

RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS

OF

INDIAN POLICY.

BY

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"No eye could be too sound
To observe a world so vast,
No patience too profound
To sort what 's here amass'd,
How man may here best live no care too great to explore.

"But we—as some rude guest
Would change, where'er he roam,
The manners there profess'd
To those he brings from home—
We mark not the world's course, but would have it take ours"

MATTHEW ARNOLD

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“ In the minor arts of life it is generally recognised that principles should be investigated and taught by thinkers who are not concerned in applying them. In the art of Social Life, so far more difficult and important than any other the separation of theory from practice is of far greater moment ”---AUGUSTE COMTE

P R E F A C E.

PARLIAMENTARY Government has been reviled on the ground of its introducing an element of uncertainty and vacillation into the action of the Executive. I am inclined to think that this is one of its great merits. I have a profound disbelief in the administrative infallibility of individuals or of parties. Too long a tenure of office inoculates statesmen with the constitutional defects of the permanent Civil Service.

The favourable change that has undoubtedly come over the aspect of Indian affairs since the present Ministry came into power, is not to be attributed to Conservative principles, but simply to the healthy and vigorous action of fresher and younger minds. All honour is due to Lord Cranborne and Sir Stafford Northcote for having checked the revival of annexation, and saved the Native State of Mysore ; but no special credit is due to their party. The same may be said of Sir Stafford Northcote's recent despatches and promised legislation, recognising the eligibility of Natives to a more important, dignified and lucrative sphere of employment in the public service of India.

- These measures, and the general policy on which they are based, have been from time to time advocated by Members on both sides of the House of Commons, by Liberal as well as by Conservative Peers. Since the

defeat of Fox's Indian Bill in 1783,—and that was more of a Court intrigue than a party struggle,—India may be said to have been always an open question. Whether this state of affairs has been beneficial or not,—whether it has betokened impartiality or indifference, may be considered doubtful.

If the extreme crisis, so often predicted and dreaded, were to arrive, and India were to become the battle-field of the two great Parliamentary parties, I am not of opinion that any very awful consequences would ensue. It would at least put an end to the impatience and apathy with which Indian affairs are now usually treated, and would make them a subject of universal attention and discussion.

This volume is not written to flatter the pride or promote the personal objects of any individual or set of men, in place, or in opposition, at home or in India. I address myself to the people of Great Britain, by whose awakened convictions, and not by such concessions as can be expected from official sources, harmonious relations can be established between the Imperial Power and the people of India, and the progress of civilisation be made compatible with the equality of races before the Law and in the Government, and with the corporate rights of the allied and protected States.

The high mission of Great Britain in the East can never be fulfilled by an uninstructed nation and an officially instructed Government. The real wants of India, the dangers, failings and temptations of Great Britain, can be more clearly perceived and more fairly appreciated by an independent observer in these cooler regions, than

by a professional functionary or a mercantile adventurer in the atmosphere of Calcutta. The lesson of Indian politics involves no transcendent mystery; it is easily learned by Englishmen, and the necessity for their learning it becomes more pressing every day.

I regret very much to have been compelled to differ widely from a nobleman whose sympathies, opinions and active exertions, from the outset of his public career, have generally been found on the side of freedom and humanity. The Duke of Argyll, so far as I can recollect, has invariably maintained in every department of politics, home, foreign and colonial,—India excepted,—the broadest and most liberal views. We owe him a debt of gratitude, not, perhaps, to be as yet fully estimated, for the strenuous efforts, to a great extent unseen, by which he helped to save this country from complicity and concert with the revolt of the slaveholders in the United States. While I have endeavoured to perform the duty of showing that the Imperial policy towards India, which he has defended, is not only unjust in the abstract, but narrow and retrogressive in its practical results, I am convinced that the Duke has been betrayed by a conscientious desire to promote the good of the people. He believes that it would lead to the elevation and enlightenment of the vast population subject to our supremacy, if they were all placed under the direct rule and tutelage of highly educated and selected Englishmen. Unfortunately for this benevolent theory, the facts of human nature are against it. Neither the ideal Hindoo nor the ideal Briton exists. Neither the average Hindoo nor the average Briton is a being of pure intellect. The Natives of India, of every caste and creed,

are men of like powers and passions with ourselves ; and in obedience to the universal law,—as true in social science as in physiology,—the healthy development of their civilisation cannot proceed without space and range for the exercise of all their faculties. Too much constraint, too much assistance,—however benevolently intended—will but distort the phenomena of progress, disturb its steady course, and drive the stream into dangerous channels.

Although so many of these pages are occupied with disputation, I trust the struggle has not been one for a merely barren victory. If old discussions are revived, and new points of difference raised, I still believe that we shall have lost no time by the way. I venture to hope that this book will assist, in however small a degree, in making an end of controversy and a beginning of construction.

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ERRATA.

P. 148, line 11, for "so far as" read "so far from".

P. 214, line 3, for "directly" read "directed".

RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS OF INDIAN POLICY.

CHAPTER I.

THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF REJOINDER.

THE most painful incident in political criticism is when we are compelled to refuse to the memory of some deceased statesman that meed of fame and honour which his friends and followers demand. But if admiring coadjutors and disciples propose the canonisation of a false saint, the apotheosis of a false hero, it surely becomes one of the highest religious or social duties to deny the pretended achievements, and to protest against the posthumous honours.

We believe the British Empire to be threatened by certain difficulties and dangers arising from a certain false policy in India. The defence of that policy in the past, persistence in all its existing results, and its occasional revival in future contingencies, depend on the maintenance of a certain false reputation. The policy of annexation and the fame of Lord Dalhousie are indissolubly combined, and must stand or fall together. The false policy cannot be attacked or defended, without attacking or defending the false reputation.

It may be alleged that there is no possibility of that policy of annexation being revived which statesmen of all parties have agreed in abjuring. But any such hopeful presumption is decidedly premature. Within two years, a distinguished Peer, while occupying a seat in the Cabinet, has distinctly approved every tenet and every deed of Lord Dalhousie's administration; he has reiterated the retrograde notion of personal sovereignty, instead of recognising the corporate nature of a State; he has declared the allied and protected Principalities of India to be inca-

pable of improvement; and he, consequently, advises that whenever the Ruler of one of them is found to be "incompetent," the separate State should be destroyed, and the territory annexed to the British dominions. He thus renews his assent to the doctrine and procedure by which the Kingdom of Oude was extinguished, and promises, so far as his power and influence can go, an indefinite series of similar confiscations.

Open, thorough-going adhesion to the principles and practice of Lord Dalhousie's viceroyalty has indeed ceased. His warmest partisans are somewhat vague and reticent, when they come to speak of the future. With the exception of the Duke of Argyll, no public man of any eminence, Liberal or Conservative, has ever said, in or out of Parliament, since 1857, one word in favour of Lord Dalhousie's conduct, beyond the most commonplace generalities, such as were demanded by the decencies of office, or the exigencies of common responsibility. It is a well-known and easily ascertained fact that even in the occasional articles or allusions of anonymous periodicals, the measures and fame of Lord Dalhousie are upheld at the present day, either by his personal friends, or by those who participated in his work, and are jointly answerable for its evil results.

Until those evil results are fully understood and generally acknowledged, until the doctrines and the processes by which Oude, Nagpore, Jhansi and Sattara were annexed have been publicly and authoritatively reprobated and rejected, there can be no absolute security that they may not again be called into play, either in the pride of our own administrative success, in indignation at some disgraceful scandal, or in the specious temptation of a lucrative "lapse."

The prevalent indifference to Indian politics disappeared in the alarm and agony of the Rebellion; and attention was kept up for a few years by the process of transferring the government from the Company to the Crown, by the conflicting interests of military and judicial amalgamations, and by several appeals for redress from Native Princes, brought before Parliament during the brief period of conciliatory and restorative measures, when the Home Government seemed going on too fast and too much in earnest

even for Lord Canning.* So long as public observation was directed towards India, so long as controversy was likely to arise and to be listened to, so long the friends and partisans of Lord Dalhousie remained silent. When, in the words of the Duke of Argyll himself, "the violent reactions of feeling and opinion which arose out of the Great Indian Mutiny were beginning to subside,"†—the vindicators and eulogists commenced their operations.

By the ties of family, early association and service, Lord Dalhousie was closely allied with both the great ruling parties, and had given cause of offence to neither of them; after his long tenure of the most splendid and lucrative office in the world, it would have been strange if he had not left behind him powerful friends and obliged adherents. Their deficiency in numbers was amply compensated by their advantages of position, giving them access to the most conspicuous strongholds of the press, and securing them a well-disposed audience. When the time was favourable they chose their own ground for the display.

It never has been anything but a display. No close fighting has ever been attempted.

The Duke of Argyll, in the first of his two essays from the *Edinburgh Review* of January and April 1863, reprinted with additions under his own name in 1865, explains that "during the two years, or more, when every fifth-rate writer and speaker thought it necessary to have his say against something which he called 'Lord Dalhousie's policy,' Lord Dalhousie himself maintained a silence which must have been painful, but which was sup-

* Lord Canning protested vehemently against the increased grant to Tippoo Sultan's family; he objected to the restoration of the Dhar territories and the Tanjore treasures; and when the Tanjore Rajah's property was at last returned to his widows, he never seems to have thought of making restitution of the Nagpore Rajah's moveable property, though the circumstances of its sequestration were identical with those of the Tanjore case. The ancestral estates were, indeed, given up to Janojee Bhonsla, the grand-nephew and heir of the Rajah of Nagpore, and he was recognised as the head of the family by Lord Canning, but those measures had been already suggested by Lord Stanley. In fact all these tardy acts of justice originated with the Secretaries of State at home, contrary to the counsels of Calcutta, as likewise quite recently in the cases of the installation of the Dhar Rajah as ruler of his Principality, the imperfect recognition of Prince Azeem Jah of the Carnatic, and the prospective restoration of Mysore to a native Sovereign.

† *India Under Dalhousie and Canning*, (Preface) Longman, 1865.

ported by a proud sense of what was due both to others and to himself."* The same silence, supported no doubt by the same "proud sense," was maintained up to 1863 by the Duke of Argyll.

It was natural and not unbecoming that the Duke of Argyll should come forward to defend Lord Dalhousie's policy and reputation. Lord Dalhousie was his friend and colleague. The Duke as a Cabinet Minister had approved of the annexations of Nagpore and Jhansi, had insisted upon the annexation of Oude, and, when these *Edinburgh Review* articles appeared, was doing his best to promote the prospective annexation of Mysore, which Lord Dalhousie had been the first to propose.† In vindicating the acts and upholding the credit of his deceased friend, he was in fact vindicating the acts and upholding the credit of himself and his own party. He had a perfect right to undertake that task. Whether he had a perfect right to pursue that undertaking by the exact course he has chosen, is a very different thing. Whether it was natural, and becoming for the Lord Privy Seal, one of Her Majesty's Ministers, to avow the most alarming principles under the most ambiguous and undefined conditions, is another question altogether. "*Noblesse oblige*." Heavy responsibilities attach to high office.

If in January 1863, or in June 1865, the Duke of Argyll had risen in the House of Lords, and had stated that our supposed Treaties with the Native Sovereigns of India were hardly worthy of the name; that it would be much better always to write and print the word derisively between inverted commas, to show that they were nothing but so-called Treaties, for really they "expressed nothing but the will of a Superior imposing on his Vassal so much as for the time it was thought expedient to require;"‡ if he had reiterated his approval of *all* Lord Dalhousie's annexations, both as to their general policy and as to the several pleadings and procedure; if he had declared that "the vices of Native Governments were systematic and their virtues casual," and that "the dependent position to which they

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, (Longman, 1865), p. 68.

† *The Mysore Reversion*, (2nd Edition) p. 41.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 11.

are reduced by our power in India did not contribute to make them better,"* if he had announced his unaltered opinion that the "only security for good government" lay in the absorption of every mismanaged Native State,† he must either have spoken with the consent of the Cabinet, or he would have exposed himself to be disavowed by his associates and answered by his opponents. He would then have been speaking in his right place and under the right conditions. Instead of doing so, he preserved silence for five years at least, and then published two anonymous articles on the subject in the *Edinburgh Review*, thus withdrawing at once from Parliamentary discussion and from official accountability. The authorship of these articles having been from the first no secret, they were assumed to convey the sentiments of a section, if not a majority, of the Liberal Ministry; while none of the opposite party were able to challenge, none of his colleagues were able to contradict that mischievous notion. In India the effect was most alarming.‡ After the lapse of two years these articles were republished in a separate form with the author's name. The effect of this publicity was even more alarming in India than that of the original articles, and has by no means subsided yet.

Not even on the platform which he has chosen for himself,—neither in the anonymous form of 1863, nor in the enlarged republication of 1865,—does the noble apologist deign to meet the arguments or to traverse the indictments of the assailants of Lord Dalhousie's policy. He contemptuously dismisses them in the last page of his article as "fifth-rate writers" quite unworthy of notice. If he had ventured to mention any names, perhaps some of his readers might have been tempted to inquire for one or two of these fifth-rate productions, to form a judgment for themselves. The Duke will not help them in the search. He sticks to the printed official records, and insists, as the only sound principle of political criticism,

* * *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 30.

† *Ibid.* p. 38, 121 and 122.

‡ To this I can testify from my own personal observations. I at once replied in the *Bombay Times of India* to the reassertion of the right of forbidding the adoption of heirs, v. *Empire in India*, p. 154. See also *The Mysore Reversion*, Appendix II.

that Lord Dalhousie's reasoning must be accepted as conclusive, and his statements of fact regarded as irrefragable. Such at least is the only interpretation I can put upon his complaints of the "ignorant injustice" with which certain measures have been assailed. "All the facts," he says, "have been accessible to the public for years. Blue Books may not be light reading; but those at least who undertake to pass judgment on the conduct of public men are bound to know something of the authentic documents in which that conduct, with the reasons which determined it, are recorded. In the case of the Indian Government this duty is the more easy, and the neglect of it the less excusable, since it is the custom of that Government to record its decisions, with the dissents of every individual member, in elaborate Minutes, often very able, *and always exhausting every fact and every argument on either side.*" In short, after a discussion in the Calcutta Council, there can be nothing more to be said! "The following pages," continues the Duke, "have been written, so far as regards the narrative of political transactions, mainly from those materials."*

If every narrative of political transactions is to be compiled exclusively from the papers carefully sifted and selected for publication by the accountable persons themselves, national and historical judgments will be lenient truly! If the Minutes of a close and secret conclave are to be humbly accepted as an exhaustive discussion; if plenary inspiration is claimed for Blue Books, and prophetic infallibility for the decrees of a Council of five, there will be small scope for political criticism.

Again, in his remarks on Mr. Edwin Arnold's work, *Dalhousie's Administration of British India*, the Duke urges, "If Historians of any class are specially bound to an impartial treatment of their subject, it is that class whose works partake largely of the character of Biography. *At least it may be expected of them that they will state the facts in the light in which they were seen by those whose conduct they have undertaken to record, and whose memory is for a time in their keeping.*"† It is not easy to compre-

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, Preface, p. vi.

† *Ibid.*, Preface, p. vii. The italics are mine.

hend how a writer can be expected to state the facts in the light in which Lord Dalhousie viewed them, when his great object in writing is to put those facts in a very different light, and to show that Lord Dalhousie misstated, misrepresented, or misunderstood them.

We will, however, reduce the Duke's claims to the most moderate proportions, and entertain his last complaint against "the omission of any adequate attempt even to set forth Lord Dalhousie's reasoning."* This charge is expressly aimed against Mr. Arnold, while to Mr. Kaye, as the author of *The Sepoy War*,† "preconceived theories," and "narratives woven so as to bring out a certain pattern," are imputed.‡ Were I concerned or warranted to undertake the defence of these two authors, I should be at a loss to deal with such loose declamation. If the Duke had exposed and refuted one specimen in each case of the faults he professes to detect, we could better appreciate the justice of his complaint. Neither of these gentlemen is, in my opinion, chargeable with any exaggeration or suppression. If they are unjust, they are certainly not ignorant. Mr. Kaye's work especially proves his research not only into the Blue Books, but into a vast mass of less accessible materials; and affords ample means to its readers to judge in Lord Dalhousie's own words the grounds on which he based his principal annexations.

It is a sufficiently remarkable circumstance, that these two historical works should be singled out for notice. Elaborate arguments and long quotations from official documents are not to be expected in a narrative, which, indeed, they would only confuse and encumber. The Duke of Argyll, republishing with additions his two articles from a critical and controversial Review, with the avowed object of vindicating Lord Dalhousie's measures, carefully avoids all the critical and controversial works in which those measures are assailed, while he complains of a want of argumentative matter in two purely historical works. If the Duke had really wished to deal with argu-

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, Preface, p. vii.

† Vol. i, published by W. H. Allen, 1865.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, Preface, p. viii.

mentative matter, he knew very well where to find it. Indignantly conscious of a host of "fifth-rate writers" who had attacked Lord Dalhousie, he cannot have been ignorant of the existence of the pamphlets by the late Mr. John Sullivan,* of such works as *The Rebellion in India*, and *Topics for Indian Statesmen*, by Mr. J. B. Norton;† *British India, its Races and its History*,‡ or *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India*, by Mr. J. M. Ludlow,§ or even my own work, *The Empire in India*.|| This was published more than a year before the Duke's reprint; and although the sixteen interpolated pages in his first Essay cannot be called a reply to my Chapters on Sattara, Jhansi and Nagpore, for they never travel out of the Blue Books, the time and circumstances of the republication make them look very like a retort.

In the Preface to the republication of 1865, two volumes by Mr. J. W. Kaye and Mr. Edwin Arnold, published in that year, are, as I have mentioned, honoured with a few words of censure. The titles of some Blue Books were alone prefixed to the second article as it originally appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* of April, 1863. Besides some Parliamentary Papers, the Essays of Sir Henry Lawrence served as a heading to the first article in the *Review* for January of the same year. The plan of thus contemptuously evading his antagonists, denouncing them collectively as remarkable only for "ignorance and injustice," and doggedly reiterating the fallacies they have assailed,—giving full play to his great advantages not only as an occasional *Edinburgh Reviewer*, but as a Peer and occasional Cabinet Minister,—was probably the best for the Duke's immediate purpose. The Duke can be accused of no unfair design in thus declining to meet his adversaries,—his "proud sense" of what is due to himself was doubtless insurmountable,—but the result is decidedly unfair. His

* Formerly a member of Council at Madras.

† The first was published in 1857, the other in 1858, by Richardson Brothers, Cornhill. Mr. Norton is now Advocate General and a member of the Legislative Council at Madras.

‡ Macmillan and Co., 1858.

§ Ridgway, 1859.

|| Trubner, 1864.

readers are virtually told that no argument worth noticing has ever been urged against Lord Dalhousie's policy ; and that a complete and conclusive answer to the empty cavils that have gone forth, is to be found in those official documents which his enemies have never taken the trouble to examine.

I have said that the Duke of Argyll, declining to notice any statements or arguments except those contained in the Blue Books, has reiterated the fallacies which his antagonists have assailed. I must bring the same charge against another personal friend of Lord Dalhousie, Sir Charles Jackson, whose *Vindication** appeared in June 1865, within a few days of the Duke's pamphlet. Sir Charles Jackson deserves the fullest credit for disinterested generosity in having volunteered for the defence, but his advocacy is not more cogent than that of the Cabinet Minister. As a practised lawyer and judge he cannot but be fully aware that a precedent must be produced and identified before it can be accepted as a principle of law, and made the groundwork for a series of decisions. Yet in common with the Duke of Argyll, in justification of the annexations of Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansi, he parades the usurped prerogative of forbidding successions by adoption as "*the settled public law of India*,"† and talks of "*these lapses having occurred by operation of law*,"‡ as if it had never been proved by Mr. Norton,§ by Mr. Ludlow,|| and by myself,¶ that no such law had ever been asserted in India, until the confiscation of Sattara by Lord Dalhousie in 1848, and that the pretended array of precedents for the enforcement of such a law was perfectly imaginary.

* *A Vindication of the Marquis of Dalhousie's Indian Administration*, (Smith and Elder), 1865. Sir Charles Jackson was successively Advocate General and a Judge of the Supreme Court at Calcutta, and for some time a Vice-President of the Legislative Council, during Lord Dalhousie's government.

† *A Vindication*, p. 9. *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 27.

‡ *A Vindication*, p. 16 and 42.

§ *The Rebellion*, p. 67, 72.

|| *British India its Races and its History*, vol. ii, p. 259.

¶ *The Empire in India*, p. 132 to 152, and 165 to 172.

CHAPTER II.

SHAM PRECEDENT AND PREROGATIVE.

IN all the Minutes and despatches penned in 1848 to justify the annexation of Sattara, no one ever professed to refer *by name or date* to a single *old* precedent, either of our own or of any previous Government, for forbidding the adoption of a successor by a Hindoo Prince; but the existence of such precedents was presumed and pronounced with an audacious confidence that is quite surprising. Two very recent cases, however, brought forward at that time as precedents, are now offered for acceptance by the Duke of Argyll* and Sir Charles Jackson,† those of Colaba and Mandavee, both of which, singularly alike in circumstances, were finally decided in 1844.

The Rajah of Mandavee was a petty tributary with whom no Treaty had ever been made.‡ The last Chief, a posthumous child not two years old, died in 1839. The widow of this child's father wished to adopt a successor.

The last Rajah of Colaba, a posthumous child, died in 1841 at the age of fifteen months. The widow of his predecessor wished to adopt one of her husband's illegitimate sons. A Treaty had been concluded in 1822 with Raghojee Angria, Rajah of Colaba, promising "protection" to him, "his heirs and successors," while "the entire supremacy," and "the right of conferring investiture on any vacancy," were reserved to the British Government.§

In 1844 it was finally decided to treat these two States as having lapsed to the British Government, mainly on the grounds of there being no one entitled to inheritance by legitimate relationship, and of permission being required to enable an adopted heir to succeed.||

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 28.

† *A Vindication*, p. 11, 12.

‡ *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864, (Longman and Co.) vol. vi, p. 254.

§ *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 183.

|| *Papers as to Succession by Adoption*, 1850, p. 214.

Both of these cases appear to me to have been decided erroneously and unjustly. That of Colaba was the worse, because the Principality was guaranteed by a Treaty; and the right of conferring investiture is not in India, any more than in Europe, the right of *divesting* a family on the failure of lineal male heirs.* But bad as they were, these cases cannot be compared with that of Sattara. The infancy of the deceased Princes; the consequent recurrence to the questionable adoption by their widowed mothers; the absence of any Treaty in the one instance, and the position of a protected inferior imposed on the other; all these incidents would nullify them as precedents for rejecting the adopted son of a Sovereign with whom we were allied by a Treaty of "*perpetual friendship*," securing the Principality to his "*heirs and successors*" in "*perpetual sovereignty*," and containing no restriction whatever on the regular operation of the Hindoo law of inheritance. The cases of Mandavee and Colaba were bad indeed; they were ominous and critical cases, and marked, as Mr. St. George Tucker and others foresaw, the commencement of an era of acquisitive encroachments; but even viewed as imperfect precedents, they were in 1848 quite new and of our own creation; whereas the advocates for annexation then, as now, alleged "*the universal and immemorial custom of India*," "*the undoubted prerogative exercised by the Imperial House of Delhi*,"† "*the ordinary and invariable practice*," the power acquired by the British Government as successors to the Emperor and the Peishwa,‡ and "*the right universally exercised by all paramount authorities throughout India*."§ Incredibly as it may seem, all these allegations were totally unfounded. Not a particle, not a vestige of documentary evidence of such a prerogative having ever been exercised, or asserted, by the Emperor, or by the Peishwa, not a

* The Governor of Bombay and one Councillor were in favour of permitting the adoption, but were over-ruled by the Governor-General and the Home Government. Mr. Henry St. George Tucker recorded an admirable Protest in the Court of Directors against the confiscation of Colaba. (*Selections from the Papers of H. St. George Tucker*, p. 27 and 100.)

† Mr. Willoughby, *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 67, 71.

‡ Lord Dalhousie, *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 81, 82.

§ Mr. R. D. Mangles, *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 147.

historical fact bearing upon it, not a single precedent for annulling an adoption, has ever been or can be adduced from the records of any of the Governments that preceded us.

The British Government has never possessed the right of disallowing adoptions for its own purposes ; even where it has retained from its predecessors, or asserted in a treaty or grant, the prerogative of investiture over minor Principalities, it has no more right to forbid the succession of an adopted son than of a lineal male descendant. The prerogative of investiture gives jurisdiction in disputed successions, asserts supremacy, and enforces subordination, but does not justify the refusal of investiture to a lawful heir. In the case of a Hindoo Prince, with whom a treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance has been contracted, not even the prerogative of investiture exists. Nothing but the moral duty of protection and pacification authorises any intervention to control and regulate the course of inheritance.

Next to the supposititious precedents, of which more will be said shortly, admissions, perverted or illusory, attributed to the doomed Princes or their advocates, formed the favourite process of proof throughout the annexing mania. The apologists of the present day avail themselves largely of the same method. The dying request of the Rajah of Satara that his adopted son might be recognised as his successor, was eagerly snatched at as a full admission that the British Government had a right to forbid the succession.* Of course it proved nothing but his consciousness of our overwhelming power, and a suspicion, too well-founded, of our sinister intentions. The Duke of Argyll, however, thinks it worth his while to urge that the Rajah asked "for this consent as one which he knew to be requisite for his own purpose."† We also know by the result that this consent was requisite, but we no more admit the right of withholding it from a duly adopted successor than the Rajah did.

Perhaps the most singular instances on record of what

* See Mr. Willoughby's Minute, para. 20 ; Lord Falkland's, para. 5, and Lord Dalhousie's, para. 13 ; *Satara Papers*, 1849, p. 71, 78 and 81.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 26.

can be twisted into admissions, are claimed by the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson from one of the greatest living authorities on such subjects, Sir George Clerk, who during a long and distinguished career has ever consistently opposed the violation of treaties, and the destruction of friendly Principalities. The Duke first states that Sir George Clerk, in his Minute on the Sattara succession, "not only admitted, but specially dwelt upon the distinction" between the right of adoption as conveying Sovereignty to an heir, and as conveying private property only, and that after declaring the regularity of the deceased Rajah's adoption according to Hindoo usage, he added:—"The question, however, remains whether he" the adopted son, "is entitled to the Sovereignty of the Sattara Rajahs." Sir George Clerk knew this distinction had been drawn by others, and that the question had been raised and remained. He gave no assent to the distinction; and he answered the question in the Rajah's favour.

Now comes the most valuable admission of all. "So far from affirming," says the Duke, "that the refusal to acknowledge this title would be any violation of an established rule, or the beginning of a new policy, Sir George Clerk admitted that no such rule had been established, and that 'our views of practice in India in regard to adoptions to Chiefships had been inconsistent and capricious.'"^{*} Sir George Clerk "admitted," that our views and practice had been inconsistent and capricious! The Duke is welcome to make the most of that admission, and to reconcile it, if he can, with that theory of a "settled law and custom of India" in which he professes to believe. Lord Canning, in his Adoption Despatch of 1860, quoted even stronger language from one of Sir George Clerk's letters, declaring it to be his opinion "that it is the inconsistency, caprice, and mutability of our opinions regarding all great principles that is the bane of our supremacy in India." To this the Viceroy adds the following brief comment;—"I fear that as regards the matter now under consideration, this is too true." The matter under consideration being that of successions by adoption, Lord Dalhousie's defenders may perhaps find solace in this "admission" also.

^{*} *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 25.

Sir Charles Jackson most inaccurately cites me twice in support of the fictitious prerogative of annulling adoptions, without venturing to quote my words. He says: "Major Bell in his work *admits* that such permission," to adopt an heir, "was sometimes refused by the Native Governments in the case of Jaghires."* In the passage to which he refers I admitted, that in the sole case of "*service Jaghires*," assigned for the payment of troops, and held, according to the terms of the grant, at the Sovereign's pleasure, a resumption "could be effected during the lifetime of a Jaghiredar, but, more often, as might be expected, after his demise." These are the Jaghiredars of whom Sir John Malcolm thus wrote: "Adoptions which are universally recognised as legal among Hindoos are not a strict right (*any more than direct heirs*) where grants of land are for service."† And, I added, "undoubtedly an irregular or unauthorised adoption did from time to time afford a just occasion, or a convenient pretext, for resuming a *service Jaghire*."‡ I made what Sir Charles Jackson calls this "admission," expressly to show that the resumption of lands assigned for a certain service, whenever the service was no longer required, far from constituting a precedent or an analogy for the extinction of a State allied to us by a Treaty, was not even applicable to petty Chiefships and hereditary landed estates.

Sir Charles Jackson accepts the statement of this counterfeit law, as he says himself, "in an unqualified way."§ Lord Dalhousie, according to him, had very little to do with the doctrine of lapse. "*He merely happened to be the Governor of a country in which these lapses occurred by operation of law.*"|| "If Lord Dalhousie is open to censure, it cannot be for lapses of territory which were effected *by operation of law*, but it must be because he did not waive the rights which the law gave him."¶ It is strange, indeed, that his legal practice and experience did not enable Sir Charles Jackson to detect what has

* *A Vindication*, p. 13, and at p. 9 he puts me as an authority in a foot-note.

† *Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm*, November 14th, 1829, quoted by Lord Canning in the Adoption Despatch.

‡ *Empire in India*, p. 147.

|| *Ditto*, p. 16.

§ *A Vindication*, p. 13.

¶ *Ditto*, p. 17.

been effectually exposed by the authors already mentioned, and by myself, in a book which he quotes if he has not read, that the mere semblance of law and custom was fabricated only by confounding sinecure offices,* hereditary pensions,† military holdings,‡ and landed estates,§ with Sovereignities; by boldly turning treaties of “perpetual friendship and defensive alliance” into “grants from a Sovereign to a subject,” or “agreements” between a King and a stipendiary,|| and then by assuming as the ordinary and regular course of law some rare vindictive act of a despotic Prince. Even in the case of private landed estates, no right of escheat in default of lineal male heirs was ever made out. The ruling sanction, in its application to the descent of landed property, never, until Lord Dalhousie’s time, extended to the right of appropriation.¶

Sir Charles Jackson cites Steele’s *Summary of Hindoo Laws and Customs* (p. 185), without quoting it, in support of the position that “Enamdars and Wuttundars,”—i.e. freeholders, not allied Sovereigns,—should have the consent of the Government for adoption.** But he omits to tell us what is expounded in the pages following, that “an adoption concluded agreeably to the *Shāstras* is not annullable,” and that the so-called consent being required simply to secure regularity and good order, is not essential to the validity of an adoption, especially when the adopted heir is of the same *gotra* or clan. Nor has he quoted from p. 58 or 235 the declaration that “the Government cannot succeed while any relations, or persons connected by *gotra* with the deceased, can be found.”†† It is difficult to suppose Sir Charles Jackson to have been ignorant of the decision in the important case of *Bhasker Buchajee v. Naroo Rugonath*, (Bombay Select Reports, 24,

* Called in the Mahratta Provinces and other parts of Central and Western India, *nemnooks*, see *Empire in India*, p. 172.

† *Wurshasun* or *yoomiah*.

‡ *Surinjam fowj* or *tunkwah jagheer*, see *Empire in India*, p. 147 and 261.

§ Called *Inams*, *surinjam zatee*, *khass jagheer*, *wuttun*, etc., according to the tenure and locality. Sometimes these holdings, as well as those mentioned in the preceding note, conferred a customary jurisdiction over the tenants, but they were always distinguishable from Sovereignities.

|| *Empire in India*, p. 132 to 173.

¶ *Empire in India*, p. 144 to 149. See also the *Inam Commission Unmasked*, by Robert Knight, (Effingham Wilson) 1859.

** *A Vindication*, p. 9.

†† *Inam Commission Unmasked*, p. 26.

approved in Perry's Oriental Cases, 151.) "*that want of the permission of the ruling authorities, is an insufficient ground for setting aside an adoption once made with the proper ceremonies,*" or of the following passage from a great authority, Sir Thomas Strange, who, after detailing the various forms and ceremonies required to constitute a valid adoption, appends the following remark :—"Most of these rules are general : they are not all imperative. *The notice to the King may be dispensed with.*"*

In consequence of the mass of misrepresentation that has been thrown over the whole subject, the right of adoption is too often treated as if it were the extraordinary privilege of introducing a stranger into the family to prevent its extinction ; and the Duke of Argyll, employing the very words used on several occasions by Lord Dalhousie, speaks of an adoption taking place on "*the failure of heirs natural.*"† The truth is that the refusal to recognise adoptions in a Hindoo family, amounts to prohibiting the succession of any one but a son or a grandson in the male line, entirely excluding uncles, brothers, nephews and cousins,—though these are "natural heirs" all the world over,—and all descendants through females, however near in blood. By Hindoo law no collateral can be the heir, until by an adoption he has become the *son* of his predecessor. It is manifest at once how brief would be the existence of a dynasty and a State, if it were dependent upon strictly lineal male descent. On this point the words of Mr. (now Sir Bartle) Frere,‡ who in 1848, said and did everything that was compatible with his subordinate position as Resident at Sattara to prevent the annexation, may be usefully quoted :—

"I much doubt if a single Mahratta family of any consequence could be found in which the succession has continued for a century and a half without having recourse to adoption. Indeed, a moment's consideration will show that there is a natural impossibility in such uninterrupted succession, so long as the custom remains as at present. Direct male succession, without once passing from an elder to a younger brother, or to a paternal uncle, nephew, or

* *Elements of Hindu Law*, vol. ii, p. 64.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 28.

‡ Late Governor of Bombay, and recently appointed to a seat in the Indian Council.

cousin, is obviously impossible for many generations together, in any country; and among the Mahrattas whenever a man of property feels his end approaching, he endeavours to adopt a son, sometimes the child of a younger brother, or other near relation who would naturally be his heir; sometimes, where there has been a family quarrel, a far distant relation.”*

It is not now open to the apologists of annexation to say that they acknowledge “the ruling sanction,” with reference to hereditary landed estates, to have been protective and regulative, not acquisitive, but that no analogy can be drawn between an estate and a State, and that an adoption, though good for conveying property, may not be good for transmitting a Sovereignty. They have shut themselves out from that line of defence; but if it were open to them, their position would not be improved. It is true there is no analogy between an estate and a State, but they endeavoured to make out their case by setting up such an analogy. They argued that where private landed estates were concerned, the Paramount Power had the prerogative of preventing successions by adoption, and thus barring all but lineal male descendants; and then they endeavoured by an illicit and stealthy process to include dependent Principalities, constituted or confirmed by Treaties, in the same category with private estates held by grants. Even if their major premiss were right, their conclusion would be wrong, because their minor premiss is false. States are not estates. But the major premiss is false also. Estates do not lapse for want of lineal male heirs. No Paramount Power in India has ever possessed the right to exclude, even from a private heritable estate, any heir entitled under Hindoo law; *à fortiori* the lawful heir cannot be excluded from succession to a dependent Principality. If the Imperial Power cannot limit or mutilate for its own benefit the Hindoo law of inheritance in the case of a subject, still less can it do so in the case of an ally.

Both the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson represent Sir George Clerk as “compelled to admit that the sanction of the Paramount Power is by custom required

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 111.

to render an adoption to a Principality valid.* He does indeed admit that custom requires the sanction of the Paramount Power, but he explains that "we require the observance of this sanction for the purpose of averting the dissensions and bloodshed that would otherwise ensue from the vindication of rival pretensions;" and he does not admit that we can "exercise that right of sanction to the extent of prohibiting adoption".†

The Duke of Argyll, who is no lawyer, may be pardoned for not duly appreciating this distinction. No such allowance can be made for Sir Charles Jackson. He says "*the fact that permission must be obtained implies that it may be refused; otherwise the permission is unnecessary and a farce.*"‡ This enormous fallacy was dispelled by me in the book which Sir Charles Jackson cites. In the very page to which Sir Charles Jackson refers for my supposed admission, it was urged that even the right of investiture and supremacy, when clearly reserved by treaty, "simply entitled the British Government, as Suzerain, to exercise supervision and control over each succession, whether by natural descent or by adoption, until satisfied that everything had been done conformably with law, with local custom, and with an equitable regard to the general interests of the family, and to the individual rights of each of its members. This alone is the meaning and scope of the ruling sanction."§ This alone was the doctrine of Sir George Clerk and Sir Henry Lawrence. The latest expression of these views by the former will be found in the following extract:—

"The confirmation has never been refused. Hence it is that I never found an instance on the old records at Delhi, and that I never knew one occurring within my experience of our own times, of any Chiefship, either Raj or Surdarree, great or small, being held to have escheated, excepting for felony, to the Paramount State. At length the Calcutta Government led off with that flagrant instance of the barefaced appropriation of Sattara."||

The Duke and the Judge may very justly object

* *A Vindication*, p. 10. *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 24, 25.

† *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 62.

‡ *A Vindication*, p. 13, 14.

§ *Empire in India*, p. 117. *Ludlow's British India and its Races*, vol. ii, p. 258, 259.

|| *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 71, 72.

that this paper, printed in 1866, was not known to them when their respective works were published. They may both decline to be bound by Sir George Clerk's opinions, notoriously adverse to those of Lord Dalhousie. Sir Charles Jackson may claim the right of picking any bit of bad rhetoric or apparent admission out of my book that he can find, while repudiating any obligation to read it, or to deal with its arguments. The Duke of Argyll may discard me altogether from his consideration. But they cannot so easily get rid of Lord Canning's celebrated Adoption Despatch of April 30th, 1860, published in the same year, which contains (paragraphs 17, 19) the following passages.

