperfectly organized collection of self-governing

States into a better-jointed, sufficiently flexible, and more efficient union.'—The Hon. ALFRED DEAKIN in his Presidential Address to the Imperial Federation League at Melbourne on June 14, 1905.

ANY discussion of Imperial organization must start from some fairly definite conception, not only of the present inter-State position, which is the hypothesis of the problem, but also of the ideal which it is hoped to promote, or at least not to retard, by the scheme proposed. In the passage quoted above, Mr. Deakin has given a very clear summary of the essential difference between the federalist ideal of Empire (including for my purpose only the autonomous democracies) and other conceivable forms of Imperial union. A federal union implies the junction of citizen to individual citizen directly and on the same footing—to that extent obliterating the State boundaries—whereas a 'confederacy' or 'alliance' implies only the external association of those masses of citizens which are called States, indirectly through their Governments. As for the present position, Mr. Deakin refers to 'our existing confederacy.'

This question of terms and expressions is one of the standing difficulties in discussions of Imperial evolution. Perhaps every writer who wishes to be lucid must expose himself to the charge of being 'arbitrary.' Mr. Deakin's explanation of the distinction between federation and confederation strikes me as another example of arbitrariness. It is valuable because it does clearly convey a real distinction of practical importance. But, as regards his use of the terms, what about the Dominion? So far from being a looser form of union than the American or Australian 'federations,' the Canadian 'confederacy' is a closer form than either of them. In it the 'residuum of sovereignty'—*i.e.*, all powers not specifically assigned to the provincial Governments—resides in the central authority. But in the United States and the Commonwealth the conception of independent States is fundamental, and so the

residuum of sovereignty—*i.e.*, all powers not taken away from the former Colonies by the Commonwealth Act—remains with the State Governments. The assumption of State independence and equality finds expression, again, in the American and Australian Federal Senates, where every State, regardless of size, has the same voting power, so far modifying the citizen-to-citizen conception which governs the election of the other House on a population basis. But in the Canadian Confederation the provinces are represented in the Senate, as in the other House, on a population basis.* Thus, the junction of citizen to citizen directly, which Mr. Deakin says is the differentiating feature of a true federation, is more conspicuous in the existing 'Confederation' than in the existing 'Federations.'

It is a mistake to protest that such distinctions are more dialectical than practical. They are necessary to clear thinking and progressive discussion, for the extremely practical reason that the Imperial question concerns, and is followed with eager attention in, certain countries where the terms 'federation' and 'confederation,' as the case may be, have an official and therefore popularly recognised meaning. Accordingly, those terms ought to be restricted to that specific use, unless there is to be a risk of popular misunderstanding and consequent friction. Thus, 'confederacy' in Mr. Deakin's sense might be a useful aid to clear Imperial thinking in Australia. But in Canada, which officially is a 'confederation,' it could not fail to cause confusion if misapplied to the Empire. Likewise 'federation' has a definite official and popular meaning in Australia, and ought not to be employed to denote any different form of union. Therefore it seems inadvisable to apply 'confederacy' to the existing Imperial connection between the autonomous democracies, or 'federation' to any kind of Imperial organization such as seems to be

* The quota is determined by giving Quebec a fixed number of representatives, and other provinces proportionate representation.

within the region of practical politics, now or in the near future.

Doubtless it is easy to make out a strong case against using 'alliance' to cover the existing position, or any future position in which there would remain the features at least of a common Crown and a common foreign policy, such as is implied by the idea of an all-round offensive and defensive combination. Yet 'alliance,' or any equally neutral term, has this great advantage, that it is not more misleading to one of the democracies than to another. If it is inadequate, the mere acknowledgment of its inadequacy, being common to all the scattered sections of a certain Imperialist school, makes it a safer aid to discussion than any term which has a localized official meaning.

The essential point about the existing position is the fact of independent Executives—exercising powers, such as the absolute control of separate armaments and antagonistic fiscal systems, which make the actual relationship more like mere alliance than anything else, despite the common Crown. The independence of these Executives is a factor which I take to be permanent—at least, for our time; since I cannot detect the slightest indication, either here or beyond the seas, of any widespread disposition to surrender any part of that independence. On the contrary, there seems to be a pronounced and popular tendency in the opposite direction. The Premier of the Dominion, who commonly is reckoned an Imperialist, apparently thinks it consistent with sound Imperialism to talk about 'treaties' being negotiated between Canada and England. When Mr. Chamberlain, in the earlier speeches of his campaign, seemed to contemplate the gradual junction of citizen to citizen, by way of unrestricted commercial competition and fiscal union, the outer States of the Empire gave pretty clear indications that such was not their conception of Imperial consolidation. Likewise in this country there were signs of a revolt against the conception of any commercial arrangement which might

possibly prove detrimental to the commercial or industrial interests of our insular territory, which was regarded by implication as holding a separate nation. In the press of Canada, and in that of Australia since federation, the term 'national' has acquired a local federal use, superseding the old habit of applying it to the single but scattered stock of which the headquarters was in these islands. But such signs of a centrifugal tendency coexist with the manifestation of a clear desire for continued and closer cooperation. That desire seems to pervade practically the whole of the democracy in Australia and New Zealand, almost the whole of the English-speaking population in Canada and South Africa, the best part of the French-speaking population in Canada, and finally a certain number of the best educated Dutch in South Africa. Under the circumstances, there seems to be an opening for constructive statesmanship, to make this widespread desire, which I need not say exists in England also, the basis of an improved organization for mutual advantage. What seems to be required is some machinery of partnership, to serve certain definite purposes, which already are recognised as inviting cooperation.

The guide to the nature of the organization required must be sought in a clear understanding of the specific purposes which it is intended to serve. Those purposes, therefore, have to be stated and analyzed. Accordingly, I offer the following classification of Imperial interests:

I. External interests, comprising:
   (*a*) Political interests;
   (*b*) Commercial interests.
II. Internal interests, including:
   (*a*) Vital interests;
   (*b*) Beneficial interests.

The principle of the above classification is to distinguish the various interests in accordance with the degree in which they demand, or admit of, joint action. In the first main division, that of 'external' interests, I regard

'political' interests as demanding joint action in almost every instance, because they are always matters fraught with the risk of serious foreign complications. The category would include such matters as the rights of British subjects in foreign countries, or territorial disputes. In such questions there is always the possibility of trouble. But the second section, namely, 'commercial' interests, includes matters which are not usually sources of foreign complications (though they may become so), and therefore do not demand joint action in every case. Examples are furnished by the commercial relations between Canada and the United States, including not only tariff questions, but such minor matters as railway bonding privileges and the like. Again, our own commercial arrangements with European countries can be settled by our own Government, without the assistance of colonial Governments. In such matters no common policy is possible until we have commercial union, which is not in sight at present.

By 'internal' interests I mean matters affecting the mutual relationship of the several countries within the Empire, and not involving negotiation with foreign Powers. Some of these matters, including especially Defence, Tariff, and Alien Immigration, are 'vital'—that is to say, they are so important to the safety or welfare of the individual nation* as such that it is difficult to obtain general assent for a comprehensive Imperial policy or the institution of any form of federal Executive. It is manifest already that Imperial defence can be organized only on the basis of allowing each nation to keep entire control of its own naval and military forces. Canada, the leader of the younger nations, seems to have made it clear that she cannot be induced by any offer of representation to surrender any portion of her control to a joint authority. That is a definite fact with which Imperial statesmanship must

* I use the term 'nation' in its accepted Canadian sense advisedly.

reckon. The question of fiscal policy is in the same position. No single nation is willing to surrender the power of taking such measures as it thinks fit for raising revenue; or for creating and maintaining the maximum amount of employment, of whatever kind it thinks best, within its own boundaries. Again, no nation with ideals of its own can surrender its right to exclude or admit certain classes of immigrants out of deference to the interests, opinions, or prejudices, of people living in other countries, thousands of miles away, under wholly different climatic or geographical conditions.

'Beneficial' interests also affect the national welfare, but not so vitally as to make undivided national control a paramount consideration. They include, for example, Ocean Cables, Ocean Transport, Postal System, Migration (white only), Naturalization Laws, Commercial Law (in certain departments), Patents, Copyright, and Judicial Appeals. In connection with all of these it seems possible to hope for the establishment, in the near future, of comprehensive Imperial institutions, controlled by a joint authority on behalf of the several countries.

The common feature in all the above classes of Imperial interests is that organization implies the cooperation of several independent Executives which actually exist. None of these Executives seems to be in need of further advice than is at its disposal already. That is where I think the plan of an advisory council, which Sir Frederick Pollock has put forward, misses the mark. Already we have the Committee of Imperial Defence, an advisory council which lately has played a prominent part in the shaping of our own national policy. The result is not encouraging. We have had the spectacle of our Prime Minister dogmatizing about our military requirements on the strength of the deliberations of that Council; while Lord Roberts, its foremost military expert, simultaneously makes pronouncements which seem to conflict with those of the Prime Minister. It appears that

the Committee of Imperial Defence admits of being used as a cloak to cover the incompetence of our responsible Executive. If so, the precedent is useful as a warning. The proposed advisory Council, irresponsible and with no executive authority, might be used as a shield by any incompetent or weak Ministry in any of the autonomous States. What is required is not more advice, but simply cooperative action by those heads of States who alone have the advantage of power and the restraint of responsibility.

As matters stand, there is the nucleus of the required executive body in the Colonial Conferences, at which the acting heads meet together to discuss the possibility of joint action in definite departments of policy. The next step, therefore, is to make that Conference a permanent institution. It could be done partly by utilizing the cables, partly by the appointment of deputies to represent the colonial Premiers in London. Such deputies perhaps exist already in the High Commissioners. But it may be left open to each colonial Premier to make his own arrangement for the purpose of the Conference. Whenever critical questions were under discussion, the representative in London would have to make a free use of the cable. On normal occasions he would act more on his own discretion, always being responsible solely to his own Government for the policy to which he committed his country. The Colonial Office, of course, would not have any regular *locus standi* in connection with the Conference, at which the executive heads of States would be associated on equal terms. If the Colonial Secretary attended, he would do so either as the Prime Minister's deputy, or by special invitation in order that the Conference might have the benefit of his opinion. In the same way other men of authority might be invited to attend, but would not thereby become members of the Conference, which must consist, as an executive body, only of the responsible heads of Governments.

Normally, but not necessarily, the chairman of the

Conference naturally would be the head of the most powerful State. Obviously, that State in practice must occupy a superior position in Conference, if only because it is in the strongest position to act independently in the last resort. But special occasions are conceivable, as will be explained later, in which it would be more convenient for the head of the State most immediately concerned in the particular question to act as representative of the whole Empire.

The function of the Conference cannot be quite the same in connection with the several different classes of Imperial interests which have been described. As regards 'political' external interests, the Conference would give the executive heads the opportunity of agreeing upon a common foreign policy, as occasion arose. Having so agreed, each Premier would be responsible to his own country, according to the recognised constitutional doctrine, for the consequences of his assent. If the common policy led eventually to war, each Premier would be in the position of having to justify that war, which he himself had helped to make, to the people of his own country. That position in itself would mark a great advance upon the existing position, in which there is no guarantee that either party in any State except our own will be prepared to defend the policy of the war and urge participation therein.

The existing danger was illustrated by the action of political parties in Canada upon the outbreak of the South African War, and throughout its duration. Both parties attempted to play to the French-Canadian electorate, which was hostile to the war. The French-Canadians had no sympathy with the eagerness of the English-Canadians to take part, which they regarded as an outburst of foreign racial sentiment. They felt that the War was none of their making, because the Dominion Government had not been consulted at every stage of the diplomatic controversy. It is true that the Dominion Parliament, a few months before the

war broke out, had passed unanimous resolutions in support of the Imperial policy in South Africa. But the French-Canadians refused to attach any weight to that incident. They maintained—and I think they were right—that the resolutions had been rushed through on the spur of the moment, at the suggestion of a special envoy from Johannesburg, and that Parliament had not realized the possibility of committing the nation to war by its hasty action. Anyway, the result was that the Dominion Government, representing the most populous and wealthy of the younger nations, had to consider the French-Canadian attitude to the extent of not sending nearly so many troops in proportion to capacity as New Zealand and Australia. Surely the situation would have been less difficult if Sir Wilfrid Laurier had been consulted throughout the diplomatic campaign. Then the resolutions proposed by him in Parliament would have had the aspect of a deliberate testing of public opinion. When war ensued, he might have persuaded the French-Canadians that the country was bound in honour to do its utmost in a struggle which its Premier had helped to bring about with the deliberate approval of Parliament.

On the other hand, the Dominion Parliament might have given an adverse vote upon the Premier's resolutions, thus expressing its disapproval of the Imperial policy. Then our Government, which possessed by far the greater part of the total fighting strength, would have had to consider whether or not it would stick to the policy so condemned. At worst, to have to face the dilemma would be better than for our Government to persevere with a policy under the erroneous impression that the Colonies would support it. In future, as the consequence of the cooperation of the Colonies in the South African War, it will be much more important to us than hitherto to know how far the Colonies are with us, and how far we may depend on their aid. Likewise it will be more important than hitherto for Canada to know how far Australia and New Zealand, in addition

to England, would be prepared to back her in making a stand against American pretensions. Similarly, the Commonwealth will be interested to know exactly how the Dominion Government would regard a quarrel with an Asiatic Power over the 'White-Australia' policy. Therefore it seems that the system of the Conference, although open to all manner of hypothetical objections, at least would be an advance upon the present haphazard system, under which it is a mere speculation whether the States will back each other in any particular line of foreign policy.

The relations of Canada with the United States have always been a source of Imperial risk. Whenever the negotiations over Canadian-American questions have been conducted by Englishmen, the result almost invariably has been disastrous to Canada, and therefore to the cause of Imperial alliance. Mr. Chamberlain's period of office was marked by a new departure in this connection. When it appeared in 1898 that certain Canadian-American questions were ripe for settlement, he agreed to an arrangement which practically left the negotiations in the hands of Canadian statesmen. The International Commission was represented on our side by four Canadians and only one Englishman. Consequently the Americans failed to get their way by the methods of bluff and misrepresentation which had answered in dealing with inexperienced Englishmen. The Canadians were greatly elated by the confidence shown on our part in their ability to handle the matter, and for the time being there was great enthusiasm in Canada for the principle of Imperial alliance. Indeed, the eagerness of the English-speaking population to assist worthily in the South African War may be traced largely to the influence of Mr. Chamberlain's new departure. But in the end, after the war, the Americans succeeded in getting the principal question at issue—that of the Alaska boundary—arranged in London over the head of the Dominion Government, by means of obvious trickery. This conclusion of

the incident cancelled all the good impression which had been created by the composition of the original Commission, and the Imperial ideal received a set-back from which it will take a long time to recover. The lesson, to my mind, is that in all future negotiations of that kind with the United States the Canadian Premier must be the representative of the Empire. He will consult the other Governments at every step of the diplomatic negotiations. If they fail to back him, he must do his own climbing down, or persevere single-handed on his own responsibility. In other words, the headquarters of the Conference must be transferred to Ottawa for the purposes of those particular questions.

As regards 'internal' questions, the function of the Conference would be different in relation to the two categories into which such questions have been divided. In 'vital' questions the Conference would enable the executive heads, not to devise a common policy for the Empire, but each to frame his own national policy with a view to cooperation. In the matter of defence, there is need of consultation to obtain uniformity in types of ships or guns. Again, the professional experts from each country would have to be brought together to discuss combined action on land and sea with reference to probable contingencies or for peace manœuvres. Of course, for such purposes the executive heads would find it necessary to place their respective naval or military forces under one command for the time being. It would be the interest of each individual State not to appear to fall behind the others in the extent of its defensive preparations, because to do so would be to prejudice its chances of obtaining a sympathetic hearing, or cordial support, for its own special item of the joint foreign policy when brought up for discussion in Conference.

Again, the Conference would throw much needed light upon the question of Imperial reciprocity. Each Premier would have the opportunity of finding out exactly how far the others were prepared to meet him

in the matter of mutual concessions. He could then, as a party leader, adopt whatever line he thought fit in formulating his own national fiscal policy for the approval of his own country. Only it would be his duty to acquaint the country with any formal proposals made to him in Conference, whether he liked them or not. In Conference each Premier would be a national representative, not a party representative, but out of Conference he would be a party leader to the same extent as under the present system.

Alien immigration, or at any rate coloured immigration, is an 'internal' question so far as it affects the coloured populations of the dependencies. The Conference would endeavour to discover a common principle of exclusion or restriction, so as to minimize the sentimental disadvantage and practical inconvenience arising from the application of different principles by different countries of the Empire.

The dependencies themselves constitute an 'internal' Imperial interest which seems to belong to a class apart. From the point of view of Canada or Australia, the interest, perhaps, is mainly 'external,' because those countries have no direct connection with the dependencies, which, however, may become a cause of war with foreign Powers. To England, on the other hand, being the suzerain of the dependencies, and solely responsible for their administration, the interest is mainly 'internal.' This divergency between the points of view of England and the Colonies respectively seems to be a danger to the prospects of close alliance. It is essential to durable Imperial solidarity that the Colonies should acquire an interest in the dependencies of a kind similar to our own—that is to say, the sense of a national duty in the task of administration.

If all the States are to be equally ready to defend the dependencies, our monopoly of administration must be given up. How to set about making the required change, which can only be gradual, is a question which the Conference would enable our Premier to discuss

with the others. Perhaps the transference of the West Indies to Canada, for purposes of administration, would be a first step; though it could be accomplished only by successive stages, beginning with the appointment of Canadian officials as vacancies occurred. Apart from other considerations, it is obvious that an alliance with a bond of sentiment, namely, the sentiment of a particular national duty in common, would be more secure than an alliance held together by material interests only. The sentiment of 'the White Man's Burden' is one which might appeal to French-Canadians and South African Dutch, if their respective countries had some sort of responsible part in Imperial administration, whereas the present sentiment of common blood is one which appeals to our own race only, and tends to become weakened by lapse of time, in proportion as the native-born replace the immigrants.

In 'beneficial' questions the Conference will determine the kind of common organization required to meet the particular need, and will arrange for its creation. The question of Imperial telegraphs already has proved capable of successful solution by the familiar principle of the joint-stock company. In the Pacific Cable, which is owned and operated by the Governments of Australia, England, Canada, and New Zealand, the States are associated simply as shareholders, and have control in proportion to their respective financial interest in the undertaking. The intermigration of white populations might be controlled to mutual advantage by the institution of a joint board. Other questions might be solved by the appointment of a committee to devise and recommend concurrent legislation. In all cases the Conference would be the source of initiative, and the executive authority—the latter by the individual action of its members when necessary.

There seems to be no reason why the system of the permanent Conference should not be initiated at any time, whenever the British Prime Minister sees fit to attempt the experiment. It can be discontinued at any

time if it does not seem to promise success, and renewed under more favourable conditions. Doubtless there will be some reluctance at the outset on the part of colonial Premiers to take the responsibility of committing themselves to a line of foreign policy. That, perhaps, is inevitable, as a consequence of the long-established colonial system. Hitherto colonial Governments have claimed our support as a matter of course whenever their own special interests have been threatened by foreign aggression, while sometimes asserting their right of giving or withholding reciprocal support just as they think fit on each occasion. Such one-sided reciprocity obviously is no sure basis of alliance, or of any kind of political combination between autonomous States. The natural outcome of the old colonial system is seen in the present distribution of the defence forces of the Empire. So long as England insists upon dictating the Imperial foreign policy in every case, so long must she expect to be saddled with a corresponding share of the defence burden. Conversely, if the younger nations wish to obtain support for their own requirements in foreign policy, they must first recognise the case for equality of sacrifice, as between the autonomous States of the Empire. Since the several States are too unequal at present, apart from other obstacles, for federation to be an acceptable solution, there seems to be no alternative except a system of alliance, such as could be put into practice by the machinery of a permanent Imperial Conference.

Nor need the experiment of the Conference be delayed until the preliminary consolidation of autonomous States has been completed, which implies the federation of the South African States, and the entry of Newfoundland into the Dominion. Were the Conference started now, only Canada and New Zealand would be represented in London. The Commonwealth, not yet having appointed its High Commissioner, could not take part, except in so far as the acting heads could find time to use the cable. The South African Colonies

and Newfoundland could not take any direct part at all, because there is no place in a Conference of nations for the artificial subdivisions of a national unit. If the acting heads of those provincial Colonies were recognised as the peers of the Premiers of Canada and New Zealand, then the acting heads of the several Australian States might, and certainly would, claim the same recognition. It is only their petty affectation of undiminished State sovereignty that has delayed the much-needed appointment of a federal High Commissioner. Under the circumstances, the obvious policy for a British Prime Minister who wished to make a beginning of Imperial organization would be to start the system of the Conference in conjunction with the acting heads of Canada and New Zealand only, which countries alone have provided themselves so far with the necessary equipment. It is safe to prophesy that an Australian High Commissioner would be forthcoming speedily in that event—or perhaps a Minister for External Affairs, the latter department being assigned specifically to the federal authority by the terms of the Commonwealth Act. Likewise the actual initiation of the Imperial Conference would stimulate the South African Colonies and Newfoundland to acquire the necessary status through provincial federation. There is no place for them otherwise in the organization of the Empire, so long as Imperial federation is not acceptable all round.

If the principle of the Conference offers the only alternative to a policy of mere negation, perpetuating the risks of the present position, then it seems futile to reject the Conference on the plea that, by recognising State independence, it prejudices the chances of a genuine Imperial federation. Mr. Deakin was right when he said that there was no real opposition in the ideas of alliance and federation, though there may be a sequence. I have pointed out that one essential feature of 'federation,' in the proper meaning of that term, is the association of States on the basis of equality, regardless of size. An alliance which recognised equality, if

only in the sense of an equal national status, might be regarded as a step towards federation. The other essential feature of federation, namely, the association of citizens as units, distinguished from the association of States as units, always on the basis of equality, may take a long time to appear in practice, as Mr. Deakin admits. It never can appear as the outcome of a negative policy. Nor is it likely to appear if the principle of alliance is found to satisfy all practical requirements. The conditions of the British Empire are quite different from those which have produced the classical examples of federation. For immediate purposes it is enough if we realize in what respects the present Imperial system fails to meet practical requirements, and to what extent any specific proposal, if carried out, would modify the prospect of future developments. Judged by such tests, the Imperial Conference seems to offer a sound principle of organization for the time being. It seems calculated to subserve the two great Imperial ideals—namely, the peaceful and sympathetic development of kindred democracies and the future of British administration in the tropics.

PART II.

CONSTITUENTS OF EMPIRE

I.—NATIONS IN MAKING

THE MAKING OF CANADA

By THE HON. CLIFFORD SIFTON, K.C.

CANADA is a country which, from the very beginning, has presented great obstacles to the work of development. Rich as it is in agricultural resources, in the wealth of the sea, of the forest, and the mine, Nature has decreed that these riches should only be made available for the use of man by persistent and self-sacrificing effort. Canals were required to make the great waterways a highway of commerce, mighty rivers had to be bridged, mountains pierced and overcome, and great stretches of difficult country spanned by railways. Looking back now over the history of the past century, it may fairly be said that the Canadian people have never flinched from the gigantic tasks which were set them. With varying success and encouragement, but with unvarying determination, they have steadily pursued their purpose, until at the present time they are able to see, at no great distance, the complete triumph of their efforts.

The early history of the country is a tale of individual effort expended in performing the toilsome labour of the pioneer. To the first settlers who subdued the forests of the older provinces and built up civilized communities there succeeded, in due time, a generation of men who were taught by their leaders to

have a wider outlook—an outlook which embraced the whole of British North America and contemplated the creation of great public utilities which should lay a broad and strong foundation for Canadian nationality.

When Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario were formed into the Dominion of Canada in 1867 the new Dominion had a population of approximately 3,400,000 souls. It had but the nucleus of a railway system, and its canal system was in its infancy. British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Rupert's Land, and the North-Western Territory were not a part of the original confederation. The Maritime Provinces were not connected by any Canadian railway with Ontario and Quebec. Between Ontario, the most westerly province of the Dominion, and the prairies of the North-West, whose agricultural capabilities were only vaguely known, there stretched a vast, inhospitable, little-known region, believed to consist mainly of rocks and swamps, offering, as it was then thought, no promise of support to a population, and impassable except to the experienced woodsman or voyageur. When the prairie region was reached and traversed the mighty barriers of the Rockies and the Selkirks still shut off the Pacific Coast Province from the rest of British North America.

Three great projects were present to the minds of the fathers of our confederation—viz., the acquisition of Prince Edward Island, British Columbia, Rupert's Land, and the North-Western Territory; the union of the Maritime Provinces with Ontario and Quebec by the Inter-Colonial Railway; and the union of all the provinces by the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

When it is considered that the total cost of these enterprises was not less than half as much, in proportion to the population of Canada at confederation, as was the entire national debt of Great Britain in proportion to the population of the United Kingdom, that the people of Canada were possessed of little acquired

or accumulated wealth, being even at that time a large debtor in the money-markets of the world, and that they were only entering upon their national existence, it must be admitted that those who declared such plans to be chimerical had much to warrant their opinions.

Nevertheless, all of these plans were quickly carried out. The desired territory was acquired, all of British North America except Newfoundland being united to Canada; the Inter-Colonial Railway was undertaken and rapidly pushed to completion; and in 1885, within nineteen years of the passage of the British North America Act, the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed—a railway which now enjoys the distinction of being the only single system which spans the North American Continent.

The years that have passed since 1867 have been years of chequered fortune; but throughout them all there has been steady progress and a constant acquisition of greater knowledge of the resources and possibilities of the country.

The wealth of Canadian fisheries has long been known and taken advantage of to the fullest possible extent. So well known, indeed, is it that the desire of our Southern neighbours to participate in its advantages has from time to time given rise to difficult international questions.

Other resources have perhaps not been so well known. To the knowledge which we possessed of the value of the timber of Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick has of late years been added the certainty that we possess the finest supply of pulp-wood in the world. For thousands of miles the white spruce forests stand in the valleys of our rivers, contiguous to water powers, easily accessible and capable of the most economical transportation. There may be obstacles to overcome, there may be temporary lulls in development; but one of the things which seems to be abundantly clear is that in the long-run, sooner or later, the country which has the raw material, the power, and the facilities for trans-

portation will do the manufacturing, and that Canada will be the great home of the pulp and paper industry of the world.

The precious metals are found more or less in almost every portion of our country, but their exploitation is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, as a producer of gold Canada, in the last year for which full statistics are available (1903), took rank as the fifth country in the world.

Coal and iron, the great bases of modern commercial development, are found in very large quantities. It is no doubt true that with a sparse population, with a limited home market, and with great distances to cover, the pioneers of our iron and steel industries have found it difficult to make headway against the highly organized and specialized industries of richer and older countries. A good beginning, however, has been made, the initial difficulties have been largely overcome, the works are now reported to be flourishing, and a steady development may reasonably be looked for.

In the development of water-power, its electrical conduct, and its application to the various services which require the application of power, we have little to learn from any competitor. Canada is the home of the water-power, and as rapidly as the application can be rendered profitable, power is being developed. Not to mention hundreds of minor enterprises, power is now being electrically transmitted from Shawinigan Falls to the City of Montreal, a distance of about ninety miles, and development work is going on by which the mighty power of Niagara will, within a very short time, be rendered available for a radius of one hundred miles upon the Canadian side of the river, proving of incalculable benefit to the locality directly affected, and indirectly conferring benefit upon the whole country.

I have referred above to the natural obstacles presented to the work of development in Canada. Unquestionably the overcoming of these obstacles and the establishment of efficient transportation agencies constitute the greatest achievement in our history.

It is difficult for anyone who has not closely followed the story of this work to understand the difficulties with which it has been beset at every point. Even the majority of Canadians fail to appreciate the magnitude of the achievements of their own country. The proximity and geographical relation of the wealthy and populous country to the South has been a deterrent factor in a variety of ways.

Take, for instance, the case of the Inter-Colonial Railway.

The shortest and best route from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to Montreal is through the State of Maine. When the project of building a railway from New Brunswick to Quebec through British territory was first mooted, it was denounced by Maritime Province newspapers as savouring of lunacy. Why, it was said, take a long and difficult route in preference to a short and easy one? The Canadian route involved an additional length of about two hundred miles, and traversed a much more difficult country. Nevertheless, national and Imperial sentiment prevailed. The construction of the road was made a part of the understanding upon which confederation was brought about. It was undertaken and completed. To-day we so fully recognise the wisdom, nay, the necessity, of the work that we are about to construct another shorter and better all-Canadian line from Quebec to the Maritime Province ports.

Consider the case of the Canadian Pacific. It was so much easier to connect the Eastern Provinces with the North-West by utilizing American railways, already constructed south of Lake Superior, that the project of building around the barren, rocky, and inhospitable north shore was regarded with the greatest disfavour. It is even said that, after the contract for building the line was made and ratified by Parliament, some of the original incorporators of the Company never could take the plan seriously, and even went so far as to dissociate themselves from the enterprise when they found that no

other course would be allowed. Nothing but the ultimatum of the Government, backed by liberal assistance, brought about the construction of the North Shore line. To-day it is so well recognised as a necessary part of the Canadian transportation system that we have in hand the construction of a second line, not only around the north shore of Lake Superior, but directly, by an almost air-line, across the great Hinterland of Ontario and Quebec from the City of Quebec to the City of Winnipeg, with easier grades and more favourable curvature, to furnish another Canadian outlet for the rapidly-growing exports of the North-West.

The construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway through the Rocky Mountains was another difficult feat. Years were spent in exploring the different passes. Tremendous engineering difficulties were overcome ; money was lavishly expended ; but the work was finished some years in advance of the time required by the contract with the Government. Here, again, time has demonstrated that our people were building wisely. Though even after the line was completed many would never believe that it had before it a commercial future. To-day, after the lapse of only twenty years, it is recognised as one of the greatest and most profitable railway properties in the world : and the Government of Canada has within a year past made a contract with the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company for another line which shall traverse the northern portion of the prairie country, cross the Rocky Mountains by one of the northerly passes, and find an outlet upon the Pacific Coast some hundreds of miles to the north of the Canadian Pacific Railway Pacific terminus. The enormous trade of the Orient will then be made accessible to the producers on the wheat-fields of the Canadian North-West by two trunk lines, which, crossing the Rocky Mountains, will connect at their terminal ports with steamships plying across the Pacific.

The Canadian Pacific Railway is now fed by branches many hundreds of miles in length in all parts of Canada.

In the North-West a new competitor has arisen in the shape of the Canadian Northern Railway, a line begun only ten years ago, which runs westerly from the head of Lake Superior, and already has about 1,400 miles of railway in operation. It is pursuing an aggressive policy of extension, and hopes within a short time to find a new outlet for the products of the West from a port upon Hudson's Bay, from which point steamships will reach Liverpool by an ocean voyage as short as that from the City of Montreal.

Altogether, the work of Canada in railway building must be admitted to constitute a creditable record. Starting at confederation with a length of 2,278 miles, she now has a system of 19,408 miles in total length; and when the works now actually provided for and definitely undertaken are completed, somewhere about the year 1911, the sum total will be not less than 23,000 miles, without account of the many shorter lines and branches which will, in the ordinary course of events, add greatly to the total.

Canadian waterways are upon a magnificent scale, and their improvement has always occupied a considerable share of public attention. The main system extends from the Straits of Belle Isle to the head of Lake Superior, a distance of about 2,400 miles. But rapids, shoals, rocky shores, sand bars, and waterfalls intervened to check and hinder the early navigator. Very large sums of money have been spent to construct canals, to deepen channels, to remove shoals, and to light and buoy the route in order to assist navigation. It is impossible to state accurately the amounts of money that have been so expended, but it is far within the mark to say that the work up to the present time represents a total outlay exceeding $80,000,000. As a result we have 14 feet of water from Lake Superior to the sea, easily the finest system of fresh-water navigation in the world. The total number of vessels in the registry books of the Dominion is about 7,500, with a tonnage of about 800,000 tons, approximately one-third that

shown by the registry of the United States. This, however, gives no indication of our ocean-going trade, a large part of which is done by vessels of British and foreign register. The total tonnage entering the ports of Montreal and Quebec alone last year was 2,236,601.

What is our commercial and industrial position? Have the efforts made to develop the country strained its resources, or placed upon it a burden beyond its strength? On the contrary, it may be stated with sober truth that there is no country in the world with an equal population where there is so little poverty, and where, man for man, the people are so well to do. The tale of increasing surpluses, growing bank deposits, expanding trade, and developing industries, repeated year by year by our Minister of Finance, has become almost monotonous.

The revenue of Canada in 1868 was $13,687,928; in 1904 it was $70,679,251. Deposits in banks in 1868 were $37,678,571; in 1904, $509,095,621. Foreign trade in 1868 was $131,027,532; in 1904, $472,733,038. Every barometer of trade gives the same indication of progress and prosperity. In a speech recently delivered by Sir Richard Cartwright, one of our financial authorities, and the present Minister of Trade and Commerce, he claimed that the proportionate growth of Canadian trade in recent years exceeded that of any country in the world.

If such be the undoubted facts, if the record above set forth is not overstated (and it can easily be verified), to whom is the credit due? What is the source of the financial strength and elasticity which has enabled this record to be made? There can be only one answer. Giving all the credit to every other industry, it must be admitted that the source of Canada's strength and prosperity is the agricultural industry. It is the labour of the Canadian farmer that has produced the wealth from which all these results have followed. The products of the farm, developed and improved, and rendered more valuable in accordance with modern methods of

production, treatment, and transportation, are the corner-stone of our prosperity. And when we speak of the future, while we dwell with some pride and satisfaction upon our resources of gold and silver, of iron, coal, and lumber, and do not minimize the great industries which naturally grow up in a country of such varied resources as Canada, it is to the wheat-fields of the North-West that we turn our eyes with a feeling that there will be no disappointment, no failure, no losing of the pay streak or the lode, that from the prairies a stream of wealth, ever increasing in volume, will flow through the arteries of commerce, and build up our commercial institutions on a scale far exceeding anything we have experienced in the past.

In Manitoba and the two new Provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta there are, roughly speaking, over 200,000,000 acres of land known to be fit for cultivation, and the population is at the present time about 750,000 souls. They cultivated last year altogether 5,250,000 acres. They produced 60,000,000 bushels of wheat, and 66,000,000 bushels of other grains. This year there will be 5,750,000 acres under cultivation. The rest awaits the plough. If 750,000 people cultivating 5,250,000 of acres of land produce 126,000,000 of bushels of grain, and there yet remains more than 190,000,000 of acres to be brought under cultivation, is it too much to say that within a few years the somewhat grandiloquent title of 'The Granary of the Empire' will be more than realized.

At the present time we are sending into these provinces annually from 130,000 to 150,000 people. They come as homeseekers, determined to go upon the land. Within two or three years, whether with or without capital, they almost invariably realize their desire, and take up land for themselves. They are coming without Government assistance, with no help except an almost perfectly organized system of reception and guidance and thoroughly efficient arrangements for transportation by steamship and railway lines. They

come from many countries and speak many tongues. Proportionately, at the present time, one-third are from Great Britain, one-third from the United States, and one-third from other countries.

Why do they come? Because Canada is known to possess and to offer free to the willing worker of any nationality a great domain of first-class agricultural land where the frugal and industrious man may speedily become an independent proprietor, a self-supporting and self-respecting citizen of a free British country, where life and property are absolutely protected, and where desirable religious, social, and material conditions surround the family. Our 150,000 settlers, with a few exceptions, are taken from the point where they reach Canada, and at once placed in touch with conditions that enable them to realize their ambition. They settle upon land and become producers. They immediately begin the process of enriching the country, adding to its production of wealth, increasing the commerce, furnishing traffic for the railways and steamships, giving occupation to middlemen by the thousand. Contrast this with what is happening in the United States. There the 800,000 immigrants who enter the United States never see the possibility of independence. They are dumped into the cities and towns, they bear upon the already overcrowded labour-market, and increasing the means of livelihood of the inhabitants of the country, they divide up that which exists with those who were previously hard set to make ends meet, and so reduce the general standard of comfort and living.

A moment's consideration of the facts shows that for Canada its immigration policy spells wealth and development. Therefore we welcome the industrious home-seeker, and if he be of British origin, the welcome is on that account the heartier.

I have so far spoken only of material progress. A word as to the other matters.

From the earliest settlement Canada has taken advanced ground on the subject of education. No-

where has the individual citizen, poor though he might be, been more ready to submit to taxation for the purpose of promoting popular enlightenment. Next to the Church the public school is, of all Canadian institutions, the closest to the people's hearts. Its management and control is absolutely and directly in their own hands, and it is a source of just pride to know that the management is almost universally efficient and successful to a degree that leaves little to be desired. Our Universities, grammar-schools, and academies, while with few exceptions not boasting the huge endowments which private and public liberality has given to similar institutions in older and wealthier countries, are nevertheless well fitted to discharge their functions. On the vital question of education our fellow-citizens of the Empire may rest satisfied that we are not behind the best traditions of our race.

Looking over the whole ground, it may be said that Canada presents to-day the spectacle of a young, vigorous, and united people, which by faith and courage has come through trying struggles, overcome great obstacles, and made good its title to national existence. Its history has not been of the spectacular kind which appeals to the imagination; but it has made for the development of the qualities necessary to national strength. While building railways, constructing canals, overcoming mountain ranges, bridging rivers, and developing the wealth afforded by Nature, she has carefully provided for the religious wants of the people, preserved the love of home and family, which is the foundation of all nationhood, established and carried on a sound and progressive system of education, and generally met all the demands of a growing civilization. Religious toleration, social order, and commercial and industrial development have gone hand in hand. Other countries may now be at or past the zenith of their career; Canada is but entering upon hers. She faces the great undertaking of the future—such as the construction of another transcontinental railway; such as

the assimilation of great masses of population—with a confidence that is born of hard experience and clear and serene faith in her capacity to repeat the success of the past. Questions as to her political future do not seriously trouble her. Such questions will find a solution along safe and conservative lines. Loyal to the Empire, but self-respecting and self-reliant, regardful of the rights and privileges of others, but jealous and tenacious of their own, the people of Canada look forward confidently to the time when a great British community upon the northern half of the North American Continent will be second to none in the sisterhood of a confederated Empire.

THE FUTURE OF CANADA

By W. PETERSON

Though the record of the 'Deeds that won the Empire' may now be considered closed, Britain has still a great work in front of her—the work of Imperial organization, consolidation, and, if possible, federation. To ridicule this aspiration, and to pronounce it unrealizable, on the ground that the achievement would be altogether without historic parallel, is a cheap and easy form of selfishness. It betrays the limitation of outlook, the want of imagination, which is one of the main defects, for all its sturdiness, of the Anglo-Saxon character. No doubt there are difficulties to be surmounted, and adverse conditions to be overcome. It may be true that the Empire, as we know it to-day, is 'anomalous' and 'amorphous.' But there are many of us—not unfamiliar with the records of the past, or the circumstances of the present time—who feel confident that, if it were possible to forecast the judgment of history, it would be found to be against a policy of drift, or 'let well alone.'

In the mission of further consolidation we start with one great point in our favour. It is by no means to its disadvantage or discredit that the British Empire is not altogether as other Empires have been. It was by the sword that old Rome, for instance, held what by the sword she had won. To her modern successor and representative has been left the glory of reconciling the

two elements, which many of Rome's subjects found incompatible—'Empire' and 'liberty.' A Constitution which secures equal rights for all under the ample folds of the British flag has given a new meaning to the old motto, '*Imperium et Libertas.*' Never before in history has the unique spectacle been presented to the world of sovereignty wielded by the parent State on the slender basis of mutual consent. The philosophic spectator of all time and all existence may wonder, perchance, what changes the future has in store for the teeming millions of British India, which is still a dependency in the true sense of the word. Such speculation is equally applicable, on a lower political level, to the native races of South Africa, and even to the negro population of the United States. But if Britain's Imperial temper remains as it has been—and there is little danger of any change—the element of the consent of the governed will never be lost sight of. India is in a state of tutelage, and for the rest the Empire may be aptly described as a system of democratic republics under the gentle sovereignty of the Mother-land. By the admission, even of those who love it least, it has stood in the main for justice and liberty, for honest and efficient administration, for the expansion of freedom of trade, and for a strict and scrupulous impartiality between races and religions. If these had not been its strongest pillars, the loosely-compacted structure which we know to-day would hardly have stood the test of time.

How Canada was obtained.

Whatever may be the ultimate destiny of Canada, she will never have cause to regret that she grew up with the Empire. The story of that growth cannot be told, even in outline, without reference to the history of the two nations whose friendship is to-day one of our greatest Imperial assets—France and the United States. It was her successful termination of the long wars against Napoleon that secured to England her remaining

possessions in North America, in spite of the somewhat unfriendly inroad of 1812, made in the name of freedom by the youthful Republic to the South; and the subsequent development of the Dominion is bound up with two factors which past history has rendered essential and indispensable, viz.: First, harmonious cooperation between the two races, which the conquest of Canada left in possession of the soil; and, secondly, ungrudging recognition on the part of the United States that there is ample room on the North American Continent for the evolution of a political ideal, a type of citizenship, and a pattern of civilization, somewhat different from its own.

Space cannot be found here for more than the barest reference to the story of the conquest of Canada, though it is one which is highly gratifying to British pride. At first the greatest gainers by the downfall of New France were our own Colonies in New England. The deliberate attempt to keep these Colonies cooped up along a comparatively narrow seaboard was foiled by Wolfe's capture of Quebec. That heroic achievement, which was only part of a wider struggle in two hemispheres at once, decided the future of the whole Continent of North America. It may be said also to have led up to the American War of Independence. For, if success had not crowned the British arms in the previous struggle, the thirteen Colonies would have had their hands full in keeping the French at bay, and would have had still to rely on British support. Destiny had decreed, however, that New France should survive on the American Continent enshrined mainly in the institutions and traditions of the Canadian Province of Quebec. Everyone is aware how different has been the fate of the region which is known as the State of Louisiana in the American Union.

One of the untoward results of the American Revolution was the dualism which it set up between the new Republic and the British possessions on its northern border. At the time of the conquest, Canada, and

what was then known as Acadia, contained only a handful of about 60,000 settlers, and it is the best possible evidence of the essential equity of the new British administration that these French-Canadians resisted every temptation to join hands with the revolting Colonies. As a consequence, Canada came to be something of a thorn in the side of George Washington. Indeed, he prophesied that the country to the north would be a source of trouble to the Union, and might bring it even to the verge of war. Washington's inability to appreciate the point of view of the United Empire Loyalists is, perhaps, the only regrettable feature in the career of one whom many Britons would be glad to claim as one of their national heroes. The persecutions which the United Empire Loyalists had to undergo at the hands of their insurgent fellow-citizens should not be overlooked in the story of the early days of what is now the Canadian Dominion. For conscience' sake they forsook all and fled, making their way mainly into what we now know as Ontario, as well as into Acadia and the Maritime Provinces. These Ontario settlers had the opportunity, however, of adding a glorious page to their country's annals by the resistance they offered to the American invasion of 1812-1815. They were no more numerous then than the French-Canadians had been at the time of the conquest, and yet they succeeded in showing that the war party in the United States, with its raucous cry of 'On to Canada!' had made as great a miscalculation of actual conditions as Carthage, when she fancied that the invading Hannibal would be able to draw away the Italian tribes from their allegiance to Rome. The story of this short war is full of the record of the prowess of Canadians, English, French, Scotch, Irish, and Indian. And as their successes secured the country from further organized attack, the significance of such engagements as those of Queenston Heights and Chrystler's Farm, and Lundy's Lane and Chateauguay, should be correctly appreciated by all who wish to understand the

story of our Imperial development, or the strain of heroic character which is leavening the nationality of Canada.

The subsequent history of the country is mainly a record of the steady growth of self-government, interrupted by periods of political strife, and even rebellion, which only resulted in hastening that consolidation in which the country rejoices now as the joint result of Canadian patience and the British instinct of political wisdom. It is no longer with isolated portions of an undefined territory, but with one of the most remarkable federations of modern times, stretching from ocean to ocean in the shape of the Canadian Dominion, that we have to do when we think of 'Canada and her Future.'

What the Empire is doing for Canada.

Amongst the advantages which the Empire confers on Canada, there is the beneficial influence of the Crown, which has meant a good deal in the development of the constitution, both in itself and also in the succession of able and distinguished Governors-General by whom it has been represented in Canada. Another obvious advantage is the security conferred on trade and commerce, and on the national interests of the country generally, by Great Britain's command of the seas. On this subject something will be said later on; meanwhile, the authority may be quoted of a Canadian expert, Major William Wood, of the 8th Royal Rifles, who lately penned the following sentence: 'And so whenever Canadians look outward to those long, open sea-ways, where half their wealth and credit is continually afloat among the great mail-fisted nations of the world, they still may have the satisfaction of knowing that they remain secure under the guardian care of that "British" navy to whose support they have, as yet, given no single item from all their national resources—not a ship, not a dollar, not a man.'

This extract may serve to secure an indulgent hearing for a good deal that has to be entered on the other side of the account. For there are directions in which England could do more for Canada than she is doing at present, partly in regard to feeling and sentiment, partly in more concrete matters. To take the latter first. The recent exposure by Sir George Drummond of certain postal anomalies, and their effects, is not considered in Canada to have been adequately met by Lord Stanley's reply that it would cost too much to remedy them. For example, the postage rate on newspapers, magazines, etc., from Canada to England is only ½ cent per pound, whereas that from England to Canada is no less than 8 cents per pound, and the rate to Canada from the United States is 1 cent per pound. In view of the flooding of the Canadian market by cheap American literature, or English periodicals dressed up with American advertisements, it was quite natural that the Canadian Senate should unanimously affirm the desirability of applying the preferential principle to the postal charges for the conveyance of inter-Imperial mails, and it may be hoped that when the British Post-Office has had a little more time to work out the question of ways and means, something will be done to conciliate Canadian opinion in a matter which bears so powerfully on the spread of Imperial feeling and sentiment. The fact ought not to be overlooked, though it seems so far to have escaped notice, that the Canadian Post-Office has to carry its mail matter on an average some 2,000 miles, as against, at the highest figure, an average of 200 miles in England. Receiving nothing for the delivery of the mails from outside, it therefore performs a more onerous service on every pound of mail matter. Again, more might probably have been done also by the home authorities in times past to direct the stream of emigration from the Old Country to Canada's shores. The consideration that British emigrants to Canada, besides receiving substantial land grants, do not need to make any change

of allegiance, hardly seems to have been allowed its full force hitherto. But organized effort is now accomplishing greater results, and the immediate future will show the extent to which the Old Country, as well as Canada, may benefit by the increased prosperity of settlers who do not go outside the limits of the Empire. Again, when Canadians note the violation of the rigid rules of orthodox economics involved in the subsidy recently voted to Atlantic liners to United States ports, they are inclined to argue that not much harm would be done by a further extension of the system to steamship lines that are British owned and that ply within the British Empire. Generous mail subsidies, such as the Annual Reports of the United States Commissioner of Navigation show to be quite common in other countries, would enable Canada to put on a transatlantic service equal or superior to that of the United States, and thus secure to her the advantage of her geographical position. Even some economic excesses would be pardoned to the Home Government by way of atonement for the deplorable lack of imagination and foresight shown some forty years ago—as, for example, when British statesmen solemnly bound Great Britain to give Germany equal rights with herself in the Canadian market. That may be mentioned here, because the denunciation of the German treaty stands to England's credit in her more recent dealings with her greatest and most prosperous Colony. Again, it might have been expected, in view of the close relations between the two countries, that British capital would by this time have got over its shyness of sound Canadian investments. Money is needed for the expansion of industry; for the development of agriculture and forest lands; of copper, coal, nickel, and other mines; of fisheries, etc.; and it is a matter of great regret that, when British capital could be judiciously expended, Americans should be getting so firm a hold on the best investments that offer. Nothing need be said here about the possibility that the Old Country may be

led in some way to reciprocate the Canadian preference. That would lead us into the heart of the Fiscal Problem, which would demand a paper to itself. Besides, the almost unanimous attitude of Canadians is that this is a question which must be left to Great Britain itself. They are glad that it is leading their kinsfolk at home to take a larger interest in the questions of the Empire and the elements of Imperial well-being and progress.

What is sometimes referred to in Canada as British inertia in the field of action is, however, of little account, after all, alongside of the increased feeling of kindliness and brotherhood which is the fruit of closer relations and better knowledge. Canada is much more to England nowadays than a 'few acres of snow,' a land with an arctic temperature sheeted in perpetual ice! Improved communications and the spread of information are doing their work. Recognition should be made here of the efforts put forth at home by such organizations as the Victoria League, the League of the Empire, and others. Under such influences the type of Briton will soon entirely disappear that goes on stolidly affixing a 2½d. stamp to his letters, with the direction, 'Canada, U.S.A.'!

What Canada is doing for the Empire.

As it is desirable to be quite definite under this head, a series of statements is here made which, it is hoped, will find general acceptance. The important issue of a contribution to Imperial Defence will be dealt with in the concluding section.

1. It may be said, to begin with, that Canada serves the Empire by preserving and continuing the tradition of loyalty, and that her readiness to remain in partnership is an undoubted source of prestige, as well as of military advantage. Especially, in view of her now rapid growth in wealth, population, and national spirit, the Dominion may be said to be adding daily to the resources of the Empire.

2. As an excellent field for emigration, Canada furnishes Great Britain with an outlet for her surplus population. A grant of 160 acres of farm-lands is made by the Colonial Government to *bonâ-fide* settlers in the North-West. In this way the Dominion plays a special part in providing ground for the expansion of the Empire. For, without any change of allegiance, the British emigrant finds in his new home opportunities of improving his condition which he could never have enjoyed in the land of his birth. The race is renewed by contact with the soil of a new country, and the old land profits by the increased prosperity of its Imperial offshoots.

3. Canada furnishes a field for the investment of British capital, still under the flag.

4. In the militia of the Dominion Canada maintains a force of approximately 40,000 volunteers, of whom about 1,500 are enrolled in permanent corps for instructional purposes. This small permanent force, which is practically composed of regulars, will be increased to 4,000 by the change to be mentioned in the next section. It should also be stated that, through the commissions given every year to the most successful cadets of the Royal Military College at Kingston, Canada has contributed something also to the personnel of the British army. This privilege will, it is understood, be extended in the near future to the Canadian Universities as well.

5. The Dominion Government has arranged to maintain Halifax and Esquimault henceforward at their present standard of equipment, for the use of British ships of war. The equipment includes unlimited steaming coal, and it is understood that the resultant expenditure will be some $2,000,000 in the coming fiscal year.

6. Apart from such undertakings and obligations, the Canadian people showed, by their spontaneous action during the South African War, with all the possibilities for the future which it implied, that they might be counted on in an emergency.

7. At a cost of heavy subsidies, Canada has provided, in the Canadian Pacific Railway, a transcontinental road that will be available, when necessary, for the transport of British troops and munitions to the East. Moreover, in the construction of the Grand Trunk Pacific she will have completed before very long a parallel road sufficiently remote from the American frontier to render relatively small the risk of its being cut. And as these roads may become specially valuable in time of war, so also in time of peace they will be increasingly used by travellers from the outskirts of the Empire, who will gladly avail themselves of improved means of intercommunication to travel by an 'all-British route.'

8. In providing five-eighteenths of the cost of the Transpacific cable—a line constructed primarily in the strategic and commercial interests of Great Britain—Canada paid even more than her share. Australia pays six-eighteenths, and New Zealand two-eighteenths.

9. Canada has shown her willingness to strengthen trade relations by granting a rebate of one-third of the Customs duties not only to Great Britain and Ireland, but also to New Zealand, Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony and the West Indies. Under this preference British imports into Canada have greatly increased of recent years, though it must be remembered that other nations have by no means stood still. Perhaps the best way of realizing the extent of the boon would be to inquire where—in the face of their competition—British trade would have been *without* the preference. It may be stated here that Canadian opinion seems to be almost solid in favour of the expediency of a preferential tariff.

10. Last comes the question of a contribution to Imperial revenues, in return for the services rendered to Canada by the army, the navy, the consular service, and the diplomatic corps. This is not so easy a matter as might appear on the surface. It is generally discussed in connection with the navy only, and here it will be as well to begin with the facts.

The following figures are taken from the *Canadian Almanac* for 1905 (pp. 133, 134):

CONTRIBUTIONS TO NAVAL DEFENCE.

	£
India	103,400
Australia	200,000
New Zealand	40,000
Cape Colony	50,000
Natal	35,000
Newfoundland	3,000
Canada	Nothing
Total Colonial contribution ...	431,400
Total naval estimates (1904-1905)	£38,300,000

These are the facts. What is the explanation? We may begin by setting aside certain suggested explanations, which mean nothing. The Canadian Government itself did not reap great glory when it sent word to London, before the last Colonial Conference, that its delegates would not be prepared to discuss Imperial Defence, *because* no one scheme of defence could be devised that would suit the different conditions of the outlying parts of the Empire. Nor will it do to say that the British navy is there, anyway, and that the expenditure on it would not be decreased even if Canada did not exist. Self-respecting Canadians like to pay their way in the world. There was an incident the other day in which a Halifax sealer was roughly handled at Montevideo, and which might have required the help not only of the British Diplomatic Corps, but also of a man-of-war. And not long ago, in one and the same issue of their morning papers, they read an account of a speech in which an Irish member took it upon him to declare in the House of Commons that Canada would never contribute to the navy, while in another column they read that the British Government had despatched a man-of-war to rescue certain Canadian missionaries from a place of danger on the Chinese coast. Moreover,

Canada has been making strides in shipping, and is quite in a position to appreciate the fact that the navy is a national insurance, essential to the safety and welfare of the whole Empire.*

Again, we may reject as meaningless and insincere the statement that anything Canada could contribute would appear so infinitesimal alongside of the expenditure of the Mother-land that it would be hardly worth while to offer it.

In seeking to discover the real explanation of a phenomenon which certainly attracts attention and excites surprise in England, especially in view of Canada's loud protestations of affectionate loyalty, the following points seem worthy of some consideration :

(*a*) Notwithstanding the flourishing condition of the country, it contains, as yet, comparatively little realized wealth. It is potentially rich, but borrowed capital figures largely in the existing business situation. Moreover, it has not been accustomed to high taxation, which in new communities tends to check initiative and to retard industrial exploitation.

(*b*) Nor is it unfair to remind Canada's critics that the Dominion has been doing a great deal for the Empire in helping to build transcontinental railways, and to develop a good canal system. Considering that his ancestors started in the wilderness without capital only about a hundred years ago (with the exception of the Laurentian valley and one or two smaller districts) the average Canadian thinks that they, and he, have done a good deal to improve an important part of the British possessions.†

* A recent calculation shows that our naval expenditure involves an outlay of £3 2s. 6d. for every ton of mercantile marine. We are spending less for the safeguarding of our mercantile shipping than any other nation except Japan, the figures being: Japan, £2 4s. 4d.; British Empire, £3 2s. 6d.; Germany, £4 18s.; Russia, £18 3s. 10d.; United States, £19 10s. 2d.

† This view derives some support from a passage in Burke's speech on 'Conciliation with the Colonies': 'But to clear up my

(*c*) Moreover, it was for long a ruling maxim in the diplomacy of the neighbouring republic that the American continent should keep clear of European complications, and the considerations which prompted this policy have always had great weight also throughout the Dominion. While the general march of events, as well as the contraction of the globe through rapid transit, militates strongly against this view, it is one which many cannot give up without regret.

(*d*) Then there is the attitude of a large section of the French-Canadians, whose services to the Empire entitle them to the greatest possible consideration. Their loyalty to British rule is cordially acknowledged; it is, in fact, assured by the solid advantages which they enjoy under the Constitution. But it is a loyalty to the *status quo*—a passive, rather than an active, loyalty. It cannot be wondered at that their training and sympathies have not led them, so far, to feel any great enthusiasm for British political ideals in the wider sense. They cherish local rather than Imperial ideals, and cultivate a national rather than an Imperial patriotism. For

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ideas on this subject—a revenue from America transmitted hither—do not delude themselves—you can never receive it—No, not a shilling. We have experience that from remote countries it is not to be expected. If, when you attempted to extract revenue from Bengal, you were obliged to return in loan what you had taken in imposition, what can you expect from North America? For, certainly, if ever there was a country qualified to produce wealth, it is India; or an institution fit for the transmission, it is the East India Company. America has none of these aptitudes. If America gives you taxable objects, on which you lay your duties here, and gives you, at the same time, a surplus by a foreign sale of her commodities to pay the duties on these objects which you tax at home, she has performed her part to the British revenue. But with regard to her own internal establishments she may, I doubt not she will, contribute in moderation. I say in moderation, for she ought not to be permitted to exhaust herself. She ought to be reserved to a war, the weight of which, with the enemies that we are most likely to have, must be considerable in her quarter of the globe. 'There she may serve you, and serve you essentially.'

this reason it cannot be said that French-Canadians as a unit would be likely to favour any movement in this direction at present.

(*e*) Apart from this factor, however, there is a residuum of difficulty which must be attributed to the Canadian feeling of nationhood—the desire to be something more than a 'colony,' a mere appanage of the Imperial system. Lord Dufferin (than whom no Governor-General ever did more for the British connection) became aware of this feeling as soon as he came to Canada, and discussed the subject in a most interesting letter to Lord Carnarvon (*vide* Sir Alfred Lyall's 'Life,' vol. i., pp. 229-231). The sentiment has no necessary connection with any vague or premature aspirations for 'independence.' It rather amounts to a tacit protest against any action that might tend to stereotype the present status of the Dominion as a protected dependency. From this point of view any taxation for Imperial purposes, however small, could hardly fail to raise the difficult questions of representation and the claim to have a fair share in the determination of Imperial policy. Its advocates would probably argue that it would be better to remain, as it were, in tutelage for a while longer, until the colonial phase of her history could be quite outgrown, and Canada, as a nation, could assume a fuller partnership than is possible at present in the duties and responsibilities of Empire, as well as in its profits and advantages.

Meanwhile, in spite of the fact that Canada has not yet come up to the level of Imperial expectations in this regard, the essential thing is that there never was a time at which the spirit of loyal attachment was deeper or more widely spread. It has shown itself in various ways, and it may be depended on to make itself felt in working out an eventual solution of the problem under consideration.

Thirty years ago Lord Dufferin, speaking, perhaps, to some extent by way of anticipation, said: 'There is not a man in England who does not understand, and to whose imagination it has not been forcibly brought home, that beyond the circuit of the narrow seas which confine this island, are vast territories, inhabited by powerful communities who are actuated by ideas similar to our own, who are proud to own allegiance to the British Crown, whose material resources are greater than those possessed by his own country, and whose ultimate power may perhaps exceed the power of Great Britain.' That is certainly how all Englishmen ought to feel towards their nearest, greatest, most powerful, and most prosperous Colony. And if such language was no more than the facts warranted some thirty years ago, how much more appropriate and forcible must it be held to-day!

It is a charge against Transatlantic habits of thought that too much is apt to be made of mere size; but it will, nevertheless, bear to be stated that the area of the Dominion is thirty-one times that of the United Kingdom, and twice that of Russia in Europe. It embraces 40 per cent. of the entire area of the British Empire.

Throughout this vast territory the outlook is such as to justify the oft-repeated boast that the twentieth century is to be with Canada. Last century was with the United States. And where the United States stood, say, forty years ago, there stands Canada to-day. Indeed, having regard to her splendid resources, to her growing population, to the facilities of transportation by land and sea, and to the increasing pressure on the means of subsistence in European countries, one is justified in considering it possible that within the next half century Canada may even outrival the experience of the United States in the rapidity of her general development. Any reluctance to realize and acknowledge the extent of the present growth of the Dominion

—such as is occasionally met with south of the 'line'—should be set down at once as evidence of a wish that she should not falsify prophecy and disturb settled convictions by attaining to such development under her existing political conditions. In the statement that Canada 'would never amount to anything,' the wish has been, as a rule, father to the thought.

No country in the world has shown such increases in its trade and commerce during the past five years in proportion to the population. Within that period the figures for both exports and imports have nearly doubled.

But it is, of course, as the future granary of the Empire that Canada bulks most largely, on the material side, with the people of Great Britain. She has still some 250 million acres of the best agricultural land in the world to be taken up. There is a general consensus of opinion that it would be difficult to exaggerate the future of the Canadian North-West. A recent writer (Mr. A. G. Bradley) speaks of this great region as 'the home of the necessities, not the luxuries, of man; where beef, mutton, and pork, wheat, oats, and the main vegetables can all be produced of the highest quality, and in the greatest abundance; where the Northern races—nay, even Italians and Galicians for that matter—can thrive and flourish in an atmosphere conducive to their native vigour, and even stimulating to it. . . . There are very few sections of the United States that ever had such a prospect. . . . The northern limit of the farming belt, and of comfortable human settlement, has been indefinitely extended by a better knowledge of the country. Edmonton, hitherto a sort of northern *ultima Thule* will become a distributing point for vast regions far to the North and North-West, even to the fertile levels of the Peace River, where wheat is now known to grow as surely and as strongly as in Manitoba itself. Abundant water-power, ample timber, an almost universally flat, fertile, and extremely smooth-lying soil over a region half as big as Europe confronts us here.'

The potentialities of the region here referred to will inevitably remind the reader of Canadian interest in the Fiscal Problem. Whatever may be the issue of the controversy now current, it cannot be doubted that no question could be raised that is better fitted to give the masses of the people an effective training in economic and political problems. It is, in fact, a national and Imperial issue, which ought to be kept outside the range of party politics. Possibly it is not a Christian—for the matter of that, hardly even a Stoic—ideal that nation should be set against nation in the effort to make itself self-supporting. But the driving force of nationality counts for much in the commerce of the modern world, and if Great Britain should be led to depart from the orthodox principles of Free Trade, she will be able to console herself with the reflection that she was not the first. In Canada the prevailing opinion seems to be that there is really no inconsistency—in view of changed conditions—in holding that, while free imports was the true policy for England fifty years ago, something different may be called for to-day. The British working man, on the other hand, both in town and country, is obviously afraid of the dear loaf and of rising prices, which will tend to enrich the landlord and the manufacturer. And it is not easy to see how a country like Canada can reciprocate further than she has already done in advance. The desire of Canadians to manufacture for themselves, and to enjoy complete autonomy in industry and commerce, is undoubtedly a great factor in what has been referred to above as the modern spirit of Canadian nationality. The present attitude of the woollen and cotton manufacturers is enough to show that further tariff concessions are improbable. And any artificial attempt to divert, on a large scale, to Britain the trade which she at present fails to do with the Dominion would, at least as regards some items, involve a breach of the operation of natural economic laws. This is one of the most difficult features of the present situation. Of Canada's imports from the United States,

about half consists of non-dutiable articles which could hardly come from elsewhere—certainly not from Britain, no matter how large a preference she might enjoy. But trade begets trade, and an English manufacturer of a certain line of machinery told the writer only the other day that he found it difficult to get orders in the Dominion: in such matters, he said, the Canadians are initiative, and prefer to supply themselves from the United States. There can be no doubt that, in spite of sentiment and adverse tariffs, a natural affinity in matters commercial exists between the two neighbouring peoples. This, however, cannot be held to invalidate the position that, in regard to the Colonies generally, it is the interest and duty of the Mother-land to make every legitimate effort to establish the closest possible commercial union. It stands to reason that the Colonies must increase in population more rapidly than other parts of the world, and the experience of the next twenty-five years is certain to show that it was worth while now to try to make their trade flow in home channels. It is from this point of view that the advocates of tariff reform and revision feel justified in arguing that it should be made an item in a well-considered system of constructive and progressive Imperial statesmanship.

And a closer commercial union—even if secured by treaties made with each of the Colonies separately—could not, after all, be scouted as a 'squalid' basis for the Imperial consolidation which is so much in men's thoughts to-day. In a recent article in the *Monthly Review* (January, 1905), Mr. Solano ably sustains the thesis that the history of British Imperial Dominion is practically one of the spread of civilization through economic expansion. 'To whatever accident the British owe their descent upon the various continents of the world, this fact is clear—that they have remained established upon them; that they continue, to-day, to spread over the face of them, by the force and virtue of economic activity.' The next chapter in the history of this economic activity, considered as a dynamic force

for the spread of civilization, may well be an attempt to consolidate Imperial relations of trade. Certainly in Canada any well-considered policy that will promote commercial and industrial development will be welcomed by the whole body of the people. Reference was made in an earlier part of this paper to the attitude of the French-Canadians to this and other matters. It is fortunate in many ways that the destinies of the Dominion should be wielded at the present time by a French-Canadian Premier. Sir Wilfrid Laurier has spoken in favour of commercial treaties with the Mother-land; he is even on record as prepared to contemplate an evolution in which the federal idea will present itself quite naturally, when 'a Parliament will, perhaps, be created, in which both the Colonies and the Mother Country will be proportionally and equitably represented, and in which common interest will be discussed with full respect to the interest of each.'

It must be admitted, however, that here Sir Wilfrid Laurier has a more difficult part to play, as any active steps towards the realization of such an ideal would not be very acceptable to the general body of his French-Canadian fellow-countrymen. This is a subject which is generally spoken of, as it were, with bated breath. But there seems to be no good reason why the facts should not be stated quietly and dispassionately. They involve no discredit to an important and highly influential section of the Canadian people, whose long residence and varied political fortunes give it a claim to ample consideration in connection with any suggested constitutional change. No one who knows the circumstances of the Dominion would expect from French-Canadians the same interest in the affairs of the British Empire as from their English-speaking fellow-citizens. It is no disparagement to them to say that they do not 'come of the blood.' They are of another stock, and one well qualified to contribute to the common fund elements that might otherwise be lacking—social grace and vivacity, artistic and literary culture, and a spirit of

happy contentment that furnishes a pleasing contrast to the rush of life on the American Continent. Their position within the Empire is altogether unique, and at the same time profoundly interesting. They own a double allegiance: on the one hand to the British Crown, as the Power which guarantees them the free use and enjoyment of their institutions, their language, and their laws, and, on the other hand, to the traditions of their race, the memories of the country from whence they came, but from which they have long been politically separated, and the associations of a literature which they proudly claim as their part heritage. And behind, or even above, these allegiances is their devotion to the soil of Canada—their native land. To the French-Canadian 'Imperialism' has been made a word of fear, implying military aggression, and the forceful overlordship of subject peoples, instead of a 'business proposition' for cooperation in commerce, defence, and other matters. They are being taught by some of their leading spokesmen to regard a closer union with the Empire as incompatible with nationhood. They are exhorted not to forget that their rights and privileges were secured to them by the 'contract' which was made at the time of the conquest, and expanded afterwards in later instruments such as the Quebec Act and the Act of 1791. The separate school question in the new provinces, which is absorbing at present so much of the time and attention of the Canadian Parliament, is only another chapter in the French-Canadian version of the history of 'State rights.' There was a time when they dreamed of dominating the North-West, and encircling British Ontario by a French nation on both flanks. That dream has passed away, and in the light of the conditions which have replaced it we may feel confident that, no matter what it may it be found politically expedient to legislate at Ottawa, the future of the North-West will inevitably assert itself. Twenty years will be a long enough period to show whether the new provinces will reproduce the conditions which grew up in Eastern

Canada, as the result of specific contract, before Confederation, or whether wider national ideals shall prevail, such as encourage Catholics and Protestants alike, on the other side of the line, to use the same schools and Universities. Meanwhile English aloofness and stolidity are almost as much to blame as Church ascendancy for the cultivation of separate interests, and the slowness of the process of national unification. Both sections of the population are aware that the development of their common country, and even the integrity of confederation, dépend on their harmonious cooperation. But in many matters they remain apart, and in none more than in regard to current proposals for Imperial consolidation. Mr. Henri Bourassa, for example, is of opinion that while his French-Canadian fellow-citizen has done his full duty to Great Britain, 'by the Empire he does not feel that he has any duty to perform' (*Monthly Review*, October, 1902, p. 59). A hostile attack on Australia or New Zealand would not necessarily mean anything to him, unless he happened to be in a mood to allow volunteers to go to the rescue. The programme of *La Ligne Nationaliste*, as published in the Canadian press, has probably never found its way into the English journals. It would be somewhat disturbing reading for optimists at home. Briefly, Canada is self-contained, and it is the peculiar mission of the French-Canadians—at least, as represented by Mr. Bourassa and *La Ligne*—to keep her so. Some of them will even discuss the admission of Newfoundland to Confederation from the point of view of its bearing on French-Canadian influence in the Dominion!

These are not the ideals which make for future greatness. At the same time they have to be reckoned with in a spirit of sweet reasonableness and calm expostulation, not of resentful recrimination. They are not in accord with the general trend of political thought at home, as represented by either of the two great parties. 'I believe that if anyone can suggest a scheme by which our self-governing Colonies can be brought

into closer relationship with the Mother Country, in which they can bear their share of the Imperial defences, and have also a share of consultation in Imperial matters, I believe the Liberal party would heartily welcome the proposal.' These are the words of a leading English statesman, the Right Hon. James Bryce. But the fact has to be faced, that when such proposals come to be made, they will nowhere meet with greater opposition than in a large portion of French-Canada. That will be the time of great difficulty so far as regards the application to Canada of the 'Imperial idea.' It will be the time also—if, indeed, that time be not already come—to urge with all due consideration and defence, that the great Dominion which we know to-day, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, is *not* the little corner which Britain absorbed by right of conquest a century and a half ago. The federation of the Empire, if otherwise desirable and possible, will not be blocked by the spirit of racial or religious sectionalism. And in proportion as Canada can achieve solidarity for herself, and bring about the gradual suppression of such elements, whether French or English, as prevent her harmonious and homogeneous development, in like proportion will she fit herself for taking the part which belongs of right to her, the leading part in the working out of a system of Imperial consolidation. She is the first of the 'new nations within the Empire.' Can she wish for a higher or a weightier rôle?

CANADIAN AGRICULTURE AND RURAL EDUCATION

By JAMES W. ROBERTSON

Canada is essentially an agricultural country. Most of its wealth must come first from its farms. Its material prosperity, at present in sturdy evidence on all sides, rests upon gainful agriculture.

The soil, the climate, and the intelligence and industry of the people, are favourable for the production of a great variety of food products of exceptionally good qualities from farms, gardens, orchards, and vineyards; and the extensive sea coasts, great lakes, rivers and streams, abound with the finest of fish.

Over 45 per cent. of the population of Canada are engaged in agricultural occupations. There are vast areas of fertile soil from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and the climate or climates range from subtropical to subarctic, with a rainfall varying from 67 inches per annum in British Columbia, 17 inches in Manitoba, to from 30 to 45 inches in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. The mainland practically lies between 60° W. longitude and 125° W. longitude. The distance across Canada from east to west is rather more than one-sixth of the distance around the earth at that latitude. It extends from a little south of 42° N. latitude to the Arctic regions. The latitude of the settled portions of the eastern half of Canada coincides with that of France. To the west of the middle line—95° W. longitude—lies the great prairie region, begin-

ning with the province of Manitoba, stretching westward for 800 miles to the foot-hills of the Rocky Mountains, and extending about 400 miles northward from the United States boundary. Seven hundred miles of mountainous regions, with fertile valleys hidden among them, are crumpled in between the prairies and the Pacific coast. The climate, on the whole, is warmer in summer and colder in winter than in corresponding latitudes in Europe. It has a land surface nearly twenty-nine times larger than Great Britain and Ireland, or seventeen times larger than France. If the area of the whole of Europe be represented by twelve, then the area of Canada would be eleven. Large tracts in the northern Arctic regions are uninhabitable, and entirely useless for the production of foods; but across the continent there is a zone about 3,500 miles long, and nearly as wide as France, with a climate adapted to the production of foods of a superior quality. Within that belt there are some mountainous regions and not a few hundred miles of arid prairies, where the settlement will always be sparse and the production of foods scanty. These comparisons indicate roughly the enormous capacity of Canada for the production of foods. The soil has been found fertile. That of Manitoba and the North-West territories is rich in the constituents of plant food to a degree that surpasses nearly all the soils of Europe. The freezing of the land in winter, which at first sight seems a drawback, retains the soluble nitrates, which might otherwise be drained out. By competent authorities in England it has been estimated that the drainage in that country from November to March carries off to the sea a quantity of nitrates per acre sufficient for an average crop of wheat.

There have been many and great changes in the methods of agriculture during recent years. It has grown to mean more than the cultivation of land. In its primitive state, the practice was to disturb the bosom of Mother Earth, plant seeds, reap, and eat the crop.

Muscular strength was its mainstay, and the constant exercise of rigorous self-denial almost its only economy. Its chief difficulties seem to have been of a similar character to those which Adam experienced after his Paradise was lost. In the growing of crops, unfavourable weather, weeds, insects, and fungous diseases, are called blessings in disguise. The disguise is unquestionably good.

Nowadays, agriculture may be said to include not only the cultivation of land, but the culture of the people who live on the land. The efforts of the farmer must be directed by intelligent purpose, if he is to prove successful in maintaining the fertility of the soil, in raising and keeping live-stock profitably, and in preparing products for markets. This all calls for education suitable to his needs. Such an education fits the people to derive happiness, material prosperity, and vigour of body, with strong gentleness of spirit, from their rural occupations. It is not so common now as it was to hear that sort of education sneered at as 'utilitarian' by those who hold to the mischievous notion that culture consists in acquiring and exhibiting conventional manners, and is shown at its best by a life of idleness in the midst of beautiful and luxurious surroundings. To the educated farmer that sort of thing is corrosion and corruption of the fibres of physical, mental, and moral life.

The wholesome fruits of culture are satisfying and nourishing only to those who follow a worthy course of action, careless of personal ease, for some important public good. To many of us who are working for the improvement of rural education, it appears that moral courage and intellectual enjoyments rest upon, and rise from, the basis of a people like Canadians, who are intelligent, capable, and disposed to work together for the good of all; who are well fed and well clothed; who live in comfortable houses; and who keep themselves perfectly clean.

Certain places are especially adapted for certain rural

industries. The province of Prince Edward Island is adapted for dairying through butter and cheese factories, but that business was going backward for want of information and education. In the year 1892, with the assistance of money given by the Dominion Government, one cooperative cheese factory was started at New Perth, in Prince Edward Island. The machinery was lent by the Government. An instructor was sent to organize the business and to arrange the locality into routes for the convenience of those supplying milk. The factory was managed as a Government dairy station, as an object-lesson for the education of the people in cooperative dairying. In the autumn of 1892 I took the liberty of exporting to London $3,600 worth of cheese manufactured at that station, and I can recall the remonstrances of some of the people against risking their cheese in any steamer. I got fault-finding letters asking me why I did not sell the cheese at home, or in Halifax, Nova Scotia. The cheese was delivered in England, and was sold there for the top market price. Some of it, indeed, sold for sixpence per hundredweight more. I angled for that sixpence, and got it. Then, when the island people knew that they had got sixpence per hundredweight more for their cheese than was paid for any other Canadian cheese sold that day in London, it put new faith, hope, and courage into them. That was the beginning of the export of cheese from Prince Edward Island—to the value of $3,600. At the taking of the census in 1891, the four cheese factories in Prince Edward Island were put in the returns as having an output worth $8,448 ; ten years later, when the census of 1901 was taken, there were forty-seven cheese and butter factories, with an output valued at $566,824. There is an instance of the result of organization and education ! There had been no increase in the number of acres of land occupied, and but little increase in the number of cows kept. The change had been in the quality of the intelligent labour applied to the conditions. The people now run their own factories,

and have repaid to the Government every dollar that was lent to them. There is no part of agriculture that is not susceptible to the same kind of improvement.

Here is another instance on a larger scale. The province of Ontario is noted for the products of its cheese factories and creameries. It made great advancement in quality and in quantity as between the two census years 1891 and 1901. The province of Quebec had not advanced so far in cooperative dairying; but a beginning had been made in organizing its cheese factories and creameries into syndicates. The syndicate was a group of cheese factories or butter factories employing the services of a travelling instructor. In 1892 a dairy school for the province of Quebec was started by the provincial authorities; and the Department of Agriculture of the Federal Government at Ottawa authorized me, as Commissioner, to turn in $3,000 a year of federal money to help the dairy school at St. Hyacinthe—to promote dairying and agriculture by means of education. We did not call it education. That might have been an unconscious slap at the Constitution of Canada, which, by the British North America Act, is said to reserve all legislation affecting education to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislatures. We began by giving short courses. Some of the wiseacres said it was foolish to think of imparting any education worthy of the name in a two weeks' course. However, we made it a rule that only students should be admitted who had worked for one year in a cheese factory or butter factory. We had neither the time nor the money to devote to those floating atoms who, in an indefinite way, wanted a college education for dairying. No one could get the course at St. Hyacinthe unless he had previously had one year of practical experience. These were the very people we wanted to help. These were they who needed help. Then, the provincial authorities went further in organizing the factories into syndicates. No one was allowed to become a syndicate instructor unless he had taken the course, or courses, of instruction at

the St. Hyacinthe Dairy School. During the first year (1892-1893) 214 students took the course; the next year there were 268 students; in the third year 328, and so on. The people of the province of Quebec were generally supposed to be far behind those of Ontario in education and cooperation as applied to dairying and agriculture generally. The returns in the census of 1901 revealed some of the results of the educational campaign. Ontario made great progress, but Quebec made much more. The following table is indicative in part of what was accomplished:

VALUE OF PRODUCT FROM COOPERATIVE BUTTER AND CHEESE FACTORIES AS RETURNED IN THE TWO CENSUS YEARS 1901 AND 1891.

	Ontario.	Quebec.
Value in 1900	$14,706,303	$12,261,898
Value in 1890	7,569,338	2,918,527
Increase	$7,136,965	$9,343,371

The development of this industry, which has increased the desire and capacity of the rural populations to cooperate in other ways, is traceable directly to education and guidance towards organization. I believe that similar means would be equally effective in the whole range of agriculture, from the cultivation of the soil to the preparation and shipping of products to ultimate markets.

In 1899 I arranged a competition among Canadian boys and girls in the selecting by hand of large heads of wheat and oats. Each competitor gathered 100 of the best heads he or she could find, and forwarded them to me. One hundred dollars in cash prizes were provided, and awarded to the successful competitors. In 1900 Sir William C. Macdonald, of Montreal, gave me the sum of $10,000 to be distributed in prizes to the successful boys and girls living on Canadian farms who entered into a

competition in the growing and selecting of seed of wheat and oats, according to the plan outlined. Each competitor was required to operate a seed-plot consisting of not less than one-quarter acre during each of three consecutive years, and each year to select from the ripened standing crop of the seed-plot enough large heads of wheat or oats *from the most vigorous and productive plants* to provide well-developed seed for the seed-plot of the succeeding year. The operations of the competitors were inspected from time to time during the term. The parents of the 450 competitors who completed the three years' work were found, as a rule, to be among the best farmers in the localities where they reside. During each of the three years 100 heads were selected and forwarded to me for examination. These were separately threshed, and the cleaned grain was counted and weighed. Certified reports showing the yield from the quarter-acre seed-plot were also received from each competitor.

The increase in the large heads from the crop of 1900 to those from the crop of 1903, on the average for all Canada, was 18 per cent. of increase in the number, and 28 per cent. in the weight, of grain per 100 heads of spring wheat; and 19 per cent. of increase in the number, and 27 per cent. in the weight, of grain per 100 heads of oats.

The export commerce of Canada in farm products is growing very fast. The following table shows the value of the exports of Canadian agricultural and animal products in three years, typical of the expansion in the last twenty:

VALUE OF EXPORTS OF CANADIAN AGRICULTURAL AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS.

1884	(year ending June 30)	...	...	$34,224,195
1894	„	„	„	...	...	47,802,859
1904	„	„	„	...	...	100,950,992

Canada has still large areas of unoccupied wheat lands of great fertility. From all I can learn regarding

those of the vast North-West (and the data are not very exact, full, or clear), I incline to the opinion that 200,000,000 bushels of wheat or its equivalent may be furnished for export from that region within the life-time of the youngest farmer settled there.* One must bear in mind the limitations of production per acre over periods of more than fifteen or twenty years where wheat is the only or chief crop, without such a system of rotation of crops as will hinder weeds from taking full possession of whole districts. That turns one to regard with increasing confidence the capacity of the undeveloped agricultural resources of the older half of Canada (lying between the prairies, or, rather, between the great Lakes Superior and Huron and the Atlantic seaboard) to supply the larger share of the requirements of the United Kingdom for imported foods. The exportation of wheat has played a minor part in the agricultural prosperity of the country. That is made evident by the following table of value of exports. I have put the average figures of five years into each of four periods during the last twenty years to eliminate the presentation of temporary fluctuations which might mislead, and I have held to the use of values rather than quantities in this article, as being the more serviceable means towards giving correct and clear impressions to the citizen of the Empire who reads it.

AVERAGE ANNUAL VALUE OF EXPORTS OF CANADIAN PRODUCTS, 1885 TO 1904 INCLUSIVE.

Period.	All Agricultural and Animal.	Wheat and Flour.	Percentage of Total Values in Wheat and Flour.
1885-1889	$40,022,251	$3,788,922	9·4
1890-1894	46,140,673	5,849,789	12·6
1895-1899	60,997,319	10,680,534	17·5
1900-1904	95,129,793	19,438,380	20·4

* In round figures, that would suffice for the present import demand of the United Kingdom.

Probably the proportion of wheat and flour to total exports will increase in similar ratio for another decade.

What I have said regarding the part which education and organization have played in the advancement of agriculture refers mainly to what has been done for the adult population by Government agencies, voluntary associations of farmers and others, the agricultural press, lectures, and the example of excellent farmers. Not much has been done in the rural schools as yet to educate the children towards aptitudes, inclination, and ability for deriving satisfaction as well as material prosperity from the occupations of rural life. A widespread feeling exists that something more ought to be done to bring rural schools into closer touch with the practical needs of country life. A large number of us believe that the public schools of Canada have played a great part in raising the general level of intelligence to a comparatively high plane. In our appreciation of that, we do not conclude that they are doing all they could do, or all they should do, for the children in rural districts at the present time. The school systems and schools of the towns and cities of the Dominion are unquestionably excellent as compared with those of other countries. The opportunities for education in rural districts in Canada are not more meagre than they are in some other parts of the world, but they are not worthy of Canadians at this time in their history and prosperity.

The neglect of the rural schools has not been from the poverty of the people. Canada is increasing in wealth perhaps faster than any country with a similar proportion of its population depending upon rural employments. The fault has been in the lack of appreciation of the real worth of education to the community. That apathy has left the rural schools in 80 per cent. of the cases in the hands of young women comparatively inexperienced as teachers. There are in round figures some 746,000 children from five to fourteen years of age in the rural districts, and about 450,000 of the same ages

in incorporated villages, towns, and cities. The educational leaders have been concerned with the enlargement of colleges, the improvement of the schools in towns and cities, and the adjustment of them to the needs of urban populations. Little attempt has been made to reform or enrich the course of study or the methods of training at rural schools, which are admittedly less efficient for the needs of the time than they were twenty-five years ago. These and other reasons caused Sir W. C. Macdonald, of Montreal, to devote large sums of money to what may be called 'object-lessons,' rather than experiments, towards the betterment of elementary and secondary schools. He had already befriended advanced education at McGill University in a princely way.

Manual Training.—As a first step towards reaching the rural schools, he furnished the money to extend manual training (in most cases to introduce it) in the public schools of the various provinces. Manual training centres were equipped, and competent teachers of experience were employed at twenty-one different places from Prince Edward Island on the Atlantic to Vancouver and Victoria on the Pacific. The Macdonald Manual Training Fund maintained the object-lesson for three years. At the end of that time the equipment was presented to the local and provincial school authorities, who have since maintained and further extended the work. Under the Macdonald Fund some 7,000 boys took manual training, and several hundred teachers attended short courses on Saturdays or on other school holidays. Now it is reported that 20,000 children attend manual training classes as a direct consequence of the Macdonald movement.

School Gardens.—The next step was to establish 'object-lesson' school gardens at twenty-five rural schools as a basis for Nature study. They are giving the schools a rural outlook and the pupils a wholesome interest in, and an intelligent acquaintance with, the forces and phenomena of their surroundings. At the

same time provision was made to establish an 'object-lesson' consolidated rural school in each of the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. Three of those schools are in operation, and a fourth is to be opened in May, 1905. A school board representing the whole area replaces the school boards of the several single schools merged into the central one. The children are conveyed from their homes to and from school in covered vans. The greatest distance of the routes is from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 miles. Some children over fourteen years of age attend, and children under five may be enrolled. All come more regularly. The average attendance has been increased by 70 per cent. at two of the consolidated schools, and by over 150 per cent. at another. Each of these consolidated schools has a school garden and Nature-study work, equipment for household science work in cooking and sewing, and manual training in woodwork. The Macdonald Rural Schools Fund meets, for a period of three years, the additional expense of the consolidated schools over the cost of the small rural schools. The school sections and other authorities contribute exactly the former expenditure. The school remains under the management of the local authorities, and the extra cost is met by the Macdonald Fund for three years, to enable the people of these five provinces to have this object-lesson and experiment in education.

Special Teachers.—To begin and carry on that work it was necessary that it should not be conducted in an amateurish way. I conferred with the educational authorities in the provinces, and got the names of one or two of their best teachers for the rural schools in each province. For New Brunswick I took the science master of the Normal School, a former country teacher, and another teacher who was eminently successful with a school garden of his own. I obtained suitable men from the other provinces. I made a class of these teachers from Canada, and sent them to the University of Chicago, where they had a Nature-study course under

Professor Coulter and Professor Jackman. Then the teachers were sent to Cornell University to get short lessons on horticulture, agriculture, and insect-life, with special reference to rural schools. Then they were sent to New York, to Teachers' College in connection with Columbia University, to receive special training there on how to make themselves effective as school teachers in this newer education. They afterwards attended the Ontario Agricultural College at Guelph, each working his own garden plot as each child works at the school.

Mr. R. H. Cowley, Inspector of Schools for Carleton County, Ontario, where five of these gardens are located, says:

'The vast majority of European school gardens look to utility. Of the few that recognise the importance of the educational end, nearly all stop short at the acquisition of a certain amount of scientific information and the habit of careful observation. On the other hand, the Macdonald School Gardens, while designed to encourage the cultivation of the soil as an ideal life-work, are intended to promote, above all things else, symmetrical education of the individual. They do not aim at education to the exclusion of utility, but they seek education through utility, and utility through education. The garden is the means, the pupil is the end. The Macdonald School Gardens are a factor in an educational movement, and for this reason Professor Robertson sought to have them brought under the Education Department, and not under the Department of Agriculture, in each province. The fact that the various provinces already referred to have passed Orders in Council incorporating the Macdonald School Gardens into their educational systems at once places these school gardens on a broader educational basis than that occupied by the school gardens of any other State or country.

'The Macdonald School Gardens not only have a recognised place in the provincial systems of education, but they are attached to the ordinary rural schools, owned by the school corporation, and conducted under

the authority of the school trustees and with the express approval of the ratepayers. The work of the garden is recognised as a legitimate part of the school programme, and it is already interwoven with a considerable part of the other studies. The garden is becoming the outer classroom of the school, and the plots are its blackboards. The garden is not an innovation, or an excrescence, or an addendum, or a diversion: it is a happy field of expression, an organic part of the school, in which the boys and girls work among growing things, and grow themselves in body and mind and spiritual outlook.

'The good influence of the school garden on the discipline and moral tone of the school is remarked by all the teachers. Pupils hitherto troublesome have become orderly and docile. The percentage of regularity in attendance has increased, and a deeper interest is taken in all the work of the school.

'In its national aspects, the school garden develops a wide interest in the fundamental industry of the country. It cultivates the sense of ownership and a social spirit of cooperation and mutual respect for one another's rights. In the care of their own plots the pupils fight common enemies, and learn that a bad weed in a neglected plot may make trouble for many others. The garden is a pleasant avenue of communication between the school and the home, relating them in a new and living way, and thereby strengthening public interest in the school as a national institution.

'The tendency of young people to rush to the cities has become an evil in some countries, and, if not checked, is likely to deteriorate the national life of Canada. In towns and cities the school garden will develop a desire in the rising generation to possess at least sufficient land for a garden. The city boy will spend more of his leisure on the home lot and less on the street. The city girl, who is now too much confined to the house, will develop a bodily vigour that can only be acquired in the sunshine and open air. The school garden will train the urban population to look toward

the country. It will train the rural population to remain in the country. It will convince the young mind that the work of the farmer gives scope for intelligence and scholarship, and holds out the promise that a life of industry in the country will win rewards of prosperity, independence, and happiness.'

This article has already grown to such length that I must drop school gardens and consolidation, contenting myself (and maybe some keenly interested reader) by promising that at an early date some Canadian educator will furnish a better and fuller account of their scope, effect, and value.

It still remains to be stated that Sir William Macdonald's purpose could not be satisfied with even these splendid helps towards the improvement of rural education. The movement needed headquarters where teachers could be trained for what has been called 'The New Education.' In consequence, the Macdonald Institute, provided by a gift of £38,000 to the province of Ontario, stands on a campus adjoining the Ontario Agricultural College. At it the Ontario Government provides courses of instruction and training for teachers and others in Nature study, household science, and manual training. Forty selected teachers are there at present, on scholarships provided by provincial departments of education and the Macdonald Funds, receiving training to introduce one or more of those branches into rural schools. After a few years the Macdonald Institute, having served its first purpose in training teachers already in the service of schools, is to become an integral part of the Ontario Agricultural College, to give farmers' daughters an opportunity for advanced education suitable for rural life.

As a permanent headquarters in Canada for this movement, and also to serve particularly the province of Quebec in its agriculture and in the training of teachers for its Protestant schools, a new college is being founded at St. Anne de Bellevue. A beautiful site, where the Ottawa flows into the St. Lawrence, is

to have a group of buildings with surrounding farms devoted to this purpose. The whole cost of the college, together with its endowment and adequate scholarships to insure that teachers trained there will teach in the rural schools, is provided by Sir William Macdonald.

College of Agriculture. — In connection with the College of Agriculture proper, there will be three main departments—the department of farms, the department of research, and the department of instruction. The department of farms will consist, primarily, of demonstration or illustration farms, each fully equipped and self-contained. These will be managed for profit, and also for illustrating the best-known methods of agriculture. There will be a dairy farm, with several breeds of dairy cattle; a beef farm, with several breeds of beefing cattle; and a small-cultures farm, devoted to such products as vegetables, small fruits, large fruits, poultry, dairy products, etc. Each farm will have a speciality, and it will also include live-stock and equipment for other branches of farming. For instance, the dairy farm will also have swine and poultry, and the beef farm will carry sheep, a few dairy cows, and poultry. Provision will be made on these farms for receiving a number of apprentices, who will learn the operations of farming, as well as methods of management, by working and sharing in the management. An industrious lad will be able to earn as much on one of the farms as an apprentice, as will pay for his board in the college residence building when taking a course of instruction during the winter. The same will apply to women, who may become apprentices on the small-cultures farm in connection with fruit-growing, floriculture, dairying, or poultry-keeping. In the college department during the winter months such women could take courses in household science, including cooking, dressmaking and cutting, housekeeping, and the like.

Department of Research.—The department of research will be equipped with a competent staff and commodious

and suitable laboratories. One laboratory building will contain the departments of biology, bacteriology, and entomology. Another will contain the departments of physics and agricultural chemistry. In this department, while the research work will be very helpful to the advanced instruction carried on in the college, original investigations will be undertaken and carried on for the benefit of agriculture in the Dominion at large. The question of the bacterial contents of soil and its fertility is one which is very alluring, and pregnant with great possibilities of service and benefit to the farming population. In every field problems await solution, and it is expected that the staff in the department at St. Anne's will do its full share towards advancing the knowledge of some of them, to the profit and enlightenment of the farmer. After the department of research has advanced any discovery far enough to make it applicable to ordinary agriculture, its practicability in regard to profit-making, etc., will be tested in the department of farms before any new method is commended to the farmers.

Department of Instruction.—In the department of instruction provision will be made for short courses for farmers and farmers' sons in such subjects as live-stock, improvement of seeds, improvement of soils, fruit culture, dairying, poultry-keeping, etc. There will also be a women's department, and short courses will be offered to farmers' daughters in sewing, cooking, dress-making and cutting, millinery, housekeeping, and so on. There will also be short courses for women in dairying, poultry-keeping, bee-keeping, and fruit culture. The long courses for men and women will be very much on the lines that have been followed at the best colleges of agriculture. In planning for and carrying out assistance towards the improvement of rural schools in the five provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, it has been thought expedient to provide a teachers' college, primarily for the purpose of training men and women to be thoroughly

qualified as teachers in advanced rural schools. Such teachers will be competent not only in ordinary subjects of school education, as accepted hitherto, but will be qualified to use these newer means of education known as Nature-study work, household science, and manual training. Those attending the teachers' college will not be required to take any work in the department of agriculture, but they will have the opportunity of doing so, if they desire to familiarize themselves with any part or detail of it. A staff fully competent to carry on the work of the teachers' college will be provided. In addition to the long course of training which may be required when the teachers' college comes to its proper work, short courses will be provided for teachers already in the service who may desire to avail themselves of the opportunities and privileges which will be found for Canadian teachers at the Macdonald Institution. It has been felt all along that the teachers' college should be specially available and useful to teachers already in the service in the Protestant schools of the province of Quebec, and to others who may seek training to become qualified teachers in the province.

Residences for the Students.—Besides the instruction building and laboratories, there will be a residence for men and another for women. There will be dining-hall accommodation, and separate gymnasiums for men and women. The buildings will have a content of about 6,000,000 cubic feet.

All these buildings will be of fireproof construction. Sir William Macdonald's direction in the matter is that the buildings are to be the best of their kind for the purposes for which they are intended, due regard being had to economy for original cost and maintenance. They will stand on a 60-acre field, sloping towards the river, with a fine southern and eastern exposure. The outside walls of the main buildings are to be of buff-brick, trimmed with stone, and the roofs are to be finished with steel and concrete structure, covered with tiles. It is anticipated that the buildings, with their

setting, will constitute as fine a group as has been seen in connection with any agricultural institution on the continent. It is expected that the main buildings will have their roofs on before the winter of the present year, and, barring unforeseen accidents or causes of delay, the college will be ready to receive students in the autumn of 1906.

Sir William Macdonald's real monument will be in the enriched lives of the rural population of half a continent, conserving the liberty, intelligence, justice and goodwill which our Empire is a means of bringing in ever-increasing fulness to all its citizens.

IMPERIALISM IN CANADIAN POLITICS

By JOHN W. HILLS

Though Canada has produced a line of statesmen gifted with ideas and with the power of expressing them, it is perhaps more interesting to look at the forces which have governed her destiny rather than at the minds of the leaders who have directed her policy. Conscious action of statesmen has played a part, but there have been other and stronger forces at work, and these forces are not the ones which might at first sight have been thought the most powerful. The actual ideals of both political parties on Imperial questions are identical, and can be described very shortly: both are unanimous in desiring preferential trade within the Empire, both hope that the future will bring closer union, and both think that Canada should carry more of the weight of the defence of the Empire. A General Election is not perhaps the best occasion for ascertaining the political ideals of a people, and in Canada last autumn the speeches of the ordinary candidate, as of candidates elsewhere, were filled mainly with local and personal questions. But still there were three great issues running throughout the controversy—the new Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, preferential trade, and defence. The last issue was unluckily obscured by a personal quarrel. The discussions on it were acrimonious and not very useful. But Canadians recognise that they do not do their fair share of the work of defence, and the question for the future is to find some accept-

able form which their contribution can take. It certainly will not take the form of a cash subsidy of a size worth discussing. It probably will take the form of Canada increasing and improving her land forces, and possibly of her building and manning ships to form part of the British fleet. The last is clearly the line upon which every effort should be concentrated. The country is rich in raw material, and would gladly foster some, at any rate, of the highly-specialized industries upon which modern shipbuilding depends; and she would not require the fleet so built to dance attendance at Halifax or Esquimalt, but would realize that it might defend Canadian interests better if stationed in the North Sea or the Mediterranean. This is looking a little ahead, but preferential trade is a present issue, and on this the country is unanimous. Mr. Foster recently told the American Economic Association at Chicago: 'Public sentiment in Canada is overwhelmingly in favour of the preferential system. As a theory it was advocated by the leaders of both parties previous to 1896, and has been supported by both parties since its enactment in 1898. In the press and on the platform it receives general commendation and support.' That certainly is a moderate statement. So unanimous is the country that little argument is required, and consequently a much larger space in party controversy was occupied by the new Transcontinental Railway. On this it was possible to take sides, and the whole country from east to west proceeded to do so. But as a rule it was debated as a local question, and it required the constructive imagination of Sir Wilfrid Laurier to show the Imperial idea underlying it—to see the produce of the East pouring along it into Canada, and through Canada to Europe, and the goods of Canada and Europe flowing back through the same channel to the East.

And yet to anyone acquainted with Canadian economic history the project requires no pictorial illustration to bring it into relation with great Imperial

questions. It is the result of the same forces which produced the preference of 1897, 1898, and 1900, and it is the latest step upon the road upon which Canada has been irresistibly driven since the repeal of the Acts of Trade and Navigation.

When Canada lost her preferential position in British markets she turned, angrily and unwillingly, to the United States. Reciprocity became essential to her, and, to quote Mr. Foster again, 'reciprocity has no meaning in Canada except in relation to the United States.' From 1854 till 1865 it existed under the Elgin Treaty; after the Civil War it was denounced by the States, and for many years after Canada was a humble suppliant for its renewal—at one time contemptuously repulsed, at another deluded by negotiations which led to nothing. 'From 1867 till 1904 no election has taken place for the Federal Parliament in which reciprocity in some form was not a dominant factor. In 1891 it was the sole issue, in the form of unrestricted exchange of commodities between Canada and the United States, and involving discrimination against the Mother Country.' The positions are now reversed, and it is for the States to sue, and for Canada to refuse. At present 'as a live issue it does not exist.'

Federation came in 1867. In the seventies two events happened: Canada took a step towards protection, and the Canadian Pacific Railway was begun. These two events sprang from the same causes, and were complementary of each other: Canada, denied access to the markets of the States, started to manufacture for herself; since her exports could no longer go south, they had to come east. The results of the building of the line have often been described, but can hardly be exaggerated; it converted the country from a series of separate communities, divided by wide distances and by wider spaces of time, closely bound to and dependent on the States lying immediately south of them, into a homogeneous country from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Had reciprocity continued, and had the

railway never been built, Canada's trade would have followed its natural direction of north to south; the building of the line forced it east and west, and made it follow a national instead of a geographical channel. The results to Canada and the Empire are very great: without it the middle west would have become a commercial dependency of Buffalo, Chicago, and Minneapolis; and we can believe that the position would have been insecure without going to the length of assuming that political union would have followed commercial connection.