"We have not shown, so far as I can find, a single instance in which adoption by a Sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent from the Paramount Power. I venture to think that no such instance can be adduced, and that the practice which has prevailed is truly described by Sir Henry Lawrence, where he says:—'The confirmation of the Suzerain is necessary in all cases. He is the arbitrator of all contested adoptions; he can set aside one or other for informality, irregularity, or for misconduct; but it does not appear, by the rules or practices of any of the Sovereignities, or by our own practice with the Istumrardars of Ajmere, that the Paramount State can refuse confirmation to one or other claimant, and confiscate the estate, however small.' I believe that there is no example of any Hindoo State, whether in Rajpootana or elsewhere, lapsing to the Paramount Power, by reason of that Power withholding its assent to an adoption. It has been argued that the right to grant sanction implies the right to withhold it. This, however sound logically, is neither sound nor safe practically. The histories of feudal Governments furnish abundant examples of long-established privileges habitually renewed as acts of grace from the Paramount Powers, but which those Powers have never thought of refusing for purposes of their own, or upon their own judgment alone."

Thus to make a plausible show of defence for Lord Dalhousie's doctrine of "lapse," his vindicators proceed to reoccupy all those false positions which Lord Canning advisedly and deliberately abandoned as untenable.

In order to transform the novel claim of forbidding successions by adoption into "the settled public law of India," a series of precedents was required. Lord Dalhousie asserted that there was such a series. Lord

Canning, after a careful search, reluctantly acknowledged in 1860 that no such precedents could be found. His two defenders persist in 1865 that the imaginary precedents are intact; they are quite silent as to Lord Canning's all important admissions.

The Duke of Argyll complains of "ignorant injustice," of "a policy misrepresented and misunderstood."* I would rather attribute ignorance and misunderstanding to the advocates for the defence, than charge them with injustice and misrepresentation. But it is difficult to suppose them ignorant of the acknowledgment which has just been quoted from the Adoption Despatch, or of its effect, upsetting entirely, as it does, the pretended prerogative for which they still ostensibly contend.

The Duke of Argyll also complains of "special circumstances having been carefully concealed by the opponents of Lord Dalhousie."† Some special circumstances have been concealed by Lord Dalhousie's friends, and the actual position of the controversy has thus been completely hidden. It is in a peculiar sense, perhaps, that the Duke and Sir Charles Jackson interpret the text that "Charity covereth a multitude of sins." Their object is charitable; ours is malignant. In them, therefore, inaccuracy is venial; in us it is criminal. It may be so: their venial offences, however, shall, as in this first instance, be proved. It remains for them to justify their vague accusations.

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, Preface, p. 1 and p. 68.

† *Ibid.*, p. 38.

CHAPTER III.

A REJOINDER AS TO JHANSI.

HAVING explained how on the general question of adoptions, Lord Dalhousie's defenders have suppressed not only all adverse arguments, but the conclusive acknowledgments of their own side, we may proceed to a particular question, that of the Jhansi succession, in which the same tactics are pursued in a still more remarkable manner.

The Jhansi case was very fully discussed in *The Empire in India*, which Sir Charles Jackson quotes, and which has not, perhaps, entirely escaped the Duke of Argyll's observation. In the *Edinburgh Review* article of 1863 the annexation of Jhansi is dismissed in two lines. In the reprint of 1865, my book having been published in the interval, these two lines are expanded into two pages. In these newly interpolated comments on this very bad case, the Duke of Argyll, while engaged in concealing its worst points, charges "the opponents of Lord Dalhousie" with "carefully concealing some special circumstances affecting it."*

The first concealment of which the Duke of Argyll complains is of the alleged circumstance that "Jhansi had been erected into a Principality by ourselves, and was not one of the old Independent States of India."† Nobody ever said it was an old Independent State. It was a dependent and protected State; it stood in a relation to us which made its destruction especially disgraceful; but it was *not* "erected into a Principality by ourselves. Far from concealing what had been said on this point, I fully exposed Lord Dalhousie's unfounded assertion that Jhansi "was held by a Chief under a very recent *grant* from the

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 31. † *Ibid.*, p. 31.

British Government as Sovereign," and "under a *grant* such as is issued from a Sovereign to a subject."* I did not conceal what had been said. I showed that it was not true. I showed that Jhansi was not held by a *grant*, but by the Treaty of 1817, renewing and confirming a Treaty of "defensive alliance" made in 1804, when the Soobadar was still under the nominal supremacy of the Peishwa. The supremacy being transferred to the British Government in 1817, was to be made real and definite. By the new Treaty the possessions of the Soobadar are secured "in perpetuity" to him, "his heirs and successors;" no article or expression in it pretends to make a gift or a grant to the actual ruler, the third of his family, who had succeeded his grandfather in 1815, three years before the new Treaty was proposed.

The Duke of Argyll adds that the Chief of Jhansi "was not recognised as having a hereditary right before 1817." This also is a mistake. He was the actual ruler of his territories; the Treaty made thirteen years before with his predecessor was in full force; no one had ever doubted or disputed the hereditary nature of that power and dignity which we had neither bestowed upon him nor upon his ancestor, but which we acknowledged and confirmed in the new Treaty. Perhaps the Marquis of Hastings, by whom the Treaty of 1817 was negotiated, may be heard on this subject.

"I remained in the same camp, and received the young Soobadar of Jhansi. As the title implies, the Chiefs of that territory were only officers entrusted by the Peishwas with the temporary command of the district; but one of them, who was a man of head as well as of courage, *succeeded in making the Soobadarship hereditary in his family*, maintaining in other respects towards the Peishwa relations of fealty with some pecuniary payments. The Soobadar is now our feudatory."†

* *Jhansi Blue Book*, p. 20, and 22; *Empire in India*, p. 205, 209. Lord Dalhousie most unwarrantably took these words from a Minute by Lord Metcalfe, who would have been the first to protest against such a gross misapplication of them.

† *Lord Hastings' Private Journal*, vol ii, p. 235. This passage is quoted by Mr. J. M. Ludlow, (*Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India*, p. 125) who has fully refuted all the sophisms repeated by the Duke of Argyll. I suppose Mr. Ludlow is one of those "fifth-rate writers" whom his Grace has never consulted. One would like to know the names of those "fifth-rate writers" whose works the Duke has read.

The special circumstances recapitulated by the Duke of Argyll, are the identical quibbles demolished by me in detail. Mine was a deed of exposure not of concealment. All my information was derived from those Blue Books upon which the Duke of Argyll professes to rely. I certainly did not "state the facts," as the Duke recommends, "in the light in which they appeared" to Lord Dalhousie, because I believed him to have viewed them in a false light.

We now come to what the Duke of Argyll evidently considers the worst of these acts of concealment. I agree with him as to the offence, but I differ with him as to the guilty party.

The Duke of Argyll asserts that in the dealings of the British Government with Jhansi, "the right of adoption had been set aside in practice;" that in 1835, "the day before he died, the Rajah adopted a son; but the boy was not recognised as his successor, being set aside in favour of an uncle." He quotes, as a true description of the events of 1835, Lord Dalhousie's words that "the previous Rajah did adopt a boy, but the British Government did not acknowledge the boy as successor, and it nominated another person to be Rajah."* He complains that these important circumstances are carefully concealed by the opponents of Lord Dalhousie. If they were true they certainly would be important.

Sir Charles Jackson makes the same statement in equally positive terms.

"In 1835, Rao Ram Chund, the dependent Rajah of Jhansi, died, leaving two uncles, and a boy adopted the day before his death, without the permission of the British Government. The Government of India, without inquiry into the fact of adoption, and treating it as an immaterial circumstance, appointed the elder of the two uncles Rajah."†

Following Lord Dalhousie, but *not* following the narrative of facts contained in the Parliamentary Papers, the two vindicators assume that in 1835 the Rajah of Jhansi did undoubtedly adopt a son, and that on this occasion the British Government refused to recognise the

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 31-2.

† *A Vindication*, p. 11.

adoption, and nominated another member of the family as Rajah. The facts are really very different.

We have seen how eagerly Lord Dalhousie accepted an imaginary chain of precedents offered to him for general use. Sattara and Nagpore were annexed on the strength of those precedents. To aid in the particular destruction of the petty State of Jhansi he tried to extract a direct precedent from its own annals. There was no such precedent; and he could only create the phantom by a perversion of the facts before him. Even the Blue Book, which the Duke of Argyll exhorts us to study, contains full proof of that perversion; and an ample demonstration of it was given in my book, which, if he has not read, Sir Charles Jackson quotes and censures.

After refuting the alleged constitution of the Principality under "a grant" from our Government, I remarked on another part of Lord Dalhousie's Minute.

"The second error is of very much greater importance, and is four times repeated:—in the last sentence of paragraph 7 it is said,—‘In 1835 Rao Ramchund died. *Although he had adopted a boy as his successor the day before his death,* the adoption was not recognised; and his uncle, Ragonath Rao, was declared Rajah.’*—again in paragraph 11, ‘There is no need of and no room for argument on this head. The historical facts on record negative the Ranees’s assertion conclusively; *for Rao Ramchund did adopt a boy, but the British Government did not acknowledge the boy as successor,* and it nominated another person to be Rajah.’† In paragraph 12 it is stated that ‘*previous adoption by a Rajah whom the British Government constituted hereditary Chief of Jhansi, was not acknowledged by the British Government.*’ And in the last sentence of the same paragraph ‘*the existence of a precedent*’ for refusing to sanction adoption, is asserted.”‡

Even if this representation were perfectly accurate, there would be a precedent for preventing the succession of an adopted son to the exclusion of collateral heirs, but none for rejecting an adopted son to the exclusion of *all* heirs, and with the object of fabricating a lapse. There would be a precedent for protection and regulation, not for appropriation.

Really there was no precedent in the succession of 1835 for any action or interference whatever. It was

* *Jhansi Blue Book*, 1855, † *Ib.*, p. 22.

‡ *Empire in India*, p. 211.

a precedent of inaction and non-interference. No adoption was rejected, no nomination was made by our Government. What occurred was as follows :—

“ There was a disputed succession in 1835 ; there were four claimants. *The fact of the adoption was denied* by the adverse parties. In the Note on Jhansi by the Secretary to Government, the decision in 1835 is thus described.* ‘ On this occasion the lawful heir by blood, descended of the body of Sheo Ram Bhow, was recognised as successor to the Raj, to the disallowance of *a boy alleged to have been adopted, or nominated as successor* by the late Rajah the day before his death, who, *if adopted*, would have been unquestionably the heir to any property of his adoptive father to the exclusion of the uncle ; and this was done without inquiry into the fact of adoption or nomination (*which was doubtful*) as though it was an immaterial circumstance.’ ”

“ It is to be observed, therefore, that in 1835 the adoption or nomination was doubtful ; in 1853 the adoption was not doubtful, or in the slightest degree irregular or suspicious, but was effected in strict accordance with Hindoo law, and in the presence of British officers, and was officially reported to Government in writing by the dying Rajah. There is no parallel here ; no precedent can be founded on the decision of 1835.”†

Whatever were the merits of that decision, our Government had no right to boast of it, or to profit by it in any way.

“ The fact is, that the settlement of 1835 was not a decision of our Government at all, but that of a certain party in the Jhansi Durbar. The only decision at which our Government arrived was the decision of not deciding, interposing, or even advising in the dispute. The Political Agent was authorised to recognise Ragonath Rao, the deceased Rajah’s uncle, who was in actual possession, but no opinion was given as to his right : and these qualifying expressions were added,—‘ It being presumed that *he is able to establish his authority*, and that his succession will be acknowledged by disinterested parties at Jhansi.’ ”‡

I then pointed out that the successions to Jhansi in 1835, and in the family of Holkar to the Indore State in 1834—both of them under Lord William Bentinck’s administration—were sad instances of the neglect of our moral duty as the *de facto* great protecting and pacificating Power, and proved the truth of Sir George Clerk’s reproach that “ the inconsistency, caprice, and mutability of our opinions regarding all great principles, is the bane of our

* *Jhansi Blue Book*, p. 18.

† *Empire in India*, p. 212.

‡ *Jhansi Blue Book*, p. 17. *Empire in India*, p. 213.

supremacy in India.”* Our refusal to interfere in the Holkar succession, which Lord William Bentinck declared must be settled by “the general wish,” and “the voice of the country,” led to scenes of bloodshed and disorder that at last compelled our armed intervention, but only for the support of the party which had the upper hand for the moment, and was in possession of the capital and Palace.†

There was another disputed succession at Jhansi in 1838, briefly mentioned in Lord Dalhousie’s Minute, which appeared to me to call for no special notice when I was discussing the subject. The Duke of Argyll does not refer to it. Sir Charles Jackson brings it forward as another example of the “ruling sanction” negatively enforced to exclude an adopted son. He says:—“On his” (Rajah Ragonath Rao’s) “death without issue, in 1838, they” (the British Government) “placed the younger uncle on the throne, although the adopted son was still living, and asserted his claim.”‡

Here at last we have an intervention, but it does not help Sir Charles Jackson in the least. Warned in all probability by the evil effects of its passive attitude towards the struggle for succession in the Holkar family at Indore in 1834, the British Government took upon itself to settle the second disputed inheritance at Jhansi in 1838,—when there were again four claimants,—after a judicial inquiry conducted by a Commission. This settlement was a legitimate assertion of the British prerogative as the Paramount Power over its feudatory. The same functions might most properly have been exercised at Indore in 1834, and ought to be exercised on any future occasion by the Imperial Power of India, where the right of succession is doubtful or disputed, even though the State concerned may not stand towards the British Government in the position of a feudal dependent or tributary. Such an intervention is regulative and protective, but involves no right or claim of confiscation.

The non-intervention of 1835 was a neglect of protective power; the intervention of 1838 was the rightful exercise of protective power; the intervention of 1853 was a gross and greedy abuse of protective power.

* *Empire in India*, p. 217.

† *Papers, Succession by Adoption*, 1850, p. 70, 71, 75. ‡ *A Vindication*, p. 11.

CHAPTER IV.

A REJOINDER AS TO NAGPORE.

THE annexation of Nagpore was treated very fully by me in the *Empire in India*. Neither of the two vindicators venture to meet or to mention any of my arguments. Yet Sir Charles Jackson professes to have seen my book, and cites it more than once. In the original *Edinburgh Review* article of 1863 the subject of Nagpore was dismissed in ten lines, as "*a case which involved no disputed question.*"* In the republication of 1865,—my book having appeared early in the previous year,—these words are omitted, and the brief paragraph is expanded into six pages. How did the Duke of Argyll ascertain between January 1863 and June 1865, that his first impression was a mistaken one, and that the Nagpore question was open to dispute after all? Whose disputations induced these after-thoughts? Surely not mine,—for the Duke calmly reiterates the fictions and fallacies, blindly imbibed from the Blue-Books, which I endeavoured to explode.

Lord Dalhousie, pursuing, if he did not originate, the unworthy and unstatesmanlike practice of depreciating our own method and our own settlement, and turning British protection into a precarious toleration, tried to degrade the Nagpore State by representing it as the mere creature of our free will and pleasure. He said that the Marquis of Hastings, who was Governor General in 1818, had "*set up a boy whom he selected to be Rajah;*" that the British Government had "*bestowed the sovereignty upon the person whom it thought best;*" and that "*the simple question of determination was whether the sovereignty of Nagpore, which was bestowed as a gift on a Goojur in 1818, shall now be conferred upon somebody else, as a gift a second time;*" and he objected to "*the gratuitous alienation a*

* *Edinburgh Review*, January 1863, p. 17.

second time of the State of Nagpore.”* I showed that the late Rajah was the nearest of kin, when he was placed on the throne in 1818; that it was a doubtful question whether he was not the rightful heir in 1816, instead of Appa Sahib, whose party we supported but whom we afterwards deposed; and it was therefore inaccurate to speak lightly of him as “a boy selected to be Rajah,” or as “a person” upon whom “the sovereignty was bestowed..”

I quoted the words of Lord Hastings himself, who in a letter addressed to the Court of Directors briefly describes Appa Sahib’s treachery and deposition, and observes that the disturbed state of the country “made it expedient for us to lose no time in establishing a new Government. The members of the reigning family, and the principal persons of the State, were consulted. They unanimously recommended the nearest of blood in the Blonsla (the Rajah’s) family, for the succession, and he was raised to the musnud in the room of Appa Sahib.”† I pointed out that this was a great contrast to Lord Dalhousie’s contemptuous assertions that Lord Hastings “*set up a boy whom he selected,*” and that he “*conferred the gift under the influence of no consideration whatever but his own free will and pleasure.*”‡

I also proved that whatever phrases as to the rights of conquest—acquired undoubtedly in Nagpore, but which we chose, from motives of policy, to waive,—and as to “*conferring*” the territory on the young Rajah, might have been used in despatches from and to the Governor General in 1818, no process of gift, or transfer, was gone through; nor were any such terms introduced into the Treaty of 1826, in the Preamble of which, on the contrary, after referring to his predecessor’s hostility and deposition, the Rajah is declared to have “*succeeded* to the throne by the favour of the British Government,” and is required, under Article V, to confirm former cessions, which of course could not have been required or permitted had he received the Principality as a gift or new grant from the

* *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 23, 30.

† *Report of Select Committee of House of Commons on the East India Company*, 1833, Appendix, pp. 104.

‡ *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, p. 28; *Empire in India*, p. 188.

conquerors. Sir Richard Jenkins, who was Resident during the late Rajah's minority, quoting the Marquis of Hastings' own words, had spoken of "the restoration of the State of Nagpore to its rank as one of the substantive Powers of India." I proved, in short, from all the records of the time, that the State of Nagpore was not conferred as a grant or gift on the late Rajah, that no new Principality was created in his favour by the British Government, but that by its forbearance and favour he succeeded to the throne of his ancestors.

Yet the Duke of Argyll feels himself justified in repeating that the British Government in 1818 "*selected an infant boy who was son of a daughter of the second Rajah;*" and quotes with approval Lord Dalhousie's protest against "*the gratuitous alienation of the State of Nagpore, for the second time.*"*

Sir Charles Jackson also quotes the assertion that "*the sovereignty of Nagpore was bestowed as a gift upon a Goojur by the British Government in 1818.*"†

Lord Dalhousie thus describes the Nagpore annexation, in his Farewell Minute of 1856, reviewing his own administration :—

"The Kingdom of Nagpore became British territory by simple lapse, in the absence of all legal heirs. The Kingdom which had been granted to the reigning Rajah by the British Government, when it had become forfeited by the treachery of Appah Sahib, was left without a claimant when the Rajah died. No son had been born to his Highness; none was adopted by him; none, *as they have themselves admitted*, was adopted at the Rajah's death, by the Ranees his widows."‡

In the ten lines allotted to this case in the Review article of 1863, the Duke of Argyll quotes this passage, omitting, however, the important words which I have placed in italics. It would have been well if they had been omitted from the original document. The passage disappears altogether from the enlarged and revised publication of 1865. It was well discarded.

"The Kingdom of Nagpore," it is said, "was left with-

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 34 and 37.

† *A Vindication*, p. 17.

‡ Papers, Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, dated February 28th, 1856, No. 245 of 1856.

out a claimant." When these words were penned by Lord Dalhousie, a very little reflection and research would have reminded him that Mr. Mansel, the Resident at Nagpore, in a despatch dated 14th December, 1853, three days after the Rajah's death, gave his opinion upon the respective standing and qualifications of each one of the late Sovereign's family who might be considered as "*a pretender to the throne.*"* I cannot see much difference between a "pretender" and a "claimant." The Rajah's nearest male relatives, according to Mr. Mansel's report, were two grand nephews, one grand nephew of his predecessor, Raghojee the Second—descendants in the female line, but all eligible for adoption, according to Hindoo law and family custom—and a nephew, sister's son, who was married, and therefore incapable of being adopted. From among these Mr. Mansel recommended the elder of the deceased Rajah's own grand nephews, as "the most favourable selection" for the throne, describing him as well educated in the Mahratta style, "amiable in disposition, and sensible, not apparently possessing brilliant talent, but tractable."†

Yet Lord Dalhousie did not hesitate to say that "the Kingdom of Nagpore was left without a claimant"; and, in spite of the evident contradictions to it contained in those Blue Books which the Duke of Argyll professes to have studied, his Grace did not hesitate to repeat that statement in the *Edinburgh Review*. Having pointedly referred to the principal claimant in his revised reprint of 1865, the Duke could hardly retain in the text this absolute denial of his existence, and the whole passage is therefore judiciously left out.

Lord Dalhousie's apologists may now say on his behalf, that though, strictly speaking, it may have been a slight overstatement to declare that there was *no claimant* of the throne, there actually was no person *entitled* to the throne, until duly adopted; and that no adoption was effected or even proposed. This, in fact, was asserted by Lord Dalhousie in the passage from his Farewell Minute now under consideration. "No son," he says, "had been born to his

* Paragraphs 33, 34, 36 of the despatch; *Papers*, Rajah of Berar, 1864, p. 20.

† *Ibid.*, 1854, p. 20.

Highness ; none was adopted by him ; none, *as they have themselves admitted*, was adopted at the Rajah's death by the Ranees, his widows." These words—"as they have themselves admitted"—seem to have been a little too strong for the Duke's digestion, even in 1863, for they are expunged from the extract as given in the *Edinburgh Review*. The statement is, indeed, almost unparalleled for heedless inaccuracy.

Instead of the Ranees having "admitted" that no adoption had taken place, they never ceased, up to the hour of Lord Dalhousie's departure from Calcutta, to urge upon the British authorities, so far as they dared, and to the best of their means and ability, the claims of their adopted son.

In his demi-official letter, written a few hours after the Rajah's death, on the 11th December, 1853, Mr. Mansel, the Resident, wrote, "The immediate people of the Court, and officials of Government, of course desire adoption, but I have given no special encouragement to the wish."*

In his formal despatch of three days later, while describing the several "pretenders to the throne," as quoted above, he said that "Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao, the son of Nana Aher Rao, and grandson of the late Rajah's sister, would decidedly be preferred by the mass of the courtiers to any other youth for the Musnud, whether given to him by adoption, or by grant from the Company."† I may here mention that this grandnephew of the late Rajah, Yeshwunt Rao, then more usually called Appa Sahib, is the same Janojee Bhonsla, so named by virtue of his adoption, who is now recognised by our Government as the head of the family, to whom the ancestral landed property was restored, with the titles of Rajah and Bahadur, by Lord Canning in 1860, "in recognition of the loyal conduct of the family during the rebellion, and of the faithful attachment of the late Banka Bae to the British Government."‡

In a subsequent letter, dated the 14th April, 1854, Mr. Mansel explained that "the family of the late Rajah would

* *Papers*, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 56.

† *Ibid.*, p. 1854, p. 20.

‡ *Calcutta Gazette*, April 14th, 1860.

prefer to retain the actual musnud in the hands of some heir selected by adoption."*

The Duke of Argyll expresses some surprise that "since, as a matter of fact, not even the plea of adoption could be urged in this case, Lord Dalhousie entered into *a long and perhaps needless argument on the petition of the widows.*"†

That long argument, to which he frequently reverted, was needless indeed and utterly futile—as the Duke himself perceives—if the Ranees had no right to adopt. Why did the Governor General, in the face of Mr. Mansel's assurances that all the Court desired an adoption, and his indication of the exact person they would prefer, resort to unfounded surmises as to jealousies among the Ranees disinclining them to adopt a successor to the throne? Of what consequence were these imaginary jealousies, except for the purpose of silencing Lord Dalhousie's own misgivings? It is as plain as possible that Lord Dalhousie was very doubtful of his right to prevent the succession of an adopted heir, and therefore tried very hard to persuade himself that the Ranees were so blind to their own interests as not to wish to maintain the sovereignty.

"It is unnecessary," he says, "to enter into any discussion," whether the widow is authorised to adopt. "There is no ground for any such discussion. The widow has made no attempt nor any proposal to adopt."‡ And then he proceeds to build up his theory as to the widows' jealousies and aversion to adopt an heir.

No reasons whatever can be gathered from the Blue Books, or from any other sources, to lead us to suppose that there ever was the slightest difference of opinion or jealousy among the Ranees; that there ever was the least doubt or question among them as to their right to adopt, as to the advisability of adoption, or as to the person to be adopted. Their only doubt was whether the Rajah's elder grandnephew, whom they considered best entitled to the throne, would be the candidate most acceptable to the British Government, with whose overwhelming

* *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 5.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 37.

‡ *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 24.

power they were well acquainted, and whose protecting and regulating prerogative they cheerfully acknowledged. They expected some communication to be made to them by the Governor-General. Fully aware of all the details of recent claims to succession, the Bhonsla family knew that in 1838 an adopted son had been set aside at Jhansi in favour of an elder relative; they knew that at Indore in 1844 one adopted son had been rejected in favour of another. They determined therefore not to endanger the succession of the rightful heir by any precipitate step. This appears clearly enough from Mr. Mansel's despatches. In that one written three days after the Rajah's death, dated 14th December, 1853, he reports having paid a visit of condolence to the Ranees, when the senior lady, the Banka Bae, let fall "occasional expressions of hope that the interests of the Bhonsla family would continue to be interwoven with the Berar Kingdom."*

In the letter of the 14th April, 1854, containing his remarks on the several "pretenders to the throne," Mr. Mansel writes as follows :—

"In my communications with the late Durbar Vakeel, I was led to suppose at first that I should receive a formal representation from the Banka Bae and the eldest widow of the late Rajah, Anpoorna Bae, *on the subject of their claims to adopt an heir to the musnud*, they and their immediate advisers treating it as hard that their case should be finally disposed of without further formal communication with them. Partly, I apprehend, from their own helplessness, and partly *from the disinclination of the most intelligent parties about the Court to engage in a course that might be deemed hostile or held offensive to the British representative*, the ladies and other near relatives of the late Rajah have not taken, so far as I can learn, any effective step to appeal in Calcutta or England against the orders executed by me, nor has any formal representation *on paper* been submitted to myself."†

Helpless they were indeed ! The Resident, we may be sure, did not overestimate their dread of evincing hostility and giving offence. Colonel Low (now General Sir John Low, K.C.B.), the only Member of the Supreme Council who at that time had any experience of characters and customs at Native Courts, and who firmly opposed the annexation, with singular accuracy divined and described

* Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 14. † Further Papers, Berar, 1856, p. 5.

the state of affairs and of feeling at Nagpore on the subject of adoption. The Ranees and their advisers, having signified their wishes to the British Resident, waited patiently for some inquiry or reference from the Supreme Government.

"They were naturally deterred," wrote Sir John Low, "from making any attempt of the kind"—*openly* adopting a son—"when they saw the British Resident at once take possession of the Government, and order the British troops to be in readiness for any emergency that might occur."* At the same time, while these measures, taken by the Resident, in pursuance of strict orders from Calcutta, overawed the ladies at the very time when prompt action was all important, his kind, considerate, and consolatory manner and expressions, and his evident desire to maintain their dignity, to preserve their wealth, and to secure them a splendid income,—“perfectly well surmised by the Bhonsla family,” as Lord Dalhousie complained,†—still more tended to confirm the Ranees as to the prudence and propriety of trusting to his good offices, and to the friendship of the Honourable Company.

Not until Mr. Mansel was removed from Nagpore, notoriously in consequence of his representations in their favour, did the Ranees suddenly awake to the exigencies of their position, and enter upon a course of appeal and remonstrance.

Almost driven to despair, they began to suspect that Mr. Mansel had betrayed them into the loss of so much valuable time. In the first memorial directly addressed to the Governor-General, the Banka Bae states that on the Rajah's death she had made many “communications both in person and by agents to Mr. Mansel, the Resident, with respect to the treaties of friendship and alliance, whereupon that officer gave us, according to the powers vested in him by the Honourable Company, every assurance of the realisation of our wish.” She explains that she had remonstrated against the letter from Government, read to the Ranees by the Resident on March 14th, 1854, declaring that “as there was no heir to succeed to the

* *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 48. † *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 9.

guddee," (throne) "Government had annexed the State to the British territories." Upon this, she proceeds, "with reference to the powers vested in the Resident by your Lordship, I communicated to him a second time through my officers, all my sentiments, whereupon he set my mind at ease by assuring me that he would in the course of three months, procure me favourable orders from your Lordship." Instead of any favourable orders, on July 15th, 1854, two days before this memorial was written, the Resident's Assistant had come to the Palace and informed the Ranees that they were to be pensioned, and that, with the exception of "a small portion of the gems and other articles," all the family property would be "seized on behalf of Government." Against these proceedings the aged Ranees protest, especially against "a departure from treaties," and concludes by begging the Governor-General, "with reference to the ties of friendship subsisting from of old between the two Governments, to continue the *guddee* of this State in this family."*

Lord Dalhousie, in his Minute on this first direct communication from the Ranees, exults over "the marked absence of any allegation that an heir was appointed to the *guddee* of Nagpore." "She does not," he adds, "so much as attempt to name, or even to affirm the existence of any heir to the *guddee*."†

This exultation was not very well founded, considering that the letter in question contains a protest against the decree "that there was no heir to succeed to the *guddee*," appeals to the treaties, and requests that the *guddee* may be continued "*in the family*." Still it is true that the heir is not *named*, but obviously from the same motives that had actuated the Bhonsla family from the first. She wishes some inquiry or proposal to be made by the Governor-General. Had the Ranees been amenable to the advice and influence of any person of strong character and courage,—and great courage would have been required to brave the British representative,—they would have publicly installed their adopted son at a very early period, and then have applied for the sanction and recognition of the Gover-

* *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 14. † *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 15.

nor-General. But they were ignorant and timid women; there was more than one pretender; and any contumacious conduct on their part might, according to their apprehensions, destroy the chance of their candidate, perhaps ensure his banishment. Immediately on Mr. Mansel's departure from Nagpore, however, they had concluded their plans for delegating agents, both to Calcutta and to London, to appeal against the extinction of the family and Principality; and within two or three days of Lord Dalhousie's unfavourable reply to this first memorial being despatched, after nearly four months' delay, he must have received another, from Hunwunt Rao, the accredited agent of the Ranees, dated 16th September, 1854, declaring that "*there are rightful heirs to the gudgee and territory of Nagpore;*" that "*there are rightful heirs of the late Maharaja, and successors to the Raj or Kingdom, entitled to succeed thereto, both according to the customs of the family and the Hindoo law,*" and that "*the Maharanee has always been and expressed herself to be willing and prepared to take into adoption any one of such heirs and successors as may be agreeable to her, on such just and reasonable terms and stipulations as she may be advised to do by your Lordship.*" The agent concluded by stating that he was "*furnished with full information regarding the affairs that have been transacted, and the events that have transpired subsequent to the demise of the late Maharaja,*" and that he was prepared "*to submit such information, either personally or by letter,*" as might be directed.*

The Governor-General wanted no further information. He had satisfied himself, in spite of Mr. Mansel's letters, that there was not even a "claimant" of the throne, and that the Ranees were absolutely averse to an adoption. He refused to receive any appeal from an agent, and in a letter dated 29th September, 1854, referred the Ranees to the Commissioner, "to whom they can address themselves, and personally communicate with him at all times."† But on the 6th October the Commissioner, after reporting the departure of several agents deputed by the Ranees to intercede on their behalf, declares that he has refused to be

* *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 17.

† *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 22.

"the medium of communication on the subject," and that he has "distinctly explained on every occasion that no officer in the service of the British Government could presume to address the Governor-General on a matter which had been finally disposed of after the most mature consideration."*

Another agent having been sent to Calcutta to complain of this total denial of a hearing, the Commissioner was desired on the 8th December, 1854, to forward any petitions the Ranees might wish to address to Government.† This gives a glimpse behind the scenes into the system of obstruction and intimidation by which the Ranees' natural disabilities and apprehensions were enhanced, and the full statement of their case kept back from the Government for an entire year.

Unfortunately Mr. Mansel, though well-disposed towards Native States in general, so far succumbed to the political heresy of the day, recently enforced at Sattara, as to disparage the rights of an adopted heir; he recommended that the State of Nagpore should for the present be "preserved in feudal chieftainship" under the Banka Baee, the grandmother of the deceased Rajah, (who had been Regent during her grandson's minority, and who for upwards of fifty years had exercised a dominant influence both in domestic and public affairs), and that Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao, now Janojee Bhonsla, should be "trained up to succeed her."‡ And he seems to have been at first animated with some confidence that this middle course would be cordially accepted at Calcutta. Thus fixing his mind on what he called "a new form to be given to native power,"—"an experiment for reconciling the interests of the people, the claims of the Bhonsla family, and the duties of Great Britain,"—he lost sight of the inherent right of Janojee Bhonsla *to be adopted*. His right was not absolute against all other claimants eligible for adoption, but it was absolute against the claim of "lapse" in default of all heirs, set up by Lord Dalhousie; it was infinitely stronger than that of any other relative of the deceased Rajah; and

* *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 27. † *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 24.

‡ *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 20.

the adoption of some one of those relatives was obligatory on the widow, both by Hindoo law and family custom.

Sir Charles Jackson says:—"The Rajah of Nagpore left no heir in the male line, and no other heir could inherit;" and in a note to this passage refers us to "Sir Richard Jenkins' *Report on Nagpore*, in which he states the principles regulating the succession to the throne. He says, 'It is hereditary in the entire male line from the common ancestor or first founder of the dynasty, to the exclusion of females or their issue.'"^{*}

Sir Charles Jackson is quite right in his quotation so far as he goes. Why does he not go a little farther and quote a little more? Sir Richard Jenkins gives the above as "the fundamental maxim," but he adds, "Another maxim generally acknowledged is, that on the death of a Rajah leaving no male heir, it is the privilege of his principal widow to adopt a child from the relations of her husband to succeed him, and herself to govern in his name."[†] Wherever Sir Charles Jackson found the words which form his garbled quotation he could have found the remaining words, and I can imagine no excuse for their suppression. Lord Dalhousie gave the whole passage fairly enough,[‡] but then his argument was, as we have seen, that the widow was averse to an adoption.

The most remarkable part of Sir Richard Jenkins' testimony is that after laying down these fundamental maxims he proceeds to declare the rule that had been observed in seating the Rajah, then a minor, on the throne, and that should be observed in choosing his successor from the female line, in case he should die without leaving a son. That rule was "to choose the nearest male descendant of the last Rajah who had any."[§] According to that rule the late Rajah's grand-nephew, the great-grandson of Rughojee the Second's daughter, and that Rajah's "nearest male descendant," was actually adopted as a son, on the death of his grand-uncle.

Partly owing to the Ranees' overstrained submission, partly to Mr. Mansel's imperfect appreciation of his natural

^{*} *A Vindication*, p. 15.

[†] During the minority only.

[‡] *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 23. [§] *Report on Nagpore*, 1827, p. 116.

and acquired rights by birth and expectations, no serious discussion of Janojee Bhonsla's claim took place in the Supreme Council before the annexation. In order fully to supply deficiencies, we must now for the first time in this critical inquiry travel out of the Blue Books, which, however, contain ample information on this subject, already quoted, to prove to the Duke of Argyll, who professes to have studied them, that the Rajah's elder grand-nephew, the principal "pretender to the throne," was not adequately or ingenuously described by Lord Dalhousie as "*a Mahratta youth*," or as "*a stranger*." The facts related in the following extract were not derived from any occult source, nor from unpublished official records, but are such as might have been gathered by any one in ordinary conversation from well-informed people at Nagpore; and their truth can still be confirmed by hundreds of living persons, including many English officers.

"According to a family custom, applicable only to the lineal descendants of the Rajahs, his" (Janojee Bhonsla's) "mother, Myna Bace, the late Rajah's niece, and great-granddaughter of Raghojee the 2nd, came to reside in the Palace a short time before her confinement, and was there delivered of a son on August 14th, 1834. On his birth being announced, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired in the public square of the Palace, and a *feu de joie* was fired by the Rajah's Artillery and Infantry. And on the 25th of the same month the principal Chiefs and Ministers of the Court visited the Resident on the part of the Rajah, for the purpose of distributing sugar on the occasion.* At the birth of no other person now living in Nagpore were such honours paid, or such a communication made to the British Resident. This boy was brought up entirely as a child of the Palace, in which he much more usually resided than in his own father's house. Wherever he went, ten or twelve of the Mahratta and Mussulman Maunkurrees (hereditary officers of rank and family) were appointed to attend upon him; spearmen and other servants, horses and elephants from the Rajah's establishment, were detailed for his service and retinue. Directions regarding his education and companions were always given by the Rajah himself. As he grew older, he accompanied the Rajah on all his progresses through the country, and sat by his side on public occasions in durbar and on his visits to the Resident. The

* Sugar is sent to relatives and intimate friends by a Hindoo father when a son is born in his house. On this occasion it clearly signified the birth of an heir-presumptive to the Rajah, whose health was frequently very delicate at this period, and who had been married for three years without issue.