The McKinley tariff of 1890 was followed in 1896 by the definite adoption by Canada of Protection. For the same reason a market in Europe had become a necessity, and she naturally turned to Great Britain. Hence the preference granted in 1897 and 1898— a preference which was increased, it should be noticed, after the enactment of the Dingley tariff in 1897. In granting this preference Canadian statesmen were actuated by Imperial motives, but it is of the greatest importance to realize that it was also a necessary step in the country's economic development. Sir Wilfrid Laurier said in an election speech last year: 'We gave the British preference because we wanted British trade. Great Britain is our best market. This makes it our duty to develop our trade in that direction, and our exports are growing greatly. But to secure low freight rates on your products it is necessary that the ships carrying them should bring back cargoes of English goods; that is the vindication of our preference policy.'

And now we are to witness the last chapter of the story. Canada has been driven, unconsciously, perhaps, at first, to make herself independent of the States, and to seek commercial union with Great Britain. But her independence to-day is not complete. Fifty years ago, when the Grand Trunk Railway was built, reciprocity with the States existed, and it was thought perfectly natural that the Atlantic terminus of the line should be Portland, Maine. But thirty years later, when it became

a question of continuing the Canadian Pacific from Montreal to the Atlantic, public opinion had changed. It was felt that the Atlantic port must be on Canadian territory, and St. John, New Brunswick, was chosen. This line, therefore, runs from a Canadian harbour on the Atlantic to a Canadian harbour on the Pacific; but to get there it goes for nearly two hundred miles through the State of Maine. There was opposition to this, opposition in which, it may be remarked, Sir Wilfrid Laurier took a part, but it was overruled. Now, this gap in the system is a weakness: the withdrawal of the bonding facilities granted by the States has been threatened, and might be enforced, and Canada cannot consider herself independent until she possesses a transcontinental railway running throughout on Canadian territory; for though it is true that a railway—the Intercolonial—does link Montreal with St. John and Halifax, and does run on Canadian territory, its course is so roundabout and inconvenient that it can be left out of account. Hence the building of the Grand Trunk Pacific, in defiance of geography and of classical economy. And upon the necessity of building it both parties are united; they differ only in details, chiefly whether it should be worked by Government or by a company. But upon the question of principle they are united, and an overwhelming majority of the people support them.

The direction of Canada's economic development has been little influenced by geography or by other natural forces of which economists make so much. Western Canada is divided geographically by the Rockies; on the other hand, it is for a great part of its area divided from the States by an imaginary line corresponding to no natural features whatever. And yet, did the Rockies not exist, British Columbia would not be more closely bound to Manitoba than it is at present; did they run east and west, Alberta and Saskatchewan would not be more completely separated from Montana and the Dakotas. The States, a country speaking the same language and inhabited by the same race, lie at Canada's

door, and yet she is united in declining to trade with them, and in desiring to trade with communities many of which are thousands of miles away. The forces which have influenced her are not the natural forces of geography or contiguity, but the sentimental force of nationality and the artificial force of commercial arrangements—commercial arrangements, that is to say, in the widest sense of the word, either such as are imposed from without, like the old colonial system, or such as are entered into voluntarily, like the former reciprocity with the States and the existing one-sided preference with the United Kingdom, or tariff barriers erected by foreign countries, like the McKinley and Dingley tariffs.

The great merit of Canadian statesmanship lies in the recognition of the potency of these two forces, and of the importance of getting them to act together; a commercial treaty is rendered far more durable if it is based on a common nationality.

CANADA AND THE PACIFIC

By G. R. PARKIN, LL.D., C.M.G.

THE geographical position of Canada stamps with great significance her future relations to the British Empire and to the world. The Dominion rests with broad frontage upon both the Atlantic and the Pacific. On the Atlantic her ports command the shortest route to Europe, and furnish an unrivalled naval base for giving security to the greatest food route of the United Kingdom and the greatest trade route of the world. Behind these ports are waterways leading to the very heart of the continent—almost to those prairies which promise soon to yield the largest available surplus of one of the world's prime necessities—wheat.

The frontage on the Pacific is not less significant in view of the general expectation that this ocean is likely soon to be the centre of a vastly increased commerce. Wherever lines of transportation from the prairies may penetrate the Rocky Mountains there can be found, in British Columbia, harbour space for any commerce that may come. Thence is the shortest route to the ports of our ally, Japan, and to what will, we hope, be the open door of China. Thence, too, is easy communication, already partly developed, with the islands of the Pacific, Australasia, India, Central and South America—tropical and subtropical countries which are the natural commercial complement of a northern land.

On both sides of the continent, in immediate contact

with the sea, are immense deposits of coal, furnishing extraordinary facilities for transportation by sea and land. It may be doubted if any coal-supplies in the world are so admirably situated for the prosecution or defence of commerce as those of Cape Breton and Nova Scotia on the Atlantic coast, or those of Vancouver Island on the Pacific. At both points excellent steaming coal can be delivered to waiting steamships almost directly from the mouth of the mine.

Across the whole breadth of the continent means of communication are multiplying with a rapidity which seems astonishing to those who watched the beginnings of the movement thirty years ago. The Canadian Pacific Railway already crosses the country from sea to sea; a second line, the Grand Trunk Pacific, by a more northern route, is in course of construction, backed up by all the resources of a prosperous people; a third, the Canadian Northern, is being pushed through by private enterprise between these two national lines from the Great Lakes to the Rockies, and it also undoubtedly looks to ultimate connection with both oceans. Between these main lines a network of branches is being built to supply the needs of the stream of emigrants which flows in to fill up the prairie country.

Eastward, a great canal system, on which thirty million dollars have been spent, supplements and simplifies the natural lines of water communication, and, as compared with railways, cheapens the transport of grain in bulk.

Should Hudson Bay prove available for navigation, as now seems likely, a new economy in transportation, a new safety by reason of greater isolation, will be given to what will soon be the great line of bread-supply for the United Kingdom.

The new situation which has arisen in the Far East as the result of the Russo-Japanese War gives this geographical position of Canada, as part of the Empire, added significance. The ports of Canada on the Pacific coast are only ten days' steaming distance from those of

Japan. Thus the Dominion is almost as closely in touch with Asia as with Europe. Across her prairies and through her ports the Far West merges for the Englishman into the Far East, and by a shorter route than that by which the East has hitherto been reached. These ports, taken in conjunction with those of Australasia, Hong Kong, and our Pacific islands, give on the Pacific the same double base for naval support and supply which is the supreme advantage that the Empire enjoys over all other nations on the Atlantic. With the free use of Japanese ports, secured by alliance, the naval advantage becomes overwhelming.

In the momentous decision which British people have made in regard to this alliance, Canada's relation to the problem must have been a weighty factor. A country which links by its railway lines the naval bases of the Empire on the Atlantic with those on the Pacific; which can furnish abundant supplies of coal to both; and which has at the same time the capacity to make the Empire almost self-contained in the most essential elements of food-supply, means much to an ocean Power which must settle the balance of naval influence on the two great oceans. It infinitely increases the value to any other Power of the British alliance.

Facts such as these compel the belief that the Dominion must always remain the keystone of that great arch of outer Empire which has gradually grown up on the foundation of this ancient British monarchy—a foundation which has withstood the shocks of ten centuries of history, and seems to have grown stronger from all that it has withstood.

But other facts supplement those already stated. Under modern conditions of commerce and war, telegraphic routes are scarcely less important than lines of railway and steam communication. In this respect the relation of Canada to the Empire, and especially to the Pacific, as a through route of national communication is quite as important as in the other points hitherto referred to. Most of the Transatlantic cables now in

existence reach the American Continent by way of Nova Scotia, and Canada has therefore a multiplied and adequate connection with the Mother-land. With the Pacific the case was long very different. The absence of any cable link across that ocean left a dangerous gap in the telegraphic equipment of the Empire. Five years ago the general demand that the great public interests at stake should not be allowed to depend on the security of cable lines which pass through foreign countries and European waters led to united action between the larger British communities to remedy this defect in our national system. The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand joined together to establish an all-British line of cable by way of the Pacific. Traversing Canada by established lines from Nova Scotia to Vancouver, it passes on through various Pacific island stations under our flag to New Zealand and Australia, thence connecting with lines to India and South Africa. As the result of that effort for united national action the Empire to-day possesses, through Canada, an alternative line of cable communication to fall back upon if those through Europe and Asia should fail.

The new conditions arising in the East make it practically certain that another Pacific cable must soon connect Canada with Japan, Hong Kong, and our other centres of Eastern interest. The United States found such a Transpacific cable necessary as soon as they took charge of the Philippines, and our need cannot be less. When the three great railway systems of Canada have fixed their termini on the coast of British Columbia, telegraphic communication with Asia by way of San Francisco will not long content them.

But the completion of the Pacific cable as a State-owned and a State-managed line has led to the earnest consideration in Canada of a much larger question. For many years Sir Sandford Fleming, to whom must be assigned much of the credit for educating public opinion on the importance of the Pacific route, has

strenuously advocated the establishment of a complete system of Empire cables, owned and operated jointly by the various Governments in the interests of the whole Empire. During the past two years the Board of Trade of Ottawa, the capital city of the Dominion, has shown great energy in the study of the question, and has brought it under the consideration of public bodies in all parts of the Empire. A pamphlet, lately issued by the Board as the result of its inquiries, proves conclusively that business men in every part of the Empire look upon the scheme as one likely to profoundly affect our future as a nation. For a people scattered as is our British race in all quarters of the globe, and yet aspiring to closer commercial intercourse, to complete political unity and effective mutual support, rapidity, ease, and cheapness of communication are of the very essence of our needs.

Hence the long and persistent effort which has at length been crowned with the almost universal adoption of penny postage throughout the Empire. Hence the establishing and subsidizing of swift steamship lines along the main routes of intercommunication. Hence the constant endeavour to induce the companies which control the lines of cable connection to lower the rates at which messages are conveyed.

If penny postage round the Empire—if the sixpenny telegram rate throughout the United Kingdom—have come to be regarded as boons of the first magnitude, then surely the cheapest possible rate for cable communication with every part of the Empire is a still greater boon to which we should look forward! It is one to which we have a right to look forward. The lowering of postage rates has always been followed by an immense increase in the volume of business done, and hence in the profits derived from the Post-Office. The lowering of cable rates would have a corresponding result. Partly through an increased volume of business, partly under the pressure of competition, the companies controlling the cable communication with the East and

Australasia have lowered their rates to one-half of what they formerly were, or even less. But no one supposes that the limit of reasonable reduction has yet been reached. The growth of commercial interests, the interchange of news, the exchange of views between statesmen and governments, the growth of national sentiment founded on intimate mutual understanding, are all hindered by the necessity of paying large dividends on watered stock to companies enjoying in parts of the Empire a practical monopoly of the work to be done. Making all due allowance for the business energy which established cable communication in its earlier stages, and granting that the reward of this energy should be large, still the question now arises whether the debt of gratitude has not been sufficiently paid, and whether the national necessity does not outweigh the continued claims of the individual or the company. If patent laws fix a limit to the rights of an inventor; if copyright laws define a time when a writer's exclusive profits cease; if Governments exercise the right of eminent domain in expropriating at a fair price, in the interests of the public, land lines of telegraph, or ground required for the public service, surely a stronger argument can be made for a nation assuming the control —at least on its main lines— of what has become its own nervous system. This is what is aimed at in the establishment of a system of Empire cables, kept under national control, maintained at national expense, and worked for national ends. Sir Sandford Fleming has described such a system as consisting of four divisions, as follows:

1. From the United Kingdom to the Pacific, embracing a cable across the Atlantic, and land lines through Canada.

2. A cable across the Pacific from Canada to New Zealand and Australia, with land lines through Australia to the Indian Ocean.

3. A cable from Australia across the Indian Ocean to South Africa, with a branch from Cocos Island to India.

4. A cable from Cape Town to the United Kingdom viâ Ascension, the West Indies, and Bermuda, with a branch to Canada.

Such a system, traversing the deepest seas, touching only British soil, protected at every point of landing by British vigilance and courage, would be as reliable for the direction of our navies, and for combined military action in times of war, as it would be useful in time of peace for the development of commerce and the interchange of thought and information on national affairs. The first colonial conference, held in London in 1887, and the second, held in Ottawa in 1894, discussed the project as a possible expansion of the Pacific cable scheme. The congress of the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire, held at Montreal in 1904, endorsed it in the strongest terms. That endorsement has now been echoed by the most important commercial bodies throughout the Empire. The subject has probably entered into the deliberations of the Pacific Cable Conference, held this year in London, and it will form a natural supplement to the work of any colonial conference summoned to consider the fiscal relations of the Empire.

Canada, as the 'half-way house of the Empire,' to use an expression of the late Principal Grant, has an especial interest in the working out of the scheme. On the Atlantic it strengthens her intimate touch with the Mother-land, and adds close connection with the West Indies and South Africa, where she has growing commercial interests. On the Pacific it touches issues vital to her present position and future development.

What are Canada's interests in the Pacific ?

One would put first the trade with China, Japan, the East Indian Archipelago, and India. From time immemorial the trade with the East, the exchange of the useful products of the Western world for the luxuries of the Orient, has proved the foundation of wealth. Rome, Carthage, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Genoa, Venice—all in turn felt the influence of this stimulus as Britain feels it now. Canada will do the

same. A Northern population, with increasing wealth, will be sure to demand what the East can give—its silken fabrics, porcelain, jewels, and other native manufactures; its tea, spices, raw material, and so on.

The Canadian Pacific Railway, in the early days of its history, secured a large portion of the tea trade of China with America as the result of superior steamboat and railway organization. New lines across Canada will enter into free competition for the same expanding trade and other branches of commerce. The open door in China is of the deepest interest to Canadians. Friendly rivalry with Japan may prove the best of stimulants to Canadian energy.

Should the Chinese and Japanese people ever become a wheat-consuming instead of a rice-consuming people —and nothing is more likely with increasing prosperity —the prairies of Canada would have an Eastern market as important as that which Europe now offers.

But Canadian trade already touches many other points upon the Pacific. The timber and coal of British Columbia find their way along the whole coast of North, Central, and South America. A line of steamships is employed in the business that has grown up with Australia. Canada's exchange of agricultural implements and other manufactures for the sugar of Queensland and Fiji is sure to develop on many lines. An improved passenger service on this route, equal to that between Vancouver and Japan, would compete successfully with the Suez Canal lines for a large share of Australasian travel to or from Europe. Few objects are more to be desired from a national point of view than that the citizens of one great Colony should become familiar in the ordinary course of travel with those of another. There are very strong climatic objections to the voyage by the Red Sea at certain seasons of the year, and an adequate Pacific service from Dominion ports would secure for either the inward or outward voyage a large proportion of Australasian visitors to Europe.

These are only illustrations of the growing interests

of the Dominion in the Pacific. The safety of commerce will soon become for Canada as important on that ocean as on the Atlantic.

How will it best be secured?

It was openly avowed by the Russian autocracy that 'the command of the Pacific' was its objective in undertaking the late war. We cannot accept the Russian view, also explicitly stated, that the achievement of this end would have been in the interests of peace, commerce, and civilization. Rather would it have been a disturbing factor and a constant menace to the interests of other nations, notably to those of Britain and her Colonies. Now that the stout resistance of Japan has thwarted this attempt to control the Pacific, the question of who are to be its masters necessarily arises. A glance around the Pacific basin shows the natural answer to this question. Commencing at the south, we have on the Pacific the great and growing British communities of New Zealand and Australia, splendidly equipped with docks and fortified harbours, and rich in coal. Farther north are Singapore and Hong Kong, also under the British Flag, in positions which give extraordinary command of the neighbouring seas. After that the Philippines, now a dependency of the United States. China might be important, but she lacks the naval power which gives effective influence on the sea. Next is Japan, the ally of Britain. Little new territory has been added to the Japanese possessions as the result of the war, but directly or indirectly she will practically dominate the coast northward to the Arctic. Passing to the American continent, we have the United States territory of Alaska. Next comes Canada, with her splendid sea-front, her ports and bases of coal-supply, and behind, her vast inland prairies, seeking through several passes of the Rockies an outlet to the Pacific for their products. After Canada comes the United States, with a sea-front on the Pacific extending from Puget Sound to Mexico, with a rapidly increasing naval power, and with the prospective control of the Panama Canal.

These, then, are the dominant factors. Germany, it is true, is in New Guinea and Kiaou Chou, France in Siam and New Caledonia, the Dutch in Java; but their interests are not sufficiently large to enter seriously into the estimate of dominant control. The South American States have no naval significance.

It seems clear that if an understanding can be reached between Britain, the United States, and Japan, the predominance of interest which they represent and the predominance of power with which it can be supported will make conclusive any decisions at which they arrive in order to give security to the Pacific basin.

What is the relation of the Dominion to this great problem?

It is a striking coincidence in our national development that the very time when the whole balance of power in the East has changed and the destiny of the Pacific is in debate is also the time when Canada has reached a period of intense activity; when her territory and political system have been consolidated; when her population is increasing by leaps and bounds; when her prairies are being filled up; her manufactures growing; and when her public men are compelled by the expansive forces at work to take large views of the present and the future.

It must be remembered that for 3,500 miles of its southern boundary Canada marches upon the territory of the United States, the other American factor in the problem of the Pacific. The actual land area of the continent north of Mexico is divided nearly equally between the two countries. While the rapid growth of the United States, during the last half-century particularly, has made Canada's relative position appear comparatively unimportant, it seems likely that the next half-century may make the disparity less striking. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's picturesque saying that 'the nineteenth century was for the United States; the twentieth is for Canada,' is not exaggerated if we refer it to the rapid filling up of virgin territory and the speedy

development of untouched resources. Canada must make her plans for a large future, and that as a Pacific Power.

In her partnership in the Empire lie her best hopes for the realization of such plans. On the other hand, as a half-way house and through route of Empire the significance of her relation to the nation as a whole cannot be overestimated. The fact that the naval stations at Halifax and Esquimalt have been handed over for maintenance to the Dominion Government proves the trust the Mother-land puts in Canadian loyalty to the national partnership. That Canada is willing to accept this crucial responsibility proves as conclusively that she begins to realize that partnership in a great Empire involves duties as well as advantages. The sense of duty will grow as Canadians face the problems of the Pacific. They cannot study them too carefully.

THE FRENCH-CANADIANS AND THE EMPIRE

By BENJAMIN SULTE

Remembering that the French-Canadians are the oldest white inhabitants of the country, one naturally asks himself what advantages have they derived from British rule, which they have lived under since the year 1760. History answers this question.

In the first place, the arrival of the British flag among the French relieved them from the burden of continual wars against the native tribes and the English Colonies—wars that had lasted for more than a hundred years, without profit to anyone, and at the cost of many lives.

Then the French of Canada escaped from the autocratic government of the Bourbons. Liberty of trade, hitherto unknown in Canada, opened a new and wide field to their native enterprise. The substitution of a silver coinage for the depreciated colonial paper-money of the French régime was another important consideration. The people were also enabled to cultivate much larger crops of grain, and to export the surplus to other countries, which they had not been permitted to do in the past. The title to their lands remained intact, as well as the laws by which they had been governed. Finally, they became British subjects by the terms of the treaty of cession, with all that that implied. Their language and their religion were respected. None of the humiliations and annoyances which usually accom-

pany a conquest were imposed upon them. They passed from a reign of absolute subjection under the Bourbons to the free and untrammelled life of a constitutional government.

In return for these unexpected advantages, which they thoroughly appreciated, the French showed themselves true to their new oath of allegiance, and perfect tranquillity reigned in the country. Within three years the British troops had returned to Europe. Then broke out Pontiac's war. The Canadian Militia enrolled themselves eagerly, and fought under the British flag against their ancient allies, the Western tribes.

A little later the English Colonies attempted to draw the Canadians into the celebrated protest against the Imperial taxes, but they refused to listen to the tempters.

In 1775, when the English troops no longer occupied Lower Canada, the American Army invaded the province, and trapped the Governor-General in Montreal. He was saved by three Canadians—Bouchette, Lanaudière, and Nivervelle—who guided him through the enemy's lines and down the river to Quebec, a distance of 180 miles.

On his arrival there he at once organized the militia, raised with their aid the siege of Montreal, and finally drove the Americans back across the frontier.

The Catholic clergy from the beginning openly pronounced themselves in favour of the British Crown. The seigneurs, or landed gentry, of the province took similar ground, so that there was but one opinion among all classes in this matter.

It must also be remembered that Quebec, or Lower Canada, received no immigration from the British Isles, and that the mass of the population was necessarily composed of Canadians, former subjects of France.

The victories of Nelson were celebrated here with enthusiasm. It was clearly recognised by the French-Canadians that this great sailor protected the mouths of the St. Lawrence, and guarded our commerce on the

high seas. When his death was announced in 1805 there was universal sorrow in Canada. I have heard a hymn sung in the churches to the air, 'Nelson est mort au sein de la victoire' (Nelson is dead in the hour of victory), proving the popularity of his name. The Bishops recommended the King's armies to the prayers of the faithful. The citizens of Montreal erected on Jacques Cartier Square the Nelson Column, in memory of the famous Admiral, which may still be seen. In the list of subscribers to the monument one finds the names of all the prominent French-Canadians of that day. We commemorated the centenary of the event this October. The first steps to this end being appropriately taken by the French-Canadians, who have so faithfully been attached to the British Empire.

The war of 1812-1815 was precipitated unexpectedly at a moment when the Imperial Government was too seriously engaged in Europe to send troops to Canada. The legislature of Quebec promptly and unanimously voted the funds necessary for the defence of the country, and passed at the same time an Act calling to arms every able-bodied man in the province. The clergy stimulated the enthusiasm of the militiamen, who accomplished prodigies of valour during the three years of the war. Without the French-Canadian Militia the conquest of Canada would have been an easy task to the Americans.

The extraordinary rejoicings which marked among us the alliance between England and France in 1854-1855 reminds one of the happy understanding which fortunately exists to-day between the two countries. To our eyes nothing is more consoling, because, though on the one hand none of us dream of restoring the French régime in Canada, it is nevertheless certain that while these two Powers are united and working in harmony, peace and prosperity must reign.

We have the freest Government in the world; we are proud to form part of an Empire that protects us everywhere throughout the globe; and our people who

are sailing Canadian ships on every ocean find protection under the British flag such as we could not ourselves afford. As in the days of Nelson, our eyes are constantly turned to the flag that shields our destinies, and so long as Great Britain and her Colonies are united French-Canada will be of the number. Should the day ever unhappily come that there remains but one faithful Colony, Quebec will be that Colony.

AUSTRALIA AND ITS CRITICS

By THE HON. B. R. WISE

Australia is a very perplexing factor in the problem of Imperial politics.

From her geographical position—if for no other and more sentimental reason—her armed strength and the disposition of her people must always be a matter of concern and interest. Dominating the Pacific and placed astride of the trade-route between America and China, she is not only the outlying frontier of England on the Far East, which is the Empire's most vulnerable side; but she is also the ultimate heir of Java, Sumatra, and the Celebes in the event of the absorption of Holland by Germany. In one set of contingencies, when promptitude might make the difference between salvation and destruction, she could anticipate by a fortnight the landing of troops in either India or China; in another, she would be the mistress of the richest tropical possessions in the world, at a time when commercial supremacy largely depends upon control of the tropics.

Nor is Australia less worthy of attention if we regard her internal development and her material wealth. That four millions of people scattered over a continent which is as large as the United States if we exclude Alaska, and larger than Europe without Spain, should in one year (1904) export £57,000,000 of produce is almost without a parallel in history; and yet, as everyone knows who is acquainted with the country, even this vast output will be greatly increased when the

engineers have solved the problems of water conservation and cheap transport, and when closer settlement has given new facilities for developing untouched resources.

And, thirdly, Australia is the most British country out of Great Britain. Canada has its French province, the Dutch are in South Africa, the United States is a medley of races, but 97 per cent. of the population of Australia is of pure British descent. For the first time in history, as Sir Edmund Barton pointed out with apt terseness during the campaign for federation, there has been 'a continent for a nation and a nation for a continent.'

Such a country, so situated and with these resources, should have a great destiny, provided that its people are well directed and possess a clear conception of their public duty. What, then, is the Australian people? And what the aims and methods of its politics?

The Reaction.

English sentiment toward Australia is suffering from a cold fit. People are a little 'tired' of her! She no longer attracts immigrants, and her stocks and enterprises have become unpopular with that mysterious entity 'the market.' This is, no doubt, partly due to a reaction from the excessive praises heaped upon Australians for their war services, which, indeed, were great; but Australians are convinced that this is not the whole explanation, and that the present unpopularity of their country is also the result of the much less subtle influence of prejudice and calumny. The blame for this does not attach entirely to writers in Great Britain, although some London newspapers have appeared in the past to take excessive pains to disparage Australia. The worst enemies of Australia have been of her own household; so that popular instinct has labelled with the name of 'stinking-fish party' those superior politicians and writers who misrepresent the aims of the

Australian democracy on the platform and in the press with a flourish of inaccurate vituperation, which, although it is intended exclusively for home consumption, is apt to mislead those who are not familiar with such methods of party warfare.

Whatever the explanation, the result is bad. Mutual understanding of each other's aims being the first essential of good feeling between nations, nothing is more likely to create differences than want of sympathy and knowledge. A young country, which is at present in the raw stage, but which is conscious of a great future, is always rather oversensitive to criticism. Dickens's 'American Notes' kept England and America apart for many years; and English criticism of Australia may be equally mischievous, if it does not change its tone and realize that Australian policy is neither selfish nor perverse, but is designed—however imperfectly the plan may be carried out—to give effect to definite ideas of social well-being, in furtherance of what Australia believes to be the best interests of the Empire.

It may not, therefore, be useless to examine very briefly what the Commonwealth, which was born with this century, has already done to justify itself, and what is likely to be its future. In the course of the inquiry we may find that a combination of circumstances has for a time somewhat discredited Australian Federation in the eyes of the public, who cannot follow its affairs closely, yet there will also be shown a solid basis of achievement; while only those who knew Australia in the old provincial days can realize how many dangers Union has averted, and what seeds of promise it has already planted.

It must be recognised at the outset that the Commonwealth is not only at present unpopular, but that it was never popular. For although it was established by a plebiscite, yet the impulse to it came from politicians, who were somewhat aloof from the party organization of their several States, and its provincial opponents were able, rancorous, and determined. Even of the

majority who voted 'Aye' in favour of the Constitution most perceived the evils and the risks of Provincialism more clearly than they appreciated the significance of Federalism. Consequently, from the first the friends of the Commonwealth have seemed half-hearted and its enemies have been persistent.

There is nothing in this experience which need excite surprise. There was the same discontent in the early days of the United States, which found expression in the now half-forgotten rising known to history as the 'Whisky Rebellion'; and contemporary observers have related of Canada that, during the first ten years of the Dominion, not 30 per cent. of Canadians would have voted for its continuance had any opportunity been offered to them of expressing an opinion. It was the same in the case of the Scottish Union with Great Britain, which Lockhart, a contemporary, declared to be 'a base betrayal and mean giving up of the sovereignty, independence, liberty, laws, interest, and honour of Scotland'; and with regard to which he was as thoroughly convinced as any New South Wales provincialist that, 'if Scotland had only stood out, she could have made her own terms, so satisfied was he that England would not have a lost "a good thing."' 'Had the Scots,' he says, 'stood their ground, I have good reason to affirm that the English would have allowed a much greater number of representatives. The English saw too plainly the advantage that would accrue to England by a union of the two kingdoms upon his scheme, and would never have stuck at any terms to obtain it.'

Symptoms.

We can now inquire into some of the special difficulties which have beset Australian Federation.

The Government of Sir Edmund Barton had a difficult task from the beginning.

No first Federal Ministry is ever likely to arouse popular enthusiasm, both because it must be formed

upon the unexciting basis of compromise and concilia tion, and because its efforts must be directed rather to the framing of organic measures of administration, in which only experts can take interest, than to the stirring issues of party politics.

But Sir Edmund Barton was also confronted by other *difficulties peculiar to Australia.*

His term of office synchronized with the most disastrous drought which has ever scourged the continent; and, as every politician knows, no Government is ever popular when times are bad.

Secondly, he had to work from the first without a Press support.

Now, the Press has great influence in Australia. The principal organs of the several States had deservedly occupied for many years a position of such exceptional authority that they could make and unmake Ministries almost at the whim of their proprietors. Yet none of them had much influence in other States, although the *Australasian*, which is the weekly edition of the *Melbourne Argus*, has always had a large continental circulation. Only the *Sydney Bulletin*, which is published weekly, has made any serious effort to reflect the popular opinion of Australia as a whole. Consequently, when federation was accomplished, the great daily newspapers suddenly found themselves deprived of their paramount political power. Their thunderbolts fell harmless on the heads of representatives from other States; and the Ministry prepared its measures and conducted its proceedings without preliminary conferences in editorial rooms. This might have been of less importance had there been any broad federal issue upon which the newspapers could have taken sides; but there was none. The States are even yet in such varying stages of development that the dividing-lines of party politics are with difficulty understood in other States even by the professional politicians; and the only possible federal issue, that upon the tariff, was rendered unavailable for effective party use, except in New South Wales, by

the recognised necessity, for well-understood financial reasons, of framing the first tariff upon a basis of compromise with a view to returning a sufficiency of revenue to each State to compensate it for the loss of its power to levy indirect taxes. Nor was the situation of the Government towards the Press improved when, in order to bring about a uniformity of postal laws, the Sydney newspapers were deprived of the valuable privilege of free postage, which they had enjoyed for many years. The Government of New South Wales shortly afterwards (1902) followed in the same direction by requiring payment for the carriage of newspapers on the Government railways. The net result of this combination of untoward circumstances is that the path of the Commonwealth has been beset with difficulties from the first, and that local and personal jealousies have raised a babel of complainings, in which the voices of the friends of federation have been drowned, and which has misled public opinion and obscured facts.

The First Parliament.

Yet the feeling of disappointment is not to be justified by the record of legislation. The first Parliament, although its members worked under novel conditions and without the aid of mutual knowledge, laid the foundations of the Union with a thoroughness which will only be properly appreciated when they bear the superstructure.

When Sir Edmund Barton entered upon office (January, 1901) the States were separated by six different and often hostile tariffs. There were six postal and telegraphic systems, and six defence forces; while each of the six States was as a foreign country to its five neighbours in all matters of judicial process. In three years Sir Edmund Barton and Mr. Deakin, on whom, with Mr. R. E. O'Connor, the representative of the Government in the Senate, the chief labour fell—except in the case of the tariff, which was Mr. Kingston's especial

care—had given Free Trade throughout the continent by a tariff which was a compromise between the highest and the lowest of the former rates; they had established uniform systems both for postal and defence purposes, which gave increased efficiency at a reduced cost; and (with the capable assistance of General Sir Edward Hutton) they had passed laws by which the process of a State Court could be enforced throughout the continent. Nor was this all! They had established a common suffrage, which gave a vote to every citizen irrespective of sex; they had set up a High Court to interpret the Constitution, and to serve (as events have proved) as a much-needed Court of Appeal from State Courts; they had made the Patent Law uniform, so that one application and one fee gives an inventor protection in the six States; and, above all, they had secured Australia for the white races by providing for the deportation of the Kanaka from the Queensland sugar-fields at the expense of the taxpayer, and by adopting the Canadian law against the influx of undesirable immigrants. And they had done all this (as has already been explained) without Press support, in a country where Governments depend upon the Press, and in the teeth of the bitter and persistent opposition of the New South Wales Provincialists. In one respect only have the anticipations of Federalists not been realized: the wider view and better tone which it was hoped that union would have introduced into politics was not immediately apparent. The Federal Parliament was certainly superior to the State Parliaments, but it showed at times a distressing want of dignity, and a tendency to subordinate larger interests to intrigues and personalities. But this is only to say that politicians changed their sky in coming to Melbourne, but not their manners; and it is noteworthy that the loudest complaints come from the most persistent intriguers, and those whose most frequent argument is the imputation of motives.

Unfortunately, the record of the second Parliament is not so good.

Sir Edmund Barton, on becoming a Judge of the High Court, was succeeded in his Premiership by Mr. Deakin; and public opinion was soon tested by a General Election (December, 1903). The Ministry put forward a progressive programme, of which the principal planks were a tariff preference for British products, and a compulsory reference to judicial determination of all industrial disputes which extended beyond the limits of one State. On the local question of Protection or Free Trade there was to be a fiscal truce. The attitude of the Opposition as it was voiced in New South Wales was negative and critical; but, none the less, Mr. Reid, its leader, who has an unrivalled facility of platform speech—'fluent as a water-spout after rain' was a description of him by Sir Henry Parkes—carried the mother colony triumphantly against the Government. Since, however, his success was due to appeals to local and sectarian prejudices, it did not win him much support in the other States. It is characteristic of the man and of the short memory of Australian voters, when it is not jogged by the newspapers, that within six months of declaring to his supporters that the fiscal issue could not be dropped, and that the Victorian and Catholic sympathies of the Barton Ministry had been a menace to the liberties of New South Wales, Mr. Reid should have accepted office as the leader of a coalition based upon a fiscal truce, and taken for his colleague in the Premiership, having equal power, a Victorian who is also a Catholic!

The session proved remarkable for rapid Ministerial changes (Deakin, Watson, Reid); but its only legislative result was a truncated Arbitration Act, which, it is safe to prophesy, will remain a dead letter on the Statute Book. This measure was passed through its final stages by Mr. Reid, although he had denounced it at the time he was in Opposition. Barren, however, as

the session was, it has defined the position of parties, and its incidents deserve notice upon that account.

Mr. Deakin resigned because a combination of Mr. Reid's followers with the Labour Party carried against him an amendment extending the operation of the Arbitration Act to State employés. The Governor-General, however, to Mr. Reid's unconcealed chagrin, entrusted the formation of the new Ministry to Mr. Watson, who held office for three months with success and dignity. The same Arbitration Bill, however, which had wrecked the Government of Mr. Deakin proved fatal also to his successors. The blow came upon a proposal for preference to Unionists—Mr. Watson insisting that no measure for dealing with industrial disputes would be of value unless the Court had power to deal with the question of 'free labour,' and also that the small advantage of preference was only a reasonable compensation to workmen, who by the Act gave up the right to strike.

On Mr. Watson's defeat everything was in confusion. He had always looked forward to an agreement with Mr. Deakin, and was understood to have formed his Ministry with a view to an early reconstruction to effect that end. Nor was Mr. Deakin averse to the alliance. His health, however, was at the time bad; and the thread of the negotiations was broken by misunderstandings and suspicions on both sides. The Trades Hall Party in Victoria were averse to any coalition with the Liberals, and Mr. Deakin declined to lead any Ministry on terms which left him at the mercy of an irresponsible 'Machine.' Consequently, in Mr. Watson's fall Mr. Reid obtained his long-coveted opportunity. He was, however, powerless alone, for his following was not one-third of the House. Mr. Deakin, however, possessed of the idea that 'cricket could not be played with three elevens in the field,' agreed to support Mr. Reid in order to restore the two-party division, provided that the latter would abandon his opposition to a fiscal truce and accept the measures of the Barton Government, which

six months previously he had promised his electors to repeal. These conditions seemed reasonable enough to Mr. Reid! He accepted office with a light heart, and set to work at once to get into recess. A large section of the Liberals under Mr. Isaacs refused to follow Mr. Deakin, and, going with the Labour Party, left the Ministry dependent on the single vote of an ingenuous legislator from Tasmania, who excused his support of the Ministry upon the plea that to withdraw it meant a dissolution! Mr. Reid, however, undismayed by this close voting, pressed gallantly towards recess. Events have proved that his instinct was not at fault, for within a week of the meeting of Parliament (July, 1905), he was left in a minority of seventeen. Anxious to divert attention from the pressing questions of Preferential Trade and Tariff Reform, and mindful of many provincial successes as a stirrer-up of strife, Mr. Reid had employed the recess in the familiar tactics of setting class against class by raising the bogey of 'anti-Socialism.' In vain Mr. Deakin asked for definitions and explanations: to define and explain would have exposed the fraud, which in time, like other scarecrows, ceased to frighten. Forced thus to meet the House without the support of Mr. Deakin, Mr. Reid, in desperation, abandoned all attempts to legislate, and, staking everything upon the hope of dissolution, proposed a scheme of electoral redistribution as the only measure of the session. Mr. Deakin promptly moved an amendment to the Address that the House was anxious to proceed with business; and Lord Northcote, upon this being carried, properly refused Mr. Reid a dissolution. Mr. Deakin is now Prime Minister with a Cabinet of Liberals, and having the support of the Labour Party.

Thus the second Parliament has, in eighteen months, unmade three Ministries and passed one Act. It is not a pretty story, but the time has not been wasted if the Progressives have learnt discipline and cohesion.

The Labour Party in the States.

Moreover, while the politicians have been marking time, the features of the Constitution have been becoming clear. The conception of federation, which involves a division of powers between Commonwealth and States and a limitation of those of the Commonwealth, is proverbially difficult of comprehension; so that it is not strange that voters should be only now beginning to perceive that most social questions are the concern of the States and not of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Parliament can deal, indeed, with any question which is remitted to it by two or more States; but, while provincial jealousies remain so strong, this power is not likely to be invoked. But directly the Labour Party perceive that the realization of their immediate programme must be sought in the State legislation, the work of the Commonwealth will be more closely confined to defence, preferential trade, external affairs, and the necessary but prosaic work of consolidating the State laws on the few matters of general concern which are within its sphere of action.

The power to legislate on matters of 'trade and commerce' gives, it is true, a large power of interference in social matters; but until the political development of the States becomes more equal, which will happen under the influence of the Labour Party, this power is not likely to be largely used. Thus, such institutions as the Industrial Arbitration Court of New South Wales and the Wages Boards of Victoria will be developed by the local Legislatures, until time makes clear that uniformity of industrial legislation throughout the continent, making allowance for geographical differences is necessary to secure fair terms to all competitors Even in regard to immigration, which is one of the thirty-nine subjects entrusted to the Commonwealth, legislation can only be tentative, so long as each State jealously refuses to modify its land-laws in such a way as to make possible a large and comprehensive scheme.

Thus we may expect to see an increased Labour activity in the State Legislatures, which perform much of the work which in England is done by Municipalities, and less in the Federal Parliament.

This need occasion no alarm. The States are many years behind Great Britain in their social legislation, and most of the measures in the programme of the Labour Party (*e.g.*, workmen's compensation, taxation of land values, better inspection of factories, and better sanitary laws) have either been for many years the law of England, or are advocated by one or other of the political parties. All these proposals are denounced as 'Socialism' in Australia.

The timid, indeed, may take heart from the experience of New South Wales, where there is simply no evidence that the legislation which has been supported by the Labour Party has had any prejudicial effect upon capital or industry. Capitalists have grumbled, as Englishmen always will, but the statistics of our industries show a steady growth both in the amount of capital invested and in the output. Even during the depression caused by the unprecedented drought, the industries affected by the Arbitration Act showed a steady expansion; while no manufacturer or other person has ever yet adduced evidence to the Court that an award has worked harshly, although the request for complaints of this nature has been repeatedly and publicly made. Yet, to judge by the vague declarations of politicians and leader writers, one would imagine every industry was being throttled. It may be so—indeed, it must be if the newspapers say so—but the official returns, which are supplied by the manufacturers themselves, furnish no evidence in the affirmative, and much to the contrary. It would be idle to quote figures, which change from year to year and are open to misconstruction, because the latest information is always available to any inquirer at the office of the Agent-General for New South Wales, Victoria Street, Westminster. During all the period, too, that New South

Wales has been working under the Arbitration Act she has been free from strikes, which by the Act are made a misdemeanour, and no trade union has refused obedience to an award which has been made against it. Sweating, too, has been abolished in the clothing trade, where the abuses were, relatively, as great as in the East End of London. The situation, indeed, has been fairly put by the impartial correspondent of the London *Morning Post* with reference to a refusal to work on the part of a small section of coal miners:

'The indirect influence of the Australian Act is, of course, a most potent element in the pressure placed upon the men. . . . The Act and the Court taken together must be credited with exercising a new and effective control over public opinion at large, which has paralyzed the active assistance of all other unions in this State and throughout Australia. Not a finger is being lifted on behalf of the strikers, not a penny is being voted for their sustenance, not a single speech has been made in their behalf by any Labour leader in or out of politics. The champions of arbitration cannot stultify themselves by any connection with those who are defying its principle and attempting to defeat its tribunal. However futile the police prosecutions about to be heard may prove, and must prove if they are to embrace all those who have laid down their tools, the Arbitration Act has at least isolated them and their quarrel, separating them and their cause from their own comrades in other trades as well as from the rest of the community. Such a spectacle has never before been witnessed in this State or in the Commonwealth, where the solidarity of trade unionists has extended and intensified many strikes that would have been comparatively innocuous if left to themselves' (*Morning Post*, March 17, 1905).

These words emphasize what it is the object of this paper to make clear—viz., that no serious political party in Australia countenances attacks on capital, or contemplates wild-cat legislation. Indeed, the best security

which capital can have is that the predominant party, which is to-day the Labour Party and those who sympathize with its aims, should have responsibility as well as power. The solid elements of sanity, patriotism, and sagacity which make its strength would then be visible to all the world, and even hostile critics would perceive that the extreme utterances of agitators or enthusiasts are not more representative of the aims or methods of Australian Labour than the speeches on a Sunday afternoon in Hyde Park are representative of the opinions of the working-classes of Great Britain.

The Labour Party.

For the moment, however, the Labour Party is a cause of offence to persons in authority who have the ear of the Press, and a stumbling-block, through misunderstanding of its aims and methods, to many well-wishers of Australia.

The changes in the attitude of the Labour Party towards federation curiously illustrate the perversity and unexpectedness of politics. Although one of the resolutions on which the Constitution was based declared in express terms (upon motion by the present writer, made at the first meeting of the Convention) that its purpose was 'to enlarge the power of self-government of the people of Australia,' and although the Bill was drawn, in conformity with this direction, upon more democratic lines than any Constitution past or present, the Labour Party opposed its adoption at every stage, because they were unaccountably possessed of the idea that the equal representation of States in the Senate would prevent majority rule, and that the movement towards national unity cloaked some insidious design of 'militarism' and 'imperialism.' No sooner, however, was the new Constitution established than these misapprehensions vanished, and the common-sense of the people perceived that the influence of a well-organized party with definite ideas must be in-

creased, and could not be diminished, by widening the area of its political influence. Thus, after a year's experience of its operation, the Labour Party changed completely round, and became the ardent supporters of a Constitution they had previously denounced, and at the second General Election (1903-1904) so greatly increased their strength as to become the dominant influence in the Commonwealth Parliament. Whoever, therefore, wishes to understand the drift of Australian politics must not misunderstand the Labour Party.

Now, the Labour Party is by no means the party of the 'larrikins' (as has been absurdly stated by some writers in the English Press), for these find their account with the older political organizations which have money to spend, but contains the best and most serious elements of Australian public life. It certainly has a fringe of discontented 'have-nots' and a small wing of extremists who have preached 'Socialism in our time,' but without indicating by what legislative measures they could reach this goal, and without influencing public opinion to any appreciable extent. The party, indeed, comprises most of the farmers, nearly all the Bush-workers, and the city trade unionists, with a sprinkling of clerks and younger University and professional men; and although its present loose organization gives too much scope for intrigue in the selection of Parliamentary candidates, its leaders are men of recognised probity and ability, and its action has never been influenced by the prospect of personal gain.

The one just cause of complaint against the Labour Party, and that which alone separates it from the Liberals, is the dominance of the 'machine' outside Parliament and of the 'caucus' within. Both these instruments of organization would seem in their present form to have outgrown their usefulness. It is only in its early days of weakness that a party need bind all its members by a pledge, and require them to accept

every plank in its platform, even although most of these may be mere counsels of perfection which are not likely to be within the field of practical politics for many years. But when a party has gained strength, and can express its ideas in definite and practical proposals, it is surely a sign of strength and involves no risk to leave a certain freedom of thought and action to its Parliamentary representatives. The Labour Party in Parliament has already realized this need for greater freedom, but the organizations outside continue to insist upon the 'solidarity pledge,' although they have lessened its stringency and agreed upon a working arrangement for the next General Election with those Liberals who are in general sympathy with their immediate aims. It is certain that as the party gains in power and responsibility it will be able to maintain an equally effective discipline by means which are less derogatory to the personal independence of its members. For the present, however, the 'caucus' and the 'machine' expose the party to suspicion and attack.

'SOCIALISM.'

In judging of the value of the Press denunciation of the Labour Party, the circumstances of Australia must be taken into account. The traditional responsibilities which attach to the inherited wealth of an aristocracy are almost non-existent in a new country, where most men win their wealth from very small beginnings; so that the rich realize with difficulty that property has duties as well as rights, and are nervously apprehensive of attacks or criticism. To such persons the growth of the Labour Party has appeared a formidable portent, heralding the very destruction of our social system. Oblivious of the record of their own parties, they unite in a chorus of protest against what they call the 'class' policy of the Labour Party, and band themselves together with much parade and noise in order to oppose 'Socialism.' The newspapers, which, being commercial enterprises, must

to a great extent reflect the opinions of the advertising classes, echo these dolorous cries, and enter with avidity upon a campaign which has at least the merit of creating a clear issue between the wealthy and influential classes on the one side and those on the other who, in their anger at what they have considered to be an unfair suppression of Labour opinions, have often gone to extravagant lengths in denouncing the newspaper Press.

Nor is there any danger that such a course will lead to any falling off in circulation. For the Australian Press syndicates its cable news; and for this reason, and because of its inherent strength and merits, has been able to defeat all the efforts of the Labour Party to establish a morning paper. Thus, although in their reports of news and speeches the leading Australian papers are usually fair, those who read their comments on the Labour Party and its doings must accept them as they would the comments of any party newspaper upon the actions and policy of its political opponents. It would be as proper to take the opinion of the *Daily News* on the Boer War as that of the *Sydney Morning Herald* or the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* on the policy and measures of the Labour Party.

Socialism is charged against the Labour Party as the head and front of its offending; but the nature of this crime is not defined. Yet what is 'Socialism'? Is it, as the *Sydney Bulletin* inquired in a recent issue, 'Socialism' to run a factory to make the postman's clothes, and yet *not* 'Socialism' to run a post-office? Or is it 'Socialism' to light a street, and yet *not* 'Socialism' to light a sandbank? Or is it 'Socialism' to run a mine, and yet *not* 'Socialism' to run a mining-battery? Is it 'Socialism' to tax land values, and yet *not* 'Socialism' to tax building improvements? Is it 'Socialism' to build ships, and yet *not* 'Socialism' to build punts?

In one sense, no doubt, Socialism is the collective ownership of all means of production; but the Aus-

tralian Labour Party, much to the chagrin of their opponents, the 'Socialists'—for there is a 'Socialist' Party in Australia which runs candidates against the Labour Party—has not adopted this policy as a plank in its political platform. It has only gone so far as to maintain that collective ownership should supersede or prevent monopolies, which is the creed of the Progressive Party on the London County Council, and the mainspring of almost all the activities of such Municipalities as Birmingham and Glasgow. In practice, this would mean that the Commonwealth Government would buy out the Tobacco Trust, and thus establish a State monopoly in that most profitable source of revenue, similar to that which the Colonial Office now enjoys in Cyprus, and to those which have existed for many years in other European States whose rulers have never yet been suspected of 'Socialistic' tendencies.

White Labour.

But the Labour Party is perhaps more discredited by a partisan disparagement of its specific measures than by a general attack upon its so-called Socialistic principles. The dispute between the Commonwealth and the Orient Company over the mail subsidy furnishes a recent illustration. Probably there is not one person in a thousand, even of the well-informed, who does not believe that all this trouble was occasioned by the clause in the Postal Act which required the employment of white crews on all mail-boats. Yet the question of white labour has never entered into this dispute. The letter from the Secretary of the Orient Company, which was published in the *Times* of March 30, 1905, should finally dispose even of this hardy fiction, although, judging from experience of similar cases, it will probably be resurrected at the next Australian election. 'The Six Hatters' is another case in point. The 'Undesirable Immigrant Act' forbids the importation of indentured labour, in order that all con-

tracts for service in Australia should be made in the country itself, where both parties can have the same knowledge of all the conditions. It is one of the many paradoxes of the Antipodes that British sentiment should have been aggrieved by this attempt on the part of Australia to protect British workmen against being made victims of an unfair bargain. Naturally, the grievance comes from a misunderstanding. An enterprising manufacturer of hats omitted to obtain a permit to land six operatives whom he had brought from England under contract. There was a question whether, as skilled artisans, they were not outside the Act; but, however that might be, he was officially advised of a means by which he could have remedied his oversight within a few hours. But our manufacturer was starting a new business, and the Sydney newspapers were looking for a stick with which to beat the Barton Government. No good business man could be expected to let slip so excellent an opportunity. Accordingly for five days the new hat factory monopolized public attention, while Australia rang with indignation against the Government. When a sufficient advertisement had been obtained, the permit was applied for and the men were landed. And they are all of them now members of the Labour Party, and one of them holds office in a branch! It is probable that the mythical accretions round this simple incident have done as much injury to Australian credit as the drought itself. The *Petriana* myth—that the shipwrecked crew of the barque *Petriana* were forbidden to land in Melbourne because of their colour!—is another story of the same kind, but fortunately this, although much more grizzly in its horrid details, was too shamelessly exploited at the General Election of 1904 to be of any further use for circulation in England!

The truth is, that in the application of the White Labour Policy, Australians have neither lost their heads nor forgotten their responsibilities towards the Empire. Realizing their dependence upon the sea-power of

England, they are endeavouring to improve the conditions of sea service in order to encourage the employment of British seamen. The clause prohibiting the employment of black labour upon mail steamers may have been an awkward step in this direction, but if this has any substantial influence in excluding British lascars from employment—which, seeing that most black crews are Arabs or Malays, is open to grave doubt—the door is always open for negotiations to the Indian Government; since Australians would achieve their object equally well by insisting that the equipment of all subsidized steamers should be up to a prescribed standard in order to insure the efficiency and proper treatment of the crew.

The employment of black labour upon shore stands upon a different footing. Upon this part of the White Labour Policy there can be no compromise, because if black labour gains any footing upon the continent, either the low standard of living will depress the higher with unerring certainty, just as under Gresham's law bad money always drives good money out of circulation, or there will be a section of the continent peopled by white masters and black slaves whose instincts and interests will always be antagonistic to the rest of the Commonwealth. It is true that the tropical portions of Australia may remain undeveloped in consequence for many years; but Australians are prepared to make this sacrifice rather than endure the evils of a mixed race or create in the North a repetition of those Southern difficulties which nearly severed the United States. At the same time, the policy is administered with due regard to the susceptibilities of foreign States. No respectable traveller is excluded or in any way inconvenienced on account of his colour. Thus, Indian potentates pay visits to Australia without any restrictions; and during the four months the Labour Party was in office arrangements were made with the Japanese Empire to admit Japanese merchants, students, or visitors, who were furnished with proper credentials from their

Foreign Office. Fortunately, the Government of the Mikado is adverse to the immigration of Japanese labourers.

It is an error to suppose that the democratic party in Australia is opposed to immigration. Following the example of the United States, Canada, and Natal (which has since been followed also by the Cape Colony), the Commonwealth has determined to maintain its present standard of efficiency by excluding paupers, criminals, and other undesirables. The Commonwealth law upon this subject is almost textually the same as that of Canada, Natal, and the United States; while it is administered with so much more consideration to British interests that no white British subject has ever been excluded from Australia under its provisions. The same cannot be said of either the Dominion or South Africa. Yet both these countries are praised for their activity in attracting immigrants, while Australia, under the odium of 'The Six Hatters,' is blamed for excluding them! As a matter of fact, the first excess of arrivals over departures since the banking crisis of 1892 has occurred since the advent to power of the Labour Party. The excess, it is true, is small (1,389), but it marks the turn of the tide, and holds out promise for the future, when the Labour Party is sufficiently strong to overcome the State jealousy of Commonwealth action, and arrange an active immigration policy.

Nor is the attitude of the Labour Party less favourable to Imperial interests in other directions. They have steadily supported an effective system of national defence, under which every boy at school will be trained in the use of arms, from the belief that a citizen army is the best safeguard of democracy, and that a country which is worth living in is worth fighting for. In this respect they offer an admirable example to the Liberal Party in Great Britain. There is not the same unanimity about Preferential Trade, which, like Free Trade and Protection, has been left an open question by the party. Mr. Watson, however, its leader, is in hearty accord

with Mr. Deakin on this subject, and it is known that he will be followed by three-fourths of his present party. The best evidence of the strength of feeling among the Australian Labour Party in favour of a closer commercial union throughout the Empire is afforded by the desperate appeals which are being made to them to change their attitude by the political leaders of English trade unionism.

The future, indeed, is with the Federalists, of whom the Labour Party is the active wing, although Liberals who are in general sympathy with Labour aims, but differ from them as to method, are found in the same camp. The Provincialists, indeed, have had their day, although Sydney for a short time yet will raise a vain and belated protest against any Australian policy. The Commonwealth, however, gains steadily with the growth of national sentiment, and local prejudices and jealousies will gradually die out when the people of Australia see themselves as others see them, and have learnt to 'think in continents.'

IMPERIALISM AND AUSTRALIAN CONDITIONS

By THE HON. SIR JOHN A. COCKBURN, K.C.M.G.

THE centre of gravity of the inhabited globe varies from time to time, and the focus of interest shifts in conformity with the ever-widening circle of civilization. In the ancient world it was round the shores of the Mediterranean that empire-making conflicts were waged, and the deeds of those days still live as the heroic in history. The Mediterranean is, however, the earth's central sea no longer. But for the fact that it serves as a funnel for the Suez Canal it might, so far as the world-power is concerned, be regarded as an inland lake. It is scarcely even a continental boundary. Its southern shore is not now the limit of Europe; this is being pushed southward to the margin of the Sahara.

The central sea of the modern world—the international arena in which the future rank of nations will be decided—must now be sought in the Pacific. Here is the chessboard which progressive nations are anxiously watching in order to secure any coign of vantage which will increase their prospects of preponderance. The United States definitely adopted a foreign policy by the acquisition of the Philippines. Germany is incessant in activity among the neighbouring islands. The phenomenal advent of Japan among the greatest naval and military powers still further emphasizes the position, and the construction of the Panama Canal will increase its significance.

Australia has always been regarded with interest as one of the most important of the self-governing Colonies of the Empire, but this interest is now transcended by that which attaches to her position as one of the continents of the Pacific. Formerly the uttermost part of the earth, she may now at any time be brought into the very vortex of affairs. Eventually the Antipodes may become the apex. As one of the keys of the Pacific—as a battery for the reinforcement of British power in that region—everything that touches the welfare of Australia is of paramount importance to the whole Empire.

In estimating the outlook, the main fact should be borne in mind that Australia, like New Zealand, is essentially British—more British than any other Colony of the Empire; more British than even the heart of the Empire itself. Ninety-five per cent. of the whole population are British born or of British descent, and their characteristics indubitably proclaim their parentage. They have inherited the same practical, hard-headed common-sense which characterized their ancestors, the same faculty for making elbow-room, the same disdain of abstract theory, the same predilection for empirical methods, as opposed to the systems and generalizations of Latin races, which brought Great Britain to the front rank of nations; not precisely the qualities which have become fashionable during the recent age of *laissez faire*, when, having attained first place and distanced all rivals, Great Britain has been content with maintaining the *status quo*, but the qualities which marked the British race in the making—qualities which will have again to be cultivated when Great Britain ceases to rest upon past achievement, and once more gives way with a will in order to regain the lead lost through indifference, and through the habit of letting things pass in what was to her for a time the best of all possible worlds.

Australia, although a continent covering about a third of the area of the whole Empire, is also an island,

and possesses in a marked degree the sea instinct which haunts sea-girt lands. The population has hitherto mainly occupied only a fringe of the littoral. The capitals are situated close to salt water, and in Sydney the largest vessels afloat can berth in the heart of the city without docking. The early settlers brought with them to their new home that passion for the romance of the sea which was peculiar to the days of long sailing voyages. They still delight in the old sea chanties. Australia, sprung from the loins of the sea, has the same love for the element, the same longing for sea-power which characterizes Britannia.

This is doubtless one of the reasons for the pertinacity with which many Australians cling to the idea of an Australian Navy, despite the irresistible arguments of naval experts, so ably put forward by Lord Selborne at the last Colonial Conference, to the effect that the command of the sea depends on the capacity to detach naval strength from locality and to concentrate it in any part of the world where a hostile fleet exists in force. Command of the sea, however, in the opinion of Australians, does not prevent the possibility of damage from chance raiders, and this, they maintain, would be most likely to occur when the fleet was engaged in some distant operation. It is just when the fire-engines are away at some great conflagration that it is especially desirable for a householder to have at hand the means of extinguishing an incipient outbreak. The rejoicings appropriate to a great British naval victory in foreign seas might be marred amid the ruin caused by an irregular bombardment. Moreover, it is urged that the initiative and alertness which evolved the Australian soldier might with equal advantage be brought to bear on naval construction and strategy.

Australians view with regret and dismay the rapid denationalization which is taking place in the mercantile marine, where lascars and foreigners in ever-increasing numbers are daily ousting British sailors from employment. It is doubtful whether a supreme navy is

possible except as a crown of a well-manned merchant service, and it would be well if, instead of denouncing the Australian Commonwealth for a well-meant effort to preserve employment for themselves and for British sailors on the great ocean liners, which at any time may act as auxiliary cruisers, Great Britain were seriously to consider whether it is wise to permit the conclusion to be drawn that the sea is ceasing to provide a career for the sons of the nation that rules the waves.

To no part of the Empire can the phrase Greater Britain be more aptly applied than to Australia. The national type and characteristics are those of the parent race, to which greater opportunities for development have been afforded, just as British flowers and fruit transplanted to Australian virgin soil flourish with unprecedented luxuriance. Physically, the native-born Australians frequently outstrip, both in stature and stalwartness, their parents of European origin. In many sports, such as cricket, they hold their own ; and the oarsmen of the Paramatta River are unsurpassed for speed and endurance. Brilliant commanders, such as Lord Dundonald, Sir Edward Hutton, and General Rimington bear ready testimony to the value of the Australian Centaurs in the field. In the realm of art, and especially in vocal music, several Australians have excelled. The average Australian is active, alert, and keenly critical. The public men are bold and enterprising—as, for example, when in despair at the lethargy of the Imperial Government, Queensland hoisted the Union Jack in New Guinea, and secured a province for the Crown.

It is in the achievement of federation that the political initiative and resource of Australia have been most conspicuously displayed. The Commonwealth Act is a piece of constructive statesmanship which has received high encomiums from the most distinguished constitutional authorities. It is the first case in history in which communities have voluntarily, and without outside pressure, surrendered a portion of their autonomy. The

movement, because it was optional, has been subjected to more severe criticism than if it had taken place under the dictates of necessity. Spontaneous as the action undoubtedly was, and premature as by some it was regarded, it was merely a case of performing at leisure a labour which the clash of arms in the Pacific would before long have rendered imperative. On the whole, the anticipations of the federal majority have been realized. But rights enjoyed from the cradle cannot be surrendered without some subsequent heart-burnings. No Federal Government which did its duty could avoid giving occasional offence to some of the States. The causes of complaint have, however, been fewer than might reasonably be expected, and much wisdom has been shown in dealing with them. The inventive genius of the nation was not exhausted in constructing the federal mechanism; the same skilful hands that erected it have superintended its working, and have been diligent in lessening the friction inevitable at the outset. It was known beforehand that the prohibition of the Kanaka traffic would give rise to trouble in Queensland; that the tariff resulting from a compromise between Free Trade and Protection would fail to give satisfaction to many manufacturers in Victoria; and that Western Australia would never rest content until linked in railway communication with the other States. But the two latter difficulties will be remedied, and the majority in Queensland have never regarded the importation of the Kanaka as otherwise than a temporary expedient. The drawbacks to federation are evanescent, the gains large and lasting. United Australia with her forces coordinated under one command faces the future with a confidence denied to disjointed States. Free Trade throughout the Commonwealth, reached, be it noted, through the pathway of Protection, has already given a marked impetus to manufactures and commerce.

Australians smile at the glib fallacy that England's industrial greatness was founded on Free Trade. They

have read history to better purpose, and are satisfied that the industrial lead was attained by means of the most stringent system of patents, monopolies, and protection that the world has ever witnessed. It is in the temporary and now baneful effervescence of a system of free imports, not in the fiscal policy of the self-governing Colonies, that the departure from true British instinct is to be traced.

The germ of all that appears in Australian life is to be found in the Mother-land, and so-called Australian tendencies are merely accentuations of inherited proclivities. These may readily be traced in many directions. The oft-noted preponderance of population in Australian capitals is but a strenuous reflex of English city crowding. Undesirable as this movement appears, its universality indicates it as an unavoidable stage in the evolution of social solidarity. The deplorable diminution of the birth-rate in Australia is only an exaggeration of British example. The extension of the sphere of State activity, which is denounced as State Socialism, is the hardly more pronounced expression of a tendency which is apparent everywhere in the United Kingdom under the name of Municipalization. Australian Governments were driven by stress of circumstances to undertake many functions previously performed by private enterprise; it must not, however, be supposed that socialistic theory played any considerable part in their adoption. The measures indicated were devised by practical men to meet everyday requirements, and were not the outcome of any theoretical preconceptions.

The Australian Colonies obtained their autonomy at a time when the tide of *laissez-faire* dogma ran high. The adventurous settlers who planted the British flag in these distant lands were familiar with the predictions of dire calamity uttered by orthodox economists against those who ventured to transgress the narrow circle within which the legitimate functions of the State were supposed to be circumscribed. They were sturdy indi-

viduals like their forefathers, and nothing would have been more congenial to their proclivities than to adhere to the old belief that public weal is best advanced by private action. In the modern world of industry, however, the isolated individual counts for little. At the outset there were in private hands no stores of capital sufficient to furnish the means necessary for organized effort on a large scale. In endeavouring to provide the first necessity of civilization—railway communication—it was found that private enterprise was wholly unequal to the task. In New South Wales, between 1846 and 1854, unsuccessful attempts were made, but the Government had to step in and complete the work. Similar results were experienced elsewhere; and it came to be recognised that railroads and other great engineering works should be constructed by the State, for the simple reason that there was no other means of getting them carried out.

State enterprise, adopted perforce in the first instance as the plan on which the industry and activity of the Australian Colonies ranged themselves, was retained because it was found that an adequate and immediate reward to individual effort was afforded by that system. It is true that there were in Australia some public men of philosophic cast of mind who, observing the advantages of governmental action, deliberately set themselves to enlarge its scope in every possible direction, and their efforts found reinforcements in every rank. The essays issued by the Fabian Society attracted much attention, and made converts not only of many of the Labour party, but also of some of the wealthiest, most cultivated, and most influential members of society. But these influences were almost negligible; the main body of public opinion moved towards material and immediate ends, unconscious of any predetermined destination.

The magnitude of her public debt in proportion to the Australian population is due to the fact that it has been advantageous for the State to perform many public

services which in other countries are undertaken by municipal bodies or private enterprise. Mr. Coghlan, in his admirable statistical account, gives the total expenditure of borrowed money in Australia:

	£
Railways and tramways	136,600,855
Telegraph and telephones	3,771,758
Water-supply and sewerage ...	29,245,167
Harbours, rivers, and navigation	17,373,507
Roads and bridges	6,482,948
Public works and buildings	17,188,178
Defence	2,379,825
Immigration	3,409,132
Advances to settlers	508,435
Land for settlement	745,049
Loans to public bodies	2,416,607
Total	£220,121,461

The excess of receipts over expenditure from the following sources for last year was:

	£
Railways and tramways	4,285,960
Water-supply and sewerage	629,354
Harbours, rivers, and navigation	184,905
Advances to settlers	7,702
Land for settlement	21,109
Loans to public bodies	111,773
Total available to meet interest on capital cost	£5,240,803

Thus a return of 2·30 per cent. is derived from the total loan expenditure. It is evident, therefore, that although some mistakes may have been made, the borrowed money has on the whole been wisely expended. The railways, representing the bulk of the public debt, were constructed and are administered not so much with the view of yielding profit as of promoting settlement and encouraging production. They could readily be made to yield larger profits if worked solely with

that object. As they stand, the railways alone are an asset worth the whole of the debt. But as an additional security there are still in the hands, and at the disposal, of the various Governments 1,782,553,693 acres of unalienated land. So that the investor in Australian stocks is secure beyond all possibility of question.

There is no more absorbing or debatable question than the extent to which State or municipal enterprise can be carried with advantage to the community. There can be no question as to the direction in which the whole world is at present travelling. The construction of the Pacific cable by the British and Colonial Governments in direct competition with private enterprise may be cited as the latest and most pronounced expression of State Socialism. Australia, in common with New Zealand, is conducting experiments from which other countries may, in matters of the deepest importance, derive the dearly-bought lessons of experience without expense to themselves, and can ascertain what it would be well to avoid and what to imitate in the solution of problems with which they may soon be called upon to deal.

Doubtless the explanation of the apparent anomaly that the United States and Australia, those two great sister offshoots from a common ancestry, are poles asunder as regards the sphere of State activity is to be found in the different condition of industry and transport at the time of their origin. The foundations of the policy of the United States were laid ages anterior to the advent of railroads and the industrial revolution. The giant power of steam had not then been harnessed to human service, intricate and expensive machinery was unknown, and highly-organized industry was unnecessary. There was at that time nothing in the problem of colonization which surpassed the power of men single-handed or grouped together for some temporary purpose. Knit together in the strongest bonds of fellowship by religious fervour, and welded by perse-

cution, the Pilgrim Fathers possessed the solidarity favourable to successful cooperation; but there was none of the outside pressure of industrial necessity which moulded the more divergent elements of Australian settlement into combined effort. In each case the best available road to successful settlement was selected. The methods differed, not because of any change in the national temperament, but because the conditions were altered.

In old countries the barrier of established custom, the ties of tradition, and the friction of vested interests, offer a serious resistance to every innovation; to strike out any new line of action in the face of such obstacles presents difficulties similar to those encountered in laying out a new thoroughfare in a crowded city. Here and there a monument of antiquity must be preserved and worked into the scheme, and the plan has to be modified accordingly. In young countries, where the ground is comparatively unencumbered, no such intricate problems occur, and convenience alone has to be studied. Under these simpler conditions the self-governing Colonies have acted as pioneers in the introduction of many measures which have subsequently been adopted, or appear likely to be adopted, in the Mother Country. Australia is the home of the Ballot and the Real Property Act. The system of graduated death duties was established in Australia long before its introduction in the United Kingdom.

Old-age pensions, so frequently advocated in the Mother Country, have already been several years in operation in New South Wales and Victoria, and doubtless before long will be general throughout the Commonwealth. The franchise enjoyed since 1894 by the women of South Australia, and more recently by those of West Australia and New South Wales, has been extended to all women for both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament. The Referendum, so often cited favourably by Mr. Chamberlain as a means of lifting great national questions above the fog of party,

is the recognised method in Australia for settling knotty problems and obtaining a popular verdict free from personal or political bias.

Much adverse criticism has been directed against the Commonwealth for its laws restricting immigration. But a law forbidding the indiscriminate introduction of labour under contract is a necessity in a country where the ruling rate of wages is higher than in Great Britain; where Factory Acts provide for boards that fix the rate of wages; and where the minimum wage is in force. There was hardly a voice raised in the Commonwealth Parliament against the clause providing for this restriction, and there was no division upon it. It was evident that without some such provision an unscrupulous employer might hoodwink those working at lower wages in other countries into binding themselves for a term of years at a rate which, though high enough to entice, was still below the Australian standard wage. The full Australian citizenship is open to the world, but he who desires to partake thereof should enter the country free and untrammelled.

The law was never intended to apply to such a case as that of the historical six hatters, who, however, were not sent back, as is so frequently stated, but, on the contrary, were admitted directly their employer applied for the requisite permission. The episode was a regrettable incident, for which a little passing inter-State jealousy was probably responsible, but does not give ground for all the clamour which was raised against the Act.

The exclusion of coloured races may be accepted as a fixed and final determination. This is not, as is frequently supposed, a mere labour question. It is a national resolve, which is shared by the great majority of every class, to preserve at all hazards the purity of the race. Those living at a distance can hardly appreciate the gravity of the position. Without immigration laws, Australia, situated as she is, would be inundated by alien races, and would soon cease to be a white man's

country, and autocratic in place of parliamentary methods of government would in some parts have to be adopted. The racial trouble in the United States indicates that prevention is the only course to pursue in view of an evil which is apparently without remedy. The widespread impression that white men cannot perform manual labour in the tropical regions of Australia is without adequate foundation; it is continually refuted by actual experience. The difficulty is not that the white man cannot work alongside of the black, but that he will not. Professor C. H. Pearson, in 'National Life and Character,' remarks: 'When he' (the black labourer) 'multiplies, the British race begins to consider labour of all but the highest kinds dishonourable, and from the moment that a white population will not work in the fields, on the roads, in the mines or in factories, its doom is practically sealed.'

It is doubtful whether there is so much real economy in coloured labour as some imagine. It is undoubtedly more manageable and docile, and these features naturally have a charm for employers; but docility is not the quality on which the greatness of the British race was based. It was not the docility of our forefathers that won for us our civic and political liberty; nor were the sea-dogs who built the Empire renowned for passive virtues, which are as little calculated to maintain as to found an Empire. In the eagerness to unearth treasure we must beware lest we sap the very foundations of the Imperial structure. Rome, the prototype of Great Britain, fell because the sturdy agriculturists, racy of the soil, were displaced by bond labour; for though the latter might till the land with profit to their masters, they could not wield the sword necessary to defend the homestead.

There is nothing either strange or novel in the ideal held by the Australian democracy that the worker should enjoy a living wage, that he should have leisure for recreation and self-improvement, and that some provision should be made by which he is enabled to

spend the evening of his days free from want and without the humiliation of the workhouse. What does it profit the nation that life has joys for the privileged few if the masses are not well housed, clad, and fed? It is as though we should be satisfied if the officers of an army fared sumptuously while the rank and file were in want. It is not thus that campaigns are won, and it is not by neglect of wealth-producing labour that nations attain either happiness or prosperity. The welfare of the workers who constitute the body of the nation has been the aim of the best men and the greatest thinkers in all ages; but while others have been satisfied with the expression of a pious opinion, Australia and New Zealand have endeavoured to reduce it to practice. Certainly the case of New Zealand, where measures have been carried to the fullest extent in this direction, seems to bear out the view that such a course not only is not inconsistent with national prosperity, but appears to be an efficient instrument to that end.

Accompanying the development of democracy in Australia, there is, however, no sign of enervation or laxity on the part of the governing power. The will of the people, once definitely ascertained, carries with it the corollary of inflexible enforcement. The duly accredited representatives of the manhood and womanhood of Australia have little of the timidity of public opinion so frequently displayed by those whose authority is based on a more limited franchise. Anti-vaccinators do not scare them, and they are not afraid to adopt severe measures for a definite public good. For example, the agricultural departments succeeded by rigorous administration in eradicating scab from the sheep scattered in millions over mountain ranges and vast plains—a herculean accomplishment when compared with the futile efforts in these islands. Acts which would be resented as arbitrary if imposed by an autocracy or oligarchy are obeyed without protest when the legislative power is unquestionably in the hands of the whole people. Regulation and restriction are then

regarded not so much as infringements of liberty, but rather as a laudable exercise of self-control. There is truth as well as satire in Lowell's witty lines:

> 'Democracy gives every man
> The right to be his own oppressor.'

One thing, however, is needful to enable Australia to realize her destiny, and that is increased population. Unoccupied lands are not only a passive hindrance to prosperity, but are a positive source of weakness and peril. In this, as in other respects, Nature abhors a vacuum, and covetous eyes may be cast on vast, unoccupied areas. If the coloured element is barred, the white must be encouraged. The diminishing birth-rate makes the matter more urgent. A country with merely a marginal population is as an empty shell, which may collapse at a touch. Prudence, as well as duty to others, impels to action. Mr. Deakin has already emphatically pronounced his opinion as to this pressing necessity. Western Australia has appointed a Commission to deal with the aspect of the problem in that State, New South Wales is taking active steps, and Queensland has always been alive to the requirement.

Among the matters which, owing to their importance and to the impotence of private initiative, demand State action, the adjustment of population should take a leading place. Systematic immigration is a comparatively neglected field, and might with mutual advantage be undertaken by the combined forces of the British and Colonial Governments. It may be noted that, while critics impress on Australians the necessity of attracting population, they often vehemently denounce measures for facilitating land settlement, which must form the basis for an increase of population. The resumption by Governments of portions of vast pastoral leases for permanent agricultural settlement has often been stigmatized as land robbery, and laws providing for the repurchase of large and sparsely-peopled estates for closer settlement have

been condemned by some usually enlightened and right-thinking English journals, and yet these measures were indispensable means towards the simultaneously advocated end. The misconceptions which arise even in fairly well-informed circles as to occurrences in Australia, and especially as to the aims and results of legislative action, would be amusing were they not provocative of mischievous misunderstandings.

Gentlemen in London who take a prominent part in discussions concerning the Colonies, and so volubly lay down the law, are to be congratulated that the responsibility of the helm is not in their hands; otherwise the course of the ship of State might be brief. The settlement of a huge continent like Australia, where distances are so enormous, presents many novel difficulties. The conditions of soil and climate are, in many cases, unprecedented and peculiar. Many of the regions in which flocks and herds abound are without permanent water. This has to be provided, often at great cost, before successful settlement is possible. In agriculture the recognised system of rotation of crops can be carried out in only a few localities. Methods of farming so successful in other countries have to be unlearnt before a successful start can be made.

The power evinced by Australia of recuperation from the effects of the late prolonged drought is astonishing. In many sheep farms the natural increase in the flocks last year exceeded 100 per cent. The wheat available for export during 1904 was estimated at 40,000,000 bushels, and the imports of wheat from Australia to this country in that year largely exceeded those from Canada. Exempt from the rigour of winter, and with the boon of two springs in each year, Australia has unrivalled advantages for production. As the land of the golden fleece and sheaf she is peerless. The panegyric of Pliny on the British Isles quoted by James Harrington 250 years ago in the 'Commonwealth of Oceana,' applies in many respects to the Colony which has now succeeded to the title.

'O the most blest and fortunate of all countries, Oceana! how deservedly has Nature with the bounties of heaven and earth endued thee! Thy ever fruitful womb not closed with ice, nor dissolved by the raging star; where Ceres and Bacchus are perpetual twins. Thy woods are not the harbour of devouring beasts, nor thy continual verdure the ambush of serpents, but the food of innumerable herds and flocks presenting thee, their shepherdess, with distended dugs or golden fleeces.'

NEW ZEALAND TO-DAY

By THE HON. W. P. REEVES

IMAGINE Italy and Sicily lying out in mid-Atlantic; give them a cooler midsummer and a scanty Anglo-Saxon population; indent the long, boot-shaped outline of their coasts deeply here and there with gulfs and fiords; banish beggary, ignorance, malaria, and the sirocco, but deprive them also of the glories and colour of history, architecture, painting, sculpture, and Latin speech and taste, and you may conceive of a country not unlike New Zealand. The ocean archipelago has the same slim shape, the same long spinal mountain chains, the same contrast between Alpine snows towards one extremity and high volcanic cones towards the other; and the brilliant New Zealand atmosphere and blue seas are Italian also, though in colouring and shape the lofty shores more resemble parts of Greece. To the landscape artist they seem almost too romantic a theatre for the sober, matter-of-fact British colonists, who are planting and ploughing plains, hewing farms out of forests, and turning silent valleys into green dairy pastures, and bleak hillsides into sheep-walks. For the Anglo-Saxon settler is a man of business; Romance does not trouble him. When natural beauty stands in the way of settlement it has to go; and the artistic mind must comfort itself as best it can with the reflection that much of the peculiar beauty of New Zealand is indestructible, and that some more of it will be saved for the prosaic reason that it does not 'pay' to destroy it.

Not that all New Zealanders are indifferent to the beauty of their land; many of them admire and enjoy it. Large State reserves protect some of the more charming landscapes; in certain places societies guard their local scenery. The Government Tourist Department advertises the country's scenic attractions, and smooths the path of the visitor or holiday-maker in a score of ways. But to the typical colonist all such things are merely by-play. His pride is in 'progress.' The traveller from England is curious about what the islands were in their natural state—about the solemn Alps, the delightful fiords, the untouched forest, the astonishing volcanic forces, the picturesque savages who dwelt among these sights. The heart of the colonist is in the transformation which is turning the stern or beautiful wilderness into a flourishing and civilized State. The bleating of sheep and lowing of cattle are sweeter music in his ears than the roar of waterfalls. To the European visitor a colonial city of fifty thousand inhabitants is just a third-rate town and nothing more. To the pioneer who has seen it grow from a handful of tents and shanties, the prosperous streets, roomy villas, and comfortable cottages represent victory—the triumph of his race in their battle with emptiness and desolation. So in the country: every new road, bridge, line of railway, every additional homestead, plantation, hedgerow, has a meaning to the settler, in whose eyes it spells advance and the conquest of obstacles. So traveller and colonist sometimes find themselves at cross-purposes. The former may occasionally seem to the latter an æsthetic butterfly. The European in his haste now and then sets down the colonial farmer or tradesman as a bit of a vandal.

First and last, then, the dominating idea of the New Zealander is Colony-making. This is his work. Touch that chord, and you will always find him responsive. Why, then, with all this passion for colonization, has the archipelago not filled up faster, and been more completely settled? Sixty-five years—the age of the Colony

—seem long enough in the eyes of some English onlookers to have shown results, not better, perhaps, but on a larger scale. At the moment of writing the whites in the islands number considerably less than a million—just 864,000, in fact—and as the coloured inhabitants are scarcely 46,000, the population is under nine to the square mile. Thirty-six million acres of land are now in occupation by whites, and turned to some sort of productive use; but that leaves rather more than thirty million acres still to be accounted for. As only one-sixth of the country's surface need finally be quite useless to the grazier, it might be thought that the acres aforesaid should have attracted a greater stream of settlers happy to make their homes in what a comparison of death-rates shows to be precisely the healthiest spot on earth.

The explanatory reasons of their steady rather than sensational pace at which the Colony has grown are briefly these:

The first is found in the resisting power of the native race, and in the humane policy which has required that the soil of the island should be acquired only tract by tract, by slow bargaining and peaceful purchase. Next, as a retarding influence, must be counted the loneliness and distance of position. Again, now that the power of the Maori tribes has been broken, and all their possessions, save some five million reserved acres, have passed to the Crown and private owners, the physical configuration of the islands still confronts the settlers with many obstacles. Their surface is broken, often mountainous; it is seamed and divided by ravines, and, to an extraordinary degree, by the beds of streams and mountain torrents of all sizes. Huge swamps demand patient and costly draining. Half the country was originally of a peculiarly dense and difficult forest. The soil towards the northern end is often a stiff clay, which yields good results only after much painful tilling. Nature has fitted New Zealand healthy and fertile, successful rather than for rapid occupation.

Bad land laws, too, leading to monopoly, have been obstructive in the past, and have left a legacy of evil. And the fall of prices of raw products, felt so severely between 1820 and 1895, embarrassed New Zealand as it embarrassed other young countries. Moreover, the New Zealander's ambition for progress, above referred to, must be taken with one important qualification. The march must not be of Progress and Poverty. The growth of population must not be any ugly rush that will lower the standard of comfort. The New Zealander is a worker—a hard and intelligent worker; but, whatever his class, he expects a liberal return for his labour. His ideal is the golden mean: a land without material misery, where there shall be something for everyone and not too much for anybody; a land where life shall not be a lottery with a few great prizes and a vast number of blanks. Hence the exclusion laws, which almost bar out Asiatics. Hence the land laws, which aim at preventing any but small or middling farmers from acquiring agricultural land from the Crown; the progressive land tax, the absentee tax, and the rates levied on unimproved values. Hence the Industrial Arbitration Act and a whole code of labour laws stipulating for fair working conditions not only in factories, workshops, and mines, but in open-air industries. Hence the statutory encouragement given to the formation not only of trade unions, but of associations of masters, with the levelling influence which such associations have. Hence the deliberate throwing of old-age pensions for the aged poor, and the whole burden of charity (outdoor relief, hospitals, lunatic asylums) upon the public in almost complete indifference to its effect upon private alms-giving. Hence the construction and management of railways, telegraphs, and telephones by the State, with the immense reduction which this implies of the field of enterprise left open to the capitalists. The New Zealander is not such a materialist as to fancy that a decent share of comfort all round—to be earned by hard work—will insure human happi-

ness. But he is the reverse of an Oriental ascetic, and he does most steadfastly believe that healthful surroundings, good food, good pay, and a fair margin of leisure, give the best chance of happiness to the common workaday person. The notion that New Zealanders, as a people, have as an ideal some elaborate State Socialism may be dismissed. They are not enthusiastically steering towards a Cooperative Commonwealth. They are not even—consciously—Fabian Socialists. But they find in practice that by collective action they can do many things which they wish to do. They are, so far, satisfied with the chief experiments they have tried, and are unconsciously coming to look upon themselves as members of a cooperative company with unlimited liability, but practically limited risks.

As a democracy their Colony is sometimes compared with democratic Switzerland. There is, however, this material social difference: the yearly sum which the average New Zealander is able to spend is more than twice the annual outlay of the Swiss; it is more than four times that of the average Russian. Yet scarcely 6 per cent. of the male bread-winners in New Zealand enjoy incomes exceeding £200 a year. And among this favoured 6 per cent. the average of income is barely £600. Such a handful are the very wealthy; indeed, the annuity does not claim to possess a single millionaire. This *aurea mediocritas* does not mean that there is neither poverty nor anxiety, any more than the fact that the death-rate is the lowest in the world means that there is no mortality. What it does mean is that the competent farmer, skilled mechanic, and able-bodied labourer have usually a more hopeful life than in other countries. Generally, the diffusion of comfort in all classes is a pleasant sight, and, as there is no luxury on a large scale, the contentment of the man of small means is nowhere disturbed by the contrast of flaunting wealth.

The wooden cottage, which is the ordinary abode of

the manual or clerical labourer, may be a small enough edifice, but, like Goldsmith's Swiss, the householder

> 'Sees no contiguous palace rear its head
> To shame the meanness of his humble shed.'

Moreover, except in Wellington, the cottage is more likely than not to be surrounded by a garden. Indeed, it chiefly is the gardens which are the saving clause of the towns and suburbs; the less said about the architecture the better. But the gardens, helped by the bright skies, fresh air, and general look of spaciousness and cleanliness, redeem most of the streets and squares. New Zealanders bid fair to be great gardeners, as, indeed, they should be in such a climate. There is still room even in most of the settled districts for man to turn round in. Though monopoly has already done him much mischief, he is not divorced from the soil. The number of distinct land-holdings is 116,000. Of these 66,000 are of more than 1 acre apiece, so may be set down as something larger than sites for buildings, yards, and cottage gardens. The remainder are nearly all urban, and their number shows that the process of packing humanity into courts, alleys, and slums has scarcely yet begun. It would, indeed, be monstrous if it had, seeing that the islands are as large as the kingdom of Italy.

Nor do you find in New Zealand the peculiarity which strikes the visitor to Australia—namely, disproportionately large cities. It is the most decentralized of colonies: there is no overshadowing centre; instead you find four towns—Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin, and Wellington. The largest of these, Auckland, has, with its suburbs, about 70,000 people, and the smallest of the four, Wellington, about 53,000. Wellington, too, though the seat of Government, exercises no special political influence. The cities, indeed, do not dictate to the Colony, though intellectually they may influence it. For instance, no representative of any of the four centres sits in the Cabinet.

The farmers are the most influential class. This is but natural in a country where there are no less than 43,000 freeholders, each occupying more than 5 acres of land, to say nothing of many thousands State tenants. Only one-tenth of the occupied soil is held by the tenants of private owners, so that rural landlordism has not yet made much headway. The farmers, therefore, are their own masters, especially in these latter years in which State mortgage loans on easy terms, together with prosperous seasons, have loosened the once tight grip of money-lenders and financial institutions. The policy by which the New Zealanders endeavour to promote the subdivision of their soil has come in for some criticism among Utopians as well as Conservatives. Conservatives see the premature extinction of a class of wealthy country gentlemen whose homes might be a refining influence. The scientific Utopian fears that the multiplication of small holdings must people the country with a race of ignorant, inefficient, thick-headed peasants without machinery, capital, or initiative. But the New Zealand farmer is by no means a boor. He is educated, keen-witted, handy. Where capital and expensive machinery are wanted he and his neighbours will use cooperation, as in the case of dairy factories. Moreover, the Government Department of Agriculture is the farmers' friend —a powerful educating and stimulating force.

Next to the farmers in influence come the workpeople. These, as a class, let the trade unions speak for them in politics, though most of them are not enrolled in unions. Many, though by no means all, of the manual workers, are keen politicians, and the class has more voice in practical politics than their fellows in North America or Europe. This is the more noteworthy because no specific Labour party exists, and no workman has ever held office in any Ministry. All adult women may, and most of them do, exercise the franchise. But there is no feminine party. Social position and industrial interests are the chief deter-

mining factors of party divisions. It must be obvious that, in a country without an aristocracy or House of Peers, without a State Church or denominational school system, without a standing army, a navy, a foreign policy, or a millionaire class, politics must concern themselves chiefly with economic questions, matters of administration, and reforms aiming at some improvement of public morals. Under this last-named head a powerful cross-issue in the shape of the temperance movement has in the last decade cut across class and ordinary party lines. Started by the *petite bourgeoisie*, and heavily recruited from the work-people and smaller farmers, the temperance or prohibition agitation is the strongest united force at work in New Zealand politics to-day. Its strength, together with the devoted attachment of the people to their national system of education, and the practical daily interest they take in their schools, go to negative the suggestion that the New Zealander is a mere gloss materialist. Artistic he is not, ascetic he is not, but moral ideals and religious speculation have their share of attention. Above all, the colonist is a reader, and not of novels only. It is often his ambition to be a writer. The books written in or about the islands would fill many shelves. A severe critic might say that only two of them—Maning's 'Old New Zealand' and Domett's 'Ranolf and Amohia'—show unquestionable distinction. There has been, however, a fair amount of meritorious writing done by others, and the newspapers, though they make public life disagreeable enough, are, on the whole, a credit to the country.

As yet the little nascent island race has done nothing in art, and hardly anything in literature. In practical statesmanship its name is linked with some bold experiments, rumours of which have gone abroad and which are much disliked by the educated and wealthy classes everywhere. So far its contribution to the world's intellectual stock has been nought. It seems, therefore, a daring, almost absurd, suggestion to hint

that certain aspects of the New Zealand character show some signs of a likeness to the Greek. The sunny, mountainous islands themselves are Greek in contour and atmosphere. You may see there the outlines of the Cretan coast and the colouring of Corfu. And the people, subdivided by sea-straits and mountain ranges, have the local life, keen local jealousies, particularist politics, and restless hypercritical interest in public affairs which history associates with the Greek democracies. With their hundreds of newspapers and elective local councils, their adult suffrage, their extraordinary proportion of actual voters—more than one-third of the total population—they make a nearer approach to being a nation of politicians than any other community I know of. The darker complexion, quicker speech, livelier manner, sociable disposition, and argumentative turn, already differentiates them from the English. Greek, too, is their love of light and amusement. The description given by Antoninus to Ulysses of the chosen sports of the Phæacians would apply with little change to the Antipodean islanders, for athletics, boating, music, and dancing are among their favourite diversions. Music, indeed, is the one art from which a resident in their islands need not be divorced.

At present New Zealand sport does not differ much from English. Apart from some wild-cattle shooting and from the rather adventurous pastime of hunting wild pigs on foot with dogs, there is little recreation in the islands which is not a fairly faithful copy of something in the Mother Country. The pioneer colonists found themselves in a land without large native game, for the pigs aforesaid—the *poaka* of the Maori—were descendants of the tame importations turned loose by kind-hearted navigators like Captain Cook. Nor had the Maori invented any athletic sport attractive to white men, for the one great game of the Maori was war. All the colonists could do, therefore, was to naturalize British amusements. There were no fresh-water fish worth mentioning, so they imported the

trout, and have seen them grow to a size unknown in Britain, and furnish excellent sport for fishers with fly and minnow. In the same way, red-deer and fallow-deer thrive, increase in bulk, and show heads which excite the admiration of English stalkers. Good wild-fowl shooting is not at all difficult to get. In several districts packs of harriers are kept, and gentleman riders follow them over fences, live or other, which do not lack for stiffness. There is a legend that all New Zealand horses jump wire fences as though to the manner born. This is not the case; but some of them are trained to negotiate wire, and do so very cleverly. Moifaa is evidence that our horses can jump, and the many persons who think flat racing sport can enjoy abundance of it in the islands. Betting on horse racing is carried on through the 'totalizator,' and though there is a great deal too much of it, the amounts staked by individuals are seldom ruinous. The 'totalizator' has levelled betting if it has widened it, and the system pay a heavy tax to the State. Even in gambling, therefore, the democratic and governmental spirit is visible. Among athletic games football easily takes first place, for the cricket is lamentably inferior to Australian. Cycling, bowling, golf, rowing, and sailing are pursued with much energy, and even polo is played here and there. But the national pastime is football, and in the Rugby Union game the New Zealand players have earned a considerable reputation. They have been too strong for the Australians and for various visiting English teams, and are now measuring themselves with exraordinary success against the best skill of the United Kingdom.

Passing from sports, there is a recreation which to New Zealanders is something more than a pastime. Foreign travel is to them a sheer necessity if they are to escape from the narrowing influence of insular life in little provincial coteries. To do them justice, they seldom miss an opportunity of seeing something of the world. And here a noteworthy thing is to be observed.

Their nearest, indeed their only, neighbour is Australia. Next in point of accessibility come the lovely islets of Polynesia. After these North America and the Far East of Asia are the easiest countries to be reached. Yet it is not to these that the New Zealand mind turns. The colouring of India and Java and the art of Japan are not what it longs for. The one ambition of every holiday-making man, woman, and child is a trip 'Home.' The New Zealand born wish to see the old country; the emigrants from it wish to see it again. Expense and distance do not prevent some hundreds of them from finding their way to London every year. To listen to some of them, when, after an absence of twenty, thirty, or forty years they look round once more on the great city is an experience sometimes not without a touch of romance or pathos.

To return to the question of material well-being, a glance at the figures giving the details of the Colony's wealth reveals an interesting and unusual position. Hardly anywhere else can be found a community so collectively wealthy, but whose members are individually of such modest means. How few are wealthy in a large way I have already pointed out. Yet, after making full allowance for debts, the net private wealth of the white New Zealanders is estimated at about two hundred and seventy million pounds. To this may fairly be added some millions representing the value of the native lands.

The public estate and assets of the Government are also large, but against these has to be set the very considerable debt to foreign creditors. The best-known proof of the Colony's wealth and productive energy is the volume of the external commerce. This has now attained to an annual total of a little over twenty-eight million pounds, of which some nineteen million pounds is trade with the Mother Country. The growth, too, of this trade with the United Kingdom is satisfactory. Between the years 1896 and 1904 it increased by seven millions sterling. Most of the remaining commerce is with Australia, India, and other parts of the Empire. All of it,

too, is carried in ships which are wholly or chiefly British owned. As in other places, the United States and Germany have pushed for business, and the former managed in 1903 to export over a million's worth of goods to the Colony, while taking nothing like an equivalent value of colonial produce in return. The New Zealand Parliament has, however, passed a Preferential Trade Act, which has increased many duties on non-British imports to an extent certain to handicap both American and German merchants. It must be added that the unfriendly navigation laws of the United States, which virtually shut out our steamers from Californian ports, have roused no small feeling in the Colony. Good and cheap steam and telegraphic communication with the outside world is a prime necessity of New Zealand. In the way of cargo-boats there are few countries of her size which are better served. Thanks, too, to the All-red Pacific Cable, the cost of cable messages has lately been lowered to 3s. a word. But letters still take a minimum of thirty-one days to reach London, and passengers, unless prepared to scurry across from San Francisco to New York with the mail-bags, must spend from forty to fifty days in the journey.

The trade above mentioned still consists almost wholly of the export of food and raw material, and the import of manufactured goods. Wool, frozen meat, gold, butter, kauri gum, hemp, cheese, oats, hides, and tallow are the chief articles shipped outwards. Wheat and barley are only grown for home consumption; indeed, the entire area devoted to cereals now only equals one-sixteenth of the land laid down in English—*i.e.*, artificial—grasses.

There is almost no transit trade: the exports are the produce of the Colony; the imports are for local use. In some cases the exports undergo processes which, like the refrigeration of meat and butter, the scouring of wool, tanning of skins, and sawing of timber, may be termed the first rough processes of manufacture.

Generally, however, the manufacturing of the Colony is for home use. It is probable that the yearly output of the factories will be shown by next year's census to be about twenty million sterling. They turn out good work, honest, unadulterated stuff, and employ some seventy thousand hands, whose pay is higher than English rates, though not so high as American.

The encouragement of these local industries is one of the chief colonial articles of faith. They are protected against dumping, and the competition of cheap labour and giant, old-established industrialism by Customs duties of from 10 to 25 per cent. Over and above this it is considered good form to buy home-made goods rather than imported. The average New Zealander thinks and asserts that his own manufacturers have a first claim, and British imports a second. If he patronizes German or American goods, he does not draw any unnecessary attention to the practice. This preference for British over foreign goods—which has always been something more than mere profession, and which has lately been emphasized by statute—is nothing extraordinary. The open ports of England are the Colony's one great market; and for many years England's treatment of her Colonies has been kindly and just—in one respect even more than just.

When we try to forecast the future of the New Zealanders, and estimate the possible development in them of national ambitions and foreign policy, we are at once brought up sharply by the dominating geographical fact of their extraordinary isolation. It is inevitable that their characteristics as a community in all that pertains to dealings with their fellow-men will be modified by this striking peculiarity. Australia, as already stated, is their nearest neighbour, and at present it takes them more than four days of steaming to reach an Australian port.

A voyage to the South Sea Islands consumes a week, and to cross the Valparaiso, the nearest large harbour in South America, involves a passage of twenty days,

passed without sighting land. In sum, New Zealand is one of the loveliest civilized lands of the globe. Already this affects the temper and policy of her colonists, and it must continue to do so. As evidence, we may analyze their attitude at the three points where alone at present they come into political contact with the outside world. I mean their attitude, first, towards the Australian Federation; second, towards the expansion in the South Seas; third, towards the Mother Country and what is termed Imperialism.

Under the first of these three heads it is now understood that they have tacitly but definitely decided to stand aloof from the Commonwealth. This generation cannot bind its children, but this generation, at any rate, is quite unlikely to change its mind. The Australian had one—and only one—temptation to hold out: that—which was, indeed, a considerable inducement—was admission within the ring-fence of the Federal Customs tariff. So soon as it was plain that New Zealand was likely to stay outside, the Australians proceeded to aim specific duties at their neighbours' chief exports. But the neighbours, though no more indifferent than other people to bread-and-butter considerations, did not flinch. They are islanders, and, like all islanders, they have an especial objection to interference by outsiders in their own affairs, an absorption in these, an entire indifference to the internal politics of other countries, and an excellent conceit of themselves. Nine-tenths of them know almost as little about ordinary Australian politics as do Englishmen. They have no animosity towards, or jealousy of, the big Island-Continent. But their interest, their pride, their hopes, are centred in their own islands. Within their boundaries there is ample scope and verge enough for the statesmanship and industry of the New Zealanders of to-day. Australia's future may be greater—so be it! New Zealand's, at any rate, will be bright and great enough for them, so they think. Were you to ask one of them 'how wide the limits stand between a splendid

and a happy land,' he might reply, 'As wide as the breadth of the Tasman Sea.'

The same insular, self-contained temper is seen when we note their dealings with the tropic inlets of the South Seas. Favourably placed as New Zealand is for trade with these, large enough as she is to dominate these tiny coral or volcanic specks, a Polynesian hegemony has been from the first the natural dream of some of her more imaginative public men. Sir George Grey sketched such an island confederation nearly sixty years ago. Sir Julius Vogel, *more suo*, planned a gigantic Polynesian trading company, State-subsidized and territorial. Sir Robert Stout tried to annex Samoa. Mr. Seddon has actually obtained a transfer of the Hervey group and certain other islands, and has his eyes now on greater things in the direction of Fiji and Tonga. But to the main body of New Zealanders these schemes and annexations appeal as yet scarcely at all. They govern their little South Sea dependencies very well. The trade of these Liliputs has increased by about 80 per cent. in New Zealand hands, and their ten or twelve thousand natives are better off than formerly. But the average New Zealander still takes but the mildest interest in Polynesia. It has always been so. When at the height of the Boer War the Imperial Government requited their patriotism by handing over Samoa to Germany and America, they shrugged their shoulders, and did not even murmur. Yet the Navigators' were then the only really valuable tropical, south of the line, which New Zealand could hope to possess. Silently she saw her last serious chance of a South Sea dominion slip away. Tonga may some day be willingly linked to her; but Tonga is a small matter. Fiji is not small, but there Australian influence is certain to be exerted against New Zealand. Any field, therefore, left for a Polynesian overlordship must be of very modest dimensions. Yet the gradual fading away of chance after chance, as group after group has passed into the hands of France, Germany, or the

United States has not disturbed my countrymen. They have been so few, and the development of their own Colony has taxed their energies so fully, that they have had no time as yet to dream of Empire.

Yet—and here comes the seeming paradox—they are Imperialists; not Imperialists in the sense of men whose vision is to dominate inferior races, rule subject territory, and maintain powerful fleets and armies with which to assert mastery, nor is any very large share of their time and attention devoted to Imperial politics. They are capable of intense outbursts of feeling, as when they despatched ten contingents to South Africa. But the Boer War once over, they turned to their island's affairs. They are Imperialists not because Imperialism tempts them with chances of meddling with other peoples' affairs, but because Imperialism protects them from any interference by outsiders, and safeguards them in the quiet exercise of self-government.

Their Imperial sentiment may be defined as an intense attachment to the Mother Country, and a pride in the Empire to which they belong, though they have no share in its government. The Imperial ideal of the more thoughtful of them is an ultimate confederation of all branches of the Anglo-Celtic race under the British flag. Members of other white races dwelling within the Empire will, they trust, either blend altogether with the British (as do German and Scandinavian settlers in the Colonies), or will be absolutely reconciled to the British Imperialism by justice and liberty, as the French-Canadians have been reconciled.

It may be said the ideals of a community of less than a million whites far away in the South Pacific do not matter to anyone. This article, however, is written on the assumption that the opinions of no division of her Colonies are quite unimportant to England. For her Colonies have a future.