Rajah would not permit his marriage to take place, a ceremony which among the Nagpore Mahrattas is usually celebrated at a very early age, but the conclusion of which precludes subsequent adoption. In a few words, as year by year the prospects of the Rajah having legitimate offspring appeared to diminish, all the family and followers of the Court became accustomed to look upon Appa Sahib as the destined successor to the musnud.*

The real circumstances that followed the death of the late Maharajah were thus described by me :—

“Appa Sahib was at once summoned by the Banka Bacc and by Anpoorna Bacc, the senior widow; and at the request of both these Ranees, his father Nana Aher Rao, and his mother Myna Bacc, formally, and in presence of all the assembled relatives, consented to resign him to Anpoorna Bacc. The Banka Bacc proposed that until the orders of the Supreme Government were received, the public ceremony of giving a new name to the young Rajah, and the usual procession and installation, should not take place; and while this question was being debated in the family circle, the information that the Resident had ordered seals to be put on the Treasury and Jewel Office, and had otherwise taken measures for exercising all authority in his own person, decided it in favour of the Banka Bacc’s consistently submissive policy. The Bacc said at that time, and on many subsequent occasions, that she had already seen the affairs of the Nagpore State settled several times by orders from Calcutta, and that she had no doubt they would be settled once more on the old terms.”†

“The ceremonies of adoption were then duly performed in the Palace, and the funeral rites were celebrated by Appa Sahib, who subsequently received the name of Janojee Bhonsla.”‡

The name of the person who had officiated as a son at the Rajah’s cremation, and at the solemn filial obsequies called *kriya karm*, was of course known to the Resident, as it was to all Nagpore; but he considered it sufficient to report in his first demi-official letter to the Governor-General that “the funeral pile was to be fired by the *ordinary relations* of the deceased.”§ Even this not very explicit account is absent from the subsequent formal despatches. We have already seen why the Ranees themselves made no direct notification.

But, it may be asked, if the Bhonsla family really wished and expected instructions to be sent by the British

* *Empire in India*, p. 176, 178. † *Ibid.*, p. 178.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

§ *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 56.

Government as to the vacant throne, why did they take the irrevocable step of adopting their own candidate? The adoption was effected on the grounds of religion and custom, though no doubt it was supposed to strengthen the claim of the heir whom all preferred, and whom the Rajah was known to have chosen. It would be the greatest mistake to imagine,—I have always disputed the notion,—that, either in the Hindoo or the Mussulman States of India, a rigorous, well-defined rule of succession has ever been so clearly laid down, and so universally accepted that there never was any ground for doubt or contention. There are no real precedents for the lapse or escheat of a Hindoo sovereignty, but there are many precedents for every variety of irregular succession, even for that of females. Adopted sons had been recently set aside, and, as we have seen, apparently with the approval of the British Government, at Jhansi and Indore. For all that the Ranees and their advisers knew, the Governor-General might prefer on this occasion to enthrone the Rajah's nephew, on the ground of his consanguinity and mature age; or the plan might be carried out, which they knew had been recommended by the Resident,*—whose influence always seemed to them unbounded—of entrusting the government for some years to the venerable Banka Bace, whom all regarded as the good genius of the family and State.

And although when the Minute of the 28th January, 1854, was recorded, the adoption of Janojee Bhonsla was still a private affair, Lord Dalhousie knew at that time from Mr. Mansel's despatches that an adoption was desired by the family, and that the Rajah's elder grand-nephew was a "pretender to the throne," and would be "decidedly preferred" for the musnud. Notwithstanding all this, his Lordship devotes two lengthy paragraphs, occupying two Blue Book folio pages, to an array of contradictory inferences and unfounded surmises proving that the Ranees *must* be averse to adoption; repeatedly declares that the Rajah has left "*no heir whatever*;"† and in his second

* A secret of this sort, if it was intended to be a secret, is never kept from those interested.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 22, 23, 26.

Minute, in reply to Colonel Low, asserts that there is "*no natural heir*."* And three times in the same words he objects to "the gratuitous alienation of the State of Nagpore in favour of a *Mahratta youth*."†

But when in his Farewell Minute of 28th February, 1856, Lord Dalhousie improved upon these phrases of studied disparagement, and tried to force down Janojee Bhonsla into deeper oblivion, by saying that the throne was "*left without a claimant*," and that "*the British Government refused to bestow the territory in free gift upon a stranger*,"‡ I am afraid he knew all about Janojee Bhonsla's claim, and his alleged position by birth and adoption. He had then received from the Ranees, and had answered, at least one letter in which Appa Sahib was named as their adopted son and lawful heir of the deceased Rajah. One small point of verbal exculpation may be reserved in his favour. He may, perhaps, have doubted whether Appa Sahib was adopted on *the very day* of the Rajah's death. But with this minute exception,—scarcely rising above a quibble,—I can see no possible excuse for those rash and extravagant assertions that there was "*no claimant*," and that "*no son, as they have themselves admitted*," was adopted at the Rajah's death by the Ranees his widows."§ Far from having admitted that negative proposition, they were, that very moment, pressing its contradictory affirmative upon the attention of Government by all the means in their power. Many months before Lord Dalhousie's departure, the Ranees had gained courage from despair; and when that Farewell Minute of the 28th February, 1856, was written, their agents in London had been

* *Ibid*, p. 55. In the same way, referring to the Carnatic succession,—where, the family being Mahomedan, no adoption was necessary—he says, "the Nawab left *no male heir*," (Minute of February 28th, 1856, para. 43, p. 11) when all that ought to have been said was that he left *no lineal male descendant*; for he left a paternal uncle, (the son and brother of successive reigning Princes,) a male heir both according to Mahomedan and English law. Mr. J. M. Ludlow has well shown how in the Sattara and Jhansi cases also, Lord Dalhousie fell into this blunder, turning "heirs and successors" into "lineal heirs," or "heirs of the body," treating the words "successors" as surplusage, and construing "heirs" as "issue." (*Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown*, p. 120, 140, to 144.)

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 23, 26, 30.

‡ *Minute of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, 1856, p. 7.

§ *Ibid.*, 1856, para. 14, p. 7.

engaged for nearly a year in addressing petitions to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control.* Copies of these petitions must of course have been immediately furnished to the Governor-General for his information. The agents also write to the Ranees on the 10th October, 1855, that being desired by the home authorities to transmit what they have to say through the proper channel, they have already forwarded three petitions through the Commissioner of Nagpore to Lord Dalhousie.† What the contents of these petitions were we learn from Mr. Ludlow, who had seen them at the office of the India Reform Society. In the first of these, dated the 18th April, 1855, it is asserted that “the late Prince had long intended to adopt one of his near kinsmen, by name Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao,”—otherwise called Appa Sahib, and now Janojee Bhonsla. It is asserted that “immediately on the Maharajah’s decease the Maharanees made known their lord’s wishes to Mr. Mansel, the Resident, and that gentleman assured the Maharanees that he would make known their wishes to the Governor-General for the aforesaid Yeshwunt Rao being placed on the throne.” And, as we have seen, this is exactly what Mr. Mansel did.‡ It is said that the ladies, satisfied with this assurance, “were content to postpone the completion of such ceremony,” and “with the concurrence of the Resident allowed Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao to perform the necessary funeral solemnities.”§

Sir Charles Jackson expresses his belief that the Ranees did not adopt Appa Sahib until “after the decision of Government in favour of annexation,” and that they then “antedated his adoption.”|| If it were so, Janojee Bhonsla’s right to the succession under the Treaty, as the “heir and successor” of the Rajah would not be weakened. Neither Hindoo law, nor the customs and precedents of the Bhonsla family, prescribe any limited number of days, after which an adoption would not be valid or effective. If it were as Sir Charles Jackson believes, all that could

be said would be that the Ranees having waited a reasonable time, under the instructions of the British Resident, for the initiative to be taken by the Protecting Power, adopted the Rajah's natural and intended heir, when the bad intentions of the Protecting Power could be no longer mistaken.

In the book which Sir Charles Jackson has quoted, I related the story of the Bhonsla's ancestral estates,—situated beyond the limits of the Nagpore territory,—their hasty sequestration on the Rajah's death, their subsequent restoration to the widow, and their ultimate assignment to the adopted son.

“The estates remained in the widow's possession until 1860, when Lord Canning having, as a partial and very imperfect reparation to the Bhonslas, recognised Janojee Bhonsla as the head of the family, the lands were transferred to him, with the remnants of the private moveable property that had escaped Lord Dalhousie's auctions.”*

Sir Charles Jackson, alluding obscurely to this transaction, says :—“The report of the Resident, who was in communication with the Ranees after the Rajah's death, and a petition of the Banka Bae's, were conclusive, *and Lord Canning refused to acknowledge Appa Sahib as the adopted son of the Rajah.*”† This point was met and fully treated by me, but Sir Charles Jackson makes no reference to the following remarks.

“In the notification of his title of Rajah Bahadur of Deoor, in the *Calcutta Gazette*, Lord Canning, certainly with no intention of insult, described the grandnephew and adopted son of our faithful Ally as ‘the adopted son of the widow of the late Ruler of Nagpore,’ an impossible relationship according to the Hindoo law, a solecism in legal phraseology, and colloquially in India a contemptuous and offensive designation.‡ Of course the object was to avoid the appearance of acknowledging Janojee Bhonsla's direct heirship to the late Rajah. But the evasion is as ineffectual as the mode of expression was ungracious. The Government

* *Empire in India*, p. 244.

† *A Vindication*, p. 23 (note.)

‡ The notification runs as follows :—“No. 1115 : Camp Hoshiarpur, March 30th, 1860 :—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has been pleased to confer on Janojee Bhonsla, the adopted son of the widow of the late Ruler of Nagpore, the title of ‘Raja Bahadur of Deoor,’ in the district of Satara, in recognition of the loyal conduct of the family during the rebellion, and of the faithful attachment of the late Banka Bae to the British Government.”

having recognised this young Prince as the head of the Bhonsla family, and having at last permitted him to succeed to the ancient estates, it was useless to call him 'the widow's son' with no ostensible father. If he be correctly described as 'the adopted son of the widow of the late Ruler of Nagpore,' then he is the son of the late Ruler also, unless we are to assail the honour of this lady, and that without any great refinement or subtlety of allusion. By the Hindoo law the ceremony of adoption severs the relationship between Janojee and his 'natural father,' the widow's late husband taking the place of the latter. An unmarried woman cannot adopt a son, nor can any woman but a widow; and the child is not adopted to remove the reproach of barrenness from her, but its spiritual evils from her deceased husband. Vasishtha says:— 'A son given is the child not of his adoptive mother, but of his adoptive father.' (Colebrooke's Digest, vol. iii, p. 254.) The adopted son of the Rajah's widow is, by Hindoo law, either the Rajah's son and heir, or else he represents the most degrading species of illegitimacy, which would completely disqualify him from succeeding to the family estates, and which most certainly Lord Canning never intended to impute to Rajah Janojee Bhonsla. There stands the dilemma, quite unassailable by any weapon in the Calcutta Foreign Office, or in any store-house of Hindoo law; and there it will remain—a moral, legal and political paradox—until, as I hope, obliterated for ever by a royal restitution.*

* *Empire in India*, p. 225, 226.

CHAPTER V.

OUDE.

THE Duke of Argyll, "having been a member of the Cabinet which decided on the Annexation of Oude, and decided, too, not only on the doing of it, but substantially on the manner in which it shall be done," expresses astonishment at "the ignorant injustice with which, on account of this transaction, the memory of Lord Dalhousie has been assailed."* He complains of that "popular impression which ascribes the annexation of Oude to the special policy of Lord Dalhousie," who, according to him, "not only deprecated annexation, but deprecated even the direct or forcible assumption of the Government of Oude."†

Sir Charles Jackson in the same manner declares that "Lord Dalhousie's advice with respect to Oude was not followed;" that "he is not, in fact, responsible for the annexation of that Province;"‡ that "he was, in fact, opposed to the annexation of Oude;" and "that his part in the transaction was the last sacrifice which he made on the altar of duty."§

So lately as the 28th of December, 1867, an article in the *Spectator*, on "the Lucknow Durbar," written, if I am not much mistaken, by a former Editor of the *Calcutta Friend of India*, asserts that the Cabinet of which Lord Canning was a member, "decided on overriding Lord Dalhousie's proposal to sequestrate Oude, and carrying out the annexation;" and that "Lord Canning was the statesman really responsible for the annexation of Oude."

And Mr. J. C. Marshman, another former Editor of the *Friend of India*, in his recently published *History*, speaks of "the Court of Directors, the Board of Control, and the

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, Preface. † *Ibid.*, p. 15.

‡ *A Vindication*, p. 117.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

Cabinet, having come to the unanimous determination to overrule the advice of Lord Dalhousie.”*

Lord Dalhousie is represented as acting in this instance under orders which he loyally and submissively carried out, against his own expressed opinion. This is a very inadequate and inaccurate representation of what really occurred. The Cabinet and the Court of Directors, who were certainly not “unanimous,” did *not* “overrule Lord Dalhousie’s advice,” nor “override his proposal.” He was left at full liberty to carry out his own project, if he chose. Lord Dalhousie’s repugnance to the absolute annexation of Oude, and to the immediate and forcible assumption of its Government,—a repugnance which he managed to overcome,—was directed merely against certain forms and phrases, and cannot relieve him of the least responsibility for a measure which he prompted and brought to pass, and which is justly ascribed to his “special policy.”

The difference of opinion between Lord Dalhousie and his Councillors can be very briefly described. Down to the despatch from the Governor-General to the Court of Directors, dated the 22nd August, 1855, the only plan for the reform of Oude which had been recommended in India and approved by the Home authorities, was that of *temporary management*, with a view to the ultimate restoration of purely native rule.† During Lord Dalhousie’s tenure of office the ideas of the Supreme Council underwent a complete change. In 1855,—Sattara, Jhansi, and Nagpore having been annexed, the mediatised Principalities of Tanjore and the Carnatic having been extinguished,—the Governor-General and his advisers unanimously agreed that the evils of Oude were incurable by any other means than the permanent assumption by the British Government of the entire administration of that country. They differed only as to the ostensible process for attaining that necessary consummation.‡

The Members of Council,—Mr. Dorin, Mr. Grant,§ General Low, and Mr. Peacock,||—all suggested, with

* *History of India*, (Longman and Co.) vol. iii, p. 427.

† See paragraph 29 of Mr. Grant’s Minute, *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 210, and p. 191 and 233.

‡ *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 233.

§ Now Sir J. P. Grant, K C.B., Governor of Jamaica.

|| Now Sir Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice of the High Court of Bengal.

slight variance in their pleadings and in the details of the settlement proposed, that a new treaty should be submitted for the King of Oude's acceptance, vesting all administrative powers in the hands of the British Government, reserving a certain income for the royal family ; and that in the event of the King's refusal to consent to these terms, the former Treaties should be declared at an end, and the territories of Oude at once forcibly incorporated with the dominions of the Honourable Company.

The Governor-General desired to take a less direct course, one that would be "more in conformity to international law,"—as he understood it,—and "therefore, less liable to criticism or cavil, and less open to the attack of those who might be expected to condemn and oppose the measure."* He recommended that a Treaty such as was proposed by his colleagues, should be placed before the King ; that if he rejected it, no coercive steps should be taken, but all relations with the Court of Oude should be broken off, the Resident and troops be withdrawn from Lucknow, the Treaties proclaimed to be null and void and British protection to have ceased. He believed that the King would shrink from the consequences of being left face to face with his turbulent vassals and subjects ; but that if he resolved on braving them, the capital would be pillaged within a month, and the King, "to save himself, would be glad to agree to whatever engagements might be offered him by the British Government."†

Lord Dalhousie, in advising the withdrawal of British protection, had his eye on another possible solution of the problem. Although the King might choose to trust to his own resources, and might even succeed in maintaining his personal safety amid scenes of anarchy and confusion, "*the security of British territories and the interests of their inhabitants might be put in danger by the state of the neighbouring Province of Oude.*" In that case the British Government would be compelled to "*interpose in His Majesty's affairs,*" and, of course, entitled to exact and enforce its own inevitable conditions.‡ In the Duke of Argyll's words, "It was by our troops that the Native

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 299. † *Ibid.*, p. 300.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 188, and p. 221, 222.

Government was maintained. Experience had proved that it could not stand without them. If the troops were withdrawn the Government would fall, or would be compelled to seek for our help again, in which case we could impose our own terms.”*

The Duke pronounces also that “the veriest formalist must admit our right to do what Lord Dalhousie recommended,—which was simply to withdraw our troops, declaring the treaty of 1801 to be at an end. He was induced to recommend this, because he thought the result would be the same.”†

From Lord Dalhousie’s language it might be supposed that the principles of action for which he and Mr. J. P. Grant respectively contended, were perfectly irreconcilable. “So entirely,” he writes, “did I dissent from the view taken by my honourable colleague, and so erroneous did it seem to me, that if unfortunately it had found favour with the Honourable Court, I must have declined to take part in the establishment or enforcement of any policy which might have been founded upon it.”‡ Yet after a few paragraphs he adds:—“I have never affected to conceal my conviction that *this measure*”—his own plan of withdrawing our protection,—“*would lead to precisely the same result as the more peremptory course advised by others, but with some intervening delay.*”§

Thus the formal moderation of the procedure designed by Lord Dalhousie, and contrasted by him with “the unnecessarily harsh” measures of the Councillors,|| amounted to nothing more than the polite invitation addressed by the landlord to the barn-door fowls, when he asked them whether they would prefer being boiled or roasted. The only dispute between the Governor-General and his colleagues was as to the particular sauce with which the fat capon of Oude was to be cooked. And after a little more unmeaning prudery, the Governor-General ended by using the very sauce compounded by his colleagues, against which he had expressed such insuperable objections. He thus concludes that part of his Minute of 13th February, 1856 :—“Having regard, therefore, to the several opinions

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 19.

† *Ibid.*, p. 19.

‡ *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 298, 299. § *Ibid.*, p. 299.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 298.

and circumstances which have just been mentioned, I resolved to forego my own preferences, and in dealing with Oude, to adopt the more peremptory course which had been advocated by my colleagues, and which was manifestly more acceptable to the Honourable Court.”*

The Duke of Argyll’s comment on this passage is remarkably just:—“Without prolonging controversy on points of principle, but protesting against the doctrine laid down by Mr. Grant, *he yet agreed to a course which was logically defensible on no other principle than that which Mr. Grant maintained.*”†

The Duke of Argyll says:—“It is a curious fact that Lord Dalhousie alone had scruples even in respect to any forcible seizure of the Government.”‡ The result shows what those scruples were worth. His own words prove that his real anxiety was to avert “criticism and cavil,” and “the attacks of those who might be expected to condemn and oppose the measure.”§ He objected to “a line of political action which was likely to create a keener opposition, and to call forth severer comment.”|| All he wanted was a plausible pretext for “the forcible seizure” of Oude. In order to obtain such a plausible pretext as he thought would suffice, he did not scruple to advise the withdrawal of that protection which was promised to the Kings of Oude by a series of treaties, and for which they had “paid such a price,” as General Low said, “as no other native ruler ever did.”¶ I may be more benighted than the “veriest formalist” despised by the Duke of Argyll, but this policy seems to me to have been detestable. Lord Dalhousie did not scruple to recommend a course which, according to his own expectations, would have led to an immediate insurrection, would have endangered the King’s life, and would have given up the great city of Lucknow to pillage.** Then, when the anticipated rebellion and anarchy had either induced the King to beg for our armed intervention, or had “threatened the peace of our own provinces,” he would no longer

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 300. † *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 21.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 19.

§ *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 299.

¶ *Ibid.*, 1858, p. 19.

** *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 299, 300.

have any objection to the forcible seizure of the country, to "a very prompt and summary settlement of the Oude question."* Such were Lord Dalhousie's scruples!

That Lord Dalhousie had scruples and misgivings as to the annexation of Oude, and as to several other annexations, cannot be doubted. That he so easily overcame those scruples, and smothered those misgivings, is his great opprobrium as a statesman. Sir Charles Jackson says:—"He always entertained a great distaste for the subject. I remember a conversation with him in 1852, in which he stated he had been pressed to take the country (by whom he did not say), and that he felt averse to such a measure. I cannot trust my memory to state the precise nature of his objections at that time."†

Sir Charles Jackson erroneously states,—and the same strange mistake is made by the other apologists,—that Lord Dalhousie's scheme of withdrawal from Oude, was "*disallowed*,"‡ and that he was "*obliged* to abandon"§ it, by the Court of Directors' despatch of the 21st November, 1855. It was not so. In this despatch,—characterised by Sir Charles Jackson as "a specimen of the art of writing important instructions so as to avoid responsibility,"|| and by the Duke as "nominally from the Court of Directors, really from the Ministers of the Crown,"¶—some apprehension was indicated that the scheme might fail, but the Directors declined to "express any opinion on the principles laid down by the several Members of Council," and authorised the Governor-General to "carry out his first suggestion," if he "should feel warranted in doing so." They were decided as to the necessity of assuming the government of Oude; but they left "all questions of detail to the wisdom of the Governor-General," abstaining "from fettering his Lordship's discretion by any further instructions,"—"whichever mode of attaining the indispensable result may be resolved on."**

Lord Dalhousie was left completely at liberty to adhere to his original plan, if he thought it likely to be successful. The Directors themselves considered the Governor-

* *Oude Papers*, 300. † *A Vindication*, p. 130, note. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 144. ¶ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 21.

** *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 235, 236.

General's plan to have "an advantage over the others," inasmuch as it "included the King as a consenting party to the measure," and was "intended to show more tenderness to the feelings of a family, who, whatever may have been their offences towards their own subjects, have not been unfaithful to the British Government."*

After the exposition already given of the true nature and object of this measure, I need hardly say that I can see no traces of any such tenderness. Indeed, since under the more "harsh" and "peremptory" course that was actually pursued, the King was offered the option of signing a Treaty, if he chose, and thus becoming "a consenting party," there was really no distinction between the two measures.

Lord Dalhousie's so-called scruples,—really more unscrupulous than the open violence ultimately adopted,—receive the severest condemnation from the Duke of Argyll, in spite of himself, when he terms the plan of withdrawal "an indirect measure of compulsion;"† and when he says that "*Lord Dalhousie probably overstated his own opinion*," in saying that "it would not be right to endeavour to extract" the King's "consent by means of menace or compulsion."‡ Lord Dalhousie certainly overstated his own opinion; his whole plan of action was based on menace and compulsion under the flimsiest disguise; even this disguise was to be thrown off, if he could provoke anything like a plausible pretext for forcible interposition; and it was thrown off as soon as he had secured the support of the Cabinet and the Board of Directors. These scruples never operated beyond the walls of the Council chamber; produced nothing but a few inconsistent and contradictory paragraphs; and avowedly aimed at nothing but disarming hostile criticism. Yet on the strength of these ephemeral scruples, Sir Charles Jackson denies Lord Dalhousie's responsibility; and the Duke of Argyll charges with "ignorant injustice" all those who ascribe the annexation of Oude to the Governor-General who compassed it, who planned it, and who carried it out.

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 235.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 21.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

That Lord Dalhousie from the first compassed and planned the annexation of Oude as his special policy, "though with some intervening delay,"* is manifest from two main expedients in the process originally designed by him, to both of which he adhered throughout. The first of these was the imposition of a new Treaty, restricting the inheritance to *the lineal male descendants of the reigning King, "born in lawful wedlock,"*†—a restriction hitherto unheard of, and unwarranted by Mahomedan law. This novel restriction was deliberately introduced by Lord Dalhousie. "It will be seen," he writes, "that the succession was limited to the children born in lawful wedlock, and was not extended to collateral heirs."‡ By thus excluding collateral heirs, many living persons and their offspring,—the King's brother and all descendants of former Sovereigns,—were cut out of the line of succession, and the probabilities of what would be called "a lapse," when merely the title and a stipend were left, multiplied enormously.

The second expedient was the repudiation of the Treaty of 1837,—a Treaty regularly concluded and ratified, brought into operation, never called in question before Lord Dalhousie's time, and actually quoted as a valid Treaty in 1847 by his immediate predecessor, Lord Hardinge, who threatened the King of Oude that its provisions should be enforced.

Full powers of management and reform were given by the Treaty of 1837. But when the assumption of the Government of Oude began to be a practical and urgent question in 1854, it was perceived by the Governor-General that two Articles (VII and VIII) in this Treaty, providing for the ultimate restoration of native rule, and for the intermediate payment of all surplus receipts into the King's Treasury, would deprive the British management of a permanent and profitable character. Therefore Lord Dalhousie (of course without alluding to these strong inducements), proposed that this Treaty, although officially published as a valid engagement, should be declared null and void by the perverted interpretation of a *secret letter* from the Court of Directors in 1838.

* *Ante*, p. 49. † *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 252.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1856, 302.

The Duke of Argyll says :—"It is not true that we derived advantage from the non-ratification of the Treaty of 1837. *On the contrary, Lord Dalhousie would have been delighted to proceed under it, if it had been in force.* It gave him all he wanted,—a right to seize the government. The King, however, was offered a better position than that Treaty would have secured to him."* All this is very erroneous. The Treaty of 1837 did *not* give Lord Dalhousie "all he wanted." It did not give him the surplus revenues of Oude, to be disposed of, as he pleased, for Imperial purposes, but compelled him to account for them to the State of Oude. It did, indeed, give him "a right to seize the government," but only for a temporary object, and bound him "to maintain the native institutions and forms of administration, so as to facilitate the restoration of those territories to the Sovereign of Oude."† Lord Dalhousie would certainly *not* "have been delighted to proceed" under those conditions.

The King was *not* "offered a better position than that Treaty would have secured to him." He was offered a fixed stipend, and an empty title, hampered as an inheritance by novel restrictions, with no prospect for him or his descendants, of reinstatement in the functions of royalty.

Lord Dalhousie's plea for not assuming the management under the Treaty of 1837, was that the Treaty had been "cancelled" by the Home Authorities. The fact is, that the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors disapproved of the increased burden of providing an Auxiliary Force, imposed upon Oude by the new Treaty, and desired that the King should be "exonerated from these obligations." But they added in their despatch to Lord Auckland,—"*Although we thus convey to you our directions for the abrogation of the Treaty, we leave it discretionary with your Lordship to adapt your measures to the state of circumstances as may be found to exist when you receive this letter;*" and they recommend that the communication to the King should be made, "as an act of grace from your Lordship in Council, rather than as the consequence of the receipt of a public and unconditional instruction from

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 110 (foot-note.)

† *Collection of Treaties*, 1864, Calcutta, vol. ii, p. 177.

England." They continue thus:—"Your Lordship in Council, therefore, is authorised to exercise the largest discretion as to the mode of carrying our wishes into effect in respect to the Treaty; but"—here is the important point,—“the order of the Court of Directors is positive, and strictly to be enforced, to discontinue the preparations which may have been made for the organisation of the Auxiliary Force.”* Their only positive objection, their only strict order, was directed against the new Force imposed as a burden on the Finances of Oude. But they used the word “abrogation;” and Lord Dalhousie fastened upon that.

Lord Auckland, with the advice of his Councillors, General Morrison and Mr. Robertson, decided on merely signifying to the King of Oude that he was relieved from the military expenses imposed by the Treaty of 1837; and they came to this decision on the express grounds of the difficulty under the Treaty of 1801 “of enforcing its conditions,” of the “solemn, recorded, and effectual warning contained” in the new Treaty of 1837, and of the power obtained by it to “assume the administration as a remedy for gross misrule.”† The last words of Lord Auckland’s Minute of the 2nd of May, 1839, the last that he penned before addressing the King on the subject, contain an expression of his entire agreement in the opinion of his colleague Mr. Robertson, that “if the independence of Oude endure much longer, it will be mainly in consequence of this very provision,”—for the assumption of the administration in case of misrule.”‡ The Government of India in 1839, did not consider or intend the new Treaty to be annulled, but simply, as they told the King, that the Articles imposing a pecuniary charge upon him would not be any longer enforced, that he would have to pay no more for the military force which, in Lord Auckland’s words, had been “*partly raised under that Treaty*,” and that the British Government would “defray the expense of the portion of it already organised.”§

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 37, 38.

† Minutes by Lord Auckland, Colonel Morrison, and Mr. Robertson: *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 38, 43, 59.

‡ *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 59.

§ *Ibid*, 1858, p. 60.

Lord Dalhousie, in laying the train for the meditated annexation of Oude, said that "pledges upon the non-ratification of the Treaty were given to Parliament."* I know not to what Lord Dalhousie, or Lord Auckland, whom he is quoting, can allude, except to the conversation that took place in the House of Lords on the 6th of August, 1838, in the course of which

"Lord Ellenborough said that to assert that there was no Treaty in existence because it had not been ratified at home, was not a correct representation of the fact. The Treaty was ratified by the Governor-General, and certainly might be acted on."

"The Marquis of Lansdowne said that he had now distinctly to state that not only did his noble friend at the head of the Government of India, immediately on being informed of this Treaty, express his disapprobation of the manner in which the promise had been drawn from the Sovereign of Oude, but he also caused it to be intimated in the most explicit manner to that Prince, that he was in no degree bound by the promise to sign such a Treaty, and entirely relieved from any stipulations or conditions it imposed."†

Whether Lord Lansdowne's statement constituted a "pledge" or not, matters very little; for it was founded on an error. No such intimation had then been made, or was ever made, to the Sovereign of Oude, as Lord Lansdowne supposed. The noble Lord at the head of the Government of India, Lord Auckland, did indeed express some slight disapprobation of the "superfluous" *promise* extracted from the King,‡ but he did *not* disapprove of the Treaty; it was entirely his own idea and his own work; he framed its conditions himself; he persistently argued with the Court of Directors for the maintenance of every item. The King was *not* told "in the most explicit manner," or in any manner, that he was "entirely relieved from its conditions," but merely that he was relieved from the additional Subsidy for troops. Lord Auckland attributed no efficacy to the so-called Parliamentary pledge; he spoke of it as an awkward difficulty, but still pursued his own course; and his letter to the King of Oude, speaking of the Treaty as still in existence, was written a year later than Lord Lansdowne's speech.

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, pp. 65 & 51. † *Hansard*, 3rd series, vol. xliv, p. 1006.

‡ *Oude Papers*, 1858, pp. 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 22, 23.

Lord Ellenborough was, of course, perfectly correct in his view of the situation. The Treaty concluded in 1837 was not, and could not be cancelled by a "secret letter" in 1838, or by any amount of conversation in the House of Lords.

The Treaty of 1837 was officially published in a volume of Treaties, by authority of the Court of Directors in 1845, and reprinted as a return to the House of Lords in 1853.

There is a note appended to the Treaty of 1837 in this printed Volume, which tells us what was thought of this Treaty at the India House so late as the 24th June 1853. It is as follows :—

"The Home Government disapproved of that part of the Treaty which imposed on the Oude State the expense of the Auxiliary Force, and on July 8th, 1839, the King was informed that he was relieved from the cost of maintaining the Auxiliary Force, which the British Government had taken upon itself."*

Mr. Kaye, in the first volume of his excellent *History of the Sepoy War*, puts forth, once more, the official version of these transactions, and calls the Treaty of 1837 "an abortion." He also mentions that the following Return was made to Parliament under the signature of the Secretary to the Board of Control :—

"There has been no Treaty concluded with the present King of Oude which has been ratified by the Court of Directors, with the approbation of the Commissioners for the affairs of India."

"India Board, July 3rd, 1838. (Signed) R. GORDON."

It must have been on the strength of this document, fortified by some overstated verbal information, that the Marquis of Lansdowne made his erroneous statement. The literal purport of the Return—true, so far as it goes,—by no means amounts to a declaration that the Treaty, which it does not name, is null and void ; nor, had it contained such a declaration, could it have had the effect of annulling the Treaty, any more than the "secret letter" of the Court of Directors, or the erroneous "pledge" given by Lord Lansdowne, neither of which was communicated to the King of Oude. The King was expressly informed in Lord Auckland's letter of the 8th of July, 1839,—just a

* *Return to the House of Lords*, No. 251, 1833, p. 94.

year after the Return to Parliament on which Mr. Kaye relies,—that “*the Court of Directors*,” in consideration of the “embarrassments which might be occasioned to the State of Oude by the annual payment of sixteen lakhs of rupees to the support of the military force,” had empowered the Governor-General “to relieve the State of Oude from all that is onerous in the conditions respecting this force.”* This notification, that the King was relieved by the Court of Directors from *some* of the conditions, is equivalent to a confirmation by the Court of Directors, of the remaining conditions, had any such confirmation been required. But immemorial custom, and innumerable precedents, and the terms of this particular Treaty, do not give a hint or show a trace of the necessity for such confirmation. The Governor-General had at least the powers of a Plenipotentiary. He had full power to conclude Treaties, and the final exchange of ratified copies made the Treaty binding upon both parties.

Sir Charles Jackson says:—“The Court of Directors refused to ratify this Treaty.”† They were never asked or expected to do so. They have never ratified any Treaties. In the six Volumes of Treaties published by authority at Calcutta in 1864, there is not one Treaty bearing the ratification of the Court of Directors. This Treaty of 1837 is attested in exactly the same style as all the preceding Treaties with the Government of Oude:—

“Ratified by the Governor General of India in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, this eighteenth day of September, One Thousand, Eight Hundred and Thirty Seven.

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN,
Secretary to the Government of India.”‡

Even in the case, which clearly did not occur, of a timely and open rejection of this Treaty by the Court of Directors, such a Treaty, concluded with every formality between the Governor-General of India and the Sovereign of Oude—signed, and sealed, and ratified,—could not have been cancelled by the Home Authorities without the knowledge and consent of the Sovereign of Oude; without, in fact, a fresh negotiation with that express object.

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 60.

† *A Vindication*, p. 124.

‡ *Collection of Treaties*, 1864, vol. ii, p. 177.

Such a fresh negotiation could have been opened without any difficulty or embarrassment by the Governor-General, if the Home Authorities had insisted on their orders being fully carried out. But there is nothing in the *Papers* of 1858 to show that they adhered to their original resolution after Lord Auckland's last remonstrance. The latest paper in that part of the collection is the Governor-General's letter to the Secret Committee dated July 15th, 1839, in which he forwards copies of his letter, of the 8th idem, to the King of Oude, apprising him simply of his being relieved from the military charges recently imposed.*

Lord Dalhousie's Minute of the 14th August, 1854, containing a précis of the correspondence in this matter, is so unfortunately arranged that no one could gather from it that Lord Auckland's letter of the 15th July, 1839, forwarding a copy of his letter to the King, was *later in date* than any of the other documents quoted, and *a year later* than the supposed "pledge" in the House of Lords. He has thrown it back, *without any date*, to a place in his narrative immediately after the Secret Committee's first letter of disapproval, dated April 10th, 1838. Then, on the top of these, he piles extracts from the despatches of the Secret Committee down to 11th July, 1839, in order to prove that they "did not recede from these sentiments,"—thus conveying an impression that they had repeatedly disapproved of the letter to the King of Oude, which they had not seen when those despatches were written, and which was never disapproved at all.

Lord Dalhousie vainly endeavours also to show that Lord Auckland knew the treaty was null and void.

"In pursuance of the discretion thus left to him, the Governor General in Council intimated to the King of Oude the abandonment of only a part of the Treaty, but in his recorded Minute *he recognised the full abrogation of the entire instrument*. He said, 'the Court has disapproved the Treaty. We are ordered to exonerate the King of Oude from its obligations.' And in the same Minute the Governor General stated that the disallowance of the Treaty had been made known to Parliament. He said, 'I find the view taken by the Court to be publicly declared. I find pledges upon the non-ratification of Treaty given to Parliament.'"[†]

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 60.

† *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 66.

There is nothing in these words to show that Lord Auckland "*recognised the full abrogation*" of the Treaty. He mentions the Court's disapproval, and the public declaration in Parliament, as constituting "a situation of much difficulty," but far from considering the Directors' orders as final and irrevocable, he determines again to bring this "*question of such extended and vital interest, in all its bearings, under the deliberate review of the Home Authorities.*"* His Council coincided with him. Mr. Robertson, in a Minute dated 9th January, 1839, is "disposed to hope that by a relaxation of the terms of the existing Treaty with Oude, the authorities in England may be reconciled to a measure which cannot now be cancelled without the most serious inconvenience."† General Morrison, on the 28th January, 1839, writes:—"Notwithstanding the public avowal made in England of dissatisfaction with the Treaty of September 1837, I would yet maintain its provisions, *in the hope that the orders for abandoning the Treaty may be revoked.*"‡

How then could Lord Dalhousie persuade himself that the Governor-General in Council at this time "recognised the full abrogation of the entire document"? He was exerting himself to the utmost to uphold it; and four months later, although another adverse dispatch had arrived in the interval, Lord Auckland professes "his unaltered adherence to the principles on which the Treaty of September 1837 was originally negotiated," and again "*leaves the case for the further directions of the Home Government.*"§

After that Minute had been sent off, but before it could have been considered at home, another letter arrived from the Court of Directors, dated 15th April, 1839, repeating their "disallowance of the Treaty," and desiring "the restoration of our relations with the State of Oude to the footing on which they previously stood." At the same time all their specific objections were aimed against the Auxiliary Force being made a charge upon the revenues of Oude; and they permit their decision to be announced

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 51, 52.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1858, p. 56.

† *Ibid.*, 1858, p. 53.