RHODES AND MILNER

The Struggle for a South African Union

By F. EDMUND GARRETT

'He came in just after Majuba, and started to build it all up over again.'—*Table-talk of Lord Milner.*

'They tell me I can only live five years. I don't mean to die; I want to live. But if I go, there is one man—Sir Alfred Milner. Always trust Milner. You don't know yet what you have got in him.'—*Table-talk of Cecil Rhodes.*

Two names history will not be able to neglect when she tells how the foundations were laid of the third great Colonial Union in the British Empire. Those names (history will round off their titular corners, and brevity pleads for the like freedom here) are Rhodes and Milner. I am asked to contribute a short study of the two careers as they appear to one who had the opportunity of watching them closely in South Africa, especially during the brief but stirring years when they overlapped.

There must be something of telling a story and something of portraiture. There are one or two touchstone aspects in which both men may alike be viewed. We must pause to seize these as the story brings them up, for each in turn. Desultory the plan may well seem; but its aim is to suggest some picture of two of the most interesting political figures of our day, and to project them upon a background which includes, in sweep of broadest distance, the bolder features of the last quarter-century in South Africa. The runners, as

in the old Greek race, will carry torches, and pass them on to one another, and it will be seen that the torch is the same torch, but each has his own way of carrying it forward.

One digression may be borne with before the lens is focussed for South Africa. My rather cumbrous title was chosen to emphasize the fact that to the thought of both these men it was never the Transvaal question, or the Cape question, or the Rhodesia question, but always the question of South Africa. And, further (this is the digression), the coming South African Union was always, in the thought of both, part of a definite whole: an Empire-State in which a self-governing and locally independent South Africa would be one of the partners, and to which 'British and Dutch alike could, without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal devotion.' The quotation is from a passage in a speech of Milner's,* which should become a *locus classicus* of democratic Imperialism. Of such an organic Empire-State, the Empire as it exists was to both men's thought only the magnificent raw material; and, in Milner's words, 'It is a close race between the numerous influences so manifestly making for disruption and the growth of a great, but still very imperfectly realized conception.' To both, therefore, all devices for working that raw material up, and creating organs of that union, all Imperial defence schemes and Imperial fiscal schemes, were a preoccupation behind and beyond the practical politics of the hour.

To the fiscal scheme, which now divides parties, Rhodes's contribution is well known. Whatever may be thought of it—and the present comment is penned, as to the scientific tariff, from the standpoint of a still unconverted insular sceptic, and as to Zollverein, from the standpoint of a Chamberlainite of 1902, persuaded that 'the Colonies must better their offer'—all candid minds must admit the loss to the discussion of a statesman who approached it from the colonial end in

* Johannesburg, March 31, 1905.

Rhodes's large, yet practical spirit. Academic he could not be, for good or evil; but he was equally free from obsessions more likely in a colonial politician. He did not come to economics with a head full of wool or mutton or other vested localisms. He recognised John Bull's burden, recognised the pelican-breast liberality of England's fiscal treatment of her Colonies since the American loss; and inferred that any Colony earnest to bridge between a producer's policy and the consumer's policy of England should be ready to take the first and the second and the third step before expecting a bargain. That spirit—and it is only the spirit I am discussing—is surely invaluable in a servant or master of colonial electorates. Justly, when displayed in Canada, it excited the Cobden Club to embrace the makers of a preferential tariff. The Canadians were the first to force the door, but Rhodes was before them in hammering at it on behalf of the same principle, which was afterwards in a modified form inserted into the constitution of Rhodesia, and thereby, as Rhodes calculated, stamped upon the future federal constitution of South Africa.

To the scheme of organic union for defence, again, which remains strategically urgent whatever may be done about commerce, Milner contributed a most suggestive word in some remarks to a Transvaal branch of the Navy League. Here, too, the first element to be seized is the Mother Country's pelican-breast liberality, and Milner emphasized the fact that all South Africa, equally with the coast Colonies, depends absolutely on the British navy to keep the seas for its trade and as its first line of defence against invasion.

This Cape Colony and Natal have recognised, not by a localized South African squadron, but by a direct contribution in aid of the British taxpayer. What more obvious for a representative of the Crown than to look forward to the South African Union making much larger strides towards converting the naval dependence into naval partnership? But then—what from a represen-

tative of the Crown was less obvious, and should be proportionately more fruitful—Milner went on to emphasize, as a matter of his personal opinion, the inevitable corollary of naval partnership—viz., the creation of some organ of consultation upon world-issues for the sea-united Commonwealth.

That scandalized some home critics. It was not in the Handbook of Official Perorations. But, thus and in other ways did Rhodes and Milner both number themselves of that great unformed party which is neither the ins nor the outs, which touches here the foreign politics of the one, here the home politics of the other; a party to which Imperialism and Carlyle's Condition of the People Question are one and the same business of fitly rearing, housing, distributing, co-ordinating, and training for war and peace the people of this commonwealth; a party which seems to have no name, no official leader, no paper even, but which I believe, when it comes by a soul and a voice, will prove to include a majority of the British in Britain and a still greater majority of the British overseas. Thus, at any rate—for here the digression stops—did Rhodes and Milner relate the South African Union to the Imperial idea; and now to our business in South Africa.

The table-talk citations set out above make a good starting-point. Sharply distinct by training, by temperament, and by the material in which they worked, both men were alike in a quick mutual recognition that left no room for jealousy. On Rhodes's part that really needed some largeness, for the edges of his political breakage were yet raw when Milner succeeded at the Cape: officially, Milner once or twice had to thwart him; unofficially, Milner superseded him also in the character of the strong man to whom English eyes were turned—the man who should reverse that strange persistent trend of things which for twenty years, while materially British brains and British capital and hard work were making the country, had caused Britishers to

keep coming off the worse politically. Rhodes accepted supersession. The 'Lost Leader' was content that

'We shall march prospering, not thro' his presence'—

provided only that we marched.

Part I.—RHODES.

Rhodes started uphill. He entered Cape politics in a day when Downing Street and South Africa were sick of each other's very names. The weary Titan who has just poured out two hundred millions was loth to spend another million then. Those were days when Froude, sent out as a missionary of Empire, could publicly advocate Great Britain's retiring from all South Africa except Simon's Bay; when the dictum that there was no more place for direct Imperialism in the country, so often quoted against Rhodes himself, could be echoed, word for word, by a Governor and High Commissioner of the Queen; when even a Wools Sampson could help in a solemn burial of the Union Jack at Pretoria. The Transvaal was gone, and no sooner gone than the Boer junta began to be provided with new sinews of war by the eager toil of British miners. Naturally, legitimately even, it became the focus of ambitions, anti-British because patriotically Republican. The push towards South African Union was as inevitable as the push of a plant towards the sun. But was union to come within or without the Empire? Wealth, power, the lure of beckoning career—these signposts now pointed all to Pretoria, and drew from Cape Colony the ablest and most ambitious of the Queen's young Dutch subjects. On every border bands of patriotic Boers were thrusting outward for expansion: south-east, towards a seaport; northward, towards the unappropriated residue of South Africa; westward, to join hands with Germany and so shut for ever the road to that residue from the British south. What was Rhodes to do?

To meet and baffle these outward thrusts one by one was the first necessity; and that, from the early eighties down to the stoppage of the last earth (the seaward opening) in 1895, he did. Those who know the inside history of those events know best his part in them, which, to be sure, was sometimes not very pellucid to outside gaze. In the west, for instance, direct Imperialists like Warren and Mackenzie, blunt, honest fellows, were quite at cross-purposes with him; but Paul Kruger read his Rhodes aright, if they could not,* and in his 'Memoirs' that good hater has put it on record who it was that really shut the Boer kraal, and kept open the British road to the north.

I have seen it suggested that what really kept foreign Powers out of Rhodesia was not Rhodes, but the Moffat Treaty of 1888 and the proclamation of that blessed phrase 'Sphere of Influence.' The criticism could not have been made had the critics known—what does not appear in Blue-Books, but what Lord Rosmead could have told them—who it was that prompted both treaty and proclamation. Rhodes had disclosed his plans, and Sir Hercules Robinson had exacted guarantees that where he planted the flag Rhodes would follow. Something more was wanted than negatives to Kruger and proclamations of spheres. The north must be not only talked about, but taken—occupied, opened up, freed from the yoke of black militarism, settled, developed. Only so could a new world to redress the balance of the old, a counterpoise to the lost Eldorado of the Transvaal, be got ready to fling into the British scale on the day when South Africa should be ready to tremble into union one way or the other. For that millions were needed, and since it was idle in those days—how idle was proved by that old crusader, John Mackenzie—to ask the British Government or taxpayer to find the

* If Sir Charles Warren desires (as he clearly needs) more light on Rhodes's part in the obscure Cape politics of that period, he might seek it from an unimpeachable witness like Sir James Rose-Innes.

millions, Rhodes resolved that they should be found by the British (and foreign) speculative investor. He would adapt to the Bourses of the nineteenth century the model which had served the seventeenth and eighteenth to lay British foundations in two hemispheres, from the East Indies to Hudson's Bay. The North Borneo Company, I think, was the modern instance which directly suggested the Charter plan to our young colonist. It was essential to his plan, however, that he should be in a position to underwrite his project, as it were, not only with a large fortune of his own, but by throwing into the scale at critical moments the stake of that vast funded wealth which he created in the Kimberley diamond-mining trust.

And the amazing thing is that he did not make the fortune first and then conceive the application of it, as a tired millionaire's hobby. We are familiar nowadays with such an origin for great philanthropic and patriotic schemes. A man makes his millions in exploiting the Turk to lavish them on emigrating the Jew, or emerges from a corner in steel to give off the transmuted metal in a Danaë-shower of free libraries, while philosophers like Mr. John Morley and Mr. Frederic Harrison decorate his brow with chaste wreaths. It is one of the more creditable features of the modern aggregation of wealth; but Rhodes's case was different. The historian will find the evidence ample and conclusive that the dreamy young colonist who built up the De Beers monopoly had already, as an Oxford undergraduate, projected his plan of a life-work for the British Empire; that this daydream supplied his spiritual food throughout the absorbing struggle of the ten years which patience and genius required to create De Beers; and that he emerged from the dust of that squalid arena to fling himself heart-whole into the toil of realizing the dream with the help of the financial weapon which he had framed and tempered for it. Many a youth might have said: 'Go to! I will lay up great possessions, that I may then apply them to such and such an ideal.'

With how many would the ideal have survived the acquisition?

The financial was only half Rhodes's idea; the other half, which led to his extraordinary career in Cape politics, was concerned with the men rather than the money—the men and the methods of pioneering. It was to draw in the adventurous youth of South Africa, Dutch as well as English, to his adventure under the Union Jack; it was to secure the Cape as a base for Imperial, as against Republican, expansion, by presenting Imperialism as *Colonialism* and working with colonists on colonial lines. To win and hold Dutch sentiment at the Cape while foiling Dutch ambition in the Republics was Rhodes's problem; and till 1895 he marvellously solved it.

He must have failed if Paul Kruger's statesmanship had looked out upon a wider horizon. There the Boer was found wanting. When the Transvaal ruling families came into their kingdom they forgot their kinsmen in the Colony. They did not remember so only to be anti-England as not to seem anti-Cape. In railways, customs, trade, State employment, they played the German game, the Hollander game, the Portuguese game—everything but the Afrikander game; while Rhodes threw the door of the north wide, and eagerly invited every young Dutchman to share in the work of development. With all his gnarled strength and subtle shrewdness, Kruger lacked Rhodes's sense of the grand scale, his zest in noble giving, his eye to the future. The patriotism of each, underneath its calculating materialism, had a deep spring of fire. In Kruger it was his sombre piety; in Rhodes, a latent poetry and romance, grandiose perhaps, but no whit less genuine, From these deep springs the conceptions of the one drew breadth; of the other, narrowness. And so during the years when the work of white expansion was being completed in South Africa, Rhodes gained with the Cape Dutch all that Kruger lost, till the last square mile of No-Man's-Land was safe under the British flag.

So far all was success. Not till the struggle over the map gave place to the struggle over civic status did the Rhodes method break down. But the success had a price. The price was a policy *within* Cape Colony so tender to Dutch prejudices as to gall many English ones. That brings up one of our touchstone aspects. What part was false in the fabric of Dutch conciliation which Rhodes built up with the best years of his manhood, and shattered in an hour? It is forgotten now, or, perhaps, by many it was never understood, how much of the sympathy between Rhodes and the colonial Boer was genuine. That long political union was not all a *mariage de convenance*. Rhodes was of an ancestry of East Anglian graziers, and the landward strain was strong and native in him. By taste and temperament he was a country squire. From financial and industrial board-rooms; from the close air of Parliaments, where he never seemed at home; from the great mobs of city men or Cape Town electors, which, in late years, he learned to sway, he loved to betake himself to road-making among the hanging woods of Groote Schuur, or experimental farming in Rhodesia. Escaped from town to Rondebosch, with the air of a released schoolboy he threw on the old flannels and the shocking bad hat, jumped on the favourite hack, and was off along the flanks of the mountain, riding with a loose Boer seat and daydreaming in the saddle.

In England, if he had never seen a Colony, he would have been in his element as a lord of broad acres, improving the estate, founding industries on it, creating model villages, living on terms half feudal, half democratic, and entailing the estate at the end under strenuous conditions of public duty. He loved landscape, forestry, the farm stud, irrigation, wide views, large maps, an added acre, a new country, the clean, keen air of the veld. And therefore, when Rhodes and an old Dutch farmer came to talk, out on the stoep, they knew each other for kindred spirits. No need for pretence, so long as the talk was left, like a familiar horse, to take its own

road. The Dutchmen could feel the soil in his bones, see the horizon in his eyes. Silly people sometimes took his adoption of old Dutch ways, furniture and house-plenishing, for a politic affectation. No; it was as genuine as his passion for Table Mountain or the Matoppos. In the height of his Dutch popularity, there was once some great pilgrimage of colonial Boers to Groote Schuur, when all they heard and saw so captivated them that one veteran suddenly stooped in the grounds, picked up a great rough stone, and cried out that he would hand it down to his remotest descendants as a memento of that day and scene. I do not know whether, after the Raid, that stone came to be converted into a missile. But I remember among the things that pleased the old farmer that day at Groote Schuur was a discussion how best to keep together the old colonial estates, Rhodes deprecating the Dutch way of splitting them up among the cadets of their big families, and praising rather a sort of selective entail. That was derided at the time as an obvious piece of playing to Dutch sentiment. Such a bit of old Toryism could never be Rhodes's natural view! Natural or not, it appeared, as we all remember, in his own will, and is stamped on the provisions under which the Norfolk estate of Dalham Hall is devised to his heirs.

In politics, too, Rhodes's way of looking at many questions was rather like that of the best sort of progressive Cape Dutchman—the sort of Dutchman who really farms, and wants his flocks dipped, and his children schooled, and his natives kept sober, but never names 'Exeter Hall,' 'War Office,' or 'red tape,' except in senses partly interchangeable and wholly pejorative. Into that mould, indeed, Rhodes fitted far more naturally than into the mould of our commercial urban electorates in South Africa, patriotically English as they were, but ridden by newspaper formulas. He was never quite comfortable as the leader of a party with no Dutchmen in it. I remember well his first appearances in the rôle of the out-and-out Progressive party man.

He was never word-perfect, and caused the Tadpoles and Tapers sleepless nights. In the grave little Parliament House under Table Mountain many a wistful glance passed in those days between him and certain old Bond stalwarts—wistful not on one side only. But the gulf was fixed.

After all, where he really failed in faithful dealing towards those Dutchmen was just where their own Dutch leaders failed too. It was in keeping back from public expression an essential part of his mind on the great issue between the old and the new population in the Transvaal. On the broader question, 'Under which Flag?' they had never any real excuse for misunderstanding him. Half a dozen blunt speeches, scattered throughout his career, told them plainly enough, even if his whole life-work had not done so, whether the United South Africa of his dreams was within or without the British Empire. But on this Outlander question, where the first tug-of-war was clearly coming, he did fail in the duty of speaking out to his Dutch followers while there was yet a chance of influencing them, and perhaps, through them, their kinsmen. He husbanded his influence, and the spade-work which should have prepared against the brewing storm was left undone. The storm burst and the influence was swept away in one thunderclap.

Nice moralists may blame him for what he *did*; I have always blamed him rather for what he left *unsaid*. And if so, there may be no good answer to the reproach of the Dutch rank and file, but there is a fair retort to the Dutch leaders. They, too, saw the storm brewing, knew that the old ought to make terms with the new, even, as we now know, whispered as much with growing urgency into Mr. Kruger's ear. They whispered, but they never spoke out to their own people. If not blind mouths, as Milton called certain negligent shepherds of his day, they were dumb eyes. They, too, husbanded their influence; they, too, left the political spade-work all undone. The result was spade-work of a grimmer

kind: the sterile labour of those entrenchments that still scar the veld, and then the fresh graves in the little pieces of enclosed ground on the hillsides. The untaught lesson has written itself out in the long lists of ignorant colonial rebels, who have learnt late in that school whose fees are high. Faithlessness to Afrikander followers used to be the charge against Rhodes in 1896. Better spare bitter names. If we all had our deserts in this tangled business, who—accused or accusers—should escape a whipping?

It is curious to speculate now in what form the crisis would have come if Rhodes had stood aside and let Johannesburg be. What hurried him was not fear of the Kruger junta alone, nor of the cosmopolitan Rand alone, but of an anti-British bargain between the two—a great industrial Republic working to unite South Africa outside the Empire. Kruger was no such Machiavelli. How easy it would be to avoid our own blunders if we could only foresee those of the other side! Rhodes failed to foresee that the old Boer caste would reject terms to the end, and that Dr. Leyds and the rest of the clever fools from Holland, instead of rising to the conception Rhodes dreaded, would waste their shallow talents on the back-stairs of European chancelleries. It is often said that had there been no Raid there would have been no war. That is the old unhistorical trick of picking out one effect in a chain of effects and calling it the cause. It is sometimes added that Rhodes planned the Raid with that purpose. I do not think any historian will take that view. He might have sat still and let the drift to war go on its own way. But war at the best must mean throwing all his patient past and his plans under the trampling hoofs of violence. It meant making himself unnecessary. No; the case with Rhodes was that he saw the crisis hurrying past him, and could not bring himself to let its threads slip out of his own hands; so he dashed at the runaway—and failed. He did not make the weather, but, like Kruger, when he cried, 'Let the storm burst!'

he wanted to ride the whirlwind and direct the storm, if storm there was to be. So the politician turned raider. It is often argued that common standards of right and wrong cannot apply to such *Uebermenschen* as a Cavour, a Bismarck, or a Rhodes. It may well be so; but it does seem as if the one or two things in Rhodes's character and career which mere burgess rectitude, whether called unctuous or not, would deem to be against the rules were those for which the bills came in most punctually, and had to be most dearly paid. The things that only success could have justified were precisely those that failed and upset all the rest. The parts of his work which then held firm, the traits in his character that stood out calm above the wreck, were those which show the man in as fine a light as the statesman, and need no apology for either. I present the copybook moralist with the hint.

Rhodes was given scant time to retrieve, but it was crowded with matter. The 'facing the music' at Westminster, the forlorn hope in Cape politics which his close friend was to take over and carry to success after his death, the peacemaking indaba in the Matoppos, the strangely appealing last scenes and legacy to Oxford and Empire—these are material for the biographer, to make his plot in sober truth more romantic than a novel, but must not tempt us away from the main thread of our story. We have traced the long career of patient reticence; we have tried to account for the one blunder of haste. We must now follow the torch as it passed to other hands; but in leaving Rhodes, 'let me,' in a phrase of his own, 'give you a thought,' which those who seek a clue to his character may find suggestive. Raid or no Raid, there was a sense, a somewhat tragic sense, in which Rhodes was always a man in a hurry. To the consciousness that life was not long enough for the chosen life-work there was added the knowledge that his own life was almost certain to be cut short. Not in the East only is man liable to receive in mid-career the sudden arbitrary-seeming message to bid

everything good-bye. The specialist doctor, with his 'bad prognosis,' is the mute with the bowstring of our Western life. The message acts variously on various men. Balzac, in 'La Peau de Chagrin,' has made a classic study of the effect on one kind of temperament; Rhodes was of sterner stuff:

> 'Life piled on life
> Were all too little; and of one to me
> Little remains; but every hour is saved
> From that eternal silence. . . . Vile it were
> For some three suns to store and hoard myself!'

So he with Ulysses. The message could not daunt, but perhaps it hurried him. Under threat of death he first went to South Africa. Again, and yet again, in his most strenuous and confident years a grim reminder came, and breathed into his work a kind of hungry fever; in the closing years he learned to look certitude quietly in the face. Thus to his own eye he was ever that 'old man planting oak saplings,' of whom he once spoke in a passage quite home-spun, but surely most touching. I, at least, know none other in his speeches that so appeals. And, indeed, when the biographer comes to seek for some one central thread on which the best and the worst of Cecil John Rhodes may alike be strung, something which makes both consistent, I think it is here that he may find it. He had no time, therefore he shunned delights and lived laborious days; he had no time, therefore he fell to the one fatal temptation, that of the short-cut. I often find myself applying to him those quaint, fine lines of Marvell's 'To his Coy Mistress.' Rhodes's mistress was a cause, a dream, the destiny of a continent; and sometimes, when the date for realization was pushed further off by a mutiny of native warriors or of parliamentary mugwumps, by a rinderpest, or a red-tape delay, or a war, I have seemed to detect in his grumble or impatient fling the very note of the delayed lover:

> 'Had we but world enough and time,
> This coyness, lady, were no crime . . .

My vegetable love should grow
Vaster than Empires, and more slow . . .
But at my back I always hear
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near,
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast eternity.'

'Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near' is exactly what Rhodes seemed always to be hearing. Often he would try, with sudden passionate intensity, and in words considerably less choice than Marvell's, yet poignant, too, in their way, to make that sound audible to others—persons with indolent delays, tiresome doubts, perhaps (let us confess) tiresome scruples. Only towards the end he learned at last a certain manly, if rather wistful, patience.

Part II.—MILNER.

A cool head and a fresh initiative—those were the crying needs of the High Commissionership in 1897 when Milner stepped into it out of Somerset House.

The old landmarks of Imperial policy in South Africa were no longer standing. Rhodes was down. Doornkop, as a name for false start and failure, had replaced Majuba. Lord Rosmead, lost without Rhodes, ill, aged, and broken with responsibility, had gone home to die. In the race for union the vantage of the moment was anti-Imperial. Kruger held the lead if he had known how to use it. On the map England stood well. There Rhodes's work could not be undone; and in population we were creeping up. But that was all neutralized by a singular racial disparity in political status; and here, as we have seen, the Rhodes method had broken down. On our part of the map the Dutch unit counted double: he was a citizen, even over-represented; on the Boer part of the map the Britisher was not allowed to count at all. The taxation without representation from which America revolted was a trifle beside the Outlander's. And here fleecer and fleeced

were not of the same but of rival races, not sea-sundered, but elbow to elbow. Armed with the proceeds of the fleecing, the Boer overlords, not yet prepared to dictate union on their own terms, were enforcing, at any rate, disunion and European intrigue as the alternative, and familiarizing young South Africa with the spectacle of British citizenship at a disadvantage. If the future was to be left to peaceful, natural forces, those forces must first be liberated. Such was the crux confronting Milner. The solution—'Equal rights for every civilized man'—had been formulated by Rhodes at the moment of his fall. It remained for Milner to apply it. How?

Direct Imperialism was supposed to have gone to the scrap-heap a decade since. Rhodes's colonialism, as we have seen, had just followed it. Milner decided first to give the colonial method one more chance. He began hopefully—worked, as no predecessor had done, at the Dutch language, both High Dutch and the Cape *taal;* studied, as nobody else has ever done, the Dutch vernacular press; talked with leading Dutchmen and travelled hundreds of miles among the farmers, with whom, in Cape Colony, as recently in the Transvaal, he got on excellently. He soon saw the need of the moment. The storm-clouds were banking up; if the Dutch of the Colony were to be roused to the danger and their duty, the need was not smooth sayings, the well-worn clichés of Government House, but 'straight talk.'

On this matter of faithful dealing one thing is certain. Let them say what they will of Rhodes, the charge of not being 'straight with the Dutch' is one which calumny itself can hardly bring against Milner. No husbanding influence, for him, at the price of a neglect of urgent duty. He had borne witness at the Jubilee to Dutch loyalty—the personal loyalty of Dutch colonists to Queen Victoria. That was a genuine sentiment. Had it all evaporated in a *feu de joie* on Queen's Birthday, or was it of such stuff as would stand in a day of trouble? Was loyalty to the Queen only

valid unless and until the call came to choose between it and loyalty to Paul Kruger? If so, the Queen's representative could not count on it for any help in the hard task before him of securing justice while keeping peace. If otherwise, now was the time to show it. He invited them to throw over that old tradition—'The Republics, right or wrong!' and substitute for it the principle, 'Rights for the British in the Republic like those which Dutchmen enjoy in the Colonies.' He granted fully the claim of kinship, but he asserted that of allegiance, and called upon the Dutch colonists by timely mediation to reconcile and fulfil both. Such in essence was the famous 'Graaff Reinet speech' of 1898. A Cape Governor, in the heart of a Dutch district, suggested the point of view, seemingly a novel one, that they should think of England not as a debtor for their loyalty, but as a generous creditor for their freedom. What a stir it made! What a tale of a tradition of mealy-mouthed officialism is told by the mere fact of that stir! It stands as a historic appeal, that fell, alas! mainly on deaf ears.

Not altogether so, however. People may talk now as if Milner had never tried to influence the Dutch, or, trying, had wholly failed to gain their confidence. But that will not do, since a chance of war has broken into the post-bags of Dutch leaders, and a Blue-Book shown the world the terms in which they wrote from Colony to Republic at the time of the Bloemfontein Conference. We thus have it beyond dispute that before Milner went to meet President Kruger he had convinced the Cape Dutch leaders, who had come into personal contact with him, that he was honest, that he preferred peace, that he was not prepared to pay all prices for peace, and, lastly, that, unlike Sir Bartle Frere, he had the British Government and people behind him. And of these things they advised Presidents Steyn and Kruger, who went their own appointed way. If Milner failed with the Dutch, in this, at least, he succeeded beyond any predecessor: he opened the lips of the Dutch leaders

in Cape Colony. To open the ears of the Dutch leaders in the Republics was beyond him; and beyond any man was it (since not even to gods is it given to undo the past) to make that secret and temporizing voice, wrung from Cape Dutch politicians, penetrate to the dumb masses of their countrymen—the men on whose consensus really hung the issue of peace or war, and who had to decide it without ever having heard the truth —except from Milner.

Rhodes used to be blamed for courting the Dutch. Milner was blamed for not courting them. The candid will admit that as Governor at the Cape he held the constitutional balance even, and that in his more autocratic office in the Transvaal he did not let the natural sulks of the Dutch leaders or the loud nearness of Johannesburg affect a readiness, an eagerness even, to do what little the bad times allowed for the Dutch rural interest. Road and railway plans showed him more than once as Member for the Veld rather than as Member for the Mines. The candid will admit this; but even the candid may add that in matters not so easy to schedule there has been a change from what recent predecessors had made the regulation manner towards the Dutch. A popular conciliatoriness that only just missed the apologetic had become a fashion, almost (what diplomatic *ententes cordiales* so easily do become) a pose.

In the main they were right, these predecessors. It is a question of occasion and of atmosphere. There are times (as in South Africa in the eighties) when a prodigal son returning from estrangement is rightly greeted with some effusiveness, even though the brother who never strayed be moved to priggish complaints that 'loyalty does not pay.' There is a time, again (as in South Africa in the nineties), when anything like fussy conciliation is 'the worst way in the world,' in Milner's own apt words, 'to impress or to win over a strong, a shrewd, and an eminently self-respecting people.' At such a time the Dutch prodigal who purports to have

sown his Republican wild oats and come home to stay is rightly looked to by a Governor for some better proofs of filial loyalty than that of always passing up his plate for more; and the fatted calf is replaced, as in time it must have been in the parable, by cold mutton rigidly shared with the loyalist brother.

Of course, after the falling on necks and feasting, after the best robe and the ring, the change to a Government House ordinary strikes a chill. It is the prodigal's turn to cry favouritism. There is a calling of such names as 'official pedant,' and (how does it run?) 'racial autocrat,' and 'callous satrap.' Such terms must provoke a smile from all who have any personal knowledge of Milner. That sympathetic charm to which statesmen of both parties bore witness in sending him forth from London eight years ago was not a thing to lose its quality in shipment across the Line, as perishable wines do. The soundness and bouquet were all there when the vintage was landed. To the last, occasions for delicacy or fine human feeling were to him opportunities; witness, for instance, the obsequies of Paul Kruger. The changed relation with the Dutch is not denied; but it was a corollary, not an aggravation, of the changed policy.

From the moment when Milner pronounced for intervention there was but one merging issue in party politics, and the King's representative was *ipso facto* a partisan. If history justifies Abraham Lincoln on the broad issue of the American Civil War, it will scarcely waver because his name was execrated by Southern planters. As mere Governor, Milner might have dined the Dutch, and read the King's Speech, and ridden to hounds with the most popular of them, as, indeed, he did. As High Commissioner he held an office unique in the Empire and at a unique juncture. Instead of amiably eliminating the Imperial factor to salvoes of the Afrikander Bond, it fell to him to assert that factor as the one untried key to the problem. Events made him the agent—nay, the tutor—of the

British people in its great issue with the Boer people. Precisians used to shake their heads over the phrase 'Milner's policy.' 'Say Salisbury's policy, Chamberlain's policy, the Government's policy,' cried they; 'but Milner's? Grossly unconstitutional!' Perhaps; but the phrase roughly embodied the facts, which were made, not by lawyers, but by the unusual moment and man. Milner's has been as individual a path among our civil servants as that of Rhodes among our politicians. Each had his day of dictatorship in the old Roman sense—a broad commission to see that the Imperial Commonwealth took no hurt.

In short, it is as unreasonable to blame Milner for not conciliating the Dutch into Imperialism in 1897-1899 as it is to blame him for not coaxing Mr. Kruger into abdication when in June, 1899, at last they came to conference. Critics suggest that if Milner at Bloemfontein had abandoned dialectics for true diplomacy—if Mr. Chamberlain somewhat later had said, 'Ah, my kind Christian friend!' instead of talking about a squeezed sponge—the prejudices dear to the strong old Dopper as life would have melted away.

Such critics do not know their Kruger nor their Boer. The Dutchman is not, like the Irishman, a creature of sentiment. Providence in its infinite indulgence has spared us the task of reconciling any race which combines both the Dutch and the Irish gifts of recalcitrance. Our redoubtable Dutch fellow-subject is a practical fellow. He knows what he wants. Give it him, and you may call him a squeezed sponge or a scalene triangle, and welcome. Insist on his giving it to you, and he will dislike you, even if you say that he prevail and sing more sweetly than the nightingale. The most that can be expected of him is to admit of Milner, as the schoolboy of Dr. Temple, 'A beast, but a just beast.' One half South Africa learnt to regard Milner's character with love and reverence. With wounds yet fresh, it was not in human nature that the feeling of the other half should be the same; but if with

them the love was hate, at least for reverence we need read nothing meaner than respect, and the foe who has mastered respect is halfway to a friend.

We have examined Milner's handling of the Dutch, as we did Rhodes's. Now for that other touchstone—the charge of being a man in a hurry. Granted that the Dutch were not to be won over, might they not have been left to time?

Against Milner this charge of hurry and lack of humane scruple can easily be brought home if you can prove one thing, to be defined presently. It is not enough to show that he led his country open-eyed into the war. That, which is said of various men according to the needs of the attack, is true of him—at least as true as of Mr. Chamberlain; for the dispatches hint one moment of tension when the Colonial Secretary (or the Cabinet) wavered and the High Commissioner stood firm—none, I think, when the rock was at Downing Street and the reed at Cape Town. The mischief once diagnosed, Milner never shrank from the surgery. He was not of those who said that Kruger would never fight, nor yet of those (if such there were) who promised a promenade to Pretoria. But when a tooth must out, and by the old way, the surgeon who refuses to promise painless dentistry does so not because he is inhumane, but because he is honest. When it came to peace-making, the Boer bargainers had stiffer work with Milner than with Kitchener, and their friends here were ready with the reason. The warrior, generous and humane, was contrasted with the 'frigid satrap.' Those who embarrassed the hardest-headed of our soldiers with these gushing diplomas had execrated him as a barbarian a few years before for the posthumous decapitation of the Mahdi. Milner also, by an odd coincidence, once had to do with a decapitation of a dead rebel chief. It was shortly after he became Governor at the Cape. The act was that of a popular Volunteer officer, and Milner insisted on Ministers cashiering him for it. I cite the forgotten incident, of course, purely *ad*

hominem for the detractor. Lord Kitchener's action either at Khartoum or at Vereeniging is not under discussion. But there was enough to suggest, what experience since the peace has amply proved, that it was the longer view, not the harder heart, that made Milner stand like steel for terms that would not compromise the future, when Kitchener, utterly 'fed up' (in army slang), was thinking rather how to get the weary thing done with, and on to the next labour of Hercules in India.

A Bishop in the House of Lords—one recalls Lord Goschen's generous resentment—charged Milner personally with apathy about the sickness in the concentration camps. When the War Office Commission of ladies looked into the facts on the spot, they soon found that, personally as officially, the head of all the devoted workers who spent themselves in setting right the camps was throughout Milner. It is visible enough in their report (Cd. 893, 1902). Reparation for witness borne unjustly could not, to an eminent Christian gentleman, be anything but a gracious pleasure. So far, I believe, the Bishop has denied himself the luxury. Self-denial is also a Christian grace: hardly, in this case, the more winning one.

No, neither hurry nor inhumanity is proved by Milner's policy having led open-eyed to war. For that you must prove something different and definite—viz., that the object of the policy could have been attained in peace. This, of course, plenty of our glib censors are ready to assert. The Transvaal situation was bad, they grant you—so bad, indeed, that it could never have lasted; and, in fact (the evidence for this next is never vouchsafed), it was coming to an end of itself. All that was needed was to leave Boer and Outlander to stew in their own juice (well, in the Outlander's juice, at any rate), and somehow, some day, freedom would have slowly broadened down from precedent to precedent. That is how Englishmen got popular rights from Englishmen, and so, by a historical law, they would ultimately

have got them from Boers. I count—any Liberal must count among his acquaintance—plenty of good people who hold all this to be clear beyond argument. Not only stalwarts of the caucus, like Blow and Crewdson, to whom the term 'Randlords' came like a mental labour-saving machine, but Fellows of their college and drawing-room intellectuals: Cockshaw, the Professor, to whom Liberalism is an exact science; and McFadden, to whom it is an emotion in a vacuum; and Henn, and Scuttermore, and Whymper of Magdalen, who belong to what a friend of mine calls the 'Peace to the Knife' party; and Patterworthy, who would like to subject all British acquisitions since (say) the Peace of Amiens to redistribution by a committee of Swiss jurists; and the Rev. Adderley Gall, who used to call for cheers at the National Liberal Club when Boer successes were reported, put on crape after Vereeniging, and was much disappointed, when he met the Boer Generals, with the tameness of their rancour. The view was developed to its full logic (if the reader allows one more type-personification) by Molyneux Dodley-Cottle (author of 'Submeanings of Maeterlinck,' 'A Pathology of Capital,' 'Ethics of a Nut Dietary,' etc.), whose pamphlet on the war proved that reform would have come, without any unkindness, if only British South Africans had shut their eyes tight and *willed* that it was coming.

These gentlemen were not living in the Colonies. To Milner the politics of Christian Science were not open. He had to act in South Africa, and upon facts. What he saw was that the admitted bad was not growing better, but worse. By bad, I mean bad for the status of British subjects, and for the British, as opposed to the Republican, trend of union. So far from freedom broadening down, the precedents, which came thick and fast, were all the other way. As for historic law, and the natural adjustment between town and country, he judged that the adjustment was likely to follow a new law of its own, where country meant a homogeneous and hostile race perfectly armed, organized as a rude

standing army, and bred in traditions of triumphant militarism.

Ah, but (we are told) he should have waited for the young generation. Were not young Afrikanders growing up who had education and could understand the inevitable forces at work? Odd as it may seem, the educated young Afrikanders did not consider these forces inevitable. They thought the Republican would be—or they could make it—the winning cause in South Africa. Test it in the concrete. Take a case wholly favourable, you would have said—a clever, ambitious young Afrikander of high character who was making his choice just when Milner came to Cape Town—Mr. J. C. Smuts. Born and bred a Cape Colonist, Mr. Smuts was loyal, of course it seems but the other day he took honours at Cambridge. He chooses Pretoria. In a year or two behold him State Attorney: honest, competent, acridly Republican, talking (like General Trepoff) of reform, but as careful as he, or as Kruger himself, that reform should not touch the tap-root of exclusive power; next, counsel for reform (the Trepoff kind) at the Bloemfontein Conference . . . next, before the war ends, a Commandant spiritedly raiding his old Colony. And to-day? To-day Mr. Smuts is *civis Britannicus* once more. A great career in politics is assured to him by his talents and the title of a Boer ex-General; a great career at the Bar by his talents and the eager retainers of Johannesburg. He accepts the new order, quotes Schopenhauer to inquiring pro-Boers, and corresponds with the High Commissioner on the requirements of a truly democratic suffrage. Of course, he is loyal; English admirers quote his speeches, sombrely pledging his faith to the logic of the stricken field. Do I impugn it? Not at all. My question is, on the contrary, How far would England have got with that young man by any other logic? How far by 'waiting a generation'?

General de Wet's war book affords a similar startling sidelight—one among many thrown by the war—upon

the unconscious undercurrent that flowed in Dutch minds in the years before it. The famous chief writes freely of colonial 'treason' and 'traitors.' He does not mean the Cape rebels who joined the Boers; nor does he mean the 'tame Boers,' in army slang, who joined the British. He means colonists who stood to their allegiance and fought. He means all colonial-born men, whether Dutch or English by extraction, who bore arms against the Republics. To De Wet these are traitors, against whom he cannot enough express his honest indignation. Traitors to what allegiance? Why, for bold spirits like De Wet, that pan-South African Republic embracing the Colonies, that dream which, we are told, would have died out if we had but waited, was already no dream, but a living reality imposing an allegiance of its own and abrogating all others! 'But will the dream die out *now?*' So some objector may ask—someone who takes a faint-hearted view of the war, and a still more faint-hearted view of the peace. There is a sense in which I, for one, hope that dream will never die out, but that little by little, under the anodyne spell of free self-government, the sturdy souls who cherish it will come to feel that the dream is realized, as nearly as it could ever be outside dreamland, in a South Africa which is united, is a 'crowned Republic,' and is as much theirs as ours.

That lies on the knees of the gods. What is certain is that when Milner came on the scene the two wrestling ideals had reached deadlock. The time was past for palliatives such as the Smutses and Reitzes would gladly have consented to—removal of the corruptions and stupid scandals of Government without real change of the bases of power. So far had things drifted that any sincere reform must involve an abdication of the Boer Government and look like an abdication of the Boer people. This was as clear to the Boers as to the rest of us; and what Milner found was that South Africa contained no inner force capable of making them consent to it. He inferred that the force must be

applied from without. Before the negotiations it was arguable that the Boer might surrender his monopoly without the war alternative. The negotiations made it clear that he would only surrender it on that alternative; the war, that he preferred the alternative to the surrender. Milner, with that keen level gaze of his, foresaw as much from the moment when the old Boer and the young faced him across the table at Bloemfontein. He read the old peasant who had grown gray in evading and defying England by turns. He read the educated young Afrikander, the acrid little Republican who accompanied Mr. Kruger as lawyer-clerk, and whose almost cynical burlesque of a charter of enfranchisement was ready cut and dry in their pockets. He came out and paced alone for some time, grave and very pale. Should he, as men who were the eyes and the voice of England had felt bound to do before him, join in a paper make-believe, throw upon Time the onus of proving paper to be only paper, and so put off the evil day? 'After all,' a shrewd Dutch leader remarked to me at that time, 'his diplomatic reputation depends on his getting something out of the old man and putting the best face on it.' Milner considered all that while he paced, pale and solitary, with bent head. Then he re-entered the Conference room, firm and erect. His verdict was formed—'complete failure,' as he telegraphed to a friend—and his diplomatic reputation must just fare as it might. All that remained now, beyond certain talk, was to make the Boers feel that, give or refuse, they could no longer evade: refusal would mean playing double or quits for South Africa. He made them feel it. They decided, as they had the right to do, to play; and they lost.

The next period of Milner's career bristles with controversy, only less than the period leading up to the war; and I wish to grapple with the points most controverted first. Let us begin with his advice on the Suspension Question. Milner, like Rhodes on his death-bed, advocated that the Cape Constitution, which the

war had practically suspended, should be suspended formally until the completion of the after-war settlement. The advice was overruled, and to-day we can all, wise after the event, prove the advice a mistake. Some mistakes there must be marked up against a man shouldering Milner's responsibilities in such a whirlpool of problems as the South Africa of the last eight years; but let us examine this one in the light of the facts, not as they present themselves now, but as they presented themselves then. There were two or three measures indispensable from the Imperial point of view to make the after-war situation in Cape Colony a tolerable one. No one will deny that. Equally, no one will assert that those measures could ever have passed the then existing Cape Parliament if the majority of Dutch members had stood to their own expressed views and sympathies. If Milner despaired of the Dutch majority, he had seen its chosen head, Mr. Schreiner, after efforts which Milner alone could estimate, despair of the Ministry which that majority had created. And no wonder! What sort of Treason Court could men be expected to set up to disfranchise their own constituents —in some cases to try themselves? To judge by their speeches, what called for a penal Bill was the martial acts of loyalists; what called for indemnity was the martial acts of rebels. In the end, happily, under sobering influences, of which the half-unsheathed blade of Suspension was not the least, they did, under protest, legislate the Imperial minimum. By a series of Parliamentary 'flukes' the Bills passed. And since then there has followed, by the greatest fluke of all, something not indeed indispensable to the situation, but carrying it at last out of the region of flukes into one rather less breathless: I mean the success of the Progressive or Imperialist party at the Cape General Election. In calling the success of my political friends a fluke, I mean no injustice to the work and organization which won the success, nor to the fine temper and modesty and manliness which have gone to make up that happy

surprise—the leadership of Dr. Jameson, which, after one great and fruitful voyage, seems likely to be scuttled in port by one of these petty local rivalries which are the curse of English politics in South Africa. Nor, in describing as a fluke certain Acts passed by the preceding Sprigg Ministry, would I detract from the credit due to the Dutch members, my late Parliamentary colleagues, for their ultimate sacrifice, no easy one, to expediency and moderation. But my point is—and no one who knows the Cape lobbies and Cape constituencies will contest it—that these successive triumphs of the statesmanship of the odd-man-out on poll or division list amounted to a series of flukes, a run of luck, on which a betting man would not have cared without heavy odds to risk his money. Such a run might come off—it did come off; but in Milner's view it was not a thing on which he could advise the Home Government beforehand to stake vital interests.

It may be said, if the advice was a mistake, it was a double mistake to advise publicly; it certainly was so, if Milner had been troubling about personal prestige. He knew the Suspension Movement was a forlorn hope; backed by his name, one to conjure with among the doubtful, it just might succeed: failure must mean rebuff. He knew that, and chose to shoulder the responsibility. That mistake at least was characteristic.

The next controversy, since it still burns in England, must detain us rather longer. Is Chinese Labour a mistake? Nothing went so near to shake or strain that peculiar personal authority which Milner had come to wield throughout the Empire as when he nailed the yellow colours to his mast. One consideration may save our breath upon this tortured issue: it is that Milner stands to be judged by the event, and the event is month by month unfolding itself. Either, as some say, Chinese labour is an expedient which the Transvaal will abandon after a brief experience; in that case, it is superfluous to ponder what might be its ultimate effects socially, while economically it will have served its turn

if it has 'stayed the rot' and tided the country over the Kaffir labour crisis. Or, in the other event, the likelier on the whole, the Chinese experiment is destined to a longer continuance, long enough to make its secondary effects worth considering; in that case Milner has given his enemies the hostage of a direct prediction, and the figures are filed for reference. The tide of white immigration into the Transvaal, especially of white men with families, will save or sink him, so far as this question is concerned, as mathematically as an Egyptian Budget depends on a good or bad Nile. Let the white tide sink with the rising of the yellow one, as opponents say it will, and Milner as a prophet is self-condemned. Let the two rise together, as he declares they must, with certain broad effects upon the ratio, not of white to colour, but of British to Boer, and Milner is vindicated. Or, if not that—for this policy has had breathed against it

> 'Twenty-nine distinct damnations,
> One sure if another fails'—

at any rate, in that case, the heart will die out of the anti-Chinese cry throughout the Empire as it has died already in South Africa. I do not mean by this that no importance attaches to the other objections which have been raised, moral or constitutional; but only that, on the assumption stated, means will somehow be found to meet these in the case of the indentured Chinamen, as in the case of the indentured Indians on whom Natal depends, or as in the case of the pre-existing Kaffir labourers on the Rand itself, most of whom are temporary human exports, forwarded without wives, from Portuguese Africa, and all of whom are, in a degree only less than the Chinamen, and under our pledge to the Boers must remain, Gibeonites, helots, persons in a non-civic status.

It is natural that the hostility should die harder in parts of the Empire which are innocent of colour problems, and therefore unhardened to the makeshifts

which such problems everywhere impose. South Africans are familiar with a polity built in distinct layers and exhibiting the rights of man in distinct stages of development. People in England, and practically in Australia, are not. Allowance should be made for that. Are not most South Africans outside Natal anti-Indian? Were not all South Africans anti-Chinese till quite recently? If they are converted to the expedient now —and the conversion is admitted by a hostile witness whom both sides respect*— it is not because they like the addition to the racial and civic variegations of their country for its own sake, but because they recognise it as the solution of a crisis which could not wait. With Milner, whose business it was to find the solution, and whose habit it is to face facts, the recognition was swifter, but the stages of it were the same which South Africa has travelled after him. The crisis which converted him was a double one, economic and political. The economic crisis could not wait, because the commercial, industrial, even the agricultural, prosperity of the whole of South Africa is nowadays so bound up with that of the mining industry that, with the Rand halting, South Africa could not recover from the war. Some critics reason as if the country might have been kept waiting indefinitely for the ideal solution; as if, after all the suffering of the war, South Africa might fitly have been prescribed a long diet of bread of affliction and water of affliction to cool the warlike passions. The gold, they point out, would not have run away. This may be high philosophy, but the truth is South Africa could no more afford to be philosophic about the Rand labour problem than Lancashire about a cotton shortage, or Wales about a coal strike. Equally, the political crisis could not wait. The necessary period of autocratic rule should be got through quickly and easily. To let depression drift unrelieved into bankruptcy was at once to make the period odious and indefinitely to

* F. H. P. Creswell, 'The Chinese Labour Question from Within,' p. 89.

prolong it. 'Obviously,' in Milner's own words,* 'the interest of the Mother Country must be to grant self-government as quickly and completely as possible'; but even the most impatient agree that to this there are in common-sense and prudence a few conditions precedent, of which the first concerns the strength of that pacific army of occupation, the British population on the goldfields. In Milner's ears the thunder of the mine batteries spoke more for the future than the thunder of the guns. The harsh but wholesome din of 'stamps,' not the clack of tongues, was the right music for this intermezzo, and business, not politics, the right *motif*. Thus the mines became the first of British interests, and the industrial—or, if you will, the 'capitalist'—policy, became the broad Imperial policy.

In a labyrinth of questions there is generally one in which the practical statesman detects the clue to all the rest. At Bloemfontein it was Franchise. Here it was Labour. By whatever path the problems of the hour were approached — revenue, war contribution, public works, commercial and agricultural distress, the unemployed question, the British immigration question, the Responsible Government question—Milner found ever the same *impasse* and the one exit. With a great mining expansion, all was possible; without it, nothing. The Labour Commission made it clear that the one key to such expansion was some reinforcement of the African supply of unskilled labour. Unskilled, therefore (in a colour country) coloured; extra-African, therefore Asiatic; Asiatic, therefore (by universal consent) stringently restricted in the interest of the skilled white workman—such was the logic of hard facts. Granting the facts correct (and Milner is not an inquirer easily duped), what escape was there from Milner's conclusion? Granting the case for prompt relief, add that no other form of relief equally prompt was even suggested, and the strongest objection to the Chinese Ordinance is confessed, not absolute, but rela-

* Speech at Johannesburg, March 31, 1905.

tive. One escape there was—yes. Wrapping our white robes about us, we might beat a hasty retreat, and 'throw the responsibility on the colonists' own shoulders.' Such a way of 'saving face' would have secured comfort, it seems, to some British consciences. It would have been, at any rate, appropriately Chinese. I have written in vain if the reader needs any exposition why it was not recommended by Milner.

'This is all very well, but hard logic isn't everything. We thought the war was to make South Africa free and British, and now the white South Africa we have heard of turns out to be a community propped up on black and yellow labour!' The appeal, like Mr. Swinburne's 'Before a Crucifix,' is poignant:

> 'Was it for this—that slaves should be—
> Thy word was passed to set men free?'

But behind it there is a perfect ganglion of misconceptions. To begin with, a White South Africa must be meaningless upon lips which in the same breath are for sweeping away as semi-servile the difference in status which white minority rule presupposes. What does a White South Africa mean, then, to South Africans? It means a South Africa of white civilization—white rulers and brain-workers and craftsmen, white professional and business men, white skilled workmen, white overseers of the unskilled. It has never yet meant a South Africa of white unskilled labour, whether British or other. Can anyone honestly say that he rushed to arms for the late war on some prospectus of a White South Africa in this latter sense? If so, he was the dupe of his own singular misinformation. In these days the more elementary facts and figures about the Colonies are iterated in school primers and tit-bitted in the papers. To be sure, they who write the papers do not always read them, or some able editors would know better than to denounce Milner for saying that there is no room in South Africa for a white proletariat. If Milner did say so, his infamy, as usual, is that of facing

the facts. There is no room simply because the proletariat is there already, and is black. Africa is neither Europe nor quite Asia, but between the two. The population of South Africa, to the extent of some seven-eighths, consists of natives, mainly of negroid race, enjoying full physical vigour. Can able editors project a future for those black masses aloof and apart? Where are you to find place for them in the white industrial scheme, if not as unskilled labour? That is where the line has been roughly drawn hitherto; and philanthropy, while aiming to fit the exceptional black to rise above it, has by no means aimed at intermixing the white below that line. To try that is to butt up against an unwritten social law which everybody who has studied it, either in the breach or the observance, is agreed wisely to let alone; while to escape by substituting whites wholesale implies a revolution in the whole economic system of the country, from Cape Town Docks, where you first encounter the muscular, cheery, sweating Kaffir, away to the Zambesi. A white man's living wage is just four to five times a Kaffir's. That is the gulf between the two standards of wants. Does anybody expect the working man to make it even a shilling less in the name of white immigration? Is the capitalist, then, expected in the same name to recast his business on the basis of paying a white man a minimum of nine or ten shillings a day for work the Kaffir does at two shillings?

Such are the heroic revolutions, social and economic, which it is suggested that Milner should have forced upon a staple industry in a time of struggling recovery after war. He decided otherwise. Of all men, he was the least likely—much less likely than some of his Australian critics have shown themselves in Australia—to forget the Imperial aspects of British immigration. But the British workers whom he sought were not drifting casuals, but men who would settle and bring up families in the country. And that these could only be skilled men at skilled wages I will cite a hostile but

candid witness. Mr. Thomas Burt, M.P., writes in 'A Visit to the Transvaal':

'The pay for white unskilled labour on the mines has generally been about 9s. to 10s. per day, while skilled white workers have received from 17s. to 20s.—some of them much more. Now, while 9s. per day would be regarded as a very big wage for an unskilled labourer in England, it is little more than a living wage, even for a single man, in and around Johannesburg. For a married man with a family such a wage is wholly inadequate.'

It is a *bachelor* white proletariat, then, that Milner is censured for not promoting. Strange, since the censors would have the Chinese coolie wived almost whether he will or no.

We can now sum up on the whole question of Milner's so-called capitalism. 'Hand and glove with capitalists' is the hostile phrase. Hand and glove with the mining industry would express his avowed policy; and we have traced its reasoned grounds. His work for the mines was as much for the miners as for their employers—nay, more, for to him the miners represent the British vote. Against the employers evidence can be quoted out of their own mouths that they would rather not see too big a workman's vote along the Rand; they fear trades unions and labour politics. Milner's preoccupation was obviously something quite different: it was to balance the Boer vote at the poll, and nobody imagines that he counted on doing that with a register of millionaires.

Is it suggested, then, that he should not have taken counsel with the heads of the industry, but rather with the hands? That there is sterling stuff in the British mechanics of South Africa was proved in the war. The engine-drivers and railway hands lived an epic of quiet everyday heroism. But in the ranks of labour in the Transvaal Milner did not find any advanced development either of union or of political leadership. There was a backwardness, which Mr. Burt notices and deplores. I

do not mean on the Chinese question merely. On that there has been no clear and consistent voice either way. I mean all round. Bring it to the test of actuality. Try to exemplify the broader statesmanship of labour which Milner (presumably) ought to have called in as against the class interest or narrower local interest of capitalist counsels. I doubt if anyone would care to name any actual Transvaal Labour leader, and compare in this sense the line such a leader actually took on test questions with the line actually taken, say, by a typical 'Randlord' like Sir Percy Fitzpatrick. Such questions, I mean, as the war contribution, the 10 per cent. profit tax, or that novel and provident piece of State socialism which has secured to a Colony for the first time the lion's share of the profits of a diamond mine. The truth is that, especially in the Transvaal, the skilled workman is a bit of a capitalist himself, and the real dividing-line is between those in each class who have the quickening touch of public spirit and those who have not. Milner simply enlisted that spirit where he found it, disregarding class.

There are working men, no doubt, especially while hard times last, who fondly recall piping times under Kruger, and wish they could have them back, 'grievances and all.' Mr. Burt cites one such with a complaisance which I find puzzling. The fatted helot is not the type of artisan citizen which Mr. Burt affects at home. He should have compared notes about that man with some keen democratic politician of Transvaal domicile. Would that he could have done so with his fellow Tynesider and Radical, the late C. R. Dodd! Light would then have been thrown upon that breach between home and colonial Liberals which Lord Rosebery lately deplored. So, too, there are certain capitalists who sigh for the back-stairs of the old régime. Those whom one sees quoted by English Liberals with seeming approval on such matters as war contribution are mostly of this school. Those of us who know their record, and remember with what groaning winches, if

at all, they had to be dragged into line for reform, are not surprised that they grudge its price. The mingled exactions and concessions of Kruger's days were really more in their atmosphere than the direct taxation of Milner's. But we can all see that this spirit of 'hang-the-franchise' and 'make-your-pile-and-quit' is the self-same spirit in Mr. Burt's workman and in these cosmopolitan capitalists. Why, if in them it is the essence of all that is ignoble and unpatriotic, does it become in a British-born artisan something to be quoted with respect by a British democratic leader? Against them both set such a typical 'Randlord' as the one I instanced. Nothing of the cosmopolite about him! A South-African-born colonist, full of old Barberton and Bush-veld memories, who risked his neck for politics in the reform days and is heart and soul in the future of the country. Most of the same claims can be made for others as typical, like Sir George Farrar and Mr. Abe Bailey. How many Rand working men have served so long a civic apprenticeship to the Transvaal?

To conclude this part of the subject, I will only add that those who fancy Milner's a likely temperament for 'a capitalist tool' should study the quiet firmness with which he crushed the incipient agitation against his enforcement of the 10 per cent. profit tax. That incident makes its own comment upon the parrot-cry. The same cry was screamed at the Jameson Ministry at the Cape. They answered it with such a graduated income tax as Liberalism in England cannot yet boast of. I ask my English Liberal friends, who call my Cape Progressive friends 'the capitalist party,' when they will be able to show the like. Graduated death duties are their top mark in democratic finance so far; and it is worth recalling that that instrument was shaped for them, as Sir William Harcourt handsomely testified, by the hand and brain of Milner.

The thread of our story can now run to a finish, disencumbered of controversy.

After his labours at Vereeniging for a secure peace,

labours which proved not less anxious and critical than those which preceded the war and dogged it to its close, Milner girded up his loins for a work as great and more congenial. With relentless industry, that *labor improbus* which stamps all he undertakes, he plunged into the heart of the chaos left by war and began to build the new order. The task was a heroic one. Everything cried out to be done at once, and there was no civil service and no tradition. Milner's plans, long pondered, were projected on large and noble lines. All the world counted on a flowing tide as the natural sequel to peace and to the British flag—that great commercial asset, as Rhodes, in an absurdly misrepresented phrase, with just pride described it. The main concern was how to make the sluices of the State big enough for the tide to flow in. Then came the check. All the world proved wrong. Instead of tide, it was ebb, ebb, till it touched the lowest low water-mark of local experience.

At first, speed had to be everything, economy nothing —now it was all the other way. Everything had to be improvised all over again on a humbler scale, and to a chorus of grumbles about extravagance, parsimony, disproportion, round pegs in square holes, and all the *voces populi* of a time of retrenchment. The solution of the labour trouble was only reached after a long and wearing controversy, and, meanwhile, finance became a formidable problem. Milner had not served for nothing in Egypt and at Somerset House; he made ends meet and carried on. But the opportunity of hard times was golden for all natural foes of the new Administration. It was not lost on the Boer Generals, nor on the Boer pastors, ever the chief cherishers of the sacred embers of race-feeling. Some promising cries were started. Milner was abundantly justified of his foresight in insisting that there should be nothing implied, but everything in black and white, in the terms of peace. Happily, the Boers were busy, like thrifty men, in getting the most they could out of repatriation funds, loans, and advances. They echoed

the cries, but stuck to business, and, on the whole, disappointed nobody except our own 'pro-Boers,' those strange persons who talk so much about 'miscalculations,' but who had to learn from the peace that it is they who miscalculated the Dutch temper, just as they learnt from the war that it is they who miscalculated the English. On the other hand, the quarter where economic disappointment was bound to tell most was among the Administration's natural friends. Johannesburg split into parties. It was no longer possible to say that for the first time on record the Dutch were divided and the British united. The solid and soberer part, probably the larger, remembered the pit from which they had been digged, and who digged them. They recognised the stern overshadowing conditions, which must, in this case, check and school the natural precocity of British colonists in outgrowing Imperial leading-strings. Others, at one time the most vocal, became the pupils (or, as they claim, the teachers) of the Boer pastors and ex-Generals; and many were those who vented their disappointment, if not on Milner personally, freely and loudly on 'Milner's young men.' For the public service, Milner was accused of a leaning to young, well-educated Englishmen, raw to their work and to the country. His 'Balliol kindergarten,' as a wag called it, insured a sharp break with old, bad traditions, and it produced some brilliant successes; but no doubt the rawness had its own drawbacks. Post-haste appointments, in any case, had to yield some percentage of failures; but the few conspicuous ones, oddly enough, were not among the 'high-salaried novices' of the outcry (whose services, if retrenched, were apt to be promptly snapped up at salaries as high or higher by business houses), but among tried men who, in the war, had emerged as conspicuous administrative successes. So exacting were the changed conditions, I am enough of a democrat to find a certain satisfaction in believing that capable autocracy has its points of weakness to set off those of admitted strength in the

comparison with the popular machine. If the latter is apt to turn too quickly upon an impugned and struggling servant, the former, unless Russian or Oriental, is apt to be over-loyal to fidelity. The new Administration's critics complained that Milner was so. He expected much of his men, and got much; but he gave as loyally. Grounds for grumbling no doubt there were. 'I myself,' says Milner, 'could point out more mistakes than any of the cavillers.' But when all is said, the practical test remains. 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' Milner and his men, official and unofficial—for we must not forget his success in drawing on the best men of all classes for his representative advisers—took over the country 'a total wreck, with half its population in exile.' They found its railways and telegraphs a battlefield, and left them better than they had ever been in peace. They extended them by hundreds of miles and repaired roads by hundreds of leagues. They laid out two to three millions in building town schools and farm schools, hospitals and orphanages and prisons, dwellings for teachers and magistrates and police. They brought the Statute-book from a jumble to a model. They found free municipalities nowhere, and created them for every town. They started expert departments, studied irrigation, founded experimental farms, brought in breed-stock, planted forests. They actually doubled the country's record in the number of children being taught in the free schools. In a word, they found a Colony without the running plant of civilization, and in three years' work created it. 'Rough, but not scamped,' is Milner's summary of the work's quality; its amount speaks for itself. Milner left it to speak when hard times blew a gust of unpopularity. He is one of those

> 'Whose blood and judgment are so well co-mingled
> That they are not a pipe for Fortune's finger
> To sound what stop she please.'

To the clamour of short-sighted impatience—and Johannesburg, though to him personally loyal, is not

the home of patience—he was deaf even when it was swollen by some who in less searching times had been loud in eulogy. How popular, and for a departing dictator how easy, to make a premature concession to the Responsible Government party! He was stone to the temptation—he would not even, as I think he might well have done, withdraw before he left that armoury of special powers against sedition, which he had long been able to leave rusting. No; all the more tempting fruit he would leave ripening for his successor. Lord Selborne's task, so well begun, will be perhaps the easier for it. And, in the end, Milner had his reward. When the time came to leave, the community he had served took thought and suddenly found its voice. There was one of those great lifting waves of deeper feeling in which the cavils and dissensions of the hour are drowned, and Milner laid down his office heartened by such a demonstration as neither he nor South Africa is likely to forget. His countrymen in that part of the Empire have ranked him among the great proconsuls. I believe that time and a wider tribunal will confirm their verdict.

In Milner's farewell speeches—strangely impressive to those who heard them, and in their pregnant plainness the best commentary offered yet by friend or foe upon his work in the Transvaal*—there was one note of personal regret, one sigh of disappointment. Men, he said, would probably choose to remember him in connection with the war, and he would rather they connected him with the tremendous effort made to build up a national fabric after the peace. The passage is suggestive. One recalls how it was the real ambition of William Pitt the younger to reform his country's finance, though a hard fate compelled him instead to be the figurehead of an exhausting national struggle and the theme of Coleridge's ghastly lampoon, 'Fire, Famine, and Slaughter.' 'His

* The three speeches are issued in a sixpenny reprint by the Imperial South African Association, 66, Victoria Street, Westminster.

enthusiasm,' in Lord Rosebery's words, 'was all for peace, retrenchment, and reform. . . . He had the consciousness of a boundless capacity for meeting the real requirements of the country'; but he was reserved for a sterner task, glorious indeed, but one that involved 'wrecking his whole financial edifice . . . postponing and repressing all his projected reforms.'

To Milner's own mind his South African career should have had two chapters. The first we have traced. To secure that the coming union should be within, not without the British Empire, and to inspire and weld into one convinced, high-tempered whole the British in South Africa, in Great Britain, and throughout the Empire, till that issue was decided—this chapter Milner completed; and any man might be content to live by it. But Milner aspired to a second chapter, beside which, could it have been fully written, the former should have seemed, as it will some day seem in the history of the country, a mere prologue, a destructive though necessary interlude. To complete the fabric of union, to celebrate what might be called the Dutch-English house-warming, and leave the South African people installed in the charge and governance of its own future—this is denied him. Like Rhodes, he has had to leave for other hands the setting of the coping-stone upon that fabric—nay, he does not claim to have carried it above the foundations; and, hater of glozing as he is, he makes no secret of his feeling that to this part of his task his countrymen have yet to do full justice. They will be readier to do it, no doubt, when the economic revival already traceable as the belated reward of his last efforts goes pulsing full through all the arteries of South African life. He had every temptation to hold on till then, if it had been physically possible. But it was not to be. The opportunity of a lifetime, Milner's opportunity as an Ædile on the grand scale, has ebbed away. For that, statesmanship needs to be able to bring to yoke Pharaoh's fat kine, the years of plenty; and all that Milner has had to inspan has been the lean, the lean, and again the lean.

No Assouan Barrages for him! In the south of Africa as in the north he has had to prepare surpluses for those who follow, not to enjoy them himself. The economic world-currents that govern depression and recovery are leisurely and incalculable. It is a tide that takes its own time to ebb and flow. Sensitive to ill it may be: a war, a broil, a rumour can retard it; but hasten it will not, for any man, neither to enable an overworked High Commissioner to see the fruit of his hands and bring his sheaves with him, nor to relieve an English-speaking community, good at work but less good at waiting, which has had to bear, sometimes with little to sustain it beyond his example, so long a strain on its loyalty. Through weary years the traders and workers of South Africa have been watching for the turn of that tide, and only heard

> 'Its melancholy, long withdrawing roar
> . . . . down the vast edges drear
> And naked shingles of the world.'

'Fancy quoting Matthew Arnold to describe a slump!' sneers somebody. Pray, sir, were you ever a young colonist trying to build up a home in a new country? The tide is turning at last, but too late for many smaller men, and too late for Milner. The undertow has tired him out.

In irrigation, in forestry, in communications, above all, in land colonization, his full plans would have changed the face of the country. Some of them, perhaps, may never be realized now; the day of opulence will come, but not the day of opulent dictatorship; they will remain like those massive stone zimbabwes out in the African veld, which time and nature cannot obliterate, but on which posterity will never build. But much is well begun, and abides the coming of the better years for triumphant completion. In education of every grade; in local government; in the administrative frame and scaffolding; in all his essays towards a broad working compromise upon those questions of colour

which are the despair of theorists and dangerous sport of local factions, English, African, Australian, and Indian, each too narrow to consider the others or the Empire; in customs union, a federal step; in the approach to railway union, another federal step; in the Intercolonial Council which he unflinchingly maintained as being, despite its unpopularity with the impatient, the one step possible at this stage towards making federation organic; last, not least, in the settlement of the bases of representation for the new interim constitution upon lines which do not compromise the future—a service second only to that rendered at Vereeniging over the terms of peace—in all this, I believe, Milner's lines have been well and truly laid, and, as in Rhodes's apologue of the avenue of oak saplings, those who come after will not greatly alter those lines. At least, if Milner has had to share Pitt's disappointment, he must be allowed to share Pitt's title of the 'pilot who weathered the storm.' Nor will men who know hesitate to apply to him also certain words that were used of William Pitt the elder, that warrior invalid. The eight years of Milner's South African service were hard years for those who bore responsibility, even if of iron frame. They pulled down Rhodes and the veteran Kruger. They made wrecks of Mr. Steyn and Mr. Reitz. They left the Unionist war Ministry a prey to the flaccid exhaustion which ever since has benumbed British politics. In Milner they strained well-nigh to breaking-point a physical constitution notoriously unequal to the will that drove it. The ageing tale of them is scored very legibly on the long, lean face, with its look of watchfulness. But all who during those hard years had to do with him, be they soldiers or civilians, will echo of Milner what was said of Chatham: that 'no one ever left his cabinet without feeling himself a braver man.'

THE PROSPECTS OF A UNITED SOUTH AFRICA

By G. G. ROBINSON

I.

The Nelson Centenary, which is the occasion of this volume, marks also the close of the first hundred years of British dominion in South Africa. It was just three months after the Battle of Trafalgar that the last of the Dutch commanders surrendered his colony to General Baird. The assertion of British predominance at the Cape was one incident, hardly noticed at the time, in the great struggle against Napoleon's scheme of universal despotism. To-day we are just emerging from another struggle, less imposing in appearance than the war with France, but fraught with consequences just as serious to the Empire; and the scene and cause of it has been that same African colony of which Pitt laid the foundations a hundred years ago. Everything has tended in this latter war to belittle the real magnitude of the issues involved. And since a true understanding of them is the beginning of wisdom in things South African, it may be worth while to repeat very briefly at the outset two or three considerations which affect it.

In the first place, then, the annexation of the Dutch Republics was not merely (as it is often represented, even by its supporters) the inevitable extinction of a backward State which lags behind its progressive neighbours. This was not the case—always a difficult case

in the ethics of States—of the 'small nation,' corrupt and inefficient in itself, but with no ambition beyond the preservation of its nationality, and no desire except to be left alone. When the establishment of the great gold industry introduced a new industrial element, mainly British, into their population, the Boer Government had no hesitation in admitting it. The primitive, pastoral ideal of their voortrekker fathers gave way at once to a new ideal of national wealth and importance, to be acquired at the expense of these Uitlanders. So far as its internal administration went, the downfall of the Republican Government was due, not to its exclusion of the foreigner, but to its failure to absorb him.

A second and far more serious consideration is that the whole of South Africa was intimately concerned in the settlement of the Uitlanders' grievances. It was never a purely Transvaal affair. 'South Africa,' wrote Lord Milner before the war, 'can never prosper under two absolutely conflicting social and political systems—perfect equality for Dutch and British in the Dutch Colonies side by side with permanent subjection of British to Dutch in one of the Republics.' The success, in fact, of the Transvaal Government in flouting British prestige had attracted to them all the malcontents and waverers in our own Colonies. A definite anti-British ideal had taken shape—the creation of an independent Dutch South Africa, with its focus at Pretoria and its limits at the sea. Everywhere, from the Cape Peninsula to the Limpopo, the Boer star was in the ascendant. British-born citizens of Cape Colony were daily making obeisance before their Dutch fellow-subjects, and the latter looked to Pretoria for their political guidance. It is hardly too much to say that in the years immediately preceding the war the paramount Power in South Africa was no longer the British Empire, but President Kruger.

Finally—this is the third and most serious consideration of all—far more was at stake in the Boer War even

than the loss of South Africa itself. If we can imagine the whole country to be torn away at the Zambesi by some natural convulsion and submerged in the sea, that would be in its simplest form the loss of South Africa, with its territories and its peoples; but that would not necessarily imply the disruption of the whole British Empire. On the other hand, such disruption was, beyond any sort of doubt, the alternative to our successful issue from the war. This was the great test case of an Empire which had just begun to realize its Imperial position. The Colonies were looking on, grown old enough to be willing and able to bear their burden with the Mother Country, but still curious to see what manner of Empire this was to which they belonged. The Powers of Europe were looking on, with no excuse for official intervention, but making no secret of their private sympathy with the Boers. We had no choice in the matter at all. And therefore when Englishmen ask, as they are apt to ask, What, after all, is the good to us of this troublesome South Africa, and why have we lavished men and money to keep it within the limits of the British Empire? the first and simplest answer is that there was no decent alternative. It was a struggle, not for the acquisition of the Transvaal, not even for the salvation of South Africa, but for the existence of the Empire itself—a defensive war, essentially as well as technically, and not an aggressive war.

The fact that war and annexation were inevitable forms no reason why South Africa should remain for ever a useless appendage of the British Empire, a mere passenger in the Imperial boat. On the contrary, all the factors are present there which constitute the essential value to Great Britain of the 'Dominions beyond the seas.' Have the Colonies any use as an outlet for the cramped population of the Mother Country? South Africa furnishes a vast tract of territory in which Europeans can live and work. Is it desirable that the Empire should be able to produce its own equipment within its own limits? South Africa offers a great

mineral and agricultural and pastoral country, richer in metals than Australia, more favoured in climate than Canada. Is the command of the sea important, and the possession of harbours and dockyards in all parts of the world? South Africa holds the key of the Southern Ocean, and forms, after Egypt, the second line of communication with India and the East.

These things are the raw material of South Africa's own prosperity and of her contribution to the strength of the Empire. For the present she has emerged from the melting-pot, an integral part, indeed, of an existent Empire, but still the strangest medley of races and interests and States. Two white races living side by side, with a century of intrigue and warfare behind them; two old British Colonies, two ex-Republics, and the territory of a Chartered Company. The object of this paper is to discuss, in the barest outline, the present relations of these different elements, and the prospect of their consolidation into a peaceful and united South Africa under the British flag.

II.

The first point to realize is the relations of the two white races. The end of the war between them, long as it was foreseen, was oddly abrupt in its result. Within a week of the conclusion of peace an Englishman might have walked unarmed in perfect safety from one end of the new Colonies to the other. There is no record since then of the commission of a single crime of violence which could be attributed in any way to feelings aroused by the war. And this very remarkable state of affairs has the one drawback, that—certainly in England, and perhaps to some extent in South Africa as well—it has obscured the existence of a racial problem at all. As a matter of fact, it is quite idle to deny that the great underlying motive in South African politics is still the antagonism of the two white races; and that the war, while it prevented this problem from being

solved in favour of the Dutch ideal, did not in itself provide a final and satisfactory solution.

What is the position? Throughout South Africa, whether viewed as a whole or State against State, the races to-day are as nearly as possible equal in numbers. In Cape Colony there is a slight majority of Dutch inhabitants, in the Transvaal a slight majority of British. Natal, which, even after absorbing a large slice of the Transvaal, is still essentially British, balances the Orange River Colony, where there is an overwhelming population of Boers. Rhodesia, where the small white population is almost entirely British, is going through bad times and a constitutional crisis, and is hardly yet a factor in the situation. The position, therefore, from the numerical point of view is not materially different from the pre-war days. The two races are still definite realities. There is no question whatever of the extinction or the absorption of either.

The future relations between the two depend principally upon the Transvaal. Here, in the country which was at once the origin and the closing scene of the war, racial feeling is naturally the most conspicuous and the most acute. The settlement of the problem here means peace throughout South Africa; and, unfortunately, the division of races in the Transvaal is very nearly coincident with other divisions, which tend to aggravate it. The British population is congregated for the most part on the narrow ridge of the Rand, and is identified with its great gold industry. The Boers are farmers, and are distributed through the rest of the country. Thus, to the old antagonism of race is added the conflict of interests between mining and agriculture and between town and country. Vitally dependent though the mines may be upon the farmers, and the latter to an even greater extent upon the profits of the mines, the fact remains that the two races are at present divided, not only by tradition and religion and language, but also by differences of occupation and mode of living. An Englishman may live in Johannesburg for years without

seeing a Boer, and the acquaintance of the Boer farmers with their British fellow-citizens is often confined to the occasional visit of an official. The two races do not come into personal contact at very many points of daily life.

The result of this separation is that our view of the present relations of the two races is almost entirely dependent upon the attitude of the Boer leaders to the Government of the Colony. It is not a bad clue. The Boers are extraordinarily amenable as a people to organization, and their traditions are autocratic. These leaders—some of them survivors of the old Kruger oligarchy, and some new men thrown into prominence by the war—have undoubtedly got their following well in hand; and their own attitude—there is no disguising the fact—has not up to the present been encouraging. They have refused altogether to help in the administration of their country; they have lost no opportunity of disparaging the efforts of the Government; they have recently established a separate political organization for Boers as such. Bearing in mind the solid allegiance of this people to their self-constituted leaders, it is not putting it too strongly to describe the general Boer frame of mind as one at least of passive hostility to the new régime.

And yet the situation, even in the Transvaal, is not by any means so hopeless as it seems at first sight. People are just beginning to realize that they expected too much of the mere conclusion of peace, and that this attitude of the Boers is not in the least surprising. After all, they say, it is only reasonable that any conquered people should feel its position keenly. A people which began its separate existence, as the Boers did, in a national exodus, and ended it in a national war, must clearly have in an unusual degree the qualities of solidarity and self-respect. Hostility was to be expected for some time to come, and ingratitude and misrepresentation are its natural weapons. This is true enough, and such proper appreciation of the real

feelings of the Boers is unquestionably the foundation of a better state of things. It should have the advantage, too, of closing the ranks of their British fellow-citizens—at least, where the main question of the future of South Africa is involved. Every sign of disunion on their part is being closely watched. Any serious disunion might very easily revive the old conflict of two separate policies and two rival national ideals. No one really wants a repetition of the war, or of the conditions which preceded it; and the prospect of a peaceful and united South Africa depends primarily upon the determined support of the new régime by the men who are its natural supporters.

Next to realizing the continued existence of this national Boer spirit comes the discovery of some means of turning it to good account. The new Government has recognised from the first that there is one object at least for which Boers and British can work together without loss of self-respect—and that is the material prosperity of their common country. The whole of the efforts of the Administration have been concentrated upon this one object in its various forms, and the solution of the racial problem will stand or fall by its attainment. The development to its utmost of the mining industry—not, it may be added, in order to enrich a handful of 'Park Lane capitalists,' but because the whole prosperity of South Africa depends, to an extent which can hardly be realized in England, upon the activity of the mines. The encouragement of a policy of land settlement—again, not from any idea of ousting or outnumbering the Boers, but in order to introduce a new and progressive element into the life of the veld, and to give British as well as Boers some stake in the land. The equipment of scientific departments of Agriculture and Forestry and Irrigation. The inauguration of a wide scheme of local self-government. The construction of public works without number. If anyone cares to read the whole story of this bewildering activity of the last three years, it is written in countless Blue-books and administrative

reports. There are only two points in it to which I would call attention here, because they have a special bearing on this question of the cohesion of the two races.

The first is the improvement of means of communication. Something like 300 miles of new railways have already been constructed in the two Colonies since the war; another 300 are in course of construction; and provision has been made for nearly 500 more. Thirteen hundred miles of roads have been made fit for traffic in the Transvaal alone, and twenty-seven permanent bridges have been built in their course. The second point is the establishment from the days of the war itself of a broad and comprehensive system of free education. The building of 'half a dozen very large town schools, between twenty and thirty town schools of average size, and no fewer than 152 farm schools' (I take these figures, like the others, from Lord Milner's great *apologia* for the Transvaal Administration in his farewell speech at Pretoria)—this speaks for itself. So does the fact that the number of children being educated in these Government schools is already more than twice the number of the best of the pre-war days. Railways and education—these above all are the means which are the most obviously destined to bring town and country together, and to give the rising generation a common tradition and a common language.

And as for results, it is frankly impossible in this matter of the two races to paint as yet a glowing picture of confidence and harmony restored. All that can be said at present is this: British and Dutch are at last coming to understand one another's point of view. They are daily found in closer personal contact. The country is beginning to wear, as it never did before, the aspect of a progressive and civilized State; and more Englishmen are deciding every year that it is a place in which they can settle down and make a home for their children. The backveld Boers are learning to think for themselves, and to admit that, after all, it is no very

desperate fate to live under a Government which respects their worldly goods, their language, and their religion, and has done a vast deal more for them besides than they ever really expected. Further than this it is impossible to go. But at least there is nothing to dissipate the hope that the two races, living for the first time on terms of perfect equality, will eventually join hands in a strong sentiment of affection and pride for South Africa.

III.

I turn from the relations of the two white races to the relations of the five South African States. Here at any rate we have an obvious unmistakable advantage as a result of the war. The disappearance of the Dutch Republics means the disappearance of an official nucleus for anti-British intrigue. The administration of the two central States is for the first time in friendly hands. The aims and ambitions of all the States are—broadly speaking—in harmony. President Kruger did a good deal in the closing years of his reign—in his conduct, for instance, of the franchise negotiations—to damage his reputation as an astute diplomatist. And therefore people are apt to forget the extraordinary skill which he had long displayed in setting his neighbours by the ears—in playing off the Cape against Natal, and Portuguese interests against both. No doubt the possibilities of official discord still exist to a very obvious degree; but at least it is half the battle to be rid of the desire for discord as such.

At the same time it is just worth remembering, before finally taking leave of the racial question, that that *un*official organization which has taken the place of the Republics as the nucleus for anti-British effort has still a certain predisposition to keep the various British Governments at loggerheads. The Boer population takes very little personal interest in the questions at issue between the States. They are questions in the main of rival ports and railway rates and tariffs, questions, that

is, affecting primarily the commercial, and therefore the British, community. No doubt the Boer farmers are concerned in their settlement too. But, then, they are not always allowed by their leaders to have a clear vision of their true interest; and, to do them justice, they would often be ready, even if they saw it, to sacrifice it to their political creed. The well-worn abuse, in the Dutch press, of the Rand and its capitalists has this additional object, that it may stimulate that jealousy of the Transvaal which is already strong enough in the coast Colonies. Political as well as material considerations—they are inextricably intertwined all through the chapter—require that States as well as individuals should present a united front.

Federation is so plainly the natural goal to which South Africa is tending that adventitious mischief-making can hardly delay it when the time is ripe. And certainly, if such a union of neighbouring Colonies is anywhere a desirable thing, it is more than usually desirable here; for South Africa is essentially one social and economic whole, and the State jealousies are a real drawback to her prosperity. There has never been any question of the internal advantages of federation. Men talked of it so long ago as the seventies—and that is a long time in the history of South Africa—and Lord Carnarvon's abortive Act provided the necessary machinery. An independent, but still a federated, South Africa was the object of Dutch intrigue during the twenty years that followed. To-day we are for the first time within measurable distance of federation under the British flag; and if we hear less about it, it is because men realize its difficulties better, and approach it on different lines. South Africa is moving slowly but surely towards federation, not by the invention of schemes and constitutions, but by the gradual removal of the countless rivalries and restrictions which form a solid material barrier against the best intentions in the world.

Certainly the last three years have shown an ever-increasing disposition on the part of the foremost South

African statesmen to meet in friendly discussion of the outstanding points of intercolonial difference. Of the formal meetings of this kind the most notable has been the great Conference which assembled at Bloemfontein in March, 1903, just nine months after the close of the war. Here, under the presidency of the High Commissioner, met for the first time representatives of all the South African Colonies, the Prime Ministers of Cape Colony and Natal, and the heads of the Administration of the new Colonies and of Rhodesia, and one immediate result was a Customs Union embracing the whole of British South Africa. No doubt it is easy to exaggerate the completeness of this Union. Under the present arrangement each Colony keeps its own separate receipts, the collection being made at a price by the coast Colonies on behalf of their inland neighbours. It is a wasteful system, and still admits of friction; but it was impossible in the abnormal conditions prevailing after the war to bring the various States into even line, and each claimed separate temporary modifications of the Convention for its own special benefit. A true Customs Union will pool the receipts, and distribute them to its members on a fixed basis of calculation, the expenses of a single Customs administration being similarly distributed. But when all is said, the Union of 1903 remains no inconsiderable achievement, when it is remembered that the Customs differences of the Australian Colonies were still provoking troublesome controversy, even after federation. And the assembling of such a Conference at all was in itself a sufficiently satisfactory sign of the times.

A far more serious cause of quarrel is the struggle of three coast States—Cape Colony, Natal, and Portuguese East Africa—for the traffic of the inland Colonies in their ports and over their railway systems. There will be enough and to spare for all of them, and the real problem is to apportion the shares in the most economical way. But unless the railways can all be placed under a single authority it will be difficult to prevent a waste-

ful war of competition for the whole. Delagoa Bay, with its practically unlimited harbour and its shorter railway route to Johannesburg, is the bugbear of the British coast Colonies, and places the Transvaal in a position to treat with them on at least an equal footing. Party politics in Natal, and to some extent in Cape Colony also, are divided by competing schemes for the development of their railways and harbours. The two Colonies are divided against one another by the competition of Port Elizabeth and East London with Durban. Both agree in a common denunciation of the Transvaal for saving herself to the advantage of a seaport which is Portuguese. South Africa as a whole—and this hard geographical fact is, after all, the dominant factor in the situation—is not so well supplied either with ports or railways that she can afford to lose anything through jealousy; and the only practical way in which she will make the most of her resources is to place the management of the whole under a single Federal Board, of which the existing Railway Committee of the Intercolonial Council may perhaps form the nucleus. In other countries the federation of railways has been the climax of the federation of States. In South Africa it seems inevitable that it should be a preliminary step.

Most serious, perhaps, of all the requirements of a peaceful and United South Africa is the adoption of some uniform policy towards her vast native population. The Native Problem must clearly be of paramount importance to a country which up to the present has been harassed at least once in a decade by a serious native war, and in which the white inhabitants are to-day outnumbered by the black in the proportion of five to one. It was the conflict upon this question, more than any other, between the Downing Street ideal and the Dutch colonial ideal, that led to the Great Trek and the establishment of two antagonistic political systems in South Africa.

Now, it may frankly be admitted that there is no very marked divergence in South Africa to-day between Boer

and British opinion upon the broad aspect of the native problem. Colonial feeling is on the whole sympathetic to the education and development of the Kaffir. On the other hand, it is quite unanimous that there is to be no question of equality, either social or political, between the white and the black races. Nor is there in practice any question of social equality in any part of South Africa. The question, however, of the political rights of natives has been hopelessly complicated by the divisions of the white population in the past. The constitution granted to Cape Colony in 1853 admitted the natives to the franchise on equal terms with the white inhabitants—that is to say, with a low property and educational qualification. This policy was in accordance with British traditions, and, as a matter of fact, it was endorsed, when the time for self-government came, by the people of the Colony themselves. Natal followed suit in theory, but has succeeded in practice in evading the obligations of its charter. Rhodesia is bound by the same law as Cape Colony, but its native population has not yet advanced to the requisite standard of progress. On the other hand, the two Dutch Republics gave no rights to their natives at all, and the Transvaal and Orange River Colony are debarred by the terms of Vereeniging from modifying this tradition until the days of responsible government. Thus there has grown up the widest possible divergence in the practice of the five South African States in this crucial problem of the native franchise; and other incongruities, in questions of land tenure and education and so forth, have followed in its train.

The present position of the problem is entirely dominated by the situation in Cape Colony, where the native vote is now sufficient to turn the scale in a large number of constituencies. It is a situation of grave peril, as men of all parties are prepared to admit; and the peril is not by any means confined to Cape Colony itself. The natives throughout South Africa are in close communication with one another. Absolute dis-

parity of treatment on the two sides of an artificial line can only result in perpetual agitation and unrest from end to end of the country. 'South Africa can never prosper under two conflicting political systems;' it is as true of the native population to-day as it was of the white races before the war, and the adoption of a uniform native policy is a vital and immediate necessity.

Happily, the first great stride in the direction of common action has recently been made through the work of the Native Affairs Commission, itself the offspring of the Bloemfontein Conference. For a year and a half the greatest experts in native questions of all the South African Colonies have been travelling through the country, engaged in a close investigation and discussion of the whole vast problem of native administration; and the report of the Commission, published early in the present year, is admittedly a monument of collective wisdom, and likely to form the basis of coherent policy in the future.

Besides these heroic efforts, the last three years have seen minor conferences innumerable between the statesmen of the different Colonies. Railway matters have furnished the ground for most of them—the apportionment of rates on the old through lines from the coast, and the construction of new lines to the benefit of more than one Colony. At the present moment, for instance, as the result of such conferences, the Government of Natal are extending their railway system into the Orange River Colony, to the mutual advantage of the latter, which needs railways before everything else, and of themselves, who desire to push their trade from the coast. Irrigation again, most pressing requirement of that dry and thirsty land, is a matter in which individual State action is neither possible nor desirable. The two great rivers of South Africa, the Vaal and the Orange, form State boundaries, and the disposal of their waters is even now forming the subject of intercolonial commissions. As other signs of the growth of joint action,

it may be added that a meeting of law officers has already considered the possibility of identical legislation in such matters of common interest as alien immigration and of the formation of a common South African Court of Appeal, and that more than one conference of educational experts has resulted in the gradual approximation of the different codes. Naturally, the success of these things depends to an enormous extent on the personal element. South Africa has been singularly fortunate of late in the fact that the administration of her self-governing Colonies has been in the hands of men who are able to see beyond the limits of their immediate surroundings.

It is idle speculation to forecast the date of a definite federation of South Africa, and it is just as idle to attempt to hurry it. The Transvaal and the Orange River Colony have been wisely started on their career with something of a federal bond in the Intercolonial Council. Possibly the rest may come by stages, too. It has been suggested, for instance, that a union between the new Colonies and Natal, which have comparatively few outstanding points of difference, might be reinforced later by the adhesion of the Cape, where there are special conditions and difficulties, and of Rhodesia. But, whatever happens, South African statesmen are already taking the only sane course of clearing the ground in advance. A Customs Union is an accomplished fact. A Railway Union is at least in the air—an arrangement, that is, under which the trunk lines, at any rate, shall be controlled and their profits pooled by a Federal Board. There is at last some prospect of a uniform native policy. So far as the adjustment of local interests is concerned, it need not be a very difficult matter, when the time comes, to fit the coping-stone of a formal federation.

But let it never be forgotten that this adjustment of local differences, necessary and desirable as it is, is not in itself the be-all and end-all of federation to-day. Certainly it is an obvious practical object, absolutely

necessary as a preliminary stage, and apt, because it is so obvious, to overshadow higher considerations. And yet a federation of South Africa, radiating from the Transvaal and containing all the elements of inequality and exclusiveness which marked the Transvaal Government, was not so very remote in the days before the war. A federation of South Africa might still, in conceivable circumstances, be the greatest misfortune which could happen. There is no special magic in the word itself. A true federation under the British flag implies far more than the harmony of the contracting Governments, and when it comes upon South Africa it must mean the practical consolidation there of the British position, the consummation of the ideal of justice and equality for which the war was fought, the strengthening and simplification in that part of the world of the machinery of the Empire.

IV.

The question of the ultimate relations between South Africa as a whole and the Mother Country possesses peculiar snares and pitfalls for the student of colonial development. The old conception of an Imperial federation is passing away—the conception, that is, of a hard and fast system of obligation and contribution to an omnipotent Imperial Government in London. In such a system there was no room for a constructive local patriotism; and in two different parts of the Empire, at least, local patriotism has recently assumed proportions which can neither be neglected nor crushed. Modern thinkers are seeking to turn to good account the nascent spirit of nationalism which is already conspicuous in Australia and Canada. A new ideal is making its way, in which the great groups of Colonies shall be the partners, and not the subject States, of an organic Empire, free to develop to the utmost their own defensive and industrial and commercial resources, indissolubly bound together by the ties of common interest and common sentiment.

If this be sound doctrine, then it must be admitted that we have need to walk more warily than elsewhere in our dealings with South Africa. Here the conditions are altogether different from those of the other Colonies. The spirit of nationalism is there, it is true. Unfortunately, it has been regarded as the monopoly till now of one particular section of the population, and that the section which is least of all concerned to construct out of local patriotism a coherent British Empire. 'A national party,' 'the national language,' 'education on national lines'—these phrases, harmless enough in themselves, have a special and sinister significance in South Africa. They are the chosen watchwords of a creed in which the Imperial connection has no place.

And if the internal circumstances of South Africa are radically different from those of Australia and Canada, so also has been the history of her relations with the Mother Country. Quite apart from any deliberate feeling of hostility to Great Britain, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Downing Street does still stand to the ordinary South African mind for spasmodic, vexatious interference, and that it will take years of sympathy to efface this impression. We are reaping in the mistrust of our colonists the fruits of a long series of 'regrettable incidents' in the past. It is still more impossible to forget that one great political party in England—the party, too, which is identified by tradition with the encouragement of free colonial development—has even in these latter days done an incredible amount of harm by trying to thwart the wishes of a South African Colony in her own domestic affairs. Such episodes as the Chinese labour debates in the House of Commons may do much to develop a spirit of nationalism in South Africa, but they will develop it at the expense of the Imperial connection.

Fortunately, the general trend of opinion in England is towards a greater respect for her Colonies. The Mother Country has given of the best of her statesmen to govern South Africa. She has recently bestowed

upon the Transvaal a constitution which, within three years of a desperate racial struggle, is surely a monument of confidence and liberality. There has been no haggling over the contribution of the new Colonies to the cost of the war. That bone of contention has wisely been relegated without any kind of bargain to the people of the Colonies themselves. And the Colonies on their part are sensible of their responsibilities. It is little enough that they are able to do at present. But at least they have shown unanimous determination to admit from the outset the principle of reciprocal obligation. The Customs Conference of 1903, for instance, adopted without dissent a resolution in favour of preferential treatment for the Mother Country; and this resolution has found effect in the tariff of the five signatory Colonies.

The personal relations between England and South Africa become closer every year. You may find more South Africans in London to-day than ever before, and more visitors from home on the battlefields of Natal. This year a Transvaal team has competed at Bisley, with marked success, and the British Association has sailed *en masse* for Cape Town. Better mutual acquaintance is assured; and that, after all, is the foundation of a better mutual understanding.

THE NATIVE QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

By SIR GODFREY LAGDEN, K.C.M.G.,

THE year 1905 has seen the position of the Native Question in South Africa brought up to date in the recent publication of a Report by an Interterritorial Commission representative of all the Colonies and Protectorates in South Africa.

The terms of reference to the Commission were wide and comprehensive. The Report itself was exhaustive in general, and, if conclusions were not in all cases finally drawn, the reason may be attributed, not so much to the lack of initiative on the part of the Commission itself, as to the complexity of the question, the divergence of views and conditions in the various Colonies, and the impracticability of urging changes and reforms suitable in one sphere, but manifestly impossible for constitutional reasons in others. The appointment of the Commission was inspired by the desire to marshal facts, to ascertain the true state of affairs affecting the natives, and to promote a common understanding upon native policy. Though the hope was cherished that advantage would result, it was always apparent that no absolute uniformity could be attained without sacrifice of conviction on vital points, which it was neither reasonable to expect nor expedient to demand. The most optimistic realized that uniformity in laws and administration can only be arrived at by stages

when common interests and the common peace justify it.

The Report is authenticated by documents and maps of an instructive nature, and is supported by official statistics. The public opinion of South Africa is reflected in the evidence of over 300 witnesses, representative of every shade of thought. The Report of the Commission furnishes, therefore, a most useful basis for discussing a subject pregnant with issues upon which public opinion is much divided. It has been criticised, on the whole, with breadth of view by the public and the press, and the magnitude of the question has been fully realized. But there are known to be many serious and experienced thinkers who, in no contentious spirit, dissent from the views of the Commission, some upon the grounds that certain prominent recommendations are illiberal and unworthy, whilst others deem them from the South African aspect to be impolitic and inexpedient.

It is not proposed to traverse this Report in detail, but to deal with salient points which have focussed attention, and are of abiding concern to South Africa, as well as to recognise different views entertained by the public. To discuss the whole group of questions constituting the native problem requires a book instead of a chapter, so that little of a searching nature can be attempted within the space here allotted. To many, the most interesting and attractive side is that which relates to tribal life, the communal system, and the changes in condition which the natives have undergone within the past century.

What is understood as the native problem existing to-day may be divided under a few heads—those which affect aboriginal contact with whites in a country which, formerly inhabited only by aboriginal races, has now been reclaimed by Europeans of higher intellect, with the fixed and determined purpose of permanent occupation and development. When the seashore is reclaimed by civilized enterprise and skilled capacity, it is

drained and converted to use, and all that is noxious is swept away. But in the reclamation of soil inhabited by human beings there can be no wholesale sweeping away. Human life is sacred; it must be preserved, however rudimentary the stage of organization; and, after due tolerance for primitive habits, the duty of the superior race is to aid the inferior in the course of its evolution. That evolution, to be sound and healthy, must, following the dictates of Nature, be of slow growth. Unnatural development of the human species creates the same sort of impression as is formed in the mind of the cultivator at the sight of a spurious and weedy plant—the genus does not commend itself for propagation.

The principal elements of racial contact under the circumstances which excite controversy are to be found in questions arising out of the land formerly enjoyed *in extenso* by the aboriginals, their settlement upon it, and their relations to the superior race. As these issues constitute the matter upon which Colonies and parties will contend in the preliminary effort towards a common understanding prior to federation, it is well to examine more closely some of the features.

A glance at the history of the early condition of the South African aboriginals as a whole reveals them as enjoying large tracts of land upon which they lived in community; that is to say, they were a pastoral people raising their flocks and herds on one commonage, and cultivating scraps of land for food wherever they were immune from the ravages of powerful enemies or marauders. They lived under the rule of chieftainship, had no religion, and were in the true sense of the word savage. The right to hold and enjoy what they possessed was governed only by the power to do so. The ethics of right and wrong were unknown to them. They had no originality.

Their subjection by European races gradually changed this state of things. Conquerors have all the world over claimed the reward of their prowess and sacrifices,

and have imposed restrictions and burdens upon the subdued. So it was that in South Africa the aboriginals, after fighting to their utmost and inflicting as much havoc as they could upon the invader, succumbed to superior intelligence and came under civilized law and order. The result was to revolutionize their mode of living, and to place a limit upon their spheres of tribal occupation.

The effects of civilization and Christianity in course of time made it manifest to the ruling race that, under the influence of control and guidance, the savages were gently emerging from their barbarous state and putting on the garb of intelligence. By easy stages this process has been going on, until at the present day the progress has been deepened by missionary effort into a knowledge of Christian religion, widened by education, and has established itself in a fairly regular form.

But concurrently with the growth of intelligence has followed a growth of population, lately at a great rate, in consequence of the stoppage of internecine warfare and the promotion of healthier conditions of life. This fact has tended to arrest the attention of the civilized race, and set it thinking.

It was not to be expected that the conquering European race, in view of its resolve beneficially to occupy the country, could, as its numbers increased and wants multiplied, continue to be indulgent in setting apart tracts of land for the aboriginals as they multiplied; nor, indeed, could it be deemed of advantage for an inferior race, struggling upwards, to be brought up in the notion that its only means of subsistence must be land: it narrows the vision of hopeful evolution. In any case, for practical reasons the granting of native territories has latterly been punctuated with a large full-stop; for, in effect, there are no more territories to grant in the South African Colonies, and the pause for reflection has to be taken. There is a demand for land according to the old order, and it cannot be met. Of the several alternatives suggested,

there are two of some importance. One is that the aboriginals, who do not and cannot in future subsist on alienated land, should earn their living by other pursuits—should, in fact, be awakened to the knowledge that success in the struggle for existence lies in learning handicrafts and pursuing callings which offer a ready and comfortable return for industry. The other is that they should be enabled to purchase land from Europeans at pleasure, if they can, and live alongside them on equal terms.

It is here that there is a strong conflict of feeling. The opinions of those who hold that, according to the best traditions of the British race, there should be absolute freedom of purchase, and that the fit will always prevail and survive, are entitled to the fullest consideration. But we have to recollect that a European race is dominant in the country, that it is in a large numerical minority, that it has resolved to preserve its ascendancy, and is acutely sensitive of any suggestion of social equality with an inferior race which must takes ages to attain the same degree of intelligence. And it is essential not to overlook the importance to the inferior races of their enjoying the sympathy of their superiors, if they are not to be impeded in their evolution. It is therefore urged with emphasis by a strong section of enlightened opinion, inspired with the best feelings, that it is unwise and inexpedient to countenance and aid aboriginals in doing that which will place them in a position calculated to invite social conflict, such as the freedom to acquire land and occupy it in close proximity to European occupiers would lead to. By such thinkers this method of intermingling is regarded with profound misgivings as being liable, not only to disturb good relations, but to deter European settlement.

The Native Affairs Commission, though not entirely unanimous in respect of this question, passed a clear resolution, recording the opinion that restrictions upon the purchase of land by natives are necessary, and

recommending that purchases in future be limited to areas defined by legislative enactment. The resolution was opposed by an experienced officer, representing the Cape Colony, for weighty reasons recorded, and it was qualified by a reservation of the Natal delegates, to the effect that the determining factors in the ownership of land by natives should be the degree of civilization attained and the abandonment of native law and polygamy.