§ *Ibid.*, 1858, p. 58, 59.

to the King, "*in such manner as the Governor-General may think fit.*"*

As it was now impossible any longer to delay informing the Oude Government that it was relieved from the new pecuniary burden, Lord Auckland immediately wrote his letter of the 8th July, 1839, to the King of Oude. This letter was carefully worded so as to avoid suggesting to the King of Oude that he might hope to escape from that liability to the direct management of his country, for which the new Treaty provided. It was written entirely in the spirit of that part of Lord Auckland's last Minute on the subject, dated 2nd May, 1839, - *to which no reply had then been received from the Court of Directors*,—in which he refers to the unanimous support of the Members of Council "*in regard to the second branch of the Treaty, that which provides for the assumption of the administration as a remedy for gross misrule.*"†

How Lord Auckland's letter and enclosure of the 15th July, 1839, were treated by the Home Authorities, we have no means of learning from the printed Papers. If their comments were quite condemnatory, I think we should have found them among the Papers of 1858. No condemnation behind the scenes, however, could, as already shown, have cancelled the Treaty. If, on the other hand, the receipt of the despatch and the copy of the letter to the King, was acknowledged with a simple expression of approval, or was silently passed over with no renewal of their adverse orders, then the proceedings of the Government of India were,—expressly or tacitly,—approved and confirmed.

From no mention being made in any of Lord Dalhousie's Minutes or despatches of any reply by the Court of Directors, to Lord Auckland's last letter, we have the right to presume that no fault was found with it. In such a case, according to common sense as well as official custom, silence gives consent. His proceedings were allowed to stand.

Thus, while it is quite clear and certain that the Home Authorities did not openly reject the Treaty of 1837, it is

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 57. † *Ibid.*, 1858, p. 59.

almost equally clear and certain that, after the relaxation of certain conditions, they finally accepted and approved it. Whether they did or did not, the notion of the Treaty having been annulled or made of no effect, by virtue of their confidential strictures, is utterly vain and totally inadmissible.

Lord Broughton, who as Sir John Cam Hobhouse had been President of the Board of Control when the Treaty of 1837 was concluded, when the supposed pledges were given in the House of Lords, and when the Return cited by Mr. Kaye was made to Parliament,* gives his testimony in the following words:—"My impression certainly is that the Treaty of 1837 was ratified by Government at home, after the disallowance referred to: the whole Treaty was not disallowed, but only one portion of it."†

No one in India, at Lucknow, or at Calcutta, ever doubted the validity and binding force of this Treaty, until Lord Dalhousie found that it stood in the way of his scheme of appropriating all the revenues of Oude.

Sir Henry Lawrence, writing in the *Calcutta Review* in 1845, describes the conclusion of the Treaty of 1837, observes that the Court of Directors "very properly disapproved" of the measure by which the King was to have been saddled with the expense of an Auxiliary Force, and that, in reliance on his Majesty's good intentions, "Government overlooked the glaring mismanagement still existing in parts of Oude, and did not act on the permission given by the new Treaty."‡ And he adds subsequently:—"No one can deny that we are now authorised by Treaty to assume the management."§

General Sir William Sleeman, who was for six years Resident at Lucknow, alludes, in two letters written in 1852 and 1854, to the "ample authority" conferred by "the Treaty of 1837."|| The Blue Book of 1856 contains an extract from one of Sir William Sleeman's despatches, quoted in one of Lord Dalhousie's Minutes, in which he gives it as his opinion that "our Government cannot any longer for-

* *Ante*, p. 57.

† Beveridge's *History of India*, (Blackie, 1866) vol. iii, p. 548.

‡ *Essays*, (published by Allen) 1859, p. 126. § *Ibid.*, p. 131.

|| *Sleeman's Journey through Oude*, vol. ii, p. 377, and 419.

bear to exercise to the fullest extent the powers which the Treaty of 1837 confers upon it." *

And in a long Memorandum of advice and remonstrance addressed by Lord Hardinge to the King of Oude in 1847, his Lordship distinctly threatens to enforce the stipulations of the Treaty of 1837.†

Lord Dalhousie, in the 1st, 18th, and 71st paragraphs of his principal Minute on the Oude question, refers to the solemn warning offered to the King by his immediate predecessor, Lord Hardinge, in 1847,—that if the abuses of his Majesty's administration were not reformed "he would force the British Government to interfere by assuming the government of Oude,"‡ but he nowhere gives the slightest hint that this warning and this threat were based upon the Treaty of 1837.

Even in his later Minute of January 15th, 1856, although he anticipated the probability of great "embarrassment," if the King should appeal to the Treaty of 1837, and desired the Resident to "meet it full in the face" by declaring that Treaty null and void, he does not seem to have contemplated the greatest possible embarrassment of all, that of the King producing Lord Hardinge's recognition of that Treaty.§ The Duke of Argyll, adhering to his avowed principles of political criticism,—following Lord Dalhousie, and viewing the facts in the light in which his friend stated them,||—relates Lord Hardinge's warning, but knows nothing of his threat to enforce the Treaty of 1837.¶ Sir Charles Jackson says that Lord Hardinge "cited the Treaty of 1837 as if it were still in force,"** but seems to consider this quite an insignificant circumstance, deserving no comment and calling for no explanation.

Yet Lord Hardinge's citation was full and his intention not open to doubt. He quotes the whole of Article vii of the Treaty, providing for the assumption of the management of Oude in the event of "gross and systematic misrule," and he adds:—

"I allude to the Treaty of 1837 as confirming the original Treaty of 1801, and not only giving the British Government the right to

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 166.

† *Ibid.*, 1858, p. 62.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 148, 156, and 187. § *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 239. || *Ante*, p. 6.

¶ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 13. ** *A Vindication*, p. 126.

interfere, but declaring it to be the intention of the Government to interfere, if necessary, for the purpose of securing good government in Oude.”*

Lord Hardinge’s plan was precisely that recommended by Sir William Sleeman and Sir Henry Lawrence, which the Duke of Argyll has entirely misunderstood. It was the same plan that Lord William Bentinck proposed, and was authorised by the Court of Directors to undertake,—that of temporary management, with a view to effectual reform of the native institutions and the ultimate restoration of a purely native government.

Lord William Bentinck, in his Report of 11th July, 1831, says :—

“I thought it right to declare to his Majesty, that the opinion I should offer to the Home Authorities would be that, unless a decided reform in the administration should take place, there would be no remedy left except in the direct assumption of the management of the Oude territories by the British Government.”

“It may be asked of me,—and when you have assumed the management, how is it to be conducted, and how long retained? I should answer, that acting in the character of guardian and trustee, we ought to frame an administration entirely native,—an administration so composed as to individuals, and so established upon the best principles, revenue and judicial, as should best serve for immediate improvement, and as a model for future imitation : the only European part of it should be the functionary by whom it should be superintended, and it should only be retained till a complete reform might be brought about, and a guarantee for its continuance obtained, either in the improved character of the reigning Prince, or, if incorrigible, in the substitution of his immediate heir, or in default of such substitute from nonage or incapacity, by the nomination of one of the family as Regent, the whole of the revenue being paid into the Oude treasury.”†

Lord Hardinge, in his Memorandum of 1847, reminds the King of Lord William Bentinck’s conferences with his Majesty’s predecessor, and informs him that in the year 1834 the Court of Directors had sanctioned the administration of Oude being assumed by Lord William Bentinck. He exhorts the King to procrastinate no longer in com-

* *Sleeman’s Journey through Oude*, vol. ii, p. 202 ; *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 62. The version of Lord Hardinge’s Memorandum in the Blue Book is not so intelligible as that given by Sir William Sleeman, and contains some manifest inaccuracies. I quote, therefore, from the latter.

† Sir Henry Lawrence’s *Essays*, p. 123 ; see also *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 155.

mening decisive reforms, so as to avoid the necessity of direct and open interference. He declares that the British Government desires to "perform its obligations to the people without setting the sovereign authority aside, or changing the native institutions of the State."* And as an example of what had been done, and a pledge of our disinterested objects, he adduces the precedent of Nagpore.

"The Nagpore State, after having been restored to order by a British administration of the land revenue, is now carried on under native management, with due regard to the rights of the Prince, and the contentment of the people."†

"If European agency should be required, in the first instance in assisting your Majesty's officers in making a just settlement, and in the next for securing the conditions made, by frequent visits throughout the districts to check abuses by personal inquiries, such assistance will be afforded by the British Government, with your Majesty's concurrence."‡

During the first six years of the vice-royalty of Lord Hardinge's successor, Lord Dalhousie, the two successive Residents at Lucknow, Colonel Richmond and Colonel (afterwards General Sir William) Sleeman, looked in vain to Calcutta for guidance and support in carrying out projects of reform.

Whatever may be said in the published Papers as to "admonitions" and "remonstrances," it is a positive fact that no plan for improving the administration of Oude was ever countenanced. Some extensive reforms proposed in concert by the native Minister and the British Resident at Lucknow, Colonel Richmond, and approved by Mr. Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, whose advice was asked in 1848, were absolutely discouraged and defeated by the Calcutta Foreign Office.§ The Bengal Civilian did not want to give assistance, they wanted to take possession; they conscientiously disbelieved in the efficacy of native efforts, and looked upon partial innovations as mere waste of time, delaying the harvest of patronage and deteriorating the crop. Oude, therefore, having been spared and neglected for twenty years, was at last absorbed by Lord Dalhousie, on the pretext of disorders in its government, which were all removable, and

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 63. † *Ibid.*, 1858, pp. 63, 64. ‡ *Ibid.*, 1858, p. 64.

§ *Dacoitee in Excelsis* (Taylor, 54 Chancery Lane, 1856), p. 102 to 108

which might have been easily remedied without annexation, if there had been any wish to preserve the separate existence of that friendly and faithful State. But there was no such wish.

Sir William Sleeman incessantly urged decisive action, at first recommending that all the authority and influence of the British Government should be used to promote the formation of a strong native administration; and latterly advising that the Treaty of 1837 should be openly enforced. During the year 1849, just as the two years of probation allowed by Lord Hardinge were expired, he forwarded to the Governor-General his plan for a Board of Regency, undertook to direct and superintend their operations with one additional Assistant and three clerks, and pledged his great reputation for the success of the experiment.

“Things would go on like marriage bells.* The judicial courts would be well conducted while the presiding officers felt secure in their tenure of office.”—“The police would soon become efficient under the supervision and control of respectable revenue officers.” “Oude ought to be, and would be under such a system a garden; the soil is the finest in India, so are the men; *and there is no want of an educated class for civil office*: on the contrary, they abound almost as much as the class of soldiers.”†—“The Board, composed of the first members of the Lucknow aristocracy, would be, I think, both popular and efficient; *and with the aid of a few of the ablest of the native judicial and revenue officers of our own districts*, invited to Oude by the prospect of higher pay and security in the tenure of office, would soon have at work a machinery capable of securing to all their rights, and enforcing from all their duties, in every part of this at present distracted country. We should soon have good roads throughout the Kingdom; and both they and the rivers would soon be as secure as in our own provinces. I think, too, that I might venture to promise that all would be effected without violence or disturbance; all would see that everything was done for the benefit of an oppressed people, and in good faith towards the reigning family.”‡—“I think the King will consent without much difficulty or reluctance to delegate his powers to a Regency, but I am somewhat afraid that he will object to its being composed of members of his own family. I shall, I daresay, be able to get over this difficulty; and it will be desirable to employ the best members of the family in order to show the people of Oude, and of India generally, that the object

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. i, p. lviii.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. lxiv.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. lxxvi.

of our Government is an honest and benevolent one.”*—“I have mentioned in my private letter to Sir H. M. Elliot, three persons of high character for the Regency. Two of them are brothers of the King’s father. The third, and best, may be considered as in all respects the first man in Oude. Mohsin-ood-Dowlah is the grandson of King Ghazee-ood-Deen ; his wife is the sister of the King’s father ; and his only son has been lately united in marriage to the present King’s daughter. He and his wife have large hereditary incomes, under the guaranty of our Government, and his character for good sense, prudence and integrity, stands higher, I believe, than that of any other man in Oude.”†

“The members of such a Board as I propose, invested with full powers, and secured in office under our guaranty during good conduct, would go fearlessly to work.”‡

“I should persuade the members to draw from the *élite* of their own creed in our service to aid in forming and carrying out the new system in their several departments. *We can give them excellent men in the revenue and judicial branches.*§—“The whole family are most anxious that the King should resign the reins into abler hands, and would, I feel assured, hail the arrangement I have proposed as a blessing to them and the country. All seems ripe for the change, and I hope the Governor-General will consent to its being proposed soon.”||

Before September and October 1849, when these letters were written to the Governor-General and the Foreign Secretary, the Punjaub had been annexed ; all were busily engaged in organising the new Province. Sattara, the first taste of blood in the previous year, only whetted the professional appetite ; it had now become insatiable. The last idea likely to find favour at Calcutta was the reconstruction of a Native State. Nothing, therefore, was done, or authorised to be done, in consequence of General Sleeman’s repeated applications, continued up to 1854. His correspondence proves that he latterly began to doubt the upright intentions of those who ruled the hour. At last he wrote as follows in a private letter to a friend :—

“Lord Dalhousie and I have different views, I fear. If he wishes anything that I do not think right and honest, I resign, and leave it to be done by others. I desire a strict adherence to solemn engagements, whether made with white faces or black. We have no right to annex or confiscate Oude ; we have a right under the Treaty of 1837, to take the management of it, but not to appro-

* *Sleeman’s Oude*, vol. i, p. lxxvi. † *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. lxxvii.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i, pp. lxi, lxii.

§ *Ibid.*, p. lxxv. || *Ibid.*, p. lxxiv.

priate its revenues to ourselves. We can do this with honour to our Government and benefit to the people. To confiscate would be dishonest and dishonourable. To annex would be to give the people a Government almost as bad as their own, if we put our screw upon them.”*

There is a touch of respectful yet reproachful irony in the following passage from what seems to have been his last letter to Lord Dalhousie,—it is dated 11th September, 1854,—gravely reminding him that when now about to leave the Residency, after representing the Government of India at Lucknow for six years, he was still unfurnished with instructions, still unacquainted with the Governor-General’s plans or wishes.

“Proofs enough of bad government and neglected duties were given in my Diary. The duty of remedying the evils, and carrying out your Lordship’s views in Oude, *whatever they may be*, must now devolve on another.”†

Thus up to the period of Lord Dalhousie’s arrival in India, no scheme had been proposed for the reform of Oude except that of temporary management. Lord Dalhousie’s immediate predecessor repeated that same proposal, and held out, *as an extreme measure*, the enforcement of the Treaty of 1837, under which all surplus revenues were to be paid into the local treasury, existing institutions maintained, and the restoration of native government facilitated, with such modifications and improvements as might be considered advisable.‡

Lord Dalhousie protested against temporary management; insisted on appropriating the surplus revenues for British purposes; in order to secure these two points, repudiated the Treaty of 1837, so recently invoked by his predecessor; and deliberately planned to bring about a scene of insurrection and pillage as a pretext for sweeping away every vestige of native government. The Duke of Argyll, however, declaims against “the ignorant injustice” of those who scribe the annexation of Oude to “the special policy of Lord Dalhousie.”

It was in every point of view his special policy. It was in the pursuance of a systematic and settled object,—in

* *Sleeman’s Oude*, vol. i, pp. xxi, xxii. † *Ibid*, vol. ii, p. 423.

‡ Articles vii and viii of the Treaty, *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 33.

obedience to a principle, such as it was,—that Lord Dalhousie avoided the temporary management of Oude. That principle was that if the British Government undertook “the responsibility, the labour, and the risk,” of reconstructing and reforming a native State, it ought, “after providing for the pensioned dynasty, for the administration of the Province, and for its progressive improvement,” to be allowed to appropriate the surplus revenue to Imperial purposes.* The double delusion, —false morally, and practically falsified,—that the British Government was not bound to interfere for the reform of a protected State, unless the interference could be made financially profitable to itself; and that the conversion of protected States into British Provinces would be financially profitable,—runs through all the arguments for the successive annexations, from Sattara to Oude.

No doubt Lord Dalhousie had persuaded himself that the temporary management of Oude was not attainable, and, if attainable, would not be effectual for permanent reform. With the fixed purpose of absolute acquisition before him, he was very easily persuaded, and attacked the plan of temporary management by arguments and illustrations of transparent futility. He adduced the two experiments of Hyderabad, under Sir Charles Metcalfe, and of Nagpore, under Sir Richard Jenkins, as instances of the total failure of temporary management;† whereas, if properly examined, they are seen to be instances of marked success, checked only by the sudden relaxation and subsequent neglect, for which our Government was solely responsible. After detailing the good results of the reforming measures in the Hyderabad country, he says:—“But the arrangement was temporary: its fruits, therefore, were transitory and disappointing. No sooner had the present Sovereign assumed the reins of government, than he set aside the system introduced by Sir Charles Metcalfe, and caused everything to revert to its former course.”‡ Did then Lord Dalhousie, who had so recently put forth the vast influence of the British Government, to coerce the Nizam of Hyderabad into consigning his most fertile Provinces, yielding a quarter of his revenue, to

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 190. † *Ibid.*, pp. 186, 187. ‡ *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 186.

British management, really think that the same vast influence would have been uselessly or unjustly put forth, to maintain British management, and pursue the incomplete reforms, at the commencement of the same Prince's reign? The promptitude with which the Government of India in 1829 acceded to the request of the Nizam that the English Superintendents should be withdrawn from his districts, is, as I observed in a previous publication, "but one instance of the utter indifference of the Calcutta officials to the internal and independent reforms of a Native Principality."*

Another objection to temporary management seemed, in Lord Dalhousie's eyes, to be final and fatal. It was provided in the Treaty of 1801 that the King's administration should be "carried on by his own officers."† Lord Dalhousie professed to see in this provision of the Treaty "an insurmountable barrier to the employment of British officers,"‡ without whose aid a thorough reformation was impracticable.

This barrier to the employment of British officers, was never, before Lord Dalhousie's time, felt or supposed to be insurmountable, or anything more than a difficulty to be overcome. Lord William Bentinck in 1831 was prepared to enter on the task of reforming Oude, under the Treaty of 1801, and the Court of Directors sanctioned its commencement.§

Colonel Low, the Resident at Lucknow, writes as follows to the Foreign Secretary at Calcutta, while the Treaty of 1837 was under consideration:—"In the whole of the correspondence, both from the Home authorities and in this country, all parties seemed formerly to have agreed that not one rupee of the revenues of Oude ought to be appropriated by the British Government beyond the expenses of managing the territory, if we should conceive it necessary to undertake its management by British officers."||

Lord Auckland, in a letter to the Court of Directors of the 9th February, 1839, refers to "the strong orders

* *The Mysore Reversion*, (2nd Edition) p. 219, and see also pp. 232, 233.

† Article vi, *Collection of Treaties*, 1864, vol. ii, p. 125.

‡ *Oude Papers*, 1854, p. 183. § *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 155. || *Ibid.*, 1858, p. 18.

already received from the Honourable Court, and still unexecuted, which would have warranted *a temporary occupation of the country by British officers*, for correction of the crying abuses that existed.”*

Lord Hardinge in 1847, exhorting the King to initiate an improved system, without delay, so as to save himself from the penalties of the Treaty of 1837 at the end of two years of probation, offered, as we have seen, to lend him the services of English officers to superintend the good work.†

Above all, at the very time when Lord Dalhousie was professing to see in the Treaty of 1801 “an insurmountable barrier” to the employment of British officers in the administration of Oude, *several British officers were actually so employed*,—appointed by the Governor-General himself, and directed by the Resident, though paid by the Oude Government. “After such a lamentable picture of the internal Police of Oude,” writes Colonel Outram, the Resident, to Lord Dalhousie, “it is satisfactory to turn to the Frontier Police, the only efficient public establishment maintained under the Oude Government; but that it is so efficiently maintained is to be attributed to its being placed under British officers independent of the Durbar, and under the immediate control of the Resident. The Oude Frontier Police was originally established in January, 1845, to the extent of 500 Sepoys and 100 horsemen, which force was subsequently augmented by his present Majesty to the total strength of 750 Sepoys and 150 horsemen.” He adds, “it has been most efficient and successful.”‡

The same means would have made all the other public establishments equally efficient. If there had been any difficulty in the terms of the Treaty of 1801, the King's consent would have removed it; and Lord Dalhousie, who had already seen that difficulty overcome in the case of the Frontier Police, and who hoped to obtain the King's consent to a Treaty of mediatisation, could hardly have doubted that his Majesty's consent would be more easily procured to the employment of a few more English officers.

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 42. † *Ante*, p. 65. ‡ *Oude Papers*, 1856, pp. 31, 32.

But this was one of Lord Dalhousie's "scruples"; this was one of his "misgivings"; this was one of his tender mercies. He could not "compel the fulfilment of the Treaty of 1801 by force of arms," on account of "its peculiar provisions."* But he had no objection to declare the Treaty null and void,—that is to say, to violate it himself by withdrawing the troops stationed in Oude in accordance with that Treaty,—to abandon the country to anarchy and the capital to pillage, and to re-enter with a large army, to dethrone the King and annex his dominions.

Nor is it so difficult as might be supposed, to account for these inconsistencies and contradictions. Lord Dalhousie *did not wish to reform* Oude; it was his special policy to annex it. Reform, whether enforced by the Treaty of 1801 or that of 1837, whether carried out by the Resident and his Assistants with a native agency, or by a larger number of British officers, would have spoiled every chance of annexing Oude. Therefore the Treaty of 1837 was repudiated; therefore Sir William Sleeman's proposals were coldly and silently received.

It was in obedience, as I said before, to a sort of principle that Lord Dalhousie objected to projects of reform, and aimed steadily at annexation. This principle was made applicable by him not only to the case of Oude, but to every case of a Native State that seemed to provoke interference, or to lie at his mercy. One of his avowed reasons for deciding to annex the Punjaub, after the rebellion of 1849, instead of continuing to give the promised "aid and assistance in the administration of the Lahore State during the minority of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing,"† was that "we should have all the labour, all the anxiety, all the responsibility, which would attach to the territories if they were actually made our own; *while we should not reap the corresponding benefits of increase of revenue, and acknowledged possession.*"‡

In the same manner he recommended the annexation of the Rajpoot State of Kerowlee by refusing to recognise an adoption, because we should otherwise "for many years to come have to bear the labour of governing this State,

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, pp. 183, and 299.

† *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta,

1864, vol. ii. p. 267.

‡ *Punjaub Papers*, 1849, p. 663.

employing, always at inconvenience, a British officer for the purpose," and at the end of the young Prince's minority have to "hand over the country with its revenue of four lacks of rupees."*

And when in 1851 he was urged by General J. S. Fraser, the able and accomplished Resident at Hyderabad, with all the weight of many years' experience in that important post, to undertake effectual measures for reforming the administration of the Nizam's Dominions, Lord Dalhousie positively declined. The Resident had suggested this policy "on many recent occasions,"—for the first time, as we learn from another source, in February 1850,† a year before the Governor-General took any notice of it. General Fraser pointed out that the assignment of several Provinces for the payment of the Contingent Force, demanded at that time by our Government, would augment the Nizam's financial difficulties, and was a measure "providing for our own interests only, not for those of the country at large, either as regards its Sovereign or its inhabitants."‡ Lord Dalhousie recorded his entire disapproval of the Resident's policy. "If," he said, "provision be made for carrying it actively and practically into operation, *all the toil of a laborious task, and all its real responsibility, must ever fall on the British agent, by whom the native ministry is controlled. The agent, on his part, while he reaps no advantage from his labours for his own State, must feel himself to be without undivided authority.*"§

It is true that Lord Dalhousie, on this occasion, pronounced a general reprobation upon suggestions such as those made by General Fraser, declaring them to proceed, "in too many instances, not from sentiments of enlarged benevolence, but from the promptings of ambitious greed."

"Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes!"

He advanced as his first and main objection to the proposal, that it was unauthorised by Treaty, that the Nizam's "consent would never be voluntarily given, and that, if obtained at all, it would be extorted only by the open exercise of a power which he feels he could not resist,

* *Papers, Kerowlee*, 1855, p. 9. † *Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam*, by Captain Hastings Fraser, (Smith and Elder, 1865,) p. 268.

‡ *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854, p. 15. § *Ibid.*, 1854, p. 38.

or by the fear that we should proceed to some such extreme.”*

What respect can we pay to these scruples, these tender mercies, when at this very time the Governor-General was engaged in extorting from the Nizam by the fear of the military power which he felt he could not resist, the surrender of his fairest Provinces to British management? In the very Minute containing these precious misgivings, the Resident is instructed to demand the transfer of the Provinces, and “to meet any remonstrances or solicitations which his Highness may make for another reference,” by declaring that the Governor-General’s “determination is fixed irrevocably.” If his Highness “should refuse compliance, or should fail to complete the arrangements which are requisite,” the Resident will then state “whether he will require any troops, in addition to the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces, for the purpose of enforcing the determination that has been announced.”†

Thus Lord Dalhousie’s scrupulosity prevented him from using the enormous influence of the British Government to introduce improvements into the Nizam’s administration, because what he called “a system of subversive interference” was “unwelcome alike to people and to Prince,” and because the Treaty declared his Highness to be “absolute.”‡ But at this very time he was endeavouring to introduce, and eventually carried out, by menace and coercion, “a system of subversive interference” over one quarter of that Prince’s dominions. He would not employ judicious pressure for the benefit of the State and people of Hyderabad; but he would use any amount of pressure to extort payment and security for a most questionable balance of debt.§ He would not take effectual steps for correcting the administrative abuses of Oude, out of regard for the “peculiar provisions” of a Treaty; but he was

* *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854, p. 38 † *Ibid.*, 1854, pp. 34, 35.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1854, pp. 38 and 36.

§ Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad in 1860, writes to the Government of India:—“Had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with, we had no just claim against the Nizam.”—“In 1853 we had little or no pecuniary claim against the Nizam.” *Papers, the Deccan*, 338 of 1867, p. 27.

prepared to annul all Treaties, and to make a general clearance of all ties and obligations by the withdrawal of our troops and Resident, with the certainty, as he believed, of insurrection and anarchy, and the consequently acquired right of invasion and conquest.

It is true that in the Oude case he would have been satisfied for the present with the exclusive administration and entire possession of the revenues, after paying the King's stipend, with the prospect of an early annexation by "lapse," under the new Treaty restricting the succession to the lineal male descendants of the Prince actually on the throne.* But he evidently preferred his own plan, and worked himself into the strange notion that it was more in accordance with "established law and custom," and less open to hostile criticism, than "the more peremptory course," as he called it, favoured by his colleagues, to which he had, nevertheless, consented. Even in his last Minute, written after possession had been taken, he recurs with regret to his original scheme, and "finds no weight in the objections" made to it.†

In dealing with the alleged debt and disorganisation of the Nizam's Government, Lord Dalhousie's aim and object can be shewn to be identical with those which he set before himself in the case of Oude. When repelling General Fraser's suggestions that he should interpose as Guide, Teacher, and Protector, he evidently looked forward to some future opportunity of interposing as Dictator and Master. He fixed his eyes on that same delightful vision of disorder, bloodshed and anarchy in the dependent State, inviting its total absorption, a vision which, equally in both cases, would be dispelled for ever by "unwelcome" measures of reform. The following passages from Lord Dalhousie's Minute on Hyderabad affairs, dated May 27th, 1851, in which he repudiates General Fraser's policy, will show his own intentions and wishes with sufficient clearness.

"Whatever may be the tenor of his Highness's administration, it cannot be said *as yet* to have materially affected the security of any portion of British territory, or to have damaged the interests of British subjects."

* *Ante*, p. 53.

† *Oude Papers*, 1856, pp. 299, 300.

"So long as the alleged evils of his Highness's Government are confined within his own limits, and affect only his own subjects, the Government of India must observe religiously the obligations of its own good faith."*

"If, indeed, the effect of his Highness's misgovernment should be felt beyond his own bounds ; if the safety of our territory should be placed in doubt, or the interests of our subjects in jeopardy if recent insults to British subjects and soldiers within his Highness's territory should occur with increasing frequency, I shall not be satisfied, as on some past occasions, with the punishment of individual offenders ; I shall probably feel myself called upon in such case to require the adoption of such stronger measures as shall effectually put a stop to outrages which, unless they are repressed, cannot fail to lower the estimation in which our power is held by Native States, and in some degree to tarnish the honour of our name."

"It may be that every effort we can make will be *insufficient to avert the crash which the recklessness and apathy and obstinacy of the Nizam are all tending to produce* ; it may be that the Government of India may, after all, be compelled to that direct interference in his Highness's affairs which it still most earnestly desires to avoid. If ever that time should come, the officer who may then be entrusted with the charge of the Indian Empire, will doubtless be prepared to act as the circumstances of the times, and as his duty to his country may seem to him to require. But he will then be enabled to act with confidence, strengthened by the consciousness that the Government of India has long laboured to the utmost, *though in vain, to avert from the Nizam the fate which will then have overtaken him.*"†

There can be little doubt as to what that fate was intended to be, and would have been, if anything like the expected "crash" had occurred while Lord Dalhousie presided over India. Nor can any one fail to see that Lord Dalhousie's special policy towards the Nizam—in spite of all the intolerable verbiage with which, as usual, he wrapped it up,—was simply that of his giving his Highness "*rope enough.*" Just as he declared the "consent" of the King of Oude to be "indispensable to the transfer of any part of his sovereign authority,‡ and that he was entitled to carry on his administration by "his own officers," the "peculiar provisions" of the Treaty of 1801 forming "an in

* This is an unfortunate specimen of Lord Dalhousie's style. The "obligations of good faith" are, apparently, *not* to be observed when the evils of the Nizam's misgovernment pass beyond his own limits.

† *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854, pp 38-40. ‡ Para. 70, p 187, *Oude Papers*, 1856.

surmountable barrier" to the introduction of an improved system,*—so, for the nonce, the Nizam was exalted into "an independent Power,"† "absolute," and exempt by Treaty from "interference in his internal affairs."‡ And these scruples arose, with regard to Hyderabad, while he was endeavouring to deprive the Nizam of a large portion of his dominions. It is quite clear that he would force no "unwelcome measure of reform" upon either of those States, when such measures were suggested by Sir William Sleeman and General Fraser, because he did not wish for their reform, but rather for some catastrophe that might lead to their fall or screen their extirpation.

The Duke of Argyll completely misconceives the policy of those who, like Lord William Bentinck, Lord Hardinge, Sir Henry Lawrence, and Sir William Sleeman, were opposed to annexation but bent upon reform. He endeavours to show that their doctrines were quite as arbitrary as those approved by him, less consistent and less efficacious—amounting, in his words, to "annexation without the avowal of the name."§ The acquisitive process of his school requiring, as we have seen, that all Treaties should, by hook or by crook—inverted commas or fabricated lapse—be annihilated, he completely overlooks the vast power of interference and supervision placed in our hands by these Treaties, which, if firmly exercised in good time, could have prevented or cured all misgovernment without destroying the Native State. Lord Dalhousie, in order to shake off the obligations of guidance and protection, dearly bought by the dependent Principality of Oude, declared the Treaty of 1837 to be an abortion, and the Treaty of 1801 to have been violated and made null and void by the King's misrule. Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir William Sleeman upheld both those Treaties, and censured the neglect of our Government in not enforcing them for the good of the people of Oude.

The Duke of Argyll believes that the best authorities on International Law, would give "some name harsher than annexation" to the course in respect to Oude favoured

* *Ante*, p. 70.

† Para. 34, p. 37, *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854

‡ Para. 27 and 36, p. 36 and 38, *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854

§ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 18.

by Sir Henry Lawrence. "The notion," says the Duke, "that the Rulers of Oude had any sovereign rights, *on account of which we were bound not to interfere with their authority*, is scouted by Sir Henry Lawrence with indignation.* Of course that notion was scouted by Sir Henry Lawrence, who recognised the Treaty of 1837, and wished to see it brought into operation. Even under the Treaty of 1801 we were entitled to interfere with the King's authority, since he was bound by Article VI, "*always to advise with and act in conformity to the counsel of the Honourable Company's officers*."† This was quite sufficient warrant for the effectual reformation of Oude, if we had determined to undertake it. Sir Henry Lawrence's indignation was directed against our neglect and delay in fulfilling our bounden duty. He certainly recognised the sovereign rights of the Rulers of Oude, but not as rights of irresponsible and uncontrollable despotism. On the contrary, he saw that the sovereignty and authority of the King were most effectually and beneficially controlled and limited by the Treaties, if we only chose to apply them properly.

Sir Henry Lawrence recommended that if the personal reformation of a Prince were rendered hopeless by a "career of vice and contumacy," he should "be set aside and replaced by the nearest of kin who gives better promise." This passage seems to shock the Duke terribly: it implies, according to him, "that the British Government has absolute power, not only over the administration, but over the succession to the throne of Native States."‡ And who doubts that absolute power? Does the Duke of Argyll doubt it? Certainly I do not. "The consciousness of our own responsibility for the maladministration maintained by our bayonets," of which the Duke speaks in another part of his Essay,§ has undoubtedly weighed more or less upon all Englishmen engaged in the government of India, as it has upon his Grace. He is quite right so far. We cannot get rid of that responsibility. Having undertaken by our system of military protection, paid for by subsidies or ces-

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 16. † *Collection of Treaties*, 1864, vol. ii, p. 125.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 17.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

sions, to forbid rivalry and to suppress rebellion, despotism in India is no longer "tempered by assassination." Not even a palace revolution is allowed without our concurrence. Time and circumstances have, in fact, reserved for us the revolutionary power as an Imperial prerogative, and we must not hesitate to use it on an emergency. The often recurring problem,—never, I believe, insoluble,—is how to use it with discretion and impartiality, whether we interfere to settle a disputed or doubtful inheritance, or to depose a contumacious or incompetent Prince. No question of this sort should ever be decided, no irrevocable step taken, without consulting those most conversant with local affairs, those most nearly interested in the welfare of the reigning family, and the stability of the commonwealth.

There is no reason why anyone holding the opinions of Sir Henry Lawrence or Sir William Sleeman, should shrink from altering a succession, or deposing a reigning Sovereign. The deposition of a King, however rare an incident, is not always to be stigmatised as revolutionary, or even as irregular. A Sovereign's abdication is seldom the result of his own free will. But there is nothing in it repugnant to the constitutional law of any country. Indeed the voluntary or forced abdication of a reigning Prince, the renunciation or exclusion of an heir apparent, have been, and obviously must be sometimes, essential conditions of prosperity and success under a monarchical form of government. And such a necessity is more likely to arise, the more the nature of the Government approaches a despotism, the more it depends for its working on the personal character and abilities of the Sovereign.

The misrule of Oude was so flagrant as to call for our intervention. General Sleeman thought the King should be removed from the throne on account of mental incapacity.

"His Majesty is hypochondriac, and frequently under the influence of the absurd delusions common to such persons; but he is quite sane during long intervals, and on all subjects not connected with such delusions."* "The King cannot be considered to be in a sound state of mind."†

"The members of the family, who have its interests most at heart, are becoming anxious for some change."‡

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. i, p. liv. † *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. lxix. ‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. lxxii.

"No part of the people of Oude are more anxious for the interposition of our Government than the members of the royal family.
* * * The King is a crazy imbecile."*

Sir Henry Lawrence had arrived at the same opinion. There was a crying necessity for the King's removal. In consequence of our military protection and acknowledged supremacy, this could only be performed by our hands.

It is at this point that the views of Lord Dalhousie and the Duke of Argyll on the one hand, and those of Sir William Sleeman and Sir Henry Lawrence on the other, completely diverge. All are agreed that an incompetent Prince is the great obstacle to good government. All are agreed that his removal is necessary. They differ as to the object and effect of his removal. The school of annexation would sweep away with the King the whole fabric of local self-government, dismiss the whole tribe of native dignitaries and superior officials, and replace them by English gentlemen. The reforming school would maintain all existing arrangements as far as possible intact; would introduce very few English officers; and even if the King's executive power were to be entirely suspended for a time, would uphold his sovereignty as the best pledge and safeguard for the separate integrity of the State and the ultimate reconstruction of a purely native administration.

The Treaty of 1837, under which Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir William Sleeman proposed to act, expressly promised "to maintain, with such improvements as they may admit of, the native institutions and forms of administration within the assumed territories, so as to facilitate the restoration of those territories to the Sovereign of Oude, when the proper period for such restoration shall arrive."†

Lord William Bentinck in 1831 proposed to form "an administration entirely native, the only European part of which should be the functionary by whom it should be superintended."‡

In 1847 Lord Hardinge assured the King that the British Government desired "to perform its obligations to the people without setting the sovereign authority aside, or changing the native institutions of the State."§

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. ii, p. 369.

† *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864, vol. ii, p. 177.

‡ *Ante*, p. 64.

§ *Ante*, p. 65.

Sir Henry Lawrence attributes the misgovernment of Oude in a great measure to that crying evil, "the want of any recognised system of policy in our negotiations with the Lucknow Court," so that everything was "mere guess-work and experiment," and there was no possibility of harmony between the King, the Minister, and the Resident. "Our great error," he says, "has been our interference in trifles, while we stood aloof when important questions were at issue."* "This interference has been more in favour of men than of measures."†

"If an able Minister was appointed or encouraged by the British Government, he was, as a matter of course, suspected and thwarted by his master; if the King did happen to employ an honest servant, the power of the latter was null unless he had the Resident's support."‡

"Among her Ministers have been as able individuals as are usually to be found in the East."§

"The result is before our eyes; the remedy is also in our hands. Let the management be assumed under some such rules as those which were laid down by Lord W. Bentinck. Let the administration of the country, as far as possible, be native. *Let not a rupee come into the Company's coffers.*"||

In the explanation of his plan he provided for only five English Superintendents, under the Resident "as Minister, not only in fact but in name."¶

"Our plan involves the employment of every present Oude official, willing to remain, and able to perform the duties that would be required of him."