In the older Colonies, where there is no bar to the free acquisition of land by natives, it is claimed, by those who advocate the justice and utility of the policy, that no evil results are likely to accrue. That opinion is, however, by no means universal even in those Colonies, whilst a large body of evidence in the new Colonies condemns in no uncertain manner any departure from the prohibition to acquire land which their early laws enacted. If the two sides of the argument are weighed, it will be found that there is against it, in the new Colonies particularly, a profoundly antagonistic feeling ready to ripen into agitation and resistance.

Upon this point, therefore, the cleavage in South Africa is marked, and it becomes impossible to lay down for common adoption a policy acceptable to all Colonies. That of absolute freedom of purchase may be right, but it may not be expedient. Between the two schools of thought there is a wide gulf not easy to span. It is a thorny question upon which practice has not had time to yield results positive enough to define as an axiom what course should be followed. If changes were made in respect of some Colonies to bring them into definite line with others, it could only be done at the expense of extreme bitterness and dangerous discontent; and if there is a risk of discord between the European races over the subject, the lesser evil is to let the several Colonies work out their own policy until the time arrives when a common interest draws them into line. There is no royal road to the solution of problems which are parts of a whole, and are best determined

when read and construed in connection with each other. It would be an error to commit Colonies to a land policy they resented, with reasonable anticipation that the path would be strewn with opposition and that the ultimate aim might be wrecked. Moreover, in the contest for supremacy of view, the cause of aboriginal development would suffer from the lack of sustained sympathy and support, which are its main buttresses.

There have not been wanting eager reformers, who have watched the trend of native development and advocated changes for betterment in the form of land tenure. The Cape Colonial Government, under the inspiration of Mr. Rhodes, carried out a scheme under which a certain territory, held under communal tenure, should be converted into individual holdings. Reasonable conditions were imposed, subject to which freehold rights were conferred entitling the individual to the free and permanent use of allotments. The general idea of the scheme was that it would tend to infuse into the freeholders a spirit of self-dependence and enterprise to which communal tenure does not lend itself. Some of the objects aimed at have been gained, but the masses have not displayed enthusiasm enough for the change to justify its extension on any large scale.

There is no space in this paper to treat of all the ramifications of the land questions, which affect each Colony so differently. The advantages and disadvantages of communal or individual tenure, of squatting, vesting in trust, etc., are fully argued in the report of the Commission. They are all matters of supreme importance to the different Colonies, and are engaging attention. What is clear is that there is complete disillusionment of the idea that land will any longer be meted out for tribal occupation under the old system of free grants. That is the universal opinion of the South African Colonies, and is the kernel of the question, signifying as it does a sweeping change in the entire land system. It is the parting of the ways. What has been granted or pledged

in good faith cannot be withdrawn during good behaviour. But the limit is reached.

Whether, then, in respect of land, or other points where racial impact is concerned, the rational policy in its initial stage is to facilitate the development of aboriginals on lines which do not merge too closely into European life, lest it lead to active enmity and stem the tide of healthy progress. Their advance cannot be stayed, but must be conducted under civilized guidance.

The chief factors that come into operation in the assisted evolution of aboriginals are just and firm treatment conducive to natural and healthy growth, educational help designed to fertilize that growth, and the establishment of auditories for the expression of grievances, and the generation of ideas upon which the superior race can base its policy for promoting welfare and encouraging improvement. If these factors are to be properly and usefully employed as a means to an end, success can only be achieved by the continued maintenance between the two races of mutual confidence and sympathy. Anything partaking of reluctance, through fear of consequences on the part of the superior race to lend itself to the elevation of the inferior, must tend to disturb the process and defeat the purpose. Precisely as children fear and dislike their teachers whilst under necessary discipline, so the aboriginal races must be expected to cherish the same emotions whilst under tutelage. It is manifested by them in various forms, such as in subtle ebullitions of violence or in sullenness. It is a phase of education, and not unnatural in the sequence of cause and effect. It is emphatically necessary to avoid, as far as possible, any course calculated to produce social antipathy between the races, and to shun ill-timed philanthropy, which is fruitful of trouble and saps the foundations of safe and sure progress.

From the early condition of the aboriginals, outlined in a previous page, to their present status is a considerable step. Under paternal Government and civilized guidance they have increased rapidly in numbers,

and are living under prosperous circumstances. They enjoy common rights of justice and protection. They are the particular care of magistrates and other officers specially appointed. Education, religion, employment, and regular wages are available to them in most parts, and it is only a question of a short time before, in every Colony, they will have equal opportunities for improvement.

It is not necessary to draw comparisons as to whether their advancement was promoted more or less under the British or Dutch administrations. The rate of desirable progress is a contentious point, many holding, for sound reasons, that progress in order to be steady cannot be too slow—so slow, indeed, that those who watch it can scarcely trace it. It is a commonplace that the harvest of missionary labour is seldom gleaned earlier than a generation after the workers have passed away.

The fact remains that great strides have been made, especially in the Cape Colony, and that the aboriginals, as a whole, to-day may claim to have risen considerably in intellectual capacity and attained to a certain degree of civilization. They wear European clothes, cultivate with European implements, consume European goods, and many tens of thousands have passed through the elementary stages of education. Some have attained to standards of excellence, and shown themselves capable of studying with profit the learned professions. It is true that agitations have occasionally been directed against the tendency to keep the masses back. Such agitations have been useful, and have generally been fomented by those who are possessed of exceptional ability to think and express their ideas. Whilst recognising the merit of such individuals, and appreciating the motives which stir them on behalf of their kinsmen, it must be remembered that the great bulk of the communities in the civilized world are not highly educated or endowed with genius, but only with a modicum of plain common-sense sufficient to qualify

them for competition in the struggle for place. Examinations and other tests which they undergo are not framed in the expectation of finding unusual capacity in any ranks. Mediocrity is the rule; the national edifice is based upon it, and the law and constitution are drawn in suitable perspective. There is no disposition amongst the Western nations to regulate legislation for brilliant scholars, but rather for the common mass of ordinary intelligence. Similarly, the great bulk of aboriginals who are now gaining a modicum of intelligence require laws and government in form appropriate to the standard at which they have arrived in bulk, and not according to the standard of those who have proved themselves exceptions. We have rightly assumed the position of guardians over the native races, and must act up to it. They cannot develop without the aid of the white race. Class legislation was, and is, necessary for their due protection. Because a few have advanced at an amazing rate, and require help and encouragement, it were neither kind nor politic to give the masses, who are far behind, a status they are not fitted for.

The relations between the two races are, as before said, determinable according to the sympathy and confidence existing between them. An idea of the acute anxiety about these relations may be gathered from the Treaty of Peace which formed the closing incident to the late war. In that document it was stipulated that no political rights should be granted to natives prior to introduction of responsible government in the new Colonies. The meaning of this was unmistakable. It meant, in plain language, that the Dutch settlers, in addition to their repugnance to admit any equality between the white and black races, feared being outvoted. In this fear the Dutch were not singular, for it is shared by the greater portion of British settlers in South Africa.

It is of primary importance to bear in mind—

That the native population is between four and five times as large as the European.

That the natives are advancing under guidance and help, which it is essential not to check.

That the franchise qualification is low, and may soon come within their reach.

That the European race has resolved, for reasons not necessary to recapitulate, to maintain its ascendancy in, and to occupy, South Africa.

As pointed out in the Commission Report, after exhaustive inquiry, the present number of native voters who have attained the qualification in certain Colonies is the merest fringe of the impending mass, and in view of this fact the full magnitude and gravity of the question may be apprehended.

It is idle to ignore that fact, unless there is to be an entire revolution of thought in favour of granting full political rights to all who can qualify—an argument, indeed, which appeals strongly to many in England, and to a few in South Africa, who hold the conviction that it should be followed because it is humanly right. In support of the conviction, an utterance of a great statesman, Mr. Rhodes, has been freely quoted, in which he advocated equal political rights for all civilized people. But Mr. Rhodes considered consequences and was the exponent of South African Colonies when he often expressed the opinion that class legislation, Pass Laws, and Peace Preservation Acts, were essential, and that natives should be regarded as a subject race so long as they continued in a state of barbarism. He did not define what constituted a state of barbarism, nor propound any scheme for the treatment of those who emerged from it in solitary numbers. That he left until solid changes in the mass in the sense of their proved intellectual capacity should be visible, and his successors felt impelled from right motives, and in the fitness of time, to adjust legislation accordingly.

Of the forces which have operated powerfully to stiffen resistance to the granting of equal political rights, the most pronounced, apart from the sentiment so strongly felt, are the belief that natives are not yet

mentally or morally fit to have a vote in the affairs of white people, and the conviction that extension of the privilege would eventually lead to organizations upon race lines after a period during which the aboriginal voters might first serve as a prey to parties and party politics, and then by sheer numbers secure the balance of political power. The prospect of such a situation is construed as intolerable by European South Africa, and, so long as that prospect is in view, the education, the advance, and general interests of the natives suffer prejudice.

Of the alternatives suggested, a certain class inclines to the imposition of a higher franchise. But that could only be a temporary shift, to be brushed away abruptly.

To the Commission, as appears from the Report, the question appealed as one of great moment, demanding resolute treatment. The solution it offered took the form of a recommendation to institute in each of the self-governing Colonies, whether they enjoyed any existing form of representation or not, a uniform system providing for separate voting, by native electors only, for a fixed and adequate number of representative members. By such a system it was, *inter alia*, contended that as a result the natives throughout South Africa would gain a uniform political status; racial strife would be minimized, if not averted; questions affecting their betterment would be freed from considerations of consequent increase in their political power, and from resulting hostility to measures conducive to their progress. It was felt that this could be done without menace to the supremacy of the ruling race.

The proposals of the Commission have been challenged by South Africans of influence, who, with a full desire to do justice to the natives and further their interests in every way, are impressed with the conviction that the cause cannot be usefully served—may, indeed, be frustrated—by giving them direct representation in any form in the elected assemblies. The case of India is cited as an example where the necessity of retaining

absolute political power is held to be paramount. The exponents of this view cling to the belief that even limited representation of the character recommended would place native voters at the mercy of intriguers, would give them an entirely erroneous conception of their political power, and lead up to a state of affairs which might culminate in rupture. It is further argued that the government of the natives entails heavy expenditure, provided largely from European taxation; that they enjoy full protection and immunity from tribal warfare without partaking of the cares or sharing proportionately the fiscal burdens which fall upon the white people. It is said, finally, that the native is separated from the white man by a gulf, not of colour or education, but of radical mental dissimilarity, and that to give him the franchise is logically as well as politically indefensible.

As a means of assuring true representation, it has been suggested by this school of thought that in each Colony Councils should be established, composed of influential and representative natives nominated by the Imperial Government, and presided over by an official of high position; that those Councils should be empowered to discuss all questions of moment to the native communities, and their conclusions or suggestions submitted to the Legislative Assemblies. This school is, on the whole, while resolutely opposed to a native franchise, in favour of native land tenure in reserved areas, believing, with Mr. Rhodes, that the possibility of acquiring land is the surest stimulus to outside labour. These views are worthy of all attention, since they are held by some of the most politic and broad-minded of South African Imperialists.

All parties and schools of thought recognise the importance of providing that the natives, who are admittedly improving, and are taxpayers and economic factors in the general polity, be heard in a fitting manner, so that their grievances may not lack expression, nor their interests suffer in consequence. It is abundantly

clear, however, that no scheme of representation offered as a solution to this problem will be acceptable to Federated South Africa unless it be limited in character, as recommended by the Commission, or assume some similar form, of which the central idea is limitation.

The mainspring of controversy is centred in questions affecting land and representation. Upon the method of handling them depends more than upon all other questions the future prosperity of the natives, and the common understanding which will enable a Federated South Africa to foster it. The matter of native education is also highly important, underlying as it does the whole structure of development; yet it is subject to the willingness and desire of the governing race to promote it. All are agreed that the character and extent of aboriginal teaching should be such as to afford opportunities for the natives to acquire that amount of elementary knowledge which will benefit them in the walks of life for which in their present state they are fitted. There the matter is hung up, and meanwhile harm arises through the propagation of misleading ideas every day that natives are driven to America to seek from the negroes there the higher education not obtainable in South Africa.

Discussion upon the whole subject would not be complete without some inquiry respecting the true aspirations of the natives themselves as expressed through their leaders. Their leaders are of two kinds—tribal leaders, comprising chiefs and councillors, and men of education who have either become teachers or mission workers, or who have drifted away from the tribe to become newspaper editors or carry on some skilled profession at which they have become expert. The chiefs and councillors are generally astute and intelligent men who may be classed as agriculturists. They are soundly acquainted with tribal affairs, and as a rule are wedded to the old communal system, which they show no desire to change. They are not inclined to express ideas, limiting

themselves to requests for more land and education, and, in response to questions, almost invariably insisting that they are content to leave their affairs confidently in the hands of Government.

The educated leaders, on the other hand, converse freely, their views as a rule taking the shape most favourable to the small class in which their education has placed them. They advocate an open franchise for all, free and compulsory education, abolition of the tribal system, which is regarded as retrogressive, and, generally speaking, their aim is equality with the white race. They cannot be said to represent the masses whose ranks they have left. They stand in a grade by themselves, needing all the help and encouragement possible to enable them to live up to the standard they have reached. They are the object of most undeserving attacks from many who dislike to see a native cleanly and well attired, and are compelled to a persistent struggle to maintain the respectable position they have made for themselves and are entitled to.

Their loudest and most emphatic complaints are directed against the restrictions imposed upon their fellows of similar standing everywhere, except in the Cape Colony, where they experience singular privileges, such as the franchise and absolute freedom to purchase and occupy land. These complaints are not unnatural, and are the outpourings of men who have been roused to mental culture and better habits.

Regarded from a general standpoint, the mass of South African natives can only be described as still far backward. They have, it is true, come on a little in late years as education has spread, and they have acquired tastes which necessitated their going out to labour under European direction. Contact with civilization has given them new ideas, which are gradually finding their way into kraal life. The same contact has brought them into touch with the lower order of Europeans, and led to the acquisition of refined vices. Regrettable though this be, it was inseparable from the

situation. The native is the unit of work in South Africa. His increasing wants are beginning to make him realize that he must labour to gratify them. As time goes on, population increases, and the thirst for land to cultivate is no longer so keenly felt, they may be expected to become continuously industrious workmen, looking upon their land as mere gardens to supplement the comforts of living. To compel them by legislation to work would be a fatal error. The aim of all who would like to see the native races industriously inclined, so as to avoid the necessity of imported labour, may be best reached, as pointed out so forcibly in the Report of the Commission, by the encouragement of a higher standard of living amongst natives, with a view to increase their efficiency and wants.

The natives have much to learn in adapting themselves to new and changing conditions, and will be well advised to let the current of their thoughts and their attitude be directed in that course which will win the respect of the European race. No weightier counsel can be tendered to them than that offered by the eminent American negro leader, Booker T. Washington, who, in closing his presidential address to the National Negro Business League recently in New York, used the following words:

'Our progress must be permanent, and not artificial, and it must be by natural and logical steps. We must pay the price for everything we get. The day has passed when the great body of the American people will give serious heed to high-sounding resolutions or loud demands. The most potent demand that we can make for fair and just consideration is actual achievement in the locality in which we live.'

The question of what is termed 'the coloured people' is a problem of itself much too intricate to touch upon in any perfunctory way. They are the descendants of white people, and are fast taking up a position which, if it does not beget sympathy, will command respect. Their friends advocate that they should be treated as Europeans.

They have advanced rapidly in the scale of civilization, and have practically shaken themselves free of all tribal associations. They have as a body performed good and faithful service to the Crown during periods of war and uneasiness, and are characteristically law-abiding. Allusion is here made to the subject because the Native Affairs Commission considered it well to suggest a definition of the word 'native,' which has a different meaning in every Colony. The object was clear. If persons of off-colour were to be given in perpetuity the status of white people, a deplorable incitement would be given to open prostitution between the races in order to gain the status. For that reason the Commission held that a moment would come when the State should declare that the product of an aboriginal woman should henceforth take the status of its mother.

In closing this paper, which only purports to cover a small portion of the area open to discussion, it may be recapitulated that the great abiding question of all is the cultivation of good relations between the white and black races, in which sympathy is an essential factor. The great issue before the Europeans in South Africa, in so far as matters relating to the natives are concerned, is to aim at mutual understanding on a basis satisfactory to the white population, yet not inimical to the rights and interests of the aboriginals.

The task is a great one involving much give and take. No precedent is available, because no such conditions have prevailed in any other country. The federation of the Australian Commonwealth and the Canadian Dominion were, however, not accomplished without sacrifice and compromise, problems being overcome of equal weight, though dissimilar in feature. Meanwhile the fullest and most temperate-minded discussion is of the highest importance.

The whole course of discussion will be clogged by the tendency to be governed by feelings rather than reason. This tendency can only be moderated by patience and the determination to fend off the clamour

for heroic measures and hasty results. The consequences of all legislation require to be considered, and as far as possible calculated.

The State has its duty to the natives as well as to the Europeans, and that duty is, not to extend to either race treatment too harsh or too kindly, but to give to both sane and adequate administration.

LAND SETTLEMENT AND COLONIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

By COLONEL OWEN THOMAS

Of all the Imperial problems in process of evolution—for solution cannot be named in this connection, since finality in Empire-building synchronizes with an era of deterioration—none can be reckoned of greater moment than that redistribution of population within the nation to which is given the name of settlement or colonization.

The subject is so large that it would, of course, be impossible to attempt to cover in one article both general principle and particular application. Nevertheless, before proceeding to consider in detail the question of settlement in South Africa, a few introductory words on the theory of colonization seem both reasonable and desirable.

At the outset I would like to say that the colonization of British territory by British citizens has no right to be regarded as emigration, and until this elementary comprehension of the relations existing between component parts of the Empire is mastered by the various redistributory agencies now at work in this country, the Imperial standpoint must be largely missed.

The emigrant breaks with his past, closes the volume of his British birth, with all of pride, honour, and love that it includes, and puts it from him altogether, or retains it only as the goal which he may hope to attain again for the comfort of his declining years. The emigrant, in a word, if he be a man of ordinary patriotism and good feeling, is to be pitied.

With the colonist it is quite otherwise. His national traditions unaltered, and his national affections unshaken, he goes forward, building his future on his past, changing the outward circumstances indeed, but only as normally happens to every man in the course of progression from the nursery, through kindergarten, school-days, and University or apprentice life, to the occupation of manhood. Migration from one part of the Empire to another should involve no greater uprooting, no further loss of English sentiment to a colonist, than the transference of residence from London to, say, the depth of a Hertfordshire village. In either case the principles of national tradition, feeling, and policy remain unaffected; in either case the outward surroundings and daily happenings of life would be immensely altered. When, from our overcrowded industrial centres, efforts are made to transfer fit persons to Canada, to Australia, to South Africa, it is fundamentally a mistake to call such movement 'emigration.' It ought to be considered not emigration—a 'going out of' the country—but rather a home-flitting to another part of the same land, where opportunities of labour are greater, the surroundings better adapted to the rearing of a healthy family, and the chance of serving the Empire a hundredfold increased. The average Englishman, especially of the less-educated class, is too apt to assume that patriotism means soldiering and naval service only. It is, indeed, obviously true that every citizen of the Empire should be so trained to the use of arms and to the meaning of strict discipline as to be capable of efficient service either on sea or land in time of need; but that in no way affects the indisputable fact that he who devotes his life to the development of the Empire as a successful colonist is not less a patriot than he who accepts death in the national defence. To belittle the devotion of the soldier is ingratitude and inappreciation beyond contempt; to underrate the Imperial service involved in colonization indicates lack of intelligence amounting to childishness.

In these days of strenuous living and severe international competition we cannot afford to remain children.

To many who read these lines the above remarks may seem like the babbling of truisms. But I have made them as a protest against the attitude assumed towards colonization by so large a majority—that it is only a last resource, a sacrifice of all that is dear on the altar of fast money-making, a veritable 'emigration' from all the comforts of civilization into the outer darkness of an alien wilderness. This is not the spirit in which to knit closely the family relation, not the way to teach English children to merge that narrower title in the more glorious name of Britons. It is idle to talk of 'Mother and Daughter Lands' so long as we persist in regarding the Colonies on the same footing as the foreign countries to which alone men of our race may 'emigrate.' If it is such an alarming and melancholy thing to move from Stepney to Rhodesia, from West Ham to Manitoba, then the sooner we give the relationship its true name, and call the Colonies England's step-children, the quicker we shall arrive at actual conditions.

We want to start, or at least very greatly to strengthen, the notion of colonization on its Imperial, as apart from its individual practical, side; to treat it as a change of homes; to bring before every man, woman, and child who migrates from England to other parts of the Empire that he is, indeed, moving within the family; that he is a living, and therefore a most powerful, factor in the continual renewing of the ties sometimes fretted by the strain of mere space distance; that upon him, in the aggregate, and not on statesmen, soldiers, or sailors, falls the responsibility of Empire. As he fulfils his service, so will the Empire grow in virility, or slip gradually into a congeries of nations, whose people will cry, 'I am of Canada,' 'I of South Africa,' 'I of England,' as the case may be, and none will be found to make answer, 'We are all of Britain.'

But though this Imperial aspect of land settlement, often somewhat overlooked, should form the foundation of all colonization schemes, nations are made up of individuals; the good of the whole includes the good of the units, and a building does not consist of foundations. Therefore the whole subject is one which requires the closest attention to every detail, both in respect of the selection and training of proposed colonists, in the preparation of the new home, and the consideration of those particular social and industrial conditions which differentiate one locality from another.

Thus, for example, the land settlement of South Africa cannot proceed on precisely the same lines as those laid down for Westralia, though perhaps superficially there may be resemblances between the two countries. Recent history has brought South Africa very vividly before the eyes of English people, and it might, therefore, very well seem as though, of all parts of the Empire, the sub-continent would, now that peace is re-established, be the particular spot towards which colonization should naturally flow. This supposition is the more natural in that, for political reasons, British population is peculiarly to be desired. The land settlement of South Africa may therefore be said at the present time to interest all Britons perhaps more than any other individual Imperial scheme. Let us see, then, what are the conditions.

It is, of course, true that, roughly speaking, the general features of South African colonization resemble each other in all the five States of which that area is composed, but it is none the less a fact that, when it comes to practice, each Colony must be taken separately.

Natal.

The Garden Colony covers some 36,000 square miles, and, as its title implies, includes much rich and well-watered territory, and a delightful climate. The fertility of the soil, in comparison with the bulk of the neigh-

bouring States, is largely attributable to the Drakensberg Mountains, which act both as a watershed and as a dispersing agent to the breeze-carried moisture of the ocean, of which the benefits would be largely lost but for this natural barrier to its further progress inland. Pasturage is excellent and extensive in many parts, especially on the north and on the western boundaries, the high veld being particularly suitable for horses and cattle. The arable land not only bears mealies and good wheat, but also, in parts, sorghum, tobacco, tea, sugar, and fruit.

Now, when it is taken into consideration, along with the above facts, that Natal is in the agricultural and pastoral districts very thinly populated, and that the bulk of the white people are English, it would seem as though this were an ideal Colony for settlers from the Motherland; and so in a sense it might be. But, owing to unwise legislation and slack supervision, the best of the country land has been allowed to fall into Kaffir hands, and a vested right thus established, which the Colonial Government could only get over by compulsory sales, and that would mean trouble with the natives. By doing a very limited amount of stock-raising on their own account, these Kaffir proprietors are independent of whites, and being disproportionately undertaxed, they are fully satisfied with a lazy life. Thus the capacities of the finest areas of arable and pastoral country have never been tested. Leaving aside this first-quality land in native hands, the western frontier, Biggarsberg, and Ladysmith districts in Dutch possession, and the smaller area owned by British-born Natalians, there remains about 7,000,000 acres of Government-owned country. A considerable portion of this land ought to be available for white settlement, but the price asked is usually too high; that offered on perpetual lease by the Land Company is charged something like four times too much for the advantages offered. For this reason, coupled with the shortage and expense of labour—Natal Kaffirs are the most unwilling

and incapable in the sub-continent—the Garden Colony does not lend itself to any extensive settlement schemes, such as could be financed and directed from England. The colonist stands to gain more in Rhodesia, for example, than in Natal, and so long as that is the case, all the chances in fruit and sugar which here offer, so to speak, from Nature itself, will not attract men who seek to do the best for themselves and their families.

It is worth noting, though, how extremely well one settlement in Natal turned out. Unfortunately, these immigrant farmers were not British, and foreigners can live in circumstances which do not commend themselves to English people. Economy was, however, in this case its own reward. Every penny gained in sale of produce was re-expended in the land—increasing its extent, fertilizing and renewing the soil, until many of the individual farmers started on their own, to become rich and prosperous agriculturists. The children of these German settlers have risen to be among the most influential men in Natal, and they are all loyal to the British Crown. When similar settlements have been attempted by English farmers they have usually proved abortive, because men have drifted away into town and commercial life, where money may, with luck, be more quickly made.

Individual settlers selecting Natal for their South African venture would be well advised to take up sugar cultivation, should their farm be within the sugar zone; while fruit farming is of excellent promise in almost every part. Bananas, pine-apples, and oranges can be grown in abundance, with comparatively little trouble, and a market exists in the neighbouring towns—especially of the Transvaal—while the export trade could be very readily built up, given more skilful packing and lower freights. The recent discovery in California of the remunerative by-industry connected with orange cultivation ought to give some impetus to the development of orange farming. Of every crop, a considerable proportion is generally waste from one

cause or another; but henceforth the enterprising can turn this residue to account for fuel purposes. The peel of the orange contains a highly inflammable oil, by reason of which the fruit when washed, dried, and thoroughly baked, becomes an aromatic and easily kindled fire-lighter, entirely taking the place of wood. When recent experiments have been further developed, it is even hoped that orange fuel may supersede coal where the latter commodity is costly or difficult to obtain.

The best pastoral, like the best arable, land is already gone; but there are good areas capable of supporting all kinds of stock, including horses, and the cattle diseases, so prevalent in South Africa, are under better control than in any of the other four colonies, while the Government Veterinary Department is specially well directed and fully staffed. The large number of native land- and stock-owning neighbours with whom a white settler in any of the best districts would find himself surrounded must be accounted a serious drawback to colonization, for Kaffir morality is not of the most dependable and altruistic description, and in a land of few fences losses may arise in such circumstances which cannot very readily find correction.

Notwithstanding this, however, Natal is for English colonization preferable to

The Cape Colony.

This large area includes very great varieties of land that might in favourable circumstances be suitable for English settlers. But here, again, the best agricultural, and much of the best pastoral, country is already occupied by the Dutch, who are far stronger than in Natal. Native occupation (outside of the assigned territories and locations) is not nearly so much in evidence as in the Garden Colony, and would not greatly interfere with new colonists, though the tendency to leave the land to Kaffirs in the eastern districts and live on the rents is a very regrettable

feature in the life of many old white residents. To allow natives to farm land once in white occupation and under modern tillage is distinctly to put the clock back. But for the new colonist this problem is not pressing. The absolutely best pasturage—that of the midlands—is fully occupied by the wool and mohair farmers of Dutch extraction, for the most part prosperous and successful men. Skilled sheep-farmers, accustomed to preparing wool for the market, might find an opening on the Karoo, and in time pull up the South African wool trade by grading and classifying their produce so that it reaches the London market in equally good condition with the Australian article. Australian wool is no better than African, but it arrives in London properly sorted, and thus commands ready sale at reasonable prices.

Apart from the price of land, the want of water is a very serious drawback to the Karoo settler—the more so that here, in common with most of the Cape Colony, large farms are essential even for small flocks, because the absence of water necessitates the provision of far more pasturage than would be required were it possible to irrigate the thirsty soil.

In the western districts, where arable land may still be had for cereal cultivation, settlement on any considerable scale is out of the question owing to the price asked for land. By reason of inferior farming methods the soil is partially exhausted, and therefore of far less value than virgin soil in Rhodesia and the fertile valleys of Natal, to mention but two alternatives; but the price is considerably higher, and has increased synchronously with the fall in actual value.

In certain parts of Cape Colony land may be obtained for fruit farming which ought to yield a profitable harvest for the capital expended in purchase. It must, however, be clearly premised that at the rates demanded only fruit cultivation, for which the soil is admirably suited, will pay. The uncertain returns on stock and cereal farming, the droughts and animal pests, make

the price of these areas, not being the best land for such purposes, undesirable for ordinary crops or stock.

Three hundred pounds in the fruit district would give a skilful, hard-working fruit farmer a good start, with prospects of sound ultimate profits, and from the Imperial standpoint it would be difficult to overrate the advantages in the direction of political stability and progress which would accrue to the Colony by an increase in the English settlement of the agricultural districts, which are largely swayed by Dutch influence and tradition of a particularly retrograde and pernicious order. Apart from this consideration, and neglecting also the question of where the best opening occurs, English settlers will naturally gravitate towards the eastern districts, where they would find themselves among their own kin, the centre of a loyal British community, descendants of the 1820 settlers. Many excellent farms are available in this area, suitable to the mixed, unspecialized farming in which English agriculturists are most experienced and successful. Capital is, however, very necessary, for matured land in these parts fetches a high price; the best, indeed, as much as £5 per acre. It is true that veldt may also be had at no more than 5s. per acre; but the cultivation of such land is risky, and attended by heart-breaking discouragements. To sum up, there are settlement areas in Cape Colony of every variety, from first-rate to almost barren, but the price is relatively high, irrigation doubtful, and labour, though more plentiful than in Natal, a difficulty. It is undeniable that practically all the advantages (except English neighbours) can be attained elsewhere on much cheaper land, and that therefore it is difficult to contemplate colonization on any large scale.

Transvaal.

Coming now to the new Colonies, it was but natural that the great stretch of territory which we call the Transvaal should have been expected to form an excel-

lent settlement for British population in process of redistribution. The obvious sequence to Vereeniging lay, it was supposed, in the introduction of a genuine stiffening of loyal Britons, a population that in the next generation might be so settled in the new home as to have become a part of the essential life of the country, and a protection against any possible recrudescence of Boer discontent. This dream does not, up to the present, show any signs of realization; and even if it be admitted that much blundering occurred over the attempts at colonization actually made, it should be frankly admitted that the failure was largely inevitable from causes inherent in the situation.

The Transvaal includes a very varied assortment of soils, climates, and agricultural possibilities. Now, whatever may be said of the old Boers, they certainly and admittedly were excellent judges of land; accordingly, when first the Voertrekkers scattered over the untilled Transvaal, they marked out at once the best districts, both agricultural and pastoral, and settled on them, so that to-day there is hardly an acre of really first-class value left for new colonists. If the high veldt and the industrial area be placed out of court, there remains the far less healthy middle and low veldt, where animal diseases play havoc with the stock during many months of the year. Yet this land is better adapted for the pastoralist than for the agriculturist. Cereal farming is quite possible, and may even yield from time to time a good harvest, though the violent storms, locusts, rust, and early frosts militate against the occurrence being frequent. But the cost of bringing the produce to market is so great, that to compete with the imported article means selling at a price which leaves little margin of profit even on a good harvest. Moreover, in the cereal districts the price of land is too high.

The Zoutpansberg district is practically Government land, and considerable opening does here offer for the English settler, especially if a railway be built from

Pietersburg to tap this country. Until such connection is made, agricultural ventures present a good deal of risk, as already explained, but stock might be advantageously reared in this neighbourhood. The subtropical area in the Transvaal gives promise of opening for the specialist farmer. The districts round Rustenburg and Marico have already gained some reputation as tobacco centres; but here, as everywhere, the price of land is unduly inflated. The reason is, of course, not difficult to understand. So long as the mineral rights of a property are not separated from the surface rights, land is not sold at its agricultural or face value, but according to some fancy standard which covers the possibility of a mineral deposit being discovered thereon. This arrangement is intrinsically wrong; it reduces all colonization schemes to the level of a gamble in land, and it defeats its own ends. If a given area be auriferous, it has manifestly a considerable value to the miner and speculator, but none to the farmer, who buys with the object of cultivating or of stock-raising, and therefore, if he knew the property to be valuable mineralogically, he would prefer another area. On the other hand, if the said property carry no mineral, why should an unfortunate be compelled to pay an enhanced price for his farm? The solution may be found in the retention of all mineral rights by the Government or vending land company, while the farm itself is sold at its value as a productive area. Possibilities of advantageous settlement of English farmers would readily emerge were this initial error corrected, and the land priced at the same rate as like territory in Rhodesia.

Orangia.

The Orange River Colony—granary of South Africa—seems at first blush an ideal settlement area, because farming there undoubtedly approximates more closely to English conditions and methods than elsewhere on the sub-continent. But the Dutch farmers of Orangia

form the pick of the Boer race, and therefore every farm of value has long been under cultivation, the agricultural land that remains for incoming settlers being either (*a*) second-class, (*b*) exhausted, and only unoccupied for that very reason. Moreover, land values are greatly enhanced since the war. Properties which six years ago could be purchased at 10s. the morgen, and cultivated, even at that rate, at practically no profit, are now only to be purchased at five times that price, which it requires no expert to explain could only mean cultivation at a dead loss.

The chief pastoral district to the north-east of the Colony is in every way suitable to the industry, but the prevalence of cattle disease, which can only be stamped out by the combined action of the various State Governments, makes stock-rearing to-day a risky business. If, however, the advice of the veterinary staff is accepted, and all the diseased stock slaughtered, the infected areas cleansed by the exclusion of cattle for fifteen months (the utmost limit of possible infection), and the system of fencing improved, Orangia will presently offer a suitable colonization area for the British settler.

Horse-rearing will, however, prove the most profitable undertaking for the farmer who is not an agriculturist, for there is great promise for the future in this stock. The Imperial Government, anxious to rear within the Empire all its own army beasts, offers encouragement to the breeder; and if a sufficient number of horses could be certainly relied upon annually, this encouragement will very properly take more definite and satisfactory shape. There can be no question that in cavalry, artillery, and service horses generally, our Empire, with its magnificent areas for breeding, should be entirely self-supporting. If war, unhappily, overtake this country again in the future, there need be no repetition of the Austrian remount scandals, of the enormous Argentine shipments; and it is the business of the British settler in breeding districts to think and act imperially upon this issue. Happily, there is little

likelihood of his failing to do so, once the point is put before him plainly.

Land settlement in Orangia has been fairly successful, and at the present time several organizations are at work, of which the most noteworthy are the Imperial South African Association, the Duke of Westminster's scheme, and Lord Lovat's Colony. But an intending settler cannot do with a very small capital; for such colonists co-operation amounts to a necessity. If several small capitalists clubbed together, so as to provide a working capital, an excellent start might be made on one farm, each man devoting himself to some special branch, and the stock including horses, merino sheep, pigs, poultry, turkeys, and, if they can be protected from contact with other herds, cattle. Food for the animals and natives employed would be grown, of course, even if no other agriculture were attempted.

Rhodesia.

But there can be no question that of all South Africa the Colony for the British settler is Rhodesia. Not only is land infinitely cheaper, but the area suitable for colonization is very considerable, and there is no Dutch element in the political sense to rub up racial sentiment.

Stock-rearing, specialized cropping, and ordinary agriculture are all feasible severally or in combination. The agricultural country within touch with the railway extends every year, so that twenty or thirty years hence every considerable area may expect to be reached.

Rhodesia is for the most part well watered and fertile, and having come into the hands of the Chartered Company practically unoccupied, the objection noted in the other four Colonies, of the previous occupation of the pick of the land, is here non-existent. Large blocks of country, in fact, actually await and cry out for settlement. Most of this land is in the hands of the Administration, but various Rhodesian Land Companies own much property.

At the outset only two classes of settlers can be regarded as really suitable—*i.e.*:

(*a*) Stock-farmers, including in the term dairy, pigs, and poultry;
(*b*) Small cultivators of specialized crops.

To both classes must be added the further limitation —a capital not less than £400 to £1,000.

Cereal farming, though the land admits of it, would not be profitable for the settler, because the local market is too small to make it worth while, and until freight is enormously reduced, cultivation for export to the Motherland, though it may one day be profitable, could only be carried on now at a dead loss. Many critics, looking for that fine ideal—an Empire self-supporting in foodstuffs—comment adversely on present discouragement of wheat cultivation in Mashonaland where the conditions are favourable. But, after all, economic laws govern even the supply of food. England will not pay a price above the ruling market-rate for wheat, because the consignment comes from Rhodesia; but at current rates the exporting farmer will lose money, and that arrangement would not be Imperialism, but folly.

Stock-farming is pre-eminently the industry of Matabeleland and the North-East province, and the country is extraordinarily healthy for cattle. But some years ago disease was imported from other Colonies and countries, and during two or three seasons the herds of healthy Rhodesia have been decimated by rinderpest, redwater, or African Coast fever. It is idle to deny that until more effective means are taken to eradicate, and then to protect efficiently against a recurrence of disease, Rhodesian stock-farming must remain risky. The process of clearing off the sick cattle, disinfecting the pasturage they occupied, and fencing the country will be a costly one, whether undertaken in its entirety by the Chartered Company to-day, or by a settlers' Government, responsible only to the Crown, presently; but it will have to be done and then stock-farming will

offer a magnificent opportunity to the British settler in Rhodesia.

Here it may be well to summarize the points to be observed in preparing this State for settlement—points really essential to successful colonization on a large scale:

1. Legislative action to include

   (*a*) Compulsory fencing.
   (*b*) Regulation and inspection of imported cattle.
   (*c*) Scientific inspection and disinfection of railway trucks, and such instruction of the police as would enable them to recognise animal diseases.
   (*d*) A seed and fertilizer Adulteration Act.

2. Departmental action covering compilation of soil maps, and detailed register of lands available for settlement.

Given these beginnings, the establishment of a settlement farm, which, financially supported at the outset by Government or a corporation, would speedily become self-supporting under skilled management, would prove a great aid to new colonists. This farm would include all branches of stock-rearing, and the culture of specialized crops—tobacco, cotton, rubber.

There is no doubt whatever that, taken as a whole, the pasturage of Rhodesia is superior to that of any other part of South Africa, and the Chartered Company does good service in supplying stock to settlers on advantageous terms. Allusion has been already made to the tick pest by which African Coast fever is spread. Investigations up to the present time have established that a tick does carry infection for six months after it has dropped from a sick beast, and cannot carry it beyond fifteen months. By working backwards and forwards from those two limits, the exact period of contagion—if the term be permissible in default of a better—will no doubt presently be authoritatively settled. The period of incubation of the fever is no less than thirteen

days These two facts together at once explain how enormous areas came to be infected from perhaps a small number of diseased imported cattle. These animals, as they trekked inland from the coast, dropped ticks along the route across which numerous other herds roamed, their owners unconscious of danger, and then in a dozen different localities wide apart the disease broke out. It is true that many districts are still clean, but the stock-farmer in an unfenced country can never be certain that his droves may not happen on a piece of tick-infected veldt, over which, perhaps, months before, a few sick cattle passed. The mischief, once compassed, is irremediable.

But this trouble, great as it is to-day, is not permanent; fencing and disinfection will follow the slaughter of the diseased cattle, and then there will be few countries in the world where the stock-breeder will have a better chance than in Rhodesia. Not only cattle, but donkeys, sheep, mules, goats, pigs, and poultry may all be farmed at a minimum of cost, so prolific is the fertile land of suitable pasturage and vegetable food.

For the small cultivator of specialized crops the outlook is equally bright—Mashonaland and the North-West afford him no less opportunity than Matabeleland provides for the stockman. Tobacco of excellent quality may be grown in many parts, and for this commodity, when the whole South African market is supplied, there remains an unlimited field in exportation. During the present season some 2,000 acres are under this cultivation, which represents, roughly, 2,000,000 pounds of tobacco. The last harvest at Enkledoorn realized £125 per acre (selling at wholesale price), and as the outlay per acre of tobacco averages, roughly, £14, it will be seen that, even at much lower returns than the above rather exceptional crop, the profit is very considerable. Tobacco, however, needs a certain amount of specialized knowledge on the part of the cultivator, both as to selection of plants, preparation of the ground, and harvesting. Above all, it is essential that the most

modern and scientific methods of drying and curing the leaf be acquired by the settler who proposes to make of his industry a good thing for himself and the country. Cooperation must here, again, come into play, for the provision of necessary plant would entail very heavy outlay on the individual if he had to bear it alone. Moreover, no new settler is likely to cultivate on a sufficiently large scale to make effective sole use of such plant, even if he were able to provide it. A settlers' Government might very profitably to itself establish public tobacco factories, to which growers would resort; and this possibility goes still further in recommending Rhodesia for Imperial land settlement.

Cotton, easily cultivated, and providing by its 'residue' admirable winter forage for stock, would form a specialized crop peculiarly suitable for the pastoralist with some arable land, and the cotton planter would enjoy the further knowledge that his labour, profitable to himself and advantageous to his new Homeland, was also actively sustaining a great British industry, entailing the employment of thousands of his kith and kin in England. The British South Africa Company last year took a step calculated greatly to help the establishment of cotton culture in Rhodesia. Up to mid-December (the latest date for sowing cotton seed in this Colony) the Company supplied to every *bona fide* applicant cotton seed at the rate of 6 pounds to 1 acre, for as large an acreage as the settler was prepared to cultivate in accordance with the directions sent for that purpose. It further promised to purchase any resultant crop at the rate of $\frac{1}{2}$d. per pound, carrying all such cotton free of charge to Salisbury, where it is to be ginned, packed, and despatched to England. The above rate would yield a profit of £1 17s. 6d. per acre.

Other specialized crops, on which there is not here space to dilate, offer equally favourable returns, and there is little doubt that for the Englishman of small capital, unable to prosper in the crowded Homeland, yet properly unwilling to go out from the British family,

Rhodesia offers very exceptional opportunities in these directions. In making for himself a competence, and providing healthful surroundings for his family, the settler has a further satisfaction. He is, at the same time, building up the Empire, stimulating the circulation of Imperial blood, and forming, in the persons of himself and his children, so many fresh ties between the glorious historical past and the yet wider and more glorious future for which his brothers—English, African, Australian, Canadian; but British all—laid down their lives. Those who passed fearlessly into silence, yet speak to-day in this one word of the whole race—'Our Empire.'

EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

By E. B. SARGANT

In the history of South African education the dates which mark the beginning and end of the period under consideration have a special significance. On the conclusion of the first British occupation of the Cape Peninsula in 1803 the Batavian Republic sent out as Commissioner-General a man of remarkable individuality, who endeavoured to put into practice ideas much in advance of his time in all that relates to schools and their organization. Whether regard be had to the training of teachers, the education of girls, local school-rates, or freedom in the matter of religious instruction, De Mist's ordinance aimed at creating completely new school conditions. The Dutch farmers opposed these innovations; the new English administrators of 1806 preferred to leave the new to grow out of the old, rather than to complete an educational reform which perhaps seemed to them to smack too much of French revolutionary ideas. Thus many of De Mist's regulations are only now in course of practical fulfilment. No less important is the date at the end of this period, when, owing to the inclusion of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State within the pale of the King's dominions, modern English conceptions of the duty of the State in regard to education are gradually transforming the school systems of the new Colonies, and are even reacting upon the systems of Cape Colony and Natal. The few years which form

the close of the period 1805-1905 will ever be associated educationally, as in other ways, with Lord Milner's tenure of the office of High Commissioner. Midway between these two dates occurs a third of scarcely less importance. In 1854 representative institutions were granted to Cape Colony, and in the same year Sir George Grey became its Governor. It can scarcely be doubted that the Education Act, which eleven years later established the school system of the Colony on so permanent a basis that no fundamental change was again made until the Act of the present year came into force, was the outcome of representative institutions. But the foundation of the Board of Public Examiners out of which has grown the present University of the Cape of Good Hope, and, again, the great development of industrial and other schools for natives, must be put to the credit of Sir George Grey himself. As head of the State, he provided impartially both for the highest and the lowest type of education in the Colony.

In so brief a survey as this it is useless to attempt to multiply dates. Accordingly, the growth of educational facilities in South Africa will be considered at the beginning, towards the middle, and at the end of the assigned century, and not, in a general way, at intermediate points. Again, for the sake of conciseness, this growth will be described in respect of (1) amount, both as regards quantity and quality; (2) distribution, not only over different areas, but as between European and other classes of society; (3) public control, both central and local, as well as private control. And, last of all, some attempt will be made to trace the growth of educational ideals during their hundred years.

In 1807 the Education Commission, as enlarged under De Mist's ordinance, reported to the new English Government that there were the following schools under its immediate inspection: a Latin school for boys (in which French also was taught) of 7 pupils, a

girls' school of 25 pupils, and 'the common Dutch schools' with a roll of about 800. Only the first two of these were aided financially by the Commission. To the foregoing list must be added the schools which the Dutch Reformed Church was accustomed to open whenever the number of its congregation in any district warranted its building a church, and there were doubtless other private uninspected schools. The medium of instruction was Dutch; nor was any radical change in this respect made until 1822, when English took its place as the official language of the Colony.

In 1859, when the first Superintendent-General of Education retired after twenty years' service, it appears that there were nearly 200 schools under inspection in Cape Colony, with an enrolment of 18,000. To these schools must be added a considerable number in Natal and in the recently created Republic of the Orange Free State; but all, or nearly all, of these ranked as private uninspected schools, since education outside Cape Colony was not yet thoroughly organized. The medium of instruction in the schools of the Republic was chiefly Dutch. No attempt to train teachers locally had been successful up to this time, but the quality of the instruction was gradually raised by the introduction of teachers from Scotland and elsewhere—men whose upbringing in Presbyterian beliefs made them acceptable to the Dutch inhabitants of South Africa.

In 1904 the number of inspected schools in all the British South African States and territories had risen to about 4,000, and the number of scholars to 220,000 or more. With few exceptions the medium of instruction is now English, but the Dutch language occurs as a subject of instruction. Cape Colony, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony make some provision for the training of teachers locally. Teaching of University standard has for many years been provided in the South African College, the Division College at Rondebosch, and the Victorian College at Stellenbosch; but

the quality of the instruction provided in each suffers from there being so many establishments within a comparatively short distance of one another, each with its separate staff of professors, and two of the three supported on denominational and racial lines. The Huguenot College for Women situated at Wellington has more recently offered teaching of a similar character, and it is clear that the Rhodes College at Grahamstown, the Grey College at Bloemfontein, and the Transvaal Technical Institute will soon take rank as important centres of University instruction. Besides controlling the examinations for almost all the degrees and diplomas at these institutions, the University of the Cape of Good Hope, through its school examinations, has a preponderating influence upon the curriculum and methods of teaching in the many secondary schools in South Africa, and even affects the teaching in primary schools. During the final years of the existence of the South African Republic, a considerable number of teachers trained in Holland were brought into the Transvaal. In the course of the late war, when nearly all the ordinary schools of the Colony were closed for a longer or shorter period, most of these teachers returned home or found other employment. But, with the rapid increase in what may be called the extraordinary schools of the war period—namely, the concentration camps—it became necessary to introduce into the new British territories a large number of thoroughly trained teachers from Great Britain and her Colonies. Besides those selected in Cape Colony and Natal, one hundred teachers were brought from Canada and Australasia, and more than two hundred from the United Kingdom itself—all within the space of one year. These teachers were well received by the parents of scholars, and already have had a decisive influence upon the quality of the teaching in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.

As regards the distribution of schools, account must be taken of the peculiar conditions of South

Africa, which until lately have made pastoral farming the main industry of the country. The abnormally large extent of country necessary to carry a given amount of stock had led to farms being placed far apart, and thus to the creation of very small towns at the furthest limit from one another which would allow the farmers to dispose of their produce and to complete their marketings in a reasonable time. Thus, while schools could easily be provided in such villages—often distant thirty or forty miles from one another - it was a task of extreme difficulty for Government to extend any sort of educational help to farmers living at a distance from centres of population. Within a few years of the beginning of the permanent British occupation, it was proposed to send four itinerant teachers to the remote and thinly-inhabited districts of which Somerset East was then a type. In the second half of the century under consideration, the railway lines began to be a chief factor in determining larger aggregations of population, and the undenominational day-schools of Cape Colony fell into three classes, corresponding to the range of education appropriate to towns, villages, and country parts. Indeed, so dominant became the influence of the railways that a distinct class of schools under railway management sprang into existence. To these centres of instruction were transported, free of cost, not only the children of the gangers and other employés, but also the sons and daughters of Dutch farmers living near the railway line. One other class of schools in sparsely-populated areas deserves to be mentioned here, namely, district boarding-schools. Rough lodging and a teacher were provided in certain places where boys could not get to school on other terms. As a rule they brought with them some of their food, and returned home at the end of each week's instruction. But in spite of these and other devices, the problem of dealing adequately with the instruction of a country population possessing so few natural means of communication remains as yet unsolved.

A difficulty of another kind presents itself in a rapidly growing mining community, such as that of Kimberley or Johannesburg. It is not easy to anticipate in which directions the town will extend, and even if school accommodation keep pace with the increase in children of school age, the constant change in the actual families living in any one district makes it difficult for teachers to obtain a real knowledge of individual children. In Johannesburg the failure of the South African Republic to provide suitably for even the barest educational needs of the Outlander population made the task of the new Government still more difficult.

In the distribution of schools it was manifestly the first duty of the various South African States to make provision for the white population, and from what has been said it should be clear that this was no easy matter, and that it is still imperfectly accomplished. The provision of schools for natives and other coloured people has been left mainly to various missionary agencies, the first society to undertake such duties being the Moravian. Before the British occupation there appear also to have been slave children in the public elementary schools of Capetown. As in the case of other pupils, they were instructed in the tenets of the Dutch Reformed Church. There was also a 'Slave Lodge' school. The first half of the century of British dominion was marked by the increase of 'mission' schools aided by Government. A leading feature of such schools was that white and coloured children were often taught together.

The second half of the century was marked by the institution of special schools for aborigines, and by the gradual separation of white from coloured scholars in other kinds of schools. Thus, having regard to their origin, the historian can easily distinguish between the two classes of schools termed 'mission' and 'aborigines.' The one class embodied the ideal of the earlier Christian missionaries in South Africa, that there should be no social distinctions founded on differences of colour or

race. The second class of schools was the result of more ample experience on the part of administrators as to the deterioration which both white and black races undergo through undue and ill-defined association with one another. It is noteworthy that some of the latest statistics for Cape Colony give the percentage of scholars in mission schools who are below standard (*i.e.*, in the infant classes) as 64, while in the schools for aborigines the percentage is only 52. In both cases the number of older scholars who are in the infant classes is quite abnormal, and this, coupled with other depressing features of these schools (such as the low standard of training of the teachers), makes the educational statistics of Cape Colony appear less satisfactory upon the whole than they would appear if only the white scholars were under consideration. There is no doubt that, in the past, the admixture of coloured children with white has been one of the chief causes tending to arrest the mental development of the latter. The enrolment of scholars in mission schools and schools for aborigines for the third quarter of 1865 sufficiently indicates the small beginnings of the new system: in 'Government' and 'aided public' schools, 4,908; in 'aided mission' schools, 16,723; in 'aborigines' schools, 2,302. The corresponding figures for 1904 are 49,109, 53,584, and 38,768 respectively. It should be noted that this distribution of classes of schools according to races is also largely a geographical distribution.

The control of schools has always been a vexed and complicated matter, and nowhere more so than in South Africa. If a third cause were to be named, side by side with the configuration of the country and the admixture of coloured races, to account for the slow progress of education in that country, there could be no hesitation in saying that denominational rivalries have been a principal obstacle in the way of an efficient national system of schools. The influence of those rivalries has been increased by the fact that the principal line of Church cleavage between the white settlers is the

same as the principal line of race and language cleavages. To this cause must be assigned the constant and bitter struggle for the control of the schools, the evil effects of which have been experienced by generation after generation of the South African population. In Natal, as is natural, this conflict is least marked. Her policy is more and more to adopt a Government system of schools, in which teachers occupy the position of Civil Servants, and this course is warranted by the small number and the distribution of the white population. In Cape Colony the general tendency has been to encourage voluntary effort on the part of parents and others, and by means of grants of public money to bring each school so formed into direct relation with the Education Department. This system was also well marked in the South African Republic. In the Orange Free State it was tempered by the grant of considerable local powers to district school boards. When these two States became part of the British Empire, the need of rapid reconstruction of the whole machinery of government led to a purely governmental system of schools for the white population. As much of the central control is now being transferred to local authorities as is consistent with the security of tenure of the teaching staff, and with the amount of local financial responsibility which the authorities in question are able to undertake. It was not to be expected that a school system which within three years of the end of the war gave the new Colonies nearly twice the number of children in school that were there before the war would not arouse some of the denominational bitterness already spoken of. But in the Orange River Colony the guarantees offered by Government for the local control of education have satisfied those who at first gave expression to their dissatisfaction by founding private schools, and there is reason to think that all parties and Churches will now work for the development of a national system of education. In the present year Cape Colony has passed an Education Act which tends in the same direction.

These are hopeful signs for the future, not only in the Colonies mentioned, but also in the Transvaal.

Enough has now been said about the actual conditions of education in South Africa during the past century. It may still be useful to trace some of the changes of ideals within the same period. As a rule such changes take place in response to the development of educational thought in the United Kingdom or some other European country, but not at the same time as that development, and not without modifications. There is always more or less retardation, so that when, for instance, a vicious principle has been rejected by educationalists at home, it may still be found bearing unsound fruit in South Africa, or, indeed, in any other Colony. In the first half of last century, as the rapid advance in the means of scientific measurement led to triumph after triumph in modern engineering, it was hastily assumed that the educational results achieved by every class of teacher could also be accurately determined through such agencies as examiners and inspectors, and that in that way rapid strides in the progress of scholars might easily be secured. In higher education this false principle led to the establishment of the University of London on certain lines which have only been refashioned in recent years, and on the same model the University of the Cape of Good Hope was avowedly formed, and still continues to do its work. At present one of the most marked educational tendencies in South Africa is to break away from the restraints of the examinations of the Cape University and to develop such teaching institutions as the South African College and the Transvaal Technical Institute into independent Universities in all but name. In lower education the same erroneous idea of the value of accurate measurement still affects the character of the inspection of primary schools in more than one of the South African States. A revolt against such conditions of work is a marked feature of educational thought in these Colonies.

A second remarkable instance of change in ideals

within the period under consideration is the view now taken by many thoughtful colonists as to the education of aboriginal natives. In the early days of last century the doctrine of the brotherhood of man and the cause of the emancipation of slaves were steadily gaining ground. It was then assumed that the coloured races would without any coercion readily assimilate the customs and the ideas of their white neighbours, and might therefore be placed under the same laws. Now it is becoming understood that, just as we have to discover new methods of securing the advance in learning of boys who are no longer subjected to the constant, and even cruel, use of the rod, so in the place of slavery fresh incentives are needed to induce negroes and other coloured people of Basuto origin to adopt our industrial standards of life. It is clear that some of the conditions of civilized existence repel the great majority of natives, just as there are conditions of their life which prove repugnant to the white races. Only through education, and only then in the course of a good many generations, will any general transformation of native customs take place. Meanwhile, it is generally recognised that the more distinct the schools for the two races are kept the better for the welfare of both; and this principle has been extended even to Cape Boys and British Indians.

The only other notable movement of thought in connection with the school systems of South Africa to which allusion will here be made is the movement towards federal action of the various States. To begin with native education, the South African Native Affairs Commission has recently reported in favour of the establishment of an inter-State native college to be subsidized and controlled by the Colonies jointly. Such a college devoted to the higher education of present members of the coloured races for all practical careers open to them would have an immense influence in assimilating to one another the school aims of the various education departments so far as natives are concerned, and in making them feel that behind all

attempts of the white man to ameliorate their condition is to be found an essential unity of purpose. In the past nothing has been more conspicuous than the want of union of States between themselves (and of Churches between themselves) as to the right means to be used for the advancement of the native population.

This federal action promises to extend to the education of the white races also. Already since peace has been established two important conferences have been held between the chiefs of the various Education Departments, and a common syllabus of instruction in elementary schools has been agreed upon for the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia. In higher education, especially in all that relates to technical and University education, the same tendency to co-operation has been shown on the part of these Colonies; and though there may be periods of retrogression as well as periods of advance, it can hardly be doubted that never again is there likely to be the same isolation of the various Governments of South Africa in educational matters as existed in the past.

But for the full realization of these common aims, and for the preparation of South Africa to act as a unit in any general discussion of the educational ideals of the different parts of the British Empire, one condition, to which allusion has already been made, must be kept steadily in view. The aims of each State must not be distorted through denominational or racial antagonism, but must present, as far as may be, a homogeneous character. Nothing will so certainly conduce to this end as the adequate training of all South African teachers, each staff of teachers in its own Colony. No wise man wishes colonists in their youth to be taught to take the purely British point of view. But if thoroughly trained colonial teachers cannot be found, it will always be necessary to introduce many such teachers from home, and so to provoke a reaction on the part of one section of the population by too great insistence in schools upon the views of the Mother Country. South

African children should understand that in ordinary circumstances it will be for them, when they grow up, to defend the colonial point of view against the point of view of Great Britain, if that be necessary, and that it is only in times of real strain to the Empire that they must sink all differences of opinion and stand shoulder to shoulder for their common interests. These views can never be properly inculcated unless the schools are staffed chiefly with colonial teachers, and this is one of the main reasons why each State should make the adequate training of teachers born and educated within her own borders the primary consideration in her educational system.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE MINING INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA

By LIONEL PHILLIPS

NATURE is very capricious in the distribution of her favours. In some lands she has been bountiful in concealing treasures beneath the earth, as well as in so arranging the climatic conditions and the composition of the soil that the surface is a means of producing boundless wealth. In California, for instance, the fruits of the earth more than compensated for a declining mineral production. The virgin lands of Canada are so favourable to wheat-growing that they offer attractions to agricultural settlers without any of the speculative allurements which precious stones or precious metals dazzle before the eyes of the emigrant. Certain sections of the globe would assuredly have reason to complain at the way they have been treated if they had the power of making representations, notably some of the deserts and the icefields. There appears to have been as great a disparity in the endowment of the inanimate as of the animate world.

South Africa, for instance, in regard to whose mineral wealth the following observations are made, had not, up to the discovery of diamonds, offered any great attraction to the surplus people of the overcrowded communities of Europe. In 1868 the imports and exports of Cape Colony and Natal combined were, respectively, £2,273,566 and £2,578,647. At that time very little trade was done with any other South African ports. It

was about this date that diamonds were discovered, but not until well in the seventies did that industry assume any importance. In the year 1887, which was prior to the production of gold upon any considerable scale, the output of diamonds had grown to 3,692,265 carats, valued at £4,126,288. The mines are of volcanic origin, the material containing the diamonds having been forced through the overlying strata. In some cases the surface has been denuded, and the diamonds distributed in the courses of rivers, where they are still found in comparatively small quantities. The great production, however, is derived from mining operations within the pipe or crater. The work of securing and disintegrating the blue ground, and of extracting the diamonds, involves the employment of extensive machinery and much labour.

The general activity awakened by the working of these mines upon a large scale was manifested in the imports and exports of the Cape Colony and Natal, which, combined for the year 1887, rose respectively to £7,300,055 and £8,915,933. After deducting the value of diamonds exported, it will be seen that in twenty years the exports had nearly doubled.

It will probably surprise the reader to learn that, from the date diamonds were discovered up to the end of 1903, the total value produced amounted to no less than £111,129,000. During that year the Transvaal made its first significant contribution to the South African export of diamonds, amounting to £239,752, won principally by the Premier Diamond Mining Company.

Besides the general stimulus given to trade through the working of the Griqualand West mines, their requirements necessitated the building of about 600 miles of railway, the terminus prior to their discovery being at Wellington, only forty-five miles from the coast. The completion of this line became the signal for an active railway policy in other parts of the Cape Colony. A considerable impetus was given to the commercial progress of the country by the opera-

tions in Griqualand West, entirely overshadowed, however, later on, by the wonderful goldfields of the Witwatersrand. Gold had been known to exist in the Transvaal, and small quantities had been obtained from alluvial workings from about the year 1880, but systematic working only began in 1888. Before that year the total recorded output only amounted to £220,217. The following table gives at a glance the progressive output of the Transvaal, sadly broken, as will be seen, after 1899 by the war, but now in excess of the rate of production before the conflict:

	£
1884	10,096
1885	6,010
1886	34,710
1887	169,401
1888	967,416
1889	1,490,568
1890	1,870,000
1891	2,938,000
1892	4,698,000
1893	5,649,000
1894	7,809,000
1895	8,578,000
1896	8,598,000
1897	11,476,000
1898	16,044,135
1899	15,739,923
1900	1,498,901
1901	1,014,687
1902	7,253,665
1903	12,589,248
1904	16,054,809
1905 (seven months)	11,809,859
Total	£136,299,428

But the Transvaal is not the only gold producer in South Africa. That industry in Rhodesia has had a very chequered career from a number of causes, which, in the narrow limits of this chapter, it is impossible to discuss; but all the well-wishers of that country, which

bears the name of the great man who secured it to Great Britain, will be glad to learn that, although the output at present is by no means sensational, it appears to be steadily increasing. Up to March, 1901, the total produced, during somewhat intermittent working over a period of four years, amounted to £793,884.

The recorded output afterwards is:

	£
Year ending March 31, 1902	650,752
„ „ 1903	713,909
„ „ 1904	851,807
„ „ 1905	1,120,528
Total	£4,130,880

For the four months April to July of the present year the production has been roughly at the rate of £1,400,000 per annum. The total value of gold exported from South Africa up to the present reaches the important sum of £140,910,308.

The growing needs of the mining industry are reflected in the trade returns. Two typical years may be selected—namely, 1898, the one preceding the war; and 1903, the last year for which complete returns are obtainable. It may be of interest to present the figures in tabulated form, because certain references may be made to them later on, and because the returns from Delagoa Bay are included:

1898.

	Imports. £	Exports. £
Cape Colony	16,621,354	24,423,413
Natal	5,369,672	2,202,021
Delagoa Bay	751,931	16,800
Total	£22,742,957	£26,642,234
Total,* including goods in transit (roughly)	£24,000,000	£27,000,000

* The transit trade of Delagoa Bay, *in addition to* the imports and exports given above, amounted to £1,770,082. No separate

1903.

	Imports.	Exports.
	£	£
Cape Colony	31,425,000	21,804,000
Natal	13,858,000	2,229,000
Delagoa Bay	4,727,000	449,000
South African total ...	£50,010,000	£24,482,000

The noteworthy rise in the imports for 1903 was occasioned by the belief on the part of merchants that the mines of the Transvaal would soon be worked at the pre-war rate of speed, and that a rapid further expansion with a commensurate effect upon general trade could be looked for. The inadequacy of the manual labour supply rendered that impossible, and resulted in a severe commercial depression. The ranks of the unemployed became swollen, and the country was in a parlous state. After the proclamation of peace, the population of the Transvaal comprised not only the inhabitants of Republican days, but was augmented by a large number of white settlers, some of whom came out during the war and desired to remain, others following with sanguine hopes for their future in a country of whose wealth they had heard such attractive reports. South Africa is at present almost entirely dependent upon the mining industry for its prosperity, and restricted operations consequently caused serious disappointment to, and hardship upon, the people of the Transvaal in particular. By supplementing the available supply of native labour by about 40,000 Chinamen, the output is now larger than it was before the war, general business has improved, and the field for the white wage-earner has become widened. Before the

figures are given for imports and exports in transit, but nearly the whole must be accounted for by the Transvaal. The Inspector-General of Customs in that colony gives the value of imports *viâ* Delagoa Bay at £1,781,252. These figures no doubt include the port dues, transit duty, and possibly railway charges.

Labour Importation Ordinance was passed, however, merchants realized the mistake they had made by securing excessive stocks in 1903, and the result was manifested in a very serious falling-off in the imports for the following year. For the half-year ending June 30, 1903, the value of merchandise imported was £16,742,153, and for the corresponding period of 1904 (the latest official figures obtainable), £10,484,687.

With a view to grouping the statistics, it may be convenient now to turn to two other branches of mining in South Africa which have been brought to the producing stage. The copper mines of Namaqualand have since the year 1879 contributed 160,353 tons to the world's supply of that metal, of an estimated value of £11,224,710. Fortunately for South Africa, coal is very widely distributed throughout the sub-continent, and so far Rhodesia produces that of the highest calorific value. Next in the order of merit comes Natal, where an export trade upon a small scale has been established. The following table will be interesting, not only because it shows the tons produced, but also the relative selling value in the respective territories:

1903.

	Tons.	Value.
		£
Transvaal	2,253,677	877,976
Natal	713,548	418,975
Cape Colony	207,193	178,851
Rhodesia	46,870	35,152 approx.

Besides diamonds, gold, copper, and coal, a small quantity of tin is now coming from the Transvaal, and a great many other minerals have been proved to exist in South Africa, whether or not in payable quantities remains to be proved. Large deposits of iron ore have been located in the Transvaal, and coal-beds proved in the same neighbourhood, so that in the future the working of that metal may be profitable; but distance

from the sea would render an export trade impossible under existing railway rates, and it will probably be some years before local consumption will justify the large outlay necessary for the erection of blast-furnaces and all the equipment connected with the production of iron, which is one of the most delicate and difficult of the metallurgical industries. Copper, silver, lead, cobalt, nickel, and other minerals have been found in various parts of South Africa, and taking the huge area of the country into account, and the extremely limited number of white men it contains, the field for the prospector is by no means exhausted.

The white population is practically confined to a few industrial centres. The last thirty years have witnessed a marvellous change: a network of railways from all the principal ports to the towns of the interior affords facilities for mining operations, and furnishes the means by which the other and permanent resources of the country may be developed. Agricultural and pastoral pursuits may be said to be in their infancy for a great variety of reasons. Prior to the development of the mines there were no markets for the products of husbandry, in addition to which pests, blights, droughts, and hail-storms have stood in the way. Under a progressive administration the counsels of science are now being taken, and indications are not wanting of increasing activity and success in rural industries. The rainfall over a large portion of the country is by no means inadequate, but it comes usually in heavy, fitful storms, and no attempt to impound it to any extent has yet been made. The invaluable supply of water is allowed to flow to the sea, doing much damage in its course in washing away rich alluvial soil. In years to come the skill of the civil engineer will doubtless do much to remedy this evil, and the staff of bacteriologists, chemists, and highly-trained agriculturists will minimize where they do not entirely overcome the physical disadvantages.

To what extent and in what direction the surface of

the land can be turned to account remains to be demonstrated. Certain it is, however, that much of the soil is capable of producing the staple commodities for man and beast, and nothing but a lack of enterprise or a little intelligent industry will stand in the way of the whole of the horses, stock, and sheep requisite for internal use being produced in South Africa. The results obtained in the past cannot be taken as any criterion for the future, because the discovery and working of minerals have created markets that were non-existent in the old days. In South Africa mineral wealth is the pioneer that furnishes a reason for, and will more and more supply the means of, establishing industries to support the growing population in the distant future when the mines cease to produce. So great, however, is the proved extent of the gold beds of the Witwatersrand alone, to take one example, that at the present rate of working it would take the best part of one hundred years to see their exhaustion. The conglomerate deposits are proved to continue in a comparatively unbroken easterly and westerly line for a distance of sixty-one and a half miles. They are tilted at an average angle of about 30 degrees from the horizontal.

It is impossible to determine the vertical depth at which it will be profitable to continue mining. Claim licenses are held upon ground in which it would be necessary to sink from 8,000 to 10,000 feet before striking the reefs; and although this depth is greater than any at which successful mining operations have hitherto been carried on in the world, it is reasonable to expect that greater depths will be successfully reached in that region than in any other part of the globe, because the temperature of the earth, so far as tests at present indicate, only rises one degree for every 208 feet sunk, whereas the average in other parts of the world is about one degree for every 65 feet.

Leaving aside problematic depths, however, and assuming a working depth of 4,000 feet vertical, which

every mining engineer would consider an extremely conservative figure, the workable area would then comprise 40,200 claims, of which, basing a calculation upon the report made by the engineers of the Witwatersrand, and presented to Mr. Chamberlain at Johannesburg on January 13, 1903, only 4·279 per cent. have been exhausted up to the end of June, 1905, or in the sixteen and a half years during which mining operations have been actually carried on.

The geological conditions do not in any way indicate that the limit of the beds is confined to the proved sixty-one and a half miles, and besides the Witwatersrand, there are a great many districts in the Transvaal where profitable mining is carried on to some extent, and where vast bodies of gold-bearing ore are known to exist, of which the yield is not, however, sufficiently high to leave a profit under existing conditions. But, in addition to the known areas, it is only reasonable to expect that in so vast a territory as that which is known to be mineralized in South Africa further discoveries of value will be made.

The number of years during which mining and prospecting have been carried on, and the small population engaged, when compared with the enormous area, give some idea of the potentialities. Labour conditions, and the cost of commodities, have an immense bearing upon the future of South Africa. The gold reefs are more extensive than anything hitherto known, but the particles of valuable metal are somewhat widely distributed in the rock, and, in consequence, profitable results are dependent upon economic working. The system under which the operations are conducted differs entirely from that prevailing in countries where white labourers are exclusively employed. The presence of a large black population results in the whole of the manual labour, in which mere muscular energy counts, being performed by the inferior race, white men occupying positions as overseers and skilled artisans. In this respect South Africa is not, and never will be, a white man's country

in the same sense that England is. The conditions cannot change, and the country is destined to prosper or to languish under this system, because either the black man must be employed, if the civilizing mission of the white man is to be conscientiously pursued, or he must be driven away from the centres of labour into the wilds, where he can live in comparative idleness, as he did in days gone by. In that case, no doubt, it would be possible to carry on the mining industry exclusively with white labourers, but so long as the black man occupies his present position in the industrial life of the country, the white man will not be found doing the same class of work.

It is impossible within the limits here assigned to the subject of mining to discuss the labour question, but it may be briefly stated, as a fact, that white men will not, unless driven by sheer necessity, undertake work which they regard as belonging to the sphere of the Kaffir, and, if they would do so, it would be extremely injurious to the prestige of the white races. The disparity between the scale of payment to the white and coloured workers is so great, and the planes upon which they live so widely different, that the employment of the former in work that, of necessity, would command lower wages than the skilled artisans and overseers receive to-day, would create a class of 'poor whites' looked down on by, and degraded in the eyes of, the Kaffirs.

The mining industry, besides giving direct employment to tens of thousands of men, indirectly supports hundreds of thousands more. In 1870 the total population of the Cape Colony and Natal was estimated at 860,000 souls. By 1887 it had grown to 1,860,000, and according to the census returns of 1904 the population had swollen to 3,518,558. This result is naturally not solely attributable to the mining industry, as it includes the natural increase among the natives, and was partly due to other industries; but a glance at the detailed figures in regard to exports is sufficient to show the

extent to which the progress of the country is dependent at present upon mineral wealth. Apart from direct and indirect employment, the mining operations furnish good markets for the farmer, and an outlet for the products of the British manufacturer. Every new mine that starts, and is able to give employment to, say, 2,000 hands, has a beneficial effect upon the country, generally quite disproportionate to the persons directly engaged. It is, therefore, of great importance to South Africa that the cost of winning gold should be as low as possible, in order that ore of low value may be brought within the sphere of profitable manipulation.

In addition to the distribution of money in wages, and for commodities consumed, the general revenue of the country, partly through the tax on profits, and partly through the railway system, which in South Africa is used to some extent as a means of taxation, benefits by an expansion in the mining operations. The cost of living is abnormally high, and the only hope of a very material reduction lies in the development of the internal resources of the country, and the establishment of local industries for which the conditions are favourable. State encouragement, through the provision of transport facilities, and possibly by other expedients, may have an effect infinitely more far-reaching than a calculation based upon the existing conditions would indicate.

South Africa needs, above all things, a larger white population, which is, at present, only about one-fourth of the numerical strength of the coloured people. The gravity of the position is illustrated by comparison with the United States, where, in spite of there being six white to every coloured man, the latter constitutes a serious social problem. But apart from this aspect of the case, the race differences between the Dutch and the English would lose much of their significance if a stream of Europeans continued to flow into the country, because their survival is far more likely to be sustained by the struggle for political ascendancy than by the perpetua-

tion of animosities due to past events. Upon the reasonable supposition that the mining industry has by no means reached its zenith, the influx of European settlers will continue in proportion to the expansion of its operations, and this may be expected to justify the establishment of other industries, which will afford employment for a larger population.

II.—REALMS IN TRUST

OUR TRUE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA*

By COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND

At the beginning of the last century there were among the great founders of our Indian Empire many who had the most intimate knowledge of the people, and had been most successful in dealing with them, who conceived that our part was so to train and educate the people of India that they would eventually be able to rule themselves. Such great Anglo-Indians as Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone and Sir John Malcolm held this view. They were men of marked ability, and distinguished in a special degree for sympathy with the people, and they thought that by the end of a century we should make our bow, and leave India to be governed by the Indians. Yet now that a century has gone by there seems a less, not a greater, probability that this will happen. We hear it is true of men who very

* When the Senate of Cambridge University honoured me with an invitation to deliver the Rede Lecture this year, they asked me to select my own subject, and I chose the question of 'Our True Relationship with India,' because I thought that the views of one who had for many years worked in close contact with the people of India might be of interest to those who from the heart of the Empire insensibly, but profoundly, influence the actions of us their agents on the outskirts. By the kindness of the authorities of the University I have been permitted to include this lecture in the present series of articles on Imperial subjects.

rightly advocate giving the people a greater share in the government of the country. But I know of no one with such an intimate knowledge of present India as Sir John Malcolm possessed of India a century ago, even advocating, as he did, that we should deliberately work towards setting up an independent India ruled by Indians. And, as a matter of hard fact, we find that the tie between India and England, instead of loosening during the last century, has year by year become closer. And with the increasing pressure of Europe upon Asia, and the competition for its markets, it seems impossible to look forward to a time when India could, with advantage to the Indians or anyone else, be left to govern itself. Say that in a fit of sentimentality we were to-morrow to announce that in ten years' time we would withdraw, and leave the people of India to rule themselves, and defend their country as best they could, not only by land but by sea, which, I ask, would be the most unhappy, the heterogeneous races of India, who would have to settle all differences of religion, of race, and of character, so as to present a united front against the avarice of the Afghan and Afridi tribesmen, and the pressure of European nations urged on by the rivalry of competition—these, or the unfortunate Foreign Ministers in Europe, who could only look on this new object of rivalry as furnishing one more risk of igniting a general European conflagration?

I do not think anyone who is conversant with the conditions at present prevailing in India could conceive that, even if we were to leave, the people would be able to hold themselves together. Three hundred millions is a large number for such cohesion. These three hundred millions are composed of races of various religions, and more different from one another than Spaniards are from Highlanders. We cannot imagine the Hindu majority consenting to be ruled by the Mohammedan minority, and still less can we imagine the masterful Mohammedans sitting down peacefully under Hindu rulers. A very prominent Indian Moham-

medan, Sir Sayad Ahmad Khan, a few years ago said: 'Suppose that all the English were to leave India, who would be the rulers in their place? Is it possible that under those circumstances Mohammedans and Hindus could sit on the same throne and equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other, and thrust it down. . . . Until one nation had conquered the other and made it obedient, peace could not reign in the land. This conclusion is based on proofs so absolute that no one can deny it.'

And supposing the whole of India were at last combined, does it seem likely that people who are totally unaccustomed to sea life would be able to organize such a navy as would be required to defend their coasts against the great sea forces of the other European and Asiatic nations who would be pressing on it? It seems impossible to conceive of India standing alone, and the longer we stay there the more difficult does it become to leave.

In regard to Egypt, a similar view was held that we should train the Egyptians to stand by themselves, and then depart. The leaders of both political parties made most solemn announcements, and sincerely meant what they said, that we intended to leave Egypt as soon as we were able to leave there a stable native government. But when I passed through Cairo last December, I did not observe British officials packing up their trunks in readiness to go, nor any signs of their handing over their offices to Egyptians. On the contrary, I saw many indications that the Egyptians themselves had come to regard our permanent stay there just as inevitable as the Indians regard our stay in India; and certainly investors in Egyptian enterprises did not anticipate that we would leave the country within any measurable time.

In both India and Egypt we have to take account of great forces operating on the whole of mankind, and cannot regard the question as simply between us and

the Indians, or between us and the Egyptians. India has need of some strong outside influence to give it cohesion. To train to stand by themselves a people who would almost certainly fall to pieces directly they were left alone is an altogether unreasonable proceeding. Noble as is the idea, it is not one which for some time to come it would be possible to carry out in actual practice, and the announcement of it gives rise to hopes which cannot be fulfilled, and, when not fulfilled, lays us open to charges of hypocrisy and bad faith.

There seems, then, little prospect of our voluntarily leaving India, and little wisdom in contemplating such a step. But there are among those who have most profoundly studied Asiatic problems some who hold that as we won India in a day we shall lose it in a night; that there will be some kind of combination among Asiatics generally to spew Europeans out of Asia. Great latent forces now surging beneath the surface will suddenly burst forth, and Europe will be rolled back from Asia. Asiatics do not fear death as do Europeans, and will sacrifice any numbers to drive them away. I am not concerned here with this argument so far as it relates to the rest of Asia; but, in my view, it is inapplicable to India. I would not pretend to be infallible in this matter, for I am aware how many mistakes we Anglo-Indians make in estimating situations, and I always remember Lord Palmerston's dictum, that if you want to be thoroughly misinformed about a country you should go to a man who has lived there thirty years and speaks the language. Still, as I have been in India only twenty-three years, and speak the language very badly, there may yet remain a particle or two of sense in what I say, and my opinion, for what it is worth, is that India and England will be bound together for many days and nights to come, so long as we do not hold India simply from pure pride of possession, but with the strong faith that it is our appointed task in the development of

mankind to preserve peace where we had found anarchy, to enforce the eternal principles of justice, to help forward those primitive races who are still far behind, and to quicken into new life those highly-cultured peoples who for long centuries have been numbed in sleep.

Most of those who work in India have this faith, and because we believe in ourselves the people believe in us, and I cannot bring myself to think that among the masses of the population there exists any general desire to rid themselves of the British. Even if in a momentary ebullition we were evicted from India, I would still believe the people would, after their mad freak was over, be only too thankful to welcome us back. In the Mutiny many officers were shot dead by their men because, relying on their loyalty, they still went down among them. Some there are who would argue from this that the officers were foolish in showing such confidence in their men. But they were perfectly and absolutely right. They knew this by the instinct of their race, and it is because officers have trusted, and do, and will trust their men, even to death, that their men trust them. How seldom has the confidence been misplaced! how often and often has it proved right! Speaking from my own personal experience, I can say that my life has frequently and entirely depended on the loyalty of Indian troops, and but for their devotion I should not be living now.

And as with the Indian troops, so with the Indian people as a whole. As long as we have that faith in their loyalty which we are amply justified in holding, they will be true to us; and this I say not as the expression of a pious hope, but as the conclusion drawn from practical experience. I know, indeed, that immature Indian youths, drawing false inferences from the rise of Japan, talk about political emancipation, rising against their oppressors, and driving them out of the land; and I have even heard of a Hindu gentleman saying in an after-dinner speech that though the

idea of blood was repulsive to educated men like himself, it was only by blood that India could be freed. But these are words, and words of exotically-educated young men, without weight or influence. I look rather to facts and deeds. At the time of our worst reverses in South Africa I was in a very typical part of India where there were only two or three other Englishmen, and where I could be in touch with real Indian feeling in regard to these events. At home men were talking of the decay of the Empire, and were in the deepest depths of gloom. But in India, though Lord Curzon was sending troops away not only to South Africa, but also to China to rescue the beleagured Legations, and though we were suffering from the most terrible famine and the severest visitation of plague in modern times, there was not the slightest sign that the people intended to take advantage of the occasion to turn us out of India. In many a European country, if there had been plague and famine as severe as they were in that year in India, serious riots would have broken out everywhere; and if the Government were at the same time weakened by the despatch of its forces on two distant expeditions, the people would have dangerously shaken the fabric of Government. To satisfy ourselves on this point, we have only to look at what is happening in a European country at the present moment. But the people of India, far from seeking to cause the Government embarrassment, sought in many ways to strengthen their hands. They had almost more faith in us than some of us had in ourselves. A disaster or two at the beginning of a war was nothing new in their reading of British history. That was merely according to precedent. But the further precedent was that we always pulled through our disasters and came out victors in the end, and so instead of trying to embarrass us they came forward with offers of assistance. Chiefs offered their troops, money, horses, anything that might be useful. Our own Indian troops were deeply disappointed they were not allowed to fight side by side

with us. And even those whom shallow observers had thought disloyal came forward with the rest. One chief, who was certainly not believed to be among the most loyal, offered the whole of the resources of his State to the Queen. He frankly told me, when I met him later, that he hated the Government of India in general and us political residents in particular, but he added that he was unswervingly loyal to the Sovereign. And this loyalty towards the Sovereign is, I believe, the strongest tie by which we now hold India, and the supreme influence which will always preserve India from drifting from us.

By their religion Hindus are taught to be loyal and obedient to their chief as appointed by Heaven, and of the strength of their attachment to the chief few who have not actually lived in a Native State can fully realize. A chief may be indolent, oppressive, and cruel to a degree which would shock outsiders, but the patient loyalty and simple affection of the people remain unshaken. Attempts on the lives of rulers in Europe and America are frequent. In India they are almost unknown. Through evil report and good report the people remain touchingly and immovably loyal to their chiefs. It is a wonderful trait in their character, and what is equally remarkable is that this same loyal attachment to their own chiefs is given to the chief of their chiefs—our Sovereign. Even if our Sovereigns had been rough, careless, and unsympathetic, I think this feeling of loyalty would still have existed to a very considerable degree. But when they have been thoughtful of the interests of the people, sympathetic, kindly, and dignified, they have a hundredfold increased this feeling of attachment; so that one of the biggest chiefs in India informed me that he sincerely believed there was in the late Queen some Divine light, for whenever he entered her presence he felt as though he were in a temple.

Indians believe—and I would challenge anyone who has studied not merely the evolution of plants and

animals till man arose, but also the evolution of man from the primitive savage packs and hordes to the most civilized races of the present day, to show that they are wrong in their belief—that our Sovereign has been divinely appointed to rule them. The great preacher Keshub Chunder Sen, who created such a powerful impression in England some thirty years ago, and became the leader of the most advanced section of Indian religious thinkers, was profoundly impressed by our late revered Sovereign. His successor and biographer records that 'the gracious reception given to Keshub by the Queen, and the kind interest which Her Majesty ever afterwards showed in his welfare, had a most profound and moral effect upon his mind. His loyalty had the colour of romance in it, and became part of his religion. The books and pictures which Her Majesty presented he treasured up, and regarded almost with superstitious honour. He beheld the hand of God in the sceptre swayed by the Empress of India. . . . He was an uncompromising champion of justice and equality, yet he was equally uncompromising in maintaining the highest standard of loyalty to the Imperial throne.' So wrote Mazoomdar, his biographer, and Keshub himself, in his injunctions to his followers, wrote of Her Majesty: 'She represents law, order, and justice, and is appointed by Providence to rule over us as a mother is appointed to look after her children. Therefore we love her and honour her. A man who hates his Sovereign is morally as culpable as he who abhors and maltreats his father and mother. Sedition is rebellion against this authority of God's representative, and therefore against God. It is not merely a political offence, but a sin against Providence.'

These are the feelings with which a great religious reformer regarded the Sovereign; and the mere sight of a member of the Royal Family, showing, as each one of them who has visited India has, by many a sign which Orientals are more quick in detecting than we are, a real kindliness of heart, has done more to attach

India to us than whole lives of labour which we humdrum officials may devote to its service. The Government of India and its officials are attacked without remorse and without cessation in the native press, but the Sovereign never. And it would be a hard strain indeed which would cause this tie to snap—of mere sentiment though it be.

But even with this tie to keep England and India bound together, some still dream of a Yellow Peril, which may sweep us from India. China may be rejuvenated as Japan has been, and the Chinese millions, led on by Japanese generals, may come surging on to India, and bear British rule away on the flood of newborn Asiatic energy. I would not like to assert too positively that such a stretch of imagination is not justified. But I would draw attention to two great barriers which have always stood in the way of invasion from the East—the one is the range of the Himalayas, and the other is the sea. Our north-west frontier is difficult enough, but our north-east is impregnable. There is no other route across it which can compare, in point of facility, with the route by which we went to and returned from Lhasa the other day. That route is the very easiest along the whole length of the Himalayas, but even that is not one which such an army as would be required to turn us out of India could ever come by. The other barrier is the sea, and no one can seriously contend we cannot hold our own on that element.

I am not, therefore, one of those who dread the Yellow Peril. Just as the Japanese have learnt much from us, we have much to learn from them. But they have probably common-sense enough to know that they have much to gain by keeping on good terms with us, and risk losing much by any such rash enterprise as tilting against us in India.

In the space at my disposal I have been unable to go very deeply into these two great questions—whether we should voluntarily leave India, and whether we are likely

to be turned out by force. I trust, however, I may have said enough to show that the contingency of our either being turned out under compulsion or leaving voluntarily is sufficiently remote to justify us in proceeding to consider our relationship with India under the assumption that we are to remain there for many a long day to come.

But if we are to retain our connection with India the feeling of the British people certainly is that we must regard not merely our own selfish interests, but the good of the people as well. This is, at any rate, the feeling of the agents in India. I am not sure indeed that some of us have not an even keener feeling in this regard than many a home-staying Englishman. Contact with the warm-hearted people of India brings sympathy with them. From one cause or another—international rivalry and the weakness of the native Governments surrounding our original factories—we were driven into using force against them; and though a commonly accepted theory is that those who use force become brutal and tyrannical, much actual experience leads me to form a precisely opposite conclusion. There were no more sympathetic Anglo-Indian administrators than those of a century ago, who had been engaged in actual war with the people. They were, no doubt, severe against men who had recklessly brought the horrors of war upon the whole population, but for the innocent majority they had nothing but sympathy. And as one who has had himself, in a lesser degree, to employ the might of the British Empire against a weaker race, I can testify to the ardent desire which such an experience awakens in one to make up to the innocent people, in any way one can, for the punishment which the wickedness, or maybe incapacity, or even merely ignorance, of their rulers has brought upon them. As a boy I could never believe the master who said when he caned me that he was hurting himself much more than he was hurting me. And I know that the Tibetans thoroughly disbelieved my

assertions that it was with the utmost reluctance that we used force against them. Yet, if they could have seen all the official and private correspondence which took place between the Indian Government and the Home Government, and between the Indian Government and me, and could have overheard conversations that had taken place, they would have been convinced that the last thing we wished was to inflict pain or cause trouble.

Those who have had any experience of the Government of India know that nothing is less congenial to them than spending their hard-earned savings in costly military expeditions. Government will go on for years —often to what we agents, who have to bear the brunt of the injury, think an exasperating degree—putting up with affronts from the weaker peoples on our border, hoping against hope to settle a question without resorting to force. And so it was in Tibet. They tried, and I, their agent, tried to effect a settlement by every conceivable means, and the exercise of a patience and forbearance such as can only be equalled by that which a Minister of the Crown has to maintain in the House of Commons of the present age. For this end I even risked my life by riding over, unescorted, into the camp at Guru to reason quietly with the Tibetans, and I did what was harder still, I instructed other men to risk their lives by advancing against their position without firing, so that we might give them a chance up to the very last possible moment. But when, in the end, in spite of every effort to avoid hostilities, we had to use force, and when, as a result, we saw the terrible injury inflicted not on the real originators of all the trouble, but upon the innocent people, who were driven along like sheep, there was not an Englishman who went to Tibet who did not earnestly desire to make up in every possible way to the country people for the injury which, in the exercise of their duty, they were bound to inflict. And this is the feeling which evidently animated those soldier-administrators who, a century ago, had been engaged in

actual fighting with the people whom they afterwards so successfully governed. In the development of the human race the use of force seems inevitable. But the fact that we have had in the past to use force in India will make us all the more ready and determined in the present and future to insure that the good the Indians will receive from us will in the end far outweigh the injury done. To benefit the people is the inspiring thought of every British Administrator in India.

But in working out this idea we must be careful not to let our old virility evaporate into washy sentimentality. Really to help the people is a difficult, anxious, and often thankless task, and requires deep study, wide experience, and delicate sympathy. I have already said that the noble ideal of teaching Indians to govern themselves, which men like Sir John Malcolm held a century ago, is not one which nowadays would be either practicable or beneficial. But we can at least train the Indians up to take a larger share in the administration, and this is what we are doing.

During the last century there has been a steady tendency to admit Indians more and more into the government of the country. A hundred years ago the employment of natives of India in any of the highly administrative posts was unknown. They were simply used as clerks. But in 1833 it was enacted that no native of India should, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, or colour, be disabled from holding any place under the Company—the old East India Company—and Indians were then for the first time employed by the British authorities in positions of trust and responsibility. Greater attention was now given to the education of the people. Universities were later on established in each of the Presidency towns, and, as more and more educated men became available, a still larger share in the administration was given to the people, and when, in 1858, the Government of India by the East India Company was transferred to the Crown, a proclamation was issued declaring it to be the will of

Her Majesty that so far as may be, her subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to officers in her services, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity to discharge. Competitive examinations for admission to the Indian Civil Service had already been opened to Indians as well as Britons, and in 1870 it was further declared to be expedient that additional facilities should be given for the employment of natives of India of proved merit and ability in the Civil Service. Provincial services for sub-judges, deputy-magistrates, sub-engineers, etc., were, in consequence, formed, and almost entirely manned by natives of India. So that now the number of Britons in the Civil Service is so small that, as Sir John Strachey remarks, it is not the least extraordinary fact connected with our Indian Dominion that we should be able, with such a handful of men, to control the administration of so vast an Empire. Roughly speaking, less than 1,000 Englishmen are employed in the civil government of 230,000,000 of people, and in the partial control of 70,000,000 more. There is only about one British civil officer to every 300,000 of the population, and to every 1,200 square miles of country. Notwithstanding the constantly increasing demands for improved administration, the strength of the Civil Service recruited in England has been reduced during the last thirty years by over 30 per cent. During the same period the number of Indians employed in the executive and judicial service has gone on constantly increasing. Indians manage most of the business connected with the revenue and land administration; they dispose of the greater part of the magisterial work. The duties of the civil courts, excepting the Courts of Appeal, are almost entirely entrusted to Indian judges; an Indian judge sits on the Bench in each of the High Courts. For many years past Indian judges have exercised jurisdiction in all classes of civil cases over Indians and Europeans alike. Eight Indians sit on the Legislative Council of the Viceroy, ten on the Council of the

Governor of Madras, and eleven on the Council of the Governor of Bombay. Nearly every year three or four Indians pass into the Civil Service, and on two occasions Indians have been elected by English constituencies as Members of Parliament. Municipalities and local boards, manned almost entirely by Indians, have been established for the administration of local affairs, and now in our local affairs Indians have obtained, at the hands of the British Government, almost the same privileges as are enjoyed by the people of this country in the management of their local concerns.

When viewed over a long period, a vast amount has then been done towards admitting the natives of India to a share in the government of their own country. But the main service we can do them may, after all, prove to lie, not so much in training them for Government offices, and fitting them to take a part in political life, nor yet in carrying out material improvements in the country, intersecting it with irrigation canals, threading it with roads and railways, tying it together with telegraph lines, fostering its industrial development, and yearly increasing the volume of its trade; nor yet, again, in educating the people, in opening to their minds the gateways leading to all the wealth of Western science and Western culture—not so much in these directions may lie the chief service we may do the people of India as in affording them, by the peace and order we preserve, the opportunity for developing along those spiritual lines to which by nature they are best adapted.

Religion is the backbone of their national life. 'If there is any land on this earth,' says the religious reformer, Swami Vivekenanda, 'that can lay claim to be the land where humanity has attained its highest towards gentleness, towards generosity, towards purity, towards calmness, the land above all of introspection and spirituality, it is India. Hence have started the founders of religion from the most ancient times, deluging the earth again and again with the pure and perennial waters of spiritual truth. And here, again, must start the wave

which is 'going to spiritualize the material civilization of the world. . . . Here spiritual activity existed when even Greece did not exist, when Rome was not thought of, when the very fathers of the modern Europeans lived in the German forest, painting themselves blue. . . .' 'Each race has a peculiar bent,' continues the Swami; 'each race has a peculiar mission to fulfil in the life of the world. Political greatness or military power is never the mission of the Hindus. But there has been the other mission given to us: to accumulate, as it were, into a dynamo all the spiritual energy of the race, and that concentrated energy is to pour forth in a deluge on the world whenever circumstances are propitious. Let the Persian, or the Greek, or the Roman, or the Arab, or the Englishman march his battalions and conquer the world, and link the different nations together, and the philosophy and spirituality of India is ready to flow along the new-made channels into the veins of the nations of the world. The calm Hindu's brain must pour its own quota to give to the sum total of human progress. India's gift to the world is the light spiritual.'

These are the views of an Indian sage, only recently dead, spoken on his first return to India from a three years' mission in America and England, and they seem to me full of wisdom and insight. The ways of Nature are mysterious, and her ends are often accomplished by means for which they seem at first never intended. We were driven originally to India for nothing better than trade, to find the wherewithal to supplement our food and dress, and the adornment of our dwellings. But, having gone there, we now find ourselves the means of affording a highly spiritual people the opportunity to develop their peculiar genius, just as the Jews were able to develop their special gift under the Pax Romana, when they had that leisure and freedom from absorption in political affairs which enabled them to develop to the full their spiritual tendencies and found Christianity, while the communications the Romans established

facilitated the spread of the new ideas throughout the Roman world. The same conditions for spiritual development, and even greater facilities for the spread of spiritual ideas when developed, are afforded by the Pax Britannica in India, by the perfecting of intercommunication achieved by us, and by the spread of the English language, which not only puts the many varied races of India in touch with one another, but puts the whole of them in contact with the entire English-speaking world—with the United States as well as Great Britain, and with those numerous learned men of other European countries who speak our language. Great spiritual leaders are thus enabled to address audiences in England and America, and, through their published works, reach numbers who, except through the medium of the English language, would have been inaccessible. This opportunity for spiritual development may yet prove to be the greatest of all benefits we can possibly confer on India.

And in yet another way we may benefit the people. We pride ourselves on being men of action rather than of contemplation; of deeds rather than of words. We may, then, give the contemplative Hindus high, living examples, acted out in the flesh, of ideals as admirable to them as to us. The history of the British in India furnishes many a bright example of Englishmen honestly striving to practically work out in their lives the high ideals which were in them, and contact with such men may prove of more effective aid to a contemplative people than many a well-reasoned-out page of argument. Already the effect upon native Indian officials in Government employ, where they are brought much in contact with Englishmen, is very marked. Indian judges are acquiring the highest character for integrity, and I know of native States who, when they wish to employ an Indian official who can really be relied on and trusted, will seek him among those trained in the Government service.

We, of course, learn much, too, from the imperturb-

able suavity and unfailing politeness of the Indian. We are not immaculate patterns, with everything to teach and nothing to learn. But we undoubtedly put the vigour and strenuousness of action into a people rather too prone to spin logic, and the sight of stolid men practically working out their ideals has not failed to inspire the impressionable Indians. Spurred on, too, by the frank criticisms which in the rôle of candid friends we are often too free in offering, the Indians have during the last three-quarters of a century—since the time of Raja Ram Mohun Roy—shown a remarkable tendency to purify their religious ideals, to cast out the dross which their religion has accumulated in the centuries, and to get back to the true, pure ideas of the original founders. India is now quickening into an altogether fresh religious life. The materialism, which is already being discounted in the West, has never satisfied the Indian; movements are everywhere on foot to reawaken religious life. The Brahmo Somaj, founded by that real hero, Ram Mohum Roy, who braved all the persecution of social disfavour and bitter religious animosity in his efforts to purify his religion, and who died in a foreign land among the first Indians to visit England, has been carried forward by the eloquent Keshub Chunder Sen, pronounced by many competent men to be second only to the great Athenians as an orator. This movement represents the ideas of the Indians educated in English modes of thought, who, while unable to accept Christianity as a whole, are ready to absorb its essential spirit, while at the same time they reject all that is worse in Hinduism. Another strenuous moment is that inaugurated by the Swami Dyananda, resulting in the founding of the Arya Samaj. Dyananda was of the more typically Hindu stamp. He sought his religion alone in the Indian jungle. His only possessions were a loin-cloth, a wooden staff, and a begging bowl. He probably did not know a single word of English, and his religion was of what in a Christian country we would call the Old

Testament type; he tried to get back and to lead others back to the simple lives and the simple ideals of the old Fathers. The Vedas, the oldest sacred book of the Hindus, were infallible, and by them and by no other book must conduct be guided. He has recently died, but the movement has great vitality, and finds favour both with English educated clerks and old-fashioned chiefs.

These are some of the religious movements among the Hindus which have been in part aroused by their contact with the English, and facilitated by the peace and order which we have preserved in India during the last century. The reformers I have mentioned, and others besides, have infused new vitality into a religion which had long lain torpid; and if such men have arisen in the just immediate past, we may well expect that as great and greater will appear in the future to purify the religious life of the people.

By preserving order, by giving the people of India full opportunity to develop along the line most natural to them, and by ourselves affording them practical examples of well-worked-out lives, we shall best help the spiritually-minded Hindus. What, then, is to be our relationship with them? It is most important that we should have a clear view on this point, for this is the governing idea by which all our actions should be guided and tested. It is what we should have at the back of our minds whenever Indian questions are under consideration, and upon the clearness, accuracy, and intensity of it will depend our success in the management of India. For years we had the idea in regard to our relationship with the Colonies that they were like the fruit of a tree which must soon ripen and then drop off, and having this idea rooted in our minds, we thought it useless to make any effort to attach the Colonies to us. We can realize, then, how important it is in the case of India to avoid falling into a similar error through having in our minds a false conception of our true relationship with the people. What, then, is it to be?

No one in the present day would like it to be that of conqueror and conquered. We did not conquer India for the sake of conquest. We entertained no such design. We acquired it in spite of ourselves because circumstances, or, as some would rather put it, an all-guiding Providence was stronger than we were. And having thus won it, as it were, almost against our will, we have no desire that our relationship with the people should be that of conquerors to conquered, of master to servant. A more evident wish is that a paternal relationship should subsist between us, that we should be in a position of a wise, kind-hearted father looking after his children. But however appropriate this relationship may be in the case of young colonies, who really are the sons of the fatherland, it is scarcely fitted to the case of India. Our method of government is often paternal, sometimes even grandmaternal; but the people are not our children, except by adoption. Nor, again, are they our brothers. They may be very distant cousins, but it is at least unscientific to call them Aryan brothers.

Our relationship with the people of India should not be that of conqueror and conquered, and it cannot strictly be paternal or fraternal, but it can be, and it should be, that of manly comradeship. When we talk of having conquered India, it would be ungenerous of us to forget that it was with the aid of Indian soldiers, and it is with their aid that we now hold it, while we furnish the cohesive power which enables the Indian people to hold together and hold India, not only for us, but for themselves. On many a hard-fought battle-field Indian soldiers have proved themselves true comrades. No officer who has served with Indian troops in time of war looks upon the native officers as anything else but comrades. There is no civil official who, at the end of his period of service, does not look back upon his time in India without recollections of many an affectionate friendship formed with a chief, a great landholder, or a high native official. Even those faithful Indian

servants we get to look upon as real companions. They have stood by us in many a difficulty, and sympathized with us in many a private trouble. The hospitality of the people of India is unbounded and never failing. The great chiefs have always shown themselves ready to stand by us, even in the dark days of the Mutiny, and whenever there has been a scare of a Russian invasion, trouble in China, or disaster in South Africa, they have come forward with generous offers of assistance; while in times of great national sorrow both chiefs and people have shown a depth of sympathy such as could only come from a people having in them the essence of real comradeship. During the South African War, alike in Hindu temple and Mohammedan mosque, prayers were offered for the success of our arms. On the death of the late Queen the grief of the people was quite poignant, and throughout India was expressed with an intensity of feeling not surpassed, perhaps not even equalled, in our own country. How the Indian soldiers, on hearing of the illness of our King, straightway knelt down and prayed in the Bishop of London's garden, is well known. And as in times of sorrow, so in times of joy, Indian people are equally sympathetic. On each victory in South Africa telegrams poured in upon Lord Roberts from every part of the Indian Empire. There is no officer who has served there who will not relate how warmly he is congratulated whenever some distinction comes to him. And, speaking from my own experience, I can say that there are few moments in my life when I have felt as deeply moved, and which I shall remember with such ever-fresh gratification, as the moment when, leaving my escort on the return from Lhasa, the whole of the 32nd Pioneers came pouring out from their camp to cheer and shake me by the hand. I felt then, and many another officer has felt the same, that these Indian soldiers were real comrades, and they deserve to be acknowledged and treated as such.

The people of India, with their warm, responsive

natures, are essentially a people who may be so regarded. Who that has met that fine old Rajput Chief, Sir Pertab Singh, would ever think of treating him in any other way? Who that has served with Indian troops in time of war would look upon them in any different light? And in working, as we must, towards greater efficiency in our civil and military administration, we must be careful not to blight in the bud this delicate flower now just slowly developing, lest, when the race is run, we find in our hands the mere stalk only, while the fair petals have withered away. Efficiency is most necessary, but it is not an end in itself. It is merely a means, and only one of many, to an end. And if to attain it we sacrifice the feeling of comradship, we shall find India only loosely bound to us in the day of trouble; the zest and spring in the life of the people will be gone, and the fairest blooms of intellectual and spiritual development will never unfold themselves.

The idea, then, which I would venture to suggest as governing all other ideas regarding our management of India is this fundamental idea of treating the relationship between us and the people of India as one of hearty comradeship. And with this idea in our minds, let us realize the grandeur and sublimity of the task which lies before us in India, and when we have devoted a sufficiency of time to considering how best to improve our material position here at home, how to get our food and clothing cheapest and house ourselves most comfortably, and when we have likewise trained our minds sufficiently—then, when we find some leisure to think of what we intend actually to *do* in the world, what practical contribution we are going to make towards the general welfare of mankind, let us turn our thoughts to India and those three hundred millions of people whose destinies lie in our hands, and let us so *act* that when, in the dim distant ages, the final history of our race is written we may be known to posterity not merely as the nation which was most clever at buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets, nor even as the most

cunning inventors and mechanicians, nor yet as writers and thinkers only, but, in addition to and above all these, as the nation which most truly translated high thought into generous action, which infused a fresher, a healthier, and a more strenuous life into the millions of India, which brought out all the latent good that for centuries had lain dormant in them, and gave them such an impulse and initial guidance as had started them fairly along the path which leads to the highest pinnacles of human glory and attainment. We sought them merely for trade. We found them immersed in strife. If ever we leave them, may it be in that attitude most natural to them, with their arms stretched out to the Divine.

INDIA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

By SIR CHARLES CROSTHWAITE, K.C.S.I.

WHAT is India? I make no apology for answering the question in the words used by Lord Dufferin at the St. Andrew's dinner, Calcutta, on November 30, 1888, for they give the most vivid picture of what we mean by India that has been drawn in a few lines. 'It is an Empire,' he said, 'equal in size, if Russia be excluded, to the entire Continent of Europe, with a population of 250,000,000 souls. This population is composed of a large number of distinct nationalities, professing various religions, practising diverse rights, speaking different languages . . . while many of them are still further separated from each other by discordant prejudices, by conflicting social usages, and even antagonistic material interests. Perhaps the most patent peculiarity of our Indian cosmos is its division into two highly political communities: the Hindus, numbering 100,000,000, and the Mohammedans, a nation of 50,000,000, whose distinctive characteristics, whether religious, social, or ethnological, it is, of course, unnecessary for me to refer to before such an audience as the present. But to these two great divisions must be added a host of minor nationalities, though "minor" is a misleading term, since most of them may be numbered by millions, who, although some of them are included in the two broader categories I have mentioned, are as completely differentiated from each other as are the Hindus from the Mohammedans; such as the Sikhs, with their warlike habits and traditions, and their

theocratic enthusiasm; the Rohillas, the Pathans, the Assamesi, the Biluchees, and the other wild and martial tribes on our frontiers; the Hillsmen dwelling in the folds of the Himalayas; our subjects in Burma, Mongol in race and Buddhist in religion; the Khonds, Mairs, and Bheels, and other non-Aryan peoples in the centre and South of India; and the enterprising Parsees, with their rapidly-developing manufactures and commercial interests. Again, amongst these numerous communities may be found at one and the same moment all the various stages of civilization through which mankind has passed from the prehistoric ages to the present day. At one end of the scale we have the naked savage hillman, with his stone weapons, his head-hunting, his polyandrous habits, and his childish superstitions; and at the other the Europeanized native gentleman, with his refinement and polish, his literary culture, his Western philosophy, and his advanced political ideas; while between the two lie layer upon layer, or in close juxtaposition, wandering communities, with their flocks of goats and moving tents; a collection of undisciplined warriors, with their blood feuds, their clan organization and loose tribal government; feudal chiefs and barons, with their picturesque retainers, their seigneurial jurisdiction, and their medieval modes of life; and modernized country gentlemen, and enterprising merchants and manufacturers, with their well-managed estates and prosperous enterprises.'

And what are the territorial limits of the Empire which contains this microcosm, this history, like the growth of the embryo in the womb—of the development of the human race from primitive savagery to twentieth-century civilization? It is in form a huge triangular peninsula, the base resting on the great ranges of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush, and the apex stretching far down into the Indian Ocean, and dividing the Arabian Sea from the Bay of Bengal. To this must be added the great Province of Burma, which takes our boundaries up to the higher reaches of the Mekong, and

to the limits of Western Yunnan. From the base of the triangle to the apex at Cape Comorin the length may be taken at 2,000 miles; and the greatest breadth, from the western boundary of British Beluchistan to the eastern limit of the British Shan States, lying on the Mekong, is not less than 2,500 miles. Then there is a land frontier of some 6,000 miles on the west and north, marching with Persia and Russia, for we have made ourselves responsible for the Afghanistan frontier; on the east with China, with France, and with Siam. A seaboard of close on 4,000 miles has to be guarded by the navy of Great Britain—a seaboard boasting many great ports, of which Calcutta, Bombay, Rangoon, Madras, and Karachi alone are worth a nation's ransom, and represent many millions, not only of British, but of European capital. Such is the Great British Dominion in India—an object of envy and admiration to foreign nations, viewed with indifference and neglect by our own people. The great majority of the nation, by whose voice Great Britain is ruled and her destinies swayed, know little and care less about their Indian Dependency. As to the means by which this Empire has been won, there may be still some foreign politicians who believe in deep-laid schemes of colonial expansion, worked out by a succession of British Governments for the past three centuries. Here, in England, the popular idea would probably be found in the opposite direction. The result would be attributed to a series of fortunate chances and inexplicable accidents. There is some justification for both views. Until a long time after our power was established beyond dispute there was no settled plan of expansion in the minds either of the leading men in India or of the statesmen at home. They drifted on the currents which direct human affairs, and the great influences at work in the world, the predisposing conditions and favouring impulses, led them into port.

British power in India had its beginning in 1583, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth—a reign which laid the

foundations of so much of England's greatness. The seed from which the tree sprang was as a grain of mustard-seed. The success of the Portuguese in their commerce with the East had roused the envy of the merchants of London. Ralph Fitch, with five others, started overland on an expedition to India to gather information as to the value of trade with that country. He carried letters of introduction from the Queen to the Emperor Akbar, and returned, after travelling through Hindustan, with a knowledge of the possibilities of Eastern commerce which satisfied the London merchants that money was to be made in it. The Queen, however, from motives of political caution, probably for fear of annoying Spain, would not sanction their modest proposal to equip three ships for the East. For the time the design had to be laid aside; but it was not forgotten. In 1599, more than ten years after Fitch's return, an association—a syndicate it would now be called—was formed, and capital subscribed for opening up trade with the East Indies; and in 1600 a charter was obtained from the Crown, giving the association a monopoly of commerce with the East for fifteen years if it should prove advantageous to the nation, but liable to cancelment at two years' notice if it should not answer that condition. The capital was a sum of £38,000—a sum that in these days, even allowing for the difference in the value of money, would be thought insufficient for the establishment of a few penny steamers on the Thames.

Such was the small origin of the East India Company, which in olden times tradition might have consecrated by some picturesque legend. The Company, since it acquired territorial sovereignty, had exercised its great powers with wisdom, justice, and consideration for the subject races committed to its charge. It was gradually brought under the control of the Crown, and when, in 1858, after the meeting of a portion of its native army, it was commanded by Parliament to hand over to Her Majesty Queen Victoria the dominion which it

had acquired under charters first granted under Queen Elizabeth, it could surrender its powers with a good conscience, and with the proud knowledge that it had played a chief part in the raising of Great Britain from a small insular to a world-wide Power, and had won a great Empire for the Crown.

In the inception of the undertaking there had been no idea of acquiring sovereignty or territorial possessions. Trade and trade alone was the object. To export bullion or such goods as the East would take, and to bring back cargoes of spices and other produce which would fetch large prices in the London market, was the purpose for which the Company existed. It was not until 1615 that the Company, in which the Sovereign had hitherto manifested little interest beyond exacting as great a share as possible in the profits, received the first substantial assistance from the Government. James I. acceded to its petition that an ambassador should be sent from the Crown to the Great Mogul. Sir Thomas Roe was selected for the duty, and proved himself to be a worthy predecessor of the great diplomatists who have aided in building up the British power. He obtained substantial concessions—in the way of trade facilities—for the Company. His advice to those in whose interests he had been deputed is remarkable, as showing that leaning against territorial acquisition which has marked the policy of so many of the men who have governed India and who have added provinces to it under the Company and the Crown: 'To seek their profit at sea and in quiet trade, and not to affect garrisons and land wars in India.'

Such was Sir Thomas Roe's advice, which for the first half-century and more of its existence the Company, with short spasms of ambition, obviously inspired by Dutch example, studiously followed, striving after dividends, and setting its face against military enterprises.

How the rivalry of the several national companies and the utter absence of any respect for international

law forced the associations, ostensibly formed for peaceful trade, to become the masters of armed fleets and military forces; how the necessary acquisition of sites for trading stations and warehouses on land led to war on shore as well as on sea, and to the gradual extension of the area of occupation; how the inevitable collision with the native powers followed, to be succeeded in turn by fresh acquisitions of territory with rights of sovereignty, is an interesting story, and has been admirably told by Sir Alfred Lyall in his fascinating essay on 'The Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India,' and also less brilliantly, but well, by Marshman in his 'Short History of India.' To their hands I would confide the reader who seeks to inform himself on the subject.

It is only necessary for my present purpose to mention briefly the main conditions and movements in the tide of affairs which led to the establishment of our dominion in India as it stands to-day.

The first condition obviously necessary to the establishment of commerce between the countries of Western Europe and the regions which for convenience we may call the East Indies was maritime power. Hence, we find the Portuguese and Dutch the first in the field, after them the English, and later still the French. As soon as it became a question of armed rivalry between the Companies representing these countries, the issue resolved itself into a fight for command of the sea. The Portuguese fell out early in the struggle. Their ships were very roughly handled in 1611 by our vessels, and the reputation of the British Company as a sea power was established. Subsequently their people were cleared out of Ormuz and the Persian Gulf. In 1662 the island and dependencies of Bombay were received by Charles II. as part of the dower of the daughter of the King of Portugal. By him they were handed over to the Company, and thus a firm settlement was obtained on the West Coast.

The Dutch had been long established in the East

India trade, and were backed by all the power of their Government. They paid more attention, however, to the islands of the Malay Archipelago than to the establishment of settlements on the mainland. In Bengal their only station at first was Balasore, but afterwards they obtained permission from the Mogul's Government to establish themselves at Chinsura, a few miles from Hugli. Their power at sea was broken by their long wars with France and Spain. In 1759 they were foolish enough to listen to the overtures of Nawab Mir Jaffir, and to send a fleet of seven vessels with a mixed force of Europeans and Malay troops to attack the British in the Hugli. This attempt ended in the complete destruction both of the naval and land forces, and put an end to any further attempts on the part of the Dutch to molest the British Settlements on the continent of India.

The French were last in the field, but proved more formidable rivals. The French Company was established by Colbert in 1664, and formed a settlement at Chandernagore, and afterwards at Pondicherry. They were ably led by Labourdonnais, Dupleix, and Bussy, and entered upon schemes of much larger ambition than their rivals had conceived. Their idea was to form a military force, and take part in the quarrels of the native princes, giving their aid to the side that would pay them best. The English followed suit, and five years of hostilities almost exhausted the power of both Companies. There is no doubt that Dupleix came very near to founding a large French dominion in Southern India. But the French leaders were at variance among themselves, and were not backed up from home. Under Bussy the French maintained their own, and made considerable way until peace was established between France and England in 1783. When war broke out again the French lost command of the sea, and the maritime supremacy of England was established. The end of the French dominion in India followed of course.

Thenceforth the history of the growth of British power is the familiar story of the results of the contact of an organized government with semi-barbarous neighbours. That natural process has been going on ever since, and is still going on. As regards the interior of India, we appear to have reached a condition of firmness and stability which nothing is likely to affect. But can any man tell when, and in what direction, and how far, we may be compelled to advance our political, perhaps even our administrative, frontier?

The condition of India at the time when we had established ourselves in Bengal and removed our European rivals was eminently favourable to the advance of our power. If the Mogul Empire had been in full life and strength, the task might have been too difficult for us, and our expansion must have been less rapid. Even before the death of Aurungzebe in 1707 the central authority had been greatly weakened. His lieutenants had begun to usurp authority, and the Mahratta force was rapidly rising in the Deccan. The disintegration became rapid when the Emperor's sons fought for the throne. The invasion of Nadir Shah completed it. The power of the Mogul was dissolved. Anarchy and brigandage held sway in the land, and the peaceful portion—by far the majority of the people—were ready to come under any flag that could protect them.

The British dominion in India was the result, then, of great movements in the tides of human affairs in the West as well as in the East. It is noteworthy that both the Government and the men in power on the spot, so far from taking advantage of the favourable currents, set themselves to resist them. In 1784 Mr. Pitt stated that his first and principal object in his India Bill was 'to prevent the Government of Bengal from being ambitious,' and from aiming at further extensions. Hastings had no designs of the kind. At one time he wanted to relinquish all the Northern Circars. Clive, after conquering Oudh, in

a war wantonly provoked by the Nawab Wazir, gave the province back to him. He opposed any extension beyond the Karamnassa. Lord Cornwallis wished to withdraw from the Malabar Coast, and to reduce Bombay to the status of a mere factory. In 1782 Lord Shelburne, Prime Minister, proposed to give up everything except Bombay and Bengal. 'The dread of territorial expansion was, in fact, the prevailing bugbear of the day' (Marshman, vol. i., p. 463). There have been some indications in late events that the dread has still an active influence on the India Office and the Cabinet.

Before passing from the past to the present and the future, I would note the importance of remembering that we never conquered India in the sense that Rome conquered Gaul or Great Britain. There was no nation to conquer. Nor did we, as some appear to think, uproot ancient dynasties, and ruthlessly destroy old historical monarchies. Passing over the time when the various East India Companies were occupied in rending each other or in the occasional peaceful rivalry of trade to the period when the English Company had come out victorious and began to expand, there was not a power or principality of any sort in the whole peninsula which had been fifty years in existence. I revert to this point with the object of making it clear why there was not and is not, and, I might venture to say, never can be, without cause given on our part by insane maladministration, any sort of general feeling against us such as exists in Finland or in Poland against Russia, or as there was in the Netherlands against Spain.

In considering how our policy should be framed in order to maintain our dominion, it is well to bear this in mind. We have not to fear or to conciliate a spirit of racial hostility to the British Government on the part of the peoples of India, and such a spirit could only be created by such acts of folly on our part as would unite against us the heterogeneous races, castes, and religions of the peninsula. At the same time it must be remembered that we are in India

a handful of aliens, ruling nearly 300,000,000 of people, most of them willing, indeed, to be ruled, and only asking to be protected in their peaceful pursuits, and to be left in undisturbed exercise of their religious and social customs inseparably connected in their minds. It need hardly be said that in such a vast conglomeration of people of such diverse races and tempers there must be here and there strata of unruly spirits who would gladly exchange the plough for the sword and peace for pillage and rapine.

In every province of India with which I am acquainted there is scattered about a considerable element of this kind—the vultures waiting for the death of their prey. In British India proper there are few large landowners or chiefs who, in case of any accidental paralysis of the paramount power, could hold in check the forces tending to anarchy even within a fractional area of one of our provinces. Hence, I would lay down the provision of an adequate British army as the first and indispensable condition to the maintenance of the dominion. Fifty years ago Lord Dalhousie wrote to the Board of Control: 'Our Raj is safe from risk only while we are strong. We have not, like the Colonies, anything to fall back upon. We must be strong, not against our enemy only, but against our own population, and even against possible contingencies connected with our native army.' Writing to Vernon Smith in 1855, the same Viceroy said: 'I have told you that India is tranquil, and you have repeated my words in Parliament. But I repeat also again and again what I have said before (and I would that I could cut it into the flesh of Her Majesty's Ministers), that India is tranquil only because, comparatively speaking, we are strong. Weaken us, and India will be neither tranquil nor secure.' Such a warning at the present day would, I am happy to say, seem uncalled for and superfluous, not because the proposition is less true, but because the Mutiny burnt Lord Dalhousie's words into the minds of all men. I doubt if there is any thoughtful man, much

less any responsible politician, who would propose to weaken the British force in India by a single rifle.

I do not forget that the great works which Lord Dalhousie began in India—the railways and telegraphs—have multiplied our power of maintaining order. When I began my service in India in 1858, there were only three short and disconnected pieces of line completed, and to reach any of the outlying districts was a work of time and difficulty even for an active man travelling alone. Now there are thirty thousand miles of railway, and each year sees a further extension, while the country is served by telegraph lines almost as well as Great Britain itself. The improvement in arms of precision still further multiplies the effective value of every soldier. The forces making for disorder are less; there are no independent and possibly hostile Powers. There are no provinces restive under recent annexation. There are no arsenals in the hands of native garrisons. There is not even a field battery manned by Indian gunners. The population from one end of the country to the other is effectually disarmed.

On the other side of the account may be recorded several items of increased responsibility. The same extension of railways that multiplies our forces means so many thousand miles of line, so many great bridges, so many hundreds of white women and children, the families of the employés, to protect in time of trouble. Above all, the danger which fifty years ago was foreseen, but hardly called for action, and which even thirty years ago could be made, by a Secretary of State for India, the subject of a somewhat melancholy pun, is now the thing on the threshold. The frontier of the Empire is now the frontier of Afghanistan, and we might at any time be called to defend it. I recognise the admirable spirit of the great feudatory chiefs and their fidelity to the King-Emperor, nor do I doubt the loyalty and peaceful character of the people of India. Nevertheless, I am forced to believe that the foundation of our dominion is the maintenance of an adequate force

of British soldiers in India, and the absolute command of the sea. If anyone disputes this proposition, let him consider what would happen to Indian securities, public or private, if the Prime Minister announced in the House his intention to follow in India the precedent of Canada, and to recall the British forces. Or let him imagine a case more easily conceivable—the advent of a new army reformer whose ingenuity had contrived a scheme under which no reinforcements for India could be obtained.

I may be accused of tilting against an imaginary foe, and with some truth, for no responsible person, as I have said, has proposed, or would propose, to reduce the garrison of India. On the contrary, the Premier has declared that the work of the British army is the defence of Afghanistan. But I have noticed in some quarters a disposition to treat India in the case of an emergency as these islands were dealt with in the Boer War, and to trust everything to the civil police and a sprinkling of troops.

In maintaining that British power in India is founded on British bayonets, I am far from suggesting that force is its only support. It rests, if not primarily, at least equally, on its character for justice, toleration, and careful consideration of native feeling. I believe that if we turned aside from the path we have followed so long and consistently; if we adopted methods of religious propaganda or outraged caste prejudices—for example, if we enforced the reading of the Bible in the schools or let loose upon the country a body of enthusiastic sanitary experts from Europe—all the rifles that England could maintain would not suffice to keep the people down. We have had warnings of late years in these directions. In the early stages of the plague the Government of India pressed their measures of sanitation, especially in connection with police interference, beyond the limit of prudence. Fortunately, when they felt something hard they withdrew their hand and relaxed their pressure. The people were

wonderfully patient under it—more patient than they would have been a quarter of a century ago. But a sore, and among the ignorant a dangerous feeling prevails, as those working amongst them will, I think, admit.

If I am asked if there is no measure which can be taken in order to give our Government a deeper hold on the people, I reply that we cannot do better than go on as we have begun. Some may think that the time has come for broadening the foundations of our rule and basing it on a system of representation by election. This is one of the main objects of the Congress, a gathering of persons supposed to represent the different provinces, which has been held yearly for the last twenty years or more. Their platform is almost the same now as it was in the beginning: employment of natives of the country in all the higher posts (they already occupy all the lower); a representative body, elected by the people, with some power of financial control; the repeal of the Arms Act; liberty to everyone to become a volunteer. But there is one thing they have not thought fit to propose—the abolition of the British army, although they think that if they were allowed to volunteer it might be reduced. They know well that British rifles are required to defend the country and keep the peace while they practise their statesmanship upon it. They know also that if they were left to their own resources they would be speedily hunted out of their legislative palace, wherever they might have established it. It is impossible to take such a Congress seriously. The unsoundness of their proposals will be apparent to anyone who has realized the diverse and multitudinous elements to which British dominion alone has given any sort of unity. Their doings serve mainly to show the political immaturity of the present generation of educated Indians. If they refrained from sedition and exciting race hatred, one might laugh at them. But they have not always so refrained. Their loyalty is ostentatious, but some-

what one-sided. 'God bless the King, but look on every British soldier as a wild beast and on every English official in India as a tyrant, to be removed as soon as may be.'

Lord Dufferin, before he left India in 1888, indicated his desire to extend and place upon a wider and more logical footing the political status, so wisely given a generation ago by Lord Halifax, to such Indian gentlemen as by their influence, their acquirements, and the confidence they inspired in their fellow-countrymen were marked out as useful adjuncts to our Legislative Councils. During Lord Lansdowne's viceroyalty practical effect was given to this policy, and a certain number of members, elected subject to the approval of the Government, were appointed to the Legislative Councils, always retaining an official majority. The difficulty lay in devising constituencies to whom the nominations should be given. To the Universities, the Chambers of Commerce, groups of Municipalities, groups of District Boards as representing the land interest, this power was entrusted. At the same time, it was arranged that a statement of the provincial finances should be laid before each of the Councils. Perhaps the most important change, however, was the power given to members of asking questions under carefully framed regulations, designed to prevent its abuse by the mischievous. That the Government has derived much advantage from this reform, which enables it to explain its policy and prevent misunderstanding, is certain. And it is believed that the wise and reasonable amongst the leading men of all classes are gratified and pleased with this reform.

The question is whether the time has come for making further progress in the same direction. There are two possible courses. The number of non-official members may be increased so as to give them the majority, or the Councils may be enlarged by adding to the numbers of both classes without endangering the official majority. I do not think the first proposal can be

entertained for a moment. We cannot, without repudiating our responsibility for the good government of the country, put it into the power of a small number of men, who after all is said could not be held to represent the peoples of India, to control our powers of legislation, or dictate to us what laws we should or should not pass. If ever a time shall come, which I very much doubt, when such a measure of representative Government can be established in India, it certainly has not come yet, and is, in my judgment, very far distant. The second course is not open to the same objections, but it has little to recommend it. The Legislative Councils are large enough at present for the convenient transaction of business. A seat on one of them is rare enough to be valued as a distinction by men of position. If the numbers were increased there would be a danger of diminishing the value. I may add that in considering the question of taking any further step in the direction of an elected council, it should be remembered that to every man in India of high birth and old-established rank, whatever may be his race or religion, the idea of canvassing inferiors for votes, or even of proposing himself as a candidate for their choice, is repugnant.

I would say, then, Let alone any further searching after a more popular foundation of our rule. Confine our efforts to improving the administration in all its branches, search out the places in which it annoys and pinches the people, and make the working of the machine as little felt as may be. Above all, avoid increase of taxation, especially in new forms, even if improvements have to be foregone. The Finance Minister we desire in India is a man thoroughly acquainted with the details of the administration, who can tell where economies can be effected or improvements in existing sources of revenue made. A great financier, full of theoretical notions of the best way of raising the revenue, and bent on putting them into practice if he can, is a man by all means to be avoided.

Lord Curzon has done grand work in the direction I am advocating. He has examined nearly every part of the administrative machine, and has been able to inaugurate measures for remedying its defects. Owing to the adoption of the Currency Commission's recommendations, he has enjoyed an overflowing treasury. The prosperity of the last few years has raised the revenue of India to a sum that ten or fifteen years ago would have been looked upon as impossible. His predecessors have hankered after police and other reforms, but an empty exchequer made it impossible for them to realize their wishes. Lord Curzon fell on happy times and took advantage of them. But it must be remembered that the ample surpluses which enabled him to remit taxation and to improve the administration in much-needed directions are absolutely dependent on the agricultural prosperity of the country—in other words, on the continuance of seasons of abundant and well-distributed rainfall. For that reason I look with some apprehension on the great increase of recurring expenditure which some of the measures, especially on military reorganization, impose on the people. It will not do for every Viceroy to come out with a series of costly reforms which he pledges himself to execute. The financial question is the main one.

Seeing, then, that we have made ourselves responsible for the happiness and prosperity of this great territory, it may be asked, What have we done for India? In the first place, I would answer, We have given her peace. For the past century the King's peace has been established over the area under our dominion, extending with that area until now it overshadows the whole peninsula. The people were rending each other in pieces before the rise of the British dominion. Hindus against Mohammedans, province against province, chief against chief. Gangs of mercenaries and brigands were living on the peasantry, fighting on whichever side paid them best. The state of the country in the middle of the eighteenth century, after the invasion

of Nadin Shah, about the time when the British Dominion began to take form, is thus described by Marshman. The prestige of the Mogul Empire 'was irrevocably lost, and the various provinces ceased to yield any but a nominal obedience to the throne of Delhi. In the extreme south the Mogul authority was extinct—in the principalities of Tanjore, Maduza, and Mysore. The Nawab of the Carnatic recognised no superior. The Government of the Deccan was shared between the Nizam and the Mahrattas, and the Mahrattas had recently extended their ravages to the gates of Delhi. In the provinces of Guzerat and Malwa the authority of the Emperor was trembling in the balance. The Rajas of Rajputana had ceased to be the vassals of the throne. The Subahdars of Oudh and Bengal acknowledged the Emperor as the source of authority, but yielded him no obedience. Even in the immediate vicinity of the metropolis new chiefs were, as the Mohammedan historian remarks, beating the drum of independence.' Contrast this picture with the peace that now reigns over the whole face of the land, broken occasionally, it may be, by local squabbles of rival religions, which are easily and promptly suppressed, and are important only as indicating that the fire of fanaticism is not extinct, and might blaze out again if our hand were removed.

In the second place, to this dust-cloud of people who from time to time have suffered so much from persecution and intolerance we have given religious freedom. Every one is at liberty to follow his own form of religion, no matter what its nature may be, provided always that the great laws of morality and humanity are not outraged. All missionaries are free to preach and teach their doctrines, but no form of religious teaching has the support of the State, except for the needs of its own servants.

In the third place, we have established civil liberty and justice, as between man and man, to the best of our ability. I speak conditionally, because it has been neces-

sary from the first to employ the people of the country in all but the highest posts. It was not to be expected that habits of corruption and partiality could be eradicated at once. These defects, however, have been gradually removed by the spread of English education, by a more liberal adjustment of salaries, and by throwing open the road to higher advancement to the judges. Speaking of the provinces with which I am personally acquainted, with the exception of Burma, which has not been long enough under our influence, cases of corruption amongst the judicial and magisterial officers are rare. At the present time there is an Indian judge on the Bench of each of the High Courts, and they have amply justified the trust reposed in them by their uprightness, industry, and ability.

As to civil liberty, I believe there is no country in the world, certainly there is none in the East, in which a man can live his own life with greater freedom than in India, unmolested by officials of any sort. If he likes to indulge in a certain amount of sedition, he can enjoy that amusement without much fear of interference. Freedom of speech and writing is unfettered within the bounds of a very generous law. It may be asked how this view is reconcilable with the statements of the Police Commission, whose report has lately been published. With a police so oppressive and corrupt, how can real liberty and freedom exist? My reply is that, although each instance of oppression or corruption brought forward by the Commission may be true, yet the result is an exaggerated picture, which gives a very misleading view of the true state of affairs. These iniquities undoubtedly occur. But over what area are they spread? over what period of time? how many of the vast population do they affect? What police in many parts of Europe would come better out of such an ordeal? If it were announced that a Commission was to be appointed to hear evidence of complaints against any branch of the administration—the land revenue, for instance, or the courts of justice—it is probable that in India, where

people are much influenced by private enmities and grudges, and are not particularly accurate in what they say, a similar case might be made out. I do not for a moment deny the need of police reform. There are few of the recommendations of the Police Commission that have not been before the Imperial and Provincial Governments for years past. They have had to be laid aside owing to want of funds. Lord Dufferin certainly would have carried out many reforms, but a falling exchange deprived him of the means. India and Lord Curzon may be congratulated that the money is now forthcoming, and that these measures are now possible. I have only referred to the matter here because I wish to make it plain that, in my opinion, the freedom and happiness of the people have not been seriously affected by faults in the police administration.

Fourthly, it may be claimed that the British Dominion has given India the blessing of light taxation. 'There is certainly,' writes Sir John Strachey in 'India' (p. 119, third edition, 1903), 'no country in the world possessing a civilized Government in which the public burdens are so light. The taxation falling annually on the population of British India is about 1s. 9d. per head. If we were to include the land revenue, it would be less than double that amount, but this would be no more reasonable than, in a similar calculation for our own country, to reckon as taxation a large proportion of the rent paid to private landholders.' The land revenue for 1905-1906 is estimated at £19,468,700. This represents the share of the produce of the land which belongs of ancient right to the Government. The land of India is a national asset the possession of which saves the people from taxation. Some of our modern patriotic politicians in India endeavour to make out that the British Government takes more than was exacted by its predecessors. At first our assessments, as we had no guide but the rent rolls of the Governments we succeeded, were excessive. As soon as experience taught us, the assessments were reduced. Increase in the area under cultiva-

tion and in the value of agricultural produce and in irrigation, has justly led to an increase in the total land revenue. But the tendency has been to reduce rates. There has been, as the Government of India reported in 1902, 'a progressive reduction of assessments extending throughout the last century and becoming more instead of less active during its second half' (see 'India,' by Sir John Strachey, p. 125, third edition). What was the state of things before our rule under the potentates whose example is held up to us? The revenue was, as a rule, farmed, and there was no limit to the exactions of the farmers but the ability of the peasants to pay. They were often stripped of everything and left without food. This is what Bernier says in his letter to Colbert written about 1650: 'The country is ruined by the necessity of defraying the enormous charges required to maintain the splendour of a numerous Court and to pay a large army maintained for the purpose of keeping the people in subjection. No adequate idea can be conveyed of the sufferings of that people. The cudgel and the whip compel them to incessant labour for the benefit of others, and, driven to despair by every kind of cruel treatment, their revolt or their flight is only prevented by the presence of a military force.' This is the description of a foreign eye-witness who had no motive to exaggerate. When we began to establish our rule a century later things were not much better.

Fifthly, I would point to what has been done for the material advancement of the country. We found it without roads—much in the state of China at the present time; nothing but ordinary cart-tracks, difficult and heavy at all times, in the rains impassable. There are now good roads (although still too few) in every district. There are 30,000 miles of railway, well and economically made, and paying, on the whole, more than 5 per cent. on their capital cost. They have been constructed partly from revenue, but mainly from funds borrowed by, or on the guarantee of, the Government of India. It cannot be pretended that these undertakings

are any addition to the burdens of India. It is true that the interest on the capital borrowed in England has to be remitted, and therefore adds to the excess of exports from India, which some persons consider to be a drain on her resources and a tribute paid to England. So far, at least, as the interest on the railway capital is concerned, no argument should be needed to show that it is merely payment for value received, and is only a small fraction of the profits accruing to the country from the cheapening of carriage and the opening up of markets, and the hundred ways in which railways, directly or indirectly, contribute to comfort and wealth.

Next to the railways may be ranked the great irrigation works which have done so much to enrich the country, more especially the northern provinces and the Madras Presidency. Up to the end of 1904-1905 the capital expenditure on productive irrigation works, which are expected to pay at least the interest on the capital outlay, was, in round numbers, £24,000,000. The interest on that sum at 4 per cent. is £960,000. After paying that interest and all working expenses, the net profit on these canals in 1903-1904 was £975,800. To the end of 1903-1904 there had been constructed 8,790 miles of main canals and 26,236 miles of distributaries, commanding and protecting 29,000,000 acres of culturable land. The direct net return to the public revenues amounted to 7·99 per cent. on the capital outlay. The profits to the peasantry who cultivate the irrigated land and to the country generally are very great. Take, as a notable example, the Chenab Canal, which cost something under £2,000,000. The value of the crops raised annually by irrigation from this canal is estimated at more than £3,000,000, almost the whole of which is directly due to the canal, for the land previously was of very poor quality and used mostly for grazing goats and camels. The Irrigation Commission has recommended a large outlay on new works. Three grand projects in the Punjab, which will cost about £5,500,000, have already been

sanctioned, and the Government of India are ready to grant money freely to carry out the Commission's recommendations. Besides these productive works, nearly £2,000,000 have been spent on irrigation for protective purposes without expectation of a return, and some of the Irrigation Commission's proposals are of this character. On these works there is, and must be, a heavy loss. As a rule the water they supply is not wanted in good seasons, and, having no perennial source, is liable to run short in drought. Expenditure on irrigation projects that will not pay at least the interest on the capital cost does not appear to me to be wise. At any rate, while there are profitable schemes to be carried out, all the money at the disposal of the Government should be reserved for them.

Space does not permit me to enlarge on what has been done in the way of legislation to protect the peasant from eviction and exactions when he holds from an intermediary landlord, and not directly from the Government. Suffice it to say that from 1859 to the present time there has been a succession of measures for the protection of the cultivator. Security of tenure and a fair rent have been recognised as no less important for the prevention of famine than irrigation. Hardly a Viceroy has left India without an addition to the Statute-Book in this direction.

What we have done for India in the way of postal and telegraphic communication must be known to everyone. I do not think that there is any Post-Office better administered than that in India. There is certainly none which carries letters for a halfpenny. The postal-order system is admirable, and is the greatest boon to the people. The person to whom money is sent has not to travel to the Post-Office to get payment. The money is handed to him at his door by the postman. As there are hundreds of thousands of men serving or working away from their homes and sending remittances to their families, often in out-of-the-way villages, the convenience of this system, which has the full confidence of

the people, is obvious. Besides this there is the Post-Office Savings' Bank, the deposits in which increase yearly, and now amount to nearly £9,000,000. It should be added that this great administrative system is carried on by an establishment of natives of the country, with only a few Europeans at the head. The work is done with extraordinary efficiency, honesty and economy. The Post-Office officials of India need fear comparison with no similar body of men. They are an honour to their country.

Much might be said of the efforts of the Government in the cause of education. I have referred to their success in raising the standard of honesty and duty in the public services. The subject, however, will be dealt with separately in this volume, and I have not enlarged upon it for that reason, not because I do not reckon it among the great benefits conferred on the country by British rule.

On the whole, I think it may fairly be claimed for the Government of India that it has worked hard and successfully, and with a single mind for the good of the people. The old gibe that if the English left India nothing but broken beer-bottles would remain to commemorate their rule has become mere foolishness, if it was ever anything else. If a peaceful and well-administered country, if thousands of miles of railways and of fertilizing canals, can afford a monument of our dominion, we may rest content. But if we were to be driven out of India to-morrow, and no European Power were ready to take our place, it is sad to think that these great works might soon fall to ruin and pass away, and that strife and anarchy might reign instead of peace. What we may hope would not altogether pass away would be the teaching inculcated by centuries of good and humane laws, and by their just administration to poor and rich alike. That teaching must have some lasting effect and influence on whatever Government might be set up in our room. It is impossible, however, to contemplate a catastrophe of

this kind, so long as Great Britain and Ireland have any life left in them.

As to what we can do for India in the future, we must go on, as I said in dealing with the aspirations for political progress, as we have been going, not attempting any great novel or heroic reforms, but watching, mending, improving in every direction. The greatest reproach that can be brought against us by our most hostile critics is the recurrence of famines. Why has not this powerful and prosperous Government prevented the constant return of famines, with the ruin and mortality they involve? Simply because the Government is not omnipotent and is unable to cause the heavens to open and the rain to fall. The prosecution of irrigation works can do comparatively little, as the areas that suffer most are not provided by Nature with snow-fed rivers that can be depended on for a supply of water in years of drought. It must be borne in mind that India is an agricultural country. There are cities with famous names that attract attention, and to the cursory observer obscure the great fact that the country rests on agriculture alone for its life and prosperity, and that this agriculture is dependent, and must be dependent, on the seasons. More than 90 per cent. of the total population is rural. If a man could sail in a balloon from Cape Comorin to Peshawar he would see, broken by tracts of forest and hills, a vast cultivated plain, dotted over with villages a mile or two, seldom as much as three or four, apart. The towns would hardly attract his eye. There are reckoned to be 2,035 towns in all India, of which 1,401 do not contain as many as 10,000 inhabitants. Over the whole area of 1,560,160 square miles, in which much waste and forest land is included, there are 184 persons to the square mile. In the more populous parts the number of persons to the square mile is from 400 to 600, and even more. It is impossible to hope that, under such conditions, and with a population always marrying and giving in marriage, famine will not follow drought as surely as night follows

day. No Government can do more than spend the resources at its command, including the lives and energies of its officers, in relieving and feeding the people. This the Government of India has done and will do, and the British servants of the Crown have given themselves with a devotion beyond praise to the humane task.

If it is desired to prevent famines in such a country the remedy is either to supply the people with means of employment and livelihood other than the tilling of the soil, or to induce them to emigrate until the population falls to a number that the land under all circumstances can support. The latter remedy, which has worked automatically in Ireland, must be ruled out as impracticable in India. There remains the former. Have we done all that is possible in this direction? Technical education is talked of, and has to some extent been provided. No doubt it is a good and necessary thing. But works and manufactures on which the technically educated are to find employment must be provided. Capital will not come to a country to establish ironworks, to build mills, to introduce new industries, merely because a certain number of persons have received some education in these matters. Is there an example of a poor agricultural country succeeding in establishing its own manufactures and industries, in the face of the organized competition of richer and older nations, without a certain amount of Protection? The success with which cotton-mills have been established and worked in more than one industrial centre in India under absolutely Free-Trade conditions may be quoted against me. But, after all, they afford a mere drop of industrial employment in the ocean of agriculture.

I have no desire here to enter upon the vexed fiscal question. But it is my belief that famines will not be prevented until industrial employments have been provided for large numbers of the people; and the question whether this can be accomplished without a certain degree of Protection needs to be very seriously examined.

If Mr. Chamberlain's scheme for tariff reform and for preferences to our Colonies and Dependencies ever comes to anything, India will have to be dealt with on the same terms as the Colonies. That is to say, she must enjoy equal fiscal freedom with them, and be allowed to work out her own salvation. Moreover, should a council or conference of the Empire be called hereafter, she cannot be excluded from it.

There are men in India of high birth and sober, reflecting statesmanship who would adorn a seat in such an assemblage, and whose advice would be of real value. It may be added that by such means more could be done to tie the people to us, and to make their natural leaders feel that they were regarded as having a rightful voice in affairs of State, than by any measures of so-called self-government and premature representative institutions, which would only spell conflict and disaster.

If we turn to the other side of the account, and ask what India has done for the United Kingdom, there will be little difficulty in showing that she has paid her debt. The possession of India has converted England from a small island Power into a world-wide Empire. In India we have the main links of our commerce with the Far East. We have the complement of that great chain of naval and coaling stations which give us a command of the sea which no other nation can boast. Our dominion in India, moreover, makes us much more powerful as a military nation than we should be without it. The 70,000 British troops and 200,000 Indian soldiers do not count for nothing. It is true that they are for the most part tied to India and set apart for her service, but in case of emergency they can be drawn upon with effect. Witness the 10,000 British troops sent by India to Natal in the Boer War, and the 20,000 Indians despatched to Pekin during the Boxer riots, at a time when England could hardly have found a man for this service. Everyone knows what an incomparable field India has afforded for the training of our army. Without this field our officers and men would

have lacked much war experience. Even when there is no actual fighting the circumstances of the army of occupation require it to be in a state of readiness and efficiency that makes Indian service of greater value as a training for the soldier than ordinary duty in England, even under the present active conditions.

If it is an advantage to a nation to have before its eyes the example of brave and devoted men (and what else can raise us from the parochial dust in which most of us grovel?), then we owe much to India. Since the days of Lord Clive, and even before that, 'India,' as Mr. Pitt said in eulogizing Clive, 'has been fertile in heroes.' If we were to wipe out from the scroll of English history the men who have made great names as soldiers or administrators in our Indian service, the list of our heroes would be meagre indeed. The names of Stringer Lawrence, Ford, Eyre Coote, Clive, Warren Hastings, Thomas Munro, Baird, Ochterloney, Mountstuart Elphinstone, Malcolm, and a shoal of others; and, in more recent times, Charles Napier, Henry and John Lawrence, John Nicholson, John Jacob, Herbert Edwardes, Donald Stewart, and Lord Roberts, who is still with us, might have been unknown to fame. And then there are the great Viceroys, who could have found nowhere else a field fitted for the exercise of their abilities. Men like Lord Wellesley, Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning, could have shown their capacity as rulers of men nowhere so well as in the Government of our great Dependency. It may seem a paradox to say that we are indebted to India for the great Mutiny, which has been well called the 'Epic of the Race.' The Mutiny has proved to us what our countrymen can do in the face of great odds and terrible hardships. More especially it reminds us that the women of these islands can be at least as brave and heroic as the men. When we are sickened by the pictures of the women of England drawn by the modern novelist—especially the female novelist—it is good to be able to turn to the scenes of fifty years ago within the battered

defences of the Lucknow Residency, and to know that our wives and daughters are of the same blood, and that the women of Shakespeare and Walter Scott still live amongst us.

But to turn to more sordid considerations. The employment in the civil administration which India offers to some of our best young men is not without its value to the nation from a pecuniary point of view. But in that respect it is not a matter of much concern. The whole Indian Civil Service consists of about eleven hundred members. If it were closed, the competition in the home professions would be keener. but the class that provides the successful candidates would not be left without careers possibly more remunerative than service in India. In other directions the nation would suffer, although it might not be conscious of its loss. It is a gain, I think, to the whole country to have a number of capable men sent yearly to India, where they are not only trained in the best administrative school in the world, but have their minds opened by contact with wider conditions, with greater problems, and with a variety of races and religions. Although when they retire on their pensions some of them may be bores, and a few may be little better than Jos Sedleys, yet the greater number are men improved by discipline, by responsibility of a character hardly understood in England, and by long experience in the work of ruling men. The little leaven must have some appreciable effect on English character and opinion.

If we seek to appraise the purely pecuniary value of India to England, we must look at the trade returns. Everyone in England knows that no tribute, direct or indirect, is derived from India. She recovers from her Dependency all expenditure on the upkeep of the British forces in India and a contribution towards the cost of the East India Squadron. But if it is taken into consideration that the maintenance of seventy thousand men in India makes recruiting for the British army generally more difficult, and that the responsibility of

reinforcing the army in the East and of keeping open the sea communications necessitate a larger military and naval budget, it might be argued that the balance was not in favour of the ruling nation.

But when we turn to the trade, the enormous value of the Indian dominion from an economic point of view becomes apparent. Of a gross trade which now approaches two hundred millions in value, the share of the United Kingdom was 40·5 per cent., exclusive of the very large supplies from Government departments and State railways, which are a British monopoly. Of the import trade, the United Kingdom accounted for 64·9 per cent., the nearest competitor being Germany, with 3·9 per cent. Our merchants and manufacturers do not need to be reminded of the value of this great market. Nor are they forgetful that if another Power held the door it would be promptly closed to them. In India they have a fair field and no favour. If even a small preference were given to them they might monopolize the trade. Whether it would be for India's benefit to give an advantage to British trade is another matter. It is not my intention to offer an opinion on the question, which could not be discussed within the limits of this paper.

In conclusion, I would observe that in any scheme of Imperial federation India is bound to take a conspicuous place. Dependency though she is, she is a great country —a country whose greatness is growing. Although necessarily subordinate to the Home authority, the Governor-General in Council, which is the legal description of the Government of India, will, I am convinced, become yearly more independent as Indian interests are more clearly defined and public opinion, not only of the educated Indians, but of the resident Europeans and of the great English services, gains strength. It will become more and more impossible to impose on the Government of India any measure which is not conceived in her interests, or to over-rule, without refer-

ence to Parliament, its deliberate and well-considered judgments.

Nor need such a result be viewed with apprehension. The greater her independence, the more she will be able and willing to do for the Empire at large. Her fighting men will be at the disposal of the Crown, and I am certain that we could always raise a considerable force of the best military races for service abroad. Our Indian troops were eager to take part in the Boer War, and they would readily go to China, or Egypt, or Africa if they were called upon. It is for us to see that the rightful position of India is recognised, and frankly accorded to her. Let her grow on her own lines. Decentralize the Government as much as possible, looking forward to the time when each of the great Provinces will be more and more independent – governed and directed, indeed, by the Viceroy, but freed from interference in all matters not of great importance in principle or policy. An India thus constituted will be divided, as it were, into water-tight compartments, and will form in the future one of the strongest links in the great British Empire.

THE FRONTIER QUESTION

By COLONEL SIR THOMAS HOLDICH, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E.

When people talk of the Frontier Question they usually refer to that question which concerns our position on the frontiers of India with regard to Russia. There are many frontier questions, some of them of far more importance locally than the doubtful eventuality of a contest with Russia for the right of occupation of Afghanistan or Tibet; but no one minds them—in England, at any rate—and we shall probably not be far wrong if we confine the subject-matter of a short article to a summary of what Russia might accomplish in the way of menace to India and what reply we could effectually make. A residence of some years in Afghanistan, which has enabled me to visit all the chief provinces and strategical points of that interesting country, and a more than general acquaintance with the fighting tribes of the Indian frontier, acquired during twenty years of exploration and surveying amongst their rugged hills and stony plains (occasionally in close connection with members of the Russian topographical staff), has naturally led me to form conclusions from a standpoint which at least possesses the merit of originality. I accordingly offer them for what they may be worth.

It surprises me, in the first place, that there should still be men of light and leading who are actually *afraid* of Russia—afraid that, with her vast resources of men and money, and with the development of her railway

system to the borderland of Afghanistan, she could really peril our security in India by an advance in force from the Oxus. We will for the moment set aside the fact that she has been disastrously beaten by a comparatively small Asiatic power, and is in no position to risk another failure in the Asiatic field, and confine our attention to that which she might accomplish on the borderland of Afghanistan on the supposition that she has recovered from the war with Japan; and then consider what should be our military policy as her action gradually develops. It is usual to take for granted the statements of military experts that Russia's capabilities as a military Power are vastly in excess of our own, and that she could, if it pleased her, distribute a force of 500,000 men at the termini of her Central Asian railway system on the Herat frontier and on the banks of the Oxus facing Afghan Turkestan without much difficulty. There is no reason to doubt this possibility. She has done even more than this in Manchuria at the end of the long single line traversing Siberia. On the other hand, we have no reason to suppose that the quality of the troops destined to take the field against Afghanistan and India would differ greatly from the quality of the army (drawn chiefly from Asiatic sources) which has over and over again proved itself incapable of holding strong defensive works against direct attack on the part of the Japanese; although we have often heard of late years from the lips of those who make a special study of such subjects, that direct attack against scientific defensive appliances must prove to be in future an impossible factor in modern tactics. There is no doubt, indeed, that military developments have tended to increase the power of defence out of all proportion to the power of offence in the field of action, and that there was ample justification for such a forecast. What are we to suppose, then? That the Japanese are a superhuman development as a fighting power in the world's arena—a race of natural soldiers such as the world has never seen; or that they are but ordinary

mortals united by the bonds of patriotism, and animated by a spirit of self-sacrificing devotion to duty, bred and inculcated by their peculiar national creed and customs, which renders them invincible when opposed to the heterogeneous masses of a half-hearted army? The latter is the more probable supposition. The Russians have fought bravely, as they always do, but ineffectually, and they have lost positions time after time which, by all the rules of the modern war game, should be pronounced impregnable. There is no sign that at the present moment the Russian army is really formidable in aught save numbers. As regards numbers, we see that, though their resources are great, they are by no means unlimited. The great area of Russian territory alone requires vast numbers to garrison it and to preserve peace within its borders. The number available for aggression is relatively small; and in any large force there would necessarily be many who are soldiers but by virtue of their uniform — half-trained conscripts from local sources. I have seen many of them on the Russian frontier. The question is, Are they good enough for an offensive campaign against Afghanistan? If Afghanistan were unsupported from India, indifferent as they may be, the answer must, I think, be a modified 'Yes.'

It is a very great mistake to ignore the Afghan army. It is a matter of history that patriotism, unity of sentiment, and devotion to duty, have hitherto been lamentably deficient in Afghan armies; but if the morale is bad, the material is excellent; and nothing but the utter ineptitude of Afghan leaders prevents the Amir from possessing as efficient a fighting force as any in the East. We do not know, indeed, at the present time what the result of twenty-five years of careful nursing may be. The impulse of religious belief and inborn love of independence may have easily developed something akin to real patriotism. I worked with Afghan troops on the borders of Kafristan in 1895, and I could mark a distinct change, both in sentiment and

discipline, which had been effected by fifteen years of peace amongst men of the same clan as those who had formed my escort in Herat in 1856, or who had acted as friendly guides in 1879. The *métier* of the Afghan is that of the irregular marksman. He is often a splendid shot, and no European troops could ever hope to compete with Ghilzai or Hazara mountaineers amongst their own hills in a defensive campaign. Ten thousand Afridis, it may be remembered (I had special opportunities for estimating their numbers), kept 40,000 British and Indian troops well employed in Tirah, and there is little to choose between the Afridi and his Afghan neighbour. The Amir of Afghanistan could certainly put 200,000 irregular riflemen (armed with modern weapons) into the field if he chose to do so, and he has at his command a very efficient force of mounted artillery to support them. In short, it would be a serious mistake for us to imagine that we could make our way to Kabul now with the same comparative ease that we did in 1878. Tirah has taught us differently. Why, then, should we say 'Yes' at all in answer to the question of whether the ordinary stamp of Russian frontier troops would be good enough for an invasion of the northern borders of Afghanistan? It is because we cannot contemplate the possibility of Afghanistan possessing a General of the Oyama type, or officers trained like the Japanese; and the first great move would be over the open Oxus plains, where strategic ability would a good deal more than counterbalance the irregular activity of Herati or Kateghani horsemen, and where the agility of the mountaineer would be useless. So far as Afghan Turkestan is concerned, we may take it for granted that, from the crossing of the Oxus, whether by bridge or by ferry, a Russian force moving across the wide plains of Turkestan (where there is little to break the monotony of the open view but the purple lines of waving grass which mark the course of canals, with a few widely-scattered blotches of village orchards, and those mounds of the now desiccated Balk plain, on

which villages from prehistoric days have sought refuge from floods), until it faced the remarkable crack in the great Elburz wall, which forms the narrow way to Haibak, would encounter no opposition worth reckoning. On the Herat side, again, to the west, the mountain ridges separating the Herat valley from the rolling Chol about Kushk are not formidable. Herat itself, with its gigantic earth ramparts and mud-wall construction, is quite capable of offering a resistance which might prove formidable with a properly-organized defence; but there would probably be no organized defence, and we must assume that the Herat valley occupation would be but a matter of weeks. From Herat to Kandahar the way is open. It is the most open way to be found Indiawards in all Asia, and it is here that we must look for the chief concentration of advancing forces. Russia, however, we may fairly presume, knows her business better than to try to *rush* India. Any such attempt would end in disaster. We must expect, rather, that she would move slowly, consolidating her position, occupying the chief towns of Turkestan; and, inasmuch as neither the resources of Herat nor of all Afghan Turkestan put together could support 200,000 troops for long, she would have to develop a railway system behind her advance. So far, then, as Afghan Turkestan, her success would probably be assured; but this would not greatly affect the military situation as regards India. It would be but a warning for preparation.

We purposely omit all references to military movements farther east than Afghan Turkestan or Badakshan. They could not be more than demonstrations at the most, and space is wanting for their consideration.

The Kabul line of advance from the Oxus presents geographical difficulties the instant that Tashkurghan is passed southwards. Then commences that solid barrier of mountain conformation culminating in the Hindu Kush, which, through all ages, has been Kabul's buffer land and protection; and the bridging of

which, from Alexander's days till now, has formed epochs in history. But we are now dealing with new conditions, with railway communications in support of vast bodies of men, and with modern scientific methods of defence in mountain country. No force that ever yet existed—Japanese, Chinese, Mongul, or European—could force a way across that barrier if properly defended. It never has been properly defended. We may admit that southward from Tashkurghan to the northern foothills of the outer ridges of the Hindu Kush progress could be made slowly, even with railway construction. We may also presume that progress farther would be carried along the lines of weakest resistance to the open spaces that exist in Gori or Anderab, and that the passage of the Hindu Kush would be attempted only at such a point as history marks to be the most practicable. Even so, the northern base of that great multiform, rugged, and inaccessible series of ridges which form the Hindu Kush, rising from 11,000 to 13,000 feet above sea-level, would mark the end of all railway-making; and beyond this the force that hopes to reach Kabul must be dependent on the ordinary convoy method for supplies over mountains blocked with snow for several months in the year, and offering opportunities through at least 100 miles for that deadly form of raiding and breaking up of communications in which the European proves himself to be but a child in the hands of the mountain-bred native of the frontier. If the Afghan is taught his business properly, the occupation of Kabul by an advancing foe from the north may be written down as relegated to past history. It should never happen again. On the Herat side to the west it is different. There the steady progress of a considerable force supported by a railway is practicable as far as Kandahar, provided there is sufficient development of water-supply along the route. There are large towns in western Afghanistan (Sabzawar, Adraskand, Farah, etc.), all of which are centres of a certain amount of cultivation, and all would contribute their share to the

support of an advancing army. Even beyond Kandahar (which is strategically but little stronger than Herat) there is little opportunity for serious check, excepting at the Kojak, until our main line of defence at Quetta has to be faced. Thus it is always well to regard the Herat-Kandahar line as the line of least resistance for India—the line on which defensive strategy is chiefly to be considered and matured. In connection with this, the alternative line from Herat to Quetta viâ Sistan is not to be lost sight of. It is a possibility which must ever be taken into account. The point to be insisted on is that the strategic value of Quetta in these days largely exceeds that of Kabul. Quetta is the real key to India, and, knowing what we know now about 'impregnable' defences, no money and no amount of scientific skill can be wasted that is applied to the purpose of bringing those defences up to modern requirements in the matter of guns and equipment. We should take our lesson from Port Arthur, although the fate of that now historic fortress need not make us nervous. Had the Japanese been inside, and the Russians the besiegers, would the latter ever have taken it?

So far I have roughly outlined the probable progress of a Russian invasion of India. Recent events have placed the probability of such an attempt almost beyond the bounds of possibility for many a year to come. For another quarter of a century we have little to fear. But the Frontier Question we have always with us. It will still agitate a certain class of politicians, and to them it will always be a matter of intense interest to know, under such circumstances, what our reply should be to Russian movement.

We talk easily in the first place of Russian millions in men and money as if we had no millions of our own. Russia, all told, can only muster about 150,000,000 of people. We have nearly double that population (290,000,000) in India alone, and it is with India just now that we are concerned. It is true that of our

290,000,000 a very large proportion are people of unwarlike races that could not be guaranteed for purposes of soldiering. But the same may be said of Russia. In all large communities the proportion of the warrior caste must be comparatively small. Certainly we could enumerate districts in India containing 50,000,000 of people where good stuff for soldiering can be found; and that is numerically sufficient for our purpose. Next, it is argued that we may have the numbers, but not the trained efficiency. The forty odd millions of Japanese are not (taken as a whole nation) a fighting people. We have seen what they can do when their hearts are in it after but a short period of actual military training. It would take no longer to turn the Afghan into a good fighting unit than the Jap, provided he believes in his leaders and means to fight. My belief is that it would not be necessary to depart from the principle of a voluntary army to obtain all the force we want; but were conscription necessary for the purpose of meeting Russia, it would be accepted by the Asiatic far more readily than it would be by the Englishman. It would be regarded more or less as a necessity not to be discussed or questioned.

A war with Russia would be a popular war with the native soldier. It would be to the great majority of them the realization of their military ambition. They are always talking about it—not only in India but beyond our borders. The spirit which animated a newly-raised battalion of Gurkhas who, not long ago, deserted in a body when they found they were not to be led at once against the Russians, is the spirit of the whole Indian army to a greater or less extent. *We* are afraid of Russia. *They* are not. Like the Japanese Minister, they would claim that fear of Russia is one of the things they are not prepared to share with us. Long before the Russians had done with Afghan Turkestan, we ought to possess an Indian army quite equal to any quasi-European army that Russia could raise. But, once again, it will be said that we must have a European

force to fight a quasi-European foe. This is a matter of sentiment, but it involves to a certain extent the implication of a mistrust of Indian troops. This is obviously not the place to discuss the relative merits of British and Indian soldiers; but let me say, at least, that I trust that the silly nonsense which is sometimes talked about 'stiffening' the native army with British bayonets is a thing of the past. They want no stiffening. I am fully convinced that there would be no difficulty in raising the strength of the native armies of India to 500,000 men if India was in peril of invasion, and to this force we could surely add 150,000 British troops to take the field chiefly on the Herat-Kandahar line.

What could Afghanistan do? At a very moderate computation the Amir could put a force of 150,000 men of all arms into the field, including excellent light infantry and artillery for mountain work, as well as a fair contingent of serviceable and irregular cavalry—cavalry, that is to say, better mounted and equipped than the average Cossack, but not so amenable to discipline.

At present Afghan troops, however excellent the raw material may be, want discipline, drill, and leading; and that they can only obtain by the importation of instructors from outside Afghanistan. These they will probably get, either in the form of British or Japanese officers, but time will be required for such outsiders to get on good terms with their men, and for the men to understand their instructors. The young British officer is unmatched in the world for his capacity to turn raw material into good fighting stuff; and here probably is foreshadowed the chief difficulty in the solution of the frontier problem. Where are officers to come from? The supply which a few years ago seemed to be inexhaustible already shows signs of failing. The spirit of unrest and discontent which now pervades the service in India is such as has never before been known, and it is ominous of future difficulty in filling up vacancies which will rapidly occur. Indeed, there are not

wanting symptoms on all sides that it is the ranks of the officers, rather than those of the men, that are likely to fail in numbers.

If, then, we can ensure troops enough, and guns enough, to meet any problematical force that Russia can put into the field, what should be our military policy for the defence of our frontier? Should we resist *à outrance* the first violation of Afghan territory? Should we wait till Russia has consolidated her position in Afghan Turkestan—which does not much interfere with us—or should we wait still further till she has overcome Afghan opposition, and is threatening our own borders? All military authorities who know and understand the frontier and the nature of frontier people alike condemn a waiting policy. We must take action from the very first, and there should be a sound understanding with the Amir as to what that action will be. This is necessary for many reasons, but *not* because we are afraid of a rising in India. There would be no rising, no agitation, even, of much consequence induced by a forward movement on the part of Russia, provided that we made proper use of our power of control over the native press. India generally is essentially loyal, and believes that nothing good is to be expected from Russian rule. It would take a series of very severe reverses to shake the confidence of the native troops in the British 'izzat.' Those who talk about a 'rising' should remember that, even in the dark days of the Mutiny, there was no rising of India generally, or we should not have been there now. Nevertheless, our prestige would demand action, and it is not difficult to forecast what that action would inevitably be. There is not much choice about it. The occupation of Afghan Turkestan would be resisted by the Afghans ineffectually. It would stir up the fiercest spirit of outraged independence amongst the Afghan people, and we should run the risk of sharing more or less the general obloquy if it were not made absolutely clear to them beforehand that we should not, and could not, under any circumstances support a cam-

paign so far removed from our own frontier as Afghan Turkestan. We could, however, and we should, give the Afghans all the support possible south of Afghan Turkestan—such, for instance, as the services of British officers supplementary to those appointed as instructors; and even a contingent of native troops specially trained in mountain warfare, such as the Gurkhas, to form and hold strong positions of defence in the Hindu Kush, and to harass and worry the line of advance on the side of Herat. An advance in force on our part to Kandahar and Jalalabad (the latter place is the most important strategical position on the Khyber route to Kabul, for it dominates more than one route Indiawards) with railway communication completed to those important centres would also form part of the practical reply to Russia's movement forwards. No such reply on our part would be resented in Afghanistan. On the contrary, if we were to sit still and do nothing, we should run the risk of rousing the fiercest indignation amongst the warlike races of that country. Knowing something of the temper of the Afghan people, both in the east and west, I have no doubt about the necessity of such preliminary action. Whether we should advance in force further than Kandahar or Jalalabad, as Russian movements developed, would depend on so many variable factors in the situation that it would be absurd to offer a decided opinion. We should certainly assist in repelling any attempt to cross the Hindu Kush, if such an attempt were obviously serious; and we might find much better positions beyond Kandahar than are offered by that fortress for delaying, or finally staying, advance on that side. On the whole, I am inclined to think that we should *have* to move in force, and that we should find little difficulty in doing so. If British officers are to be associated with Afghan troops in future, it is obvious that they cannot be withdrawn at the time when they are most needed. The damage done to our prestige by recall would be too serious to contemplate; and if our officers were involved in an

anti-Russian campaign, our soldiers would expect to be asked to support them in the field. They would not commit suicide like the Japanese because they were not allowed to go to the front. They would do worse: they would become actively, and perhaps mischievously, discontented.

And what would the end be? If we did not succeed in forcing Russia back to the Oxus, there would be nothing left for our military politicians but the partition of Afghanistan with the Hindu Kush as the buffer land—the long-contemplated conclusion to the Frontier Question in Asia. As to our remaining on our own borders, quietly awaiting the time when Russia, having conquered Afghanistan and absorbed its fighting races, should attempt the invasion of India from the Indus Hills, it is not to be contemplated by any sane politician who has the smallest acquaintance with the geographical configuration of the Indian trans-frontier and the temper of its fighting races.

If Japan has not, however, settled the Frontier Question for us, she has, at least, deferred its practical solution by force of arms *sine die*. Russia has not gone completely mad. With her huge army badly beaten in defensive tactics, it is beyond belief that she should contemplate aggressive action against another host which, we may confidently predict, would be her equal in numbers, and her superior in national cohesion, if not in scientific resource. Who can tell what may occur in the next quarter of a century? Japan and China may create an absolutely new phase in Asiatic politics, and we may find the means at last of effecting an agreement with Russia on such a basis of mutual advantage that it will no longer be worth her while to break the peace. Such an agreement, we are told, is outside the pale of practical politics. It is difficult to understand why this is so —but that is another question. It may be answered sooner than we expect by a reconstituted and reorganized Russian Government.

THE INDIAN ARMY

By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR EDWIN H. H. COLLEN, G.C.I.E., C.B.

At no period of our history has it been more imperative than at the present time that those who believe in the Empire should understand what its constituent forces are, and how these can be applied to the maintenance of its security. The days of isolation of the Mother Country are sped, never to come again; but the task is one of enormous difficulty, requiring years of labour and the efforts of many minds, both of statesmen and of soldiers. Unless we apply ourselves earnestly to it, in a patient and scientific spirit, we shall never achieve that which should be the aim and object of this long and laborious work, the safety, peace, and honour of all the dominions over which the Sovereign of this island-kingdom rules, whether by his Lieutenants and Viceroys, or through the constitutional Governments of those great countries oversea, united to us by the bonds of race, religion, speech, interest, and sentiment.

In all the discussions which have taken place since the war in South Africa upon the vital subject of the defence of the Empire, at least three main points stand out sharply above all the mists of doubt and detail gathering round them: the need for an army for service oversea, capable of large expansion, the powerful help which can be given by the armed forces of the self-governing Colonies, and the fact that the defence of the land frontier of the Empire means the defence of the

land frontier of India. It is true enough that the defence of India has long been recognised as the essential military problem of our times. Statesmen and soldiers who have made this question their study, who have been connected, whether for long or short periods, with England's great Eastern dependency, have over and over again pleaded for a just consideration of the military claims of India. By precept and by practice, a long and distinguished succession of Governments of India have endeavoured to establish the doctrine, and, although the full measure of our responsibilities has not always been taken, even in the East, efforts have been steadily, if gradually, made to give effect to the principles of defence. But until quite recently these things have been dealt with from the Western point of view, in an insular and isolated fashion. 'India must look to herself, and no doubt we shall come to her aid if she is hard pressed, as we have done before. So long as we supply her with drafts for her normal garrison, she must be content to rest assured that we shall do our best when the time comes, if it ever does come; but we cannot make any promises. We may have to stand against enemies in our own gates, and we must be careful not to encourage false hopes. India has great natural barriers, and she must make the most of these'—and a great deal more to the same effect. This sort of argument has now somewhat fallen into the background, but its supporters are still not inactive, and they have been reinforced by the fact that the military Power, Russia, whose outposts have been pushed nearer and nearer to the Indian border, has sustained a series of defeats from a people small in numbers, but animated by lofty patriotism, by the courage which despises death, and by a long-sustained effort to organize their forces for victory. There is a very simple reply to those who do not believe in the possibility of Russian aggression in Afghanistan. Russia has undoubtedly lost heavily in military power and prestige in Asia, and this fact, and the probable change in her domestic institutions, may

operate to prevent her from troubling us for some time to come. But of this there is no certainty, and we must not overlook the possibility that Russia, after a period of recuperation, will profit by the lessons she has learned, and emerge with far greater military strength than she possessed before the war. Undoubtedly all this will take time. Russia cannot recover, and reorganize her military system, in a day or in a year. Our position in the East is also immensely strengthened by the recent treaty with Japan. We shall have breathing-time for our own task, and that task is so to organize our own forces that we may be able to reinforce India, and other possessions, in such a way and to such an extent that we may insure the safety of the vast country which has been committed to our keeping. Such a policy is perfectly consistent with an endeavour to establish an 'understanding' with Russia. It makes for peace, and not for war.

It is fortunate that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has proclaimed more than once, in clear and unmistakable language, that the problem of the British Army is the problem of the defence of Afghanistan—in other words, of the defence of India. If that declaration is thoroughly pressed home into the national mind, then it must follow, as the night the day, that, despite all difficulties and opposition, we shall obtain, although not without infinite toil, a military system which will enable us to rise to the height of our responsibilities. It is, then, of the first importance that the people of England should understand what the Indian Army is; what its evolution has been; its characteristics; how far it meets the conditions of the problem; what has been done to render it capable of performing, with the aid of the support which must be forthcoming from the central power of the Empire, the task which may be before it; what the lessons are which we may learn from the past; and that they may be able to judge with impartiality whether we are on the right track in our efforts to render it a more efficient military weapon.

Before attempting to describe what the army in India is, let us consider for a moment the nature of the task it has to undertake. It is not merely the defence of India or of Afghanistan, whichever way we like to put it. It is the active defence of India, and, added to that, the maintenance of order within India itself. And if we remember that the area of India is 1,870,000 square miles, that the frontier line is about 6,000 miles long, that its length from north to south is some 1,900 miles, and its breadth from east to west about the same, and that the population of India is 300,000,000, we may form some idea of the magnitude of the problem. Now, this vast population, consisting mainly of those who, in one form or other, adhere to Hinduism, and of Mohammedans, the great preponderance being on the side of the Hindus, is of the most varied character, just as the language and the characteristics of the country are varied. Amidst plenty of peace-loving folk desirous of living and dying as their forefathers did, there are elements of violent disturbance, and the stupendous natural upheavals which have produced the terrible catastrophe we have lately lamented are only emblematic of the explosive forces which lie beneath the fair and tranquil surface. It is a common saying amongst experienced men who know India well, that 'we are living on a volcano'; and this is said by those who have the greatest affection for their native fellow-subjects, but who know that there exists, and must exist, in the vast congeries of peoples and races, and tribes and castes, those who are dissatisfied with British rule, and who are ready to work on an inflammable material. We have had plenty of disturbance in past times, and must expect it in the future. Fanaticism, religious bigotry, and extreme credulity are potent enemies to peace and order if the power of control is weakened or removed; and although they may be jeered at as alarmists, there are many shrewd observers, some of whom have had long and intimate contact with the people, who are inclined to

think that, with the process of assimilation of Western ideas which is going on, the respect for authority is being lessened rather than increased. However this may be, few will be found to deny that the every-day task of maintaining the *Pax Britannica* throughout this immense Empire is no light one, and that it will be tenfold heavier whenever war beyond the frontier causes the depletion of our garrisons.

The regular army in India embraces both British and native troops, the former in round numbers some 74,000, and the latter 157,000 with a small reserve of 25,000, and a total of 486 guns. But just as in this country we have a second line of militia, yeomanry, and volunteers, so in India there is a second line of European volunteers, Imperial service troops, militia, and military police, numbering about 76,000. We see, then, that the total regular army, British and native, including the reserve, is 256,000 strong, and the second line 76,000. The reserve is to be increased to 50,000, and might be further enlarged. If we choose to put it in another way, we can say that the British Army and volunteers number 106,000, the regular native army and its reserves 182,000, and the native auxiliaries 44,000. Of the British portion of the regular army it is unnecessary to say much. The cavalry regiments, batteries of artillery, and battalions of infantry relieved periodically from home maintain in India the splendid traditions of the regular army—an army which has won victory for England in every part of the habitable globe—and keep up the admirable regimental system which has survived all the changes of the last and present century, and is admitted to be the best training-school for the officer or private soldier. The units of the British force are maintained at high strength, because they must be ready to take the field, and a further increase in that strength would be most desirable.

The regular native army comprises batteries of mountain guns, sappers, cavalry, and infantry. It draws its recruits from the North-West Frontier and beyond for

DISTRIBUTION AND STRENGTH OF BRITISH AND NATIVE ARMIES AND AUXILIARY FORCES IN INDIA

Commands.	British Army.										Native Army.							Auxiliary Forces.			
		Artillery.								Cavalry	Artillery.										
	Cavalry Regiments	Horse Artillery Batteries.	Field Batteries.	Heavy or Position.	Mountain Batteries.	Garrison Companies	Guns	Royal Engineer Officers	Infantry Battalions.	Body Guards	Regiments.	Northern Mountain Batteries	Frontier Garrison Companies	Guns.	Sappers and Miners Companies	Indian Submarine Corps	Infantry Battalions	Reserves.	Volunteer Corps.	Imperial Service Corps	Militia Corps and Battalions.	Military Police Corps.
Northern - -	3	4	9	3	5	3	120	91	14	—	15	7	1	42	4	—	44	10,908				
Eastern - -	3	3	15	3	—	6	120	95	17	1	11	1	—	24	5	1	26	5,435				
Madras - -	2	2	9	—	—	1	66	28	6	1	3	—	—	—	9	—	31	3,276	66	33	6	21
Western - -	1	2	12	1	3	9	102	46	11	1	10⅝	—	—	—	9	2	31	5,223				
Burma - -	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	4	—	—	2	—	12	1	1	7	—				
Total - -	9	11	45	7	8	21	408	260	52	3	39⅝	10	1	78	28	4	139	24,842	66	33	6	21

The Madras Command is now the Ninth (Secunderabad) Division.

Commands.	British.					Native.					
	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Royal Engineers.	Infantry	Total.	Cavalry.	Artillery	Sappers and Miners.	Infantry	Reserves.	Total.*
Punjab	1,881	3,619	91	14,460	20,051	9,411	3,725	585	39,775	10,908	53,496
Bengal	1,881	4,522	95	17,550	24,048	7,018	1,393	708	24,072	5,435	33,191
Madras (Division)	1,256	1,968	28	6,188	9,440	1,839	37	1,569	26,185	3,276†	29,630
Bombay	627	4,178	46	11,358	16,209	6,673	1,575	1,398	25,197	5,223	34,843
Burma (Division)	—	290	—	4,132	4,422	—	680	170	5,931	—	6,781
Reserves	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24,842
Auxiliary forces	—	—	—	—	32,000	—	—	—	—	—	44,500‡
Total	5,645	14,577	260	53,688	106,170	24,941	7,410	4,430	121,160	24,842	227,283

British troops		74,170	
Auxiliary forces (volunteers)		32,000	
			106,170
Native troops		157,941	
,, reserves		24,842	
Auxiliary forces: Imperial service troops		18,000	
Auxiliary forces: Militia		6,000	
Auxiliary forces: Military police		20,500	
			227,283
Grand total			333,453

The 'levies' in the Punjab and Baluchistan, numbering about 4,000, are not included, as they are not officered by Europeans or enrolled as military bodies.

* Reserves not counted in Command total.

† Includes Burma.

‡ Imperial service troops 18,000
Militia corps 6,000
Military police 20,500
Total 44,500

Patháns, from Nepal for Gúrkhas, from the Punjab for Sikhs and Punjabi Mohammedans, and from the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh for Hindustanis—both Hindus and Mohammedans. The Western or Bombay area furnishes Mahrattas, Rajputs, and some Mohammedans, while the Madras territories are now called upon to furnish only a few men, Tamils (Hindus) and Mohammedans. The centre of military activity has shifted more and more to the north, and the tendency is to draw to a much larger extent upon the resources of that part of India. And to complete this brief summary, the whole army, British and native, is now divided, according to the latest scheme, into three large Commands—the Northern, Eastern, and Western, with divisional commands in Southern India and in Burma. These territorial Commands are again divided into divisional areas, and the troops are eventually to be organized into mobile divisions, leaving other troops for garrison purposes, and to form movable columns to maintain order. The accompanying tables show the strength and distribution of the military forces (see pp. 668, 669).

The history of the evolution of the native army and of its organization can hardly be told in a few words. It abounds with dramatic incidents, and in lessons for the future, but it cannot be done full justice to here. The French taught us to enrol and discipline natives to fight our battles, and as we gradually advanced from our bases at the seaports we drew to the colours, not only the inhabitants of the conquered countries, but adventurers in the shape of Patháns, Rohillas, Rajputs, and others from more distant lands. Field brigades were organized, then divisions, until at last, just before the Mutiny of 1857, we had 311,000 native troops, forming, with the European forces, 40,000 strong, three 'presidential' armies, and various local forces and contingents. These separate armies, belonging to the presidencies of Fort William in Bengal, Fort St. George in Madras, and Bombay, had grown up into almost independent forces.

In those days of great distances, unshortened by rail and telegraph, it would have been impossible to have had one army directed by a central authority. Campaigns, reorganizations, mutinies, followed in rapid succession. The Nepal War gave us the Gúrkha soldier, and the Punjab Wars the Sikh; but we crowded the ranks of the largest portion of the army with high-caste Hindus, and a tremendous military revolt shook India from one end to the other. An overgrown and amalgamated army, dangerous centralization of authority, the weakness of the European force, religious fears bred by ignorance, credulity, and fanaticism, and our blind following of Western patterns and ideals, were the main causes which prepared the way. The Sepoys seized upon the new cartridge made up 'agreeably to instructions received from home,' to declare that the lubricatory material was a mixture of the fat of pigs and cows intended to destroy alike Mohammedans and Hindus, and became convinced that their religious safety lay in joining the standards of rebellion, and in exerting their utmost efforts to overthrow the dominion of their alien masters. The career of the East India Company had been 'from factories to forts, from forts to fortifications, from fortifications to garrisons, from garrisons to armies, and from armies to conquests,' but this chapter of history had now closed upon them. The Crown assumed the government of India, and after the Mutiny was quelled a period of reconstruction followed. The local European forces were merged into the general army; the native armies were reorganized on the 'irregular' system, under which there were but few British officers in each regiment; a Staff Corps was formed; but in creating a new Bengal Army, the Madras and Bombay armies, the Punjab frontier force, and the Hyderabad contingent, all of which had done admirable service in putting down the rebellion in a series of arduous campaigns, were maintained as separate entities. The minds of men were concerned with so framing the new plan that another outbreak might have no chance of success. But by

degrees the warnings of the Mutiny faded away, the Bengal Army had become unwieldy, and was fast tending to an amalgamation of material, and it was only in 1879, when the Afghan War was teaching us a sharp lesson, that those who believed it to be possible to have a better system of administration, with a more scientific and a more secure plan, were able to obtain a hearing. Things did not move fast, a great deal of discussion took place, and it was not until 1895 that the Bengal Army was divided into two parts, or Commands—the Punjab, with its Pathán, Sikh, and Punjabi regiments; the Bengal, with its Hindustanis—and the Madras and Bombay armies allotted to the areas to be known as the Madras and Bombay Commands; while the Commander-in-Chief in India was given full powers over all, with the intention that he should delegate to the Generals commanding the forces in these great territorial areas a large measure of initiative and responsibility. Since 1879 immense progress has been made in every branch of the army and in every department appertaining to it. Increase of the army by 10,000 British and 20,000 native troops, reserves, linking of battalions, establishment of regimental centres, the amalgamation of hitherto separate presidential departments, the creation of Imperial service troops, increase of pay to the native army, reorganization of recruiting, re-armament, elimination of inferior material, introduction of the double-company system in the infantry, complete reorganization of the transport, increase to the supply and transport corps, establishment of mounted infantry schools, formation (1886) of a plan of mobilization and its development, completion of frontier and coast defences, reform of horse-breeding, remount, and military account departments, institution of an ambulance corps, a great development in the manufacture of warlike stores, and continuous improvements in the sanitary service of the army—these are some of the measures which were carried out prior to 1903, from which year a fresh departure took place in the unification of the army, and a further 'reorganization' was

initiated under the auspices of the present Commander-in-Chief in India, Lord Kitchener.

Before these new schemes are discussed, it will be well to consider, although necessarily with brevity, what are the characteristics of the material of which the native army is composed; for it is this material to which we have to trust largely in the hour of stress and peril, and our plan of reorganization must be based upon a knowledge of its conditions and capability. Let us first look at the main constituents of the army—Patháns, Sikhs, Punjabi Mohammedans, Dogras, Gúrkhas, Jâts, Hindustanis, Mahrattas, Rajputs, and Madrasis. There are other classes from which we draw recruits, but these are the main elements. Of these, the Patháns and Gúrkhas may be called 'foreigners,' as they do not belong to British India, although many Pathán tribes dwell within the British borders. Patháns are physically fine men, and, as soldiers in our ranks, brave, loyal, and devoted. The merits of Gúrkhas are well known. They are brilliantly courageous, cheerful, staunch, and dogged. The Sikh is a splendid soldier in physique, in character, and resolute bravery. Neither he nor the Gúrkha could pass examinations or reach a standard of education such as some think should be exacted of all soldiers, but both have the true soldierly instinct, and no finer soldiers can be found. The Punjabi Mohammedan is an admirable soldier—although the quality varies with the particular tribe—sturdy, brave, and with many martial instincts. The Dogra from the lower Himalayas becomes an excellent fighting man. Jâts, mainly from the Delhi territories, furnish good material. Hindustanis, Brahmans, and Rajputs still produce good soldiers, but have fallen from their high estate since the days when we conquered India with their aid. The Rajput is not the soldier he once was, but is still capable of doing good service when well led. The Mahratta, once the fighting man of the Deccan, who did such fine service under Wellington, seems to have lost much of his military virtue; while the

Madras soldier, whether Tamil (Hindu) or Mohammedan, is no longer the soldier of our early history in India. When we think of all that these men have done for us—of how Wellesley's Madras battalion fought at Assaye, of the story of self-devotion at Arcot, and of 'Who will follow a damned black fellow?' as the little Madras Sepoy shouted when he dashed over the ground swept by the storm of battle—it is impossible not to regret the decay of the military spirit. But peace and civilization, as well as our own neglect, have been the contributory causes, and we have to face the situation. To some the solution would be to have none in our ranks but Patháns, Sikhs, Punjabis, and Gúrkhas. To others this seems to be a most dangerous doctrine, and probably the true remedy is to be found in steering the middle course, and by careful selection endeavouring to get the best men from the areas longest under our rule, as well as from the northern countries. Of one thing we may be quite certain—we can never have material of a uniform standard of excellence, and what we have to do is to look to it that we improve what we have got.

Now, these classes and races group themselves naturally into the northern, eastern, western, and southern areas of India. The key of the policy which, after many years, led to the reorganization of 1895 was decentralization, power of mobilization, with the more complete segregation of the races. It was to be one army divided into four watertight compartments—the Punjab, Bengal (or Hindustan), Bombay, and Madras. It was found by experience that, for example, Sikh regiments degenerated, and were prone to assimilate with other elements, when quartered long away from their homes. There was to be no 'localization' in the exact sense, but so far as was practicable the troops were to be stationed in the main area from which they were drawn. The idea was not merely the preservation of the balance of power, which all history has taught is necessary in dealing with mercenary Asiatic armies, but to introduce a simpler and decentralized system; not to focus every-

thing at the far-off headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, but, while putting him at the head of the whole army, to delegate responsibility to high and powerful commanders of the forces. In fact, to make the chief command one over four armies, call them what you will, instead of having independent local armies, and in the case of Bengal dangerously overgrown and amalgamated.

The statesmen and soldiers who supported this 'reorganization,' with long experience of India and the character of the people, were fortified by every incident in the military history of India, in their desire to preserve the country from the dangers of an immense amalgamated army. They felt, too, that from these four or five commands (for Burma was to be separate as at present) would spring the field army in due proportions, which could be mobilized more easily from these areas, each with its own military resources, than from a huge military force, unified and governed by a central power. The native soldier does not enlist from any sentiment or patriotic feeling; he may come from a fighting stock, but he passes under our standards because soldiering is a good trade, and his pay and pension are assured. The reorganization of 1895 made for safety and mobility. The men were not disturbed; the Sikh knew he would be for the most part within hail of his home and under Generals, great and lesser, who would identify themselves with him and his country. And so it was with the others.

The first step in the abandonment of the principles which had held the field for so long was made in 1903. The regiments of cavalry and battalions of infantry were re-numbered and re-named, so as to get rid of all territorial connection. The object aimed at was to have one army in India, and not four bodies in one army—a complete reversal of the older policy. The next step was to abolish the Southern or Madras Command, and practically the Madras army, substituting regiments recruited from northern races for the Madras

battalions, with the exception of ten battalions maintained at a reduced strength. The re-distribution of the army, which is understood to be largely due to Lord Kitchener, although it has been often discussed before, and put on one side owing to its great cost, is an attempt to organize the army in units of command similar to those in which it would take the field, as follows:

	Divisional Commands.
Northern Command ...	Peshawar, First Division. Rawal Pindi, Second Division. Lahore, Third Division.
Western Command ...	Quetta, Fourth Division. Indore, Fifth Division. Poona, Sixth Division.
Eastern Command ...	Meerut, Seventh Division. Lucknow, Eighth Division. Secunderabad, Ninth Division.

The idea is that each divisional area shall furnish one fighting division, subdivided into three brigades, to concentrate the main portion of the army in large cantonments, and abandon a number of the smaller stations. There will also be some separate troops on the North-West Frontier, at Aden, and a divisional command in Burma. No details are as yet available showing how far the concentration will go, but as a division consists of one cavalry and three infantry brigades, and divisional troops such as artillery, sappers, and pioneers, besides other auxiliary services, it is evident that the redistribution will involve a heavy building programme. From a strictly military point of view, the troops should be actually concentrated in divisions; but there are many reasons of the strongest kind against such an arrangement. In a country of the vast extent of India it would be out of the question to have troops at nine points only, and the real question is, does the advantage of concentration compensate for the disadvantages? The troops cannot always be training. In the hot weather most of the British troops should be away

in the hills, while the native soldiery require liberal furlough to visit their homes, and their wives and families. This is an essential condition of the existence of the native army, a married army with the families living in distant homes. Under the previous arrangements field divisions were drawn from particular areas, but not symmetrically. That was impossible. Some of the divisions, but not all, could have been trained together in the cold weather, under the Generals who would lead them in the field, and have had all their stores and transport at hand: but they could not be actually concentrated, and neither under the old nor the new plan can the troops, the units, always be the same, as there must be changes of station in relief.

The whole thing turns on the degree of concentration. Let us take an example. The present Eighth (or Lucknow) Division has its headquarters at Lucknow, with a brigade at Fyzabad; a second brigade distributed between Cawnpore, Allahabad, and Benares, hundreds of miles apart; a third at Calcutta, the capital of India, and seven hundred miles from Lucknow, embracing garrisons and outposts from Dinapore to Darjeeling, and from Buxa Duar, on the Bhutan frontier, to Cuttack in Orissa, on the Bay of Bengal; and a fourth brigade in still more distant Assam, and distributed in various stations and outposts for the protection of a frontier liable to the incursions of savage tribes. To call the troops stationed all over this immense area a 'division' is, of course, merely calling old things by new titles. If there is to be reality, then this division must be concentrated at least in brigades, and that will necessitate the withdrawal of garrisons not merely from unimportant places, but from points of which some are of vital importance; while unless the whole country of Bengal and Assam is deprived of military garrisons, no further concentration can take place, and no training as a 'division' can possibly be undertaken. The excessive concentration of troops in India has hitherto been regarded as inex-

pedient. It is certainly not desirable from the health point of view, nor is the association of large numbers of native troops desirable, having regard to their own comfort, and political and economic conditions. If the formation of class brigades of native soldiers be intended, then it cannot but be regarded as a most unwise and dangerous experiment, while the withdrawal of troops from a number of stations means that the civil power will have to rely more and more on the police. These are some of the objections which present themselves. On the other hand, the policy of reasonable concentration instead of dispersion has been followed since the Mutiny days, as railways developed and conditions changed. It is a military advantage to have formed bodies of troops ready to take the field, and to increase the field army from 100,000 to 140,000, irrespective of Imperial service troops. But advantages may be purchased too dearly, and it ought to be shown exactly how the troops to be left behind are organized in movable columns and garrisons, and the effect upon the native troops carefully ascertained, as that is a matter of vital importance. Above all, we must be assured that true mobility can be attained, and that the army is preserved from the centralization which was so fruitful a source of danger in the past. By the judicious expenditure of money the additional divisions of the field army can be thoroughly equipped, but it will take many years. The transport alone will be on a gigantic scale, while several thousand officers would have to be obtained from England, and this in itself is a problem difficult of solution. The transport of India is not inexhaustible, but the foundation of an expansible system was laid some years ago by the formation of organized corps and cadres, and by continual effort to search out the resources of the land. The power of rapid railway construction must also be enormously developed in order to move and to feed this increased field army. It is one thing to move a large army in a land of railways and roads and resources, but quite another

to make such an effort through mountain passes and over such a country as Afghanistan. It would be useless to discuss, even if there were space, hypothetical conditions of the forces we might have to meet. But so much may be said, that it is not merely a question of putting 140,000 men into the field. If we have to defend Afghanistan, we shall require a much larger force of British and native troops. It is to England we must look to supply the former, and to India for the power of expansion of the latter. White officers and transport are the essential requirements, and such a system in India as will enable us to draw large numbers to our colours. These are the essentials, and not merely the concentration of divisions and brigades, a plan which involves a loss in expansive power, and a withdrawal of the army from contact with the sources of that power—the people. The plan of concentration has its advantages, but by itself it cannot create the force we must be prepared to organize, while it has by no means been proved, so far, that with the development of railway communication, present and future, it would not be better to avail ourselves of this power of concentration, rather than embark on a most costly expenditure in bricks and mortar.

In this sketch only the broader aspects of the constitution of the Indian army have been touched upon. It would not be possible to enter upon the details of such matters, for example, as the recruiting system, the special conditions under which the native soldier serves, the organization and establishment of units, the officering of corps, the system of promotion, the conditions of reserve service, the details of the army departments, such as supply and transport, ordnance, remounts, medical, ambulance, and military finance. Nor can the forces of the second line—the volunteers, the Imperial service troops, militia, and military police—be more than alluded to. The Imperial service troops are raised and paid for by the native Princes, while loyally placed at the disposal of the British Government when their

services are required. Until recently, the principle was always accepted that the central administration was governed by the supremacy of the Governor-General in Council, as responsible for all military affairs. The Military Member of the Council, assisted by a small military department or war office, was charged with military administration and finance, and was in effect a Minister of War, but with sharply-defined responsibilities. The Commander-in-Chief, with a large and powerful staff, had the entire control and command of the army. He was the executive servant of the Government, while his presence in the Cabinet or Council insured the complete presentation of purely military considerations. The high efficiency of the Indian Army was the best evidence of the effectiveness of the military administration.

From henceforth the system of army administration in India will be greatly changed. As a result of the recent controversy, and of the demand made by Lord Kitchener for the concentration of all powers of administration, as well as of command, in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, a large redistribution of army business will take place. The Military Member of Council will now be limited to responsibility for contracts, stores, ordnance, remounts, military works, clothing, and manufacturing services, for the Indian medical service, and the Indian marine. The question of the control of military finance has not yet been settled. The Commander-in-Chief will be directly responsible for all other military business, including supply and transport, and it is possible that further additions to his powers will be made. The Military Supply Member of Council is to be intimately acquainted with the characteristics of the native army, but will only specially advise the Governor-General in Council on questions of general policy as distinct from purely military questions. This officer is also to possess special knowledge of manufacturing business, and it is apparent that the interests of the native army will inevitably suffer, as it is not possible

to obtain a technical officer who has made a study of its conditions. The Army Department, with a Secretary, will have the Commander-in-Chief as its head, while the Military Supply Department, also with a Secretary, will have a Member of Council. There are elements of great difficulty in this arrangement, and the position of the latter officer will be peculiarly invidious. Other disadvantages are that a vast deal more work will be thrown upon the Viceroy and his Council that any difference of opinion must bring the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief into direct conflict, and that the functions of administration and command will be hopelessly mixed up. The system which had lasted so long, and had on the whole worked well, might have been improved without radical change. It had yielded a thoroughly efficient army, whose striking power was increased year by year in pursuance of a definite policy That policy has now been abandoned for one which leads to the amalgamation and centralization of military forces and powers. The old safeguards have been swept away.

In the Indian Army, rightly governed and organized, Britain has a most powerful weapon of offence, the most potent means of defence, and a guarantee for peace. But its constitution as an Oriental force requires to be incessantly watched, and guarded from rash experiments. The greater the knowledge of that force and of the elements of its composition, the greater will be the security against sudden and dangerous innovations, and, possibly, a revulsion of feeling may take place in the direction of the administrative system which has been destroyed without due inquiry, and from merely personal reasons, and has not been replaced by any workable arrangement. By studying the conditions of India, the more convinced will the people of this country become, that our military system at home must be framed in such a way, that in the hour of peril to the Empire it may be able, not only to reinforce the Indian Army, but to meet all other demands which may be suddenly made upon it.

THE STATES OF INDIA

By LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR DAVID BARR, K.C.S.I.

THERE is a tendency among visitors to India to regard Native States with a certain amount of curiosity, as places that should be seen, because they differ so much from other parts of India in that they are more picturesque—more 'truly Eastern,' as the saying goes—and because, perhaps, they contain more of that barbaric splendour which is fast dying out of the larger towns and districts of British provinces. But few consider the constitution of these States, the facts connected with their ancient history, and the manner in which, during the past hundred years, they have slowly and surely been welded into the Empire. The Rajas are, to the globe-trotter, mysterious personages hedged about with dignity and pomp, which appear to the uninitiated grotesque and unintelligible, and they receive from their officials and subjects an old-world homage and reverence such as is not met with in any other part of the British Empire. That the Rajas are courtly in their manners and profuse in their hospitality adds an additional glamour; but what their real status is, and to what extent they are influenced by those English officers who are styled Agents to the Governor-General, or Residents, or Political Agents, passes the comprehension of the casual visitor, who, after seeing what there is to be seen in any particular State, having visited the city with its palaces (ruined or modern), its mosques, or temples, and having purchased some curiosities of art or manufacture, having ridden on an

elephant, or even shot a tiger or stuck a pig, goes away delighted with his visit, but more than ever mystified as to what it all means, and how it comes about that such an institution as a Native State, or such an anomaly as a ruling Chief with his court, and his nobles, and his army, and his officials, and his subjects, and all the paraphernalia of Oriental sway, can possibly exist in the India of the twentieth century, and within from fifteen to twenty days' journey from Charing Cross. And yet there is no reason why anyone should be amazed; the history of feudatory* India is no sealed book, and it is only because the fact is lost sight of in the general impression that India is the greatest dependency of the Crown of England, that those who come out in yearly increasing numbers to see India forget that the Native States are an integral part of the Empire, and that they are an important feature in its constitution and its strength. The States cover an area of 633,462 square miles, or about one-third of the whole of India: they contain nearly 63,000,000 subjects, or about one-fourth of the total Indian population, and yield to the Chiefs gross receipts of more than £13,000,000, or about one-sixth of the revenues of British India. There are in all some 600 States, but of these about 500 are insignificant in size and status; many of them are tributary to the larger principalities, while others are held under guarantee or direct from the

* The word 'feudatory' in this application does not imply that there is any real analogy between the relations of the Native States to the British Government and the incidents of ancient feudal tenure. No doubt some of the minor States are grants from the British Crown, to the tenure of which personal duties and military service are attached as incidents and conditions. But the resemblance to the feudal system is at best superficial and unreal. The expression 'feudatory States,' though, perhaps, calculated to mislead, has come into very general use of late years, merely from want of a better or more convenient term to denote the subordination of territorial sovereignties to a common superior, combined with the obligation to discharge certain duties and render certain services to that superior.—Sir Charles Aitchison, 1880.

British Government. It is proposed to deal with those States which are under treaty, or in alliance with the Empire, and with those Chiefs who are entitled to receive salutes—varying from twenty-one guns, as the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the Maharajas of Mysore and Baroda, to nine guns, as some of the Rajas of Central India and Kathiawar.

There is much difference in the origin of the various principalities. The great States of Rajputana—viz., Udaipur, Jaipur, and Jodhpur, the representatives respectively of the Sisodia, Kachwaha, and Rahtor clans, are of immemorial antiquity, tracing their lineage back to mythical legends. To these families belong also the Rajput States of Bikanir (Rahtor), Rewah (Baghel), Rutlam (Rahtor), Sitamau (Rahtor), Jhalawar (Jhala), and Kota (Hara), and many tributaries scattered over Rajputana, Central India, and Kathiawar, with a few such as Mandi, Sirmur, Chamba, and Suket, in the Punjab.

The Mahratta States, Baroda, Gwalior, Indore, and Kolhapur, are held by descendants of Mahratta leaders under Shivaji and the Peishwa. They date from the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Mahratta power began to wane, and when the Chiefs of these States, throwing off their allegiance to the Mahratta union, after various conflicts with the Mogul Empire and the growing power of the British, were glad to come under the protection of the East India Company, and to enter into the treaties offered to them by Sir John Malcolm in Central India, and by Elphinstone in the Deccan and Gujerat.

The Nizam of Hyderabad, the premier Chief in India, ruling a territory 80,000 square miles in area, with a population of 11,000,000, and a revenue of about £2,500,000, is the descendant of a Turkoman noble named Chin Killich Khan (Asaf Jah), who was appointed by the Emperor of Delhi, in A.D. 1713, as Viceroy of the Deccan, with the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk. After the death of the Emperor Aurungzeb, Asaf Jah asserted

his independence, and held as his own the greater part of the territory which had been assigned to his charge as the delegate of the Great Mogul. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the battle of Assaye, when the Duke of Wellington (then Sir Arthur Wellesley) finally broke the Mahratta power which was threatening Hyderabad, the Nizam made a treaty of alliance with the British Government; and a Resident was appointed to his Court to negotiate terms which provided for the protection of the Hyderabad dominions, and the cession of certain districts which had been allotted to the Nizam after the defeat of Tipu Sultan in 1799, the revenues of which were assigned for the maintenance of the British troops garrisoned at Hyderabad. The present Nizam—Mir Mahbub Ali Khan, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., is the fourth in descent from the founder of the dynasty in the Deccan. His Highness was invested with ruling power on attaining his majority in 1885. During his minority Hyderabad was wisely administered by Sir Salar Jung, who initiated a form of government which was most beneficial to his State.

The Maharaja of Mysore is the ruler of a State in southern India of a total area of 30,000 square miles, containing a population of 5,500,000, and yielding a revenue of about £1,500,000. It is an ancient Hindu dynasty which has undergone strange vicissitudes. The State was conquered and usurped during the eighteenth century by Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan. After the Battle of Seringapatam in 1799, when Tipu was killed and his family taken prisoners by Sir Arthur Wellesley, Mysore was restored by the East India Company to the ancient line, and Krishna Raj, a descendant of the ruling family, was installed as Maharaja. This Chief was guilty of so many acts of misrule that the British Government were compelled, in 1831, to resume the administration of the State, which was, however, carried on in the name of Krishna Raj, at whose death, in 1881, an adopted son was recognised as successor. Fifty years of British administration restored Mysore to

more than its previous prosperity, and when the State was made over to the young Chief on attaining his majority in 1887, he entered into an agreement to abide by the form of government which had been so long enforced, to respect all laws and regulations passed by that Government, and to act in conformity with the advice of his Resident in all important matters. The Maharaja, who was an enlightened and well-educated Prince of great promise, died in 1895, and was succeeded by his son, the present Maharaja, during whose minority the State was administered with great ability by the Dewan Sir Shishadri Ayer. In 1902 the young Chief was duly invested with ruling powers.