"It would be desirable to retain the services of one or two respectable men, *to assist the Resident, and form with him a Court of Appeal from the Superintendent's decrees.*"**

Nor did he ever deviate from these opinions. Five years after the annexation of the Punjaub, in June, 1854, he wrote as follows, in a private letter to Mr. Kaye:—

"Our remedy for gross misgovernment was given in my article on Oude in the *Calcutta Review* nine years ago, to take the management temporarily or permanently. We have no right to rob a man because he spends his money badly, or even because he ill-treats his peasantry. We may protect and help the latter without putting the rents into our own pockets."††

* *Essays*, p. 129. † *Ibid.*, p. 63. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 129. § *Ibid.*, p. 128.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 131, 132. ¶ *Ibid.*, 132. ** *Ibid.*, p. 135.

†† *Kaye's Lives of Indian Officers*, vol. ii, p. 310.

Above all it is worthy of remark that Sir Henry Lawrence,—nomeretheorist, but one of the ablest administrators in India, who would willingly have undertaken the task he was then sketching out,—proposed that the assessment of the land-tax should be fixed for the whole country, and distributed among the five districts, “as far as possible by the people themselves,”—“in a great assembly of the people.”*

Sir William Sleeman declared that in Oude there was “no want of an educated class for civil office; on the contrary they abound almost as much as the class of soldiers.”† By their means, “with the aid of a few of the ablest of the native judicial and revenue officers of our own districts, invited to Oude by the prospect of higher pay,”‡ he intended to carry out his projects of reform, if Lord Dalhousie would have sanctioned and supported them.

The administrative abuses of Oude and the demoralisation of all its establishments were greatly aggravated during the six years of Lord Dalhousie’s masterly neglect, which, following immediately on Lord Hardinge’s two years of probation, seemed to hold out a prolonged lease of power to the vile advisers of an imbecile King. Before Sir William Sleeman left Lucknow, he had become convinced that the correction of abuses and inauguration of a new system were no longer within the capacity of a Board of Regency, and that stronger measures must be taken. “Our Government,” he wrote on the 5th March, 1854, to Colonel Low,§ who as Resident had negotiated the Treaty of 1837, “would be fully authorised at any time to enforce the penalty prescribed in your Treaty of 1837, and it incurs great odium and obloquy for not enforcing it.”|| He found that he would require the aid of some English officers. He wrote to Lord Dalhousie, “I shall not propose any native gentlemen for the higher offices,”—meaning, no doubt, those originally intended for the Board of Regency,—“but it will be necessary to have a great many in the subordinate ones, to show that your Lordship wishes to open employment in all branches of the new administration to educated native gentlemen.”¶

* *Essays*, pp. 132, 133. † *Ante*, p. 66. ‡ *Ante*, p. 66. § Now General Sir John Low, K.C.B. || *Sleeman’s Oude*, vol. ii, p. 419. ¶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 355.

He recommended that "all establishments, military, civil, and fiscal, be kept entirely separate from those of our own Government, that there may be no mistake as to the disinterestedness of our intentions towards Oude."* He declared that "by adopting a simple system of administration, to meet the wishes of a simple people, we should secure the goodwill of all classes of society."† And in his last letter to Lord Dalhousie, he said, "There are many honest men at Lucknow. But no honest man can obtain or retain office under Government with the present Minister and heads of departments."‡

Yet the Duke of Argyll declares that Sir William Sleeman's plan was "annexation without the avowal of the name";§ and that to Sir Henry Lawrence's plan "some name harsher than annexation," ought to be applied.||

On another point the Duke completely misunderstands, and consequently misrepresents, Sir William Sleeman and Sir Henry Lawrence. He says, "they had a strange theory that though the King had no indefeasible title to any part of the Kingly power, he had an indefeasible title to the whole of the Kingly revenues,—that the whole revenue over and above the costs of administration was absolutely due to the King of Oude: that is to say, it was legitimate to seize the Government in the interests of the people, but it was not legitimate to administer for the benefit of the people the revenues of the State."¶ And he complains that, according to their doctrine, "the whole surplus was to go where it had gone before,—to be spent on the pageants and buffooneries and dancing-girls of Lucknow!"***

This is a very great mistake. Neither Sir Henry Lawrence nor Sir William Sleeman ever proposed that the surplus revenue should be paid to the King. Both of them intended that the King should receive an annual income fixed at the discretion of the British trustee.

In order to prove that in Sir Henry Lawrence's opinion "it was not legitimate to administer for the benefit of the people the revenues of the State," and that all the surplus,

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. ii, p. 380. † *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 381. ‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 423.

§ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 18.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

** *Ibid.*, p. 19.

after defraying the actual costs of administration, should be handed over to the King, the Duke quotes a sentence from Sir Henry Lawrence's Essay on Oude :—"Let not a rupee come into the Company's coffers."* Sir Henry Lawrence's real meaning will be easily understood when the sentence is restored to its place between two other short sentences not quoted by the Duke of Argyll. The whole passage will then stand as follows :—"Let the administration of the country, as far as possible, be native. Let not a rupee come into the Company's coffers. Let Oude be at last governed, not for one man,—the King,—but *for him and his people*,"†—that is to say, for the State of Oude. In another place he says, "We have not been guiltless : in repenting of the past, let us look honestly to the future. *For once let us remember the people, the gentles, the nobles, the royal family*; and not legislate merely for the King."‡

It is strange that the Duke of Argyll should have also completely misunderstood Sir William Sleeman. "We have a right," the latter said, "under the Treaty of 1837, to take the management of Oude, but not to appropriate *its* revenues to ourselves."§ As late as September, 1852, he tried, but in vain, to sound Lord Dalhousie on this very point.

"I believe that it is your Lordship's wish that the whole of the revenues of Oude should be expended for the benefit of the royal family *and people* of Oude, and that the British Government should disclaim any wish to derive any pecuniary advantages from assuming to itself the administration."||

"Were we to take advantage of the occasion to *annex* or *confiscate* Oude, or any part of it, our good name in India would inevitably suffer; and that good name is more valuable to us than a dozen of Oudes."

"Annexation or confiscation is not compatible with our relations *with this little dependent State*. We must show ourselves high-minded, and above taking advantage of its prostrate weakness, by appropriating its revenues exclusively to the benefit of the people and royal family of Oude."¶

When Lord William Bentinck said that "the whole of the revenue should be paid into the Oude Treasury,"*** he

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 19. † *Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays*, p. 132. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 136. § *Ante*, p. || *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. ii, p. 372.

¶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 378, 379.

*** *Ante*, p. 64.

did not say that it should be paid into the King's Privy Purse. Nor can "the King's Treasury," mentioned in Article VIII of the Treaty of 1837, be held to signify the King's Privy Purse. The distinction between the two Treasuries is quite well understood all over India; and wherever it has been imperfectly observed in practice, could be established by our influence in any Native State on the first convenient opportunity. Far from wishing to give all the surplus to the King, or to provide him with the means of unlimited extravagance, Sir William Sleeman suggested an annual sum for the Royal Household of fifteen lakhs of rupees (£150,000),* three lakhs less than that offered to the King by Lord Dalhousie,—eighteen lakhs (£180,000), besides one lakh (£10,000) to the Queen Mother,—on condition of his signing the draft treaty of 1856.†

Sir Henry Lawrence, indeed, proposed to give the King a larger income. "Twenty, thirty, or even fifty lakhs per annum might, as the revenues increased, be allowed. He should be furnished to his heart's content with silver sticks,"‡ and so forth. The magnitude of the highest sum here mentioned,—fifty lakhs, £500,000, more than a third of the gross revenue,—is sufficient to show that it is not to be taken literally, but only to express forcibly his opinion that if matters could be smoothed and simplified by a liberal allowance to the King, the exact sum ought to form no difficulty in the settlement. Sir Henry Lawrence was merely writing an article in the *Calcutta Review*, with no official responsibility to give precision to his language. Had he been Resident at Lucknow he would certainly not have recommended a larger income for the King than Sir William Sleeman did.

These two distinguished officers had no weak tenderness for the King's "pageants and buffooneries." They complained that in consequence of our neglect the country was governed too much "for one man, the King," and insisted that for the future it should be governed "for the

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. ii, p. 381. † *Oude Papers*, 1856, pp. 242, 291. Lord Dalhousie observed that, according to Sir William Sleeman, about twelve lakhs, (£120,000) was all that the King "was usually able to obtain" for his own Household.—*Oude Papers*, p. 302. ‡ *Essays*, p. 136.

people, the nobles, the gentles, and the royal family, and not merely for the King.”* The Duke of Argyll says they considered it “not legitimate to administer the revenues of the State for the benefit of the people.”† That would have been “a strange theory” indeed; but the Duke alone is responsible for its conception. Nothing of the sort can be found in the writings of Sir William Sleeman or Sir Henry Lawrence. They evinced no reluctance to expend the revenues of Oude for the benefit of the people. They sketched out schemes of roads and other public works that would have transformed the face of the country. Sir Henry Lawrence proposed to commence operations with a loan of a million sterling, to be paid off in ten or fifteen years,‡ so that there would have been little or no surplus for anyone during that period.

But the Duke of Argyll may still object that although these two eminent men did not, perhaps, exactly intend to throw all the surplus revenues into the King’s hands,—“to be spent on the pageants, buffooneries, and dancing-girls of Lucknow,”—they certainly intended that all the revenues of Oude should be spent within its limits, that the surplus should not belong to the British Government of India. If his Grace had restrained his rhetoric within those bounds, his statement would have been perfectly accurate, and several pages of my rejoinder might have been spared. When Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir William Sleeman said that “the administration should, as far as possible, be native”; that “not a rupee” should “come into the Company’s coffers”; that we had no right “to appropriate its revenues to ourselves,” and that they “should be expended for the benefit of the royal family and people of Oude,” they undoubtedly intended to exclude our Government from any claim upon the surplus revenues, and to restrain the nepotism of Calcutta within moderate bounds. Until the growing mania for territorial extension arrived at its climax under the fostering care and encouragement of Lord Dalhousie, it was generally acknowledged that the resources of Oude had already been sufficiently drained by monstrous subsidies, extorted

* *Ante*, p. 84.† *Ante*, p. 83.‡ *Essays*, p. 135.

cessions, and forced loans,* and that no further demands for Imperial purposes ought to be made upon its Treasury. When the Treaty of 1837 was under consideration, the Articles imposing an annual burden of sixteen lakhs of rupees upon Oude for a new Auxiliary Force, were opposed upon these grounds by two members of the Supreme Council, Mr. Ross and Mr. Shakespear. Both of them observed that in return for the great cession of territory in 1801, we had declared in the 1st Article of the Treaty of that year that the Nawab was "relieved from the obligation of defraying the expenses of any additional troops which at any time may be required for the protection of Oude." And Mr. Shakespear added that before exacting any new subsidy, it would be necessary "to cancel the 5th Article" of the Treaty of 1801, "which engages that no demand whatever shall be made upon the territory of his Excellency, on account of expenses which the Honourable Company may incur for the suppression of disorders within his territories."† This was the main objection of the Court of Directors to the Treaty of 1837. This was the objection of Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir William Sleeman to the surplus revenues of Oude being appropriated by the Honourable Company. On a mere debtor and creditor account, as well as by innumerable and unremitting friendly services, the State of Oude had paid in advance for all the protection, guidance, and instruction we could give. Against Oude we had no pecuniary claim. Even Lord Auckland, when pressing his plan for a new Auxiliary Force, felt himself compelled in common decency to urge that it would be "a measure of real economy" for Oude.‡ All our efforts for "the tranquillity and good government" of Oude, should be, he said, "without the taint which schemes of acquisition in money or land might give them." Any such scheme he declared to be "as repugnant to my own designs and feelings as they have ever been disavowed by the Honourable Court, and by

* With regard to some of these Sir Henry Lawrence says:—"The friends of Lord Hastings have asserted that these loans were voluntary, but Colonel Baillie has shewn the transaction in a very different light. The money was extorted from the Nawab by the importunity of the Resident, who acted on repeated and urgent instructions from the Governor-General."—*Essays*, p. 118.

† *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 28.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

each successive Governor-General, in discussing the grave question of the position in which events have placed us, both towards the Oude ruler and people.”*

Sir Barnes Peacock,† who was Legal Member of Council when the annexation of Oude was discussed, “could not recommend that any part of the revenues of Oude should be applied to the payment of the military administration of the Province.” After referring to the cessions and promises of 1801, he says:—“For the same reason I would not place the residue of the revenue at the disposal of the East India Company, but would leave it to be disposed of entirely for the benefit of the people of the Province.”‡ “If the Honourable Court of Directors should resolve to adopt that measure, I think that no pecuniary benefit should be derived by the East India Company.”§

So that Sir Barnes Peacock, one of Lord Dalhousie’s colleagues, an acute and clear-headed lawyer, propounded that same theory which seems to the Duke of Argyll a strange delusion when it comes from Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir William Sleeman. Yet Sir Barnes Peacock had no great sympathy for the King of Oude. He speaks on behalf of “*the people of that State.*”||

The source of the Duke of Argyll’s error is evident enough. He can think of no “people” but the people of all India. He can think of no “State” but that which is centralised at Calcutta. Like Lord Dalhousie and his best contemporary interpreter, Mr. George Campbell, he looks upon the revenue of a native Principality as a very inconvenient alienation from the Imperial assets, to be called into the common stock as soon as may be.¶ He cannot understand how Oude could have any right to be a State at all. The school of annexation has always

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 8. † Now Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta. ‡ *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 232. § *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 231.

|| *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 232. ¶ “It is indeed only in this way”—by rejecting adopted heirs—“that we can hope gradually to extinguish the native States, which consume so large a portion of the revenues of the country, and so prevent us from lightening the burdens and improving the condition of the mass of the people.”—(Campbell’s *Modern India*, p. 169.) This book was published in 1852, just in the nick of time, as if to serve as an exponent and defence of Lord Dalhousie’s policy. It represents very fairly the ordinary views held by the Bengal Civil Service, of which Mr. Campbell, late a Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, now Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, is a very able and distinguished member.

ignored entirely the corporate rights of the Native State. They seem to argue and to act upon an incoherent and inconsistent doctrine, oscillating between Oriental despotism and revolutionary violence,—by which the reigning Prince, for the time being, is made the sole representative and personal embodiment of the State. So long as he remains on the throne, his absolute power must not be limited,* or he would have “virtually no sovereignty at all;”† he would be “in leading strings,” “a mere puppet,” and “a sham Sovereign.”† He alone is responsible for any disorder or misrule in his dominions, whether injurious only to his own subjects, or affecting his relations with the British Government. Whether he be a criminal or an imbecile, he is fully empowered to transfer by his signature all his possessions, and may justly and legally be terrified or coerced into doing so. But with or without his extorted consent, the removal of the reigning Prince extinguishes the rights of his family, annuls all treaties, and terminates the separate existence of the Principality, which naturally and necessarily merges in the Paramount Empire as an ordinary Province.

The Duke of Argyll, in common with the school of annexation which he admires and defends, persists in seeing nothing but the King's person between the British Government and the desired acquisition of territory. Sir William Sleeman and Sir Henry Lawrence saw a great deal more. With them the King was not the State. They knew that Oude had, since the cessions of 1801, paid for our military protection over and over again, not only by contributions and advances in the hour of our financial need, not only by supplies and means of transport in several campaigns, but by the inestimable aid of her friendly countenance and faithful influence in days of great military and political emergency. They knew that these services had not been rendered by the King alone; that we had been indebted as much or more, in proportion to their respective importance and ability, to the ministers, the officials, to some of the great landholders, to many of “the nobles, gentles, and people,” whom Sir Henry Lawrence

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, pp. 34 and 37.

† *Mysore Papers*, 1866, pp. 84, 85, 86.

exhorted our Government to "remember." They knew that many persons belonging to these classes had been the greatest sufferers from our neglect, our exclusive attention to our own immediate interests, and, when those were secured, our uniform support of the King's personal authority throughout his own dominions.* They knew that these classes,—the most sensitive, the most reflective, the best informed, the most influential, and the most improvable members of the community,—although anxious for our corrective intervention, would see their own inevitable ruin and degradation in the extinction of the Kingdom. Hear Sir William Sleeman in 1853.

"In 1801, when the Oude territory was divided, and half taken by us and half left to Oude, the landed aristocracy of each was about equal. Now, hardly a family of this class remains in our half, while in Oude it remains unimpaired. Everybody in Oude believes those families to have been systematically crushed."†

"The members of the landed aristocracy of Oude always speak with respect of the administration in our territories, but generally end with remarking on the cost and uncertainty of the law in civil cases, and the gradual decay, under its operation, of all the ancient families. A less and less proportion of the annual produce of their lands is left to them in our periodical settlements of the land revenue."‡

There was not in Oude even such a semblance of a party in favour of British appropriation, as there was in Mexico in favour of the unfortunate Emperor Maximilian. Every one supposed—whether rightly or wrongly it matters not,—that after absorption within the Honourable Company's territories, all avenues to promotion and distinction would be closed, that the manufacture and import of many articles of ornament and luxury would be very much diminished, that all encouragement to native art and learning would cease, and that the wealth of the country would be drained away to Calcutta and London. Even the "pageants and buffooneries of Lucknow," did not excite much horror in the minds of this ignorant population. Such sights are run after by the simple inhabitants of India almost as eagerly as the more serious and intellectual attractions of a review, a royal procession, or a

* *Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays*, pp. 75, 109, 131.

† *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. ii, p. 415. ‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 168.

Lord Mayor's Show, are in enlightened England. The people are well aware of their Prince's lavish expenditure, but they are rather proud of it than otherwise. The money is spent among themselves, and they all benefit by it, more or less, if only by a little occasional entertainment and excitement. As General Sir John Low remarked, when discussing the question of the stipend to be allotted to the Ex-King of Oude, "these Princes" do not "hoard up their money in large sums, and bury it," nor do they "dispose of their lakhs, as most European gentlemen do with their thousands, that is to say, save more than they expend, and send their savings off to a distant country."*

Nor was the aversion to lose all their local privileges and customs amid the cold uniformity of British rule, confined to the great landlords, the courtiers and the higher officials, the traders and artisans of the capital and large towns. There was literally no class in the country that desired the downfall of the native State.

"It might have been expected," said Lord Canning, in his despatch of the 17th June, 1858, "that when insurrection first arose in Oude, and before it had grown to a formidable head, the village occupants who had been so highly favoured by the British Government, and in justice to whom it had initiated a policy distasteful to the most powerful class in the province, would have come forward in support of the Government. Such, however, was not the case. So far as I am as yet informed, not an individual dared to be loyal to the Government which had befriended him. The village occupants, as a body, relapsed into their former subjection to the Talookdar," or great landlord, "owned and obeyed his authority as if he had been their lawful Suzerain, and joined the ranks of those who rose up in arms against the British Government. The endeavour to neutralize the usurped and largely abused power of the Talookdars by recognising the supposed proprietary rights of the people, and thus arousing their feelings of self-interest and evoking their gratitude, had failed utterly." * * * * * "Those whom we

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 221.

had desired to benefit, and had to our thinking benefited, did not value the rights which we had restored to them, and far from standing up in defence of those rights, and in support of the Government which had been the means of reviving them, they had acted in complete subordination to the Talookdars, and had been no less forward than these latter in their efforts to subvert the authority of that Government and expel its officers.”*

The village occupants knew much more of the British revenue system than Lord Canning imagined. They perfectly understood that the “supposed proprietary right” enjoyed by the villagers of our adjacent districts, was nothing more than the right to pay their quota directly to the Government instead of to the Talookdar. They knew quite well that any intermediate profit-rent which was lost by the Talookdar would be no gain to them, but would fall into the coffers of Government; while they would lose the protection and countenance of their hereditary Chief, and would be transferred to the covenanted and uncovenanted mercies of a Collector and his underlings. They knew that in the neighbouring British districts the assessment of the land tax had been systematically and progressively enhanced, and that the ryots, for want of substantial and influential landlords, were exposed to the illicit exactions of subordinate officials.

The alleged prevalence of oppression and extortion in Oude is utterly irreconcilable with the fact that the population showed no inclination to emigrate into the contiguous territories of the Company, open to them on three sides.† The mal-administration of Oude did not drive the people to rebellion, nor even to remonstrance. The King was utterly incompetent, but not cruel. The great fault of his Government was not tyranny but weakness.

Whatever may have been the errors of the last reigning King of Oude, however much he may have neglected and mismanaged the internal affairs of his Kingdom, he was neither a cruel tyrant nor a faithless Ally. “In all those measures,” said General Low, in 1855, “which relate exclusively to the interest of the Paramount State, such as

* *Papers, Oude Proclamation*, 1859. pp. 5, 6. † *Oude Papers*, 1856, pp. 52, 57.

searching for and giving up criminals who have escaped into Oude from our provinces, supplying our troops when marching through Oude, protecting our mails, etc., etc., the Government of Oude has always been, and is up to this day, unusually attentive and efficient. I can further truly remark that the Kings of Oude have co-operated most actively and efficiently with us in capturing Thugs and Dacoits."

"In regard to their external relations with us, their conduct has been remarkably irreproachable."*

"It is not only that the Kings of Oude have never been hostile to us in their proceedings, and never intrigued against us in any way; they have abstained from every kind of communication with other native potentates, except openly, and through the medium of the British Resident; and during our wars against our enemies, they have constantly proved to be *really active and most useful allies*† to us; they have, again and again, forwarded large supplies of grain and cattle, etc., to our armies, with an alacrity that could not be exceeded by our own British Chiefs of Provinces; and during our wars against the Nepaulese and Burmese, the King of Oude lent us very large sums of money,—no less than three crores of rupees" (three millions sterling) "when we were extremely in want of it, and could not procure it elsewhere; and even so late as 1842, the grandfather of the present King supplied us with fourteen lakhs of rupees," (£140,000) "and his son, the father of the present King, supplied us with thirty-two lakhs of rupees," (£320,000) "which were of very great use indeed to Lord Ellenborough's Government, in enabling him to push on and equip General Pollock's army, to retrieve our disasters in Afghanistan."

"During the Nepal war, the King of Oude lent us, free of all cost, nearly 300 elephants. The aid thus obtained for conveying our artillery and ammunition, and tents, etc., in our mountain warfare, was of immense value to us, and of a kind which it was totally out of our power to obtain in any other manner, or from any other quarter."‡

In every respect, and at all times, the State of Oude fulfilled the duties of a good neighbour, and in time of war surpassed them. There were, unquestionably, disorders in the King's Government, but neither the Honourable Company nor its subjects were offended or injured by them. Our frontiers were not disturbed; our com-

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 226. † Italics in the original.

‡ *Oude Papers*, 1856, pp. 225, 226.

munications and commerce were not interrupted or impeded. The State of Oude paid its way, and had contracted no debt. There was no desperate disease; it was simply a case of irregular functions, which the protecting Power could have cured at any time. The weakness and looseness of the Oude administration, were due in a great measure to our own derelictions and neglect.

Far from its being true that the Oude Government was enabled to be oppressive with impunity in consequence of British military support, Sir William Sleeman declares that its inability to control the more powerful feudatories arose from that support not being given to which the Government was justly entitled. From time to time, he tells us, Regiments had been withdrawn from several points, which "*to do our duty honestly by Oude,*" we ought to restore.*

"The British force in Oude is much less than it was when the Treaty of the 11th September, 1837, was made, and assuredly less than it should be with a due regard to our engagements and the Oude requirements. Our Government, instead of taking upon itself the additional burden of sixteen lakhs of rupees a year to render the Oude Government more efficient, has relieved itself of a good deal of that which it bore before the new Treaty" of 1837 "was entered into; and this is certainly not what the Court of Directors contemplated, or the Oude Government expected."

"Our exigencies became great with the Affghan war, and have continued to be so from those wars which grew out of it with Gwalior, Scinde, and the Punjaub; but they have all now passed away, and those of our humble Ally should be no longer forgotten or disregarded. Though we seldom give him the use of troops in the support of the authority of his local officers, still the prestige of having them at hand, in support of a just cause, is unquestionably of great advantage to him and to his people, and this advantage we cannot withhold from him with a due regard to the obligations of solemn treaties."†

Notwithstanding all these difficulties and discouragements, the weak Mussulman Government of Oude succeeded, a few months before the annexation, in putting down effectually a determined religious conflict between the Hindoo priests and votaries of a shrine called the Hanooman Ghurree, near Fyzabad, and a formidable band

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. i, p. 186. See also vol. i, p. lxiv., lxv.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 200.

of Mussulman fanatics, under a popular saint named Ameer Alee. The Mahomedan aggressors were attacked and dispersed, and many of them killed, including their leader, by the King's troops, without any assistance from the British Force at Lucknow. Lord Dalhousie plainly intimates that the failure of the Oude Government in suppressing this dangerous outburst of Moslem bigotry would have led to "a very prompt and summary settlement of the Oude question by the hands of the Governor-General."* The unexpected success of the Oude Government, however, was not allowed to delay that prompt and summary settlement very long, and, strangely enough, seems to be adduced by Lord Dalhousie as an additional reason for hurrying it on.

The Treaty of 1801 imposed upon the British Government, in return for immense advantages, the obligations of guiding the State of Oude by its authoritative counsels, and preserving good order and subordination throughout the country by its military support. It neglected the first duty; the latter duty, as Sir William tells us, was not performed effectually or "honestly." And then the protecting Power denounced the evil results of its own negligence, as if they were insults and infidelities perpetrated by its friend and pupil. Lord Dalhousie complained of "the systematic and continuous violation of the Treaty,"† by the misrule of Oude. That misrule arose much more from our default than from that of the Princes and Ministers of Oude. We were always negligent; they were never contumacious. If any provisions of the Treaty were unfulfilled, we had the full right and ample means of enforcing them. But our counsels were indefinite and intermittent, and we never tried to enforce them. At last Lord Dalhousie took advantage of our own wrong, and founded his claim to confiscate Oude upon that very weakness and looseness of administration which the British Government, more especially during his vice-royalty, had deliberately refrained from correcting.

With all their shortcomings and self-seekings the British authorities, both at home and in India, had never failed,

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 300.

† *Oude Papers*, 1856, pp. 190, 255.

until Lord Dalhousie's advent to power, to recognise their obligations to the State of Oude, the integrity and separate existence of which they were bound in honour to maintain. Those who advocated the reform and deprecated the annexation of Oude, cared less for the Prince than for the Principality. They looked upon a Native State as a social and political aggregation of divers individualities and complicated interests, which would be thrown into confusion, and doomed to rapid decay, on the introduction of our ordinary system of government. They considered the higher classes of Oude to be undeserving of this doom. And although they entertained no exaggerated notions of the King's divine right to power, still less, as the Duke of Argyll most erroneously imagines, of his divine right to the revenues,—they considered a Monarchy, however limited and restricted, as the only practicable form of native government; they looked upon the Royal title and the hereditary throne as the only effectual preservative for the framework of a Native Principality. They looked upon the Prince as the chief Ruler, but not as the master or owner of the State and its inhabitants. They considered that Treaties were made and maintained by a reigning Prince as the representative for life of a dynasty and a State, which are established institutions with a perpetual succession.

Of course a State is not absolutely inviolable and sacred; its territorial limits and independence may be justly modified or even nullified, as a consequence of war or utter disorganisation; but so long as friendly relations subsist, the State is a definite political community, not to be broken up or destroyed for the faults or deficiencies of its chief Ruler, or for any remediable defects in its constitution. The incompetence, misconduct or contumacy of a reigning Prince, though it may justify or necessitate his deposition, does not annul a Treaty, or annihilate the State. A revolutionary crisis may justly be made an occasion for reform, but not, as Lord Dalhousie planned it, a pretext for rapacity. The reign of a bad Prince may afford a fair opportunity for improving, but not for appropriating a friendly State.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PUNJAUB.

THE Duke of Argyll says of the annexation of the Punjaub that "there is no need to defend it in point of right, and as little need now to support it in respect to policy."* Sir Charles Jackson considers that acquisition to be so completely removed from the sphere of controversy, that at the outset of the *Vindication* he declares his intention of "passing it over in silence."†

Mr. J. C. Marshman, formerly Editor of the *Friend of India*,‡ in his recently published History, declares, that "to offer any vindication of a measure which even the most prejudiced of Lord Dalhousie's opponents have not ventured to impugn, would be altogether redundant,"§ Those "fifth-rate writers" are more "prejudiced" than Mr. Marshman supposes; and he is not so well acquainted with them as the Duke of Argyll. The annexation of the Punjaub was promptly impugned by Mr. John Sullivan, who had been a Member of Council at Madras, in a pamphlet, entitled "*The Koh-i-Noor, to whom does it belong?*"|| to which I am indebted for several suggestions; and by Mr. J. M. Ludlow, in his "*British India, its Races and its History.*"¶ But, while I, also, must dispute both the right and the policy of that so-called conquest, I freely admit that,—mainly because it looked like a conquest,—it has never excited the same disgust as the annexations of Nagpore, Jhansi, and Oude. The iniquity of the transaction was shrouded by the smoke of battle; and its impolicy, gradually becoming apparent, was hidden once more, for a time, when the Punjaub poured forth to our

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 4. † *A Vindication*, p. 3.

‡ A weekly paper, published at Serampore near Calcutta, and conducted with great ability, which steadily supported all Lord Dalhousie's measures.

§ *History of India, by John Clark Marshman*, (Longmans, 1867,) vol. iii, p. 349

|| London, 1850.

¶ Vol. ii, pp. 166, 167.

assistance, in the crisis of the rebellion, the troops that we had previously poured into it.

The same may be said of a still more iniquitous affair, the conquest of Scinde. There was a fight for it. Although the Ameers were goaded to resistance by a series of increasing demands, intolerable provocations, and a menacing advance upon their capital, the mere fact of their resistance made their violent expulsion from Scinde less injurious to our fame than the quiet spoliation of a friendly family. Public opinion in India, even in royal palaces, is not educated to the pitch of examining into the diplomatic details of a rupture, unless the scene of action be very close at hand. The sword was drawn; blood was shed; no further justification was required.

The impolicy of Lord Dalhousie's peaceful annexations consisted, in a great measure, in the moral aspect which they presented to the world of India. The moral objections to annexing the Punjaub were, doubtless, much less manifest. The impolicy was, therefore, less obvious. And I can well understand that Lord Dalhousie himself, when he decided on converting the Punjaub into a British Province, may have had few or none of those compunctious visitings, those "doubts and scruples," by which he was disturbed, according to the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson, during the process of annexing Oude.*

In a despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,—dated the 7th April, 1849,—he endeavoured to prove that we could justly take advantage of our military force to make the Punjaub "a profitable possession"† for ourselves; but the endeavour seems to me to be all in vain. No justification is made out at all.

Dhuleep Sing was the Ward of the British Government. Of this there can be no question. By the Articles of Agreement of the 16th December, 1846, the British Government undertook "the maintenance of an administration, and the protection of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing during the minority of his Highness."‡ This engagement was to "cease and terminate on his Highness attaining

* *Ante*, p. 51, and *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 69.

† *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 665.

‡ *Papers, Articles of Agreement with the Lahore Durbar*, 1847, p. 49.

the full age of sixteen years, or on the 4th September, 1854.”* The Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, wished that “the new terms of agreement entered into for protecting the Maharajah during his minority, should be made as public as possible. It has therefore,” he wrote to the Secret Committee, “been determined, in communication with the Sirdars, that his Highness shall come to my camp on this side of the Beas on the 26th instant; and I propose afterwards, when the Agreement will be formally ratified, to pay his Highness a friendly return visit at Lahore.”† In the General Proclamation of the 20th August, 1847, the Governor-General announced that he felt “the interest of a father in the education and guardianship of the young Prince,” and that “he had at heart the peace and security of this country,” the Punjaub, “the firm establishment of the State, and the honour of the Maharajah and his Ministers.”‡

In order “to maintain the administration of the Lahore State during the minority of the Maharajah,” the Governor-General was armed with supreme and plenary power, and was “at liberty to occupy with British soldiers such positions as he may think fit, for the security of the capital, for the protection of the Maharajah, and the preservation of the peace of the country.” The British Resident was placed at the head of the administration, with “full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the State.”§ Subject to the instructions of the Governor-General, “unlimited powers” were given to the Resident.||

Lord Dalhousie declares that the British Government “maintained the Government of the State in the Council of Regency.”¶ That Council was merely one part of the machinery instituted by the Governor-General, and kept in perfect subordination to British authority.

Lord Hardinge thus describes the new arrangement in a despatch to the Secret Committee of the 21st December, 1846.

* *Papers, Articles of Agreement with the Lahore Durbar*, 1847, p. 51.

† *Ibid.*, 1847, p. 25.

‡ *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 53.

§ *Papers, Articles of Agreement with the Lahore Durbar*, 1847, p. 50.

|| *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 35 and 48. ¶ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 659.

"A Council of Regency, composed of leading Chiefs, will act under the control and guidance of the British Resident."

"The power of the Resident extends over every department, and to any extent."

"Those terms give the British Resident unlimited authority in all matters of internal administration, and external relations, during the Maharajah's minority."*

And in a letter dated the 3rd July, 1847, the Governor-General reminds the Resident that the Articles of Agreement

"give to the Government of India, represented at Lahore by its Resident, full power to direct and control all matters in every department of the State."

"It is politic that the Resident should carry the native Council with him, the members of which are however entirely under his control and guidance; he can change them and appoint others, and in military affairs his power is as unlimited as in the civil administration; he can withdraw Sikh garrisons, replacing them by British troops, in any and every part of the Punjab."†

The Resident himself, a month later, thus describes the working of the machine.

"On the whole, the Darbar" (the Council of Regency) "give me as much support as I can reasonably expect; there has been a quiet struggle for mastery, but as, though I am polite to all, I allow nothing that appears to me wrong to pass unnoticed, the members of the Council are gradually falling into the proper train, and refer most questions to me, and in words at least allow, more fully even than I wish, that they are only executive officers,—to do as they are bid."‡

Thus the Council of Regency never was "the Government of the State," as Lord Dalhousie calls it,§ without the British Resident at its head, to whom its members were strictly subordinate.

One important count in the indictment brought by Lord Dalhousie against "the Sikhs," is that whereas "they had bound themselves to submit to the full authority of the British Resident directing and controlling all matters in every department of the State,—the Government of Lahore, in reply to the orders of the Resident, neither punished" the rebel Moolraj, when two British officers had been murdered at Mooltan, "nor gave reparation for

* *Papers, Articles of Agreement with the Lahore Darbar*, 1847, p. 24.

† *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 18. ‡ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 32. § *Ante*, p. 99.

the offence, but declared that their troops were not to be depended upon.* This attempt to separate the Resident from the Government of Lahore, and to use the latter term as synonymous with "the Sikhs," is quite unwarrantable. The Resident was at the head of the Government of Lahore; and the Councillors of Regency were, as we have seen, merely executive officers, "to do as they were bid," "under his control and guidance."† "The Sikhs," however rebellious, were subjects, not responsible rulers. The Resident's "power" was "unlimited in military affairs." He could "withdraw Sikh garrisons, replacing them by British troops, in any and every part of the Punjab."‡ And when the military emergency arose, he pursued his own course by the tenor and spirit of these instructions, ordering the troops backwards and forwards, occasionally consulting the Durbar or informing them of his determinations, but never allowing them to act independently, or to adopt their own plans for restoring the peace of the country. The Resident was the Government of Lahore. When the news arrived of the outbreak at Mooltan, the Resident transferred none of his authority to the Councillors; he gave all the orders himself. "I have put in motion upon Mooltan," he reports on the 22nd, "from different points, seven Battalions of Infantry, two of Regular Cavalry, three troops and batteries of Artillery, and twelve hundred Irregular Horse."§

The first intelligence from Mooltan left the fate of the two British officers uncertain, and gave no particulars of what had passed. The Resident had decided on the 24th of April, 1848, to support the Maharajah's force with a brigade of British troops. But when assured of the barbarous murder of the English officers, and the defection of their Sikh escort, the Resident countermanded the march of our brigade, because the Durbar troops might prove faithless.|| After several false starts, and much vacillation, the British troops did not arrive before Mooltan until the 18th of August.¶

During the continuance of this dangerous delay, several occurrences took place, eminently calculated to terrify,

* *Papers, Punjab.* 1849, p. 660. + *Ante*, p. 100. ‡ *Ante*, p. 100.

§ *Papers, Punjab.* 1849, p. 133. || *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 139. ¶ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 291.

provoke, and exasperate the Sikh chieftains and army, and to drive them headlong into the rebellion of Dewan Moolraj, just when the splendid exploits of Lieutenant Edwardes (now Colonel Sir Herbert Edwardes, K.C.B.) had made it appear almost hopeless. By the middle of July, Edwardes, with the Maharajah's troops, supported by the army of the Nawab of Bhawalpore, had defeated Moolraj in two pitched battles, and had forced the rebel leader to take refuge in his fortress. He had no army in the field; he was "hemmed in, disheartened by defeats, and weakened by desertions."* The news was spread throughout the Punjab that a British force, with heavy guns, was on its way to destroy the great stronghold of revolt. The Resident was expecting to hear of Moolraj doing some "act of desperation" that would "close the rebellion,"† when a fresh insurrection broke out, headed by Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Nazim, or Governor, of the Hazara Province. On the 14th of September, Sirdar Chuttur Sing's son, Rajah Shere Sing, who was in command of a body of Durbar troops, co-operating with General Whish in the siege of Mooltan, yielded at last to "his father's awful maledictions,"‡ and the general disaffection of his Sikh officers and soldiers, and moved over to the enemy with his whole camp. Being much distrusted by the Dewan Moolraj, Shere Sing soon left Mooltan, and became the leader in a new rebellion, which assumed the most formidable dimensions. How can we account for this strange infatuation, reviving fanaticism in the breasts of those most interested in the preservation of peace and good order, and inciting them to revolt at the most inopportune moment, when their chance of success was desperate?

Three incidents mainly contributed to stimulate the second Sikh war,—the exile of the Maharanee, the refusal to fix a day for the Maharajah's marriage, and the treatment of Sirdar Chuttur Sing. The equity and expediency of all these measures may have been very defensible at the time, and may even now be fairly entertained by those

* *Papers, Punjab*, p. 243, 250. † *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 258. "My expectation is that the rebel will either destroy himself or be destroyed by his troops, before the next mail goes out." (June 22nd, 1848.) *Punjab Papers*, 1849, p. 220.

‡ *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, by Major Edwardes, C.B., vol. ii, p. 446.

who took a part in them; but the question we have to consider is not so much whether each or all of these measures were wise and justifiable, as whether they were the work of the British Government, acting, under Treaty, as the Guardian and Trustee of the infant Sovereign. If the rebellion was aggravated and extended by the policy of British officers, approved and confirmed by the Governor-General, opposed and deprecated by the Council of Regency, the pretence of separating the Resident from the Government of Lahore, and throwing off all responsibility from the autocratic head upon the consultative members, can no longer be maintained.

Of the Maharanee's bad intentions and incessant intrigues against the Council of Regency, there can be no doubt. But in her compulsory retirement at the country palace of Sheikhopoor, her evil influence was almost extinguished; and in May, 1848, one of the most mischievous plots carried on in her name having been exposed and defeated, and the chief conspirators publicly executed, she would have been powerless, if left to her own devices. Two years after the annexation, Major Edwardes, who played such a brilliant part in these events, and had the best means of becoming acquainted with the facts, and with the weightiest opinions bearing upon them, writes that "the Ranee Jhunda, who had more wit and daring than any man of her nation, was weary of scattering 'ambiguous voices,' and of writing incendiary epistles from Sheikhopoor to quondam *mauvais sujets*, who treated them as if they came from Joseph Ady. Her memory survived, for she was not a woman to be forgotten; but her influence had followed her power, and there was no longer a man found in the Punjaub who would shoulder a musket at her bidding."*

It is perfectly clear that the strong measure of sending the Maharanee into banishment,—in fact imprisonment in exile,—was taken by the Resident, on his own judgment and authority, supported by the previously communicated permission of the Governor-General, but contrary to the advice of the Council of Regency. The Resident,

* *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 412.

in a despatch dated the 16th May, 1848, reports what had taken place on the preceding day.

"Maharanee Jhunda Khore, the mother of Maharajah Dhulcep Sing, was removed from the fort of Sheikhopoor, *by my orders*, yesterday afternoon; and is now on her way, under charge of an escort, to Ferozepore."

"Her summary banishment from the Punjaub, and residence at Benares, under the surveillance of the Governor-General's Agent, subject to such custody as will prevent all intrigue and correspondence for the future, *seems to me* the best course which we could adopt."*

There is not a word in the despatch to lead us to suppose that this step was approved by the Cabinet of Regency, or that they did anything more than act as "executive officers," and "do as they were bid."† When relating any decision of importance, the Resident generally states that the Council "unanimously" agreed with him, or that they "yielded"; but in this case there is a significant silence on the subject of any discussion in Council.

We know that in August, 1847, the Chiefs were "decidedly averse to incur what they considered the odium of participating in effecting the banishment of the Maharanee," and in consequence of their objections to sending her out of the country, her new residence was fixed at Sheikhopoor, only twenty miles from Lahore.‡

The order for the Maharanee's removal and banishment is signed by only three of the Council of Regency, and of these only one, Rajah Tej Sing, the Ranee's bitter personal enemy, is a Sikh. The signature of Golab Sing, a mere youth, is also attached, on behalf of his absent brother, Rajah Shere Sing, as if no means could be spared to fortify this document with the apparent concurrence of the Durbar.

And although it is signed by three members of the Council, and by the brother of a fourth, it only purports to be issued, "*according to the advice of Sir Frederick Currie, Bart., and Fakcer Noor-ood-deen*," a Mussulman Councillor, who, accompanied by two English officers, personally saw to the order being carried out.§

The Resident himself seems to have had some notion of the dangerous excitement that might be caused by this

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 168

† *Ante*, p. 100.

‡ *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 35 and 51.

§ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 228.

strong and severe measure. "A formal trial," he writes, "of Maharajah Runjeet Sing's widow would be most unpopular and hurtful to the feelings of the people."* Can he have really supposed that "the summary banishment" of Runjeet Sing's widow from her son's dominions, would be less unpopular? But was there no alternative but a formal trial? Why should the Rance not have been put on her defence, as she repeatedly demanded, in a private investigation? There may have been another reason for avoiding a formal or informal trial. The Resident says there is no doubt in his mind that the Maharanee was "deeply implicated" in "conspiracies for tampering with the sepoys, and making revolt and insurrection." But he adds:—"Legal proof of the delinquency of the Maharanee would not, perhaps, be obtainable."† She might have been acquitted.

The Resident, however, declares that "this is not a time for us to hesitate about doing what may appear necessary to punish state offenders, whatever may be their rank and station, and to vindicate the honour and position of the British Government."

"But," he continues, "while doing what we deem an act of justice and policy, it is not necessary or desirable to do it in a way to exasperate the feelings of the soldiery, and the Chiefs or people. We must bear in mind that the Maharanee is the mother of their Sovereign, and the widow of our Ally, Maharajah Runjeet Sing: and we must respect the feelings which they entertain regarding the violation of the seclusion of females of high rank."

"I propose, therefore,‡ that the Maharanee be sent to Benares under a strong guard; that she be allowed to take with her her jewels, and such of her property as she may immediately require, and her domestic servants; and that she be accompanied by the venerable Fakeer Noor-ooddeen," a Mahomedan, "the personal friend and adviser of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and a person greatly respected by the Sikhs generally."

"At Benares," the Resident suggests, "she should be subject to such surveillance and custody," as will "pre-

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 168. † *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 168. ‡ Therefore!

vent her having intercourse with parties beyond her own domestic establishment, and holding correspondence with any person, except through" the Governor-General's agent, Major Macgregor.*

Not a hint was given to the Maharanee or her attendants, either in the Resident's note to her, or in the order from the Durbar, as to her destination. The deputation were expressly forbidden to "use any deceit" to induce her to come away quietly, but they were "to tell the Maharanee no more than was entered in the *purwanna*," or order.† In obedience to these instructions, Lieutenant Lumsden refused to satisfy her request for information as to "whither she was to be escorted."‡

"Happily," reports the Resident, "there was not the slightest opposition; all was acquiescence and civility, from the Maharanee downwards, *very probably somewhat induced by the executions which took place a few days ago.*"§

In a subsequent letter, the Resident observes that he had anticipated "*she would probably think she was doomed to the same fate as her confidential rakeel Moonshee Gunga Ram,*"—who had been hanged a few days before. Therefore, by the Resident's permission, Lieutenant Lumsden assured her Highness, "*as the party left the fort,*" that "she would be subjected to no injury or indignity."||

Thus was the mother of the Sovereign, and widow of our Ally, hurried away into exile, under imminent terror of immediate execution, in charge of two English officers and a Mahomedan Chief, escorted by a strong guard. This was the plan adopted by the British authorities to avoid exasperating the feelings of the Sikh soldiery and people, or offending the feelings which they entertain as to the violation of the seclusion of females of high rank!

By the 10th Article of the Treaty of 16th December, 1846, the Maharanee was to receive an allowance of a lakh and a half of rupees (£15,000) per annum. On her first removal from Lahore to Sheikhopoor, in August, 1847, this stipend was reduced to forty-eight thousand rupees (£4,800), and after her deportation to Benares to twelve thousand rupees (£1,200) a year. This second reduction

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 169.

† *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 229.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 229. § *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 169. || *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 229.

was made in consideration of the fact that the Ranee was "taking with her a very large amount of private property and jewels."*

She was not allowed to remain in possession of her jewels and other property very long. On the 30th June, 1848, before her arrival at Benares, the Resident writes that a seizure has been made of important correspondence which, "if genuine, and it seems impossible it should be otherwise," proves, "beyond a shadow of doubt," the complicity of the Maharanee Jhunda Khore "in the late conspiracy, and in other intrigues and machinations." Among the important correspondence seized at Lahore were "some original letters *intended* for the Maharanee, *which were not delivered*, owing to her sudden removal,"—very conclusive evidence!—and also "*some copies of letters addressed to her*,"—still more conclusive! In order "to get hold of the originals of those last described," the Resident requests that "the greatest care may be taken to secure all her property and papers;" and that "*the Maharanee should even be subjected to have her person, and those of her confidential slave women, searched by respectable females, appointed for that purpose by the Governor-General's agent.*"†

The news of these little amenities, so eminently calculated to soothe the exasperated feelings of the Sikh Chieftains and soldiery, so congenial to their uncivilised notions of the respect due to the seclusion of ladies of high rank, may possibly have created somewhat of a sensation when spread through the Punjaub.

The Resident further suggested that "the confinement of the Maharanee, on reaching Benares, should be much more stringent than was at first intended," and that "as a state prisoner, she should not be allowed to have the command of wealth, of which she has, hitherto, not scrupled to make use to accomplish purposes the most treasonable, and to procure open violence and murder, and secret assassination."‡

The Resident's suggestions were carried out; the Ranee's papers were all secured, but nothing treasonable, or of any

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 179 and 577. † *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 235.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1849, pp. 235, 236.

importance, was found.* She was also deprived of all her jewels and valuables.†

The effect of the Maharanee's deportation upon the Sikh soldiery was instantaneous. The Resident himself writes as follows to the Governor-General on the 25th May, 1848.

"The reports from Rajah Shere Sing's camp are, that the Khalsa soldiery, on hearing of the removal of the Maharanee, were much disturbed; they said that she was the mother of the Khalsa, and that, as she was gone, and the young Dhuleep Sing in our hands, they had no longer any one to fight for or uphold; that they had no inducement to oppose Moolraj: and if he came to attack them, would seize the Sirdars and their officers, and go over to him."‡

A prominent place is given to this cause of general disgust and indignation in Shere Sing's Manifesto.

"It is well known to all the inhabitants of the Punjaub, to the whole of the Sikhs, and in fact to the world at large, with what oppression, tyranny and undue violence, the Feringees have treated the widow of the great Maharajah Runjeet Sing, now in bliss."

"They have broken the Treaty by imprisoning, and sending away to Hindostan, the Maharanee, the mother of her people."§

Dost Mahomed, the Ruler of Cabool, in his letter to Captain Abbott, alleges this grievance as the chief cause of disaffection in the Punjaub.

"There can be no doubt that the Sikhs are daily becoming more and more discontented. Some have been dismissed from service, while others have been banished to Hindostan, in particular the mother of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, who has been imprisoned and ill-treated. Such treatment is considered objectionable by all creeds, and both high and low prefer death."||

There can be little doubt as to the Maharanee's incessant and malicious intrigues after her first removal to Sheikhpoor, and the reduction of the income guaranteed to her by the Treaty. That she would have had no scruple in getting her great enemy Rajah Tej Sing's throat cut if she could, and in damaging or disgracing one or two other members of the Regency, may well be believed. It was only to be expected that every one who engaged in

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 263, 266.

† *Ibid.*, 1849, pp. 263, 575.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 179. § *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 362. || *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 512.

rebellion or conspiracy, should make a free use of her name, and profess to act on her behalf, and with her sanction. But she is represented on all hands as a remarkably clever woman, and it appears highly improbable that she should have been so blind to British power, so forgetful of recent lessons, so regardless of her son's interests, upon which her own future position entirely depended, as to provoke, with a divided country and diminished resources, another struggle between the Khalsa and the Company. It is utterly incredible. Not only is there no "legal proof," as the Resident admits, but there is nothing to be found in the Blue Book which amounts to substantial evidence, or affords any moral grounds for concluding that she ever compassed or countenanced such a renewed struggle, before her removal to Benares. In exile and degradation, stripped of her jewels, cash and other property, deprived of her papers, forbidden to have an interview with any one, even with an English attorney, except in the presence of the Governor-General's Agent,* she may very probably have plunged into desperate plots of revenge, and opened a secret communication with the leading insurgents.

The deportation and imprisonment of the Maharanee, declared by Lord Dalhousie to have been intended not only as a "precaution," but as a "punishment,"† appears to me to have been a measure as inexpedient and impolitic as it was unjudicial. Whatever that lady's crimes and conspiracies may have been,—and we have nothing to prove them but a mass of vituperative assertions,—it might have been foreseen, and, doubtless, was foreseen and predicted by the Council of Regency, that her persecution would be ten times more provocative to the Sikhs, and more injurious to British honour and authority, than her continued intrigues could possibly have been.

The Ranee's banishment was looked upon by all who were attached to Runjeet Sing's Kingdom, at once as a national insult, and as a preliminary step to the dethronement of her son, and the destruction of the State.

Rajah Shere Sing was one of those "Chiefs of the greatest note," whom, having first despatched towards Mooltan with

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 575. † *Ibid.*, 1849, pp. 575, 578.

all the disposable troops of the Sikh Army, the Resident recalled to receive the ominous injunction and warning that they must "put down the rebellion by their own means, as the only hope of saving their Government."* It was in his camp, as we have just seen, that the alarm and excitement first arose, when the Maharanee's deportation from the Punjaub became known.†

But Shere Sing had not only the disaffection of his own troops to contend with. A storm was brewing in another quarter. His father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Nazim or Governor of the Hazara Province, began to be involved, in the month of July, in certain personal difficulties, to be described hereafter, which led him to fear that his own ruin, and that of Runjeet Sing's Kingdom, were objects predetermined by the British authorities. The old Sirdar kept up a regular correspondence with his son, Rajah Shere Sing, in the camp at Mooltan, and with his younger son, Golab Sing, at Lahore. He was probably, in common with the Sikhs in general, somewhat alarmed and disgusted by the Maharanee's exile, and other menacing incidents and rumours; and when his anxieties were redoubled by the dangers impending over himself, he thought of applying a test to the secret intentions of the British Government, to ascertain whether the Treaty was to be broken,—whether the outrages and rebellion of Mooltan were to be visited on the innocent Dhuleep Sing. The youthful Maharajah was betrothed to Sirdar Chuttur Sing's daughter,—Rajah Shere Sing's sister. The Resident should be asked to fix a day for the marriage to take place. If he consented, it would be a sign of continued friendship and good faith: if there were any evasion or hesitation, it would be a proof of some sinister purpose. Major Edwardes writes as follows to the Resident on the 28th July, 1848:—

"Yesterday evening Rajah Shere Sing Attareewalla begged me to grant him a private interview, at which he laid before me the wishes of his father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

"If it is not your intention that the nuptials of the Maharajah should be celebrated some time within the next twelve months, the Sirdar would wish to be allowed to lay aside the duties of his Hazara Government, and proceed on pilgrimage for two years; if,

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 137, 140.

† *Ante*, p. 108.

on the contrary, the marriage is to take place this year, the Sirdar would suggest that, with your sanction, the Durbar should appoint astrologers, on the part of the Maharajah, to fix an auspicious month and day, in conjunction with other astrologers on the part of the bride.

“The above is the substance of the Rajah’s conversation; and he earnestly requested me to procure him an answer from you within ten days. The request seems strange at the present moment. The secret motives of men are difficult to divine; but there can be no question that an opinion has gone very prevalently abroad, and been carefully disseminated by the evil disposed, that the British meditate declaring the Punjaub forfeited by the recent troubles and misconduct of the troops; and whether the Attarecwalla family have any doubts, or not, upon this point themselves, it would, I think, be a wise and timely measure to give such public assurance of British good faith, and intention to adhere to the Treaty, as would be involved in authoritative preparations for providing the young Maharajah with a Queen. It would, no doubt, settle men’s minds greatly.”*

The Resident returned a very stiff official reply to this application, carefully avoiding any such “assurance,” public or private, as Rajah Shere Sing wished to elicit, though endeavouring to satisfy him with common-place courtesies. He observes that “all the ceremonies for affiancing being complete, it would, in common usage, rest with the family of the bride to determine the time when the actual ceremony of marriage should take place;” but that “of course, with reference to the position of the Maharajah, *nothing can be done in this case without the concurrence and approbation of the Resident.*” He will “consult, confidentially, the members of the Durbar now at Lahore on the subject of the time at which the marriage should be celebrated,” and Rajah Shere Sing may be assured that the British Government will only interfere “to secure that all is done which may be best calculated to promote the honour and happiness of the Maharajah, and of the bride and her family.”

And then come these portentous words:—“I do not see how the proceeding with the ceremonies for the Maharajah’s nuptials *can be considered as indicative of any line of policy which the Government may consider it right to pursue now, or at any future time, in respect to the*

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 270, 271.

administration of the Punjab, and it is, on that account, that I see no objection to the marriage being celebrated at such time, and in such manner, as may be most satisfactory to the parties themselves, and the Durbar.”*

Major Edwardes can now have had no doubt as to the views in favour at Head-quarters; and, however cautiously he may have communicated to Shere Sing the substance of the Resident's answer, the Rajah and his father must have felt henceforth but little hope that the Sovereignty of Dhuleep Sing would be allowed to survive the suppression of the actual revolt. The less Major Edwardes said on the subject, the more they must have been alarmed.

Major Edwardes says: “Unhappily the full meaning of the application did not appear.”† It must have appeared clearly enough to the Resident by the light of Major Edwardes's own lucid explanation, which we have just quoted. The cold and studied reply indicates that the question was fully understood. And by the aid of their other informants at Lahore, where Rajah Shere Sing's brother, Golab Sing, had access to the Resident, we may be sure that the full meaning of the reply to their urgent application was understood by the two Sikh Chieftains. The Resident would not admit that the Maharajah's marriage was a matter of political significance, or public consequence; and he would not promise to take any immediate steps to have a day fixed for its celebration. “Of course, nothing can be done without the concurrence and approbation of the Resident,” but “he will consult the Durbar confidentially.”

Just at the time when Sirdar Chuttur Sing must have received the news from his sons of the negative result of his test, he was himself falling into great straits.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing was the Nazim, or Governor, of the Hazara Province, inhabited by an armed Mahomedan population,—“warlike and difficult of control,”‡—who entertained a bitter and bigoted hostility of all who bore the name of Sikh. Under Runjeet Sing's Government the Province had never been effectually settled, and the revenues were only occasionally collected by a military

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, pp. 272, 273. † *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol ii, p. 448.

‡ *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 18.

expedition. Captain James Abbott, one of the Resident's Assistants,* was appointed to aid and advise the Sikh Governor, in the execution of his duties. Very soon after the outbreak under Dewan Moolraj at Mooltan, Captain Abbott became impressed with the belief that Chuttur Sing was "at the head of a conspiracy for the expulsion of the English from the Punjaub, and was about to head a crusade against the British forces at Lahore."† From that time Captain Abbott took up his abode at a place thirty-five miles distant from Chuttur Sing's residence,‡ and "shut himself out from all personal communication" with his colleague.§ "The constant suspicion," writes the Resident, "with which Captain Abbott regarded Sirdar Chuttur Sing, seems to have, not unnaturally, estranged that Chief from him."

"This state of feeling seems to have been taken advantage of, by persons interested in widening the breach between the two; till Captain Abbott looks upon Sirdar Chuttur Sing as a sort of incarnation of treason, and the Sirdar has been led to believe that Captain Abbott is bent upon the annihilation of himself and the Khalsa army in Hazara, on the first opportunity."||

The Blue Book affords ample materials for balancing the antecedent probabilities in this case. Nearly a year before his differences with Chuttur Sing commenced, the Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, had written of Captain Abbott to the Governor-General in these terms:—"Captain Abbott is an excellent officer; but he is too apt to take gloomy views of questions. I think he has unwittingly done Dewan Jowala Sahace injustice." Of this Dewan Jowala Sahace Sir Henry Lawrence adds, "I only know one better native. According to the light he has enjoyed, the times he has lived in, and the school in which he has been brought up, he is a respectable, as he is assuredly an able, man."¶

On a later occasion, the succeeding Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, shows us Captain Abbott falling into the

* Distinguished before that period for his enterprising journey to Khiva, well described by his own pen.

† *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 279.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 285.

|| *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 279.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 279.

¶ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 30.

same hasty and unfounded suspicions of another Sikh Chief, Jhunda Sing.

"Soon after the defection of a portion of the Churrunjeet Regiment of Horse, which formed a part of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's Brigade, (on which occasion the Sirdar's conduct was open to no sort of suspicion,) Captain Abbott wrote of Jhunda Sing as one connected with the extensive band of conspirators whom he considered as leagued to aid the Mooltan rebellion.

"Upon that occasion I explained to Captain Abbott, that if his opinion of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's disaffection rested on the facts he had mentioned, it was without due foundation; for that the Sirdar had closely and scrupulously obeyed my orders in every step he had taken."*

Besides these two particular instances of Captain Abbott's special infirmity, we find in the Blue Book the Resident's judgment on that officer's general capacity as a political detective, professing to observe the obscure symptoms of a nascent insurrection.

"His Lordship will have observed a very ready disposition on the part of Captain Abbott to believe the reports that are brought to him of conspiracies, treasons, and plots, suspicion of everybody, far and near, even of his own servants, and a conviction of the infallibility of his own conclusions, which is not shaken by finding time after time that they are not verified."†

Who, on the other hand, was Sirdar Chuttur Sing, so unfortunately associated with this perverse coadjutor? The Resident tells us that he was "an old and infirm man, the father-in-law of the Maharajah, with more at stake than almost any man in the Punjab."‡

"Sirdar Chuttur Sing is a wily old Chief of Runjeet Sing's time, who has been concerned in his day in many treacherous proceedings, and is the confidential friend of Maharajah Golab Sing; but he is now infirm and in ill health, and has obtained much wealth, and an honourable position in the present administration, while his daughter is the betrothed wife of the young Maharajah of Lahore."§

"Mr. John Lawrence, in a private letter received yesterday, writing of him, says, 'I cannot, in any way, account for Chuttur Sing's conduct; I always looked on him as a harmless old fool. He is, moreover, now very infirm, and suffers much from chronic disease.'"||

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 328.

† *Ibid.*, p. 279.

§ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 286.

† *Ibid.*, p. 285.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 334.

In another despatch he observes :—"Sirdar Chuttur Sing and his sons were raised to their present position by the arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, with the approbation of the British Government. The family is unpopular with the Chiefs, and the old adherents of Runjeet Sing, as being upstarts, and the creatures of the British Government. They are unpopular with the army, * * * and they have no weight with the people."*

In the midst of the agitation caused throughout the Punjaub by the delay and uncertainty following the first successes of Major Edwardes against the Dewan Moolraj, Captain Abbott received intelligence, upon which he placed reliance, that the Brigade of Durbar troops stationed at Pukli, near the residence of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, had determined on marching either to Mooltan or to Lahore, to join in the insurrection. So far as can be gathered from the Blue Book, his information showed that a portion of the force was in an excited and disaffected state; but Captain Abbott himself reports that the officers "did not countenance the men in the move," that they "made a show of putting down the mutiny," and that they fired "two successive salutes," in honour of the "two victories" of Lieutenant Edwardes." He also states that the Golumdauz or Artillerymen, and the Zumboorchees, or camel-gunners, were "disinclined to the move."† Thus the disaffection, by his own account, was by no means general or decided. Nothing whatever appears to prove that Sirdar Chuttur Sing promoted or approved the misconduct of the evil-disposed among the Sikh troops.

Captain Abbott, however, had satisfied himself that Chuttur Sing was at the head of a vast conspiracy, and was about to march upon Lahore at the head of all the Durbar troops in Hazara. During the first week of August, 1848, without any warning, without any communication with the Governor of the Province, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Captain Abbott roused the armed Mahomedan peasantry, over whom he had obtained great influence, and closed the passes by which the Brigade stationed at Pukli could descend into the plains. On the 6th of August "the

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 380.

† *Ibid.*, p. 310.

mountaineers assembled in great numbers, and surrounded the town of Hurripore," where Sirdar Chuttur Sing was residing. The Sirdar was induced, as a natural movement of self-defence, to order the detachment of troops, which was stationed for the protection of the town, to encamp on the esplanade under the guns of the fort.* Colonel Canora, an American, who had been for some years in the Sikh service, refused to move out of the city to the new position with the battery of Artillery under his command, unless by Captain Abbott's permission. Sirdar Chuttur Sing "repeated his orders, saying that Captain Abbott could not know the peril they were in from the threatened attack of the armed population, who could easily seize the guns where they were."† Canora not only refused to obey these orders, but loaded two of his guns with double charges of grape, and "standing between them with a lighted portfire in his hand, said he would fire upon the first man who came near."‡ Sirdar Chuttur Sing sent two companies of Sikh Infantry to take possession of the guns. Colonel Canora first cut down one of his own Havildars, or Sergeants, who had refused to fire upon the Infantry, and then applied the match himself to one of the guns, which missed fire. At that moment he was struck down by musket shots from two of the Infantry soldiers. After his fall, and before he expired, he is said to have killed two Sikh officers with his double barrellled pistol.§

Captain Abbott calls this most justifiable and unavoidable homicide, "an atrocious deed," "a cold-blooded murder, as base and cowardly as that of Peshora Sing,"|| and talks about Chuttur Sing having "*determined upon the murder*" of Colonel Canora.¶

The Resident, in several letters to Captain Abbott, having

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 279.

† *Ibid.*, p. 280.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 287 and 303.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 280, 301, 303.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 302. Peshora Sing, one of several pretenders to the throne of the Punjab, was in open rebellion against the Lahore Government in March 1845, when he was captured by the troops under Chuttur Sing, and put to death in prison by order of the Minister, Jowahir Sing, the Maharanee's brother. Chuttur Sing does not seem to have been to blame.—*Trotter's History of India* from 1844 to 1862, vol. i, p. 42.

¶ *Idem.* p. 311.

received both his account of the affair and that of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, makes the following sound and sensible observations :—

“The death of Commedan Canora is stated, both by the Sirdar and yourself, to have been occasioned in consequence of his disobedience of the reiterated orders of the Nazim, and his having offered violent opposition to those whom the Governor, after many remonstrances with the Commedan, sent to enforce his orders.

“I cannot at all agree with you as to the character you assign to this transaction. Sirdar Chuttur Sing was the Governor of the province, military and civil, and the officers of the Sikh army were bound to obey him, the responsibility for his orders resting with him. Taking the worst possible view of the case, I know not how you can characterise it as ‘a cold-blooded murder, as base and cowardly as that of Peshora Sing.’* ”

“Your statement of the disturbance in Hazara, does not materially differ from that received from other quarters ; nor does it differ in facts, making allowance for different statements of motives and intentions, from that given by Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in his representations to the Durbar, and letters to me.

“It is clear that whatever may have been the intention of the Pukli Brigade, no overt act of rebellion was committed by them till the initiative was taken by you, by calling out the armed peasantry and surrounding the Brigade in its cantonment. It seems, also, that the armed peasants were threatening Hurripore, before the Nazim ordered the guns out of the town, to the open space between the fort and the city.

“The Sirdar states that this was merely a precautionary measure, in consequence of the rising of the population, the cause of which he did not know ; while you state that it was for the purpose of bringing off the Pukli Brigade, which was surrounded and hemmed in by your orders ; of which orders the Governor had had no notice.†

“I have given you no authority to raise levies, and organise paid bands of soldiers, to meet an emergency, of the occurrence of which I have always been somewhat sceptical.

“I cannot approve of your having abstained from communication with the Nazim on the state of his administration, for the purpose of making his silence or otherwise on the subject, a test whereby his guilt or innocence was to be determined by you. You had already withdrawn your office from the seat of Government, and had ceased all personal communication with the Nazim, and had told the Nazim’s Vakeel that you had no confidence in his master. It is not to be wondered at that, under such circumstances, a weak, proud Chief should feel offended, and become

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 313.

† *Ibid.*, p. 313.

sullen, and be silent as to the disaffected state of the troops under his Government,—if he was really aware of the fact.

“It is much, I think, to be lamented that you have kept the Nazim at a distance from you; have resisted his offers and suggestions to be allowed himself to reside near you, or to have his son, Ootar Sing, to represent him at Shirwan; and that you have judged of the purposes, and feelings and fidelity of the Nazim and the troops, from the reports of spies and informers, very probably interested in misrepresenting the real state of affairs.

“None of the accounts that have yet been made, justifies you in calling the death of Commedan Canora a murder, nor in asserting that it was premeditated by Sirdar Chuttur Sing. That matter has yet to be investigated.”*

Chuttur Sing was eventually goaded into open rebellion. Captain Abbott having predicted his treason, took, with perfect good faith, the best measures to prove his prediction true. Having played an aggressive part, and forced Chuttur Sing “to take his line,”† Captain Abbott acted with consummate ability and energy; and though he could not accomplish the task he had assigned himself, that of destroying the Sikh troops by means of the Mahomedan mountaineers, he maintained a position in Hazara till the end of the war. When Chuttur Sing had committed himself beyond retreat by a series of acts of contumacy and hostility, and when Captain Abbott was proving himself fully equal to the occasion, that officer’s provocative policy was glossed over and consigned to oblivion. But there is nothing whatever in the Blue Book to show that the Resident ever saw reason to withdraw or modify his opinion that “the initiative was taken” by Captain Abbott. The insurrection in Hazara was, in fact, originally an insurrection of the Mahomedan peasantry, with the object of exterminating the Sikh troops and Governor, instigated and promoted by a British officer.‡

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 316.

† *Ibid.*, p. 323.

‡ It is worthy of note that, at the end of the campaign, “Abbott alone, who had held his lonely post at Nara from first to last, was unfairly stinted of the honours due to his acknowledged worth,” when Edwardes, Lake, Taylor and Herbert were decorated and promoted.—*Trotter’s History of India from 1844 to 1862*, vol. i, p. 212. “The gallant Abbott, who had defended the fortress of Nara against fearful odds, down to the close of the campaign, was invidiously refused the honour due to his distinguished efforts and success.”—*Marshman’s History of India*, (Longmans, 1867) vol. iii, p. 350. *Somebody* appreciated his services justly, if Lord Dalhousie did not.

It is interesting to observe the spirit in which Captain Abbott devised and prosecuted his offensive operations. It goes very far to explain the powerful influence which he obtained over the fanatical Mahomedans of the Hazara Hills. Besides money, he gave them what they most coveted, an opportunity of revenge and triumph over the idolatrous Sikhs, the obstinate persecutors of the Mussulman faith. I quote from Captain Abbott's own despatches.

"I assembled the Chiefs of Hazara; explained what had happened, and called upon them by the memory of their murdered parents, friends and relatives, to rise, and aid me in destroying the Sikh forces in detail. I issued *purwanas* to this effect throughout the land, and marched to a strong position."*

"I have placed a force in the Margulla Pass to destroy Pertaub Sing's Regiment, should it refuse to turn back at my reiterated orders."†

"I have ordered out the armed peasantry, and will do my best to destroy the Sikh army."‡

"The Sirdar sent me no intelligence of this cold-blooded murder, as base and cowardly as his murder of Peshora Sing; but on finding it confirmed by eye-witnesses, and that the Sirdar had thus identified himself with the mutineers in Pukli, I ordered all the Chiefs of Hazara to rise, and, in every way, harass and molest those who should support him."§

It must be remembered that there were no "mutineers in Pukli"; Captain Abbott had no information of anything like a mutiny; he was acting merely on the rumours of a secret conspiracy, brought or written to him, from a distance of thirty-five miles, by spies and informers. No overt act had been committed before his own hostile movements. His own letters prove that before the unfortunate Canora's death, there was nothing apparent or even alleged against Sirdar Chuttur Sing, that required investigation. He presses matters on to a climax.

"I left Shirwan for a position nearer the new theatre of operations, the foot of the Gundgirk mountains,—terrible to the Sikhs for three most bloody and disastrous defeats, from numbers not one-fourth of their own. It is within sight of Hurripore, and may be called the throne of Hazara, as here I have at my back the bravest and most loyal of the population, and my orders are better obeyed than from any other locality."||

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 311.

† *Ibid.*, p. 301.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

† *Ibid.*, p. 306.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 303.

From this "throne," he sent to Hurripore, and summoned ChutterSing to give up "the murderers," as he called them, of Colonel Canora, and to comply with "a schedule of demands."

"I have given him until to-morrow morning for decision. If he then refuse the terms, I shall be satisfied that it is not mere alarm about himself from the population of Hazara, but a sense of detected guilt, and consequent desperation, which has led to this rebellious conduct. If he comply, *the country need not be ravaged, nor the army destroyed*, and his conduct may be made the subject of legal investigation.

"The Pukli Brigade is still in limbo. It is unfortunate that the Pukli Brigade got intelligence of my possession of that pass in time, *as, in all probability it would have been destroyed*. As it never actually marched, I am reluctant to order it to be destroyed, until in motion."*

Here is another distinct admission, out of his own mouth, that no overt act had been committed. It was, in his opinion, "unfortunate," that these obstinate Sikhs would not mutiny, or march to Lahore, in time. He was "reluctant" to have them "destroyed" in their quarters, because they had not moved. Yet he had already ordered the armed peasantry to "destroy the Sikh army," and "to harass and molest, in every way," those who supported the Governor of the Province.

In another place Captain Abbott declares that the "murder" of Canora "formed the break in the ice of *deep and silent treachery, so long carried on with a smiling face*,"†—acknowledging, in fact, that, before that unhappy event, he had nothing to bring against Chuttur Sing except rumours of a conspiracy gathered from spies and informers. As the Resident wrote to him:—"There is no proof of misconduct before the raising of the armed population, and his plea is, that all that he has done since, has been of a defensive character."‡

More than once Captain Abbott betrays his consciousness that he had given Chuttur Sing good cause for alarm, and for the precautionary measures which were bringing them into collision. "I wrote to the Sirdar," he says, "insisting upon the instant surrender of the murderers of this loyal and gallant officer, and the return of the troops

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 303.

† *Ibid.*, p. 311.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

to their cantonments, promising, upon these conditions, *to settle all disturbances in the country.*"*

"He" (Chuttur Sing) "says that Canora was engaged to join the peasants in plundering Hurripore. He"—evidently Canora—"knew nothing whatever of what was passing amongst the people of the country, *and more than once expressed anxiety lest the town should be plundered.*"†

"If the murderers of Colonel Canora are surrendered to me for judgment, and the troops sent back to their several cantonments, *I will, instantly, reduce the country to its former profound tranquillity.*"‡

There is an occasional inconsistency, amounting almost to incoherence, running through Captain Abbott's reports, in spite of his bold and confident doings. For instance, after declaring his intention of "destroying the Sikh army in detail," and "harassing and molesting" everyone who should support the Governor, he complains of that personage having expressed alarm at the rising of the armed peasantry, and having written in "a tone of virtuous indignation," under a "pretence of extreme peril from a people *whom two of my chuprassees*" (messengers) "*would settle in three days.*"§ As if it were very likely that either the Mahomedan population on the one side, roused by appeals to their "murdered parents," and to the "bloody defeats" they had formerly inflicted on the Sikhs;|| or the Sikh Governor and troops, on the other, alarmed by the sudden insurrection, would interpret Captain Abbott's exterminating orders and proclamations with all that moderation and reluctance, and all those conditions and qualifications, with which he professes to have tempered them!

The Resident had too much good sense and experience to look upon the calling up of these fanatical mountaineers as a mere demonstration, which Captain Abbott could easily keep in hand, and settle at any moment with two of his *chuprassees*. He very properly calls it "a momentous business," and tells the Governor-General, "I have pointed out to him how much easier it is to raise, than to allay a power thus brought into action, and impelled by religious antipathies, and feelings of long cherished hatred."¶

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 302.

† *Ibid.*, p. 304.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

§ *Papers, Punjab*, p. 279.

† *Ibid.*, p. 303.

|| *Ante*, p. 119.

The Resident writes to Captain Abbott that both of Sirdar Chuttur Sing's sons, Rajah Shere Sing, at Mooltan, and Golab Sing, at Lahore, complain that their father has been "betrayed into misconduct by mistrust, engendered by your withdrawal of your confidence from him, and declared suspicions of his fidelity, and by fear at the Mahomedan population having been raised, as he believed, for his destruction and that of the Sikh army."*

What Chuttur Sing believed, was the exact truth. Captain Abbott himself tells us so repeatedly. He speaks of "arousing a high-spirited people to the work of destruction."† The Mahomedan population was raised by him "to destroy the Sikh army," and to "harass and molest" everyone who should support the Sikh Governor.