The beautiful country of Kashmir, extending over 80,000 square miles, and containing a population of about 3,000,000, is ruled by His Highness the Maharaja Pratab Singh, G.C.S.I. In 1586 Kashmir was a part of the Mogul Empire, and became the summer residence of Akbar and of some of his descendants. The State was subsequently conquered, first by the Afghans and afterwards by the Sikhs. During the Sikh War it was governed by Gulab Singh (a feudatory of the Maharaja of the Punjab), to whom, after the victory of the British armies, it was conferred as an independent State, under certain conditions of alliance, by a treaty signed at Lahore in 1846. The ruling family is Dogra (Hindu), but at least three-fourths of the population of Kashmir are Mohammedan. The State includes the provinces of Jammu and Punch, and the subordinate and tributary chiefships of Chitral, Hanza, Nagar, etc., and the governorship of Ladakh and Gilgit. The revenue of Kashmir is about £450,000. The importance of the State is emphasized by its position on the frontier of India, bordering Tibet on the east, the debatable boundary with Russia on the Pamirs on the north, and Afghanistan on the west.

It would be wearisome to recount in detail our relations with all the minor States of the Punjab, Central India (including Bandelkhand, Baghelkhand, and Malwa),

and the peninsula of Kathiawar in Bombay, or the Madras States of Travancore, Cochin, and Vizianagram. It may be sufficient to note that the relations between the Government of India and Native States are governed by treaties and engagements, varying in their conditions in accordance with the size and importance of each State, and the circumstances under which it came into contact with British power. Generally speaking, the position of all Native States is one of subordinate cooperation, the Government undertaking to protect them and to acknowledge their independence on conditions of loyalty to the Crown of England, of good administration, and of due fulfilment of treaty obligations. Some of these treaties have in many respects become obsolete, owing to altered circumstances and to the disappearance of conditions, such as internal warfare and the aggressions of foreign Powers, which were the cause of the original agreements; but, although no treaties have been abrogated, as time has gone on the ties between the British Government and the protected Princes have been strengthened and drawn closer by a series of enactments dealing more directly with the rights of Empire, and emphasizing the policy of union and amalgamation of interests in all matters affecting the protection, the expansion, and the welfare of the States on the one part, and of the Government of India on the other. Thus, the larger principalities contribute towards the maintenance of troops, and provide land for cantonments and railways (admitting the right of jurisdiction of the paramount power in such areas), and facilitate the extension of roads, railways, and telegraphs constructed by the Imperial Government throughout their dominions. They engage not to enter into relations with any other State, to refer all disputes of an interstatal character to the adjudication of the British Government through their political officers, and to employ no Europeans in their service without the sanction of Government. They agree to the extradition of criminals,

and acknowledge the right of the Government to try European British subjects who are charged with offences in their territories; and they cooperate in measures for the suppression of dakaiti (gang robbery) and other violent crimes. On the other hand, the Government of India agree to respect the rights of the States, not to interfere in their internal administration, so long as that is conducted with justice, and to protect them from external aggression. The integrity of each State is observed; and the right of succession is maintained, not only to direct heirs, but, on the failure of such heirs, by adoption in accordance with the rules which govern, by mutual consent, the exercise of this prerogative.

It will thus be seen that a system of *imperium in imperio* has been established, which, while it upholds the dignity of feudatory Chiefs, raises them to their legitimate position as Princes of the Empire; for in the days of the Mogul Empire, when the great Akbar essayed the task of conciliating the Rajput chiefs, his policy was to utilize their services, and to treat them as pillars of the State (*Arkan-i-daulat*).

The policy of the Government of India is identical in this respect with that of Akbar; but whereas the Mogul Emperor had only the Rajput Chiefs to deal with, the paramount power of England has during the last century taken under its protection a vast number of principalities in all parts of India, which survived the destruction of the dynasty of the Moguls, or escaped demolition by the Mahrattas, the Pindaris, and the Sikhs; while many have sprung into existence as the result of British victories and the establishment of British authority.

It has been said that Native States are a hundred years behind the rest of India in civilization. This may be true; but it is nevertheless the case that the subjects of these States prefer the despotism of their Chiefs to the laws and regulations under which British provinces are governed. Instances have been brought to light of chaotic misrule, grinding exactions, cruelty, and barbarism

on the part of ruling Chiefs, borne with patience, almost with apathy, by their people, whose innate feeling of loyalty silenced complaint, and compelled them to endure vicissitudes which in British India would have speedily led to an outburst of popular demonstration. Fortunately, such cases are becoming rare. Chiefs are learning that good administration is one of the conditions on which they hold their States, and that the British Government will not tolerate misrule.

The future of Native States lies entirely in the hands of their rulers. A retrospect of close upon a century gives remarkable evidence of their capacity for improvement, and of a surrender of many of those old-fashioned ideas which so long impeded progress and development. It must be borne in mind that a new generation of Chiefs has come into existence—men who have received careful education and training, and who have not been slow to profit thereby. The old traditions exist, and in some places are cherished; but the general tendency of the native rulers of to-day is to emancipate themselves from the trammels of custom, and, without any severance of the bonds of caste or religion, to come forth as the leaders of thought and opinion in their States, and as the real rulers of their subjects. Great changes have occurred, and a flood of light has been brought into the darkest places by the expansion of education and the civilizing effects of improved communications, not only throughout India, but with the world. There is hardly a State in India that has not realized the benefits of the extension of railways, telegraphs, and post-offices. Many Chiefs—notably the Nizam, Scindia, Mysore, Baroda, Bhopal, and Holkar—are interested in lines of railway in their own territories, and participate in the profits accruing therefrom. The Imperial telegraph and postal systems traverse every State, irrigation and public works have been generally adopted, and of recent years the Chiefs of India, with but one or two exceptions, have relinquished their right of coinage and have adopted the currency of British India. These and many other

measures all tend towards unification with the Empire, and emphasize the position of subordinate cooperation, which is the true basis of the welfare—it may be said the *existence*—of the States of the Empire.

It cannot be doubted that as time goes on the obligations and responsibilities of the rulers will increase, and that the standard of administration will be raised; but it is clearly one of the most important duties of the Government of India to maintain the integrity of the States and to encourage the efforts of the Chiefs towards the attainment of efficiency. Sir John Malcolm, the first and probably the greatest of the representatives of the paramount power in Native States, said in 1816: 'If we made all India into *zillahs* (British districts), it was not in the nature of things that our Empire should last fifty years; but if we could keep up a number of Native States without political power but as royal instruments, we should exist in India as long as our naval superiority in Europe was maintained.' And, forty years later, Lord Canning, writing of the transfer of India from the East India Company, said: 'The Crown of England stands with the unquestioned ruler and paramount power in all India, and is for the first time brought face to face with its feudatories. There is a reality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has never existed before, and which is not only felt, but eagerly acknowledged by the Chiefs.'

Thus it will be seen that the chief factor in our dealings with feudatory India is the sense of loyalty of the ruling Chiefs to the Crown of England. As is the *Raja*, so is the *Raiyat*, the people of Native States follow the lead of their rulers; and it is no exaggeration to state that there is more loyalty of the real kind in these States than in many parts of British India. It is a healthy sign of the times that spontaneous expressions of this loyalty are evoked when danger to the Empire is rumoured. It is not many years ago since Russia loomed largely on the frontiers of India. At first her designs on Central Asia and the Khanates, bordering on Afghanistan, caused a

certain amount of uneasiness, perhaps even of distrust. The late Sir Henry Daly, one of the ablest of Indian political administrators of modern times, who held charge of the group of States, seventy-two in number, comprised within the Central India Agency, used to tell of a conversation with one of the great Mahratta Chiefs about the time of the Russian advance on Merv. He had deprecated the Maharaja's anxiety and his thirst for information as to what Russia was going to do. 'Was she going to attack India?' 'What side would the Amir of Afghanistan take?' 'Was England strong enough to repulse an attack?' 'What would be the result to Native States if Russia took India?' Sir Henry assured the Maharaja that there was no immediate cause for alarm, and pointed out that Native States enjoyed, under British protection, comfort and ease such as they had never known under any other régime. 'Yes,' said the Maharaja, 'that is true; but although a man is comfortable and easy when he is asleep, still he likes sometimes *to turn over on the other side.*'

Of recent years the Chiefs have spoken with no such uncertain voice. In 1886, after the Penjdeh incident, when war with Russia seemed to be imminent, His Highness the Nizam came forward with a spontaneous offer of pecuniary aid for the defence of the Empire; this was echoed by many other Chiefs, and, although the Government of India found themselves unable to accept money from the Chiefs, their willing tribute of assistance was taken in the form of a quota of troops for Imperial service. This organization, commenced by Lord Dufferin, has since been expanded, until at the present day the force, maintained by twenty-three States for Imperial defence, amounts to 16,000 men —divided into cavalry, infantry, and transport—trained, disciplined, armed, and ready to take their place with the King's Indian Army whenever and wherever their services are required. These troops have already been utilized in the wars on the Kashmir frontier, in the Tirah, and in China. The Maharajas of Gwalior, Bikanir, and

Idar have gone on service with their troops, while many other ruling Chiefs have volunteered to take the field.

The loyalty that stimulates the feudatory Princes and brings them into closer union with the Empire of India, permeates their States, and is shared by their nobles and subjects—but it does more than that: it sets an example to the whole of India. It counteracts in a large measure the efforts of those who would seek to stir up discontent, and it emphasizes in the most unmistakable manner the advantages of an Empire founded on the confidence of the many tribes, castes, and religions of India as a whole.

Yet it is impossible to overlook the fact that the loyalty of the Chiefs and people of India is based not only upon the justice and equity of the Government, but in a greater degree upon their attachment to the Throne of England. Viceroyalty is not clearly understood, and therefore, perhaps, not fully appreciated; it is regarded as merely one of the many dispensations of Providence. To the people of India the Government is more or less of a myth—they recognise the power, admit its wisdom, and admire its benevolence, but they cannot grasp its origin. They see Viceroys come and go, they wonder who they are, whence they came, and whither they disappear—they look beyond the representative of the King of England and yearn for the Majesty of the King himself.

The first manifestation of this sentiment was in 1875, when the King, as Prince of Wales, visited India. It was the first real outburst of loyalty that had spread over the land since India came under British rule. Those who were serving in India during that visit will never forget the enthusiasm of the people—'the humble millions,' as Lord Curzon recently called them—usually mute, inscrutable, and mysterious. The native Chiefs vied with each other to do honour to their future King; they flocked to meet him on his arrival at Calcutta, and those who were honoured by his visit to their States were lavish in their entertainment and profuse in their gifts. Their homage was real and

sincere, but the people were no whit behind the Princes in their demonstrations—the crowded streets, the packed balconies, the eager desire to look upon the face of the great Queen's son, gave the strongest proof of the loyalty of all classes and of their joy and satisfaction.

The next great event was the Imperial Assemblage held by Lord Lytton on January 1, 1877, to announce the assumption by Her Majesty of the title of Empress of India. This was a pageant chiefly for the benefit of the ruling Chiefs so far as the assemblage at Delhi was concerned; but the proclamation was read on the appointed day at Presidency towns, at the headquarters of every district in British India, and at each of the Political Agencies, so that the knowledge that Queen Victoria was henceforth to be known as Empress of India (Kaisar-i-Hind) was widely and simultaneously diffused throughout the length and breadth of India. The announcement did not stir up much enthusiasm for the simple reason that the Queen's sovereignty over India was already acknowledged; and it was difficult to explain the necessity of superadding the title of Empress to that of Queen. *Victoria* was the name by which Her Majesty was known and loved by her Indian subjects, and to them this was sufficient and required no Imperial designation.

The Queen's death caused an outburst of grief unprecedented in the annals of Indian history, the mourning was spontaneous, sincere, and general; there was not a town, not a village that did not exhibit signs of woe for the national loss. The feeling of sorrow was stupendous, and bore the most fervent and eloquent testimony to the loyalty of India and the love of the people for the great Queen and Mother. It was a loss brought to the homes and the hearts of all, from the ruling chief in his palace to the humble tiller of the soil in his field; and even those who knew the people best and loved them most were astounded by the display of general, humble, unpretentious, but nevertheless wholehearted, sorrow.

There followed the succession of King Edward VII. as Emperor of India, the deferred Coronation, and His Majesty's illness; then in August, 1902, the Coronation in Westminster Abbey, attended by several of the ruling Chiefs; and, finally, the Durbar held at Delhi on January 1, 1903, to celebrate the Coronation.

The Durbar was an amplified and glorified edition of the Imperial assemblage of 1877. Lord Curzon followed, but greatly improved upon, the lines laid down by Lord Lytton, and that his Durbar was an enormous success was testified by the vast throng that attended it.

To the Indian mind there was one 'little rift within the lute,' and that was the difficulty of differentiating between Royalty and Viceroyalty. 'Why did His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, the King-Emperor's brother, take a back seat on the daïs? Why did not *he* hold the Durbar?' This was the popular view of the situation, though the initiated knew that the official programme had been drawn up with the utmost care and after deliberation over every detail; that it had been revised many times and finally approved by His Majesty, under whose mandate the Durbar was held by the Viceroy. His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught attended 'by order of His Majesty' and had no official responsibility: but who of those who were present can forget the Duke's reception by the assembled multitude when, with his Royal Consort, he drove up to take his seat on the daïs and to wait for the Viceroy's arrival? 'There is *Royalty*,' was the feeling of all who rose to greet the King-Emperor's brother.

During the course of Lord Curzon's speech in the Durbar it was part of His Excellency's duty to deliver the message from the King-Emperor to his Indian subjects; this the Viceroy did with much dignity and deepest reverence—standing with bared head as he read the words written by His Majesty. But to some of those who were present it seemed that a great opportunity was lost. 'How much better it would have been,' said they, 'if the Duke of Connaught had read the

King's message'—and without doubt, if it could have been so arranged, if the Viceroy, on reaching that point of his address which preceded the King's message, had announced that 'His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught will now deliver to the Durbar the gracious communication of His Majesty the King-Emperor to his Indian subjects,' what an outburst of enthusiasm it would have called forth! The heart of everyone in that splendid assembly would have been touched, and the reason of the Duke's presence on the dais, the object of his deputation by His Majesty, would have been made manifest, not only to the Durbar, but to the whole of India.

The key-note of loyalty in India is devotion to the Crown of England; this has been strikingly illustrated during the Royal incidents to which allusion has been made. It will once more be made manifest when their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales visit India, and of all those who pay their homage there will be no more loyal hearts than the Chiefs of the Indian Empire.

INDIAN EDUCATION

By THEODORE MORISON

In the eyes of the great majority of thoughtful Indians, education is the grand justification of British rule in India. Many of them cavil at our military expenditure, at our fiscal policy and our autocratic methods of administration, but even the most hostile critics of Indian government are whole-hearted advocates of English education, and persistently demand that a larger share of public money shall be spent upon diffusing European learning in India. It seems a strange anomaly that those who can see no good in anything done in India by Englishmen should at the same time be struggling most earnestly to make English ideas paramount among their own people, but of the fact there can be no question. I have heard an eminent Indian politician maintain throughout the evening that the English were draining all the wealth out of India, and yet in the end confess that the moral advantages of British rule more than compensated for this loss. This is not an empty phrase. It is not a conciliatory platitude to cover an awkward situation, but the expression of an intense conviction, often uttered by educated Indians, that the regeneration of their people depends upon the introduction into India of Western thought and Western education. European culture necessarily comes to them through the medium of English, and it is therefore to the great masters of English thought that their homage is chiefly paid. This is how they come to be such

warm advocates of the study of English literature by their countrymen.

What are the ideas, one naturally asks, which Indians derive from English literature? That literature is a record of the hopes and fears, joys and sorrows, of the English people for the last three centuries; it reflects their pleasures, their politics, their vanities, their religion. There is in it matter for all tastes. It is not the expression of one idea or sentiment, but of thousands the most diverse, and yet to most Indians there is one dominant note, one characteristic teaching, running through it. The answer which almost all Indians give to the question, 'What has English literature taught you?' is that it has taught them liberty to think for themselves; it has freed them from slavery to authority. This, perhaps, is not the lesson which a German or a Spaniard would extract from English literature, for the value and suggestiveness of any new idea depends largely upon the previously existing stock to which it is conjoined; but the intellectual antecedents of the Indian were such that this idea more than any other appeared to him novel and suggestive. The characteristic of all Indian teaching in the past, whether Hindu or Mohammedan, has been reverence for authority. The young scholar has been taught to justify his views by citing a great Pandit or Maulvi, and when he had elected to follow a certain school of thought, it was sheer blasphemy to question the teaching of any of its great masters. With such antecedents, it is not surprising that the most wonderful and illuminating idea in English literature should have been the freedom and independence to which it introduced them. They found themselves suddenly brought into a world in which independent private judgment was a duty, and the conscientious exercise of it a virtue.

Probably no other literature in the world could have taught them this lesson so forcibly, because no other literature is so saturated with the love of liberty as that of England. From Elizabeth to Victoria

it is one long pæan upon liberty and patriotism, and young Indians learn to glow with genuine sympathy when they read how the little island kingdom struck for liberty against the might of Spain; they kindle at the stern exultation of the regicide Milton or the revolutionary raptures of Shelley, and find in Adam Smith, Mill, and Herbert Spencer the loftiest reaches of modern English thought. When once they have drunk of English literature they see the world from a new standpoint, their intellectual centre of gravity is permanently changed, and they judge every question by reference to their new standard of the duty of independent private judgment. Some English writers have imagined that the European culture which Indians acquire is never more than a veneer, and they have drawn fanciful pictures of the way in which the Indian reverts under the stress of excitement to the ways and feelings of his forefathers. This is singularly unjust both to the convincing power of English thought and the sincerity of Indian nature. The Indian does not, of course, become an Anglo-Saxon because he is a disciple of John Stuart Mill, but he ceases to be the intellectual child of the Maulvis and Pandits; a new compound is formed, from which the English element can never again be separated. Proof of this may be found in the almost daily experience that English education estranges men from sympathy with uneducated or only slightly educated wives. When once the husband has learned to look with European eyes, he finds it difficult to exchange ideas with his Indian wife, and she, in spite of her docile wish to admire and obey, no doubt finds him incomprehensible. That is the reason why the young men are insisting so passionately on female education, and why so many of them actually teach their wives English after marriage. Even mothers, in arranging matches, have been known to say, 'Now that the boy is educated, we must find a wife for him who knows English, otherwise they will never get on together.'

The new spirit which has been generated in the Indian

mind by Western thoughts is manifesting itself in many diverse forms of activity. Religion, politics, and social customs are all being modified by it, but it would take too long to consider the many and subtle ways in which it is affecting Indian life. Personally, I am strongly of opinion that it is working for good, that all the most earnest, hopeful movements which are at work in Indian society are more or less directly inspired by this new spirit, but I cannot deny that while in the transitional state some of its manifestations are hard to bear with unless a man both knows and sympathizes with the ideas which prompt them. Take, for example, the familiar and trying case of bad manners. Some Indians who have revolted from the old attitude of reverent submissiveness, and have adopted the English standard of independence and private judgment, intentionally discard the ceremonious deference of Eastern courtesy, and assume the easy manners of Englishmen. This is not because they want to be impertinent or familiar, but because they have come to feel that Oriental politeness is too servile; the English element in their composition revolts against self-abasement, and carries them over the border-line between independence and insolence; but it would be narrow intolerance to allow our distaste for bad manners to blind us to the sterling worth of the many reforms which are re-creating Indian society.

Now, although this new spirit has been called into existence by the Indian Government, we have never, strange as such neglect may seem, attempted to direct or control it. We have thrown the pages of English literature open to the people of India, and left them to take from it what they pleased. English education, which was the direct creation of the Government, has not hitherto arrived at guiding the development of Indian thought, or at the training of character. Theoretically, that is left to the boys' guardians; in practice it is generally neglected altogether. The course of an Indian boy's education is generally something like this:

he learns to read and write in the local vernacular at his own home, because there are probably no educational facilities in the rural village in which his parents live. When about eleven or twelve he is sent to live at the house of a relation or friend in a neighbouring townlet which possesses a High School—that is, a school in which English is taught up to the standard of matriculation to the University. The headmaster and all the staff are probably Indians, and the boy is at first conducted through the dreary wilderness of English spelling by a subordinate master who probably does not draw more than £2 a month, and whose English would probably not be understood in London. In four years he is taken through a course of arithmetic, history, and geography, an Oriental classic—*e.g.*, Persian or Sanskrit —and English. This English course is the main part of his education, and by the end of four years he will be expected to write some of his answers in English, and his masters will from time to time teach him in English, though they generally think it prudent to fortify this instruction by a second explanation in the vernacular. He now enters upon the highest course of instruction given in a High School, which consists of two years' preparation for the matriculation examination of the University. Now all his work has to be done in English, and he begins to write and speak with some fluency, if not correctness. He studies such examples of English literature, as Lamb's 'Tales from Shakespeare,' or Kingsley's 'Heroes,' the 'Lays of Ancient Rome,' or the 'Deserted Village.' When at length he passes his matriculation examination, he has to decide where and how he will pursue his University education. There are perhaps about a dozen colleges in the whole of the province, each situated in a large town, and all of them teaching simultaneously for the same public examinations. If, as is often the case, the father knows nothing of English or modern education, the boy decides for himself, in consultation with his master and school friends, which college he will join. He leaves

his father's home furnished with an unusually large sum of money, and goes to one of the big towns in which a college is situated. There his first care is to make arrangements for lodging, and in close proximity to the college he finds a quarter or bazaar which caters for the student population—there are booksellers and sweet-sellers, cloth-dealers, grocers, wine-sellers, and followers of even less reputable callings, clustering side by side in dusty alleys, and some of them have an upper room to let. One of these the student furnishes with a lamp and bed, and then proceeds to the college to be enrolled. After consulting the time-table, he attends classes for about four hours a day, at one of which an Englishman—the first, perhaps, he has ever seen—expounds certain books. When the class is over, the Englishman jumps into his dogcart and drives away, while the student sets out on foot in the opposite direction. From his class-fellows who walk back with him to the bazaar he learns that Mr. Smith is a very good lecturer, who gets all his students through the examinations, but that Mr. Jones is not thought much of; in any case it is unlikely he will ever come more closely into contact with either of them than he has that day. 'Are they harsh and violent men,' he asks, 'as people in the village say all Englishman are?' 'Oh no; Mr. Smith is a very good man. Students occasionally go to his house to have their essays looked over, and he is very kind. But it is a long way off, and it is rather alarming.' In the course of talk the new student discovers that some of his class-fellows belong to the same caste as himself, and that they club together to employ a cook, and take their meals in common. He, too, from motives of economy, probably joins this 'mess,' and thus completes his simple arrangements for board, lodging, and tuition. Amid such surroundings he lives for four or five years. Except for his attendance in class during college hours, he may spend his days and nights how he pleases. There is no check upon his going out or his coming in. The only stimu-

lating ideas he is likely to come across in his college career are derived from his text-books or the newspapers. Of bright or intellectual society he knows nothing. Even his class-fellows are so scattered about the bazaar that he cannot count upon meeting them easily and frequently. He rarely has access to a library or reading-room, nor are there social or literary societies which he can join. Where there is such an absence of corporate life in the college it is well-nigh impossible for the English professors to enter into and influence the lives of the students, as do the Dons at the English University. Opportunities for meeting outside the class-room do not exist, and the Englishman who wishes to cultivate personal relations with any of his class has to invent occasions for private conversation with them.

The above is typical of the normal life at an Indian college. Exceptional institutions do exist, as at Aligarh, which is a residential college professedly copied from a Cambridge model; but, as a rule, Indian colleges are not centres of an organized social life, and they do not attempt to guide or control the student when he is outside the class-room. The new educational policy which Lord Curzon instituted aims at remedying this cardinal defect. Furious controversies have raged round University education for the last three or four years in India, and in the multitude of technical details round which the battle has been fought the English reader is apt to lose sight of the central policy at issue, but it is one which is not only easily intelligible, but which embodies a conception of education which is thoroughly familiar to all Englishmen. The new educational policy aims at gradually converting existing Indian colleges into residential colleges upon the model of English public schools or of Aligarh. The day scholar is to be turned into a boarder, and, instead of being allowed to roam at will about the bazaar, beguiling the vacuity of his leisure hours with dubious acquaintances, he is to be compelled to live in a college quadrangle or hostel, where he and his companions will

have access to libraries, and clubs, and common rooms, and will be able to live a corporate college life, in which they will be under discipline, and in which their parents will have reasonable assurance that their sons are not going morally, mentally, and physically to the bad. In the social life of the college the English members of the staff will be expected to take a prominent part. The principal administrative officers of the hostels will be Englishmen—that is to say, they will do work similar to that of a house-master at a public school or a tutor at college. They will take part in athletic games, and join the literary and social clubs which will inevitably spring up where a number of young men are collected together. Thus it is hoped that in each college will grow up a distinctive 'tone' or set of opinions which will in time constitute its traditions, and which will mould and impress each succeeding generation that comes under its influence.

Now, whatever else may be said of this policy, it has one superlative merit: it is the application of a conception of education which Englishmen thoroughly understand, and which, therefore, they are likely to execute well. In the association of masters and boys, in their influence upon character, and in the creation of a healthy and manly tone among the boys, lies the distinctive and almost solitary merit of our historic public schools, and the same educational tradition is carried on in the Universities, where the junior Dons undeniably import an element of thoughtfulness into undergraduate life. This is the best characteristic of English education, and Englishmen would know how to transplant it to India. An Englishman transferred from Oxford or Cambridge to a residential college in India would know at once what part he was expected to take in the life of the boarding-house or hostel, and he would know how to set about it. He would reproduce in India those parts of his own experience at Harrow and Cambridge, or Rugby and Oxford, which had most influenced and impressed him, and,

either from that reason, or from some bent of national character, it also appears to be the kind of educational work which Englishmen like best. What is certain is that the Englishman taken suddenly from Oxford or Cambridge either to India or to a public school at home cannot do one thing, and that thing is unfortunately the sole work which used to be required of him in India—namely, teach. That a master should know how to teach has never been considered an essential qualification at English schools, and, therefore, very few 'Varsity men go through a training in pedagogics. Under the old conception of education in India, the student's guardians were responsible for his moral and physical training, and the college only undertook to supervise his intellectual development. Such a conception of education was perhaps inevitable when the people were hostile to English education, and suspected the Government of ulterior motives upon their religion; but it was one with which the ordinary University man was ill equipped to carry out. A German who had himself been well taught, and who came from a society in which the art of teaching is valued and understood, would have had before him in India a familiar task with which he would have grappled successfully; but, neither in his own experience as a boy, nor from the opinions prevalent in the schoolmaster's world, would an Englishman learn to appreciate the value and importance of good teaching, or understand the advantages of uniformity in instructional methods. The consequence has been that every professor in India has been a law to himself, and that the greatest inequalities prevail in the efficiency of teaching. But the conception of education now put to the front is one which is familiar to every public-school boy and University man, and which appeals to an Englishman's idea of the 'right thing' in education. It is no small part of the merit of the new policy that it contemplates a system of education which will be thoroughly understood by the men who have to carry it

out, and that it demands the application to India of the tradition of English education.

This, then, is the idea which lies at the root of the educational reforms about which there has been so much controversy. It is not a better teaching or a higher standard of knowledge which is primarily aimed at, but the training and formation of character by methods with which all Englishmen are familiar.

By the passing of the Indian Universities Act of 1904 the way was made clear for reform; but the new policy is still in its infancy, and in very few places has even the machinery been erected for carrying it out. The experiment, for such it must still be considered, will be watched with intense interest by all who understand its immense importance for India. It is no exaggeration to say that upon the character of the education given in our colleges depends the content or discontent of India. The English-educated class forms whatever public opinion exists in India with regard to political affairs. It is, of course, true that they form only a microscopically small fraction of the whole population, but yet in the long-run it is their opinion which is likely to prevail, because there is no other class which holds any opinions at all upon public questions. The great mass of the agricultural population is as yet only concerned with the chances of the harvest, the gossip of the village, or the propitiation of the local ghost; but if ever they so far widen their mental outlook as to admit political conceptions, they will draw their ideas from the intellectual minority above them. In that minority the political opinions of the English-educated reign supreme. The old Conservatives, who remain faithful in their allegiance to Oriental ideals, have put forward no constructive view of politics, and even in social matters they are fast giving ground before the crusading culture of Europe. The political opinions of the English-educated, therefore, seem destined eventually to become predominant in India, not because they are the wisest, but because there is no opposing school

of thought to resist their progress; and so it is upon the political ideals prevalent among those who have attended our colleges that depends the answer to the question whether or no India will be content in the future to remain within the circuit of the British Empire.

CEYLON

By SIR HENRY A. BLAKE, G.C.M.G.

CEYLON, which contains the largest population of any single Government in our Colonial Empire, is an island in the Indian Ocean, lying south-east of the Madras Presidency, its northern extremity, which overlaps Cape Comorin by about two degrees, forming the Gulf of Manaar, at the northern point of which the island of Ceylon is separated from India by the Paumban Channel, the island of Ramasweram, and a series of sand-banks, intersected by shallow and shifting channels, which are named Adam's Bridge, as they practically bridge the twenty miles or so that separate the south-eastern point of Ramasweram from Manaar Point. The extreme length of Ceylon is 266 miles; its greatest width 140½ miles; its area is 25,331⅝ square miles, or 16,212,480 acres. This area is about equal to that of Holland and Belgium. Although so close to the continent of Asia, it is asserted that the island has never been joined to India, as is shown by certain differences in the fauna and flora. The tiger is not known, but among the animals that roam through the great forests are found the elephant, cheetah, black bear, buffalo, boar, elk, and small deer. From time to time elephants are captured by means of elephant kraals, a system that involves the expenditure of considerable time and money in the preparation. A strong enclosure having been constructed, many hundreds of men are employed for some weeks in forming a cordon round the portion of the forest where herds of elephants are known to be. The men are supplied with torches, and work

inwards, making noise by day and lighting their torches by night. The cordon gradually contracts, until the elephants are at length driven into the kraal, the entrance to which is securely fastened. The beaters stand round outside the enclosure, ready to turn back the rushes of the herd upon the barrier by thrusting flaming torches in their faces. After a time tame elephants are introduced into the enclosure, ridden by their mahouts, who, strange to say, are hardly ever, if ever, attacked by the wild and frightened members of the herd. Of these one is singled out, and two tame elephants range themselves on either side, while an agile native close behind watches an opportunity to lasso the leg of the wild one, upon which the strong rope is made fast to a tree. The same process is repeated until all are secured. The captured elephants are then left until starvation reduces them to docility, when they are conducted by trained elephants to their future 'stables,' where they are similarly fastened to trees, and carefully fed until they resign themselves to the position, and are trained by their keeper and attendant, who is a member of a special class. In the capture of the elephants there is a great deal of unavoidable cruelty, as a proportion of those fastened to trees kill themselves in their efforts to burst their bonds; but once tamed the elephant is at once the most docile and intelligent of all animals whose services man has appropriated. The tame elephants take a keen and sporting interest in the captures, and assist by cajolery and force in the operations.

The population was in 1901 over 3,500,000, which is divided as follows:

Europeans	6,300
Burghers and Eurasians	23,482
Sinhalese	2,330,807
Tamils	951,740
Moormen (Mohammedans)	228,034
Malays	14,902
Veddahs	3,071
Others (including some 70 nationalities)	9,718

The population is now probably over 3,600,000. About one-fifth of the land is under cultivation, of which rice and other grains account for 730,000 acres; coco-nuts, areca-nuts, etc., 800,000; tea, 380,000; cacao, 33,000; tobacco, 25,000; sugar-cane, 11,000; coffee, 4,000; while rubber-trees and other new products are estimated at 45,000.* The probable eventual extension of the various cultivations is given as an additional 1,260,000 acres, but this I consider underestimated, as there are immense acres in the low country of the North Central, Northern and other provinces that with irrigation may offer inducements to capitalists to grow cotton, rubber, or coco-nuts, while apparently arid districts in the coral formation may be suitable for the growth of Sisal hemp or other fibre plants.

The history of the island shows that the aboriginal Veddahs, who were probably always nomad forest-dwellers, were conquered by the Sinhalese in the sixth century B.C., who were in their turn invaded and conquered by the Tamils 300 years later. The annals of the various dynasties, as given in the 'Mahawausa,' show that the Kings, both Sinhalese and Tamil, held their thrones on a tenure as precarious as their ancient Irish brothers, a large proportion dying by violence. To the terrors of the parricide Kasyapa, who, with the aid of the Premier, beheaded his father A.D. 478, we owe the most striking and interesting ancient ruin in Ceylon; for, fearful of the revenge of his brother Moggallana, who had collected an army in India to punish him, he fortified the rock of Sigiriya, which rises with perpendicular sides from the plain to a height of 600 feet, and maintained himself on this impregnable rock fortress for seventeen years. The extraordinary and daring ingenuity with which walls were built and passages constructed in positions that apparently would scarcely afford foothold for a cat compels admiration for the builders; and the extensive excavations under-

* I quote these figures from Ferguson's admirable 'Ceylon Handbook and Directory.'

taken by the archæological department show that the five acres on the summit, which can now only be reached by ladders, were covered with well-constructed and ornamented buildings, while ample attention had been paid to the questions of water and sanitation. The frescoes then painted in a gallery that is now reached by a perpendicular wire-rope ladder, which hangs 8 feet from the overhanging side of the rock, are perfectly fresh, and after an exposure of 1,500 years show clearly the dresses and jewelled ornaments of the royal ladies there depicted with their attendants. In 1398 the Emperor of China sent an expedition to Ceylon, which captured and carried away to China all the members of the reigning family, who were kept in confinement for a number of years, until at length the Emperor chose a King from among them, and sent him back to resume the kingdom.

In 1505 Western civilization first made a permanent settlement by means of the Portuguese, who landed by arrangement with the King of Cotla, and thirteen years later built a fort at Colombo. In 1658 Manaar was taken by the Dutch, who ultimately ousted the Portuguese, and continued in possession of the maritime provinces until 1796, when Colombo surrendered to the British.

In 1803 hostilities began against the independent kingdom of Kandy, and in 1815 the Kandyan kingdom was acquired rather by invitation of the inhabitants, who revolted from the atrocious cruelties of the King, Raja Singa, than by conquest. And from that date begins the history of the island as an important portion of the glorious Empire, of which the island forms one ot the most prosperous and exquisitely beautiful units.

Ceylon lies between 5° 55″ and 9° 51″ N. latitude. The island north of 7° 30″ is quite flat, with an average rainfall of about 39 inches, of which nearly four-fifths falls between October and January, and a mean annual temperature of 81°. This average temperature is almost identical all round the littoral, and the south-east of the

island has even a smaller rainfall than the Northern Province. The flat lands of the maritime provinces are the home of the coco-nut and other palms; and here is to be found the mass of the Sinhalese population. The mountain districts are situated east of Colombo, and, roughly, cover an area represented by a circle, with Nuwara Eliya as a centre and a radius of forty miles. The rainfall of this mountain district ranges from 70 inches to 231 inches, with a mean annual temperature from 58° to 75°. Within this area is situated the tea, coffee, cacao, and cardamom cultivation, and here the British planter has given evidence of the indomitable energy that has enabled him to recover from the disastrous failure of coffee after 1875, and to produce tea, cacao, cardamoms, rubber, and cinchona, to the value, in 1904, of Rs. 60,428,350.

Nor have the native inhabitants shown any lack of energy, for the exports in 1904 from native industry reached the sum of Rs. 45,000,000; and we must not forget that, while almost every pound of tea was exported, a large portion of the native crops was consumed at home.

Previous to 1875 British capital was almost exclusively devoted to coffee, a crop which required the greatest care and supervision at certain periods, but with considerable intervals, during which the coffee-planter had a free time. But the tea cultivation calls for incessant supervision, as the entire plantation must be picked over at regular intervals of seven to ten days, according to situation, temperature, and moisture, the finest flavour being obtained in the dry season, when retarded growth gives time for the formation of the essential oil to which tea owes its 'bouquet.' The tea-planter, besides having a knowledge of agriculture, must also know the scientific reasons which govern the processes of withering, drying, and rolling that go to produce the fragrant cup that sets so many millions of tongues a-wagging—and the exigencies of the cultivation and manufacture leave him but little time for that recreation

without which the British Jack is certain in time to become a dull boy.

While the foreground in every part of Ceylon is beautiful from wealth of tropical growth, it is impossible to exaggerate the magnificence of the mountain scenery through which the railway passes from Rambukkana in the west, by Kandy, to Banderawella in the east, and amid which the lot of the up-country tea and cacao planter is cast.

It may be stated in general terms that the hill districts are healthy and suitable for the residence of Europeans, and that the low country is malarious, especially where forest or jungle has been recently cleared.

Within the past year or two the planting of rubber has received a great impetus from the increase of demand over supply, and probably an equivalent of 40,000 acres has been planted. In this, as in other matters affecting the agricultural interests of the island, the Government affords every possible assistance. At the Peredeniya Botanic Gardens, besides the Director, there is a staff consisting of a mycologist and an entomologist, who are ready to visit any property and advise as to fungoid or insect pests that may make their appearance. There is also an experimental station attached to the gardens, the Superintendent of which makes practical experiments in the growing of various crops in various ways; in the effects of treatment of cacao canker by spraying and other means; in the results of different manures; and in the growing and tapping of rubber-trees. A number of planters have permitted experiments in manuring to be made on their properties, and in this way a mass of information as to results at different elevations and under differing conditions is collated and presented to a committee of planters and officials, who meet at Peredeniya at stated intervals.

In addition to this machinery that has been at work for several years, there was formed last year an Agricultural Society, with a view to interesting the entire community in agricultural improvement. Of this

society the Governor is President, the Board meeting monthly. Both European and native cultivators have taken up the work of the society with vigour, and the scientific staff of the Botanic Department are important and active working members. The membership of the principal society now numbers over 750, each of whom pays a subscription of Rs. 5 annually. Each member receives a copy of all the publications of the society. There are, besides, a considerable number of local branches, the members of which pay a small subscription, and each branch is affiliated to the parent society by a payment of Rs. 5. All papers of interest to small cultivators are translated into Sinhalese and Tamil, and the leaflets are distributed by the local societies to their members. A number of native gentlemen have thrown themselves heartily into the work, and undertaken various experiments under the advice of the Botanic Department. There is thus equally from the planters of the hill districts and the planters of the plains a large number of stations devoted to experiments on present crops and new products that without expense to the public must produce results of great value in the near future.

The Legislature of Ceylon consists of a Legislative Council of seventeen members, the unofficial members being a Tamil member, a Kandyan, a Mohammedan, a low-country Sinhalese, a Burgher, a general European member, a planting member, and a representative of the Chamber of Commerce.

Space will not admit of more than a mere mention of the rapid expansion of means of communication by railways. In 1867 the seventy-four miles of railway to Kandy was opened. There are now 562 miles of railway completed, the total cost of which up to December 31, 1904, was Rs. 74,732,727, the railway debt at that date being Rs. 40,394,489. The railway system, besides paying the interest and sinking fund on its debt, now contributes a considerable amount to the annual revenue of the Colony. At present a further extension

is projected from Colombo to Negombo, from Avisawella to Ratnapura, and possibly from Banderawella to Passara.

The returns for 1904 show that the total trade of the Colony amounted to 2,064¼ lacs of rupees. Taking the two periods 1895 and 1904, the figures are as follows:

	1895.	1904.
IMPORTS FROM	Lacs	Lacs.
United Kingdom	200¼	260½
British Colonies	519¼	665¾
Foreign Countries	45¾	127
EXPORTS TO		
United Kingdom	574¼	511¾
British Colonies	115	183
Foreign Countries	85¼	316¼

These figures show how rapidly the trade with foreign countries is increasing. Ceylon possesses two splendid harbours, Trincomalie and Colombo, and a fine harbour at Galle, the great port of exchange between the ancient East and West, which might by a comparatively small expenditure become once more a great port to satisfy the exigencies of the expanding trade with the Far East. Colombo is an artificial harbour enclosing over 600 acres. Trincomalie is one of the best natural harbours in the world. It is now abandoned as a naval station, but one day the Indian Government may see the utility of securing the advantage of the only harbour on the western shores of the Bay of Bengal south of Calcutta by constructing a railway over Adam's Bridge to connect with a Ceylon line from Manaar to Trincomalie, in which event the latter would become the principal port for Eastern trade with Southern India.

To those who contemplate the investment of capital

in Ceylon, as to those who are already engaged in cultivation, the Labour Question is important. In 1904, 76,963 coolies came from Southern India, and 56,246 returned. All coolies on arrival are sent to Ragama Camp, eight miles from Colombo, whence, after a detention of twenty-four hours, they are despatched to their destination. The coolies are contented and peaceable. Medical aid is provided in every district. There are sixty-six hospitals and 371 outdoor dispensaries in the island. As a contribution to medical expenses, an export duty is collected of 10 cents per hundredweight on coffee, tea, and cacao, and 5 cents per hundredweight on cinchona. Drugs are supplied at cost price to superintendents of estates. The rates paid for medicines at public dispensaries would hardly satisfy a private chemist, 5 cents an ounce being the authorized charge for an ordinary mixture, 2 cents for a lotion, and 2 cents per square inch for a blister!

A Commission has just reported on the subject of education, on which legislation will be proposed during the coming session. In the meantime it is known that 21 per cent. of the population are able to read and write in some language.

It would require more space than can here be given to do justice to the various questions affecting this fascinating island, but enough has been said to show that its prosperity is apparently stable, and that it presents possibilities of profit and pleasure to intending investors or seekers after archæological interest or perfection of natural beauties.

BURMA

By SIR F. W. R. FRYER, K.C.S.I.

Burma is the easternmost province of British India. It is also the most recently acquired province of that empire. It is bounded on the east and north-east by China. The eastern boundary touches, besides China, the French province of Indo-China, the Siamese Shan States, and Siam proper, and finally runs down to the Bay of Bengal. On the north-west it is bounded by Bengal, Assam, and the feudatory State of Manipur, and on the west and south by the sea.

The total area of the province has been estimated at 238,738 square miles. The extreme length of the province is 1,200 miles, and its extreme width is 575 miles.

Burma is watered by five great rivers: the Irawadi, the Chindwin, the Panlang or Sittang, the Salween, and the Myitnge. There are also numerous minor rivers or streams.

There are walls of mountains on three sides of the province: the Arakan Hills, the Chin Hills, the Kachiu, Shan, and Karen Hills. The lower province, which consists of rich alluvial plains, is far more fertile than the upper province, and has a much more plentiful rainfall. The extension of canal irrigation will much increase the fertility of the upper province.

The races who inhabit Burma consist of Mongoloid tribes, and are by no means homogeneous. Besides Burmans proper, there are Talaings, Karens, Chins,

Shans, Kachins, Taungthus, Was, Palaungs, and others. They speak different languages, and differ more or less widely in their habits and customs. Out of a total population of 10,489,024, according to the last census, Burmese is spoken by 7,006,495 persons, and other languages by the remainder.

The predominant religion is Buddhism, but even amongst Buddhists animism still survives.

The advance of British power in Burma has been very gradual, and the conquest of Burma was never in any sense premeditated. From the time when the first mission from India visited Burma in 1695, up to the final dethronement of the last King of Burma, the Burmese monarchs always treated any approaches from India with arrogance and contempt, and never could understand that they were dealing with a superior Power. The first Burmese War of 1824 was due to the encroachment of the then King upon our borders, and to his invasion of Kachar. The second Burmese War of 1852 was due to a succession of outrages committed on British subjects by the Governor of Rangoon, and to the non-observance of the Treaty of Yandabo, which terminated the first war. The third Burmese War of 1885 was due to the oppressive action of the King towards a British company and to his advances towards a foreign Power. The expansion of the boundaries of a European Power ruling over an Eastern country appears to be inevitable, as its Eastern neighbours are sooner or later unable to appreciate the fact that it is for their own interest to maintain peace and to abstain from provoking their European neighbours. So long as Runjit Singh ruled the Punjab and made it one of his chief objects to maintain peace with England, so long were we able to avoid a war with the Sikhs. As long as King Mindon, a peaceful and wise Sovereign, ruled in Burma, so long were we at peace with Burma. And so with Afghanistan: we have had peace when the ruler of that country was wise enough to see that it was to his best interests to preserve the peace with us.

As soon as the pacific ruler passes away and is succeeded by a ruler who is not so fully alive to his own best interests, acts of aggression or bad faith are committed against us, and war is forced upon us.

The history of England in India, of Russia in Turkestan, and of France in Indo-China, all point to the truth of this proposition.

After the annexation of Burma was finally completed, we had, of course, to subdue the unruly tribes on our frontier: Chins, Kachins, and suchlike tribes, had to be taught that they could no longer be suffered to raid and plunder. This task is now nearly completed. Only the Was and a few Kachins remain to be dealt with.

The Was occupy a country which, according to the views of the British Commissioner with the Burma-China Boundary Commission, should belong to Great Britain, whilst the Chinese Commissioner proposed a boundary which would intersect the Wa country. The Was themselves, in fear of absorption by China, were anxious to be declared British subjects. If the Mandalay-Kunlon railway is to be continued into China, it will be necessary to administer the Wa country through which the line will pass, and also a small tract inhabited by a turbulent people called the Somus, who live just across the Salween river and command the proposed line.

Similarly, if we connect Burma with the Assam line of railway through the Hukong Valley, we shall have to assume the government of the Kachins of the Hukong Valley. The Hukong Valley is situated within the line of our administrative boundary, and the Kachins, who inhabit the valley, have several times sent deputations to ask us to take over the government of their country, and so put an end to their dissensions.

In Burma we have demarcated all but a small section of our frontier with China, our frontiers with France and with Siam are fixed, and there appears to be no immediate danger of any disturbance of the peace.

It must, however, be recognised that the relations of Burma with her foreign neighbours, and more particularly with China, require most careful watching. There has of late been an agitation in Burma for separation from India, but it seems in any case most inadvisable that the charge of the frontier policy of Burma should be removed from the Indian Foreign Office. Imperial policy makes it, I think, imperative that Burma should remain a province of India for political if for no other reasons

The administration of Burma is now conducted by a Lieutenant-Governor under the orders of the Government of India. A Legislative Council for the purpose of making laws and regulations was constituted in 1897, when the province was raised to a Lieutenant-Governorship. The province had previously been administered by a Chief Commissioner, and all laws and regulations had to be made by the Indian Legislative Council. The number of members of the Burma Legislative Council is nine: five are Government servants, and four are selected from the non-official community.

The primary administrative division of Burma is into Upper Burma, including the Shan States and the Chin Hills, and Lower Burma.

The Shan States are administered by their own chiefs, subject to the supervision of the Superintendents of the Northern and Southern Shan States. The Chin Hills are administered by a Superintendent. In both the Shan States and the Chin Hills there are special laws suited to the circumstances of the people.

The rest of Burma is divided into eight divisions, each under a Commissioner, four in Lower Burma and four in Upper Burma. Under the Commissioners are thirty-seven Deputy Commissioners, each in charge of a district. Subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner are Assistant Commissioners and Extra Assistant Commissioners. In each district there are two or more subdivisions, which are ordinarily in charge of an Assistant or Extra Assistant Commissioner, and the subdivisions

are again divided into townships, or Myos, each in charge of a township officer, or Myook. Finally, each village is in charge of a headman. This headman collects the revenue and receives a commission on his collections. He generally has some small civil and criminal powers, and is responsible for the peace and good government of his village.

Excellent village laws have been passed in Burma which enforce the joint responsibility of the villagers for the suppression of crime and for their own good conduct. It was to these laws that the speedy pacification of the upper province may in a great measure be attributed.

The Japanese sent a delegate to study the system of administration in Burma with a view to applying it to Formosa, and the Americans also sent a representative to acquaint himself with the system in force, in order to ascertain whether it would be suitable for the Philippine Islands.

Up to the present year the divisional and district officers in Burma have carried on the whole work of the administration, both revenue and judicial; but now the amount of work has increased so greatly that in the more populous parts of the province it has been found necessary to divide revenue from judicial work, and separate officers have been appointed to deal exclusively with judicial work.

The resources of Burma are very great. The food-supply of the province is always in excess of the requirements of the people. There never has been any general scarcity of food in Burma, and whenever there has been a famine in any other province of India, the food-supplies of Burma have been available to supply the deficiencies of India. Burma may, therefore, be styled the granary of India.

The principal food product of Burma is rice. In Lower Burma six-sevenths of the total area under cultivation is devoted to rice. In Upper Burma the rainfall is much smaller than in the lower province, so

less rice is grown, and the rice produced in the upper province generally requires irrigation.

Cotton grows freely, but is of too short staple for European markets. It, however, finds a ready sale in China. I am persuaded that cotton of longer staple could be easily introduced, especially on the canal-irrigated lands of the upper province.

The forests of Burma are very valuable, and it is from Burma that most of the teak timber of the world comes. In 1902-1903, 229,570 tons of teak were exported from Burma.

Rubber, too, grows readily in Burma, and rubber plantations are being rapidly extended.

All sorts of minerals are found in Burma. The petroleum industry is already a very large and flourishing one. The Burma ruby-mines, too, are well known.

Coal is known to exist, and will be worked when communications are improved. At present the cost of transport from the coal-fields is found to be a great drawback to their successful working.

There are many other minerals, such as gold, silver, lead, jade, amber, and tin, in Burma, and as the communications of the province are improved, and the population increases, its mineral resources are sure to be developed.

At present labour is very scarce in Burma, and there have been many schemes for inducing the surplus population of India to migrate to Burma. I doubt whether there will be any very extensive movement of population from India to Burma until there is direct railway communication between the two countries. Hindus have a prejudice against settling permanently on the other side of the sea. This does not prevent large numbers of Indians from crossing the sea to work in the rice-fields and rice-mills of Burma, and no difficulty is experienced in enlisting men of the warlike Indian races and Gurkhas for service in the Burma regiments and in the military police. A small proportion of these men marry Burmese wives and settle in the country, but the

majority return to India with their savings. Gurkhas especially find the country congenial to them. Many Chinamen, too, have made their homes in Burma, and the Chinese have formed a very flourishing colony in that country. The Chinese, however, are principally engaged in commerce and in market-gardening.

Sixty-seven per cent. of the total population of the province are dependent upon pasture and agriculture, and cultivable land is so plentiful, and the rules under which waste land can be taken up for cultivation are so easy, that the floating population, willing to work as daily labourers, is very limited. Consequently, when labour is required in large numbers, it has mostly to be imported, and imported labour is expensive. It is also difficult to keep imported labourers, whose tendency is to acquire land of their own and to abandon daily labour for the more independent and, to their ideas, sufficiently remunerative employment of agriculture.

Now that communications with China are being opened out, trade with China promises to develop considerably, and it is probable that more and more Chinamen will find their way to Burma. Chinamen are akin to the Burmans, and readily assimilate with them.

Burmans do not make good soldiers; they are too much averse to discipline. Karens and Kachins have been tried in the military police. The Karens have not done so well as was expected, but the Kachins promise to be excellent soldiers, and a company of Kachins in the Military Police did excellent service when forming part of the escort of the Burma-China Boundary Commission. They distinguished themselves in an encounter with the Was, who made an attack upon the Commission. Many Shans, who formerly were inhabitants of Burma, and occupied lands in the Katha and Bhamo districts, were driven out by the depredations of the Kachins; and now that the Kachins have been reduced to order, they show a tendency to return to their former habitations.

In Burma revenue is levied from all cultivated land. A rate is fixed according to the description of land, and this rate remains unaltered for a term of years. The cultivated land is measured up every year, and so all extensions of cultivation come under assessment annually. To protect those who bring waste land under cultivation, they are given leases of the land which carry exemption from land revenue for terms of years based upon the nature of the land to be cleared and the amount of labour required to clear it. This is the system in Lower Burma. In Upper Burma we found a system in force, at annexation, by which each household was required to pay one-tenth of its annual estimated income to the State. The whole village was held jointly responsible for this payment. There were two descriptions of land. Private land was not assessed, except, of course, in so far as the income from land was included in the household income. State land was made to pay as much as could conveniently be squeezed out of the State land tenants.

Since annexation it has been decided to assimilate the revenue system throughout the province as much as possible, and private lands are now assessable at three-fourths of the rates levied on State lands. The old assessment on households, which was called Thathameda, from a Sanskrit word signifying one-tenth, is being gradually reduced so far as concerns agricultural income, and only persons who derive their income from sources other than land will continue to be assessed at full rates. The total land revenue of Burma in 1903-1904 was 2,18,15,715 rupees. In Lower Burma a capitation tax is levied at the rate of 5 rupees per married man and 2·8 rupees per bachelor. This tax came down to us from Burmese times. It brought in 49,13,658 rupees in 1903-1904. The capitation tax has not much to recommend it, I think, except its antiquity and the fact that it brings in a large revenue.

Then there is fishery revenue. The fisheries of Lower Burma are very large and productive, and Ngapi, a

preparation of fish prepared with salt, and of exceeding malodour, is used by all the Burmans as a daily article of diet. The fishery revenue of Burma amounted in 1903-1904 to 29,07,886 rupees.

A revenue is also derived from water-rate, which is levied on lands irrigated from Government canals. This will naturally increase as more canals are opened. The Government has completed the Mandalay Canal since annexation; the Shwebo Canal is nearly finished, and three more canals have been begun. The Mandalay Canal is 40 miles long, and has fourteen distributaries. The Shwebo Canal is 27½ miles long, and has two branches, 29 and 20 miles long respectively. This will show that these canals are works of importance.

Besides this there is the Customs revenue. This brought in 1,52,66,121 rupees in 1903-1904. Then there is the very much debated opium revenue, which brought in 45,50,182 rupees in the year 1903-1904, for which my figures are taken.

The salt revenue, Excise revenue, stamps, and assessed taxes, go to swell the total revenue, and forest revenue is a very important item. In the year I have taken forests brought in a net income of 50,19,093 rupees.

There are various local and municipal revenues levied in Burma, but, as these are not Imperial, I need not mention them.

The gross Imperial and provincial revenue of Burma for 1902-1903, the last year for which I have correct figures, was 808 lakhs. Out of this sum the amount allotted to the province for provincial expenditure was 336 lakhs, or 41·6 per cent. Thus, Burma contributed to the Imperial exchequer 472 lakhs of rupees.

Out of this contribution from Burma to the Imperial exchequer there has to be deducted the cost of the troops in the province; Burma's share of the cost of the Central Government; the provincial share of the home expenditure, including charges for stores, pensions, and furlough allowances; Burma's share on the interest on the public debts, of railway charges, of interest on rail-

way debt, of interest on the capital expenditure on canals; of Indian marine expenditure; and of India's contribution to the navy. I have taken these figures from a recent speech by Sir Hugh Barnes, the late Lieutenant-Governor. He added that it was calculated that, deducting these payments and the cost of the wars waged for Burma, Burma had never yet fully paid its way, and that the present year was the first in which an equilibrium would be arrived at. Henceforth, no doubt, Burma will more than pay her way, and it seems to me that Burma has not done badly, in view of the fact that she has paid all her own charges to the Imperial exchequer, including the cost of three expensive wars, and that in future she will provide a surplus to the Imperial treasury.

It must not, however, be forgotten that Burma is still in great need of development. She needs more railways, better communications, and a more liberal expenditure on public work in general. Capital expended on the development of the province will, judging by past experience, return a liberal profit. The revenue of Burma is constantly increasing. Last year there was an increase of 73,42,610 rupees in the total revenues of the province, and, owing to the system of assessment, the land revenue increases automatically with the increase of cultivation.

Financially, then, Burma is a source of strength to the British Empire. The conquest of Burma was, as I have said, not undertaken voluntarily, but of necessity. Lower Burma was conquered because we could not brook the presence of an aggressive and hostile Power on the borders of India, and Upper Burma was conquered primarily because we could not allow that province to be acquired by a foreign Power.

Great Britain has a large trade with Burma. The value of foreign imports by sea was 847 lakhs of rupees in 1903-1904. Foreign countries trade with Burma on equal terms with ourselves; 58·67 per cent. of the imports, however, came from the United Kingdom.

This large trade would be seriously diminished if Burma were to cease to be a province of the Empire. The ports of Burma, if held by an enemy, would be a constant menace to India, the Straits Settlements, and Ceylon; and, indeed, it is difficult to contemplate the loss of strength which the Empire would incur if Burma passed from its rule. It would mean eventually the loss of India, and the loss of India would mean the ruin of the British Empire.

The only direction in which Burma can be a source of weakness to the Empire is in the fact that it requires a garrison for its defence.

The total strength of troops in Burma is 10,629 men, of whom 3,352 are Europeans and the rest natives. During the South African War a British regiment and 300 British Mounted Infantry were spared from the garrison, and in times of stress even more troops might be spared. There are 2,750 British or European volunteers in Burma who could be made available in case of necessity; and it cannot be doubted that, if we ceased to hold Burma, we should require a very much stronger force for the defence of the Indian provinces on the borders of Burma and of the Indian sea-coast. The loss of Burma would thus mean the loss of power, and would also be a very grave blow to our prestige and to our commercial prosperity. Thousands of Englishmen find employment in Burma as officials, as merchants and traders, on the railways, in the forests, on sea-going and river steamers, and in many other ways. These men would be added to the great army of the unemployed, which presents a sufficiently difficult problem already.

Then, too, there would be the loss of capital, to say nothing of the public buildings, railways, canals, and roads. There are the European-owned factories, mills, oil-wells, river-steamers, and other valuable property, which would be irretrievably lost. It needs no argument, I think, to show that Burma is too valuable a

possession to be parted with so long as we have the means of retaining it.

Apart from the value to the Empire of a province possessing the resources and natural wealth of Burma, it may be confidently asserted that British rule in Burma has been of the greatest advantage to the province. We found anarchy, and we have established order. The country has been brought under settled administration, the happiness and contentment of the people have been secured, and the country has been opened out and developed with great rapidity. Under the Burmese régime might was right, and the non-official community were at the mercy of the ruling classes and Court favourites. When we took over Upper Burma, we found gangs of robbers fostered and protected by provincial Governors on the one understanding that their depredations were to be confined to country outside of that ruled over by their patrons. Nobody could call any property his own. The country was quickly becoming waste, and taxes could no longer be paid. The gain to civilization by our occupation of Burma is something that we may justly take credit for, and we may confidently assert that our conquest of Burma has not been wholly selfish. We were certainly actuated in some measure by a desire to introduce order and good government in a country adjacent to our own each time that we declared war against Burma, and we have certainly attained that result.

Burma is, as I have endeavoured to show, one of the most valuable possessions of the British Crown, and as time goes on it will become more and more valuable. As it is it pays its own way, and costs us nothing to retain, and is, for this reason alone, a source of strength to the Empire, and not of weakness.

OUR IMPERIAL INTERESTS IN NEARER AND FURTHER ASIA.

By VALENTINE CHIROL

India is the stronghold of British power in Asia, and the security and welfare of India must always be the paramount consideration that governs our Asiatic policy, and, indeed, one of the main considerations that govern the policy of the British Empire as a whole. None the less is it essential that we should bear in mind the large and complex interests which the enterprise of generations of Englishmen have created for us in Asia beyond the immediate frontiers of India. No doubt it is from India, or as a consequence of the position we hold in India, that British influence has been carried west and east along the highways of the seas into other, and, in some cases, geographically remote, regions of the Asiatic continent. But for our possession of India, it is, perhaps, questionable whether, or to what extent, we should have built up at the mouth of the Red Sea, in the Persian Gulf, on the waterways of Mesopotamia, and in the southern provinces of Persia westward of India, or eastward, at Singapore and in Siam, at Hong Kong and throughout the Far East important centres of British interest and influence, either strategical, political, or commercial. However that may be, they exist to-day, and they constitute essential factors of Imperial policy which are apt to receive less attention than they deserve. The object of the following rapid survey is to promote, however imperfectly, a better appreciation

of their value, either on account of their intrinsic magnitude, or in their relation to the safety of India.

The Gates of the Red Sea.

Aden, which, for administrative purposes, is actually attached to the Bombay Presidency, needs only cursory mention. Its great fortified harbour, commanding the southern approach to the Red Sea, with the island of Perim right in the middle of the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and Sokotra Island off the Horn of Africa, forms, as it were, one of the outer gates of India which we are bound to retain under our control for the protection of the shortest and most important sea-route from the Metropolis to our great Indian dependency, as well as to the Far East and to our Australasian Colonies. Moreover, owing to their insular or quasi-insular position, these possessions lie almost beyond the reach of the disturbing influences at work in other parts of the Asiatic continent. Aden, of course, is situated on the mainland of Asia, but in so remote a corner of the Arabian peninsula that the troubles which arise from time to time with neighbouring tribes of Arabs, or even with Turkey when the Porte elects to extend to them its dubious protection and assert its somewhat shadowy rights of sovereignty in those regions, may be regarded merely as unpleasant incidents of little more than local importance.

The Persian Gulf.

Until a few years ago our position in the Persian Gulf might have seemed equally unassailable. At the cost of no small sacrifices of blood and treasure we had in the course of the nineteenth century restored peace and security to its waters, over which, until we began to show our flag, wholesale piracy had for generations run riot. We had gradually taught the turbulent chiefs of the littoral to exchange their hereditary pursuits of slave-raiding and buccaneering for the less exciting, but

more commendable, ventures of trade and of pearl-fishing. Some of them we had bound over by treaties, making them directly responsible to the Government of India, whose authority they pledged themselves to recognise. In other cases we had, with perhaps excessive generosity, acquiesced in the revival by Turkey and Persia of an effective authority which, to say the least, they could never have established without our sanction and cooperation. Needless to say, they accepted all the advantages without assuming the slightest share in the responsibilities of the new situation. To the present day British gunboats alone police the Gulf, and it is to British political officers that local differences are in most cases referred for arbitration and settlement. If the Persian Gulf and its ports have been thrown open, and remain open, to the trade and pacific enterprise of the whole world, it has been, and is still, due solely to the unceasing efforts by which, without claiming any exclusive privileges in return, we have established the *Pax Britannica* throughout the length and breadth of its inhospitable waters.

The Russian Advance in the Middle East.

Though the trade of the British Empire which passes through the Persian Gulf amounts now to a respectable sum—namely, between three and four millions sterling a year—it is not by their commercial value that our interests there can be adequately measured. Their importance at the present day is conditioned upon the pressure of those new forces which are making themselves felt all over Asia. As Lord Curzon observed in one of the most pregnant speeches he delivered during his memorable tenure of the Viceroyalty of India, the great Powers of the European continent are becoming, or visibly aim at becoming, also great Asiatic Powers. The advance of Russia in Western and Central Asia has already caused increasing anxiety to two or three generations of British and Anglo-Indian states-

men, and the mere precautionary measures it has imposed upon us, and especially upon our Indian dependency, have already proved a serious burden to our Imperial resources. The might of Russia has borne down from the north within the last decade upon the decrepit kingdom of Persia with irresistible weight. It has, perhaps, been temporarily checked by the blows showered upon Russian prestige in the Far East, but the check can hardly be permanent. Financially, by the loans in which she has entangled the spendthrift Shah Muzaffer-ed-Din, and strategically by her military position, which envelops the Persian frontier from the Caucasus to the Heri Rud, from Tabriz to Meshed, Russia dominates Teheran; nor does this satisfy her ambition, which aims at displacing British influence not only in Northern, but in Central, and even in Southern Persia. The attack was in the first place openly directed against British trade. A lavish system of bounties and drawbacks to promote Russian commerce; a new tariff forced upon Persia for the exclusive benefit of Russian trade; a bank specially created on the lines of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and like the latter, to all intents and purposes a Department of the Russian Ministry of Finance; the reorganization of the Persian Customs Service by a staff of Belgian officials devoted to Russia's interests because dependent upon her favour; the construction of expensive roads in Northern Persia, combining commercial with strategical advantages; the appointment of enterprising consular officers all over Persia, working hand in hand with native agents, drilled in the school of General Kosakowsky's brigade of 'Persian' Cossacks—these were only some of the more salient features of her plan of campaign.

Perhaps the most significant indication of her policy was the engagement she wrung out of the Persian Government not to sanction the construction of any railways in Persian territory without her consent. The Russians themselves have made no secret of the object of this engagement. It was intended to cover the

period during which railway construction in the Far East and in Central Asia would necessarily absorb their energies and their resources. Afterwards, Persia might be safely released from this eccentric engagement, on condition, of course, that she placed the construction of her railways in Russian hands. Now, Persia is, on the whole, a poor country; there are few railways that can be profitably built on a purely commercial basis, and those only the lines that would open up communication between North-Western and Central Persia and the Persian Gulf. It is in Southern and Central Persia, on the other hand, that our material interests are chiefly concentrated. We have opened up not only the navigation of the Karun, but an important trade-route from the head of its navigable waters to Isfahan. We have a practical monopoly of the carrying trade by sea to and from all the ports of the Gulf. The Imperial Bank of Persia—the principal institution of credit in the country—is a British bank created under a royal charter. One of the chief lines of telegraphic communication between India and Europe crosses the whole of Persia from the head of the Gulf, and the Indian Government, which constructed that line, is now building a second line direct from Beluchistan, which will connect with the first one at Kashan. These—and I have named only a few of the more important—are not inconsiderable interests, and if adequately supported, they are capable of great development. If Russia really wants commercial railways in Persia, there should therefore be no difficulty in arranging for British cooperation on a business basis. But if she wants to monopolize railway construction throughout Persia for purposes of conquest by railway, she can have but one goal in view, and that goal we cannot allow her to reach if we have any regard for the future safety of India. To tell the truth, she has not been at much pains to disguise her aims. For whilst she has been seeking to project her influence into Khorasan and Seistan with a view to a flanking movement round the Western

borders of Afghanistan towards the North-West frontier of India, she has shown her hand scarcely less openly in the Persian Gulf itself. The *Variag*, whose visit to Bunder Abbas a few years ago was the first outward and visible sign of Russia's designs upon a 'warm-water port' in the Gulf, was, it is true, sent to the bottom of the sea off Chemulpo within two days of the rupture between Russia and Japan, but her name can still be read blazoned in huge letters of white paint on the sun-scorched cliffs of the Gulf, and the Sheikh of Koweit can still tell the story of how her captain bade him note the Russian colours which she flew—'the colours which,' he boasted, 'will soon rule these seas.' The danger which she portended was never, it may be admitted, very serious, as far as sea-power was involved, and it has, at any rate, been indefinitely postponed by the events of which her own unhappy ending was the prelude. But it is by no means impossible—many of those who are in the best position to study Russian policy hold it to be probable—that if Russia resigns herself to being effectually headed off from the Pacific, she will at no distant date concentrate all her energies on the Middle East in order to fight her way to the Indian Ocean. It therefore behoves us, in the meantime, to make our position in Southern Persia and in the Gulf secure against the attack.

Germany and the Baghdad Railway.

We cannot, moreover, remain blind to the fact that Russia is no longer the only European power that turns covetous eyes towards the Persian Gulf. The German conquest of Asia Minor by railway may for the present claim to mean nothing more than a policy of 'peaceful penetration.' But the methods of German diplomacy at Constantinople itself, and of German *Welt-politik* in other parts of the world, bid us be careful how we accept German assurances with regard to the Baghdad Railway. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the

result if not the object, of German railway policy in Anatolia, has been effectually to strangle British railway enterprise in that region. The story of the Smyrna-Aidin and Smyrna-Cassaba Railways, which, under British auspices, first opened up the country, affords conclusive evidence on that point. Nor should we overlook the important commercial interests we have to safeguard in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, where hitherto they have encountered no hindrance save Turkish obstruction and misgovernment. Our trade with Mesopotamia is at present an entirely sea-borne trade *viâ* the Persian Gulf, and the possible effects of railway competition are at least a factor to be carefully considered. Again, there is the larger and far more important question of the expediency of allowing a great European Power to obtain facilities of uncontrolled access to the Persian Gulf. It will be alleged, no doubt, in the first instance, that those facilities are required solely for commercial purposes, just as Russia alleged originally with regard to the Manchurian Railway, and as Germany alleges in Shantung; but we know how that sort of claim paved the way, in the former case, for political and military supremacy, and, in the latter case, is still being shaped towards economic monopoly and administrative control. Fortunately, with regard to the Baghdad Railway, Great Britain still holds the trump cards in her hand. Germany is hardly yet in a position to carry out this great undertaking without British cooperation, and there are good grounds for believing that she requires our cooperation for political as well as for financial reasons. It is much easier to paint 'Constantinople — Baghdad' in large letters on the rolling-stock of the Anatolian Railway than to raise in Germany the millions required for the completion of the line, especially now that the fat sections of the line are finished, and the lean sections have to be built, which cannot for a long time to come, if ever, pay their expenses.

But that is not all. The influence of Germany at Con-

stantinople is unquestionably in present circumstances very great. The fact that she obtained the Baghdad concession is a proof of it. But it is based mainly upon the all-powerful favour of the Sultan, whom the Emperor William II. has spared no efforts to conciliate. Turkey trembles before the Sultan, and hates him. Even Abdul Hamid cannot live for ever; and when he disappears the reaction which is bound to follow will seriously affect Germany's position, for by the very methods she has used to ingratiate herself at Yeldiz Kiosk, she has incurred the distrust and animosity of all the best elements in Turkey. British influence, on the other hand, which outside Yeldiz Kiosk is still considerable, will then revive, and it would be no small boon for Germany, when that hour comes, to have British interests tied up with German interests in one of the biggest ventures into which William II. has launched her. It does not, however, follow that, because there were overwhelming objections to the terms upon which Germany invited British cooperation two years ago, we must play dog-in-the-manger, and set our face at all costs against the construction of the line. What we have to guard against is that a line debouching on to the Persian Gulf shall not assume the character of a Manchurian or even of a Shantung Railway, with a Port Arthur or a Kiao-chau as a terminus. The most effectual guarantee against such a contingency, and one to which Germany's consent should be readily given if she is really innocent of any political *arrière-pensée*, is that the eastern section of the great trunk railway—say from the Gulf to Baghdad, together with the proposed branch on to the Persian frontier—should be built, administered, and worked by this country. It is a demand we are fully entitled to make, for the valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates has been opened up exclusively by British enterprise. Its foreign trade is almost entirely in British hands, and we hold, and intend to retain, the command of the seas which give access to it. Sir William Willcocks, who has recently investigated the subject on the

spot, tells us, with the authority of his great experience in India and in Egypt, that it would be an easy task for modern engineering science to irrigate the plains of Mesopotamia, and convert them once more into flourishing granaries, as in the days of yore. In the redundant populations of India we have ready to hand the material required there for purposes both of preliminary labour and ulterior settlement. There are, therefore, excellent reasons of a positive as well as of a negative order why we should claim recognition of the predominant interests we have in the construction of a railway opening up those regions.

With regard to our position in the Persian Gulf, the policy of this country has been laid down on sound and definite lines in the declaration made two years ago by Lord Lansdowne: 'We' (*i.e.*, His Majesty's Government) 'should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any power as a very grave menace to British interests, which we should resist with all the means at our disposal.' But as Captain Mahan, who has written with great weight on the broader issues this question involves for an Empire which rests upon sea-power, has very forcibly observed: 'Naval control is a very imperfect instrument, unless supported and reinforced by the shores on which it acts. Its corollary, therefore, is to attach the inhabitants to the same interests.' We have ample means of doing so from such a base as we possess in the Persian Gulf; and if we make good and timely use of them, we may yet convert our position in that part of the Middle East from a source of weakness into a bulwark of Imperial strength.

The North-West and North-East Frontiers of India.

Questions which concern essentially and almost exclusively the strategical defence of India do not come within the scope of this article, and I therefore leave it

to others to deal with the problems connected with Afghanistan and the Pamirs, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet, which, however large and important, are mainly problems of frontier policy. For the present, at any rate, there is no room in those inhospitable regions for the commercial activity and individual enterprise which in other parts of Asia impart a living force and a concrete value to British interests and British influence. Before these again find any adequate field, we must pass from Southern Persia right along the great mountain walls of Northern Hindustan to where Upper Burma marches with China and Siam, and to the wonderful peninsula which stretches up to them northwards from the Straits of Malacca.

Western China and Siam.

Though one of the great overland routes into China leads from Bhamo, in Upper Burma, through Yun-nan to the fertile and populous province of Sze-chuan, in the upper valley of the Yang-Tsze, it can never become an important highway for trade until railway communication is established; and notwithstanding the strategical and commercial advantages of such a line, the difficulties and cost of construction are so great, owing to the natural obstacles presented by a succession of deep valleys and rugged mountains running at right angles to the only possible *tracé*, that the Indian Government has finally decided against its feasibility, and private enterprise will presumably be even more reluctant to face so gigantic an undertaking. To the south dense tropical forests, covering the recesses of a little-known country, stretch from Burma into the upper valley of the Menam, and for many years to come it is chiefly through the southern ports, and especially through Bangkok, that the natural avenues of access to Siam will lie. Fortunately, the specific agreements concluded between this country and France with regard to Siam, as well as the general understanding which has placed Anglo-French

relations on a new footing of cordiality and mutual confidence, have removed the danger of international friction in the valley of the Menam, as well as in that of the Mekong, where the Shan States, under British protection, are now separated only by the river from the western provinces of French Indo-China. That a Siamese loan on very reasonable terms has been issued this year with great success, under the joint auspices of French and British financial houses, is both a tribute to the growing prosperity of Siam and a proof of the genuine desire on both sides of the Channel for friendly cooperation in what was a few years ago a dangerous arena of jealousy and strife. It was indeed high time that we and the French composed our differences, for whilst we were fighting over shadows, Germany, as the *tertius gaudens*, was possessing herself of the substance. Railway construction was becoming a German monopoly, and the German flag was taking the first place, which had so long been undisputedly ours, in Siamese ports. In fact, in 1903 more than half the tonnage entered and cleared at Bangkok was German.

Singapore and the Malay Peninsula.

It is, however, still with Singapore that the prosperity of Bangkok is, and must remain, most intimately connected. For Singapore, owing to its splendid position on the Straits of Malacca and to the magnificent hinterland opened up in the Federated Malay States, is the great emporium of South-Eastern Asia, and, indeed, one of the corner-stones of our Empire. Commanding the chief ocean highway to the Far East, its fortified harbour, with dockyards and wharves and coal-stores, is a naval station of the first importance, and one of the busiest commercial ports in the whole world. The shipping entered and cleared at Singapore, which, together with Penang and Malacca, constitutes the Colony officially known as the Straits Settlements, amounted in 1903, to nearly 18,500,000 tons exclusive

of native craft—an amount second only to Hong Kong and London in the shipping returns of the Empire. In the same years the value of exports and imports (exclusive of inter-Settlement trade) totalled, roughly, £32,000,000 and £39,000,000 respectively, or considerably more than double what they had been a decade ago. Much of this prosperity no doubt is due to the development of the Federated Malay States, which occupy a large portion of the Malay Peninsula, and constitute one of the finest estates in the whole length and breadth of the Empire, yielding in abundance not only all the fruits of a fertile tropical soil, but also great mineral wealth. It has been developed almost entirely within the last twenty years, and, thanks in no small measure to the genius of Sir Frank Swettenham, a born Empire-builder, such as our race seems almost alone able to bring forth, the Federated Malay States show already a trade of some £12,000,000 exports and imports and a revenue of £2,000,000, and they own over 350 miles of railway, built entirely out of current revenue. Whether British North Borneo and the adjoining Protectorates of Brunei and Sarawak, which lie in the same latitude some 500 miles further east, will ever rival Malaya may be doubted, though they have many natural features in common, and the excellent work done by Rajah Brooke in Sarawak deserves more than mere honourable mention. Space, however, does not allow me to do more than refer incidentally to Borneo, where the extension of Rajah Brooke's authority, at any rate to Brunei, seems to be urgently needed.

Hong Kong and the Far East.

The Malayan Peninsula, notwithstanding its great intrinsic value, is itself only the stepping-stone from India to the Far East. Not till Hong Kong is reached does one stand actually on the threshold of a region where we have built up interests of immense actual and potential importance which have made us a power

in the Northern Pacific, and given us a share in the future destinies of Asia largely distinct from that conferred upon us by our position in India. Hong Kong itself, which we have transformed, since we first occupied it sixty years ago, from a bare and almost untenanted rock into a magnificent clearing-house for the trade of the Far East, with a population of 300,000 souls, with a fortified and well-equipped naval station, with a splendid natural harbour and excellent dock accommodation, scarcely, however, yet adequate to the needs of a port where the annual entries and clearances (nearly 22,000,000 tons in 1903) represent a larger tonnage of ocean shipping than any other port in the Empire, not excepting London—Hong Kong, as a British possession, exists solely as the warden of the British settlements and markets in the Far East.

The Opening up of China.

The first successful attempts to open up intercourse with China were made from India. In the enterprising days of 'Good Queen Bess' three ships had, it is true, been despatched, in charge of one Benjamin Wood, to convey letters from Elizabeth to the Emperor Wanleh, the last of the great rulers of the Ming Dynasty. But Wood's expedition came to grief on the way, and, though some forty years later, in 1637, a squadron of four British vessels under Captain Weddell actually reached Canton, and by the preliminary argument of a three hours' bombardment appear to have temporarily convinced the Chinese of the advantages of international trade, the results achieved were not of a permanent character. It was the East India Company that, under a charter from the British Crown, first established, in 1664, and maintained thereafter for more than a century and a half, regular commercial relations, though often by very irregular methods, with the Middle Kingdom. The China trade, centred at Canton, remained an actual monopoly of the Company until 1834. But by that time it had come to be regarded

as one of the most important of British oversea enterprises, and it was for its preservation and extension that the British Government then determined to assume direct control over our relations with the Chinese Empire, and that the two China wars were afterwards waged by which the wall of Chinese isolation was irrevocably breached. The Treaty of Nanking of 1842, and the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858 (which was not, however, ratified until we occupied Peking in 1860), constituted, until quite recently, the fundamental charters of Western intercourse with China. The action which we had initiated served also as a precedent for similar intervention—though with unexpectedly different results—in Japan. It is unnecessary, for my purpose, to dwell at any length upon the history of our relations with the Far East, or to investigate closely the merits of our policy, in those earlier phases. What I am concerned with is the results that were achieved, and in this country their magnitude seems seldom to receive adequate recognition.

The Present and Potential Value of the Chinese Markets.

It is now universally admitted that no country in the world possesses greater natural resources than the vast Empire of China, or offers, owing to its teeming and industrious population, a greater potential field for foreign commercial and industrial enterprise. Those resources have hardly yet begun to be developed, and we have touched but the fringe of that field. Yet, according to the official returns of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, the foreign trade of China amounted, in 1903,* to a value of 326,739,133 H.Tls.† as to im-

* I have taken the statistics of the year 1903, in preference to those of 1904, for the trade of the Far East, as the former year was not subjected to the disturbing influences of the Russo-Japanese War.

† The value of the *Haikwan* tael, which fluctuates with the market value of silver, averaged 2s. 7⅞d. for the year 1903.

ports, and 214,352,467 H.Tls. as to exports, or, together, 540,691,600 H.Tls. (roughly, £70,000,000). Of the imports, 50,603,772 H.Tls. came direct from Great Britain, 33,856,203 H.Tls. direct from India, and 136,520,453 H.Tls. from Hong Kong—a very large proportion of the latter being transhipments from ports of the British Empire. As to exports, Great Britain took 10,024,095 H.Tls.; India, 1,944,043 H.Tls.; and Hong Kong, 89,195,605 H.Tls. The interest of the British Empire in the foreign trade of China amounted, therefore, approximately to over £40,000,000, or, in other words, to four-sevenths of the whole. To take only one staple of British industry, China imported, in 1903, £5,800,244 worth of British cottons. Of the 57,290,389 tons of shipping, including Chinese shipping, entered and cleared at Chinese ports in 1903, 28,122,987 tons, or nearly half, were British. Of railways built, in construction, or projected in China—though British enterprise has been heavily handicapped in this direction—concessions for 683 miles (93 already open for traffic at the end of 1904) are in exclusively British hands, and British interests are represented as to one-third in an Anglo-German concession for 810 miles of railway connecting Shantung with the Yang-Tsze Valley. Moreover, British capital and British control have a very large share in the Northern Chinese Railway system, consisting of 580 miles, already completed, of which Peking, Tientsin, and Niuchwang are the chief termini. Of the very considerable British interests already engaged in the development of the enormous mineral wealth of China, some idea may be gathered from the fact that the shares of the 'Pekin Syndicate' and its offshoot, the 'Pekin Shansi,' which have obtained important concessions for working the coal-fields and petroleum deposits of Shansi and of part of the province of Houan, stand to-day on the London Stock Exchange at quotations representing a valuation of over £2,000,000. The coal-fields of China, it must be remembered, have been estimated to be sufficient to supply

the whole world for 3,000 years; yet, according to Mr. Brenan, late British Consul-General in Shanghai, China is still importing coal from other countries to the extent of 1,400,000 tons per annum, and at a cost of £1,000,000. Nor does coal represent by any means the only form of mineral wealth hidden below the surface of Chinese soil. Last, but not least, we must bear in mind the large amount of British capital —over £22,000,000—invested in Chinese Government loans over and above the share of the war indemnity owing to this country under the terms of the peace protocol, signed at Peking in 1901 after the repression of the Boxer Movement.

Enormous as are these material interests already represented by British capital invested in China and the actual volume of British trade with China, they must, however, pale into insignificance compared with the value of our potential share in the development of that vast Empire. To form an estimate of its capacities, we have only to compare the growth of foreign trade in Japan under an enlightened system of government and liberal institutions with the growth of foreign trade in China under the obstructive misrule of Peking and the obsolete methods of the Chinese authorities all over the country. Japan has barely one-eighth of the population of China, and her people, though more alert, are not more industrious; her natural resources are incomparably smaller. Yet during the last two decades, whilst the foreign trade of China has only increased from, roughly, £43,600,000 (in 1883) to about £70,000,000 (in 1903), the foreign trade of Japan has increased during the same period from a little over £9,000,000 to over £60,500,000, or eight and a half fold.* Even ten years ago the foreign trade of Japan was barely half that of China; to-day it

* The figures for 1904 show another enormous increase in the foreign trade of Japan, which rose during the first year of the war to £69,032,000; but the increase, which was mainly in imports, may have been to a considerable extent artificial and due to army requirements.

is only by one-seventh inferior to it—in other words, the 50,000,000 inhabitants of Japan now deal with foreign countries at the rate of about 24 shillings per head, while the 350,000,000 inhabitants of China still deal with foreign countries only at the rate of less than 4 shillings per head.

We cannot hope for any transformation of China similar to that we have witnessed in Japan, for the ruling classes in China lack those elements of patriotism and enlightenment which alone rendered possible such an evolution as Japan has accomplished. Nevertheless, things are moving, even in China. The commercial genius of the Chinese people will not be denied, let the Mandarins hamper it as they may. The obstinate conservatism of official China cannot in the long-run keep the Chinese markets closed against the commercial enterprise of this country. That is a question merely of time and patience. The real danger that threatens it is the policy of economic exclusion based on political ascendancy, of which Russia and Germany have already given us a foretaste in Manchuria and Shantung.

The British Settlements in China.

I have dealt so far with various British interests which can be more or less closely reduced to terms of money. Not so, however, the interests of another and more complex order represented by the British communities that have struck root in the 'Treaty Ports' of China. Yet they constitute in many ways an Imperial asset of a still higher order. In virtue of our treaties with the Chinese Empire, British subjects have right of access for purposes of trade and residence to thirty-five towns in China, which, by an extension of an originally accurate description, are still technically designated as 'Treaty Ports,' even where they are situated far inland, away both from the sea and from the great navigable rivers. Under treaty, foreigners residing in certain areas set apart as 'settlements' or 'concessions'—a distinction upon which it is needless here to enter—enjoy rights

and privileges of a far-reaching character. The British communities, more especially, being the oldest and the most enterprising, have thus been free to put into practice in the more important centres those methods of self-government which are characteristic of our race. At Canton, at Tientsin, at Hankow, at Niuchwang, and, above all, at Shanghai, flourishing settlements have grown up, largely governed by their own laws, and differentiated in degree rather than in kind, by treaty limitations, from British Colonies in the ordinary acceptation of the term. Shanghai has well earned for itself the title of the 'Model Settlement,' and may therefore be taken as a pre-eminent type of all other settlements of a similar or kindred order in China. Except in the matter of political sovereignty, Shanghai is to all intents and purposes as essentially a British city as Hong Kong or Singapore. It comprises, it is true, a native city subject exclusively to Chinese administration, and therefore squalid and decaying, and a French settlement subject to special municipal laws framed in the somewhat narrow spirit of French bureaucracy, which have served only to hamper its prosperity. But the real Shanghai, the great, thriving, bustling emporium of commerce and industry in the Far East, is the so-called 'Mixed Settlement,' which is so entirely dominated by the British element that, although cosmopolitan in theory, it is a thoroughly British city. Of the foreign, *i.e.*, non-Chinese, population, which is increasing by leaps and bounds, two-thirds are British subjects. Its magnificent quays, its stately public buildings, its docks and warehouses and banks, its goodly private houses, its churches and hospitals, its clubs and theatre and race-course and golf-links, all testify to the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon spirit, which is equally reflected in the constitution and the methods of the municipal authority that governs this great city. The municipality of Shanghai is a representative body elected by and from among the 'land-renters' or qualified citizens. This modest body, consisting of ten members, is practically responsible for

the good government and security of a 'settlement' with a population of close upon 400,000 souls within an area of nearly 9 square miles. The rates and taxes which it levies provide a revenue of about £200,000, which defrays the expenses of a mixed body of police—European and Asiatic—of a volunteer corps about 700 strong, and of an efficient fire-brigade, besides different administrative departments, the most important of which are, perhaps, those of public works and public health. Of the wealth of the community, whose interests are committed to this municipal body, some slight idea may be gathered from the fact that the land tax of 5 per mill. is levied on property assessed at a value in the aggregate of about £9,000,000, and the general rate on house property — 10 per cent. on actual or assessed rentals—represents nearly another £10,000,000 worth of real property. Of the enormous amount of capital invested in trade, finance, and industry, centred at Shanghai, it is difficult to frame an exact estimate; but it may safely be computed at over £200,000,000. More than half the import and export trade of China passes the port of Shanghai, to the value, in 1903, of about £40,000,000, and it is the chief centre of the growing native cotton industry.

Though no other 'settlement' or 'concession' in China approaches Shanghai in importance, it would be easy to show that many others reproduce on a smaller scale results similar to those which British energy and the British aptitude for self-government have achieved in the 'Model Settlement.' I have dwelt at some length on this aspect of British interests in China because it is not easily realized by those who have not had an opportunity of seeing with their own eyes these robust offshoots of the British tree transplanted with all their indigenous vitality on to Chinese soil. The conditions under which they have grown up are, moreover, changing so rapidly that the methods which have hitherto sufficed for their protection are breaking down under the pressure of new forces.

The Decline of British Influence in the Far East.

Until a little more than ten years ago—*i.e.*, until the war between China and Japan—our position in the Far East was one of undisputed ascendancy. The preponderancy of our commerce and shipping was overwhelming; our settlements in the Treaty Ports open to foreign trade set an example of orderly self-government and prosperity; our language had become the accepted *lingua franca* of the coast and the chief medium of intercourse between the more educated natives and the world of Western thought; and the commanding naval force we maintained in the China seas, resting on such strategical bases as Hong Kong and Singapore, amply sustained our prestige as a great Asiatic Empire. Our diplomacy, it is true, conforming to the *laissez-faire* attitude of the British Government, often hesitated to push these advantages, and, in China especially, the innate obstructiveness of the Peking Government and the awakening rivalry of European competitors were often treated with improvident supineness. But the enterprise of our fellow-countrymen held the field in spite of this handicap. With the disclosure of the unfathomed weakness of the Chinese Empire in its struggle with Japan, and with the aggressive intervention of Russia, France, and Germany against Japan at the close of the war, the whole situation was, within a brief twelvemonth, completely revolutionized to our detriment. We had failed to avert the war; we had failed to stop it; and in the end we had failed to prevent a compulsory settlement being effected by others which we ourselves avowedly disapproved, but did not venture to oppose. We could no longer pretend to any primacy of influence either at Peking or at Tokio. We had obstinately closed our eyes to the development of Russia's power in Eastern Asia ever since Ignatieff snatched the Maritime Province from China under cover of the Anglo-French Expedition to Peking; and just as, in spite of Khiva and

Geök Tepe and Merv, we only woke up to the full significance of Russia's advance in the Middle East when we found her securely entrenched on the frontiers of Afghanistan, so it was only when she had got the Chinese Government in her grip that we began suddenly to realize the meaning of the naval station she had created at Vladivostok, 'the Ruler of the East,' and of the 5,000 miles of railway she was building across Siberia in order to bring her European possessions into close contact with her new base on the Pacific. Nor had Russia appeared alone on the scene: she had brought France and Germany in her train; and though the former was content merely to nibble tentatively at the southern extremities of the huge 'yellow corpse,' Germany, with the voracity of a youthful appetite in such matters, lost no time in snatching at one of the choicest morsels. The seizure of Kiao-chau by Germany served as a welcome excuse for Russia to seize Port Arthur and Talienwan, and then the absorption of the whole of Manchuria became merely a question of time. First, the Siberian Railway had to be deflected to the long-coveted 'warm-water port,' and military precautions taken for its safety; then the Boxer Movement had to be stamped out by armed occupation, and that occupation could not, it was contended, be terminated without 'guarantees,' of which the nature was constantly modified so as to exclude finality.

The story of British policy in China during that eventful period, from 1895 down to 1902, will not constitute a very creditable chapter in our annals. It was a period in which painful exhibitions of weakness alternated with needlessly strong language, and vigorous protests were invariably followed by 'graceful' concessions. We seemed to have borrowed the most futile leaf out of the book of China's own statecraft, and to have no other aim than to save our faces by the most puerile devices. Thus, Wei-Hai-Wei, which we took with a great flourish of trumpets as a counterpoise to Port Arthur, dwindled down ultimately into a pleasant

sanatorium, or at most a useful *dépôt* for our ships. We juggled for a time with 'spheres of influence,' or, 'of interest' until the hollowness of these pretensions grew as wearisome as a worn-out joke. Russia in Manchuria, and Germany in Shantung, gave us plainly to understand that their motto was: 'What is mine is mine, but what is yours is not by any means your own.' We tried to arrive at a direct understanding with Russia, but the negotiations were gradually watered down to an indifferent agreement with regard to railways in the North, the value of which Russia illustrated in her own way by a bold attempt to retain possession of the Peking-Shanhaikwan line after the Boxer rising. We then concluded a formal convention with Germany, which she promptly interpreted in her own way as having no force with regard to Manchuria, but very peculiar force with regard to the valley of the Yang-Tsze. From the wretched Chinese Government we obtained 'assurances' galore and an abundant promise of 'open ports' and facilities for inland navigation and concessions for railways. But whilst German railways materialized in Shantung and Russian railways in Manchuria, and so-called Belgian railways, under the auspices of Franco-Russian diplomacy, worked down from Peking into the Yang-Tsze Valley at Hankow—*i.e.*, into the heart of our own much-vaunted 'sphere'—most of the achievements of British diplomacy remained mere paper, and, for what they were worth, might have gone straight into the waste-paper basket. In the midst of all these perplexities there had come the South African War, and it had not only absorbed our energies, but it had effectually diverted public attention from the imbroglio, and even the creditable part played by our Indian troops in the relief of the Peking Legations only temporarily revived it.

The Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1902.

British interests in the Far East seemed to be drifting rapidly towards a *débâcle* when the situation was sud-

denly transformed by the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1902. In spite of many blunders and much futile groping about for mere palliatives, the British Government had fortunately never lost sight of the great issues involved in the Far Eastern question. The failure of the various expedients to which they had had recourse had in itself demonstrated the necessity of working out the solution on entirely fresh lines, based on the fullest recognition of a new and most important factor. That factor was Japan, and, to the credit of British statesmanship be it said, this country was the first to appreciate its value.

The Rise of Japan.

The future historian will not improbably give to the evolution of Japan in the era of *Meiji* the foremost place amongst the great events of the second half of the nineteenth century. Only fifty-one years have even now elapsed since the nations of the West, applying to Japan the same forceful methods that had already been applied to China, compelled her most reluctantly to reopen to foreign intercourse the doors which she had kept hermetically sealed for two hundred years against the outer world. Happily for Japan, isolation had not meant in her case, as it had in that of China, stagnation and degeneracy. She had preserved with her pristine forms of society the pristine virtues of a race imbued with great ideals of self-sacrifice and devotion to the common weal, and at the same time endowed with great intellectual capacity. The extraordinary rapidity with which, under the guidance of her ruling classes, she borrowed from the alien civilization of the West its scientific and mechanical equipment, together with many of its outward forms and methods, was so unprecedented a phenomenon that it provoked at first nothing but scepticism, and, from superficial observers, derision. The relations between this country and Japan had, indeed, assumed a very friendly character as soon

as the old reactionary forces which resented foreign intrusion had been finally overcome. It was a great Englishman, Sir Harry Parkes, who first unravelled the tangled thread of Western diplomacy in Japan, and the makers of modern Japan soon realized that they had no more sincere and enlightened well-wisher than the plain-spoken British Minister who represented his country in Tokio from 1865 to 1883. But there was one unfortunate circumstance which militated for a long time against a generous recognition in this as in other European countries of the real character of Japan. Most of the British residents were engaged in trade, and lived in the treaty ports set apart under our earlier treaties, as in China, for foreign settlement. Thus it happened that they were brought almost exclusively into contact with the Japanese trading-class, a class which, under the old feudal system, occupied a very low place in the social hierarchy, and was the last to adapt its methods to the new conditions of Western intercourse. The British merchants in Japan were, therefore, apt not merely to compare the Japanese merchant unfavourably with the same class in China—where it represents *per contra* the healthiest and most intelligent element in the social organism—but also to judge the whole of Japan equally unfavourably by the light of their limited experience. Sounder views, nevertheless, prevailed in the long run, and in spite of considerable opposition from the British communities in Japan, Lord Rosebery's Government had the courage to admit, even before the signal proof of national efficiency she gave to the world in the course of her war against China, that Japan was entitled to be released from the disabilities in matters of international intercourse, which it has been the custom of Western Powers to impose upon Oriental nations on a lower plane of civilization. The revision of the British treaties with Japan in 1894, and our renunciation of the special privileges of extra-territoriality and of exclusive jurisdiction over British subjects, were fully justified by the event. The

social evolution of Japan progressed steadily and quickly —so quickly, indeed, that her enemies still remained blind to it until they suddenly found themselves confronted with the stern reality they had so lightly challenged.

The Community of British and Japanese Interests.

Meanwhile our refusal to join in the coercion of Japan after the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been the first step towards a political *rapprochement*, to which Japan made willing and practical response by lending at our instance, her invaluable cooperation, as prompt as it was efficient, in the relief of the Peking Legations and the restoration of order in Northern China in 1900. The more openly the aggressive policy of other Powers in the Far East stood revealed, the more fully did Great Britain and Japan come to realize their own community of interests. Japan had become in contact with the West a great commercial and industrial power. I have already alluded incidentally to the growth of her foreign trade. Twenty years ago it did not amount to £10,000,000 ; in 1893 it had increased to about £30,000,000, and in 1903 it reached over £60,000,000. It had grown more than sixfold within two decades. This immense expansion of foreign trade has been only commensurate with the economic development of Japan's resources in every other direction. The tonnage of her shipping, excluding junks, grew from 225,000 tons in 1893 to nearly 1,000,000 tons in 1903. During the same period her railway system, built entirely out of her own resources, grew from under 2,000 to over 4,500 miles ; the production of silk, cotton, and other textiles was trebled ; the number of male and female operatives employed in her cotton-mills alone increased from 25,000 to 72,000 ; and what, perhaps, most graphically illustrates the general growth of commercial activity, the amount of bills cleared at various clearing-houses rose from

about £21,000,000 to over £350,000,000. At the same time the ordinary revenue of the State grew from £8,500,000 to nearly £22,000,000 in the last financial year before the war; and the population of the country, which at the first census in 1872 was only 33,000,000, has steadily increased, until it now exceeds 50,000,000 souls (including Formosa).

In these circumstances the preservation of foreign markets for her trade and of a convenient outlet for her redundant population gradually assumed as great an importance in the eyes of Japanese statesmen as it has long possessed in the eyes of British statesmen. It was naturally towards China that Japan looked for the former, and towards Korea for the latter. She thus necessarily found herself brought into line with the Powers whose policy was that of the 'open door,' as against those whose object was to create for their own benefit zones of political ascendancy which were also to be zones of economic monopoly. To that extent she could count on the moral support of the United States as well as of Great Britain. But she wanted more than merely moral support. For if her economic interests were threatened by the general trend of events in China, her very security as a nation was threatened by Russia's ambitions. Not content merely to entrench herself in Manchuria and to dominate Peking from the Great Wall, Russia was already clutching at Korea, and casting about for another Port Arthur at Masampo, which faces the Japanese islands across the now famous Tsushima Straits. The advance of Russia in the Far East was an even greater menace to the safety of Japan than the advance of the same Power in the Middle East was to the safety of India. The community of commercial interests in China was thus reinforced by a community of political interests, and of both the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1902 merely constituted the logical corollary and the public expression.

The Japanese Alliance opened up a new era in the history not only of our relations with the Far East, but

of our position as an Asiatic Empire. It showed not only that we had no intention of surrendering the great commercial interests bound up with the preservation of China as a field of industrial enterprise open to all comers, but also that we realized the fundamental unity of the Asiatic problem, whether it be looked at from Teheran or from the North-West Frontier, from Peking or from Seoul. It cannot be rightfully alleged that either Great Britain or Japan have sought to deny to Russia an ample sphere of expansion in Asia. The conciliatory spirit in which we have negotiated with her in regard to a whole series of Central Asian questions, and the conspicuous moderation of the proposals put forward by Japan in St. Petersburg before the outbreak of war, bear conclusive evidence to the contrary. Neither in England nor in Japan has the desirability of a general understanding with Russia on a broad and liberal basis lacked recognition. But it takes two to make an understanding, just as it takes two to make a quarrel, and Russia never exhibited any genuine disposition to respond to the advances made to her. Had she listened to the overtures of Lord Salisbury, even after the Port Arthur episode in 1898, or to those of Marquis Ito, when he travelled to St. Petersburg at the end of 1901, the Anglo-Japanese Agreement might never have come to pass. But she chose on both occasions to reject the proffered hand, and the methods and purpose of her public policy from Persia to Korea were more and more openly directed towards the goal which some of her most influential spokesmen have repeatedly proclaimed — namely, that of exclusive domination in Asia, which is held to be her appointed destiny or mission.