The Resident on the 19th August, 1848, writes to Captain Nicholson, who, under his instructions, was endeavouring to arrange matters, and bring all parties to their bearings, as follows :—

"We must bear in mind that, whatever may have been supposed to have been the purpose of the Pukli Brigade and the Sirdar, no over tact was committed by either, until the Brigade was surrounded in Gahundia, and Hurripore was threatened by the Mahomedan tribes, of whose purpose no notice had been given by Captain Abbott to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Governor of the Province. The initiative was clearly taken by Captain Abbott,—I do not say unnecessarily, but it was so taken; and the Nazim now pleads that he was acting for the protection of himself and the troops committed to him, and also of the country under his government, in calling the Regiments from Hassan Abdal and the other cantonments."‡

Captain Nicholson writes to much the same effect :—

"From all that I can learn, Sirdar Chuttur Sing's conduct, at the commencement, was owing as much to nervousness and suspicion as any other feeling, and but for the murder of the unfortunate Commandant of Artillery, I should have had hopes of an amicable adjustment. As it is, the dislike to surrender the perpetrators would alone, I believe, prove an insurmountable obstacle."§

"I have already mentioned, that I attribute Sirdar Chuttur Sing's behaviour, in the first instance, to his distrust of Captain Abbott's intentions, which was excited by the assemblage, by that

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 296.

† *Ibid.*, p. 312.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

officer, of a body of Moolkias," (the armed mountaineers,) "to overawe the Sikh troops in Pukli, who, he had reason to believe, meditated marching on Lahore. This distrust was further, unfortunately, increased by the reports of designing parties on both sides, who, for the furtherance of their own interests, endeavoured to create disunion between Captain Abbott and the Sirdar, who has since, I fear, committed himself past forgiveness.

"That he will never accede to any terms in which a free pardon for all this is not included, I feel certain.

"I would beg to solicit that instructions be, at once, sent to Mr. Cocks, who, I suppose, will be here in the interim, as to whether he is authorised to promise a full pardon to the Sirdar for all that has occurred. If he be, there is no difficulty whatever."*

At this time, and even on previous dates, Captain Abbott's inflammatory language exaggerates and misrepresents what he calls the "crimes" of Chuttur Sing. He writes to the Resident, on the 13th August, that Chuttur Sing is "exciting to mutiny the bulk of the Sikh army, and calling upon the Jummoo Prince" (the Rajah of Cashmere) "to invade the country." "Last night I intercepted letters from Sirdar Chuttur Sing to Maharajah Golab Sing," (of Cashmere) "the Rajahs Jowahir Sing and Runbeer Sing," (Golab Sing's nephew and son,) "and others, entreating the aid of four Jummoo Regiments."†

What he calls "exciting the Sikh army to mutiny," was sending for the Regiments from the neighbouring cantonments for the protection of himself and the troops from the insurgent Mahomedans. As for the intercepted letters, they are, in fact, the best evidence of the Sirdar's innocence at that period, for, containing no treasonable matter, or Captain Abbott would have been sure to mention it, and being couched, as he says, "in a tone of virtuous indignation," they, also, were simply appeals for aid, written under the influence, as Captain Nicholson said, of "terror and anxiety."‡

When the news of Chuttur Sing's movements first reached Mooltan, his son, Rajah Shere Sing "discussed the matter with me," said Major Edwardes, to whom Shere Sing showed the letters received from his father, "with

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 308, 309.

† *Ibid*, p. 304.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

great good sense, and put it to me, whether all that his father had done to oppose the Moolkias" (the insurgent peasantry) "was not perfectly natural and excusable, on the supposition that he was innocent of the plots suspected by Captain Abbott. 'No man,' he said, 'will allow himself to be killed without a struggle.'"*

The insurmountable obstacle, as Captain Nicholson at once perceived, was the death of Colonel Canora, and the requisition for the men who shot him. Chuttur Sing had rewarded these men on the spot, a very natural proceeding in his position and with his notions, but which, he felt, fixed upon him the stigma of the murder, if such it was to be considered by the English authorities. "He has identified himself with the murderers in paying them for their bloody work," wrote Captain Abbott to the Resident.† It is perfectly obvious that if Chuttur Sing had taken a step towards giving up those men to what they and their comrades would have supposed to be certain death, he would not merely have sacrificed his own honour uselessly,—for there was no secret about his having rewarded them,—but it would in all probability have brought on an immediate mutiny, to which he would himself have fallen the first victim.

The Resident seems to have had a general idea that the principal difficulty of the case was concentrated on this point. "After the death of Canora," he writes to the Government, "the Sirdar thought himself compromised irretrievably, it would appear, with us."‡

Major George Lawrence, also, writes :—"He" (Chuttur Sing) "is anxious to come to terms, but fears he has committed himself too far to admit of his obtaining them."§

We are not surprised to find that he could obtain no terms from Captain Abbott. That officer refused to see Chuttur Sing, who offered to wait upon him, if assured of a free pardon. "I declined this ; thought it quite impossible that we should meet amicably, until I knew the sentiments of Government upon his conduct."||

"I gave him yesterday," writes Captain Abbott to the Resident, "a statement of my demands, viz., the surrender

* *Papers, Poonjab*, 1849, p. 294.

† *Ibid.*, p. 289.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

† *Ibid.*, p. 311.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 311.

of the murderers for judgment, and an order to the several Regiments to return to their duty.”*

But from the Resident we might have expected a more even-handed procedure, and a more impartial arbitrament. Satisfied that the death of Canora, even according to Captain Abbott's version, was not a murder, he might surely have dealt more judiciously with that “insurmountable obstacle,” the peremptory demand for the surrender of “the murderers” into Captain Abbott's hands. Perceiving “clearly” that “the initiative” had been taken by Captain Abbott, he might surely have offered Sirdar Chuttur Sing a full pardon, conditional on his proving the plea that he had resorted to none but defensive measures, and had acted only “for the protection of himself and the troops,” when they were hemmed in by the insurgent mountaineers.

No such offer was made to Chuttur Sing. No such offer was proposed or sanctioned by the Resident. No one told the Sikh Governor that the Resident had by no means decided hastily, like Captain Abbott, that Canora had been foully murdered. No hint was given that any question or dispute between him and Captain Abbott could possibly be open to investigation. No promise was made to Chuttur Sing but that of his life; no terms were offered him but those of implicit submission to Captain Abbott, against whose aggression he complained, and with these terms was coupled the intimation that he was dismissed from his Government, and that his landed property would be confiscated!

Captain Nicholson declared that Sirdar Chuttur Sing's conduct was the result of “terror and anxiety,”† and he never deviated from that opinion. He told the Resident that the demand for the men who killed the unfortunate Commandant of Artillery would prove “an insurmountable obstacle,” and that Chuttur Sing would “never accede to any terms” but “a free pardon.” Yet on receiving overtures from Chuttur Sing, he “insisted, as a preliminary, on the Artillery Commandant's murderers being given up.”‡ And on the 20th August he wrote to the Resident as follows :—

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 306.

† *Ibid.*, §98.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

“Considering how extremely desirable it is that matters should, if possible, be peaceably arranged, believing, also, that the Sirdar’s conduct, of late, though heinous in many respects, *had its origin in fear*, I have taken upon myself the responsibility of offering him the following terms, which, whether he accept (as Jhunda Sing seems to think he will) or not, I hope will meet your approval, *viz.*—That if the Sirdar, immediately, come in to me, and send back the troops to their posts, I guarantee his life and izzut” (honour) “being spared; *but I neither guarantee his Nazimship nor his Jagheer, which, indeed, I have intimated to him he cannot expect to be allowed to retain.*”

“All things considered, I trust you will agree with me, that the loss of the Nizamut and of his Jagheer will be a sufficient punishment, and that I have acted rightly in offering these terms.”*

This severe sentence, without trial and without judgment, was instantly, by return of post, “entirely approved, confirmed and ratified” by the Resident, in a letter dated the 23rd August, to Captain Nicholson.†

Yet on the very day, the 23rd August, on which the Resident “confirmed and ratified” the degradation of Chuttur Sing and the resumption of his estates, he wrote as follows to Major Edwardes:—“Lieutenant Nicholson and Major Lawrence, with the best opportunities of judging, entirely concur with me that the Sirdar’s conduct is owing more to his distrust and fear of Captain Abbott’s feelings and intentions towards himself and the troops, than to any other cause.”‡ He had previously remarked in a letter to the Commander in Chief:—“Lieutenant Nicholson *does not seem to know the manner of Commandant Canora’s death; he calls it a murder*, and says that he understands Sirdar Chuttur Sing headed the party that killed him.”§ And on the 24th August, the day after he had approved and confirmed the hard terms proposed by Captain Nicholson, the Resident wrote to Captain Abbott, disapproving of much of his conduct, pronouncing it to have been “far from judicious,” and that he was not justified “in calling the death of Commedan Canora a murder.”||

On the 5th September the Resident writes to Government:—“I have promised him” (Chuttur Sing) “merely

* *Papers, Panjab*, 1849, p. 295.

† *Ibid.*, p. 297.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

† *Ibid.*, p. 297.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 316.

life, and an honourable investigation into his conduct.”* How could that be “an honourable investigation,” which was preceded by the infliction of heavy penalties? The Sirdar was not even told that, if he succeeded in clearing himself, these penalties would be remitted.

When Chuttur Sing found that his appeal to the Resident and the Durbar was fruitless; that Captain Abbott's proceedings were not disavowed, or, to his knowledge, disapproved; and that no terms were offered to him but bare life, what could he think but that he had been marked down as the first victim in the general ruin of the Punjab State? Already alarmed and disgusted by the Maharanee's removal and ill-treatment, and by the evasive answer as to the Maharajah's marriage, his head may probably have been full of plots and projects, and he may have been intently watching the course of events, when Captain Abbott's initiative threw him into an equivocal position. When that officer was permitted to pursue what he himself called “the work of destruction,” unproved, so far as Chuttur Sing knew,—when the plan of setting up the Mahomedans against Sikhs, and reviving old blood feuds, was adopted and sanctioned by the highest British authorities, the old Sirdar's disaffection was confirmed. He was driven to desperation; he no longer resisted the importunities of the fanatic Sikhs among his followers and the troops. He plunged into open rebellion, and devoted himself to one last struggle for his religion and the Khalsa Raj.

And from the manner in which Chuttur Sing with the Sikh troops, and Captain Abbott with his Mahomedan peasants, were left by the Resident to fight it out by themselves, the Sikhs at other stations were soon persuaded that such was the settled plan of the British Government. Major George Lawrence writes from Peshawur on the 5th of September :—“Colonel Ootar Sing declared that men from different Regiments had called on all to march on my quarters, as it was my intention to destroy all the Sikhs, *by raising the Mahomedan population.*”* He adds :—“I keep all the Mahomedans as much out of sight as possible, and will do everything in my power to preserve the peace,

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 329.

but it is utterly impossible to suppose that this state of things can last.”*

When Sirdar Chuttur Sing was fully committed beyond all possibility of retreat or redemption,—when redress was refused, and he was sentenced without judgment,—his sons, of course, threw in their lot with their father, and the second Sikh war began. Until they took that step, the Mooltan rebellion was isolated,—confined, indeed, within the walls of the fortress; although its importance was enhanced and the dangers attending it were aggravated by the Maharanee’s removal, by our military vacillation and delay, and by the rumours of impending annexation. Up to the middle of September, 1848, no Chief of note or distinction had joined in the insurrection. Captain Abbott’s notion of a general conspiracy throughout the Punjab, in which all the members of the Durbar and Maharajah Golab Sing of Cashmere were implicated, as well as his charge against Chuttur Sing, of having been accessory before the fact to the Mooltan outbreak, are conclusively disproved by the dates and incidents of each successive convulsion. “As yet,” writes the Resident, on the 8th September, “no Chief has, openly, joined Sirdar Chuttur Sing.” “Neither the army beyond Hazara, nor the Chiefs generally, appear to have been prepared for this move of Sirdar Chuttur Sing.”

“If Rajah Shere Sing should not join his father, supposing the rebellion to gain head, it will be very surprising; and it is equally surprising that the Sirdar should have taken his decided line, without having secured the concurrence of his son.”†

Two facts, in particular, show that Chuttur Sing had not secured the concurrence of his son, and that neither of them had any complicity with Dewan Moolraj of Mooltan,—firstly, the good conduct of Rajah Shere Sing until the middle of September, and, secondly, the surprise and mistrust of the Dewan Moolraj at Shere Sing’s tardy defection.

Major Edwardes tells us, on the 4th September, that “since the Rajah’s” (Shere Sing’s) “arrival before Mooltan,

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 340.

† *Ibid.*, p. 333.

he has omitted neither persuasion, threats, nor punishments, to keep his troops to their duty.”*

Major Edwardes, who had the best opportunities of judging, believes that Rajah Shere Sing undertook his share in the task of suppressing the rebellion of Dewan Moolraj, with the best intentions. A large proportion of his Sikh troops were unquestionably disaffected; but on the march from Lahore “the Rajah made severe examples of one or two soldiers in his camp who gave licence to their tongues.”† So determined did Rajah Shere Sing appear, up to the end of August, 1848, to check the disloyalty of his men, that he was reviled as a Mussulman,—the greatest reproach that can be cast upon a Sikh,‡—and a conspiracy was detected to put him to death by poison. When this crime was fully brought home to the ringleader, Shoojan Sing, “a Sikh jagheerदार horseman of some consideration and still greater notoriety,” the Rajah “carried the extreme sentence of the law into effect, and caused the traitor to be blown from one of his own guns,” in his own camp. “The act,” Major Edwardes adds, “was extremely unpopular in the Rajah’s force, and I rather think that he himself expected resistance.”§

As Major Edwardes remarks, this was “a sufficient proof, that up to the end of August, Rajah Shere Sing was still loyal, and determined to go any lengths to check the disloyalty of his men.”||

Reviewing all these transactions two years later, Major Edwardes says:—“The question with which I am concerned in this event is, ‘When did Shere Sing resolve to join his father?’ I have no hesitation whatever in stating that it is now as certain as anything in this world can be, that it was on the 12th or 13th of September,—certainly within forty-eight hours of the fatal step being taken.”¶

Moolraj was quite unprepared for the desertion of Rajah Shere Sing. He had done his best to corrupt the Sikh soldiers in Shere Sing’s camp, but the Rajah himself had rejected all his overtures. The consequence was that

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 329.

† *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 244; *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, pp. 420, 425.

‡ *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, pp. 330, and 344. § *Ibid.*, pp. 329, 330.

|| *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 433. ¶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 503.

"Moolraj could not believe that Shere Sing had come over in good faith,"—"withdrew all his own soldiers within the walls of Mooltan," and made the Rajah's army "take their places in the British front," under the walls of the Fort.* In a few days Shere Sing was disgusted with Moolraj's suspicions, and went off to join his father.

The Resident writes to Government on the 23rd of September :—"Rajah Shere Sing's conduct has been very extraordinary, and is almost inexplicable."† It was indeed inexplicable, except upon the very obvious presumption that he had decided to come forward, at all hazards, to the assistance of his injured father, and for the independence of the Sikh sovereignty, which he began to see was doomed. Still, but for his father's wrongs, he would rather have trusted to the good faith and generosity of what he knew to be the stronger side. On or about the 10th of September, Shere Sing received letters from his father,‡ in which the old Chief, without doubt, informed him of the heavy penalties to which he had been sentenced; and on the 14th, in a "fit of desperation and confusion,"§ the son consented to espouse the cause of his father, and to make it the cause of the nation. And in the private and secret letter to his brother, Golab Sing, at Lahore, Rajah Shere Sing expressly declares that he has taken this step in consequence of Captain Abbott's conduct to his father. "The Sing Sahib" (Sirdar Chuttur Sing) "has several times written to me, stating that he constantly obeyed Captain Abbott's directions, but that officer, acting according to the suggestions of the people of Hazara," (the Mahomedans) "has treated him most unjustly, and caused him much grief and trouble; and that he has also exerted himself to destroy and disperse the Khalsa troops." He adds, "I resolved, therefore, yesterday, to join the Sing Sahib, and devote myself to the cause of our religion."||

All idea, therefore, of a deep conspiracy on the part of either Rajah Shere Sing or Sirdar Chuttur Sing, is completely negatived. The general insurrection of 1848 was

* *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 515.

† *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 360. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 343

§ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 359; *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 505.

unpremeditated. Chuttur Sing was goaded into hostilities by Captain Abbott's aggression, and his son was driven to join him in what they both felt to be a desperate rebellion, by the refusal of redress, and the multiplied rumours and symptoms of the Raj having been doomed to destruction.

But everything tends to prove that the original outbreak at Mooltan was equally unpremeditated. The Dewan Moolraj was rich, in infirm health and without children, timid, unpopular with the army and people; and the Resident reports that immediately before the catastrophe he had "only five or six field guns,"* and "had discharged almost all his regular troops, preparatory to resigning his government."† From all the accounts, it appears certain that Moolraj, though disaffected at the changes which had compelled him to resign, and at the prospect, as he feared, of having to account for the revenue collections of past years, was involved in rebellion against his will. The attack on the two British officers sent to relieve him of his post, was caused by a sudden impulse of discontent and fanaticism, in the results of which, after a vain attempt to quell it, Moolraj felt himself irretrievably compromised. With hope of scant mercy from the British Government, and certain of death from the mutinous soldiery, if he trusted to that mercy, he yielded to circumstances, and accepted the lot that fate had cast before him.‡

Before the murderous outbreak at Mooltan, the Dewan, as we have just remarked, had discharged almost all his regular troops. That had been the order of the day for more than a year all over the Punjaub. Between 10,000 and 20,000 soldiers had been disbanded before April, 1847;§ and towards the close of that month the Resident speaks of gradually reducing the Infantry "from 20,000 to 15,000 men, and the Sowars" (Cavalry) "from 12,000 to 10,000."|| The reports from every province describe the same process of reduction. Mr. Agnew, who was sent

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 133. Lord Dalhousie's final opinion is that "the first outbreak was unpremeditated, and, in a manner, accidental."—*Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 585.

† *Ibid.*, p. 371.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 151; *A Year on the Punjaub Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 165.

§ *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 2.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 6.

in company with a Sikh Governor to take over charge from Dewan Moolraj, is instructed to give his "early attention" to "reducing all unnecessary Irregulars"; the best men from the Regular Regiments serving at Mooltan are to be picked out and sent to Lahore; "the remaining men may be paid up and discharged."* Thus the military class at Mooltan,—not, be it observed, conscripts, but soldiers by hereditary profession,—not only knew what was in store for them under the new administration, but actually had a foretaste of it before the British officers arrived. Moolraj, not well pleased with his forced retirement, must have felt a malicious satisfaction, when dismissing his troops, in explaining to them the cause of that unpopular measure. We cannot, therefore, be surprised to learn that the man who led the attack on the British officers, as they passed over the drawbridge of Mooltan, was a soldier, "brooding, perchance," as Major Edwardes wrote, "over his own long services and probable dismissal,"† nor that the subsequent acts, by which Moolraj was effectually involved in rebellion, and "the crowning crime of assassination," were perpetrated by the Sikh troops.‡

For some years before the Sutlej campaign, all the power of the Punjab State had been wielded by the Sikh soldiery, through their Punchayuts, or elected committees. They had raised and deposed a succession of Princes and ministers; in every political conjuncture their favour had to be propitiated by largesses and augmented pay. The Sikh army claimed the privilege of representing, as a corporate body, the Khalsa,—the elect and holy race of true believers. Lord Hardinge, writing to the Court of Directors on the 30th September, 1845, says that "the most influential and leading Chiefs" feel "their personal interests" to be "endangered by the democratic revolution so successfully accomplished by the Sikh army."§ Even the Maharanee saw her own brother, Jowahir Sing, shot down before her own eyes, by the sentence of this armed Inquisition.

Sir Henry Lawrence, in an article published in 1847,

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 126.

† *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 51. ‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 161.

§ *Papers respecting the Late Hostilities, etc.*, 1846, p. 6.

in the *Calcutta Review*, when he was Resident at Lahore, thus describes what took place after the murder of the Maharanee's brother :—

“No man dared to seize the helm. Rajah Lal Sing was not wanting in courage ; and Maharajah Golab Sing has abundance ; but neither coveted the Viziership, which involved responsibility to a thousand exacting masters. Intoxicated with success at home, where no man's honour was safe from their violence, where they had emptied the coffers of the State, and plundered those of Jummú, the unsated soldiery now sought to help themselves from the Bazars and treasuries of Delhi. This madness of the Sikh army was the true cause of invasion, and not either the acts of the British Government, or its agents.*

“The majority of voices was for an immediate march. The Raní and her advisers, who felt that all authority was lost, urged them to be gone at once ; but this very impatience roused the suspicions of the soldiers. Thus doubtful did matters remain for more than twenty days : the whole Sikh army, it is true, at last left Lahore, but, as on former occasions, they still hesitated to ‘cross the Rubicon,’ and finally commit themselves. The great delay, however, was in persuading the Sirdars. *They* had property to lose. The rabble had only property to gain. Sirdar Tej Sing, who ultimately was Commander-in-Chief of the invading force, consented only when openly and loudly taxed with cowardice, and even threatened with death.”†

In the Duke of Argyll's own words :—“It was the Khalsa army, not the Lahore Government, which began the Sikh war. The great force which Runjeet had brought together, and had disciplined with admirable efficiency for the purposes of war, was an army whose fierce fanaticism, inflamed by concentration and by the sense of power, had become incapable of control.”‡

The victories of Lord Gough, and the occupation of Lahore, put an end to this Praetorian Parliament. The Panchayuts were no longer recognised or allowed to assemble. Discipline was restored and enforced. Military license was restrained. The political influence of the army was annihilated.

The Sirdars, who for years had trembled under the thralldom of the Sikh Panchayuts, rejoiced at their subjugation. But the unruly fanatics who had organised and

* *Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays*, p. 264.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 277, 278.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 55.

guided those short-lived democratic institutions, were, of course, furious at their downfall, and, though somewhat dejected and discouraged by the recent crushing disaster, only waited for an opportunity to claim their representative functions, and to regain their former ascendancy.

One of the Resident's ablest Assistants, Lieutenant Reynell Taylor, writes to him to that effect on the 15th of July, 1848 :—"It is the recollection of the past glories of the Khalsa, and of the honoured and lucrative position of a soldier in those days, and in those of anarchy and confusion that followed them, mixed with a good deal of military pride and confidence in their union and strength in the field, that makes, and will make the Sikh soldiery disposed to sedition and rebellion." In the same letter he says :—"I believe that a large proportion of the Sikhs would be well pleased to see the matter" (Moolraj's rebellion) "settled in favour of Government."*

In every scene throughout the insurrectionary crisis the same incidents repeat themselves. The Sikh soldiers try to force on a rebellion, opposed and resisted by the nobles and landholders, and even by their regimental officers. It was so, even by Captain Abbott's account, with the Sikh Brigade which he suspected and surrounded in Hazara. "The officers," he writes, "received his" (Chuttur Sing's) "orders with distrust, demurred, delayed, but were finally borne along by the men."† According to him, Sirdar Chuttur Sing "ordered them" (the troops) to destroy an innocent and loyal man, and to mutiny against my authority, *and that of their officers.*"‡

Captain Nicholson writes to the Resident :—"If the Sikh troops in Hazara were under the control of their officers, there would be no difficulty ; but, as usual in the Sikh army, few or none of the officers have any influence with the men."§

Major Lawrence writes from Peshawur :—"I really believe that most of the officers are very desirous to keep their troops to their allegiance ; but, with a people so easily worked on by designing men, their task is most difficult."||

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 257.

† *Ibid.*, p. 311.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

† *Ibid.*, p. 303.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 340.

The Resident, shortly after the bad news from Mooltan, writes :—"The Sikh *Sirdars* whom I have sent may be implicitly relied upon, and the influence which they have with the soldiery they will make the best use of. But the soldiery themselves are not equally trustworthy ; they are dispirited ; not satisfied with their *Sirdars* ; and have, as may be supposed, no very kindly feeling for us."* On the 22nd of June, he wrote again :—"The *Sirdars* are true, I believe ; the soldiers are all false I know."†

On the 13th of July, Major Edwardes reported thus to the Resident :—"With respect to the *Sirdars*, I believe them to be heart and soul on our side, which is the side of jaghires, titles, employments, and whole throats. But their force, with equal confidence, I report to be against us to a man."‡

The Resident writes to Government to the same effect on the 17th June, 1848 :—

"The Sikh troops are far worse than useless ; even in this rebellion against their own Government, they are not only not to be depended on, but they are certain in the event of an opportunity for successful collision, to take part with the rebel interest. This is felt and acknowledged by every *Sirdar* in the country."

"On the night of the 8th instant, the Churunjeet Regiment of Cavalry broke into open mutiny : the *Sirdars* succeeded, with some difficulty, in preventing the Artillery and the Infantry Regiment from joining them."§

Many of the *Sirdars* were by degrees drawn into the tide, particularly after the Maharanee's exile, and the defection of Chuttur Sing and his sons, but they went reluctantly and doubtfully, and in some cases were evidently dragged into it by the troops. The *Sirdars*, in fact, had something to lose. The Sikh soldiers had lost nearly everything ; and they saw that if a reformed system were firmly established in the Punjaub, their occupation was gone. As the British administration was more completely introduced, they found their organisation broken up, their special privileges abolished, their pay lowered, and their numbers reduced. Of course they were ripe for revolt.

On the 4th of August, 1848, Major Edwardes, describing

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 137.

† *Ibid.*, p. 220.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

|| *Papers respecting the Late Hostilities, etc.*, 1846, pp. 95 and 99.

to the Resident the abortive mutiny of a Sikh Regiment, which the officers succeeded in suppressing, says :—

“The whole affair is eminently characteristic of the treacherous, avaricious, and intriguing Sikh soldier,—another proof, added to the many afforded by the Mooltan rebellion, of the imperative necessity of remodelling the Khalsa army, if we wish for security in the Punjab. Lieutenant Lumsden is, I believe, engaged in revising the internal economy of that army, but paramount to this is the necessity of totally altering its constitution, which is rotten to the core.”*

And the Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, writes as follows on the 27th September, 1848 : —“The Sikh soldiers of the old régime can never again be trusted ; and I must say that, to my knowledge, *Rajah Tej Sing said, two years ago, and has always adhered to the opinion, that it was less dangerous, and would prove less embarrassing, to disband them all, and raise a new army, than to continue a man of them in service.*”†

We did not take Rajah Tej Sing’s advice ; but, on the contrary, as the Resident said, kept up the old Sikh troops, as “the disciplined army of the country, and left in their hands all the artillery and munitions of war.”‡

Chronic mutiny had existed in the Sikh army for six years, sustained by religious fanaticism, and swelled by continued success to the dimensions of a democratic revolution. The warlike population of the dominant faith, connected by innumerable ties of family and fellowship with the Sikh soldiery, sympathised heartily with their representative pretensions. We knew it ; we were warned of it. Nothing occurred in 1848 that was not contemplated and expressly provided for, when the British Government undertook, in December, 1846, the office of Guardian during the minority of Maharajah Dhulceep Sing. The several extensions of the British protective occupation were conceded by Lord Hardinge, at the urgent request of the Durbar, with special reference to “the reorganisation of the army.”§ That was recognised on all sides, throughout the negotiations, as the great requirement and

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 273.

† *Ibid.*, p. 377.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

§ *Further Papers respecting the late Hostilities, etc.*, 1846, pp. 95 and 103. *Papers, Articles of Agreement, etc.*, 1847, p. 5.

the great peril. Lord Hardinge, writing to the Resident on the 7th of December, 1846, declares that he "cannot permit the renewal of a state of anarchy and *military despotism*, similar to that which existed last year," and that he "cannot, after the experience of the last eight months, consent to leave a British force beyond the stipulated period, for the purpose of supporting a Government which, in its present state of weakness, can give no assurance of its power to govern justly as regards its people, and no guaranty for the performance of its obligations towards its neighbours."* Within ten days of this despatch being written, the Articles of Agreement were signed at Lahore, on the 16th December, 1846, embodying the only terms on which the Governor-General would consent to the continuance of a British force at Lahore, and by which "unlimited authority in all matters, during the Maharajah's minority," were conferred upon the British Resident.† His object, Lord Hardinge announces, will be "to counteract the disorder and anarchy which have disturbed the Punjaub during the last five years, chiefly owing to a numerous Sikh army, kept up in the vicinity of the capital, by whose republican system of discipline the soldiery had usurped all the functions of the State."

"The immediate effect," he says, "of depriving a numerous body of military adventurers of employment, (there being still many to be disbanded to reduce the numbers to the limits of the Treaty of Lahore,) may be troublesome, and a source of some uneasiness. No policy can at once get rid of an evil which has been the growth of years."‡

"I see around me," writes the Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, in April, 1847, "and hear of, so many men, who, having been Generals and Colonels in the Sikh army, are now struggling for existence; and, at the same time, know that so little justice has been done even in recent reductions, that my great wonder has been the good conduct of the Sikh army during the last twelvemonth."

"I am well aware that neither independent feelings, nor lawless habits, are easily eradicated: and I am quite

* *Papers, Articles of Agreement*, 1847, p. 42.

† *Ibid.*, p. 24.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

satisfied that there is nothing too foolish, nothing too desperate, for Asiatic zealots or desperadoes to attempt. I endeavour therefore to be on the alert.”*

In June, 1847, he writes as follows :—“It is wise to keep before our eyes the fact that the animus of unrest and insurrection slumbers, but is not yet dead, in the Punjaub. It would be a miracle if it were otherwise ; for assuredly the habits acquired during six years of anarchy are not to be laid aside in a month or a year.”†

It is clear, then, that neither Lord Hardinge, nor Sir Henry Lawrence, the Resident whom he appointed, expected to be immediately free from all danger of military mutiny or rebellion. It was in anticipation of such possibilities, that the Governor-General assumed, with the consent of the Lahore Durbar, “unlimited powers,” under the Articles of Agreement, of December, 1846, and, in particular, acquired the right of stationing a British force, of such strength as he might think fit, in any position, “any fort or military post in the Lahore territories, for the protection of the Maharajah, for the security of the capital, and for maintaining the peace of the country.”‡

The following extract is taken from the recently published *History of India*, by Mr. J. C. Marshman.

“The precautionary measures adopted by Lord Hardinge manifested equal foresight and vigour. He did not expect that a country teeming with disbanded soldiers, the bravest and most haughty in India, who had been nurtured in victory and conquest, and pampered with seven years of military licence, would be as free from disturbance as a district in Bengal. To provide for the prompt suppression of any insurrectionary movements which might arise, he organised three moveable Brigades, complete in carriage and equipment, each of which consisted of one European corps, three Regiments of Native Infantry and one of Cavalry, with twelve guns, chiefly of European Horse Artillery. These were held in readiness at Lahore, Jullunder and Ferozepore, to take the field at the shortest notice.”§

Yet on the very first occasion of the peace of the country being disturbed, the Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, writes to Lord Dalhousie :—“Dewan Moolraj is an officer of the Sikh Government ; he is in rebellion, if rebellion at all, to

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 6, 7.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Papers, Articles of Agreement*, 1847, p. 50.

§ *Marshman's History of India*, 1867, vol. iii, p. 305.

the Sikh Durbar, and the orders of that Government. The coercion must come from the Sikh Government, *unaided by British troops, if possible. If it should be necessary to move a British soldier, the affair will be a serious one for the Durbar.*"*

"I could not consent, under any circumstances, to send a British force on such an expedition, *whatever may be the result and consequence of the state of things which will follow, to the continuance of the Sikh Government.*"†

"After what has happened, I feel that if the question were one merely affecting the maintenance of the Sikh Government, and the preserving the tranquillity of their provinces, we should be scarcely justified in expending more British blood, and British treasure in such service."‡

And this, although the British troops were there, under treaty, and were subsidised, for that very service of maintaining the Sikh Government, and preserving "the peace of the country."§

"The principal Sirdars started this morning, under the impression that the British column would follow. I have sent for them back, to explain to them that they must, by their own resources, put down the rebellion of their own Governor, aided by their own troops and their officers, and bring the perpetrators to punishment."||

So soon was the menacing note of annexation sounded in the ears of the Sikh Sirdars! And this language, natural and excusable in the first excitement, indignation and perplexity of a sudden and alarming crisis, pervades, with some intermittence and inconsistency, all the Resident's correspondence, and is at last deliberately adopted by the Governor-General in pronouncing his final judgment.

On the 27th April, the Resident continues his narrative.

"The Chiefs returned yesterday morning, and having heard what I had to say regarding the necessity of their putting down the rebellion, and bringing the offenders to justice, by their own means, *as the only hope of saving their Government*, they retired to consult and concert measures.

"After much discussion they declared themselves unable, without British aid, to coerce Dewan Moolraj in Mooltan, and bring the perpetrators of the outrage to justice. They admitted that their troops were not to be depended on to act against Moolraj, especially the regular army of the State, and they recommended

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 133.

† *Ibid.*, p. 139.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

§ *Papers, Articles of Agreement*, 1847, pp. 49, 50, 51.

|| *Papers, Punjab*, p. 140.

that these corps should be kept in their former positions, to maintain the peace, and prevent, as far as possible, the spread of the rebellion. This service they thought the Sikh troops might be depended on to perform, under the arrangements they proposed for the Chiefs, with their personal followers, going out themselves into the Provinces,—more especially if speedy measures were taken by the British Government for the occupation of Mooltan.”*

There can be no question that this advice was the best possible for the time. If it had been taken, the rebellion would have been speedily crushed. It was not taken. This discussion took place on April 26th, 1848. But it was not until August 18th that the British troops, under General Whish, arrived before Mooltan.† The siege was raised on September 14th, in consequence of the defection of Rajah Shere Sing.‡ It was not until December 26th, 1848, that the Force under General Whish, having been strengthened by a Division from Bombay, resumed its old position before Mooltan, after three months and a half of inaction, during which period the Commander-in-Chief had made no military movement to arrest Chuttur Sing's operations, or to support the British officers in the more distant posts. Mooltan was taken in a week after the renewal of the siege; the Dewan Moolraj surrendered himself unconditionally on January 22nd, 1849. But, in the meanwhile, the mischief was done; these long delays, these retrogressive and suspensive manœuvres, had given double force to all other provocations and temptations. The Punjaub was in a blaze. Rajah Shere Sing was now at the head of 30,000 men, with 60 guns. The battle of Chillianwalla was fought on January 13th, 1849. On February 21st, Lord Gough, reinforced by the whole of General Whish's army, gained the crowning victory of Goojerat; and on March 14th, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Rajah Shere Sing, and other Chiefs, gave up their swords; and the remains of the Sikh army, to the number of 16,000 men, laid down their arms. So ended the second Punjaub war,—eleven months having elapsed since the first outbreak at Mooltan. Not a British soldier was moved for the first three months. After the first failure to take Mooltan, there was a total cessation of active efforts in the field for three months

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 140.

† *Ibid.*, p. 291.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

more, from the middle of September to the middle of December, 1848.

Every one had foreseen the inevitable effect of these dilatory measures. Throughout the Blue Book are scattered innumerable expressions of opinion by the Resident and his Assistants, that any long delay in punishing the mutinous outrage at Mooltan, would act as an irresistible encouragement to military ambition, and an incitement to Sikh fanaticism. Major Edwardes says :--“ It was my own belief at the time, that had the Mooltan rebellion been put down at once, the Sikh insurrection would never have grown out of it ; it was a belief shared, moreover, (as well as I remember,) by every political officer in the Punjab, and I for one still think so now.”*

On June 22nd, 1848, Major Edwardes, having, with the troops of the Nawab of Bhawalpoor, a force of 18,000 men and 30 guns under his command, all well-disposed, and in high spirits at their two recent victories, proposed to the Resident to commence the siege of Mooltan forthwith, asking only for a few heavy guns, and an Engineer officer with a detachment of Sappers.† And two years later he writes :—

“In June and up to the end of July, I am quite sure that Lieutenant Lake’s force and my own could have taken the city of Mooltan with the utmost facility ; for it was surrounded by nothing stronger than a venerable brick wall, and the rebel army was dispirited by its losses at Kinseyree and Suddoosam. On this point neither Lieutenant Lake nor myself, nor General Cortlandt, (who was an older, and therefore a steadier soldier than either of us,) had ever any doubt.”‡

Major Napier of the Engineers,§ writing from Mooltan on September 14th, just as General Whish was compelled to raise the siege, explains the effect of the long delay on the *personnel* of the rebel army. “Moolraj’s forces are now very different from what they were when Edwardes met them. Except a few, the Irregulars have been exchanged for the old Sikh soldiers.”||

* *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 145.

† *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 223.

‡ *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 403.

§ Now Sir Robert Napier, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief at Bombay.

|| *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 356.

But the veteran Chief of the Indian army could not "consent to an insufficient force, such as one Brigade of any strength, being sent," and preferred to wait "until the proper season for military operations" (the cold season) "should arrive."*

If these dilatory measures were adopted in perfect good faith,—and I have no doubt that they were by the military authorities,—I should not hesitate to condemn them as unstatesmanlike and blundering.

If they were not adopted in perfect good faith,—“if,” as has often been hinted, “the delay in crushing the rebellion sprang in part from a secret hope of its spreading far enough to furnish Government with a fair excuse for annexing the whole dominions of Runjeet Sing,”†—such a policy can only be characterised as unprincipled and unjustifiable.