That is a claim which Great Britain and Japan are equally bound in self-defence to traverse. Eastern Asia being the point of most urgent danger, it was there that the alliance of Great Britain and Japan first took effect. That it did not suffice to avert war is no reflection upon the foresight and statesmanship of those who

concluded the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. For if the existence of that agreement failed to restrain the ambitions of Russia within limits which she might have peacefully compassed, is it conceivable that they would have been more effectually restrained by the protests of Japan, had she continued to stand absolutely alone and unsupported? Is it not obvious, on the contrary, that Russia would have forced matters even more relentlessly to an issue? In that case Japan would either have been driven to recognise the paramount power of Russia in the Far East, or, as from what we know of the Japanese spirit is far more probable, she would have accepted the challenge, with the heavy odds of a possible and even probable revival of the old coalition of 1895 against her. For, failing such a public pledge as the Anglo-Japanese Agreement contained that Great Britain would keep the ring, France would hardly have been able to resist the solicitations of her ally, and Germany would assuredly not have missed the opportunity of placing her 'mailed fist' at the service of her Eastern neighbour in return for future favours. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement, by restoring even in this negative shape the balance of power in Asia, localized the war, and enabled Japan to concentrate all her energies upon its prosecution without fear of interference from other quarters, with the result that she has carried it to a successful conclusion, and that the aggressive tendencies of Russia in the Far East have received a severe check.

The Renewal and Extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Long before the war itself had come to an end, both British and Japanese statesmen were naturally compelled to consider the question of the renewal of an alliance which had rendered such good service, not only to the interests of both the contracting parties, but to the peace of the whole world. The Russian armies had been repeatedly defeated, the Russian fleets annihilated;

but however protracted might be the struggle, however unbroken the course of Japanese victories, it was not to be for a moment expected, nor indeed was it to be desired, that the might of Russia, who is a great European as well as a great Asiatic power, should be crushed. It would have been rash even to assume that her ambitions would be permanently arrested even in the Far East, and still less in other parts of Asia. Nothing would, at any rate, have tended more than a dissolution of the alliance between the two Powers who represent the forces of conservation in Asia, to revive the hopes of those who represent the forces of disintegration.

In these circumstances the British and Japanese Governments wisely decided that the true guarantee for the maintenance of peace in the future was not to loosen but to strengthen the ties uniting the two countries. As the result of their friendly consultations a new Agreement was signed in London on August 12 last. Its purpose, like that of the Agreement of 1902, is purely defensive, but it brings both Powers immediately into line if the interests which it is designed to protect are attacked by another Power. It is concluded for a term of ten years instead of five; and it covers not only the Far East, but the whole sphere of British and Japanese interests in Asia from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and opposes a practically insuperable barrier to the restless ambitions which have disturbed the peace of the Far East ever since the adventures of Kiao-chau and Port Arthur, and still threaten, as they have done for generations past, the peace of the Middle East.

This alliance will fulfil in Asia the same purposes which the Dual Alliance was originally intended to fulfil in Europe, and no more than the latter can it be rightly regarded as an aggressive alliance. It will be a powerful combination for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Asia; and Russia, one may even hope, will in the face of it, gradually be brought to a more

reasonable frame of mind, and, it may be added, more in consonance with her own interests as a great European Power, and with those of her continental ally. There must be many Russians even now who realize with scarcely less consternation than it is already realized in France how disastrously the Asiatic adventures into which Russia has wantonly plunged have weakened her power in Europe. It is surely not unreasonable to hope that, the hour of *recueillement* having come in St. Petersburg, there may be statesmen there who will recognise that there is and always will be room for an understanding with both England and Japan in regard to Asiatic affairs as conducive to the higher interests of all parties as the understandings which have recently taken place between France and England, and between France and Italy. This is, however, a digression. Great Britain and Japan had to look in the first place to the protection of their own interests, and there could be no doubt as to the direction in which it pointed. The chief weakness of the British position in Asia is due to the fact that, whereas our strength resides mainly in our naval power, we can no longer rely mainly on naval power for the defence of our Asiatic interests; and, on the other hand, the experience of the present war shows that, even against Russia alone, the naval power of Japan had to be strained to the uttermost, and would scarcely have proved adequate against a coalition of Powers. In combination, however, Great Britain and Japan will each contribute what the other lacks, to the common benefit of both.

Conclusion.

To conclude. It is doubtful whether our position in India itself could be permanently safeguarded by trusting merely to some given line of strategic frontiers, and sacrificing the great interests which generations of Englishmen have built up beyond them in both nearer and further Asia. Prestige is a word which may be easily

abused, and be turned to derision. But it represents, nevertheless, a living force, especially in the East, and we should soon discover to our cost what it means in India if we were to shrink from the responsibilities inseparable from our position as one of the great Asiatic Powers in the widest sense of the term. At home, too, the loss of that position would speedily be felt by our working-classes not less than by their employers, for whether we cling to the practice of what is called Free Trade, or whether we make the experiment of a new Tariff policy, we may be sure that the markets of the world will be more and more fiercely disputed to us by our competitors wherever they can extend their political influence at the expense of our own, and no continent at the present day possesses markets of such potential value or such undeveloped fields of industrial activity as those which still remain to be opened up in Asia. Our alliance with Japan, based on either side, as all durable alliances must be, on an enlightened sense of self-interest, will go far to avert the dangers which have begun to threaten our position as an Asiatic Power, and with it the stability of our whole Empire.

But in the long-run we must rely, not upon any alliance, however solid, but upon ourselves. If, as the consequence of an alliance with Japan, we were to relax our energies, and allow ourselves to be lulled into a sense of false security, then that alliance would ultimately prove to have been not a boon, but a curse to the Empire. What we are justified in expecting from that alliance is that it will secure peace in Asia for a long term of years, and that it will therefore give us time to put our house in order, to reform and strengthen our military organization at home and in India, to place the economic future of India on a sound basis by fostering the new spirit of industrial and commercial enterprise which is already astir, to extend the great system of railway and irrigation works which is doing so much to mitigate the ruin periodically wrought by famine; and, beyond the borders of India, to coordinate

and develop the forces which make for the peaceful consolidation of our influence and the expansion of our trade, alike in Mesopotamia and Southern Persia, in the Valley of the Menam and in the busy markets of China. Above all in China. For it is in China that we must chiefly look to reap the economic advantages of the new position created by the Russo-Japanese war and the Anglo-Japanese alliance. But to reap them effectively we shall have to display greater individual energy and more sustained diplomatic activity than our people have shown of late years in China. Moreover, we must remember that in this field our allies will be our rivals, and very formidable rivals, unless we can extend to the domain of commerce and industry the same mutually beneficial cooperation which is now assured in the domain of politics. Neither in China nor in Persia, nor anywhere else in Asia, do we need or seek territorial aggrandisement, but in both the Nearer and the Further East we must look to it that the doors we have opened shall not be closed against us, that the claims we have pegged out shall not be 'jumped' by others; and that not only the treaty rights of this country, but the interests created by the enterprise and industry of our fellow-countrymen shall not be injured or curtailed. *Videant Consules ne quid detrimenti res publica capiat.*

Our Asiatic Empire firmly planted in India has struck deep and far-spreading roots, and thrown up vigorous off-shoots which cannot be allowed to perish and decay without grave and even fatal damage to its vitality.

LORD CROMER IN EGYPT

By SIR ELDON GORST, K.C.B.

The story of the Empire would not be complete without some account of England's work in Egypt during the twenty-two years that have elapsed since the British occupation of that country. Much has been written on the subject of the marvellous development of Egypt's material resources during these years of British rule, of the improvement in the moral and physical condition of the population, and of the progress effected towards establishing a sound and stable system of government. It is not here proposed, nor would space permit, to describe in detail this branch of the subject. The condition of a country in which, within some twenty years, the revenue has, in spite of very considerable reductions of taxation, risen from nine to twelve millions, in which the value of the imports has doubled and that of the exports increased by 50 per cent., in which the production of cotton—the principal crop—has also doubled, speaks for itself. A few dry facts of this character are more eloquent than pages of glowing description, and bear ample testimony to the results obtained from applying with intelligence to a country endowed with many natural advantages the elementary principles of sound administration.

The first point to which a general survey of the situation directs attention is the change which has quietly and almost imperceptibly come about in the external position of Egypt and in her relations to the

Empire. It is well to recall what that position was in the early days of the Occupation. The presence of a British force in Egypt was viewed with disfavour, if not with actual hostility, by most of the Powers of Europe. Continental opinion openly derided the sincerity of the motives which were the justification of our intervention in the internal affairs of that country, and which led us to persist in that intervention when France, at first our partner in the business, drew back and refused to go further. In a word, Europe was jealous of the predominant position which we were acquiring in the Valley of the Nile, and was bent on opposing, sometimes openly, sometimes secretly, the work which England had undertaken. Nor would it have been easy to find a more convenient field for the exercise of that opposition than was offered by the existing state of affairs in Egypt. The country was on the verge of bankruptcy, with a mutinous army, a poverty-stricken population, and a helpless Government; it was threatened by a fanatical uprising of its distant provinces; it was so bound hand and foot by international fetters that it could not move without the assent of the Powers of Europe—if ever a task was surrounded with what seemed insuperable difficulties, it was that upon which we embarked on the day when the British soldier set foot on Egyptian soil. In addition to the hostility displayed by the Powers towards our Occupation, public opinion in England, both official and non-official, viewed the undertaking with indifference, if not with actual antipathy. There was a general feeling that we were assuming responsibilities with little present profit and much prospective risk, and even the ardent Jingo of those days shook his head dubiously over the new departure. It was neither the wisdom of the statesman nor the passion of the multitude that led us into our Egyptian venture, but sheer force of circumstances. On no occasion has the nation been more unwilling to go whither its destiny called.

The first few years of the Occupation were not calculated to dissipate the forebodings with which Great Britain had entered upon her task. The abandonment of the Soudan to dervish tyranny, with the crowning disaster of the fall of Khartoum and the sacrifice of its brave defender, General Gordon, the innumerable embarrassments, diplomatic and administrative, arising out of the local situation in Egypt, were not circumstances upon which a patriotic Englishman cared to dwell. Loss of valuable lives, loss of money, loss of prestige, seemed at one moment to be all that we should derive from the situation, and it is hardly surprising that the very name of Egypt was for some years anathema equally to the politician and to the man in the street. Not only did the country constitute a very weak spot in our diplomatic armour, where we could easily be attacked by any ill-disposed Power, but our Occupation appeared to be an absolute bar to the maintenance of cordial relations with our nearest neighbour across the Channel. In view of these considerations, British statesmen were sincerely desirous to bring our intervention in Egyptian affairs to an early close, and several attempts were made in that direction during the first few years after 1883. Circumstances were, however, stronger than policies, and all such efforts were doomed to failure.

It would be difficult to imagine a more complete contrast to the state of affairs as it then existed than is presented by the Egypt of to-day. In the space of some twenty odd years—a brief period in a human life, and hardly appreciable in the life of a nation—the external position of Egypt and her relations to the British Empire have undergone as complete a revolution as the internal condition of the country and its population. Europe has recognised that the task upon which England so unwillingly entered must not be impeded or thwarted by the prospect of a premature evacuation, and that so long as we are responsible for the good government of the country, we have the right, and

indeed the duty, to insist upon being given a free hand for the execution of our programme. Diplomatic intrigue is no longer the fashion in Cairo, nor is it now possible for other countries to utilize the so-called international *status* of Egypt as a means of putting pressure on the British Government. Last, but not least, the occupation of the Valley of the Nile is no longer a stumbling-block in the way of the establishment of intimate and reciprocal friendship between England and France, and it may even be said that the recent adjustment of long-standing grievances in regard to that country has of itself tended to bring the two nations closer together. Egypt has, then, ceased to be a point of weakness to the Empire and a source of danger to the world, while the material progress of the country, made under circumstances often very unfavourable, and the reconquest of Khartoum and the lost provinces of the Soudan, are facts which may afford legitimate gratification to all sections of the British race.

What, then, have been the causes of this rapid and complete transformation both in the internal and external situation of Egypt? By what means has a problem which seemed at the outset fraught with innumerable difficulties, and which contained all the elements of an acute international quarrel, been honourably and unobtrusively solved within the space of a few years? These are questions of vital import to those whose concern is the welfare of the Empire.

First and foremost, our work in Egypt has been successful because for once we have not only put the right man in the right place, but have left him there. 'Egypt is the gift of the river,' said Herodotus more than 2,000 years ago, and, without exaggeration, it might be said that the Egypt of to-day is the gift of Lord Cromer. His has been the master-hand which has brought the country out of a condition of bankruptcy into a position of financial prosperity which may well be the envy of many larger and richer communities, and which has changed anarchy and rebellion into the rule

of law and order. His cooperation and support were, as Lord Kitchener himself would be the first to admit, vital factors in the successful campaign which resulted in the reconquest of the Soudan, and the restoration to Egypt of her lost provinces. His skill has steered the Egyptian bark through many diplomatic perils and dangers which often threatened shipwreck, until it has at last been brought into the calm waters of the Anglo-French agreement. During the earlier years of the Occupation there have been many occasions when an Egyptian conflagration seemed on the point of bursting out, but the crisis has always been averted by the sagacious and patient statesmanship which has been the keynote of Lord Cromer's policy. It is quite as much by what he has averted as by what he has effected that Lord Cromer has earned the gratitude of his countrymen, and contributed to the cause of peace. The system of government which has grown up in Egypt under Lord Cromer's inspiration may be described as a benevolent despotism—the best form of government, in the opinion of many philosophers, when you can get it. Most historical despotisms have been either inherited or obtained by violence, and the present case is one of the rare examples where power has been earned by merit. Strength of character, firmness of purpose, patience to wait for the opportunity, and courage to seize it when it comes—the exercise of qualities such as these have gained for Lord Cromer the confidence not only of the country which he represents, but also of the country over which he rules. Personal power that is not so acquired and not so justified can never be expected to produce good results.

Given the man and the power, the next question is how the one will use the other, and here we come to the second principal cause of the success of England's government of this Oriental people. The great aim which Lord Cromer and his English assistants have ever had before them has been the promotion of the welfare of the Egyptians, and the prosperity of their

country. They have studied the needs of their adopted land, and endeavoured to supply them without any suspicion of partiality in favour of British interests in cases where the latter might appear to clash with those of Egypt. And by so doing they have best served the true interests of the country of their birth, and have kept alive her ancient reputation for sincerity and single-mindedness amongst the weak and down-trodden populations of the earth. At first the Egyptian man in the street viewed with ingrained suspicion our most harmless proceedings, and was constantly imagining—very often at foreign suggestion of a not wholly disinterested character—some secret design in the simplest proposals. Now his confidence has been gained, and whatever view he may take of the measures adopted under British initiative, he is at all events ready to admit that they have been put forward in absolute good faith. That the existence of this feeling of confidence enormously facilitates the work of reform in Egypt goes without saying, and the first care of those who are engaged on that work has always been to avoid anything which might tend to enfeeble it. Further, not only has the Egyptian learnt to appreciate the motives underlying our reform policy, but experience has shown him that the measures themselves are beneficial. Under the new order of things, the daily life of the fellah or agricultural labourer has undergone a complete revolution. He no longer groans under taxation greater than he can bear. The arbitrary extortions of the tax-collector are no more enforced by the whip. The petty tyranny and oppression of the local official, from the policeman to the irrigation officer, have disappeared. The law and the court of justice have ceased to be regarded as evils even greater than all the rest. The equality of all, both rich and poor, before the law; the abolition of vicarious punishment; the suppression of unsound and burdensome taxes; the increased supply of the water by which alone his crops can be matured—these are priceless advantages which even the Egyptian

peasant must recognise as due to British control. There can, indeed, be no doubt, firstly, that he does appreciate this fact; and, secondly, that he would resist very strongly any attempt to restore the former state of affairs. Whether it is possible to go further and to say that he is proportionately grateful to those to whose efforts the change is due is a question to which the answer is more doubtful. In spite of the unquestionable talent of the Anglo-Saxons in ruling Oriental peoples, the two races are at the opposite poles of humanity, and can seldom be united by any very strong bonds of sympathy. No dominant race can expect to inspire affection in the peoples over whom it rules, but the Englishman has, as a rule, succeeded in inspiring the two next best feelings—respect and fear. Curiously enough, the Eastern races have generally exhibited a marked preference for Anglo-Saxon masters as compared with those of other nationalities. The reason, perhaps, is that, though we are very slow at understanding them, they easily understand us, and quickly acquire the comfortable feeling of knowing exactly where they are. Two other facts have greatly helped to cement the good feelings that exist between the rulers and the ruled in Egypt. The one is the care which has been exercised by the Anglo-Egyptian officials as a body to conciliate the prejudices, as well as the interests, of the people. Differences of religion, of thought, of social and family habits, have all contributed to make this no easy task. After years of study the Oriental still remains an enigma to his Western brother, and the workings of his mind are a perpetual surprise. Mistakes have often been made where they were least anticipated, but in the long-run patience and observation have prevailed, and we have learned how to avoid treading upon the Egyptian's toes. The importance of this result for the due accomplishment of our work is not to be overestimated, for nations, like human beings, are much more sensitive to that which hurts their feelings than to outward injuries. The other fact which has sugared the

pill of foreign domination to the dweller on the banks of the Nile is that the Egyptian element has been utilized to the fullest possible extent in the work of administration. 'English heads and Egyptian hands' has from the first been Lord Cromer's motto, and it has been vigorously applied in practice. From the Minister of the Khedive in Cairo down to the humblest clerk in the provincial administration, the great mass of the bureaucracy is native. A few carefully-chosen Englishmen direct the machine from behind the scenes; but the first lesson they are taught is the necessity of acting with tact and discretion, and of keeping as much as possible in the background. The government of the country is carried on in the Khedive's name, laws are passed by the Egyptian Council of Ministers, orders are signed by the Ministers of His Highness and executed by Egyptian officials. The situation is summed up by the fact that only one Englishman — the financial adviser — permanently attends the meetings of the Council of Ministers, and even he has no vote. When, in future ages, Macaulay's New Zealander digs up the official archives of the Egyptian Government he will hardly find any trace of the names or existence of Lord Cromer and the small band of Englishmen who have assisted in the regeneration of the country.

The third principal reason for the success which has attended British rule in Egypt is that there has been little or no interference on the part of the authorities at home. For once in the history of the Empire a really free hand has been given to the man on the spot. The four great bogies which have damped the ardour and tied the hands of some of our greatest pro-Consuls—the Home Government, Parliament, the Press, and Public Opinion—have in their mercy left Egypt severely alone. In this instance they have obeyed the behest 'not to speak to the man at the wheel,' with the result that the ship has been brought to the haven by a plain, straightforward course. Doubtless it has taken time to arrive at this desirable consummation. Slowly but surely the

man and his work have gained the confidence of his fellow-countrymen, till Lord Cromer's name has become a proverb for single-minded policy and honest administration. The advantage to Egypt and her hard-working population has been great. The European, after years of study amongst the people of the East, finds difficulty in arriving at even a moderate understanding of their customs, habits of thought, and prejudices. It is not, therefore, surprising that the intervention of those who have no such special knowledge generally produces more harm than good. Good intentions cannot supply the place of knowledge of local conditions and racial peculiarities, and Egypt has lost nothing by having been saved from the invasion of the faddist and the doctrinaire politician. This attitude of non-intervention in Egyptian matters on the part of the British public has been gradually transformed into a generous recognition of the value of the work accomplished under Lord Cromer's direction. Only those who serve the State in foreign lands can rightly estimate the immense advantage to the Anglo-Egyptian Administration of the knowledge that its actions were meeting with the approval and support of the British nation. As a general rule, the British public is nervously suspicious of any information with an official taint; when the best men have been selected to watch over the interests and carry out the policy of the country in other parts of the world, public opinion usually seems to think it has done enough. It neglects their advice and recommendations, and prefers to listen to the ignorant criticism of irresponsible globe-trotters, or the suggestions of interested parties who have axes of their own to grind in secret. From obstacles of this description the work of the English in Egypt has been singularly free. From the first the British people and the British Press seem to have realized that they could place the fullest confidence in Lord Cromer's execution of the great task that had been confided to him. In moments of difficulty and crisis—and there have been many such in the last twenty years

—it has been of inestimable advantage to Lord Cromer and his coadjutors to feel that they had behind them the support and encouragement of their fellow-countrymen at home, and that their labours and motives were not being misconstrued by their own people.

Doubtless one of the chief reasons why Egypt has been especially favoured in this connection has been that our local administration has lain outside the battle-ground of political parties in this country. Neither side has had any interest in unduly extolling or unduly depreciating the work upon which Great Britain was engaged in the Nile Valley. There being no party advantages to be gained, the subject of Egypt has not recently formed part of the polemics which rage between the 'ins' and the 'outs,' and the results of the Occupation have been appraised merely on their merits. The conversion of public opinion, which was at first distinctly unfavourable, has thus been allowed to follow a natural course, unimpeded by extraneous influences, until the moment has arrived when the efforts made for the regeneration of Egypt offer no further scope for controversy.

The administrative system by which Egypt is ruled is unlike anything to be found elsewhere in the world. It has been evolved partly by the accidents and circumstances of the moment, and partly by the practical administrative genius of the great man in whose hands the destinies of the country have been placed. It is full of absurdities and paradoxes, but it has yielded good results, and it may not be without interest to indicate very briefly some of its chief peculiarities.

The first point to be remarked is the very personal character of the Egyptian system. Most modern bureaucracies are constructed on the same principle as the automatic safety appliances utilized on railways. They are intended to be, as far as possible, independent of human error. Innumerable checks and controls are invented with a view of reducing to a minimum the chance that mistakes may be made. The depart-

mental consultations which take place before even a simple issue is decided are no doubt a preservative against hasty and ill-considered action, but they also have a tendency to weaken the feeling of personal responsibility. Moreover, the leading-strings which keep the average human being on the right path are a terrible hindrance to the efforts of the earnest reformer; the machine ends by absorbing the human elements that ought to work it, and operates in the direction of discouraging individuality and initiative. It would, therefore, be wholly unsuitable to the needs of a new country.

The Egyptian Administration is a plant of too recent growth to have contracted the defects which characterize bureaucracies of long standing. It has developed under the care of a few master-spirits, who have strongly impressed their individuality upon their work. The survival of the fittest is the brutal rule of Egyptian official life, and, indeed, as regards the English in the Egyptian service, such a rule was an absolute necessity. Their number being very limited, and the power of those in high position very considerable, whether for good or evil, it was essential to give very short shrift to those who were not efficient.

It may be objected that a system which requires specially-qualified men to work it stands self-condemned. Demand has, however, a tendency to create supply, and the present case has been no exception. Not only are young men of talent attracted to a service in which seniority plays second fiddle to merit, but the responsible nature of the work with which, from the first, they are entrusted, forms the character and develops the intelligence of those who can survive the test. They acquire experience while still young and active in mind and body, and are consequently less susceptible to what may be called the 'sleeping sickness' characteristic of bureaucracies in general. It follows that in the questions of importance that are dealt with by the higher officials routine and red-tape play a

comparatively minor part. The business of the Government is largely carried on by personal communication, and thereby the delays and misunderstandings produced by departmental correspondence are avoided. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule, and occasionally Anglo-Egyptians have been known to indulge in acrimonious official correspondence in bad French over some trivial dispute which a five-minutes' interview would have set right; but such practices are discouraged by the powers that be, and are dropped at an early stage.

There are some manifest advantages in the Egyptian system—or want of system, as some would perhaps call it. It produces men, and it can effect improvements. The daily work of administration is carried on in a business-like manner, and does not oppose obstacles to progress and reform. Its lack of rigidity is especially suitable to the needs of the Oriental community for whose benefit it exists. These are great merits, but there is, of course, the other side of the medal. In the first place, the predominance of the man over the machine causes the latter to work erratically whenever the former is changed. The mechanism is so responsive to the touch that an unskilful hand can quickly produce disaster. The human element is of necessity subject to frequent variation, and no two men, however equally versed in the art of government, take the same view either of ends or means. Consequently, there is at times a want of continuity in the methods adopted, owing to the fact that the personal factor has a tendency to overshadow tradition and precedent. New ideas can be put into execution and administrative experiments tried with greater facility in Egypt than elsewhere. But new ideas are not necessarily good ones, and experiments sometimes end in failure. The very ease with which new projects can be launched is sometimes the cause of their being adopted without due consideration or sufficiently thorough study, and occasionally it is found that a false road has been followed, and that the steps taken must be retraced.

The natural and proper remedy for the defect here

pointed out should be found in an enlightened and disinterested criticism of the measures which the Government are proposing to adopt. Unfortunately, such criticism does not at present exist in Egypt. In England we suffer from a plethora of discussion combined with a poverty of results. The reverse is the case in the land of the Pharaohs, and neither in the institutions of the country nor in the Press can there be heard at present the voice of an honest and well-informed public opinion. The want of local restraining influences of this kind is much felt by those who have at heart the welfare of the Egyptians, and who would be only too thankful for some trustworthy barometer of the wishes and feelings of the people. Time alone can repair this deficiency by the gradual spread of education and by the regular evolution of some simple system of local self-government which will help the people to a more complete understanding of public affairs.

The story of Great Britain's work in Egypt and of what has been accomplished under Lord Cromer's inspiration and guidance is in many respects an object-lesson which may not be without utility to our countrymen both at home and across the seas. The circumstances of the case were no doubt peculiar and not likely to be reproduced elsewhere. Special difficulties had to be met by special remedies. But, in the main, it may be said that the qualities to which Egypt owes her regeneration and the Soudan its release from barbarism are the very same which created the British Empire in the past, and which are equally indispensable for its preservation in the future.

THE LONGEST RIVER IN THE WORLD*

By SIR WILLIAM E. GARSTIN, G.C.M.G.

Few, if any, of the earth's chief waterways have aroused such universal and sustained interest as has that great stream which, rising at the equator, flows due north, through thirty-one degrees of latitude, to the Mediterranean. Almost from the dawn of history, the Nile has formed the basis of endless conjecture, and the subject of many a myth. The earliest writers vied one with another in relating legends regarding its sources, the dwellers on its banks, and the countries through which it passed.

This is easy to understand. Those pioneers of civilization who settled in its northern valley, and who, by the help of its beneficent waters, converted the desert into an area unrivalled for its agricultural prosperity—thus amassing the wealth which enabled them to form a mighty Empire—were aware that this river had its beginning in a land far away to the south, barred to

* This title has been given advisedly. The Nile, in its course from the Ripon Falls to the sea, traverses a distance of some 3,400 miles. Treated as a *single river*, then, it stands first as regards length among the principal streams of the world, the Yang-tse-Kiang coming next with 3,200 miles. If, however, to the mileage of the main rivers be added that of their longest affluents, then the Mississippi, with its great tributary the Missouri, comes first, with a waterway of 4,100 miles, and the Nile—even taking into account the united lengths of the Victoria Lake and the Kagera River—only fills the second place, its total length not exceeding 3,900 miles.

them by an intervening wilderness of sand and rock. Experience also taught them that its annual rise and fall occurred with an almost mathematical regularity, and that they could foretell with exactness the periods when its waters should overflow their fields and enrich them with their fertilizing deposits. They understood these facts, but they knew little or nothing more. It is not, then, to be wondered at that they sought to explain these marvels by inventing wild fables concerning the life-giving stream, bestowing upon it various appropriate names, and representing it as being under the special care of a tutelary deity.

Long after the Pharaonic Dynasties had passed away, and had been succeeded in the Nile Valley by those of other conquering races, the mystery which shrouded the sources of the river was maintained inviolate, and its secrets remained unrevealed. Rumours that its birthplace was located in a land of great lakes and ice-clad mountains, inhabited by strange people and by savage beasts, from time to time reached the outer world. These stories were, however, either disbelieved, or were treated as travellers' tales. It was not until the last century that the veil was finally lifted by the efforts of intrepid explorers, and that the sources of the Nile were defined beyond dispute.

As our information regarding the hydrography of the Nile is extended we begin to comprehend the complexity of the causes which produce its constancy of supply and its regularity of rise and fall. Our knowledge of these causes is of very recent date, and, indeed, is only now being perfected. It tends, however, to emphasize one fact--namely, that the Nile, in its entire system, is a far more wonderful river than was even that mythical stream evolved by the imagination of the early searchers after its sources.

At its outlet from the equatorial lakes its discharge is considerable, and is largely augmented by the numerous torrents which feed it in its passage through the country of mountain and forest. It enters the marshes a noble

river. It issues from them a comparatively insignificant stream, having lost more than half of its volume in its struggle through 500 miles of swamp. Midway between its head-waters and the sea it is joined by another great river, which at times brings down an amount of water six times greater than that of the Nile itself, but which at others fails entirely. Finally, during the latter half of its long course to the north, its volume is not augmented by that of a single tributary, and it traverses 700 miles of desert, wilderness, and mountain, its course barred by cataracts and rapids, before it arrives at that land which owes its existence to its precious waters.

It is proposed in the following pages briefly to describe the Nile sources, and the general characteristics of the countries through which it passes. The subject is one that has been frequently treated of by competent pens, but, as the present account is confined to the impressions actually gathered on the spot during travel, a summary description of this marvellous river may be of some interest to those who have not had either the time or the inclination to study the large amount of literature which exists regarding it.

It is assumed that the Nile has its origin in the equatorial lakes. This assumption is a legitimate one, as the Bahr-el-Gebel, with its continuation, the White Nile, is the true river, and forms the real source of the constant supply; while the Blue Nile, like the Atbara, is nothing more than a very important flood-tributary of the main stream.

The White Nile has two great systems of supply. Of these by far the more important is the immense sheet of water, situated under the equator, and covering an area of 26,000 square miles—known as the Victoria Nyanza. The other, and secondary, system is that which comprises the two smaller lakes—the Albert Edward and the Albert Nyanza—with their connecting river, the Semliki. These last all lie within that remarkable fissure in the earth's crust termed the 'Albertine Rift,'

which bounds the western edge of the Uganda plateau, and follows a north and south line for nearly 1,000 miles.

The two systems unite at the north end of the Albert Nyanza, whence their combined waters issue as the river called, in its upper reaches, the Bahr-el-Gebel, and afterwards the White Nile. It has been stated that the Victoria Nyanza system is the principal source of the Nile. About this there can be no two opinions. This lake, occupying an immense depression in the centre of a wide plateau, bounded on all sides by mountain ranges, naturally receives the drainage of the entire area. The tropical rainfall which for some three-quarters of the year deluges this region forms the source of supply. Lake Victoria is fed by numerous rivers, which drain the uplands. Its principal affluent is the Kagera, by some considered to be the real source of the Nile. This important stream rises some three degrees south of the equator, in the wild and remote country adjacent to the chain of volcanoes which bars the 'Rift' valley across, between the lakes of Albert Edward and Kivu. Further south than this the Nile sources cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be located, as these mountains form the watershed between the streams flowing south into Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, and those flowing north to feed the Nile.

The outlet by which the Nile leaves the Victoria Nyanza is situated at the north-west corner of the lake. Here it falls over the rocky barrier of the Ripon Falls, with a drop of some 15 feet. The river, from this point to its junction with Lake Albert, is called the Victoria Nile.

The catchment area of the Albertine system is smaller than that of Lake Victoria, as the 'Rift' valley is narrow and enclosed by high mountain ranges. One source of supply, however, exists here which is wanting in the eastern system—namely, that derived from the melting of the snowfields and the glaciers of Ruwenzori. This range, known to the earlier geographers as the

Mountains of the Moon, rises out of the very centre of the 'Rift' valley. It is girdled on one side by the Albert Edward Nyanza and on the other by the Semliki River. Its snow-fed torrents have consequently no other outlet than either the stream or the lake, and their waters must therefore help eventually to swell the volume of the Nile.

To those who have never visited Uganda it is difficult to give any but a faint idea of the scenery of the country in which the Nile has its birth. Every variety of landscape is here met with, and the beauty of this region can scarcely be surpassed elsewhere.

Lake Victoria is bounded on the east and north-east by a chain of lofty mountains, from which long spurs run down to the water, ending in a succession of noble headlands of bold outline. The scenery of this portion of the lake is grand and impressive, differing from that of the opposite shore, where the landscape is softer, and possesses the charm due to low-rounded hills and to an undulating and well-wooded country. Here there are no abrupt elevations, and the numerous bays and inlets are fringed to the water's edge with a tropical vegetation. Behind the coast-line stretches an expanse of alternating hill and valley, densely populated and richly cultivated, bearing evidences of much prosperity.

The Victoria Nyanza presents an endless series of contrasts. In the open water, where no land is visible, it more resembles a sea than a lake, and the storms, which frequently lash its surface into waves of consider able size, tend to impress this resemblance vividly upon the navigator.

Near the coast, however, the islands are so numerous and so close together that the dividing expanses of water are practically land-locked, and so sheltered that storms can have no effect upon their secluded havens. Many of these islands cover a large area, and contain hill-ranges of considerable height. Others are mere rocky elevations rising from the lake, a few acres in

extent. One and all are clothed with a rich carpet of verdure, extending from the heights almost to the water-level. The shores of these islands are almost invariably belted by a dense growth of bush and forest, or by groups of the graceful 'raphia' palm. The reflection of the trees and palms, mirrored in extreme detail upon the surface of the placid lake, combined with the picturesque background of hills, produces an effect of fairy-like loveliness and peaceful beauty hard to rival, and still harder to describe. Amongst the trees tiny hamlets nestle, while every clearing reveals well-cultivated fields, bordered by groves of rich bananas. In each bay and channel the canoes of the fishing population add life to the scene.

The prevailing tone of this island scenery, and, indeed, of the whole of Uganda, is green, of every shade imaginable, from the darkest olive to the most delicate emerald. These tints contrast delightfully with the patches of vivid red, observable wherever the surface-soil, or the underlying ironstone, is exposed, and their monotony is still further relieved by the vermilion bells of the many flowering trees which form brilliant spots of colour in the enchanting picture.

The region lying to the west of the Victoria Nyanza, between it and the 'Rift' valley, may be best described as a succession of terraces, rising one above the other to the escarpment of the Albertine depression. These terraces are much broken by rocky ridges, some of considerable height, indicating the 'fault' lines of the period of the great dislocation, when the whole face of this portion of the earth's surface was changed. Much of this area is covered with primeval forest, many of the trees being of exceptional girth and height. The undergrowth is everywhere extremely thick, and overhead the branches meet so closely that, into the heart of these forests, the sun's rays barely penetrate, and a gloom resembling twilight prevails throughout their dark recesses. The air is hot and steamy, and the trees are entwined in the embraces of snake-like creepers of great

thickness, which hang down in fantastic loops and festoons, and make progress extremely difficult. In these sanctuaries large herds of elephants wander at will, and in almost complete security. Their remoter strongholds are the home of the chimpanzee and many rare species of monkeys.

In some of the valleys the bamboo grows in luxuriance, but more often than not the hollows separating the ridges are filled with papyrus swamp, through which a sluggish stream slowly filters.

In the vicinity of Lake Albert Edward these ridges rise into a succession of mountain ranges, some of the higher peaks attaining a height of nearly 9,000 feet above the sea. At such altitudes the air is fresh and bracing, while the views are magnificent and of great extent. The slopes of the lower hills resemble terraced gardens, so profusely are they strewn with wild flowers. Like most plants in Uganda, these flowers are of large size, and in order to top the grass and reach the sunlight their stalks attain a height of several feet. The effect of these varied masses of colour is extremely pleasing, and the traveller is reminded of Swiss mountain scenery when the 'alpen rosen' and the gentians are in bloom. Thick clumps of tall forest trees fill the valleys, and in these shady retreats brightly plumaged birds of many species are to be met with.

As the escarpment of the rift is approached the character of the landscape changes completely. The trees, the flowers, and the birds disappear, and a barren expanse, or table-land, of lava, interspersed by black and jagged rocks, extends to the very summit of the cliffs. The scene here is a remarkable one. The surface of the plateau is seamed by the inverted cones of extinct craters, many hundred feet in depth, close to one another, and frequently separated only by a ridge a few yards in width at the top. The simile of a gigantic honeycomb, of which the cones form the cells and the ridges the dividing walls, is irresistibly suggested. The sides of these craters are very steep, and, in almost every case,

are covered with thick vegetation, their green slopes contrasting sharply with the sterility existing above ground-surface. Some of them contain small lakes, and, looking down from above into the pellucid water far below, the reflection of the trees and palms which border their shores is charmingly reproduced. The traveller in this part of the country cannot help conjecturing as to what must have been its aspect when the many volcanoes, of which these craters once formed the outlets, were in full activity, and were all spouting flame, or throwing up streams of molten lava.

The remote sheet of water, known as Lake Albert Edward, although its general aspect is one of loneliness and gloom, is, nevertheless, at times invested with a wild beauty, visible on those rare occasions when the thick haze, which usually hangs over its surface, lifts and permits a view of its surroundings. On a clear day the views are very fine. At its southern extremity a tract of bare, lava-covered plain, in which geysers throw up jets of water and steam, rises sharply to the mountain range dividing the valley of the Albert Edward from that of Lake Kivu. Over the hill-tops a cloud perpetually broods, due to the smoke emitted by the craters of the still active volcanoes. West and north-west the Wakondjo mountains form a noble background, rising apparently to the skies. This chain is among the finest in Central Africa, and its spurs descend, in a series of sheer precipices, to the shore of the lake. These mountains are, however—more particularly in the Semliki Valley—dwarfed by the imposing mass of Ruwenzori, which entirely dominates the landscape. The snow-clad peaks of this, the highest mountain in Africa, tower above all else, and stand out in distinct relief above the rugged summits of the secondary ranges. High up the western slopes of Ruwenzori, and across the deep gorge in which the Semliki skirts its base, extends an outlying area of the great Congo forest, the scene of Stanley's wanderings, and the home of the pigmy, the gorilla, and the strangely marked okapi. The eastern slopes are devoid

of trees; but in almost every valley and cleft a glacier-fed stream tears down into the lake in a series of cascades of clear, icy-cold, and sparkling water.

The third and most northerly of the great reservoirs of the Nile is the Albert Nyanza, which, as has been explained, receives the waters of Lake Albert Edward, by means of the Semliki River. In shape the Albert Lake is long and narrow, and is chiefly remarkable for the grandeur of the mountains which confine its waters, like the walls of an immense rocky cistern. Looking across from the summit of the eastern cliffs, the panorama is a very striking one. The lake lies spread out a couple of thousand feet below, each bay, creek, and headland being distinctly visible in the clear atmosphere. On the western side tier upon tier of hills rises, one above the other, many of the peaks being of picturesquely irregular outline. The bases of the lower ranges are washed by the waves of this storm-haunted and desolate-looking lake. The eastern cliffs, like the plateau itself, are covered by thick bush, or forest, and descend almost perpendicularly to the flats below. The rivers which feed the Albert Nyanza, one and all, leap down the face of the escarpment in a series of grand waterfalls, some of the drops being many hundred feet in height.

Into the northern end of Lake Albert the Victoria Nile discharges itself, thus uniting the waters of the two great systems which together form the Nile sources. The actual outlet by which the river finally issues forth is situated a few miles to the north of this junction.

Before describing the course of the Nile, a few words regarding the different races which dwell within the land of its birth may not be out of place. If the scenery is varied, so also are the types of the inhabitants.

The north-eastern shore of Lake Victoria is the home of the Kavirondo, a tall, good-looking people, resembling the negro in nothing but the colour of their skin, and disdaining any attempt at clothing beyond a few beads. To the north of the Kavirondo country, on the Nandi

plateau, dwells a fierce race, somewhat resembling the Masai of East Africa in its customs, cast of features, and its love of fighting, and not, as yet, acknowledging the supremacy of the Government. Both these peoples are in marked contrast with those inhabiting the country to the west of Lake Victoria—namely, the Baganda, a race of Hamitic origin. The Baganda have attained to a considerable degree of civilization, being decently clothed and expert agriculturists. Their dwellings are well built and comfortable. The chiefs are mostly of the Bahima blood. The Bahima are the aristocracy of the Uganda Protectorate, and are supposed to be originally of Galla stock. They are large cattle-owners, and are said to share with the Masai the practice of drinking the blood of the living animal. They are a tall and handsome people, slightly fairer than the Baganda, and as a rule hold themselves severely aloof in the seclusion of the southern hills.

The shores of the Albertine lakes, and the valley of the Semliki, are occupied by races of mixed blood and inferior type, probably throwing back to that of the original inhabitants who occupied this country prior to the great Hamitic invasion. In the fastnesses of Ruwenzori are found the Bwamba—those ape-like men described by Sir Harry Johnston—while in the adjacent Congo forest dwell the strange dwarfs known as the Pigmies.

Throughout the entire length of the Nile Valley, until replaced by the Arab far to the north, the dwellers upon either bank are of pure negro blood. The Nilotic negroes, although the several tribes differ much with respect to their customs and habits, are all of one common type: all exceptionally tall, and all coal-black in colour. The males go naked, and the clothing of the women is limited to a scanty apron of grass or hide. Although much given to fighting among themselves, the negroes of the Nile Valley are a good-humoured race of people, very indolent, and only cultivating the soil to an extent absolutely necessary to support life. They pass most of their time in hunting and fishing.

This digression finished, an endeavour will now be made to give some idea of the general course of the river from its source in the Victoria Lake.

The Nile, after its first leap over the beautiful Ripon Falls, traverses a hilly country, in a narrow channel, its stream being much broken by rapids and falls, and its bed rocky and full of reefs. On emerging from this region it passes through a chain of swampy lakes, succeeded by a tract of woodland country, and eventually encountering a fresh series of obstructions in the shape of rapids. Over these obstacles it dashes impetuously, with an increasing slope and velocity, until it reaches the 'Rift' escarpment, where it throws itself over the cliffs in the magnificent cascade—the finest throughout its entire course—to which Sir Samuel Baker gave the name of the Murchison Falls. Here the Nile, after rushing, like a mill-race, through a cleft in the rocks, under 20 feet in width, falls nearly 150 feet, in a double drop, into the pool below. The roar produced by the fall of this immense volume of water is deafening, and can be heard for many miles; while above the pool a perpetual cloud of spray, illumined by the iridescent colours of a rainbow, rises high in the air, like the steam from a boiling cauldron.

Leaving the falls behind, the river glides on with a swift current, between wooded hills, to the Albert Lake. Into this its waters discharge themselves across a reedy bar and through wide papyrus swamps. Thus far it has compassed a distance of 255 miles. Five miles to the north it leaves the lake, and reassumes the appearance of a river. From this point of its course it is known as the Bahr-el-Gebel, or Mountain River, and this name is applied to it as far as Lake No, north of which it is known as the Bahr-el-Abyiad, or White Nile.

After issuing from Lake Albert, the Nile passes through a region of very varied aspect. At times it flows, with a narrow, deep section and a swift stream, between bush-covered but stony hills, a favourite retreat of the surly rhinoceros and the bush-loving antelopes.

Again, for many miles, the high land recedes from the channel, and the river wanders sluggishly through wide, shallow, and reedy lakes, the haunt of the hippotamus, the crocodile, and a myriad water-fowl.

Eventually, after the narrow gut of Wadelai and the fever-stricken post of Dufile have been left behind, the grand range of the Kuku Mountains approaches the valley on the west, and diverts its course. A few miles further on—at the British post of Nimuli—it turns sharply to the north-west, and enters afresh upon a region of cataracts and rapids, which for the next hundred miles obstruct its flow, and render its course a tempestuous one.

Throughout this portion of the Nile Valley the river scenery presents a series of beautiful pictures. The mountains bar the stream on the west, rising almost vertically, with scarred and scarped faces, like a Titanic wall. To the east low, wooded hills run parallel to the river—at times, little more than stony ridges, but occasionally rising some hundred feet above the water. Many tributaries join the main river here, unfordable torrents during the rainy season, but for the rest of the year deep and ragged gashes in the general surface level, the boulders in their dry beds heaped up in indescribable confusion.

The channel of the Nile is much broken by rocks and islands, and the rapids follow one another in constant succession. Both banks are fringed with a dense belt of bush and high reeds. Looking down any one of these reaches, the tumbling, indigo-coloured water, streaked with foamy threads of white, the purple background of hill and mountain, the sombre greens of the forests and the lighter tints of the reeds, with the brilliant blue of the sky overhead, present a combination of wild river scenery not often to be met with, and not easily to be forgotten. Occasionally, the remains of old forts and entrenchments are to be seen, crowning the summits of rocky elevations which command the stream. Some of these ruins bear historic names, such, for

instance, as Laboré, Muggi, and Kiri, recalling the times when Emin Pasha and his lieutenants devoted all their energies to the introduction of a semblance of good government among the wild tribes of the Shuli, the Madi and the Bari.

Past all these places the river flows on, at times raging at the obstructions placed in its path, and testifying to its indignation by the turbulence of its waters at every fall and rapid; at others, pursuing for a brief period an undisturbed course, between wooded islands, where small villages find shelter under a leafy shade. Again it bars through wild and narrow gorges, bounded by precipitous cliffs and rocky crags, until at length, as the mountains recede farther from the valley, it winds through a rolling expanse of woodland, much broken by ravines and ridges, the favourite abode of the lord of these forests—the mighty elephant. With each succeeding league the country becomes more open, and the granite hills are more isolated and further apart. At length the conical peak of Rejaf is sighted—a sign that the mountainous country is coming to an end and that the land of the marshes is approaching. Finally, at 445 miles from the Ripon Falls, and not far from the station of Gondokoro, the river issues from the region of rapid, rock, and forest, through which it has for so long followed a troubled course, and enters upon the second and more peaceful phase of its career. At this point the scenery changes abruptly, as does the character of the stream itself.

The narrow, rocky bed, the straight course, and the heavy fall in the levels, are replaced by a muddy bottom, a flat slope, and a broad channel, winding through grassy islands in a constant series of bends and sharp curves. Instead of high banks, bush-covered hills, deep ravines, and forest land, on either side now extend wide swamps, full of tall reeds, and intersected with shallow lagoons and innumerable channels.

The width of the Nile Valley in the marsh country is considerable, in places being as much as eight or nine

miles from high land to high land. Through and across this dreary expanse of swamp the river wanders, at times approaching one bank and then again the other. It rarely touches either, but crosses the marshes backwards and forwards in an exasperating succession of loops and twists. On both sides of the valley the dry land is marked by a belt of thorny bush, varying in width from a few hundred yards to several miles. Beyond this bush immense flat plains extend covered with high grass and scattered patches of forest. These plains are intersected by shallow depressions, swamps during the rainy season, but connected one with another by reedy channels, which drain slowly into the Nile as it falls.

In this length of river the European stations of Mongalla, Lado, and Kivu—the last two Belgian—are situated. None of these places can be described as health resorts. Miserable as the general aspect of this portion of the Nile Valley is, there is worse to come. At 718 miles from Lake Victoria the Bahr-el-Zaraf, or Giraffe River, branches off from the main stream through the swamps to the east, and the Bahr-el-Gebel enters that dreadful tract known as the 'sudd' country. The word 'sudd' in the Arabic language means a barrier, and this name is now applied to the entire area in which the river is liable to be blocked by the water-weeds which break into its channel from the illimitable marshes through which it strives to force a tortuous passage. Throughout its entire length through the 'sudd' the Bahr-el-Gebel has no banks at all, and its water surface is flush with that of the swamps on either side.

It is difficult in words to give a fair conception of the general appearance of the 'sudd' country. Its utter desolation baffles any attempt at description. Even the most arid desert seems a desirable spot by comparison with this horrible morass. Its confines once entered, all trace of high land shortly disappears, and a dead-flat horizon meets the view in every direction—

a sea of reeds and a waste of water. For nearly 300 miles the Bahr-el-Gebel wanders between hedges of tall papyrus, much of which stands quite 15 feet above the river surface. Occasionally a palm-tree or a stunted mimosa is visible in the far distance, indicating the existence of a dry patch of land; but such objects only intensify the general flatness. The 'sudd' blocks form obstacles of a most serious nature, and if not cleared away as soon as they form close the river altogether. These blocks are chiefly caused by the breaking loose during stormy weather of large areas of the reeds, which find a nursery in the shallow lagoons so common in this locality. These water-plants, mainly consisting of papyrus and two varieties of tall grasses, grow in the beds of the lagoons. The attachment of their roots, however, is not a very stable one, and in strong winds, especially if accompanied by a rise in the water levels, they become easily detached. The result is a floating island, formed by a mass of vegetation, closely bound together by creeping plants, and by the earth which still adheres to the roots of the larger reeds. Should such an island drift into the river channel, it is carried along by the stream until it reaches a sharp bend or a narrow point, when it comes to an anchor. Other islands of the same nature probably follow it, and are similarly arrested, the area of the original obstruction being by this means enlarged. By the pressure thus caused, the floating mass is gradually compressed into a smaller space, its thickness below water being consequently augmented, and the waterway beneath it proportionately diminished. This necessarily causes an increased velocity in the contracted water section, and as fresh portions of 'sudd' float down the stream they are sucked below the surface, and so tend still further to add to the thickness of the obstacle. With each fresh addition the area of the waterway is diminished, and the compression increases until the entire mass becomes wedged into a solid block of crushed reeds and earth, sometimes as much as

20 feet thick, and so solid that a hippopotamus can cross it with impunity. Experience has proved that the best way of removing such an obstacle is to commence from the down-stream end and cut the surface by means of trenches into blocks of some 10 feet square. Round the block thus cut a wire hawser is bound, and the steamer to which it is attached goes full speed astern. This operation is repeated until the block is pulled out. It is then allowed to float down-stream, and another is removed in the same manner. The work is long and laborious, but when the 'plug,' so to speak, of the obstruction has been removed, the pressure of the water assists the process, and at length the whole mass bursts and finds its way down the stream.

One striking feature of this region is the almost entire absence of all kinds of life. Not a fishing village or a canoe is ever seen. Even the hippopotamus and the crocodile appear to shun this locality, and water-birds, elsewhere so plentiful, are, with the exception of a few night-herons or an occasional cormorant, rarely met with here. If, however, this solitude is to be deplored by day, the same complaint cannot be made during the night—as far, at all events, as insect life is concerned. With the disappearance of the sun the mosquito makes his appearance in countless myriads, and his hum resounds through the entire period of darkness. The air swarms with these pests, and on a still night life is made a burden by their attentions.

The general feeling of all those whom an unkind fate has obliged to spend any time within the 'sudd' region is one of relief when they have passed through it, and have issued again into the open river and into an atmosphere comparatively clearer and less unwholesome.

In spite of the drawbacks connected with climate, mosquitoes, and monotony of landscape, it must, nevertheless, be admitted that even this dismal country occasionally produces a spectacle which goes far to redeem the depressing influences of its surroundings.

At certain seasons the thick growth of creepers which entwines and covers the papyrus bursts out into a glory of blue and purple flowers, resembling the convolvulus in appearance. The effect of these masses of brilliant colour, set in a dark green background, is a very lovely one.

Again, as the sun sets, particularly during the rainy season, when the western sky is ablaze with orange and crimson, and the water reflects the colours of a fire-opal —the glare below being separated from the paler tints of turquoise in the sky above by bands of claret-coloured or purple clouds—a glamour is cast over the melancholy marsh-land, which temporarily obliterates the repulsiveness of its general aspect.

At night, when the moon is at the full, the enchantment is even more potent. As she rises above the mists, a soft golden light is diffused all around, and against the radiancy of this glow the reeds and tall grasses stand out in strong and dark relief, each delicate thread of the papyrus fronds being distinctly traceable. To add to the magical effect, glittering points of light like tiny stars flit about in all directions through the reeds, marking the path of the fireflies, and deepening the gloom of the background. The stillness is intense, only broken by the occasional splash of a fish. The scene, under such conditions, is most impressive in its weird beauty; so much so, that the observer is for the moment apt to forget that this region is one of the most fever-stricken and desolate upon the face of the earth. With the return of daylight, or the disappearance of the moon, the spell is broken, and the feeling of depression revives.

Everything at last comes to an end, and even the 'sudd' country is eventually traversed and left behind.

At 985 miles from the Ripon Falls the Bahr-el-Gebel emerges into the shallow, reedy expanse of water known as Lake No, nearly 60 per cent. of its discharge having been wasted and evaporated in the endless marshes through which it has lately passed. It is here joined

by the Bahr-el-Ghazal, or Gazelle River, from the west. From this point it is called the White Nile. The character of the river scenery now changes, and, by contrast with that recently passed through, improves. The stream is broad, open, and fairly straight, and although bordered on either side by wide areas of swamp, the dry land is visible beyond, sometimes marked by a belt of forest, but more often extending to the horizon in a high, grassy plain, upon which many native villages are located. There is now plenty of life upon the banks, as the Shilluks, who occupy the western shore, own large herds of cattle which they bring down to pasture in the marshes. They themselves are to be seen in numbers fishing and hunting the hippopotamus or the crocodile. The country to the east of the White Nile was formerly the home of the powerful Dinka tribe, but these last, during the dervish occupation, migrated inland, and are now only beginning to return to the river-bank.

Some fifty miles down-stream of Lake No the Bahr-el-Zaraf rejoins the White Nile, and at 1,060 miles from Lake Victoria its largest and most important tributary, the Sobat, enters it on the eastern bank. This stream largely influences the discharge of the main river, and from May to the end of November brings a larger volume of water into the Nile than ever succeeds in passing through the southern marshes from the equatorial lakes. The colour of the Sobat water, when rising, is a creamy white, changing, when in full flood, to a brick-red. Its stream tinges that of the White Nile for many a mile below the junction.

The next 300 miles of river merit but a brief description; indeed, any attempt at a detailed account of the dreary scenery here met with would be monotonous to an extreme degree, and would involve endless repetition. A few isolated granite hills stand out from the surrounding plains, and occasionally rocks crop up in the river-bed. The section of the stream is wide and shallow, and the current is feeble. The marshes continue on

either side, varying in width according as the channel recedes from or approaches the high land. The grass plains, which extend to the east and west, are separated from the river by a band of bush and forest. In certain localities villages are fairly numerous, but, on the whole, this area is thinly populated, and its wide pasture-lands are chiefly occupied by herds of wild-buffalo, giraffe, and many species of antelope. North of the Sobat the elephant, except during the rains, is rarely met with near the river. He prefers the solitude of the interior, where he is not disturbed by his enemy, man, and where food and water are plentiful. This reach of the Nile contains the posts of Taufikia, Kodok (late Fashoda), Renk, and Goz Abu Goma. Close to the latter station is the ford of Abu Zeid. Here the depth of water is, at low Nile, so small that through navigation at times is arrested, and 'portages' by land are rendered necessary.

At mile 1,370 the large island of Abba (once the home of the Mahdi) divides the stream into two branches. At this point the 'sudd' vegetation and the marshes—properly so called—come to an end. The river-banks now consist of long shelving beaches, flooded at high water, but in no sense of the word swamps. The forest becomes thinner, and is replaced by bush, while the soil is lighter, and more sandy.

Here, too, the country of the negro ceases, and that of the Arab commences. It is perhaps worth mentioning that, right across Africa, north latitude 13° marks the dividing-line between the Arab the camel owner, and the negro the cattle proprietor. North of this line the camel forms the chief source of wealth to the nomad tribes; south of it his place is taken by the ox and the sheep. As soon as the Nile has crossed this parallel of latitude, the change in the life of the people is apparent. Whereas in Negroland cultivation on the river-bank is entirely unknown, in the Arab country the entire population migrates to the Nile in summer, bringing with them their flocks and herds, and cultivating the

foreshores and the mud flats. As the water falls, the scene at such times is a busy one.

North of the station of El-Duem (mile 1,458), villages are numerous, the beehive grass 'tukl' of the negro being replaced by a more substantial structure, built of mud, with a dome-shaped roof. To the west lies the country of the Baggara Arabs, and the east, or Ghezireh, is inhabited by a population of mixed blood.

The width of the White Nile now increases, until it resembles a lake rather than a river. The forest land entirely disappears. The river here is thronged by immense flocks of pelicans, storks, geese, ducks, and other water-birds.

Eventually the palms of Khartoum and the roofs of Omdurman are distinguishable in the distance, and the historic tree—mentioned by the earlier travellers as the spot where all fleets starting for the south used to assemble—makes a good landmark on the eastern bank. Gradually the different buildings show up through the shimmer of the mirage which hangs over these plains, and a few miles further on—after rounding the long low point of land which, from its supposed resemblance to the trunk of an elephant, gives its name to Khartoum—a strong stream, coming from the east, is felt, and the Blue Nile and the White Nile unite.

At this junction the waters of the White Nile have traversed a distance of 1,580 miles from the outlet of the river in the Victoria Lake. Looking east, the picturesque river-front of Khartoum presents an animated scene. The Blue Nile is filled by craft of every description—from the small native skiff to the large stern-wheel steamer plying between Khartoum and Omdurman.

Except during the period prior to the annual rise, when the Blue Nile is practically dry, and the waters of the White Nile fill the empty channel, the stream of the eastern river, being much stronger than that coming from the west, forces the waters of the latter right across the western shore. At all times the effect of the

meeting of the two rivers is a striking one. In flood the Blue Nile brings down an immense volume of chocolate-coloured water, and holds back the discharge of the White Nile, ponding this river up and flooding the marshes for many hundred miles up-stream of the junction.

Even during the winter months the contrast between the waters of the two streams is a remarkable one. The colour of the White Nile never varies, and is at all times an olive-green—almost gray; while, when the Blue Nile flood has passed away, the water of that river is exceptionally clear, and in sunshine the reflection of the sky causes its surface to assume a brilliant blue. A hard-and-fast line marks the meeting of the two currents for a long way down-stream of the junction.

No description is here necessary of either Khartoum or Omdurman. Interesting as both these places are, full details of their environments are to be found in almost every Egyptian guide-book.

Space does not permit of more than a very brief account of the Nile in its journey to the north, conveying the united waters of the two great streams which combine to form that single river to which Egypt owes its prosperity. As, moreover, its valley north of Wadi Halfa is now almost as well known as that of the Rhine, the scantiest allusion will suffice for that portion of its course.

North of Khartoum the trough of the Nile is of considerable breadth, and full of sandbanks and of large islands, many of which are highly cultivated. To the west the desert stretches an expanse of broken ground, relieved by occasional rocky ridges and ranges of low hills. On the east the country is flat, and, although now waste and bush-covered, its soil is good, and only requires irrigation to render it capable of producing excellent crops. This area forms a portion of the famous island of Meroe—in ancient times renowned for its fertility—comprised within the triangle formed by the Nile, the Rahad, and the Atbara.

At rather less than forty miles below Khartoum the Nile enters the narrow gorge of Shabluka. Here the stream passes, with a deep section and rapid current, between two ranges of hills, which rise sharply from the water on either side. The length of this pass is about four miles, and at its northern extremity the Shabluka Rapids, formerly called the Sixth Cataract, commence. Even at half-flood this obstacle is navigable for steamers, but care is at all times necessary, as the only safe channel is a very crooked one, and the river-bed is much studded by rocks. The scenery of these rapids is beautiful. The Nile is split up into several branches by islands, all thickly covered with trees and a luxuriant undergrowth. Through this foliage the shining black surface of the granite rocks projects at intervals, making a sharp and agreeable contrast. The trees are completely swathed in bands of lovely creepers, which entirely mask their shape, and hang down in graceful festoons, resembling a rich green velvet curtain. At times these creepers are resplendent with bright blue flowers. The colour of the near hills is a purple-red, and of those at a distance from the river a deep violet.

The rippling water is full of ever-changing lights. Shabluka is certainly one of the most charming spots upon the Nile, and it is to be regretted that tourists nowadays are obliged to make this portion of their journey to Khartoum by rail, and consequently miss seeing this picturesque reach of the river. Between Shabluka and the Atbara the river-banks are high, and the country is generally flat, except where broken by ridges of stony hills. Bush covers the greater portion of this area, but the remains of large villages and of former cultivation show that it must once have been prosperous and thickly populated.

This reach of the Nile contains the old towns of Shendy, famous for its pyramids and ruined temples, and Metemmeh, notorious for the wholesale massacre of the powerful tribe of Jaalin Arabs by the dervish Emir Mahmoud in 1898.

The Atbara River, now spanned by an iron railway-bridge, joins the main stream on its eastern bank at 1,790 miles from its source at the Ripon Falls. This is the most southerly of the tributaries of the Nile, and between this point and the sea, a distance of nearly 1,700 miles, it does not receive the water of a single affluent, either small or great. The Atbara, in flood, brings down a large addition to the volume of the Nile, and its waters are highly charged with deposit.

After passing Berber, the point upon which the caravan routes used to centre, and Abu Hamed, where the Soudan Railway leaves the river and runs across the desert direct to Wadi Halfa, the Nile takes a great bend to the north-west, forming a loop some 587 miles in length before arriving at the open water below the Second Cataract. Within this loop, in which the river-bed is an almost continuous succession of cataract and rapid, is situated the Province of Dongola. To the west extends the great Bayuda Desert, the home of the Sawarab, the Hawawir, and the Hassaniyeh tribes, while further north the long depression known as El-Kab, the habitat of the Kababish Arabs, extends parallel to the Nile for several days' journey. To the east of the river the desert covers the country in a continuous sheet, broken by ranges of granite hills, to the coast of the Red Sea. After traversing the wild, inhospitable, and rocky region inhabited by the Monasir, Robatab, and Shaghyieh Arabs, the Nile at last passes Merawi, the southern extremity of the Dongola Province. Between this point and Kerma, a distance of 200 miles, its course is open, and unbroken by either rock and reef.

Merawi, the ancient Napata, is picturesquely situated opposite to the fine mountain of Gebel Barkal, whose bold outline shows above the surrounding landscape as if guarding the ruins of Queen Candace's capital. The extent covered here by pyramids and monuments testifies to the former importance of this once famous city.

Between Merawi and Kerma many places bearing well-known names are passed. Korti, Debba, New Dongola, and Hafir, all recall memories of the two British expeditions to the Soudan, while old Dongola was the stronghold of the priest-kings of Ethiopia during the nine centuries in which Christianity flourished throughout this region.

Throughout this portion of the Nile Valley, in spite of the narrow width of the cultivated area, there are evidences of considerable prosperity. The population is increasing, and the province bids fair to return to that state of fertility for which it was formerly renowned.

At certain seasons of the year a small fly appears in myriads in the Dongola Province, and makes life almost intolerable. So bad is it that the natives when at work in their fields hold a brazier of live coals in front of their faces.

The Danagla, or Dongolawi, are a race of very mixed blood, in which Arab, negro, and Berberi all have their share.

Near Kerma, at Hannek, the cataracts recommence, and continue uninterruptedly as far north as Wadi Halfa, a distance of 240 miles. The river scenery in this region is extremely wild, but also in places extremely beautiful. For the last 100 miles up-stream of Halfa the Nile traverses that desolate extent of sand and rocks called by the Arabs the 'Batn-el-Hagar,' or Belly of Stone. A grimmer or more savage region than this it is impossible to imagine. In every direction black, fantastically-shaped peaks and boulders arise, apparently thrown haphazard upon the surface, the wild confusion extending into space. Not a tree, or even a bush, breaks the barren expanse, and so impossible is this country that the line of railway which connects Kerma with Wadi Halfa is to be taken up and relaid elsewhere, the gradients and curves, necessitated by the conformation of this wilderness, having baffled even the ingenuity of the engineers to adjust.

In the immediate vicinity of the river the scenery is

fine, rendered more so perhaps by the contrast with the sterility of the adjacent landscape.

Deep gorges, foaming rapids, wooded islands, and sandy or pebbly beaches are passed in constant succession. Here and there a small village, in the midst of a minute area of cultivation and surrounded by groves of date-palms, gives a pleasing idea of peace and calm amidst the turmoil of the general surroundings. Occasionally the remains of old fortresses are visible upon the crags. Some of these correspond with the advent of the Mamelukes, but others are of far older date, constructed by the Bosnian soldiers despatched by the Sultan of Turkey to the King of Ethiopia in the fifteenth century. Among the many beautiful spots in this portion of the Nile Valley may be instanced Dulgoh, with its Rhine-like scenery; Khaibar, with its wall of black granite spanning the river-channel, and flanked at either end by the Keddain hills; Dal, with its noble rapids and green islands; and Sarras, the former frontier station, with its picturesque reach of river.

At 2,500 miles from its sources at the equator the Nile emerges from the long rapids of the Second Cataract and passes Wadi Halfa, the terminus of the Soudan Railway. In its course from Khartoum to this point the fall in the bed-levels has been as much as 850 feet. From Wadi Halfa to the First Cataract, a distance of 200 miles, the river is open, and navigable throughout the year. This region is that of Nubia proper—a country of rocky hills and golden-coloured sand, with occasional stretches of cultivation, and many date-palms. The colour of the sand is one of the most striking features of Nubian scenery. By daylight it has a peculiarly warm orange tint, which makes the black of the rocks show up sharply, and by the light of a Nubian moon it seems to glow with a ruddy hue, resembling a snow-field, just tinged by the rays of the rising sun. Throughout this reach of river tiny villages may be observed perched among the rocks, well above water-level. Below them, on the narrow

strip of level, are small areas of crop, fringed by continuous lines of palms. By day and night, throughout the season when the river is low, the drone of the 'sakia,' or water-wheel, is a sound that rarely ceases.

Barren as is the soil, and scanty as are his means of living, the Nubian loves his rocky home, and can with difficulty be induced to leave it, even if he is offered a more kindly climate and surroundings. This portion of Nubia contains many monuments of an earlier civilization, among them the temple of Abu Simbel standing out pre-eminently, with its fine façade and its grand colossi hewn out of the solid rock.

At Korosko—half-way—the influence of the Nile reservoir is first felt, and the inhabitants have constructed new dwellings, at a higher elevation than their old ones, so as to be above the highest water-level under the new conditions.

After passing through the Kalabsha Gate, with its contracted river-channel and fine granite cliffs, a length of some thirty miles brings the temples to Philæ and the palm-trees of Shellal into view. Here the last cataract—that of Assouan—commences, now spanned by the great dam, with its five locks for navigation.

Some few miles down-stream the town of Assouan, with its fine hotels and charming river-front, is reached, the Nile having at this point traversed a distance of just 2,700 miles from its outlet at the Victoria Nyanza.

For the 600 miles of river between Assouan and Cairo no description is necessary. Twelve miles to the north of the city of the Caliphs the Nile bifurcates into the two branches of Rosetta and Damietta, and between them lies the area known as the Delta, so renowned for its fertility and its prosperity. At the apex of the Delta are situated Mougel Bey's two barrages.

The distance from this point to the sea is about 160 miles, and the total distance between the Ripon Falls and the Mediterranean is consequently rather more than 3,400 miles.

The Nile, in making this journey, probably passes

through more varied conditions of country, soil, and climate, and affords existence to a greater variety of races than is the case with any other among the main waterways of the world.

To describe it in any detail would fill a large volume. Much has been written regarding it, but much remains yet to be recorded. It must always—not only on account of its physical characteristics, but also because of the place which it has maintained throughout the world's history—be one of the most interesting of the great streams which water the earth's surface.

BRITISH RULE IN THE SUDAN

By THE HON. SIDNEY PEEL

THE regeneration of Egypt since the British occupation has been founded on the control of the waters of the Nile. A sound system of irrigation has been the basis of all her rising prosperity. At first there was enough to do in regulating and distributing the water naturally brought down by the river. But as the area of cultivated land increased, and the demands for water began to exceed the supply to be distributed, the need of insuring the present and increasing the future prosperity of the country forced the rulers of Egypt to turn their eyes once more to the upper waters of the Nile, and the reconquest of the Sudan became a political necessity. The Battle of Omdurman was the logical consequence of Tel-el-Kebir.

But the last six years have wrought a great change in the prospects of the Sudan. It is still, and must remain, the key of Egypt, but it is no longer a mere conduit-pipe or line of communication to be guarded at all hazards. Under British administrators it is beginning to justify its existence on other grounds. Conquered for the sake of the Nile, it shows signs of bearing fruit of its own, like the vineyard that was dug over and over for the sake of its hidden treasure.

The obstacles to be surmounted were, indeed, formidable. The vast size of the country, the difficulties of transport and communication, the tropical and, in parts, unhealthy climate, the general ignorance of its resources

and capacities, were only a few items. The consequences of Egyptian misrule had been accentuated a thousandfold by the dark days of dervish dominion. War, pestilence, and famine had played their dreadful parts. Lands once populous had become a wilderness. It was calculated that out of eight millions of population at the time of the Mahdi's rebellion no less than six had been altogether swept away in less than twenty years. The remnant had lost all the little civilization they once possessed; they had almost forgotten how to cultivate their lands. Education of any kind was totally non-existent; religion was replaced by fanaticism and superstition. In the distant provinces and along the frontiers of Abyssinia and Darfur a state of anarchy prevailed, and the only commerce was that in slaves. As for revenue, it seemed that the whole country must be dependent for years to come for the barest necessities of administration on the revenues of Egypt.

One difficulty, at least, the new rulers were determined to avoid. The Sudan was not to suffer, as Egypt had suffered, from the evils of internationalism. The Convention of 1899 between Great Britain and Egypt regulates the political status of the Sudan, and lays down that the British flag is to float side by side with the Egyptian. If the Sudan were merely a dependency of Egypt, it might well be argued that it was also a part of the Turkish Empire, and that the Capitulations should apply. But the British flag exorcises this danger. The mixed tribunals and consular jurisdiction are, happily, names signifying nothing south of Halfa. The British administrators were able to set to work unhampered by these diplomatic fetters.

The British flag had also an effect of another kind. It would have been impossible to persuade the Arabs to submit patiently to the dominion of the Egyptians, whom they had learnt to hate and despise. Direct British rule, of which the flag was the symbol easily understood by all, was a totally different matter. The proud tribesmen of Kassala and Kordofan yielded easily

to the mere name of Englishman an allegiance which battalions of Egyptians could not have enforced. Now and again, indeed, since the final defeat and death of the Khalifa at the Battle of Om Debreikat towards the end of 1899, the smouldering embers of fanaticism have flickered into a flame. New Mahdis have appeared from time to time, who might have proved dangerous under a weak Government. The Sudan affords a ready field for religious pretenders, but their swift suppression has always nipped the rising in the bud. The latest and most dangerous of these false prophets appeared in the summer of 1903 in the same part of Kordofan in which the original Mahdi won his early successes, and gained a considerable following. But the Government struck swiftly and surely. He was surrounded by a force and brought for trial to El Obeid. It was a test case in the eyes of the Arabs. The new Mahdi had prophesied that he would be captured by the British, and the event was eagerly followed all over the Sudan. But he had not prophesied the result of the trial, and his prompt execution for armed rebellion set many doubts at rest. An Arab Sheikh, who had travelled to El Obeid in order to be present at the expected miracle, remarked to a British officer on his return to his home near Khartoum: 'No more Mahdis for me: I have seen enough; henceforth I shall cultivate my land.' There is no doubt that he represented the prevailing sentiment.

Frontier troubles were at first hard to deal with on account of the uncertainty of the Abyssinian frontier. Pursuit of raiding-parties might have produced friction with King Menelik. Happily, good relations have been preserved with that potentate, and the definite delineation of the frontier has enabled the brigand bands, for the raiders were hardly more, to be summarily dealt with. On the opposite side of the Sudan, to the west of Kordofan, lies Darfur, a tributary native State, now ruled by Ali Dinar, a member of the ancient line of Sultans. Darfur is so remote from the Nile, and of such vast extent, that it is on every ground desirable

that its internal independence should be maintained. Fortunately, Ali Dinar is a wise and sagacious man, who is clearly alive to his own interests, and he has cooperated with the British authorities to restore tranquillity to the border.

Although no distinct line can be drawn, for the two divisions shade off into each other, the Sudan falls into two parts, the Arab and Mohammedan, and the Negro and Pagan. Each presents very different problems of administration. The negro tribes of the Upper Nile and of the remote Bahr-el-Ghazal have always been looked upon by their northern neighbours much as the Greeks in classical times looked upon the Barbarians—namely, as belonging to another category of the human race and by nature destined to slavery. Only that wonderful democratic leveller, the creed of Islam, can obliterate these distinctions. Some of the lower tribes, like the Dinkas and the more remote Niam-Niams, were powerful enough to maintain a sort of independence against the dervishes, but they were always ready to second the efforts of the Arab slave-dealers by raiding their weaker brethren and selling them into captivity. It takes time for them to learn the lesson that under British rule their old habits have to be put aside, and it takes time, too, for the smaller tribes to gain confidence in the new masters, and to realize that the British occupation does not mean merely a transfer from one set of slave-drivers to another. But wonderful progress has been made. British officers have visited and patrolled nearly the whole of the vast countries which border the Sobat, the Upper Nile, and the Bahr-el-Ghazal, and even the shyest and wildest tribes are rapidly settling down. Sometimes a sharper lesson has been found necessary. The most recently occupied province was the Bahr-el-Ghazal, which lies south of Kordofan, and stretches away from the western bank of the Nile to the Congo watershed. In the north of it the Dinkas, and in the south the Niam-Niams, were predominant. Both were fierce and warlike and averse

to any kind of labour, and both were chiefly occupied in harrying their more peaceful and industrious neighbours. Both were reluctant to abandon their ancient ways, and against both force had to be applied. The Dinkas were first reduced, and as lately as the beginning of this year a strong column was sent out to patrol the country along the Congo watershed inhabited by the Niam-Niams. A certain Sultan Yumbio was the head and spirit of the offenders. By many overt acts of hostility he had displayed his disregard of the central authority. Hitherto invincible in his petty wars, and fortified by the deadly climate and impenetrable nature of the country, which had enabled him to maintain his position against the dervishes, he could not believe that the hour of submission was come. One skirmish was enough. Surprised by a swiftly-moving patrol, his forces were scattered after a brief resistance, and he himself was taken prisoner, only to die of his wounds the next day. His death was followed by the submission of the whole country, and to-day peace reigns in the Sudan. One cannot but sympathize with this representative of the old order, thus brought suddenly into contact with a new system of right and wrong, backed by the sanction of irresistible force. But civilization has no room for him and his like, and his inevitable fate opens the way of progress and happiness to the negro tribes.

The future of the negro Sudan is only a part of that obscure and difficult problem common to a large part of Africa, the eventual future and destiny of the negro races. The establishment of peace and security of life and liberty is only the first essential preliminary to any consideration of the question. It will not be settled in a few decades, perhaps it will not in a few centuries. Far different is the case of the Arab Sudan. The Arab is capable of a very high degree of civilization. He has a good intelligence, and in all the manly qualities he is very far ahead of the Egyptian. And this is of the utmost importance. The tropical Sudan can never be a white man's country. Eventually it must depend very

largely upon our being able to fill the lower ranks at least of the administration with trained natives. At present they are manned by Egyptians and Syrians. But if the country is really going to develop as it promises to do, it will have to draw largely on the administrative capacity of the native Sudanese. As yet this has been found practically impossible owing to the complete absence of any sort of education, except that which consists in committing to memory large portions of the Koran. The Government has set actively to work to remedy this deficiency. The Gordon College has played a valuable part in keeping prominently forward the need for an educational system; it has also done a great deal of practical work. There is now housed in the College a training-school for young men, containing already nearly a hundred pupils, all representative of the highest classes in the country, going through a five years' course designed to fit them for positions as schoolmasters and cadis or other Government appointments. A selected few are just on the point of passing out. Their zeal and aptitude for learning leave nothing to be desired, and the institution promises to be of great utility. Admission to it is eagerly sought by candidates from all parts of the country. The same is true of the primary schools which have been started in the principal centres. Technical schools are also doing their best to supply the lack of all kinds of trained artisans and mechanics, such as carpenters, fitters, and so on, which dervish rule had completely extinguished. The English foremen in charge of these schools report very highly on the capacity of their pupils. Indeed, many of them appear to be able to use their toes as well as their fingers, which naturally is a great advantage.

The Sudan used to be merely another name for sun-dried desert, even in the estimation of those who knew the country. To-day a fuller acquaintance with its resources has changed that view, and capitalists are scrambling over each other in their endeavours to obtain

concessions of land. The fact is that there are immense tracts of soil suitable for the cultivation of cotton and corn. The one thing lacking is a supply of water for irrigation. Between the two Niles, between the Blue Nile and the Atbara, about the river Gaash in Kassala, and along the course of the Rahad and the Dinder tributaries of the Blue Nile, are millions of acres lying waiting for the engineers to perfect their schemes for controlling the waters of the Nile and its tributaries. Along the Nile itself, north of Khartoum, there is much to be done by bringing land under cultivation and pumping water during the flood and early winter. Mr. Leigh Hunt and Mr. Grieve are pioneers in this work, and their experience will prove of incalculable value some day when the water from the great lakes can be brought down without paying so great a toll in the Sudd country. It will then be possible for the Sudan to take water from the Nile for large irrigation all the year round, but at present, during the scanty summer supply, Egypt's claims have first to be considered. All the experiments up to the present, however, show that cotton can be successfully cultivated during the flood and winter, and cotton-growing has a great future before it.

Cotton and corn are far from being the only products of the Sudan. The gum trade has attained very considerable proportions since the reopening of the country. The best gum is the sap of the gray-barked acacia, which grows best in Kordofan, between El Obeid and the Nile. It is brought down to Omdurman by boat or camel, and the sorting of the different kinds is one of the sights of the beach. From the Bahr-el-Ghazal there comes even now a certain amount of first-class rubber, and more is hoped for when that province has been fully explored.

Altogether the economic prospects of the Sudan are promising enough. The mere fact that the annual revenue has increased from about £8,000, immediately after Omdurman, to over £500,000 tells its own tale. It would have been easy to increase this total by squeezing,

but the reverse policy has been wisely followed, and future years will reap the benefit of it. Three things are necessary for further progress: an increased supply of labour, improved means of communication, and large irrigation schemes. Both these last mean, of course, a considerable capital expenditure. The labour question seems likely to solve itself in a few years' time. The demands for all sorts of commodities, which is everywhere springing up, is driving people to labour. Five years of settled security have already had a great effect on the increase of population. The number of children of five years old and under, all over the Sudan, is very remarkable, and it is encouraging both as a symptom of present prosperity and as a sign for the future. As for irrigation schemes, the Sudan now possesses an irrigation service of its own, and various large schemes are being carefully considered. Their execution, however, as well as many other developments, depends largely upon improved means of communication, and especially communication with the sea.

Goods going to Khartoum have now to be brought from Alexandria to Luxor, there transferred on to the narrow gauge to Assouan, thence carried by boat to Halfa, and once more put on board the trucks of the Sudan Railway, which runs to Khartoum. It is a long, cumbrous, and expensive process. The new railway which is being rapidly constructed from the present line near the mouth of the Atbara to the Red Sea will simplify the transport question enormously. Once Khartoum is within easy reach of the sea, trade and commerce will be greatly stimulated. Machinery and material of all kinds will be able to come in at a reasonable cost, and it will be possible to begin to think of opening up other parts of the Sudan by means of light railways and many other enterprises which are now practically prohibited. The new railway will be completed by March of next year, and it is reasonably hoped that it will prove a great step forward in the development of the country. One very satisfactory feature of its construc-

tion is that no difficulty has been experienced in obtaining an adequate supply of native labour.

The terminus of the new railway on the Red Sea will not be Suakim, on account of the difficulty caused by coral reefs in approaching its harbour. A satisfactory port has been found thirty miles up the coast. The name of the new port has caused considerable discussion. Its native name is Sheikh-el-Bargoud, which literally means Saint Flea—rather curiously, as, although the Sudan possesses many other insect pests, it is said to be too hot for fleas. Such a name being clearly impossible, what is it to be called? So far the name settled upon is Bunder Sudan, meaning the Port of the Sudan, not a very striking title. No doubt the really appropriate name would be Port Cromer, but if that is rejected, it seems a pity that it should not be named after the present Khedive of Egypt, on the analogy of Port Said, and called Port Abbas. In an Oriental country such compliments are very greatly appreciated. They are also (the Sudan is not yet a wealthy country) inexpensive.

The new railway is, for the time being, the central point of Sudan politics, and beyond a doubt the country is ripe for the development which is looked for. It is still, of course, a considerable drain on the Egyptian exchequer, but Egypt gets a more than sufficient return for her expenditure. Command of the all-important water-supply, a peaceful and contented neighbour, and an ever-increasing market for her trade, are things worth many times over the outlay she has made. Very shortly the Sudan may be able to provide the whole cost of its own administration, and so relieve Egypt entirely of the annual burden. Such a result would have appeared almost incredible six years ago. Immense credit is due to the little band of British officers and civilians, who, in spite of all discouragements, and in the face of one of the hottest climates in the world, have laboured so unceasingly and so skilfully at the great task committed to their care.

THE NILE AS I SAW IT

By EWART S. GROGAN

The chill breath of Karissimbi's morning snows fanned my cheek; I turned in my steaming bed of bamboo peat, shook the moisture from my clothes, pulled on my boots, and climbed to a rocky spur on the old volcano's flank.

Six thousand feet below the last of Africa's great secrets lay sleeping beneath the mist-counterpane of night.

Never shall I forget that dawn.

Alone, perched like some silly fly far up on the weather-scarred face of one of those vast volcanoes by the mighty travail of whose birth all the stupendous form of the African continent has been distorted, climatic conditions readjusted, and the comings and goings of men from the dim pre-Pharaoh days to the million generations of men as yet unborn moulded anew—alone I sat and saw the sun slide from behind the Ankoli hills and gradually bring into fierce relief the ten million features of the last great stretch of Africa's unknown.

South, the mists writhed in the seventy-mile caldron of the Kivu Lake, drew into long wisps, and were sucked heavenwards by the fast-warming air. The black cliffs of Kwijwi Island started from the placid bosom of the lake. Headlands galore, purple and forbidding, scored the shell-tinted waste of water. And the Titanic walls of this, the greatest of all rifts, towered

east and west above the billowy sea of minor hills till they merged in the perspective of a hundred miles, where the Rusisi River plunges in its rocky gorge and starts on its long journey viâ Tanganyika and the Congo to the sea.

West loomed the giant pile of Kirunga's forest-draped slopes, banking up the great crater, which smoked sullenly, and from time to time hurled a fire-bomb into the aching sky.

And to the north, beyond the long course of the Rutchuru River, the Albert Edward Lake, first resting-place of Father Nile, was already fading in the re-accumulating mists of day.

Here, where I sat, was the parting of the ways.

The moisture dripping from the vegetation either fed the Atlantic through the Congo or the Mediterranean through the Nile at the dictate of the morning breeze, for even as the destinies of nations are moulded by the play of the infinitesimally small, so is the form of Africa carved by the breezelets from Karissimbi's snows.

The moss bank upon which I rested is the true source of the Albert Nile, and I watched in wonder the little drops babble away on their marvellous 3,000-mile journey to the blue waters of the Mediterranean.

Shade of Ulysses, what an 'odyssey'!

Waving my hand to them in farewell as they trickle over the rock's face and are gone, I see phase by phase the wonderful panorama that those drops will see.

I see a rocky gorge, fern-draped and cellar-cool, wherein a snowstorm of butterflies heave and sink upon the glistening sands, followed in their giddy maze by the brown eyes of a gorilla, which coughs its sweet content, while a mighty bull-elephant—Njojo Mkubwa of the Batwa—rubs his creaking hide against the rocks and idly fans his ears.

Mile upon mile of reeking forest, where the pungent sweat of hypertortured life drifts in a maze of liana-strangled trees, where death gives fresh impetus to life, where orchids blaze, where great moths flash fierce

colours at the strayed sunbeam, and the tireless music of the insect life peals like an organ night and day.

An open glade, warm with the diffused light that trickles through the overhanging lacework of the trees. A small fire is crackling against the trunk of a mighty podocarpus, and the thin column of smoke creeps upward and hangs like a summer cloud in the stagnant air. In the middle of the glade a framework of sticks supports long strips of drying meat, and the unctuous odour of roasting elephant flesh tickles the nostrils of a group of vultures which are fidgeting and craning their snake-like necks on the lightning-bleached top of a towering juniper. To and fro, here and there, flit little gnome-like figures, stunted, gnarled, hairy of limb, veritable retrospects into the vague world of childhood's dreams, the homeless, ever-wandering, all-knowing children of the Dawn of Man.

I see a long, slimy pool of putrefying reeds, where foul fish foregather and great pythons writhe and gorge themselves on hideous toads and slither, long, gleaming bands of gold, through labyrinths of fœtid green and purple spume, where fireflies dance, great butterflies flash, dragon-flies glint, and the suck-suck of swamp, the roar of huge-bellied frogs, the cicada's scream, merge in a sad minor key, where, in the ceaseless struggle between fruition and decay, death wins.

Then follow babbling shallows, clusters of busy villages, mile upon mile of banana-groves, of fields green with maize, millet, beans, and peas, groups of laughing women balancing pitchers on their heads, lowing herds of cattle, a huge rock-torn gorge, black with forest, and the Nile, fast growing, has swept out into its long, tortuous course, which meanders through the vast alluvium of the Rutchuru plains.

The Kirunga volcanoes are dim forms looming purple in the south; herds of cobus and topi are scattered about the plains, and at night the 'boom' of the hunting lion makes the wretched native cower in his stockade of thorns.

North, south, east, and west the sea of grass rolls to the round horizon, broken only where a herd of elephants, ears a-flap, heads a-nodding, are swinging away to the cool reed-beds of the Albert Edward Lake.

The smell of sulphur fills the air, fumaroles spit, and tall geysers play, iridescent in the sun. Far and near the humph-humph of dozing hippos breaks the quiet which hangs over Lake Albert Edward's broad expanse.

Weird cacti cast their gaunt shadows over miles of snowy salt, and the wretched Wanyabinga fisher-folk cringe in terror as they watch the vultures hover over scenes of nameless cannibal orgies in the far-off Balegga Hills.

Strange canoes of fibre-sewn planks drift idly on the still surface of the lake, or bustle to and fro in the deep shadows of the Katwe cliffs, which stand sheer and brisk against the stupendous mass of cloud that for ever screens the huge mysteries of the Mountains of the Moon.

Then, roaring in gorge and tumbling in cascade, the Nile is again the Nile, threading the neck, and hurrying to the flat bottoms of the Semliki valley.

Anon the forest creeps upon the river's silent reaches —great, dim, mysterious aisles of trees where giant bananas battle for a peep of sky; mop-headed palms leap clear above the mass of green, and raphias with long, graceful fronds sweep and caress the passing tide.

Here do great crocodiles lurk, and the shy okapi picks his nervous way along the beds of forest streams; ape-men haunt the glades—curious survivals of an infinite past—low-browed, hairy of limb, pathetic-faced as any dog; pigmies seek honey, or fret the testy elephant with tiny poisoned arrows; black-and-white colobus monkeys dash jabbering along the rubber vines; great apes cough and grunt; the air is heavy with mind-wasting scents; and, above all, beneath all, all-permeating, thrills the tireless anthem of the insect world, the suck-suck of decaying swamp, and the warm, sensuous feel of straining, redundant life.

And above loom forty miles of forest-stained slopes—the vast buttresses, torn by ten thousand ravines, which hold up the great waste of shimmering snow and blue serac, above which leap, 20,000 feet on high, the gleaming tips of the Mountains of the Moon.

Then the muddy tide, swollen with the wastage of Ruwenzori's snows, crawls into the wide-flung swamps of the Albert Lake.

It is a weird, uncanny world of its own, with its endless bands of yellow weed, its pearl-tinted waters, its islands of papyrus, whereon the poor hunted Wanyabinga hide their primitive huts, fleeing from the myrmidons of the Brussels rubber mart. Flocks of pelicans splash and gabble in the silent pools. Far and wide rings the plomp-plomp of rising fish. Elephants stand sphinx-like, belly-deep in weed, hippos galumph and bellow in their play. White clouds of ibis drift across the weed. Geese scream to the whistle of the flighting teal. Silently poling their way down the lanes of water are the scarce-moving forms of natives in canoes. And interwoven with it all, mystifying and enchanting, are the long woofs of mist and the kaleidoscopic dance of noon's mirage.

Here again are white strips of sand, green bands of bananas, yellow clumps of huts, and above, the towering purple hills, gorges inky black or all aglow with flowers, groups of chattering apes, a leopard snarling on a rock, the plaintive-screaming fish-eagle, frail canoes dancing on billowy seas, precipices plunging into limpid bays, fierce Balegga with their faces hidden in long, greasy plaits of hair, basking crocodiles and wallowing hippos. The ninety miles of the Albert Lake are left behind, and the Albert Nile and Victoria Nile, twin children of the Kivu Hills, have merged and slid into the broad stream which for a moment lingers under Wadelai.

A tiny lake, scarce five miles wide, smothered with weed, two insignificant hills, over one of which the Union Jack flutters on a crooked pole, some gravitation-defying huts, a sad-eyed Englishman, such is Wadelai,

and the Nile swishes round the bend, and has left this outpost of Empire in the purple haze.

I see a hundred miles of mere—great wastes of weed through which the Nile rushes down narrow lanes between wide, placid pools, where the heavy thud of a leaping 7-foot fish and the sad cries of water-birds alone break the silence of the evening—a mere set in a long trough of sun-shorn hills, where trees burst like guns and the brown grass shrivels and drifts, ash-like, on the breeze; where heat is heat, and aged rhinos wander unceasingly through dry belts of thorn; where Shulis and Lures—curious Nilotic men—sit meditating in the sun—a sun round, red, and glowing like a furnace door; an awful sun, a sun that shaves the earth and blisters the very rocks. Here, nightly, fearful storms brew, and the sun-tortured hills are riven and scared by lightning, till the whole district wears an aged look quite in keeping with the rhinoceros, who is its chief denizen.

Then, plunging through eighty miles of rapid and cascade, the Nile eddies beneath Bedden. Here are the outposts of the Belgian King, and blue-uniformed cannibals practise the goose-step to the accompaniment of interminable bugle blasts. Here all living things have crowded to the English bank, and cringe in fear of the teeth of the 'Billygee.' Sardine-tins glisten on the banks, and absinthe-bottles drift upon the pools, and hell is loose, and Ostendwards a king draws cent per cent.

Creeping past the mushroom rock of Redjaf, the hills of Lado and Gondokoro, a land still vaguely reminiscent of the 'Forty Thieves,' where Baker Pasha beat his great English heart into the trust of negrodom; where Emin lived and dreamed; where Speke passed and Gordon strove before the long hiatus when Mahdism came—a land of great English memories tossed by a Foreign Minister to the howitzers and cannibal hordes of the Congo State—the now mighty flood pours through a thousand channels into the world of swamp.

A world of swamp indeed!

Thirty thousand miles of water, weed, mud and

papyrus—a Titan sponge which sucks in a score of rivers, and leaves but one to make the long journey to Egypt's cotton-fields.

Here are great reaches of still water, where thousands of hippos lie in long purple bands throughout the day, waiting for the night, when they emerge and scatter through the reed-beds, and their drumming fills the air like summer thunder.

There are huge banks of bottomless mud upon which ducks cluster in solid acres, pelicans squat, geese scream, and golden-crested cranes roost in such countless swarms that their night cries sound like gunfire in the distance —birds by the ten million.

On every side, to the horizon and a hundred miles beyond, lies the endless sea of dark green papyrus.

The great orb of day is sinking lurid in the west; the pools are all aglow; the purple shades of night are already lurking behind the drifting mist-wreaths; the hippos throw their heads on high, and with wide-open mouths bellow welcome to the night; herd upon herd of elephants is plunging eastward to the far-away dom-palms of the Sobat plains; spank-spank sounds the plunge of Nile salmon on the feed; a hundred curling wreaths of smoke show where long, ash-smeared Dinkas are milking cattle; now and again a Nuer drifts past in his canoe, spear poised on high to strike the feeding fish; duck, teal, and geese are flighting overhead in hosts unthinkable, and the air screams with the whistle of a billion wings. Then of a sudden the scene shivers and is gray: the sun has gone, and the writhing mists are paramount; a faint humming seems to permeate the world; it swells to a moan, gathers strength, intensifies, drowns even the great sound of the flighting duck, grows ever louder till the whole marsh seems to roar with sound. King mosquito rules the great Nile swamp. Dinkas are buried deep in cowdung ash; cattle stand motionless in clouds of pungent smoke; the birds have flown and left the marsh to thick-skinned hippos, four-legged fish, and the coming of the dawn.

Again the banks stand high and well defined, giraffes browse on the flat-topped acacias, and here and there a Shilluk village is perched above flood-water mark.

The 400-mile long swamp is left behind, and the Nile, limpid and free from silt, slides, a broad oily sheet, past Fashoda's mud-bank, by the encampments of Baggara Arabs, near Dejebel Ain, a long 600 miles to where Khartoum broods over the Blue Nile.

And so a thousand miles through pink deserts backed by violet hills, past date-palms and the Arabs' yard-wide strip of green, beneath changeless temples, tombs, cities, and the awesome relics of the infinitely old, the Nile flows; as a last after-thought begets Egypt's wealth, and Karissimbi's snows have joined the sea.

Such was the Nile when I, first of all men, saw the source issue, drop by drop, from Karissimbi's moss.

Now at Assouan the Nile is tamed. A palace, college, hotels, and bungalows have usurped the mud-heaps of Khartoum; the sudd has yielded to the white man's will, and steamers pant fortnightly past the Lado Fort; bullock-waggons astonish the rhinoceroses of Wadelai; prospectors are chipping rocks on Ruwenzori's flanks; and the German scientist is hunting bugs on Karissimbi's slopes.

The shroud of a million years is rent.

The Britisher is abroad.

Old Father Nile! Tush! 'tis a coming highroad of the world.

THE TROPICS AND THE EMPIRE

By LADY LUGARD

The British Empire extends over some 16,000,000 of square miles, or about a quarter of the habitable territory of the world. About 4,000,000 square miles, or a quarter of the Empire, lies within the tropics, and this portion of British territory is so much more densely occupied than the remainder, that of the 413,000,000 who are estimated to comprise the population of the Empire, something more than 350,000,000 are counted as inhabiting it. These figures are only approximate, but they serve to indicate the importance of the relation which the tropical part of the Empire bears to the whole. A territory so vast, a soil so fertile, a population so numerous, are factors in the Imperial position which we cannot afford to ignore.

The first fact which we have to face in regard to the tropical Colonies—the fact, indeed, which has generally determined our acquisition of them—is that, if they were not British, they would almost of necessity belong to some other Western Power. There is no such thing as the possibility of leaving them neutral and independent. They must by their nature be either for us or against us. That being so, circumstances, directed by British energy, have settled the question that some 4,000,000 square miles of them shall be for us. There has been very little theorizing about it; but an East India Company in one direction, West India Companies in another direction, Royal African Companies of the South and West and East, North Borneo Companies,

and many another form of individual activity have created the 'accomplished fact.' Conflict has often been provoked, successive administrations have been forced to defend the interests of British subjects. The public, looking on, has applauded, and the position has passed beyond discussion. Here we stand with the direct administrative responsibility for one quarter of a quarter of the globe upon our shoulders.

In India this responsibility has been faced, and the administration of India is a thing apart. But in the remainder of the tropical Colonies the question still remains to be asked, What shall we do with them? They are as yet undeveloped properties; some of them are much more. They are nations of human beings with a history of which we are for the most part as profoundly ignorant as they themselves are of their future. It is scarcely realized that the extent of territory acquired for Great Britain in Africa within the last five-and-twenty years is nearly half as great again as the whole of British India. Who remembers that British New Guinea covers nearly 250,000 square miles; or that British Guiana, with over 100,000 square miles, is half as large as France? 'Are they of any use to us?' says the sceptical Little Englander; and whatever be the opposing convictions of the Jingo and Little Englander, they would probably agree in the one conclusion that the tropical Colonies are not of as much use to us as they might be. On this possible agreement it appears to some of us that the basis of a new development in colonial administration might be laid.

The self-governing Colonies have for a long time received a large share of public attention. A good deal of public money has been spent on them and in them. Public time has been freely lavished upon the consideration of their affairs, and in the course of the last half-century, since we entered on the new colonial chapter which was initiated by the abolition of the Corn Laws and the repeal of the Navigation Acts, they have established themselves very firmly, and, in spite of assertions

sometimes heard to the contrary, we may be permitted to believe very loyally, on the foundation of self-governing freedom. Whatever fault there may be to be found with our colonial Empire, it may be safely asserted that no such successful development of external expansion has been made by any nation in the world's history. The organism of Great Britain has grown into Greater Britain, and it lives and moves and breathes as freely as before. It has lost nothing of the individuality which characterized it. Practical science has kept pace with political development, means of communication have multiplied, and the whole is as near to us as the part once was.

Those of us who believe in the future of the United Empire see promise of the fulfilment of our most sanguine hopes. We believe that the framework of a great liberty has been constructed which will stand the test of a nation's growth. But with the settlement of South African questions it would seem that the most important affairs of the self-governing Colonies have been brought to the stage in which the self-governing Colonies must for the most part take charge of them for themselves. The interest and the attention of those responsible for the conduct of Imperial affairs is about to be liberated from the claims which have hitherto held it absorbed, and the possibilities of a new chapter of colonial history may engage consideration. Questions of self-government may give place to questions of Crown colonial government, and ability which has hitherto been directed to the self-governing Colonies may turn to the Crown Colonies. The Crown Colonies are, for the most part, the tropical Colonies, and tropical development may easily become one of the most acutely interesting questions of the future.

The conception of the development of our tropical resources has one great charm for the English imagination. This is that to realize it rests mainly with ourselves. Within the limits of benevolent autocracy, we may do as we please in the greater part of the Crown-governed

Colonies. Tropical Australia, which has been transferred to the administration of the Australian Commonwealth, is outside the present range of experiment from home. Some of the West Indian Colonies approach nearly to conditions of self-government. India has its own time-honoured administration. But with abstraction made for these and for any others for which abstention may be deemed desirable, there still remain some 2,000,000 square miles in which a Colonial Office, which should be supported by public sympathy, could initiate any experiment that it chose to make. These 2,000,000 square miles of territory possess vast resources. They produce in small quantities now the cotton, the silk, the tobacco, the coffee, the tea, the cocoa, the sugar, the rice, the gums, the oils, the dyes, the drugs, the spices, the minerals, and other materials of commerce and manufacture which are needed for the maintenance and the expansion of our trade. There is little doubt that the production of raw material could be indefinitely multiplied till it should render British manufactures of these and similar articles substantially independent of foreign supplies. The extension of such markets of supply would automatically create markets of consumption within the Empire for many classes of manufactured goods; and were it possible to organize a system of tropical administration which should enable British industry to bring about this result, British trade would enter upon an era of prosperity which would leave little doubt of the value of the tropics. The Empire is large enough to become, if it were desirable, self-sufficing; and the tropical Colonies are, in truth, to it as the tropics have ever been to the world—a reserve of wealth of which the distribution insures the creation of more wealth.

They may be, perhaps, more than this. They were also in ancient times reserves of labour for the great civilizations which based their industries upon the institution of slavery. They may become again reserves of labour, but of free labour, which, under white direc-

tion, may be no less valuable than reserves of raw material in enabling us to maintain our industrial position against competition of a very different character from any to which we are now exposed. The ascendancy of Japan in that new theatre of the world's action which lies round the Pacific Ocean suggests other reflections besides those concerning military and naval efficiency. We are forced to recognise that we shall have some day to face in the markets of the world the industrial development of a people actively intelligent as the Japanese, with a body of the best manual labour in the world lying ready to their hand in China. Against the competition of white labour we may well be able to hold our own; but it seems likely that in the industrial future the most dangerous competition which we may be forced to face will not be white. Our Imperial position permits us, if we will realize it, to face even this contingency without fear.

The future of native races, and the place which they are to take in the making of the Empire, has rightly been regarded as one of the most interesting that the extension of Empire involves. Our fathers were passionate abolitionists; but is it enough that natives in the less-civilized portions of the tropics should have been relieved of the necessity of labouring for others? Is it not desirable that they should take the further step of learning to labour for themselves? We speak very proudly of the unity of the Empire. In the matter of its labour supply it has not yet been regarded as one. The self-governing Colonies generally dislike the idea of so regarding it. They have not been able to face the fact that we are not a white Empire, but a white and coloured Empire. They prefer in those parts of the Empire for which they are responsible to exclude the coloured and to preserve the white element alone. For purposes of self-government this is easily comprehensible. It may be wise or unwise; but in the Crown Colonies, where there can be no question of self-government in the white man's sense, this barrier does not

arise. There the labour problem may be, and in some instances has been, greatly simplified by a recognition that the Empire is one, and that all British subjects are at home where they are protected by the British flag. To enable them to move from one field of labour to another involves at present the difficult questions of indentured and imported labour. But need these questions always remain difficult? Would it not be possible to approach them without passion, in a spirit of enlightened common-sense, and apply in a great sense to all our native subjects that freedom to carry their labour to the most advantageous market which was only conferred upon the English labouring poor when the Settlement Acts were repealed about the year 1834. Up to that time local English labour was not allowed to migrate freely beyond the call of its own village bells. It was considered a terrible innovation when the new Poor Laws were passed, and every man could become, if he chose, a pauper upon the neighbouring parish; but it is difficult to imagine how the Empire could have been made if the old Poor Laws had been maintained. So now it seems to many minds a terrible thing to contemplate that labour should be really free to circulate within the Empire. But can the greater Empire be made unless means are found to render this circulation of labour harmless through such parts as urgently require it?

The question with regard to the tropical Colonies is one of method. How to approach them, how to develop them? It is not a question to be recklessly answered, but neither does it seem in its nature to be unanswerable. It needs to be fairly considered. Englishmen in India and elsewhere have not shown themselves to be deficient in administrative ability. And if the whole body of men now engaged in administering the British tropics were to have their attention directed to the end of promoting industrial development under conditions consonant with good English traditions, it is hardly conceivable that such a direction of their

thoughts would remain without result. The recommendation of individual administrators would no doubt vary widely; but there is no reason why the principle of local initiative, which has been so successful in the self-governing Colonies, should not be adapted by the white element in the Crown Colonies to produce through different channels similarly satisfactory results. What is needed is that public interest should awaken to the fact that vast territories, of which the industrial wealth has been as yet barely touched, lie waiting for development. If this could happen, the rest would surely follow. Did Lancashire believe that the cotton required to feed her looms could be produced wholly within the Empire, there would not be lacking either capital or energy to establish a cotton-planting industry in all suitable Colonies. The creation of the British Cotton-Growing Association already points to a movement in this direction. Not only questions of planting, but questions of transport, questions of labour, questions of administration, and questions of taxation—which extended administration must always carry in its train—would no longer be simply catalogued in a list of obstacles—they would be faced and dealt with. Men would not content themselves with pointing out that native cottons are usually of the wrong staple. They would introduce systems of cultivation which should produce cotton of the right staple. They would not rest with the observation that difficulties of transport raise the price of native goods above any profitable level. They would insist on the creation of systems of transport which would put an end to this artificial price. They would not feel that all was said on the thorny question of native labour when it is pointed out that food in the tropics is too cheap to induce the native to work voluntarily for his bread, and that any attempt to force him to work is slavery in disguise. The most practical minds would be set to find a solution of the labour problem, and in the organization of free labour existing generations would make a further step in the path

of progress which was opened by the abolition of slavery.

One difficulty is that the industrial centres of England do not believe in the existence of this potential wealth. They have yet to be convinced that, without meddling with their neighbours' tariffs, without involving themselves in commercial wars, or other disturbances which they dread on the field of normal trade, there lie within the Empire markets almost untouched as yet which may be indefinitely enlarged.

Were the resources of the tropical Crown Colonies developed, their populations would not be stationary. The first effect of British administration in tropical Africa is to put a stop to the practices of slave-raiding and intertribal war. Slave-raiding—by which large tracts of country are annually desolated and the able-bodied male population slaughtered, while women, children, and boys are carried away into captivity—is as destructive to the race of man as indiscriminate hunting is to any kind of game. Yet the populous regions of tropical Africa have been raided for centuries, and man is still relatively thick upon the soil. The race is so persistent that it has endured. Let it be preserved with even a moderate amount of care, as elephant and buffalo are in certain regions preserved, and it will increase at a rate which may be a peril or an advantage according to the manner in which it is treated by the white man. It is not difficult to foresee a period when the existing 12,000,000 or 20,000,000 of Northern Nigeria may be increased to a total approaching the present total of India; and the same may probably be said with truth of other tropical Colonies. It does not follow that in every instance the increase should be made entirely with their present inhabitants. Were the circulation of native labour within the Empire free, it would be the aim of enlightened administration to attract to the less populous but naturally fertile districts immigration of the most desirable kind.

It is, therefore, advisedly that we speak of markets

that may be indefinitely enlarged. If the millions whose increase we have assured by the humanitarian character of our legislation are led to employ themselves in reasonable labour, they will almost necessarily rise in the scale of humanity. The wealth of the countries in which they live must also proportionately increase. If their labour is intelligently directed, the increase will be great. There will be surplus wealth to exchange for commodities which they desire, and, according to the degree in which their territories are opened to civilization, their wants will be satisfied from the markets of the civilized world. If their countries are not opened to civilization, but are still protected by civilized powers from the ordinary ravages of war, slave-raiding, and famine, their numbers must increase in many portions of the Empire as savages, in others as semi-civilized, ambitious races, ready and able to organize resistance to an order of things which they have not accepted. It is not, therefore, too much to say that great alternatives lie before us in the tropics.

But if, on the one hand, the public is but half convinced of possibilities of development on which it has not been in the habit of reflecting, and about which it is insufficiently supplied with accurate information, so, on the other, those who are charged with the administration of the Empire are themselves but half convinced that the conditions justify a policy which would in its nature involve further outlay of public money at a moment when the call for economy is urgent. Such a policy would probably involve the raising of loans for local railways; possibly the subsidization of shipping companies. It would carry with it an intelligent revision of laws and regulations affecting the employment of coloured labour. It might involve the establishment in the Colonies and Protectorates of local departments of trade and industry affiliated to the Board of Trade. It would almost necessarily involve extensive rearrangement of administrative machinery. These things are not to be achieved by thought and action

alone. They represent expenditure, and the public is the ultimate paymaster.

We halt between two uncertainties, and it is a matter of doubt whether the public, as it gains further knowledge, will force on the administration, or whether in this matter it will be for the administration to lead the public. The situation is perhaps hardly ripe for action. But a great opportunity is preparing itself, and the statesman who first sees his way to formulate a constructive policy of tropical development which shall command the confidence of the country is likely to live in British memory as the leader of one of the most important movements to which our colonial history has given rise.

THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS AND BEYOND

By SIR FRANK SWETTENHAM, K.C.M.G.

THERE is no more fascinating subject than the origin and development of English interests in the Far East. It is a theme which lives and moves, and, like an attractive personality, appeals to the imagination, the feelings, and the intelligence, by its romantic past, its brilliant present, and its enormous possibilities. Every detail is instinct with the glamour and the sunshine of those distant lands, the civilization and the customs of strange and deeply-interesting peoples. The story of English adventure and English achievement in the Far East has yet to be written; this is but a sign, to indicate the road which for centuries has carried our people and our interests, and must continue to carry them in ever-increasing numbers and importance.

When, in 1819, Stamford Raffles acquired the island of Singapore for the East India Company, his main object was to found a British station to counteract the growing influence of the Dutch in the Malay Archipelago. The Company already owned the island of Penang, at the western entrance to the Straits of Malacca, and they also possessed a strip of territory at Malacca, on the west of the Malay Peninsula, and Bencoolen, a station on the south-west coast of Sumatra. Bencoolen, originally selected (in 1684) as the site for a trading station to enable the Company's agents to purchase pepper in Achin, became, in 1785, a dependency of

Bengal with a local government, of which Raffles was, in 1813, the titular head.

As to Penang, it is interesting to remember that the founder, Francis Light, had recommended the occupation of that island (in 1786) on the ground that it would form a useful port of call for British vessels trading to China and the Further East, a forecast which has been justified by events.

Raffles, however, was far from satisfied. He had been Secretary to the Government of Penang, Resident Councillor of Malacca, and he held the post of Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen; but he realized that from none of these places was it possible to exert an influence that could stay the progress of Dutch expansion, which threatened to monopolize the trade of the Archipelago. Raffles, better than any other, knew the value of the island trade; for, in addition to his other experiences, he had been Lieutenant-Governor of Java and its dependencies during the whole period (1811-1816) that those places had been under British rule. With his extraordinary prescience, he doubtless foresaw the immense development of which these countries were capable, and probably he alone was fully alive to the fact that the door of commerce was rapidly closing, and would soon be shut in the face of the British trader. Neither Bencoolen, nor Penang, nor Malacca possessed the possibilities of successful competition. They were inconveniently situated, and they were not capable of either drawing the trade of the surrounding islands and continents, or of affording accommodation to the shipping, which alone could carry the trade when fairly developed. The position of Singapore, at the very gate of the Further East, in the narrow waters which divide the Straits of Malacca from the China Sea, fulfilled all the conditions. Raffles visited the place, realized its manifold advantages, immediate and prospective, and at once took steps to arrange with the Malay owners for its acquisition. The Dutch had already marked Singapore for their own; but, while they were thinking, Raffles

acted. Though they protested vigorously, and the East India Company for a long time hesitated to confirm the action of their servant, reluctant approval was at last given, on the ground that the occupation was then such an old story that the Company did not feel inclined to disturb the arrangement.

There is a peculiar interest in recalling the circumstances under which we acquired Singapore, in view of what it has become. Raffles' object has been attained: Singapore is the market of the Archipelago, and to a greater extent than any Dutch port in the East. Moreover, it is the centre of trade for the Malay States, Siam, French Indo-China, Borneo, Sarawak, and to some extent the Philippines; above all, it is a point of call, a coaling and refitting station, on the highway, from the West and Nearer East, to China and Japan. It is unlikely that Raffles foresaw, or anticipated, the marvellous development of the Far Eastern trade which has resulted from the opening of the Suez Canal; and it is doubtful whether he realized the wealth of the Malay Peninsula which, in the last thirty years, has added so enormously to the importance and prosperity of Singapore. To-day Singapore, counted by the tonnage of the shipping which annually makes use of it as a point of call, stands eighth on the list of the world's great ports. The value of its trade in 1903 was nearly £70,000,000. About 200,000 tons of coal are constantly stored on the wharves; it possesses great facilities for coaling, docking, and repairing ships, and, as a fortress, it is probably capable of defending itself against any attack likely to be made on it by an enemy.

It has hitherto been customary to rank Ceylon as the premier Crown Colony, and, strictly speaking, she has a good claim to that position; but the Federated Malay States, which are not British possessions, have, in the last thirty years, been so administered, under British protection, that, from a roadless, sparsely inhabited, and quite unknown wilderness, they have developed into a dependency which rivals, in almost every particular

except population, the greatest and most prosperous of English Crown Colonies. The Straits Colony and the Malay States are so closely knit together—by position, by community of interest, and by many other ties—that, for purposes of comparison, they may fairly be counted as one administration. So regarded, British Malaya—as the united Colony and Protectorate would naturally be styled—stands easily first of all those British Colonial possessions which do not enjoy responsible government. Moreover, this is a possession in which the nation may feel some legitimate pride, for no part of it has been acquired by conquest; no people and no potentate complain that our influence has injuriously affected their liberties, their dignity, or their comfort. Neither the Colony nor the Protectorate has any debt whatever, though many great and useful works have been constructed out of revenue. Both Colony and Malay States are free to all nations, to all commerce; while no class and no nationality has any exclusive privileges.

About 2,400 miles to the west of Singapore is Colombo, with its splendid harbour protected from the fury of the south-west monsoon by a world-famous breakwater. The trade of Ceylon in 1903 was valued at £15,000,000, and most of it passed through Colombo. The great port of Hong Kong, with 10,000 tons of shipping entering annually, and an actual trade valued at £20,000,000 per annum, stands about 1,100 miles to the north-east of Singapore. Situated as it is at the mouth of the Canton River, on the shore of a land-locked harbour, furnished with splendid docks and appliances for every description of refitting, the value of this great commercial station, fortress, and arsenal is obvious. Hong Kong does for the South of China what Shanghai does for the Yang-tse provinces, and, between them, they furnish the markets where China sells its produce for export, and buys its foreign goods. Both ports are the headquarters of great fleets of European, Japanese, and Chinese owned vessels, which maintain a ceaseless traffic with the rivers and outlying ports of China, the ports of

Siam, of Borneo, of the Philippines, of French Indo-China, and Japan.

These three Eastern Colonies—Hong Kong, the Straits, and Ceylon—with the Malay Protectorate, enjoy a revenue of over £5,000,000 per annum, and their in and out trade is worth at least £160,000,000. They are Crown Colonies; two of them have no debt, and their ports are absolutely free; while the third, Ceylon, has a debt of less than £5,000,000. They all contribute handsomely to the cost of Imperial defence, and, though they are all exceedingly prosperous, an immense proportion of their populations are Asiatics—as peaceful, loyal, and law-abiding subjects of the Crown as are to be found in other parts of the Empire. There are practically no local manufactures to compete with English-made goods, and no hostile tariffs.

Colombo, Singapore, and Hong Kong complete the line of British fortresses, which, with Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden, guard the great ocean highway from Europe to China and Japan. It is natural that an island kingdom, which owes its position amongst the nations to sea-power, to an immense mercantile marine, and to enterprise in exploiting distant markets, should have taken care to secure convenient stations on one of the greatest of the world's trade-routes; but the nation may congratulate itself that there were Englishmen who, before it was too late, had the foresight and courage to seize upon the best, and in some cases the only suitable, positions along the 10,000 miles of water which divide England from China. Until the face of the earth is changed, or until England loses her command of the sea, nothing can alter the fact that vessels of every nationality, on a direct voyage from Europe to China or Japan, must make use of British ports of call. If this country were unfortunately involved in war, and the ports of all British Colonies were closed, trade with the Far East—by the Suez Canal, at any rate—would practically be denied to an enemy's ships. The import-

ance of these conditions, dependent mainly on our tenure of the Eastern Colonies, is only now coming home to the great mass of English people in the lessons taught by the tremendous struggle between Russia and Japan. If we may hope that this most sanguinary conflict is nearing its end, can there be a question of greater importance to England than the terms of peace and our future relations with Japan and China? Within reasonable limits of time, is it likely that any Imperial question can be of such vital concern to English interests as the development of China, and the terms on which our alliance with Japan is to be continued? It may be assumed that no English Government would neglect the opportunity of renewing that alliance, or would permit the diplomacy of other powers to prevent its renewal. Japan recognises the value of our friendship now and in the future; but will our statesmen fully grasp the position and all its potentialities? Of the possibilities for good and evil there is hardly any limit. Where so much might be said, there is wisdom in restraint; but everyone who has any personal acquaintance with the facts must feel a keen anxiety that those with whom will rest the final decision of this momentous question will at least have the fullest and most accurate information to guide them. Whatever happens in regard to peace, to terms, to the future of China and its four hundred millions, to the expansion of Japan, and to the ultimate relations between the island powers of West and East, it is certain that the importance of our Eastern Colonies must increase. The intention of this paper is to endeavour to impress upon English readers the immense value of these three Crown Colonies at the present time; their unique positions in regard to the navy, the mercantile marine, the British manufacturer, merchant, and banker; the influence that is and ought to be exercised from these points of vantage; and the opportunities possessed by the British Government for utilizing these outposts of Empire as centres from which to collect the best, the latest, and the most

reliable information on all matters of Far Eastern concern, whether political or commercial.

It has been commonly asserted, especially by Englishmen settled in China, that England has never had a definite policy in the Furthest East, and, while no attempt has even been made to disprove that statement, the facts seem to justify it. Russia, on the other hand, made little secrecy as regards her intentions. The occupation and fortification of Port Arthur, the enormous sums spent upon Dalny, the construction of the Siberian Railway, and the practical occupation of Manchuria, were facts which could bear only one interpretation. Japan's position was equally clear to every intelligent observer, and all students of Far Eastern affairs recognised that the moment Russia really threatened Korea, Japan must and would fight for existence, with its back against the wall. Germany, a comparatively new factor in the Far East, has a policy which may roughly be described as Shantung for Germany alone, and the rest of China, especially the Yang-tse Valley, for German enterprise on at least equal terms with all other nationalities. France, again, having acquired in Indo-China, during the last fifty years, a territory twice as large as the Mother Country, has a policy of expansion which embraces the island of Hainan, the province of Yun Nan, and as much of Siam as can be secured. Probably these are not the limits of extension to which the Colonial party in France would be willing to confine their aspirations. M. Paul Doumer, lately Governor-General of French Indo-China, and now the President of the Chamber of Deputies, tells us, in his recently published account of his Far-Eastern administration, that 'a nation with a bold and energetic policy may secure a flourishing commerce. This is the policy that I have pursued in Indo-China to the utmost of my ability and resources, in order to secure a future for France as a great Asiatic power.'

And England—what is England's policy? We, who of all the nations have, throughout the longest term of

years, made the largest sacrifices to secure open markets and identity of treatment for European traders in the Far East, what is our policy? If we had had a policy when Russia frightened our war-vessels from Port Arthur, and if we had been steadfast in upholding it, humanity might have been spared the spectacle of twelve months of bloodshed on a scale unknown in the history of the world: great ships of war going to the bottom of the sea in a few minutes with all their companies, and gigantic battles fought on the soil of a people who are not belligerents, but who are suffering all the miseries of war. What is past will surely be a lesson for the future, and once again we realize that weakness of purpose, whether in individuals or in nations, is dogged by a revenge which often hits the innocent more hardly than the guilty. Let us, then, maintain the alliance, the value of which is recognised equally by Japan and ourselves; let us give our strength to uphold the integrity of China, and support Japan in making that Empire a strong and independent country. We have declared for the open door, but while other Powers have professed their adhesion to that doctrine, some of them have spared no pains to obtain exclusive advantages for themselves; some have not hesitated to occupy Chinese territory; and we have taken no effective steps to prevent the successful pursuit of that policy. Japan has been compelled to draw the sword, and, in defending her existence as a nation, she has achieved such results, on sea and land, that China now regards her as the dominant Power in the Far East. When the war is over, China will listen to the advice of Japan as she has never listened to the divided counsels of Europe. For Japan, and for us, the best policy will be an undivided China and a guarantee of lasting peace, during which the middle kingdom will be able to develop its immense resources, to the benefit not only of Japan but of this country, and of every other nation which honestly seeks the open door and fair trade on equal terms.

April, 1905.

WEST AFRICA

By LIEUT.-COL. SIR FREDERICK LUGARD, K.C.M.G.

It is not proposed in this short article to give any summary of the history of the West African Colonies, which can be obtained in full detail in Mr. Lucas's admirable series, or in summary from the Colonial Office List. It would appear to me to be of more interest if I confine myself to a few general remarks on our West African possessions, and dwell perhaps at somewhat greater length with that particular one, Northern Nigeria, of which I have personal knowledge, and finally discuss a few questions of interest in African administration in general.

I.—West Africa (General).

In the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, which sat for three and a half months in 1865 'to consider the state of the British establishments on the Western coast of Africa,' may be found an account of the origin and objects of each colony, which is of quite unusual interest, and is supported by a mass of evidence filling a very bulky volume. The object with which these settlements were established was, in the first instance, the promotion of the oversea slave trade, and when that trade was stopped they were maintained for its suppression. So little was known only forty years ago of the value of tropical products that the Committee give it as their opinion that, apart from the

slave trade, commercial enterprise would never have established itself on the Gold Coast; that there would probably have been no British West African settlements at all; and still less would the Crown have implicated itself in questions of Government or Protection. In a general view of the early history of these Coast Colonies, therefore, the slave trade is the main and almost the only consideration. In their origin the Gold Coast and Gambia consisted of successive companies, formed in the former case in 1667 (after the Dutch War), and given charters to hold and govern forts, without acquisition of territory, for the purpose of prosecuting the trade in slaves and in gold. For these purposes the British Government subsidized them in sums varying up to £20,000 per annum.

In 1727 the early agitators for the suppression of the slave trade obtained a charter, and formed a company for the settlement of liberated slaves, obtaining for the purpose the cession of the present site of Freetown (Sierra Leone) from the native chiefs.

In 1807 the oversea slave trade was abolished, and a 'languid commerce' took its place on the Gambia, while the Crown took over the administration in Sierra Leone.

On the Gold Coast the merchants were ruined, and could no longer maintain themselves, and, some twenty years later (in 1821), the Crown took over the government, and both the Gambia and Gold Coast were placed under a central administration at Sierra Leone. On the Gold Coast there were but four forts retained, the cost of which was £17,000; but, in the following year, the British Government, disgusted at the expense of the Ashanti War, handed them back to the merchants with a subsidy of £4,000 per annum, and they were successfully administered by Governor Maclean.

Twenty years later (in 1842) the Home Government again took stock of its West African Settlements, and a Committee recommended that the Gambia and Gold Coast should once more become separate Governments

under the Crown, concerned with administration only, and leaving commerce to the merchants. The abandoned forts were to be reoccupied, and more built (to control the native chiefs and the export of slaves, but not for territorial extension). An increase of the troops and a line of blockhouses were also recommended. This, it will be remembered, was a period of some activity against the slave trade to America, and between 1848 and 1853 three more Committees followed. The first recommended less forcible methods, the second that the means of suppression should be reinforced, and the third that the operations should be directed rather against the demand than the supply.

Yet another twenty years passed, and in 1865 we obtain from the proceedings of the Committee to which I have referred a vivid glimpse of the condition of West Africa at that time, and of contemporary opinion in England. Lagos, meantime (in 1861), had been added to the settlements, owing to the intervention of a naval officer in a native question of succession, and was made a consulate. Each of the settlements had increased its territory, in spite of the orders from England, and we can hardly wonder at this when we find that the bullets from opposing native combatants pattered on the barracks of the native soldiers at the Gambia, while on the Gold Coast the first attempt at a liquor license was opposed by the natives, because its effect was felt two miles inland, where the British had no jurisdiction. The evidence of Colonel Ord, R.E., Governor of Bermuda, who was sent by the Government to make a special examination and report on the West African Settlements, went to show that all that was claimed as under British protection was the actual beach of the sea—where it was not Dutch! My allusion to bullets and liquor licenses will recall to my reader's memory that for over two centuries arms and liquor had been the main articles of exchange with the natives for slaves, and that at the time I am now writing of they had become the staple imports. The small extensions of territory which the Committee complain

had taken place were stated to have been caused by the necessity of keeping the natives at some little distance from the forts, for the suppression of the slave trade, and the opening up of legitimate commerce, including the collection of a small revenue by Customs duties. They involved no protection of native tribes. Attempts, however, which had resulted in failure, had been made by the Gold Coast to levy a poll-tax on the natives immediately round the forts, and from this fact the Committee argued that a certain equivalent protection had been involved. At this time the Dutch still occupied forts along this coast, and much friction existed with them.

The condition of the 'West African Settlements' in the year 1865 was, briefly, as follows: Each had a Governor and Colonial Secretary, a Chief Justice and Queen's Advocate, a few Stipendiary and Police Magistrates and Clerks, and a Legislative and Executive Council. The grant in aid for all the civil establishments on the coast was £14,000, in addition to charges for liberated slaves and missions. The troops consisted, on an average, of sixteen companies of natives, commanded by some fifty British officers, among whom the proportion of deaths and invalidings was very heavy indeed; five companies ('besides cavalry and artillery' and a local militia) were quartered at Sierra Leone, three on the Gambia, eight on the Gold Coast (which, however, generally had three only), and two at Lagos. The cost was borne by the British Treasury, and amounted to £130,000 per annum, in addition to barracks, hospitals, and stores. There were thirteen vessels of the navy and two river gunboats engaged in the suppression of the slave trade, and the naval officers stated that their vessels were not fast enough to catch slavers at sea, but were able to conduct an effective coast blockade. They were also employed in assisting the local Governors in wars with native chiefs, and disputes with traders, and in protecting trade from pirates. The maintenance of this squadron, whose primary duty was the suppression of the slave trade (a

task undertaken by Great Britain alone, in spite of the treaty pledges of other Powers), cost the Government £157,869 per annum, and involved the death or invaliding of a large proportion of the crews. At this time the conscience of the nation had been deeply moved by the iniquity of the oversea slave trade. The markets of the United States, and later of Brazil, had been closed, and that of Cuba alone remained in spite of the undertakings of Spain. The results of suppression had so much increased the cost of slaves that better treatment of those who escaped our men-of-war had at least been ensured. The chief object alike of the 'Settlements' and of the war-ships was stated to be the suppression of the oversea slave traffic, and the cooperation of the former had enabled Government to limit the size of the squadron. The internal slave trade remained untouched.

The Imperial Government was thus spending a sum which could not be less than £320,000 per annum on the West African Settlements and slave trade, out of a revenue of £70,313,437, or nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total revenue of the United Kingdom. It happens that this is the precise amount of the grant in aid for Northern Nigeria last year, a country in which, by means of this grant in aid, a vast system of internal slave trade and slave-raiding has been almost entirely suppressed. It is the only West African Settlement to which any grant is now made, and, apart from the slave trade question, an important area for legitimate commerce is being opened up. This temporary contribution from the Imperial Exchequer now forms only half the proportion of the total revenue of the United Kingdom that it did in 1865.

To return to the condition of the Settlements themselves. Their aggregate revenue amounted to £80,400, while their expenditure (apart from military) came to £98,200. The deficit of £17,800 was only partly covered by the civil grant in aid of £14,000, and there was a growing debt in each. A house and land tax had been

started in Sierra Leone. The Gold Coast poll-tax having been a failure, a liquor license was in this year (1865) attempted. Trade was not promising, though there was a 'certain amount' of legitimate commerce which was fostered to counteract the slave trade. The success of the scheme for the education of liberated slaves is reported as very doubtful, while the checking of barbarous customs was quite ineffectual. 'Countless treaties' had been made with the native tribes for the suppression of the slave (oversea) trade, commerce, amity, and territorial cession, some also for protection, but they were vague and not properly understood.

The Select Committee reported that in their opinion the assumption of governmental functions had been wrong, (*a*) because the West Coast was not adapted to colonization by British settlers; (*b*) because British law was inapplicable to native customs, and our assumption of responsibility brought no adequate advantage to the natives, whom it enervated and disunited by teaching them to lean on the Government. England was pledged to vague responsibilities, and 'to administer a country which we cannot even tax as subject.' The forces required involved a dangerous scattering of our officers, who might be required for a war nearer home, and a great loss of life and destruction of health, both bodily and mental. To govern properly, said the Committee, needs a much larger expenditure, a more thorough occupation of the country, and larger public works. Meanwhile, for the suppression of the slave trade it would be a wiser policy to maintain forts and treaties only, while commercial agents must keep on good terms with the natives without the assistance of Government force. Basing their conclusions on premises such as these, in which the great extension of trade which has taken place in the last forty years had not been foreseen, and the white man's civilizing mission towards the inferior races was not recognised, it is not surprising to find that the Committee recommended immediate reduction, though not complete abandon-

ment, of the Settlements. The Gold Coast was to be given up as soon as the chiefs could stand alone. All taxation, and its correlative of protection to tribes, should be at once abolished, and the settlements carried on temporarily on a grant in aid, 'with a view to ultimate withdrawal from all except, probably, Sierra Leone.' The various settlements should (they said) be again placed under Sierra Leone, as being economical, tending to a uniform policy and to contraction. They regarded the assumption of territory while domestic slavery existed as impossible, assuming that it must be legally prohibited, but practically recognised as being impossible of immediate abolition. Finally, they condemned (most rightly) the employment of attorneys in native causes and trial by jury, and recommended that native chiefs should be the sole judges of their causes, with only a right of appeal to the English. The Chief Justices and Queen's Advocates of these early Settlements, limited to the seabeach, had, it appears, at this date brought overmuch British legal procedure to bear on their dealings with the natives.

Let us once more pass over a period of twenty years. The year 1885 marked the beginning of the 'scramble for Africa,' for which the Berlin Conference of that date laid down the 'rules of the game.' The Dutch Settlements which 'thwarted our trade' on the coast had ceased to exist, and the French had already inaugurated their vast West African Empire with its capital on the Senegal, and its policy of cutting off the British Settlements from access to the interior, and of themselves gaining outlets to the sea at French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and French Congo. Togoland and the Kameruns had become German the previous year, and a British Protectorate was simultaneously declared over the 'Oil Rivers' (Southern Nigeria). At the Conference itself the British delegates were able to declare that the British flag alone flew on the Middle Niger (Northern Nigeria), and thereby to secure to Great Britain the custodianship of its free navigation. The oversea

traffic to the New World in slaves had died out, but with the growth of commerce the import of firearms and crude spirits had increased enormously.

The following five years witnessed the first real attempts of the European races to establish themselves and assume administration in the interior, and, just as ninety years before the conscience of Europe was awakened by Great Britain to the horrors of the oversea slave traffic, so now again our nation led the way in the calling of a Conference at Brussels (1890) to consider the question of the interior slave trade. This memorable Conference dealt with the remaining phase of the oversea traffic (now conducted almost solely by Arab dhows between the East Coast and Arabia) and with the prohibition of the import of firearms into Africa, which in the hands of natives had been found to be a primary means of promoting slave-raiding, and also a threat to the domination of the white races, who now proposed to partition the continent among themselves. Efforts were also made to control the import of spirits, which in the British Colonies alone amounted to many millions of gallons per annum.

During the last ten years the energy of our French neighbours has compelled the effective occupation of the Hinterlands of our various West African Colonies, and though owing to this cause it has been somewhat more rapid than it otherwise might have been (for the tradition of limiting the energies of administration to the collection of Customs from gin on the coast died hard), it cannot, I think, be denied that it has resulted in an enormous extension of trade, and in great benefit to the native races. During this period the settlement of our frontier with France has led to not a little friction, which is now happily a thing of the past. The only important war was caused by the hostility of the Ashantis, and led to the annexation of their country after a brilliant campaign under Sir J. Willcocks. Minor troubles have occurred in the consolidation of our rule in each separate colony, with the result that

the whole territory which is under the British flag (with the exception of a portion of the Hinterland of Southern Nigeria) has now been brought under administrative control, while the newly-created gold industry on the Gold Coast, and the prospects of commerce generally, are very satisfactory.

The staple exports of the West African Colonies are rubber and oil seeds (especially palm-oil, shea, and ground nuts), while hides, cocoa, and many minor products are yearly increasing in importance. Efforts have recently been made to develop cotton as a new and lucrative staple, so as to supersede the American supply from within the Empire.

Exactly forty years ago, as we have seen, the total revenue of the West African Settlements was £80,400, and their total trade was only £1,183,000. The statistics of the last published year (1903) show a total aggregate revenue of £1,700,031, which is rapidly increasing, and a total volume of trade of £9,738,584. So great a trade, which, except for spirits, is chiefly British, is worthy of some encouragement from the British Exchequer, which in 1905 spends on the development of the latest addition to its possessions (Northern Nigeria) the same sum as it spent on the coast in 1865, when the trade was almost nil, and it may, I trust, look forward to its being an equally sound investment.

II.—Northern Nigeria.

It was due to the enterprise of Sir G. Goldie, founder of the Royal Niger Company, that the territories which form the Hinterland of Lagos and Southern Nigeria were acquired by England in spite of the eager efforts of France, and it is now some twenty years ago since he was able at the Berlin Conference of 1885 to announce that the British flag alone flew on the territories on both sides of the Niger up to Say, which is considerably north of the rapids. Complications with France in the west, and the loudly-expressed opposition

to the Company's practical monopoly of the trade and navigation of the Niger, which emanated more especially from Liverpool, led in 1898 to the formation under direct Government auspices of the West African Field Force in Nigeria, and in January, 1900, to the transfer of the administration to the Crown, the Company remaining without their charter as a trading concern only.

The southern part of the Company's territory was included in what had hitherto been called the Niger Coast Protectorate, under the new title of Southern Nigeria, while the great territory inland to the north of the seventh degree of latitude was called Northern Nigeria, and comprised an area of some 320,000 square miles, bounded on west and north by French possessions, and on the east by those of Germany. The country for which the British Government had thus made itself responsible mainly consisted of the 'Sokoto Empire' in the west, and the Bornu Empire in the east, both of them Mohammedan in religion, and boasting a civilization derived from the great Empire of Songhay, which had flourished in the sixteenth century, and was itself but the heir of the series of great Empires which had preceded it. The story of these early Empires has recently been told in a volume named a 'Tropical Dependency,' and the little known chapter of history which is there unfolded is of quite extraordinary interest. The Moors and the Berbers of Northern Africa from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries led the van of Western civilization, and gave to Spain the culture and art, the wealth and the learning, which made her the unrivalled mistress of the West, and has immortalized the names of her principal cities—Cordova, Seville, etc. Here the arts of painting, sculpture, music, and architecture, and the sciences of mathematics, astronomy, and medicine attained an eminence which, clouded through the dark ages which followed the fall of the Moors and Berbers, was only revived and hardly excelled in quite modern times. This wonderful civilization was brought to

Europe from Africa, and the same influence extending southwards made the kingdoms of Mellistine and of Songhay no less renowned in their day, while their principal cities—Timbuktu, Jenne, Katsena, and Kano (the two latter in Northern Nigeria)—became the marts of civilization, and exported their manufactures throughout the then known world. The civilization, therefore, of the Niger Sudan took its origin from the north, derived all its traditions from that direction, and conducted its trade with the Mediterranean coast. Its cultured progress ever thrust southwards the barbarian hordes of negro pagans which it encountered on its frontiers. Before the ever-advancing tide of civilization these tribes were compelled to take refuge in the dense and inaccessible jungle of the great 'Forest Belt' which extends south of the eighth parallel of latitude, and between it and the sea, or in the swamps and network of creeks of the deltas of the great rivers. Some few, however, still held their own, and are found to-day amid the forests of the Benue Valley and the inaccessible mountain fastnesses to the north of it.

Following the voyages of Vasco da Gama and the other great ocean explorers of the fifteenth century, the new era of civilization in Europe, which arose after the fall of the Moors and Berbers in Spain, found access to Western Africa from the southern coast instead of across the northern desert. Meanwhile the wealth, splendour, and literary pre-eminence of the Askia dynasty of Songhay was at its zenith in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but the life and death struggle of Europe against the Mohammedan Turks and Moors had at this period closed the gates of the North, and for three centuries the Niger Sudan was cut off from contact with Europe by the Northern route, except for a few stray caravans by the more easterly roads. Our Colonies on the West African Coast were located among the lower negroid types, who had been ousted from the interior uplands by the superior and civilized races from the North, and I have already shown that the result for

three centuries has been (as might have been expected) a thankless task. Forest products have been, it is true, exported in considerable quantities, bought chiefly in times past with noxious crude spirits and firearms; but the secret societies which permeate these negroid tribes, and the fetishism and superstition in which they are steeped, have rendered any general progress difficult to achieve. Though in the case of individuals high standards of education have been attained, there is a tendency among the partially educated to parody the manners and dress of Europe, while the non-educated masses relinquish with reluctance, or do not relinquish at all, the cannibalism and the horrible fetish rites of their ancestors.

In 1900 the British Government came for the first time into contact with the traditions of the ancient civilization of the Sudan, and with races whose rulers professed a monotheistic religion, and were descended from a type of humanity greatly superior in intellectual ability to the coast population. In the early years of the nineteenth century Othman dan Fodio in the west, and El Kanem in the east of Nigeria, founded respectively the Sokoto Empire and the present dynasty of Bornu. Both were Mohammedan propagandists, and the vital force which enabled them to lead their followers to victory was the watchword of Islam, though, as a matter of fact, there were arrayed against them many followers of the prophet, and their religious zeal was but the cloak for secular conquest. The two dynasties exist to the present day, but differ profoundly in their system. Dan Fodio gave to each of his Fulani chiefs a flag of conquest, and setting out with this sacred symbol, each founded a separate emirate in which the ruling race was alien to the native population, and Moslem and pagan were alike subjected to it. El Kanem came, on the other hand, from the east of Chad as a deliverer from a foreign yoke—namely, the Fulani, who had recently conquered the old Bornu dynasty. The Kanembu, as his followers were called, were closely allied in race to

the Kanuri of the west of Chad, and at the present day are identified with them, speaking practically a common language and adopting the same customs.

The dawn of the twentieth century, which inaugurated a British administration in this land of ancient traditions and civilization, found throughout its length and breadth a chaos of misrule and anarchy. Like all despots in the tropical zone, the Fulani ruler had become a merciless tyrant, practising inhuman barbarities upon a subservient but deeply discontented people, who in turn were in constant revolt. The pagan tribes which fringed the emirates and the rebellious subjects were alike the victims of ceaseless raids for slaves, and vast areas of land were depopulated, devastated, and deluged in blood. In the west the conquering Rabeh, who, on the defeat of his master, Sulieman, by Gordon's lieutenant, Gessi Pasha, had fled from the Nile regions with the remnant of Sulieman's army, had invaded Bornu, and laid its capital, Kuka, in ruins, ousted its ruling dynasty, and sold its people into slavery.

I have said that the country inherited an ancient civilization, and it will perhaps be well to describe in a brief word the salient points of that civilization, which was not introduced by the Fulani, but adopted by them from their predecessors, and has its origin in remote antiquity.

The ruling chief was supported by a council, to whose advice he was bound to listen on all important affairs of State. In him was vested the ultimate title to land, but his principality was divided into fiefs, held in a kind of feudal tenure by the principal officers of State, who collected taxes on behalf of the Emir and of themselves. The functions of Government were delegated to a large number of office-holders holding ancient and much coveted titles, some of which are common to almost all the emirates, while others are peculiar to certain ones. The members of the ruling house had certain offices, and succession followed the Koranic rule. Each considerable town had its seriki, or chief, who in turn had

a more or less complete hierarchy of office-holders. The law was administered by judges (Alkali) deeply versed not only in the Koran, but in the commentaries of many Moslem jurists, and in theory it was strictly impartial, the Emir himself being amenable to the Alkali's court. Taxation was based on the tithe prescribed by the Koran for Moslems, and the Kurdin Kasa or tribute laid down for conquered pagans. Death duties, tolls on merchandise, and many other forms of taxation added to the revenues. The Alkali's judicial award was enforced by the executive power, and the system of rule was so admirably organized that the order of the chief, whether it concerned the labour required for buildings in the city or a levy of corn or cattle, was apportioned to each town and district, and enforced by an army of messengers with extraordinary promptitude and efficiency.

In the decadence which marked the Fulani rule at the close of the nineteenth century this admirable system had become distorted, and was a mere vehicle for extortion, rapine, and cruelty. The Moslem rulers had become tyrants, delighting in torture and sensuality. Living persons were often impaled in the market-place, where their shrieks of agony were the jest of small boys till they died a lingering death; the refinement of the tortures they inflicted as described, by Dr. Miller, C.M.S., are too awful for repetition. The traditional offices were usurped by favourite slaves; the decisions of the courts were guided by bribery and extortion, and the Alkali's verdict, if unpalatable to the chief, was set aside. Additional taxes of all kinds were imposed, and arbitrary levies gave the peasantry no rest, and stifled all industry, since production was merely the mark for spoliation. Tax-gatherers lived like harpies upon the districts; from their lust no woman was safe, and their greed allowed no man to call his property his own. The warriors who had conquered in the name of Mohammed were effete. Mounted on horses covered with trappings, themselves smothered with quilted arrow-proof robes or shirts of mail, they raided the country annually for slaves.

Such was the state of the country in 1900, when its administration was assumed by the British Government. It has been the task of the Administration to endeavour to restore the ancient régime, improved by British ideas of justice and organization, and to introduce a system of rule in which the native chiefs and the British rulers shall be identified in a single effective machine, each cooperating with and complementing the other, while the emancipation of the peasantry alike from slavery and from extortion may lead to the increase of population, and of productive industry. It is as yet early to judge how far the untiring enthusiasm of the political staff has succeeded in realizing the first beginnings of these ideals, for the Administration is as yet but five and a half years old, and the first years were occupied in consolidating British rule, and in creating the machinery with which to work.

III.—Administrative Questions.

This brief sketch of the conditions which obtain in West Africa, and more especially in Northern Nigeria, will, I trust, have aroused sufficient interest in my reader to justify me in adding a few words on the nature of some of the problems with which the young British Administrator has to deal in Africa, and the methods by which he endeavours to solve them.

(*a*) *Slavery.*—Among the problems which are peculiarly African that of slavery occupies a prominent place. The British tradition (which I should be very sorry to see abandoned) is that in any country which has been annexed to the Crown, and has become a Colony under the British flag, slavery is not tolerated in any form; but that in the initial stage of development, which under most diverse and varying conditions has been called by the ambiguous term of a 'Protectorate,' it is impossible to forbid domestic slavery. This tradition would, however, appear to have been set aside in the case of Ashanti, which has been annexed, and in

which slavery is still tolerated. In recent years, however, under the rule of Mr. Chamberlain, who with extraordinary perspicacity grasped the essential principles of the intricate problems of the remotest dependency for which he was responsible, an important step which I had advocated for many years was taken, and I believe that in all protectorates (certainly in all at that time under the Colonial Office) the *legal* status of slavery was abolished. This means that the law (as administered by British courts only) does not recognise the existence of slavery. Property in persons (as slaves) is not admitted; a 'slave' is held to be personally responsible for his acts, and competent to give evidence in court. The institution of domestic slavery is not thereby abolished, as would be the case were a decree of general emancipation enacted, but it gives to the slave the right to assert his freedom if he wishes. It is not an offence for a *native* to own slaves (non-natives, including coloured British subjects from British Colonies cannot of course do so), and so long as the master and slave work harmoniously together the law does not interfere with their relations towards each other. If, on the other hand, the holding of slaves were made illegal by an edict of emancipation, or even if the slave population were encouraged to assert their freedom, complete anarchy and chaos would result, involving no less misery to the slaves than to their masters. The former would be deprived of occupation, and the great cities would be filled with vagrants, criminals, and prostitutes; while the latter would be reduced to beggary and detestation of British rule that had robbed them of property, which, under the law of Islam, was as real as any other form of property, and had in most cases been paid for in hard cash.

An institution which forms so essential a part of the social fabric, and is ingrained in the lives and habits of thought of the people, which has existed since the times of Abraham and Moses, and of which we read in Herodotus and Strabo, cannot be abolished by em-

pirical legislation, and the attempt to do so would result in chaos and misery. Slavery is at present the only form of labour contract, and a very real—though perhaps in our view an inadequate—return is made by the master for his slave's work. He is supported in sickness as well as in health; his master is responsible for any crime committed by him; he is usually given one or more days in the week to work on a piece of land of his own, and its proceeds are his personal property, with which he can, if he desires, redeem himself. Under a good master he becomes one of the family and cannot be sold when he has been long in service, and he may often rise to positions of high command. There are many other liberal provisions for the benefit of the slave in Mohammedan law, which space forbids me to discuss here. The general effect of the institution is to establish a form of contract (in a country where the idea of a written contract is unknown) not unsuited to a primitive race (as has been proved in the early history of almost every race in the world, including our own), and not illiberal to the lower classes if the laws of the Koran in their favour are made effective. Under this régime, when well administered, cases of desertion by slaves are few, and the people are for the most part happy. The evils attendant upon it are principally two, and these two are very great. In the first place the institution of slavery involves slave-raiding (for new slaves) and slave trade. The horrors of the slave raid are beyond description, and I will not enter into them here; I am dealing only with the administrative problem, and from that point of view they are a terrible evil in that the country is depopulated and laid waste. Men are killed by thousands and women and children are carried off or starve in the Bush, while in the slave-raiders there grows up a lawlessness born of the lust for butchery, rape, and rapine. In the second place, the institution of domestic slavery results in holding a very large portion (including the farm-slaves, probably considerably more than half the population of a Mohammedan community) in a

state of tutelage, which arrests all progress towards a higher plane of life and civilization, and limits industry and production. The slave is an irresponsible being, for whose trespass his master is held amenable at law equally with that of his cattle, and who may be similarly punished, and for grave offences killed at will.

The administration, then, while tolerating the existence of domestic slavery, affords opportunity to those who, on account of cruelty or recent enslavement, etc., desire to assert their freedom; and by declaring the freedom of the children born of slave-parents, and by suppressing slave-raiding and slave-trading (since the profits to the trader became too precarious) insures the gradual extinction of the status of slavery. The knowledge that their slaves can assert their freedom has meanwhile the effect of making the masters treat them well, and insures to the slave population a great amelioration of their conditions. In taking this line, however, the Government assumes a heavy responsibility. It is its duty during this period of transition to educate both the upper and the servile classes to the idea of a free labour contract between master and servant. To promote this the introduction of a cash currency is a very valuable medium, and the introduction of a direct and *individual* taxation teaches the peasant his responsibility to the State, and his personal interest in and obligation to it. The law holds him personally responsible for his acts, and the executive holds him personally responsible for his contribution to the revenue.

But the Government is itself responsible for introducing a new difficulty, which militates against the operation of the policy I have so briefly outlined. Formerly it was almost impossible for a slave to gain his freedom by desertion. He was seized and returned to his owner by any Mohammedan chief into whose territory he had escaped. Land was in possession of fief-holders, and he could build no village and cultivate no farm without the knowledge and sanction of the overlord. The introduction of peace and security,

which has opened up to cultivation and reclamation the great depopulated but fertile areas lying waste in the country, has on the one hand afforded to the runaway slave illimitable opportunities for setting up for himself; while, on the other hand, in the eye of the law as administered by the British courts, the forcible rendition of a fugitive slave is a crime. If done by a British subject it is participation in enslaving, if by a native it becomes a 'common assault' or 'illegal detention,' etc. Herein is a dilemma. The judicial authority, which may not recognise the status of slavery, is opposed to the executive which desires that the existing system shall only gradually expire in proportion as the new and better order of things becomes efficient to take its place. I frankly recognise the difficulty; but I think it is better to accept it than to perpetuate the system by legalizing it on the one hand, or to create chaos by arbitrarily and prematurely abolishing it on the other. I find its solution (*a*) in the combination in the person of the same officer of judicial and executive functions whereby, by the exercise of tact and common-sense, aided by his experience and knowledge of the people, he may be able to avoid dealing judicially with cases which he considers are unsuited for judicial action; and (*b*) by the use of the native courts in the last resort. All cases in which an officer considers that cruelty, or recent enslavement, or other good cause, gives just grounds for liberation he can deal with judicially; but if, after inquiry, he finds that the runaway slave is merely a criminal or vagrant, he would, while not denying his right to assert his freedom, decline to grant him land on which to settle, or if a vagrant in a city would allow the native courts to deal with the matter. Such cases are in practice very few indeed. The large majority of runaways are women, and the question can be dealt with as one of divorce, and not of slavery, while the Government forbids the marriage of soldiers and other Government employés with fugitive slave women. Self-redemption is encouraged by Govern-

ment, both in justice to the master for property legally acquired (at the time of acquisition) and because the slave will value the freedom which he has himself earned, and which confers on him in native public opinion a status of freedom which the arbitrary law of the white man is powerless to confer.

The subject is one of such interest that I wish space permitted of my adding a few words on the conditions of redemption; the obligations of Government towards the slaves it liberates, and their disposal, and the consequential institution of Freed Slaves' Homes, and their methods and limitations; on the question of employment of slave labour; of enlistment of slaves; of probate of native wills in which slaves are treated as symbols of currency; on slavery among pagan tribes, and on many other aspects of this problem. In Northern Nigeria slave-raiding is a thing of the past, and some progress has already been made in the education of the people in the directions I have indicated, while slave-trading and slave-dealing are, I think, becoming daily more rare.

(*b*) *Liquor Traffic.*—I have shown already how the importation of crude spirits took its origin in the days of the oversea slave trade, nearly three centuries ago, as the commodity with which slaves were chiefly purchased, and how it still remained the chief article of import in exchange for the legitimate exports of a later period. Much has been written as to its demoralizing effect upon the natives, while its supporters have made misleading statements as to the number of gallons consumed per head of the population in contrast to the consumption at home, including for their purposes the population beyond the spirit zone, and asserting that the liquor is not harmful, and that drunkenness is not prevalent. Leaving this controversy to the long list of eminent men who have testified to the demoralization and to their opponents, I have but one word to say on this subject from another standpoint. The gin and rum is manufactured almost entirely in Germany and

Holland, and is now for the most part not even carried in British ships. It appears to me that, from a commercial point of view, it were better that we imported Manchester and Birmingham goods rather than foreign products, and that these would tend to raise to some extent the standard of comfort and the plane of civilization of the natives, which crude spirits certainly do not. If to such imports be added—as I should like to see—agricultural and other industrial implements (hand-gins for cotton, hand-mills for crushing oil-seeds and the like), the cost of transport of raw produce in bulk would be decreased, and the productive output increased, with a corresponding gain to commerce, which its advocates cannot maintain to be the result of the spirit traffic. The difficulty which has stood in the way of reform is, that as long as the Colonies of France and Germany, which are sandwiched between the British Colonies on the West Coast, maintain the import and decline to increase their duties, it is said to be impossible for us seriously to increase ours. There has, however, under Mr. Chamberlain's direction, been a steady increase of duties, which has considerably reduced the import, while yielding nearly double the previous revenue, and I trust that this highly satisfactory process may be continued. The amount of liquor imported into the whole of West Africa in 1895 was 5,510,472 gallons, yielding a total revenue of £374,727, while in 1903 it had fallen to 4,348,847 gallons, yielding a total revenue of £731,386. I have elsewhere* discussed this question in full detail, and will not add more in this place—the more so that it is not a problem which I have had personally to deal with, since the import of 'trade liquor' is entirely prohibited in Northern Nigeria.

(*c*) *Taxation.*—Space forbids me to say more than a very few words on this subject. In dealing with uncivilized races, by far the easiest method of raising a revenue is by Customs dues on the coast. The merchant who pays these adds correspondingly to the

* *Vide Nineteenth Century*, November, 1897.

selling price of his goods, and the native producer, who therefore ultimately pays by collecting a larger quantity of produce for a given amount of goods, neither knows of nor cares about the tax. Such methods of indirect taxation are suitable to a savage population, but among the higher races of Northern Nigeria, who have inherited a Mohammedan civilization, direct taxation, as I have already said, is an institution sanctioned by tradition, and accepted as a natural law by the people. It remains to settle how it may be collected with the least leakage and waste, and with the least chance of extortion and oppression in the collection; in what proportion it shall be shared between the Government and the native chiefs; to simplify and organize the too diverse forms which it has taken in the past; and to regulate its incidence on the people so that each may pay in proportion to his means.

The disadvantage of limiting taxation to the collection of Customs lies in the fact that, when a country has attained a further stage of civilization, it is difficult to institute that direct taxation which all civilized States recognise as due to the Administration from the individual, according to his wealth and ability, and the amount of protection, and cheapening of commodities by improved communications and other public works, for which he is indebted to the Government. Where, therefore, it is feasible and possible to introduce the first rudiments of a direct taxation among uncivilized tribes, it has a value apart from the mere amount of revenue collected, in habituating them to the idea of an obligation to the State which it is incumbent on them to discharge, and at the same time it is an outward and visible sign which they well understand of the acknowledgment of the Suzerain Power, with the correlative necessity of obeying the injunctions of the Government to abstain from outrages and lawlessness. Among such tribes in West Africa property is usually held on a communal basis, and the impost is therefore necessarily in the nature of a capitation or poll-tax; whereas among

the more civilized races, where individual rights in property have become recognised, it is possible to institute a graduated taxation, according to the wealth and ability of each member of the community to pay it.

Direct taxation is also unsuitable to a people who are held in a state of slavery or serfdom, for the responsibility of the individual is then assumed by the slave-owner. A serf or slave cannot be expected to recognise or understand his obligation to the Government when the results of his labours are not his own, and the produce of the fields he tills belongs to his master. He ceases to have an individual responsibility to the State for his actions, or an obligation to maintain its efficiency by his contributions, however small. These obligations pass to his overlord. Direct taxation, therefore, as being the State recognition of the rights and duties of the individual, is the moral charter of independence of a people. Communities, moreover, who have only recently emerged from such a state of servitude take some time to acquire this sense of responsibility and of obligation. One of the chief defects of Mohammedan rule in Africa is that it holds a large section of the people in this state of irresponsible tutelage, thereby arresting all progress.

The fertility of the soil and the abundance of marketable sylvan produce which needs no culture, the employment of women in manual labour, and the absence of the pressure of population in countries devastated by tribal wars and slave raids, combine to afford the African an abundant leisure, which, in the absence of any external incentive to work, is apt to be devoted to indolence, quarrelling, drink, or sensuality. The imposition of a moderate taxation supplies such an incentive and stimulates production, while at the same time it promotes the circulation of a currency, to the great benefit of trade.

In Northern Nigeria the proposal is to collect the ancient taxes in a simplified and modified form by the agency of the native chiefs and district headmen, without the intermediary of the tax-collectors, who formerly

were the curse of the country. We propose to share the results with the native chiefs, who no longer have to keep up standing armies and other expenses of Government. The policing of the country is now undertaken by the Government, upon whom, therefore, it devolves to enforce the payment of traditional taxes. The British Administration is thus brought into close touch with the native rulers—themselves aliens in the Mohammedan States—and the interests of both become identical, and close cooperation is insured, while the chiefs will be assured of a regular income (which they are now powerless to enforce), to replace the former arbitrary levies and the profits of the slave trade. For the evils of an alien and absentee landlordism, working through an agency of alien tax-gatherers, is substituted a system under which each village chief collects from the individual, and pays to a local district headman, who in turn pays direct to the Emir and Government. This effects decentralization of native rule—which is no less important than decentralization by the Administration itself—and gives to the men who occupy positions of importance definite duties and responsibilities.

It is wise, as Lord Cromer has said, to make the incidence of taxation as light as possible in the first years of administration, so as to encourage productive industry, and not overburden the peasantry in the earlier stages of agricultural and industrial development; but it is equally wise, in my view, to habituate all classes to their obligation to contribute to the State. Nor can the conditions of the peasantry in Egypt, where I understand that irrigable and cultivatable land is of great value, be considered as identical with those of a country like Nigeria, where limitless land, fertile and well watered, lies ready to the hand of the cultivator, who needs only an incentive to employ his indolent leisure. The serious difficulty lies in the fact that, in the early stages, pending the wider distribution of currency, payment must be made in kind, and its transport and realization present obstacles which almost nullify its

practical value. Still, the principle is established which in later years will, with improvement of communications, render more adequate returns, and produce a revenue proportionate to population and prosperity. Meanwhile, the solution lies in enhancing the value of the products in which payment is made, and decreasing their bulk by means of simple industrial machinery, such as hand-gins for cotton, oil presses, and the like.

I had hoped to find space to add a few observations on some other subjects of interest in tropical administration, such as the treatment of native chiefs and their relations to the Administration; the question of native jurisdiction and courts, Mohammedan and pagan; currency and barter; the position and duties of troops and police; education, and many others; but the limits of my space are already exceeded.

The aims of West African administration are comparatively simple. Unconcerned with that large range of subjects which provide material for the domestic legislation of more civilized countries, its problems are confined to two main branches: (1) The treatment of native races, who are centuries behind ourselves in mental evolution, and the steps by which they may be gradually brought to a higher plane of civilization and progress; and (2) economic development by which these tropical countries may develop a trade which shall benefit our own industrial classes by the production, on the one hand, of the raw materials—rubber, oils, cotton, hides, etc.—which form the staples of our manufactures, and by the absorption in return of our manufactured cottons, hardware, and other goods.

Of all our tropical dependencies, West Africa, on account of its climate, suffers most from a lack of continuity in administration—that greatest of all drawbacks to success and progress. The necessity, on the one hand, of periodical return to England to recruit, which deprives the country of the services of its officers for one-third of their nominal service; and the limited period, on the other hand, for which officers, espe-

cially those in the higher and more experienced grades, can, as a rule, remain in the West African service, robs the Administration of the fruits of accumulated experience, and continually dislocates the machinery and introduces changes which militate against efficiency and a steady advance. There is, in my belief, a perfectly feasible way in which this difficulty might be overcome, and which would tend to the great advantage of both of the two branches of tropical administration which I have indicated; but in the position which I at present hold it is not fitting for me to propound schemes which have not as yet the entire approval of the Secretary of State, nor would space permit of my doing so here.

I am convinced that one of the questions which will most occupy thought in the twentieth century will be the development of the tropics, and the solution of the twin problems which (as I have said) it involves, and I am confident that the genius of our race will be among the first to recognise the growing, and, indeed, already vital, importance to civilization of the raw products of the tropics, with the necessity for organizing the industry of its teeming millions and promoting their welfare on well-considered lines of policy, and that we shall solve its difficulties, whether by one method or another, as we have ever done in the past.

NOTE.—The figures relating to the amount of liquor imported into West Africa, quoted on page 855, through an oversight include liquor imported for the use of Europeans, which, however, is comparatively trivial in amount.

THE EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE

By SIR CHARLES ELIOT, K.C.M.G.

The eastern side of Africa is so little known that it may not be amiss to remind the reader of the various political spheres now recognised there, chiefly in consequence of arrangements made towards the end of the last century. The mainland is divided between Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Portugal, the share of France being represented by the large island of Madagascar. The extreme south, of course, is British, and inland our territory runs northward uninterruptedly to Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika; but on the coast Portuguese territory begins at Delagoa Bay and occupies about fifteen degrees of latitude. North of it comes German East Africa, which stops about five degrees south of the line, where begin our own equatorial possessions. The remainder of the east coast, from the equator up to and round Cape Guardafui, constitutes the Italian sphere. Our inland territories near Tanganyika and Nyassa, which are conterminous with Rhodesia, but separated from the sea by the Portuguese possessions, are known by the name of British Central Africa—a somewhat misleading designation, since they are not really central, but southern, and have no connection with our two equatorial Protectorates of Uganda and East Africa, which form the subject of the present article and are, to a certain extent, central. But even these territories are very distinctly eastern, and do not extend into the heart of

Africa. They occupy, roughly speaking, the eastern third of the continent, and the extreme western boundary of Uganda is on about the same meridian as Alexandria.

It may be said, without undue national pride, that the British sphere is the most important and hopeful part of the east coast. In the Italian and Portuguese territories European influence is practically confined to a few ports, and little effort has yet been made to control or develop the interior. The Germans have seriously undertaken the task of investigating and improving their possessions, and their long coast line, which in many parts possesses a rich and fertile hinterland within easy distance of the sea, has enabled them to obtain gratifying results. But they also suffer, though in a less degree than the Italians and Portuguese, from want of communication with the interior, and the consequent difficulty of maintaining order or encouraging trade. Though the British Protectorates are in some ways less favourably situated, inasmuch as the healthy and fertile interior is separated from the coast by a jungle from 70 to 200 miles wide, yet there is easy communication by rail and steamer from the Indian Ocean to Entebbe, on the further side of Lake Victoria, and a good road from Entebbe to Lake Albert.

Our equatorial possessions are organized as two Protectorates, known as East Africa and Uganda. The former, which is a definite administrative division, and not merely a general designation for this side of the continent, is the country between Lake Victoria and the Indian Ocean. It is traversed by the Uganda Railway, which connects the lake with the port of Mombasa. The Uganda Protectorate, on the other hand, consists of our territories which lie to the west and north of the lake, and is not very definitely divided from the southern Sudan.

It is a curious fact that Uganda, though about 700 miles from the sea, created considerable interest some time earlier than the nearer, and in some ways more important, territories which now form the East

Africa Protectorate, and which have become known only in the last five or six years. Uganda was visited by Stanley, and the reports of the large and intelligent native population anxious to accept Christianity and European civilization speedily inspired active sympathy among all the friends of missions. In virtue of the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, the British East Africa Company occupied Uganda, but finding that the administration was a heavier drain on their resources than had been anticipated, soon became anxious to hand over their new acquisition to the Government. Meanwhile, Christianity had made extraordinary progress, not unmarred by bickerings between the various sects, and there was a strong feeling that for religious and philanthropic motives the country ought not to be abandoned. This sentiment was supported by an estimate of its wealth, which was, perhaps, somewhat exaggerated, and our Protectorate was proclaimed in 1894. As it was difficult to hold the interior without communication with the coast, it was decided to construct the Uganda Railway, which was begun in 1895. It was only during the construction of this railway that people became alive to the fact that the road to Uganda was more valuable than Uganda itself.

The peculiarity of the East Africa Protectorate is that, though it is equatorial, large parts of it possess a temperate climate which has been shown, by an experience now amounting to about fifteen years, to be suitable to Europeans. Not only can they reside continuously in the country, but they can rear children there. This surprising fact seems most improbable to those who are not acquainted with the Protectorate, but it must be remembered that temperature and climate depend on elevation as much as on geographical position. The best-known equatorial countries—such as West Africa, Brazil, and the Malay Archipelago—are comparatively low and flat. It is only rarely, as in Bolivia and East Africa, that we find the much rarer combination of equatorial position and considerable altitude.

On the mountains of the Mau, which are actually on the Equator, the days often resemble an English October, and at night there may be a degree or two of frost. The salient feature in the geography of East Africa is that volcanic action has thrown up a plateau, varying from 5,000 to 10,000 feet high, between the sea and the great lakes, which are largely formed from the waters which run down from this elevation. In British territory this plateau begins about 200 miles from the coast and extends about 300 miles in the direction of Lake Victoria. Less accurate information is forthcoming as to the interior of the German and Portuguese possessions, but it seems probable that a strip of high and healthy, though possibly not everywhere equally fertile, country runs down continuously to Rhodesia.

Uganda, which lies beyond this plateau, cannot at present claim to offer a climate suitable to European residence, though perhaps further exploration and improved communication may enable us to use the great Ruwenzori range and the mountains which border the Upper Nile for the establishment of stations. At present its importance is largely political. It looks both south and north, and commands the highways leading to Egypt and the Cape. It thus affects our two most important interests in the Continent. In Northern Africa we have chosen Egypt and the east as our sphere rather than Morocco and the west. Now, the main factor in the prosperity and safety of Egypt is the Nile, and by the possession of Uganda we control the whole course of this river from its double source in Lakes Victoria and Albert to its mouth in the Mediterranean. In Lower Egypt the rise and fall of its stream are regulated by a dam built at Assouan, and it is now proposed to exercise a similar control over the upper portions of the river by means of various works, among which will be dams built on or near the two lakes. In any case it is clearly most important that the power which occupies Egypt should also occupy Uganda, for

a rival in the possession of the sources and upper course of the Nile might have opportunities of seriously injuring the territories which depend on its rise and fall.

Uganda has another aspect which is important for Egypt and the Sudan. It is a Christian native state. Probably in no part of the world have the efforts of missionaries met with such rapid and thorough success. Elementary education and a taste for European civilization are generally diffused; and if all the inhabitants are not really Christians, it may be said, without exaggeration, that those who are not are regarded by the others as backward and barbarous. The country has definitely thrown in its lot with Christianity, and—here is the point—it is anti-Mohammedan. It is, therefore, not likely to originate any fanatical movement, and forms a barrier against the spread of any such movement southwards. In view of the power which Islam has shown of spreading among African races, and the damage done on the Upper Nile by the Khalifa and the Dervishes, the existence of this Christian state must be regarded as a great guarantee for the preservation of peace.

Looking southwards, the importance of Uganda for all projects of opening up communications between the north and south of the continent is obvious. It lies on the highroad from the Cape to Cairo and in the middle of the road. The objections to making a railway between these points are two. As things are, there is no prospect of any traffic at all commensurate to the cost of construction; and, secondly, this construction is likely to encounter serious difficulties in the southern Sudan, where the line must either make a considerable diversion from the direct route, or else pass through marshes, where the necessary works will be enormously costly, if not impracticable. Nothing, however, is more likely to stimulate traffic and the need of communication than the development of Uganda and the establishment in its neighbourhood of colonies of Europeans connected with South Africa by business interests. The fact that such colonists from South Africa are

actually settling in considerable numbers in the neighbouring East Africa Protectorate will probably prove of great importance for the future of the country and determine the direction of its development. If it is ever decided to construct the Cape to Cairo Railway, Uganda will be able to supply plentiful and intelligent native labour, such as is rarely found in Africa.

To the west, Uganda borders on the Congo Free State, and these frontier lands still merit the titles of darkest and unknown Africa. The shortest route to the eastern side of the Congo is undoubtedly by the Uganda Railway, and though the Belgian authorities have naturally a preference for roads which open up their own territory, this route is beginning to be used.

Politically the East Africa Protectorate is less important than Uganda—that is to say, it does not contain many points which are of strategic value or affect the neighbouring lands. But it offers a series of excellent harbours along the coast, and since ships could be supplied with practically unlimited quantities of meat and European vegetables, it might be valuable as a provisioning station in time of war. Mombasa, with its adjacent land-locked harbours, is capable of accommodating the largest fleets, and is a rapidly increasing port, somewhat handicapped at present by its defective water-supply. This defect, however, will probably soon be remedied by the construction of waterworks, bringing water from a neighbouring stream at a cost of about £100,000.

It is, however, not so much of the political importance of the East Africa Protectorate that I would speak as of its commercial and economic possibilities. Uganda is a black man's country; East Africa is fitted to be a white man's country, and is rapidly becoming one. As explained, this Protectorate rises gradually from the sea into a plateau varying from 5,000 to 10,000 feet in height, excluding peaks which attain an altitude of nearly 19,000 feet. This plateau is cleft down the middle by a depression known as the Great Rift

Valley, which, though some thousand feet lower than the surrounding heights, shares their temperate climate. For purposes of colonization and cultivation, the Protectorate may be divided into two parts—the highlands composed of this plateau and of the Rift Valley, and the lowlands, consisting of the coast and the country round the shores of Lake Victoria. The lowlands must be regarded as a planter's country, suitable for most forms of tropical agriculture, but not for the permanent residence of Europeans, though they can perfectly well reside there and superintend cultivation. The shores of Lake Victoria are not healthy, though it is hoped that they may be much improved by drainage. The sea coast, however, must be given a high rank for health among tropical climates. Mombasa and Lamu are certainly not inferior in this respect to Calcutta and Bombay, considering that they are tropical towns; the temperature is moderate, and there is a continual breeze from the sea. For practical purposes the healthiness of the coast is increased by the proximity of the highlands, which can be reached in twenty-four hours from Mombasa when a change of air is needed. The chief products of the lowlands are rubber, copra, mangrove, bark (which is used for tanning), and various kinds of valuable fibre. The indigenous rubber, which is obtained from a creeper called landolphia, is of good quality and plentiful in many districts, particularly in the forests near Melindi and Witu. It is also found in various parts of the highlands, and is abundant in Uganda. The copra is said to be of extremely good quality.

It is not, however, these tropical lowlands which are the most valuable and characteristic feature of East Africa, but the temperate highlands, which are not merely a planter's country, but suited to the permanent residence of Europeans. It is somewhat difficult to define their extent, as the country at some distance from the railway is not known as well as it should be, but the belt of good land is about three hundred miles wide in the part where it is traversed by the railway, and it is

to report that those who explore the less-known districts nearly always report the discovery of fine land in some unexpected place. Thus the Commission which has recently been delimitating the boundary between British and German territory report the existence of a new escarpment called Isowri, and excellent grass about eighty miles from Lake Victoria. The best-known districts, taking them in the order in which they lie along the Uganda Railway, are the Athi plains, Kikuyu, the Rift Valley, the Mau, and the Uasin Gishu plateau.

Perhaps there is no better and more practical way of giving the reader an idea of the country than to make an imaginary journey by the Uganda Railway from the Indian Ocean to Lake Victoria. In doing so I should say that I follow the time-table which was in force a year ago. The service of trains may have been altered and accelerated since then.

On leaving Mombasa, which is situated on an island fitting rather closely into an indentation of the coast, the railway crosses a long bridge, and reaching the mainland, at once begins to climb a somewhat steep ascent to Mazeras, about fifteen miles from the starting-point. This first section of the line is also one of the most beautiful. The scenery is tropical; the hills are covered with groves of cocoanuts and bananas, and from their summits are obtained wide views over the island of Mombasa and the many inlets round it—Port Reitz and Port Tudor, and the beautiful valley of the Mwachi River. Around Mazeras there is a good deal of cultivation, but shortly after it begins the least profitable and most uninteresting part of the journey—the Taru Jungle, a belt of forest and scrub nearly two hundred miles wide, which divides the highlands from the coast. This jungle contains very little visible water, but the fact that it supports a thick vegetation, and that the land responds with a wonderful outburst of green and flowers to every shower, or the most rudimentary irrigation, indicates that the soil is rich and may some day be utilized. At

present the whole stretch produces nothing which is of any use except fibre plants, spiky, sword-like growths of forbidding appearance but considerable commercial value. There are some oases in this district, such as the beautiful Teita Hills, but one must commend the arrangement by which the train passes through the greater part of it during the night. Leaving Mombasa at noon, it reaches Makindu at the end of the jungle very early in the morning, and about sunrise the traveller awakens between 3,000 and 4,000 feet above the sea-level, and in scenery which will astonish him if he is making the journey for the first time, and make him think he has travelled several thousand miles and not two hundred and fifty, which is the actual distance. The air is clear and cool and the grass dewy. On either side extend prairies covered at most seasons of the year by herds of zebra and antelope, and dotted with trees of fair size. A little further on, near Nairobi, the plains become undulating, treeless expanses, but here there is a certain amount of scattered vegetation and abrupt, grassy hills. If fortune favours, a glimpse may be obtained of the great snow-covered dome of Kilima Njaro, on the German boundary, but the mountain, though visible from many points, is seen best from Makindu, which is passed in the day-time on the return journey. After threading its way through the hills, the train strikes across the Athi plains, as the open country is called, and reaches Nairobi about midday. All this part of the Protectorate is a game reserve in which no shooting is allowed, with the result that the most extraordinary spectacle of wild and fearless animal life may be seen quite close to the train. The commonest animals are zebras, a large antelope, called the harte-beest, of somewhat bovine appearance, and two very graceful smaller antelopes, yellowish, with a black stripe, known as Grant's and Thomson's gazelle. Ostriches are also abundant and conspicuous, and with luck the traveller may get a sight of giraffe, lion, or rhinoceros, especially early in the morning. There is

probably no place in the world which can show an even approximately similar display of large game, or offer better shooting in the districts where shooting is allowed.

Nairobi, about 5,500 feet high, and the second capital of the Protectorate, is reached about noon. It is a European settlement which has sprung up in the last five years, and is growing so rapidly that I do not venture to state what its present population may be. But it probably retains the appearance which it had about a year ago of a West American mining town formed of tin shanties, though not devoid of comfortable bungalows. It is said that hotels and a bank are being constructed, which will certainly add to the comfort and possibly to the appearance of the town. Nairobi, though not beautiful in itself, is the connecting link between two dissimilar regions, each very beautiful in its own way. Before it stretch the spacious Athi plains; immediately behind it rise in gentle, wooded slopes the hills of Kikuyu. This district extends from Mount Ngongo on the south of Nairobi to Mount Kenya, a snow-capped mountain rivalling Kilima Njaro, in the north, and is perhaps the most favoured district of East Africa, combining, as it does, agricultural with pastoral land, plentiful water, a sufficient supply of native labour, but also a sufficiency of unoccupied land which can be taken up by Europeans. It is difficult to make those who have not seen the country believe that it recalls an English summer landscape with its green lanes and sunny parks, and one often feels that it would not be out of keeping to see some village spire rising above the trees, which are so curiously European in appearance.

In crossing Kikuyu the train reaches an altitude of about 7,500 feet, and then suddenly descends into the Rift Valley. Probably there is no place in the world where a railway effects such a sudden and thorough transformation of scenery without the aid of a tunnel. The line makes a great curve, and almost in the space of a minute passes from the fertile, comfortable fields of

Kikuyu and emerges on the sides of a wild, desolate, wind-swept valley, bounded by strange volcanic mountains. This is the Rift. The first few miles of it, though impressive, are somewhat arid, and the good grazing-ground does not begin until the neighbourhood of Lake Naivasha, which is followed by Lakes Elmenteita and Nakuru. Here the quantity of stock attests the excellence of the pasture, and one may sometimes see the curious spectacle of gazelles which have strayed into the flocks grazing unconcernedly among the sheep and the native herdsmen. The grazing of the Rift Valley is decidedly good, but the idea prevalent among many Europeans in East Africa that it is better than in other parts may be erroneous, and it is probable that the pasturage on the higher levels of the Mau escarpment is really superior, though the land has not been grazed down by native flocks, as, owing to tribal quarrels and the coldness of the climate, the natives do not much frequent the upper regions.

The Mau escarpment bounds the railway on the west, and its level, excluding peaks, is often as much as 9,000 feet. The railway, which naturally follows the lowest and easiest route, attains an elevation of about 8,000 feet. The train reaches the Mau summit in the early morning ; and if the traveller has been incredulous of the coolness of equatorial regions, and not provided himself with several blankets, he will be convinced of the reality of the cold, and pass a most uncomfortable night. By a curious coincidence the coldest part of the journey is also that nearest to the equator, which is only about ten miles north of the railway. The plateaux of the Mau extend to a considerable distance north and south of the railway. They are not well known, owing to their being almost entirely uninhabited, but the character of the whole district appears to be the same, and its quality and suitability for European residence has been tested at several points. What is said of it applies equally well to the Settima Range and the plateaux on the eastern side of the Rift Valley, con-

siderably to the north of the country traversed by the railway.

I have compared Kikuyu to English summer scenery; the Mau and Settima somewhat resemble Scotch moors. Frost and mist are frequent; the open spaces are covered with strong grass, diversified by shrubs resembling blackberries and large heath. There are many forests of fine trees, sometimes in the form of patches, sometimes as continuous tracts. Watercourses are numerous, but game is not abundant (or, at least, not conspicuous), and native inhabitants are almost entirely absent. This last fact is to be attributed, not to any secret unhealthiness in the district, but to the preference of African races for low, swampy districts, where they find in abundance the food which they require, and where they have become immune to the fevers which torment Europeans.

To the west of the Mau, the railway descends rapidly, by a remarkable system of viaducts, to the shores of Lake Victoria, a region which is fertile indeed, but better suited to cultivation by Africans or Indians than to be even the temporary residence of Europeans. To the north of the railway, however, the Mau is prolonged in the Nandi country and Uasin Gishu plateau, districts which rival Kikuyu in their beauty and fertility. The latter is in the locality which it was proposed to hand over to a colony of Oriental Jews, as part of the movement known as Zionism. This proposal, however, appears to have fallen through, and it is to be hoped that the district will be opened to British colonization.

Brief as has been this sketch of the more accessible parts of the Protectorate, I hope that I have succeeded in making the reader feel that it is not a swamp or a desert, but a very beautiful, potential colony, possessing special importance from its unusual position, which in some ways makes it the door to a new world. The criticism most commonly passed on it by those who are acquainted with Natal, the Transvaal, and Rhodesia is that it is like South Africa, but better. I have not

myself visited South Africa, but pictures and descriptions leave on one the impression that it is an arid and yellow country. East Africa, on the other hand, is, as a rule, a green country, and offers a rich spread of grass. Severe drought is rare, and, it would seem, always partial. The famine of 1897 was formidable because there were no means of communication to combat it; but had the Uganda Railway then been in existence it might have been easily overcome.

The settlement of Europeans in these districts is now proceeding rapidly, but experienced some difficulties in the beginning. The plan proposed in 1904 by the Foreign Office, which then administered the Protectorates, was to make the portion of the Rift Valley lying along the railway a native reserve, in which no private European might hold land, though a tract of 500 miles in the same territory was given to a syndicate. This arrangement would have been disastrous, for it would have excluded Europeans from some of the best land in the country, which had for them a peculiar value on account of its accessibility and nearness to the railway, whereas the nomadic tribe of the Masai, in whose favour the reservation was to be created, could not in any way utilize the advantages of the railway, and had no desire for access to it. I am glad, however, to say that this policy has been reversed. It is recognised that the welfare of the country requires that the land of the Rift Valley should be developed by Europeans, and the Masai have been induced to trek to a reservation on the Laikipia escarpment at some distance from the line.

One important native question appears to be thus settled, and there is hope that the others will not give much trouble. By a happy combination of circumstances, the lands which are most appreciated by natives are not those most coveted by Europeans, so that there is room for both races. There are, however, two desiderata for a successful settlement of the native question. The first is that British officials should make a more strenuous attempt to learn native languages. There

can be no doubt that many quarrels which have led to serious and costly punitive expeditions could have been amicably settled had the parties been able to discuss the situation in any common language, for it must be remembered that the greatest talent and one of the great passions of the African is the use of words. In North America the negroes are most successful as clergymen and lawyers, and in Africa serious difficulties can often be avoided if they are heard with a large patience and the aggrieved parties are allowed to argue for two or three days. Secondly, though native reserves are a good thing if they mean that the land necessary to natives is secured for their use and cannot be taken up by Europeans, they are not a good thing if they mean that natives are to be left to themselves, and that no attempt is to be made to induce the nomadic tribes to adopt a settled life and abandon raiding. We know that these tribes are not incurably nomadic, for many have settled down within the last few generations, and no effort should be spared to make the Masai and other races adapt themselves to new conditions, for the continuance of their wandering and predaceous habits can only mean their rapid extinction.

Since the Government has changed their policy and begun to favour European immigration, which they did not in practice encourage until the autumn of last year, the country has made most rapid strides, and the increase in trade and general prosperity is greater than the most sanguine would have dared to anticipate twelve months ago. The revenue has increased 50 per cent., imports 33 per cent., and exports 50 per cent. Provision was made for a deficit of £45,000 on the working expenses of the Uganda Railway in the past year, and the most sanguine estimate made was that the line would pay its way in two years' time. Instead of this, it appears that in the period of March 31, 1904, to March 31, 1905, the receipts have actually covered the expenditure, and yielded a small surplus. The chief exports at present seem to be hides, rubber,

fibre, and copra; ostrich feathers and wool show a promising commencement. I am told by a well-informed person recently returned from the country that a considerable number of sheep have been imported, and that the wool obtained from the first cross has elicited some very hopeful quotations. He also says that the cultivation of ramie fibre in Kikuyu promises to be a certain success. Land is rising rapidly in value, and he thinks that some of the best land near the railway will touch £20 per acre. The timber on the Mau is reported to be excellent both in quality and quantity, and a large concession is being arranged for working the forests, which will probably involve the construction of a branch line. The only crop which has been a failure is cotton, from which great things were expected. It would appear, however, that this failure must not be considered as final. The climate and soil are suitable, and in some places the crops have done well, but, unfortunately, the area selected for the principal experiments was on the banks of the Tana, and the seasons for the rise and fall of the river were not sufficiently investigated, with the result that the plantations were flooded and destroyed. It would appear, however, that inexpensive engineering works would suffice to prevent such disasters in the future, and, apart from this, there are many other places where cotton can be grown without danger of inundation—notably, the Lamu Archipelago, a group of islands close to the mainland, and somewhat resembling those of South Carolina and Georgia. The main difficulty for cotton-planting, however, as well as for other industries on the coast, is the scarcity of labour, but I think it can be met in two ways. Firstly, Indians should be induced to settle in the country. I do not think they should be allowed to hold land in the highlands among Europeans, nor are they likely to be attracted by either the climate or class of agriculture which is profitable there; but they are wanted on the coast where the natives are few and indolent, and where the country and its products strongly

resemble Southern India. Secondly, I think that Uganda and East Africa should be treated as a whole, and the dense and intelligent population of the former Protectorate encouraged to migrate into select areas of the latter, due precaution being taken to prevent the spread of the sleeping sickness. The proposal to send natives of Uganda to work in the mines of South Africa did not seem to me feasible, but I see no reason why they should not be encouraged to labour for a period as cultivators on the coast of East Africa, which is comparatively near their own country and not unlike it.

It would appear that the majority of white immigrants into East Africa are South Africans. It has often been suggested that they were not the best class of colonists for the country, and it was suggested that New Zealanders or Australians would be preferable. But the fact of the preponderance of South Africans, if it proves to be true, must be accepted, and is likely to have important consequences which can hardly be disadvantageous as tending to draw two British Colonies together. Among those consequences may be the opening up from Uganda of communications with Rhodesia by land, and the establishment of a sea-trade between Mombasa and the ports of the South. East Africa can at present supply maize and European vegetables if they are required by southern markets, and to these may shortly be added wheat and barley.

In view of this connection with the south, attention should be given to the question of assimilating the coinages of the two countries and abolishing the rupee currency at present used in East Africa. It is also most desirable that the East African Colonies should be included in the South African Customs Union. This project was mooted a year or more ago, and I believe was not thought favourably of in the South African Legislatures, but a closer connection between two groups of British dependencies may lead to a different result. Perhaps Lord Milner's visit to Nairobi in last spring may be an augury of more friendly relations.

THE WEST INDIES

By SIR ALFRED LEWIS JONES, K.C.M.G.

THE history of the West Indies has been written by various men at different times, and little now remains to be told of those wonderful islands around which the naval heroes of England, France, Spain, and Portugal had many fierce fights and exciting adventures. It was on these waters that the immortal Nelson got his training. But Britons have a peculiar interest in the earliest over-sea possessions of their country, and it is doubtless because of the romantic associations of Jamaica and the other luxuriant islands of the Antillian group, riveting my attention as a boy, and engrossing my thoughts as a man, which when their bitter cry for help was sounded throughout the length and breadth of the United Kingdom, which inspired me with the desire to do what lay in my power to extricate these Colonies from the trouble that threatened to swamp them. Pestilence and hurricane had played havoc with what remained of a prosperity that was phenomenal, but which had dwindled down to a condition of hand-to-mouth existence owing to one cause and another. This was principally due to the unlimited opportunities given to beet-producing countries for supplying the home markets with their subsidized products, thus ruining the staple industry of the West Indies—sugar. The once successful sugar-cane planter, finding his market captured and unable to compete with the near-at-hand and cheaply-produced beet-sugar, struggled on until finally compelled

to succumb, with little hope of recovering lost ground. It was at this stage of Jamaica's history that Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, cast about for means to prevent absolute collapse of the islands, and, if possible, to restore them to their former prosperous state. Specifications were drawn up by the Crown agents, and tenders invited for the establishment of various steamship services, the development of the fruit trade, and the encouragement of travel to the 'hundred isles.' The requirements were such as to deter ship-owners, fruit-growers, or hotel proprietors offering to undertake the whole scheme as called for, and I was therefore appealed to. My firm, having had a unique experience in each of the branches referred to, occupied an advantageous position, and we were enabled to fulfil the Government's onerous requirements. We were therefore persuaded to carry out the programme, and what that means few can appreciate, for from the first the contract was one that offered little inducement, and little, if any, prospect of a return on the capital outlay, and on the time and labour expended. Besides, it had to be proved that fruit could be brought thousands of miles oversea from the West Indies and delivered in marketable condition in England. Experts maintained that it could not be done, but by costly installations in the steamships and persevering experiment we solved the problem satisfactorily, and have made this scheme a pronounced success. But this was not attained without considerable expenditure of money and many heavy losses.

Mr. Chamberlain, in his wisdom, demanded a service of first-class mail steamers, capable of carrying a large number of passengers and many thousands of bunches of bananas, and to-day we have brought Jamaica within ten days' sail of England, and passengers have the opportunity of travelling in a style and with such comfort as was not dreamt of a short time since. Jamaica being the largest and most important British Colony in the Caribbean Sea, it was selected for special attention,

and, indeed, it needed looking after, for the island was in a very poor way, and the people apparently in despair and listless. Instead of bestirring themselves, they were giving way to the ruin fast overcoming them. There is no doubt whatever that the lack of energy and enterprise was in a large degree responsible for the poor condition of the island five years ago. Had a strong effort been made to introduce other industries in lieu of the abandoned sugar trade, Jamaica would have been in a better position to-day. The dependence upon one industry has killed other places, even as it brought partial desolation to Jamaica; but the fillip given to the cultivation of bananas, pines, etc., owing to the evidences of activity shown by the establishment of the new steamship line, the opening of splendid hotels, and the greater amount of energy that had to be thrown into the banana industry, caused a general awakening which undoubtedly had a good effect, as it inspired hopes of better times in many breasts.

Although the trade of the islands has not increased by leaps and bounds, returns show a decided and continuous advance. But Jamaica has not yet risen to the occasion, for it will require far more than the growing of bananas to restore her fallen fortunes. The cultivation of cane, and the manufacture of sugar, the establishment of central factories, the making of preserves and condiments, and the undertaking of every branch of industry that can be carried on profitably, must be introduced if Jamaicans would prosper. In the new interest created by the British Cotton Growing Association in the cultivation of Empire-grown cotton there are undoubtedly rare possibilities, and, if followed up, not only in Jamaica, but in the other islands under British dominion in the Caribbean Sea, as it ought to be, the future can be looked forward to with every confidence. The suitability of the soil and climate have been clearly demonstrated, and it only requires enterprise and determination to make the issue certain. In fact, samples of cotton brought to this country have realized as much as

1s. 6d. per pound. In fact, the West Indies will receive something like £100,000 for the cotton grown there, and this encouragement must be the effect of turning attention to this means of making money. To help in this direction we undertook for some time to carry cotton freight free. Old-fashioned ways, like obsolete machinery, must be cast aside before satisfactory results can be secured, and indolence, which is named as one of the greatest curses of the beautiful and fruitful Antillian Islands, must be overcome before any real and lasting progress can be made.

On my visit to Jamaica I saw, in the few days I spent there, the enormous possibilities of the country: the soil seems to be capable of producing anything with very little attention, and if science and labour were but applied to the ground, no complaints such as we have heard in the past would be again made. I also witnessed the lethargic attitude of the people, much of that of the blacks being inborn laziness, and, in the case of the whites, it appears to be a quite natural effect of the climate. It is, of course, ridiculous to expect the same amount of energy in people subjected for long periods to the hot, enervating climate of the low-lying parts of Jamaica as is to be found in Britain; but I am convinced that far more is possible than is now attempted. There appears to be a too great dependence upon the Imperial Government, for, while I recognise the duty of the Government to take the initiative and display a practical interest in the wellbeing of the Colonies, giving such as need it financial help and sound, useful counsel, I nevertheless believe such assistance can be harmful, and not only check individual effort, but defeat its own purpose. Mr. Chamberlain, in his schemes for the advancement of the Colonies and the amelioration of conditions in those that might be considered below par, seemed to understand this fully, and exercised wonderful discretion in his dealings with Britain's dependencies and the solution of their problems.

The encouragement of the banana trade by the ex-

Colonial Secretary has been a splendid thing for Jamaica and for Great Britain. The regular shipment of something like 30,000 bunches a fortnight by the Imperial Direct Line steamers, in addition to others, constitutes a trade which is constantly increasing. This, to say nothing of the millions of bunches annually shipped to the United States, has caused the laying out of great tracts of land for banana cultivation, and promises to become a far more important source of labour and profit in the near future. But. as before stated, bananas are not sufficient to restore the past prosperous condition of the West Indies, and the necessity of returning to the production of sugar, and to the development of cocoa, coffee, and fruits that will preserve is obvious. It is in cotton, however, that we hope to see Jamaica come to the front. The trials that have been made, and the reports that have been drawn up by Sir Daniel Morris, Commissioner for Agriculture in the West Indies, are most encouraging. Honey is a valuable as well as an important product, and the steps that have been taken to insure the exportation only of qualities that will do the Jamaican apiarists credit cannot but have a beneficial effect. Some success has attended the establishment of the new preserves factory, and there is no doubt that, with a greater measure of success, the industry of fruit-preserving would play no small part in the restoration of the fallen fortunes of Jamaica. There is also a prospect for cattle and horse breeding, though not to the same extent as in other directions named.

With education, increased energy, cooperation, and intelligent enterprise, the West Indies will flourish, and there is no doubt that the crowds of tourists now invading Jamaica will influence the people there for good, besides inducing many of the visitors to invest capital in the islands for development purposes. Land values are improving, and even since the inauguration of Mr. Chamberlain's scheme there has been a great advance in the price demanded for old sugar estates and other untenanted properties, of which the island had numbers.

When English people come to understand the nearness of the West Indies, the benefits of the ten days' sea voyage, the health-giving virtues of the climate, where, in the mountains, almost any temperature can be obtained, and which has been so confidently and emphatically declared by Sir J. Crichton Browne, the stream of tourists will flow towards Jamaica and the other islands in a way that does not now seem possible. Publicity should be given to all the advantages obtainable, and if every means available are employed, our own idea of prosperity will be attained.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CROWN COLONIES

By SIR FRANK SWETTENHAM, K.C.M.G.

It has been said that comparatively few people think, really think, about subjects beyond the concerns of their daily life. That is possibly the principal reason why a nation which possesses the greatest Empire the world has ever known, an Empire with lands on every continent and islands in every sea, inhabited by four hundred millions of people of almost every race, colour, language, and religion, should never have provided any means for teaching the art of administration. We are said to be amateurs in everything except sport; but there we are counted professionals, and it is only people of the same origin who seriously dispute our claims to excel in what we regard as our national pastimes. True, we were once regarded as passably capable shopkeepers, but now we have serious rivals in all forms of trade, and we are assured, by those who ought to know, that England is losing, or has already lost, her business preeminence. Still, there are two callings into which destiny has forced Britons where we may congratulate ourselves that we are experts: we are sailors and we are administrators. The geographical conditions which drew the people of these islands to find a home on the sea; the spirit of adventure which is as the breath of life to the navigator; the experience and profit of successful voyages; the attractions of distant travel, of foreign lands, and the desire to go further, to know the unknown,

—these circumstances made the English sailor. It is probable that the developed characteristics of the successful sailor, coupled with a long experience in the management of people of divers races, begot the aptitude for administration which is now so marked a feature in their character that, in the art of government, Englishmen have little to learn from other nations. England has always had rivals on the sea, and we only keep our position there by great national sacrifices, by a splendid organization, by the most perfect system of training that we can devise, and by the prestige of many hard-fought battles. Sea-power alone will not preserve the Empire, and, considering the enormous interests which depend upon the successful maintenance of our position, it does seem passing strange that we have, hitherto, trusted to the genius of the race to acquire by experience a knowledge which it has never been thought necessary to teach.

We speak of men being born administrators, but it only means that, of the many who are set to the work of government, without any special training, some pick up the threads quickly and, with experience, become really efficient. Still, it is hardly fair on the governed, especially in remote parts of the Empire, where the people can only make themselves heard with difficulty, that the experience should be gained at their expense, when a little preliminary teaching would save both parties from the painful results of even well-intentioned blunders. That course might be regarded as typical of English absence of method, if it were not that we have an object-lesson of a contrary kind in the British Navy. But it is certainly characteristic of American methods that, directly the Republic took over the Philippines, an American University sent a capable representative to visit the English, French, and Dutch Colonies in the immediate neighbourhood of the newly-acquired territories, with instructions to collect and record all possible information in regard to the government of those dependencies.

It may be said that there is now in London a school, founded in recent times, with the declared object 'to organize, promote, and supply liberal courses of education specially adapted to the needs of persons who are, or who intend to be, engaged in any kind of administration, including the service of any Government.' The object is admirable, but the Governors of the London School of Economics would hardly suggest that they are yet able to offer to students a liberal course of education in the art of administration, and no qualification in that subject is required by the Civil Service Commissioners in their examination of candidates for the Home, the Indian, or the Colonial services.

This is not the place to describe the constitution of the Crown Colonies, but everyone knows that a Governor, appointed by the Crown, is directly responsible for the administration of his charge. The Governor is subject to the authority of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with whom he is in constant correspondence on every subject of importance, and sometimes on matters of apparently trifling detail. The ultimate authority, the final court of appeal, in executive matters, is Downing Street. It may be questioned whether the British people realize how admirably the work of the Colonial Office is done, how efficient is the staff of that department of the public service, and how much of the efficiency is due to the great qualities and the business-like methods of Mr. Chamberlain, who, during the eight years that he was Colonial Secretary, won for his office the admiration and respect of the Colonies to a degree never known before. The striking characteristics of the work done in Downing Street in its connection with the Crown Colonies are the patient care with which each question is examined and the anxiety to be just in every case, however great or however small the issue. Mr. Chamberlain introduced a readiness to encourage promising proposals, and to support distant workers in their efforts to advance British interests, even when those efforts met with opposition or complaint

from foreigners. It is not surprising that an English department, working on these lines, has gained the confidence of the people of the Colonies, and there is equal cause for satisfaction in this country. It is not suggested that the Colonial Office has arrived at perfection. Those who are under the Office, but not in it, would like to see a good many changes, both as to general principles and the handling of details, and they could give excellent reasons in support of their views. To mention one point only, the Office is inclined to err on the side of lenience in dealing with incapable servants. Experience has proved again and again that a man who has failed in one administrative post is not likely to succeed in a higher and more responsible appointment. Without pretending to any attempt at exhaustive criticism, one other point may be mentioned. The machinery of Crown Colony government is based upon a set of cut-and-dried rules, called the Colonial Office Regulations, which cover a wide field and are applied impartially to all Crown Colonies. The rules deal with a variety of subjects, from the keeping of accounts and the conduct of correspondence to the wearing of uniforms and the firing of salutes. In the main they are excellent; but some of them may have been framed in the days of the Plantations, and if the whole code is too sacred for revision, it is at least probable that identical regulations cannot be applied, with perfect success, to Colonies like Cyprus and St. Helena, on the one hand, and the Straits and Ceylon on the other. There are differences between Fiji and Trinidad, between Lagos and Malta, British Honduras and Hong-Kong, which cannot be removed by the application of one set of regulations, however great their authorship and antiquity.

If I now leave the methods of Crown Colony administration, and give a word to the results which are obtained by honest, capable, and zealous officers, it is not because the system is perfect, or that I have any desire to argue that some other form of government may not be infinitely preferable. When a Crown Colony

develops into one with responsible government, it may be assumed that this is a process of evolution which insures a last state better than the first. If a Colony is able to pay its way handsomely, while ministering to its own needs, and yet imposes no duties on the produce of its own industries, or on imports from this country or any British possession, it possesses certain attractions, and courts the sympathy of manufacturers in all parts of the Empire. If, again, the Colony bears a fair share in the cost of Imperial defence, it deserves the thanks of the British taxpayer. If it takes, uses, and distributes annually many millions of pounds' worth of British products, it may be regarded as a valuable customer; and if, with all this, it has no debt whatever, it may fairly be looked upon as a credit to the system under which it is administered. There are Crown Colonies which fulfil all these conditions, and satisfactorily perform many other duties to their own advantage, to the advancement of Imperial interests, and to the benefit of the many people of divers races who seek, and find, freedom and justice under the protection of the British flag. It may seem strange to advocate a system which differs so widely from government by party and popular election; but the system is open to two tests, (1) the results obtained and (2) the opinions of those who have lived and worked in a prosperous Crown Colony, especially if they have also lived and worked in a Colony with responsible government. The striking difference between the systems is really this: that whereas, under party government, each party, when in power, considers that it is entitled to advance the interests of its own adherents, the Crown Colony system aims at securing, and usually secures, the general welfare of the whole community. With parties, the one in power can do no wrong, in the eyes of its supporters, so long as it ministers to their demands. It follows that it can do nothing right in the opinion of the Opposition. But in Crown government, by the class of men selected for that work, there are no parties, no selfish interests to be served. The interests of the

administration and the community are one, and all who are not officials, and many who are, make it their business to criticise the policy of the Government and the conduct of its servants in every detail. Should the local authorities prove deaf, extravagant, incompetent, the ear of the Secretary of State is open to complaints, on any subject from any source.

If any excuse were needed for drawing attention to these questions at this time, it is furnished by the fact that the Transvaal, and, later, the Orange River Colony, are about to receive some new form of constitution which will give them representative or responsible government. The probationary period through which these Crown Colonies have passed seems, to many unbiassed minds, all too short. That view is not likely to receive much consideration, however, for it seems to be settled that it is expedient to accede to the demand of those who decline to be satisfied, until they have obtained absolute control of local affairs. It is some years since a Crown Colony was granted the privilege of local self-government, and in that time much has been said and written on two very important questions:

(*a*) National Defence.

(*b*) A new Fiscal Policy, which, by a system of Imperial preferences, is to tighten the bonds of Imperial union.

It seems to be admitted that all parts of the Empire are equally concerned in its defence, and that all are bound to share the cost of maintaining a Navy of sufficient strength, in the highest state of efficiency. It is probable that colonial statesmen would agree that, if any self-governing Colony were cut absolutely adrift from the Empire, it would not be allowed to work out its own salvation without interference from other nations. They would also agree that every British Colony would prefer its present position to the control of any foreign Power.

It may therefore be assumed that the defence of the Empire is not only the duty, but the first interest of

every component part. Beyond the natural desire to preserve the many advantages of existing conditions, there is the sentiment of kinship, of nationality, and, perhaps, an appreciation of the Mother Country's generous treatment of her Colonies. Where a Colony has been won by conquest, England has paid for it with English lives and English money. Where it has grown up as an English settlement, the initial expenses have all been borne by England. In both cases the costs have often been heavy; but when success was assured, and the Colonists asked for emancipation, it has been given freely, without claim, either for the costs of administration before the Colony became self-supporting, or for the value of the permanent improvements.

It was perfectly natural that full advantage should be taken of a practically unlimited power of self-government; that nearly four hundred millions of English money should be borrowed; and that the self-governing Colonies should arrange their fiscal systems without regard to any but local interests. Now, however, the British taxpayer is beginning to feel the strain of bearing alone the ever-increasing burden of National Defence, and he also feels the inevitable result of foreign commercial rivalry. The position is difficult, but it would have been easier to-day if, when self-government was granted to the Colonies, the very reasonable condition had been laid down that, in the matter of tariff, the children should extend to the Mother Country the same consideration that was given to them.

England's position in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, is the result of operations—initiated by people in those territories—operations which have cost this country a very heavy price. It is unlikely that a self-governing Transvaal, or a self-governing South African Commonwealth, will exercise, in its dealings with these islands, a self-denial for which there is no precedent elsewhere; but now that the English people are alive to the situation will they not require that, in the grant of all future constitutions for colonial self-

government, it shall be provided that the Colony, while profiting by every advantage of its Imperial connection, shall fulfil some of its Imperial responsibilities, and grant to British commerce identical tariff treatment to that extended by this country to the products of the Colony?

April, 1905.

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