But whether the dilatory plan was unstatesmanlike or unprincipled,—whether it was a blunder or a crime,—nay, even if it was the wisest possible, and in every respect justifiable,—my position is unaffected. It was emphatically *our* work. It was a plan deliberately adopted by the Resident and the Governor-General, contrary to the advice of the Council of Regency. It was the plan of Lord Dalhousie, administering, “with unlimited powers,” under treaty, the government of the Punjaub. It was the plan of the Guardian, managing the affairs of his Ward.

Lord Dalhousie’s procedure in settling the future relations of the Punjaub with British India after the campaign of 1849, just amounts to this :—a Guardian, having undertaken, for a valuable consideration,‡ a troublesome and dangerous trust, declares, on the first occurrence of those troubles and dangers, of which he had full knowledge and fore-warning, that, as a compensation for his exertions and a protection for the future, he shall appropriate his Ward’s estate and personal property to his own purposes. And this, although the Guardian holds ample security in his own hands for the repayment of any outlay, and the satisfaction of any damages he might have incurred, in executing the conditions of the trust.

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 238, 239.

† Trotter’s *History of India from 1844 to 1862*, (Allen, 1866,) vol. i, p. 134.

‡ Valuable, even if inadequate, which I think it was not.

Immediately on hearing of the outbreak at Mooltan, and even before the distressing news had arrived of two English officers having been murdered by the mutinous soldiery, the Resident assumed that tone and attitude towards his colleagues in the Council of Regency, which seem to have suggested and fomented Lord Dalhousie's retrospective demands. "The Sikh Government" must act for themselves, "unaided by British troops. If it should be necessary to move a British soldier, the affair will be a serious one for the Durbar."* There was no "Sikh Government," apart from the Resident, who was at the head of the Punjaub administration with "unlimited powers." The Durbar could only "act under the control and guidance of the Resident."† The British troops were stationed, under treaty, in the Punjaub, and subsidised from its revenues, expressly to afford that aid in preserving the peace of the country which the Resident refused to afford. He did afford it at last, but only after a long delay, and then, as he avowed, from a regard to British interests,‡ and with a menace of that penalty of extinction which was ultimately inflicted, against the protected dynasty and State.

Both the delay and the menace mainly contributed to kindle the general conflagration. How fuel was added to the flame by several measures for which the British authorities were solely responsible, we have already seen.§

We have quoted the Resident's refusal to send a British force to Mooltan, "whatever may be the consequences of the state of things which will follow to the continuance of the Sikh Government."|| In the same dispatch he writes to Lord Dalhousie as follows :—

"Your Lordship will, I fear, have to consider how far it is incumbent upon us, how far it is possible for us, to maintain an engagement with a Government, which, in the persons of its Chiefs, its soldiers, and its people, repays our endeavours for its maintenance by perfidy and outrage, and is powerless to afford us redress.

"Doubtless we have reduced it to its state of weakness, but we are not responsible for its treachery and violation of trust."¶

* *Ante*, p. 139. † *Ante*, pp. 99, 100 ‡ *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 141.
§ *Ante*, pp. 102 to 130. || *Ante*, p. 139. ¶ *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 140.

At this time no "Chiefs," except the Dewan Moolraj of Mooltan, had committed any offence; no "soldiers," except those at Mooltan, had taken part in any perfidy or outrage; and "the people" had not moved in the matter at all.

Dewan Moolraj was not a Sikh: he and his father had governed Mooltan for thirty years, with almost independent sway; they had fortified the city with the scarcely disguised object of holding their own against the Sikh Government, whose power they had repeatedly defied,—once during the British occupation of Lahore, before the transfer of authority to the Resident.* In April, 1847, the Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, sent one of his Assistants to Mooltan, and makes the following remarks on the subject in a despatch to the Governor-General:—"Lieutenant Nicholson has returned from Mooltan, and, on the whole, gives a favourable report of Dewan Moolraj. He has, evidently, been in the practice of acting as if he were the Sovereign of the country, and was, in the first instance, inclined to resent Lieutenant Nicholson's visit."†

If Moolraj, therefore, rebelled again, it was nothing to be surprised at,—nothing but what ought to have been, and must have been, contemplated and prepared for, when we assumed the administration of the Punjab. Yet the Resident speaks of this occurrence as something prodigious and unheard of; and denounces the Sikh Government,—over which he was presiding, with unlimited powers,—as guilty of "perfidy and outrage, in the persons" of the refractory vassal, and turbulent soldiery, whom the Durbar, by imploring British assistance, had confessed themselves unable to coerce.

This inability, also, is made a charge against the Durbar by the Resident, and a pretext for no longer maintaining our engagement with it; although its inability to control the Chiefs and the army, was the main cause of that engagement being made. It is "powerless," he complains, "to afford us redress." He adds:—"Doubtless we have reduced it to its state of weakness." The Government of the Punjab was *not* powerless; but all its power was concentrated in the hands of the British Re-

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 117.

† *Ibid.*, p. 5.

sident. Its power mainly consisted in the British troops, subsidised from the revenues of the country, which the Resident hesitated to employ. Without the aid of the British troops, to which it was entitled by treaty, it was, of course, in "a state of weakness," and to that state of weakness, as the Resident admits, we had depressed it. The very fact of the British occupation and transfer of power to the Resident, tended to destroy the personal influence of the Sirdars. Both the physical and moral force at the disposal of the Durbar apart from the Resident's support, was greatly diminished.

The scheme for the reduction and reorganisation of the army seems to have been most judicious,—though, perhaps, the more sweeping measure proposed by Rajah Tej Sing would have been safer and more effectual,*—and it appears to have been carried out with great consideration, and with many countervailing advantages for the humbler and less ambitious soldiers, especially for those who were not Sikhs. But it was a most critical and delicate operation, and it was emphatically *our* work.

By the unlimited authority entrusted to the Resident, the numerical strength of the Sikh army had been lowered, until every town and village was filled with the disbanded and discontented brethren of those who were still retained in the ranks, whose disaffection was at the same time enhanced by a stricter discipline, curtailed privileges, and the downfall of their political and religious preponderance.

It could not be expected,—we have seen that it was not expected by Lord Hardinge and Sir Henry Lawrence,—that this transition stage would be passed through in perfect tranquillity. Yet the Resident declaims against "the perfidy and outrage,"—"treachery and violation of trust,"—"spoliation and crime,"†—committed at Mooltan, as unprecedented and unimaginable, and imputes it all to the Sikh Government, "in the persons" of the mutinous soldiery, who, during six years had domineered over all authority, who had murdered three Prime Ministers and several Princes, and whose subjection was the special task we had engaged to perform.

* *Ante*, p. 136.

† *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 141.

We knew what we were about when we assumed the Guardianship of a Prince whose dominions had suffered from six years of anarchy. We undertook the obligations of suppressing military mutiny and civil war,—“of preserving the peace of the country,” with British troops subsidised for the purpose. Furthermore, we obtained by the Treaty unlimited military powers throughout the Punjaub,—the right of holding all the strong places and positions, the right of disbanding and enlisting troops. It may have been hoped, but it can never have been expected, that everything would go on smoothly, that our troops would never be actively employed,—that none of those scenes of violence and bloodshed, which had compelled the Durbar to entreat our aid, would recur during the British occupation. For the term of our Guardianship,—the minority of Dhulcep Sing,—we demanded full powers, we accepted full responsibility.

Lord Dalhousie admits his full responsibility, as the Guardian of British interests, for the inordinate military delays which swelled the Mooltan rebellion into a war, but does not seem to feel any responsibility at all, as the trustee and administrator of the Punjaub State, and the Guardian of its infant Maharajah. “On the one hand,” he writes, “it was impossible to doubt that, if there existed in the minds of the people of the Punjaub any inclination to rise against the British power, a delay in visiting the outrage committed at Mooltan, and the apparent impunity of the offender, would give strong encouragement to an outbreak which might spread over the whole Punjaub. On the other hand, it was equally clear that there would be serious danger to the health and to the very existence of European troops,” if they were to carry on “military operations in the hot and rainy months.”*

It might have occurred to the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief that the loss of life among the European and native troops of our army, and the general destruction of life and property in the Punjaub, would be much greater in the event of a general rebellion, than could possibly be caused by the march of one Brigade of

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 656.

British troops in the hot and rainy months. And as it might have been anticipated, so it proved. "Strange to say," writes Mr. J. C. Marshman, "it was found that General Whish's troops were more healthy during their progress to Mooltan than they had been in cantonments, and it was manifest that the unsuitableness of the season, which was urged as a ground of objection to an early and prompt movement, was a mere bugbear."*

These were Sir Henry Lawrence's reflections on the military plans of 1848:—"We cannot afford in India to shilly-shally and talk of weather and seasons. If we are not ready to take the field at all seasons, we have no business here."†

On the whole, however, Lord Dalhousie concludes that "it can never now be determined whether the immediate commencement at that time" (the hot season) "of the siege of Mooltan would or would not have averted the war. But this, at least," he adds, "is certain, that if the short delay which took place in punishing the murder of two British officers at Mooltan,"—a short delay of nine months!‡—"could produce an universal rising against us throughout all the Punjaub, the very fact itself betokens the existence of a deep and widespread feeling of hostility against us, which could not long have been repressed."§

We shall see that the "rising" was by no means "universal," and that Lord Dalhousie's denunciations of the Sirdars and the people of the Punjaub were highly exaggerated.

Lord Dalhousie continues his argument as follows:—"The worst that can be alleged, therefore, against the delay is, that it precipitated the crisis; and opened, somewhat earlier, to the Sikhs that opportunity for renewal of war, which, sooner or later, so bitter a spirit of hostility must have created for itself."

Major Edwardes agrees with Lord Dalhousie on this point; he, also, thinks the struggle was inevitable, sooner

* *History of India*, vol. iii, p. 319.

† *Kaye's Indian Officers*, (Allen, 1867) vol. ii, pp. 397, 298.

‡ Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson were murdered on the 20th April, 1848; the citadel of Mooltan was surrendered by the Dewan Moolraj on January 22nd, 1849.

§ *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 657.

or later. He expresses his belief, in passages already quoted, that "had the Mooltan rebellion been put down, the Sikh insurrection would never have grown out of it," and that, with very moderate assistance from Lahore, he could have taken Mooltan in June.* He indicates as plainly as is consistent with modesty, and a decent respect for seniors and official superiors, his opinion that the delay was, both in a military and political point of view, an error of judgment. But he says, in his table of Contents to the volume:—"The Author shows that it was providential." In the text he observes:—"So far as regarding this as matter for regret, I see in it only the strongest example that ever came within my own experience, of human judgment overruled by Providence for good."†

The "good," according to Major Edwardes, was that "the whole of the Punjaub was annexed to British India in March, 1849;" whereas, "if the most favourable circumstances had succeeded, and on the 4th of September, 1854," (when the Maharajah obtained his majority) "the Governor-General, in fulfilment of Treaties permitted to remain in force,"‡ had withdrawn the British troops, and handed over the Punjaub to its youthful Sovereign, "with a revenue improved by peace, an exchequer replenished by honesty and economy, and an army improved by discipline," no one can believe "that the peace of the frontier would have lasted for a year, or a second Sikh war have been avoided."§

I cannot enter into the designs of Providence, but I freely acknowledge that Major Edwardes had many precedents for his assumption. Every conquest has been hailed as providential by the conqueror. "Te Deum" is sung by the victor for every victory.

Nor do I consider myself at all bound to enter upon the point of inquiry raised by Lord Dalhousie and Major Edwardes,—whether the Sikhs in the early part of 1848, were so determined on having a second struggle with British power, that our military delays and errors in dealing with the Mooltan outrage only "precipitated the

* *Ante*, p. 141.

† *A Year on the Punjaub Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 145.

‡ A most expressive formula.

§ *A Year on the Punjaub Frontier*, vol. ii, pp. 145, 146.

crisis," which was inevitable and must have arrived "sooner or later."

A mere guess or surmise of what might have happened under different circumstances, cannot prove that a certain decision was wise, or just. If the annexation of the Punjaub was an iniquitous proceeding; if its iniquity has been made manifest, it is no reply to say either that it was Providential, or that it must have happened sooner or later.

This guess, or surmise, of the inveterate and inextinguishable hostility of the Sikhs, is by no means warranted by the history of our previous relations with them, by the progress of events during the insurrection, or by our experience of other States and other races in India. No doubt there was a turbulent spirit abroad in 1848; there were elements of political and religious fanaticism pervading large classes in the Punjaub, especially the Sikhs serving in the army, or connected with the soldiery. We knew all this when we undertook the Guardianship; our protective occupation was invited expressly to meet those perils. No doubt this turbulent and fanatical spirit became hostile to the British occupation, and to the party of Sikh Sirdars who co-operated with the Resident, when the new administration was carrying into effect the reduction and restraint of the army. But there would have been the same hostility against a purely native Government, if it had attempted to enforce, without British assistance, the same unpopular measures.

About the time of the bad news from Mooltan, however, everything indicated that the Punjaub was settling down into a state of peaceful industry. A general impression prevailed of the overwhelming and resistless power of the British Government, and of the moderation and justice of its policy. On April 6th, 1848, the Resident thus reported to the Governor-General:—

"Perfect tranquillity prevails, at present, throughout all the territories under the Lahore Government; and I have no reason to think that the apparent contentment of the people is other than real. We have now, or have had during the cold months, British officers in all parts of the country; and the impression seems general that all classes are satisfied at the present state of

things. In those villages, chiefly in the Manjha, to which numbers of the disbanded soldiery have returned, we sometimes hear of prophetic rumours being circulated, of a day coming when the Sikhs are again to be brought into collision with the British, and with a different result from the last; but, beyond this idle and infrequent talk, there is nothing to indicate that the return of the Khalsa independence is either expected or desired. The universal civility and kindness with which all Europeans, of all ranks and callings, whether officials, or travellers, or sportsmen, are treated, is very remarkable.”*

It is impossible to say exactly what permanent effect would have been produced on the habits and pursuits of the people, if this tranquillity could have been preserved during the six years and a half of the Maharajah's minority that remained, when the disturbances first broke out, or even in the five years and a half that remained, according to the Treaty—if Lord Dalhousie had not decided in favour of annexation—when the insurrection was finally quelled in March 1849. If a judicious system had been brought into play, five or six years might have accustomed the people to the advantages of peace and order, and a strong native Government might have been installed at Lahore.

Great changes for the better had certainly begun to tell in the first fifteen months of British occupation. A great advance had been made towards a state of political quietude, the best evidence of which is to be found in the slowness and reluctance with which the successive steps in the insurrection were taken.

Notwithstanding the dangerous excitement that undoubtedly prevailed throughout the lower ranks of the Sikh soldiery, both those in the service and those recently disbanded, there had been no extensive mutiny, or desertion of numerical importance, until Rajah Shere Sing went over to the enemy in September, from motives which we have already discussed. When Sirdar Chuttur Sing and his son, with the troops under their command, were openly cooperating with the Dewan Moolraj, who had now defied the British power for five months with impunity, when General Whish was obliged, as the result of Rajah Shere Sing's defection, to raise the siege of Mooltan, and wait

* *Papers, Punjab, 1849.* p. 127.

for reinforcements,* a great stimulus was given to the ambition and fanaticism of the disaffected Sikhs throughout the Punjaub. And yet up to October 4th, the Resident writes, no Sirdar had joined Chuttur Sing,† and he had failed utterly to induce any of the Regular troops, except those who had been with him in Hazara, and against whom Captain Abbott had taken the initiative, to join his banner. He had marched "towards the camp of his son, Rajah Shere Sing and the other insurgents, in despair at the refusals he had received *from the Sikh officers* at Peshawur."‡ It was not until October, that the troops at Bunnoo and Peshawur broke into mutiny,§ when Moolraj had held out for six months, and Chuttur Sing was, to all appearance, unchecked and unopposed.

Thus the main cause of an "unpremeditated and accidental"|| outbreak, according to Lord Dalhousie, growing into a formidable insurrection, was the long delay before any attempt was made to punish the Dewan Moolraj,—a delay which, by degrees, raised him from a very low grade in popular estimation to the rank of the great heroes of Hindoo lore, and dissipated almost all the advantages of the brilliant success of Major Edwardes and General Cortlandt, at the head of the Maharajah's troops. This delay, astonishing and inexplicable to the people at large, was explained by the Resident to the most influential men of the country in a sense the most alarming and exasperating possible. They were told that "they must put down the rebellion by their own resources, *as the only hope of saving their Government.*"¶ No wonder a rumour soon got abroad among the Sirdars and soldiery, as Major Edwardes tells us that "the British meditated declaring the Punjaub forfeited by the recent troubles and misconduct of the troops."** The rumour was true.

As if to add more fuel to these inflammatory rumours, to stir up against us every feeling of loyalty and chivalry at the most critical moment, the Maharanee, "the mother of all the Sikhs," was suddenly deported from the country, and imprisoned at Benares, under circumstances which, we

* *Punjab Papers*, 1849, p. 355.

† *Ibid.*, p. 381.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 390, 391.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 375. and 397.

|| *Ante*, p. 131 (note). ¶ *Ante*, p. 139.

** *Ante*, p. 111.

may be sure, assumed in the telling an aspect of violence and indignity.* The effect upon the Sikh troops of this most ill-judged measure, was, as we have seen, immediate.† The Ranee's influence was almost annihilated,‡ when we made her a martyr, and it revived at once.

The rumour as to the impending annexation, the doubts as to his daughter's marriage with the Maharajah, and the facts as to the Ranee's persecution, may have already converted old Chuttur Sing into a conspirator, but it was the Mussulman insurrection of his own Province, headed by his colleague, Captain Abbott, unchecked and unreprieved by the Resident, that compelled him to become a rebel.

Surely it is sufficiently obvious that among a warlike race and sect like the Sikhs,—so lately dominant throughout the Punjab in Church and State,—and after the stirring events of the previous six years, these successive temptations and provocations could not but prove irresistible, and that they form an ample explanation of the phenomena and development of the second Punjab war, without resorting to the unwarrantable surmise that “a renewal of war” was inevitable, and that our dilatory proceedings merely “precipitated the crisis.” There is nothing to show that, without these delays and errors of judgment on our part, there would ever have been a crisis at all. Measures for which the British Resident and the Governor-General were solely responsible, made a hero out of the timid Dewan Moolraj, a martyr out of the baffled Maharanee, and a formidable rebel leader out of the infirm and aged Governor, Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

Lord Dalhousie could not, or would not, see, that his full responsibility, not only for the military delays, but for every exciting and irritating incident, and for every step, good or bad, that was taken before or after the first explosion at Mooltan, effectually barred his ingenious method of separating the Durbar, as “the Government of Lahore,” from the Resident, the absolute head of that Government. During the period prescribed by the Treaty for the Maharajah's minority, no crisis, no second struggle, could absolve the British Government from the obligations of Guardian-

* *Ante*, pp. 106, 107.

† *Ante*, p. 108.

‡ *Ante*, p. 103.

ship and management, so long as it professed to fulfil those duties, and was able to do so without interruption.

Even supposing that every administrative measure before the outbreak at Mooltan, and every step taken by the Resident after it, had been the wisest possible,—supposing the rebellion had not been in the slightest degree provoked or extended by any error, excess, omission, or delay of the British Government,—Lord Dalhousie's case would not be in the least improved. Supposing that the surmise by which he attempted to justify the annexation, were demonstrably true, and that the Sikhs were really animated, from the first day of the occupation, with so deep and bitter a hostility, that they only watched their opportunity for revolt, and would never have been pacified without a second lesson, then I say that they were entitled to that second lesson without any extra charge. The State of Lahore had paid heavily in money, and in territory, for the first lesson; and we had undertaken, in consideration of an annual subsidy, secured on the public revenues administered by us, to perform the office of Teacher for a term of years. If unexpected difficulties had presented themselves in the performance of this office, we should, even then, have had no right to complain. But it was not so. We understood quite well the nature of the evils we had engaged to encounter and cure, and they were clearly aggravated by our own malpractice.

In his last instructions to the Resident, before publicly announcing the annexation of the Punjaub to the British dominions, Lord Dalhousie wrote as follows:—

“The time has arrived at which it is necessary that the determination which the Governor-General has formed regarding the future administration of the Punjaub, should be communicated to the Government at Lahore.

“On meeting the Council of Regency, you will present to them the Note herewith transmitted, in which the determination of the Government of India, regarding our future relations with the Punjaub, is fully set forth.

“If the Government of Lahore should acquiesce in that determination, you are authorised to grant the Terms which are contained in the enclosed paper.”*

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849. p. 648.

Lord Dalhousie's object in thus thrusting prominently forward the Council of Regency, and investing it, in its last moments, with the character of "the Government of Lahore," is transparently obvious. He wished to fasten upon the Regency a sort of national responsibility, in which the Maharajah might be included. But the Council of Regency, apart from British control, never was "the Government of Lahore," and its maintenance up to the date of annexation, proves the very contrary of what Lord Dalhousie wished. The continued existence of this Regency, throughout the rebellion, proves that British responsibility and guardianship were never shaken off or shifted for a day. If indeed the British Guardian had been driven from his position at Lahore; if he had lost the custody of the Maharajah's person; if he had been forced to abdicate for a time the functions of government, he might have been justified in reentering the country as a conqueror, and declaring all previous engagements to be at an end. But no such interruption ever took place. The Resident's authority as chief ruler of the Punjab was never suspended. During the rebellion, which in Lord Dalhousie's opinion warranted him in dethroning his Ward, the capital city was never disturbed; and the Government of the Punjab, exactly as we had chosen to organise it,—including the Council of Regency,—was unaltered to the last. Six out of the eight Councillors remained faithful to their engagements, and signed the Terms, under compulsion.*

These six Sirdars,—Rajah Deena Nath, Bhace Nidham Sing, (the head of the Sikh religion,) Fakeer Noor-ood-deen, Shumshere Sing Sindhanwalla, and Uttur Sing Kaleewalla,—who were perfectly blameless in their public conduct,—were told that "if they refused to accept the Terms which the Governor-General offered, the Maharajah and themselves would be entirely at his mercy," and would not be "entitled to receive any allowance whatever." If they signed the Terms, and continued "to give their advice and assistance, whenever they were called upon to do so," their jagheers (landed estates) would not be confis-

* *Papers. Punjab*, 1849, pp. 649, 653.

cated, though no promise of hereditary tenure could be made. But, "if they did not subscribe to the conditions," the Resident "could not promise that any consideration would be shown them." *

In the last crisis of the rebellion, on the 18th of November, a Proclamation had been issued, sanctioned and approved by Lord Dalhousie on the 14th of December, 1848, which contained the following announcement :—

"It is not the desire of the British Government that those who are innocent of the above offences, who have taken no part, secretly or openly, in the disturbances, and who have remained faithful in their obedience to the Government of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing,—be they Sikh or be they of any other class,—should suffer with the guilty." †

Were the six members of the Council of Regency guilty? On the contrary, they had done their best for the British Government during a season of extraordinary trial and temptation, and had faithfully co-operated with the Resident in the administration of the Punjaub. Yet they were told that unless they signed and sealed the deposition of their Sovereign, and the destruction of the State, they would be made to suffer with the guilty, that their estates would be confiscated, and that no consideration would be shown them.

Was the young Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, whose Government was professedly upheld in this wonderful Proclamation, guilty? We must suppose that the extraordinary political casuistry of the Resident was accepted at Head Quarters, and that the Governor General's Ward was considered to be guilty "in the person" of his mother, who was a prisoner at Benares, or of those "evil disposed and insurgent Sirdars," who, according to this document, had rebelled against his own Government. For he was made to suffer with the guilty. He was dethroned, despoiled, and banished.

Furthermore, this same Proclamation declares to "the loyal subjects of the Maharajah," as well as to any "who, merely through ignorance, may have been led away by the false statements of the evil-disposed," that "the army" of

* *Opers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 649, 650.

† *Ibid.*, p. 449.

the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, "has entered the Lahore territories, not as an enemy to the constituted Government, but to restore order and obedience."* But where two recent treaties stood in the way of annexation, what was a Proclamation more or less?

And though Lord Dalhousie thus publicly proclaimed on the 18th of November, 1848, that the large army under the Commander-in-Chief was not entering the Punjab "as an enemy to the constituted Government," he had already written secretly to the Resident, on the 3rd of October, "The Governor-General considers the State of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes, directly at war with the British Government."†

The State of Lahore at war with the British Government, while the Sovereign of the Punjab was at Lahore, the Ward and Pupil of the Resident! The State of Lahore at war with the British Government, while the administration of the Punjab was carried on at Lahore by the British Resident, in the name of the infant Sovereign, by virtue of a Treaty with him, and in unaltered accordance with the arrangements of that Treaty! Where was that State of Lahore with which the British Government was at war, to be found? In the camp of Rajah Shere Sing, or in the fortress of Mooltan, which had been summoned to surrender on the 5th of September, "after the firing of a royal salute in honour of Her Majesty the Queen, and her Ally, His Highness Maharajah Dhuleep Sing"?‡ Was it personified by the Dewan Moolraj, or Chuttur Sing, or Shere Sing, who were all proclaimed as rebels "against the Government of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing"?§

Straightforward and truthful answers to these questions will prove that the British Government was not at war with the State of Lahore.

The State of Lahore in October, 1848, and up to the day of its destruction, was to be found at Lahore, embodied and represented, in the persons of the Maharajah, the Resident, who was at the head of the Government, and his colleagues, the Council of Regency, the continuity

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 449.

† *Ibid.*, p. 375.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 327; *Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 471.

§ *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, pp. 260, 438, 449, and 562.

of whose functions was never interrupted or disturbed by war or tumult for a single day.

Lord Dalhousie avoids altogether the question of Guardianship. He makes exaggerated complaints of universal treachery and perfidy, and founds upon them his iniquitous claims to treat the Prince, who had never ceased to be his Ward, as a vanquished enemy; to repudiate all the Treaties, which had never ceased to be enforced, as null and void; and to appropriate the Punjaub, which he had never ceased to occupy and administer in trust, as a conquest.* It was impossible for the British Government to conquer the territory, which it was occupying by virtue of a Treaty of protective alliance. Far from war having ever been declared against the State of Lahore, the war was carried on, and the submission of the rebels was demanded, from first to last, in the name of our Ally, the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing.

On the 3rd of October, 1848, Lord Dalhousie secretly and confidentially "intimates" to the Resident, that he "considers the State of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes, directly at war with the British Government." On the same day, he expresses his satisfaction, in another letter to the same official, at hearing that the fortress of Govindghur, in the city of Umritsur,—up to that time garrisoned by Sikh troops,—has been handed over to a British force, "in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Bhayrowal."†

With a view, it may be presumed, to minimise opposition, to retain the influence of the Durbar, and the services of the local troops, and to keep the feudatory Princes and the Sikhs of our own provinces quiet, he will not openly declare war; but, with a view to ulterior demands, he "intimates" war against the Lahore Government, in a secret letter to his own agent, who is at the head of that Government!

Having conducted the administration of the Lahore State, for two years and three months, through the trials and troubles of a rebellion, by means of his own agent and his own nominees, in the name of his Ward and Ally, the Maharajah, under a Treaty which he upholds and enforces

* *Reviewers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 661.

† *Ibid.*, p. 374.

to the last,—he turns round, when the rebellion is over, declares the Treaty to have been violated, and therefore null and void, and explains that the successful campaign, ostensibly carried on for the suppression of a rebellion against the Government of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, really constituted a war against the Maharajah and the State of Lahore, by which the British Government has “conquered” the Punjaub.*

In his indictment against the State of Lahore, Lord Dalhousie falls into several exaggerated misstatements. He says, “the whole body of the nation,—army and people alike,—have, deliberately and unprovoked, again made war upon us.”† In a subsequent passage of the same despatch he betrays his knowledge of the facts that “the Sikh people form comparatively a small portion of the population of the Punjaub,” and that “a large proportion of the inhabitants, especially the Mahomedans,” took no part in the hostilities, and had no sympathy with the rebellion.‡

Even if the meaning of the phrase, “the whole body of the nation,” is restricted to the dominant sect of Sikhs,—about a sixth of the population,—it is inaccurate. There is a list of thirty-four Sirdars, or leading Chieftains in the Blue Book, who, with their relatives and dependents, took no part in the rebellion. Twenty-eight of these are Sikhs, only two are Mahomedans, and four are Hindoos. Among the six faithful members of the Council of Regency, was Bhaee Nidham Sing, “the head of the Sikh religion.”§

Lord Dalhousie ventures to write as follows:—“It is a shameful fact that of the Sirdars of the State, properly so called, who signed the Treaties, the greater portion have been involved in these hostilities against us.”|| That also is an erroneous accusation. A careful analysis of the several lists and documents proves that the majority of those who signed the Treaties were *not* involved in hostilities against us. Of the sixteen Sirdars who signed the Treaties and Articles of Agreement of 1846, only five joined in the rebellion, and one, Runjore Sing Majeetia, who was in the Council of Regency, was imprisoned at Lahore, on suspicion of carrying on a treasonable corre-

* *Papers, Punjaub*, p. 661.

† *Ibid.*, p. 664.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

† *Ibid.*, p. 660.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 660.

spondence. In the list of disaffected Sirdars, Runjore Sing Majeetia is put down as "convicted,"* but his conduct was not the subject of any judicial investigation; and in another part of the Blue Book his guilt is said to have been "proved" by an attempt to escape after his arrest, and by his having destroyed or concealed some of his papers.† There seems to have been nothing like evidence against him. Of the eight Councillors, then, six were faithful; one was suspected; one only, Rajah Shere Sing, took the field against the Government of Lahore.

To the list of Sirdars who remained faithful to their duty, who adhered to the cause of the Government of the Punjaub, as constituted under Treaty by the Governor-General, must certainly be added the name of Sirdar Khan Sing Mān, the Sikh Governor appointed to supersede the Dewan Moolraj, who accompanied Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson to Mooltan. So strong seems to have been the very natural prejudice against every Sikh who took part in that ill-fated expedition, that the Resident, in his first report of the treacherous destruction of the two young English officers, jumped at a hasty conclusion which was very unjust to Khan Sing Mān. He wrote to the Governor-General:—"The Sirdar made terms for himself; and the British officers were left to be cruelly butchered,"‡—an account by no means borne out by the words of the only statement before him at that time. All that his informant, Peer Ibrahim Khan, the British Agent at Bhawalpore, had written on this point, was:—"Sirdar Khan Sing Mān, by the permission of Mr. Vans Agnew, begged for quarter, upon which he was seized, and the two gentlemen killed."§

The following description of what had passed was given by an eye-witness, Kootub Shah, a Mahomedan soldier:—

"Sirdar Khan Sing offered to devote his life; but Mr. Agnew objected, saying it was useless for him to sacrifice himself; that, alone, he could do nothing; and that he had better ask for quarter. The Sirdar's people went outside the Eedgah, and demanded quarter. The troops then entered the place, and plundered everything. On their approaching the Sirdar, he said that he had

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 489.

† *Ibid.*, p. 139.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

asked for quarter, and that it would be useless to kill him, but that they might do what they pleased. He requested them to spare the wounded British officers. They, however, refused to listen to him, and seized him.

"During that day the Sirdar was kept in confinement in the Amkhas; the next day he was taken to the fort, *where he was put in irons with his son.*"*

This deposition was made in June, 1848; and is fully confirmed by the fact, for which Sir Herbert Edwardes vouches, that "he remained in confinement throughout the siege, until the ruins of the exploded magazine at once killed and buried him. After the fall of the Fort," (in January, 1849) "his body was dug out, *and was found so heavily ironed, that it must have been impossible for him to walk. His little boy had been apparently sleeping beside him on the bed.*" Major Edwardes, like the Resident, had heard conflicting accounts of Khan Sing's behaviour, but, he says, "under these circumstances, I thought it right to adopt the most charitable construction of the Sirdar's conduct, caused him to be buried with all honour, and sent the gold bangles which were on the arms of his son, to the surviving members of the family."†

Sir Herbert Edwardes likewise ascertained that Gool-deep Sing, the Sikh Commandant of the Infantry Regiment forming part of Mr. Agnew's escort, "replied alike to bribes and threats, that they might blow him away from a gun, but should never induce him to take service with the enemy." He, also, "was put in irons by Moolraj, and in despair at the shame which had been brought on Mr. Agnew's escort, threw himself into a well, as he was passing it under a guard, and was drowned."‡

In the list of "openly disaffected Sirdars of the Lahore State, ascertained to be in rebellion and insurrection," forwarded by the Resident on the 25th of December, 1848, for the information of the Governor-General, we find Golab Sing Povindea and his son Sirdar Alla Sing included, to whose names, however, with two others, this note is appended:—"It is most probable that these Sirdars are

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, pp. 462, 463.

† *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 162.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 161.

under restraint with the Peshawur troops.”* They were certainly under restraint.

Sirdar Goolab Sing Povindea was the General in command of the Division of Sikh troops at Peshawur, and also Governor of the Province, and Major George Lawrence,† the Resident's Assistant at that place, repeatedly praises his constant exertions, and those of his son, Colonel Alla Sing, to preserve good order in the district, and keep the troops steady to their allegiance.‡ Indeed all the superior officers at this station, with one exception, appear to have been most active and zealous, and to have done their best on behalf of the Government of Lahore.§ With their assistance, Major Lawrence most gallantly remained at his post until the middle of October, 1848, when the troops broke into open mutiny. Soon after this, an intercepted letter from the rebel leader, Rajah Shere Sing, contains this passage :—“The Peshawur troops have left that place, with all the guns. The Povindea” (Sirdar Goolab Sing Povindea) “and Elahee Bukhsh” (the General of Artillery||) “are in confinement, and the Feringhees have fled to the Khyber.”¶

Thus Lord Dalhousie's wholesale impeachment is not just, even if restricted to “the army.” Again we find General Whish, in his final despatch of the 23rd January, 1849, after the fall of Mooltan, expressing his thanks to General Cortlandt, “who commanded the Regular Regiments and Artillery of the Durbar,”**—i. e. of the Lahore Government,—and the Governor-General himself sends his thanks to General Cortlandt for the same services, “as an officer of the Maharajah of Lahore, through the Resident.”††

Notwithstanding the defection of Rajah Shere Sing, Major Edwardes had still a considerable force of Durbar troops under his command, at the end of the siege of Mooltan, and was able to detach six guns and a Regular Regiment, besides Irregular troops, to reinforce Lieutenant Taylor at Lukkee.‡‡ That officer and Lieutenant Young,

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 490.

† Now Sir George Lawrence.

‡ *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, pp. 291, 315, 339, 397, 398.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 339, 397.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 340.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 414.

** *Ibid.*, p. 556.

†† *Ibid.*, p. 586.

‡‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 551, 570.

acting under the directions of Major Edwardes, maintained themselves in different parts of the Derajāt and Trans-Indus territory, and retook several forts from the insurgents, without the aid of any British troops.* Lieutenant Taylor appears to have had at one time 5,000 men with twelve guns under his command.† Some of these were the old Regular Infantry and Artillery of the Lahore Government, some were new levies, but all were in the service of the Native State, and raised from the population of the country subject to Maharajah Dhuleep Sing. One superior officer, at least, who was with Lieutenant Taylor, was a Sikh,—Futteh Sing, mentioned as “a good soldier.”‡ Some troops in the pay of two of the loyal Sirdars attached to the Lahore Government, Misr Sahib Dyal and Dewan Jowahir Mull,§ did good service to the end of the campaign.|| Dewan Jowahir Mull in person, with Sheikh Emam-ood-deen, an officer of high rank under the Lahore Government, formerly Governor of Cashmere, were present “with their men” at the action of Soorujkoond, near Mooltan, on the 7th November, 1848, and are said by Major Edwardes to have “behaved very well.”¶ Soon after this affair, Sheikh Emam-ood-deen and his force were detached by Major Edwardes, to drive the rebels out of the district of Jhung; and while General Whish was concluding the siege of Mooltan, the Sheikh was occupied in investing the stronghold of Chuniote, the rebel garrison of which, 2,000 strong, laid down their arms to General Whish on the 9th February, 1849, on his march from Mooltan to join Lord Gough’s army, and were made over as prisoners to Sheikh Emam-ood-deen.**

Misr Sahib Dyal, whose men did their duty so faithfully to the last, was selected by the Resident in November, 1848, to accompany the Head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, “as the chief officer on the part of the Durbar,”—the Regency, with whom, according to Lord Dalhousie, we were then, “to all intents and purposes, directly at war!” He is described as “an able and highly

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, pp. 588, 630. † *Ibid.*, p. 585. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 633.

§ See the list, *Ibid.*, p. 547.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 631. ¶ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 457, 584,—*Edwardes’s Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii, p. 556.

intelligent person, of considerable experience and knowledge of the country, and of approved fidelity to the interests of the young Maharajah and the British Government.”*

This same Misr Sahib Dyal had, at an earlier period, brought to a successful conclusion, by means of the troops under his own command, a most important affair, which had caused much anxiety to the Resident, and occupied a large British force for more than a month,—the destruction and dispersion of a formidable band of insurgents, at one time 5,000 in number, under a noted fanatic, Bhaee Maharaj Sing, who, in communication with Dewan Moolraj, the rebel Governor of Mooltan, and well provided with funds, was scouring the country, and summoning the Sikhs to join in a religious war. The last scene in the active career of this fanatic is thus described in the Resident’s despatch of the 13th June, 1848.

“Misr Sahib Dyal was as good as his word; and he and his people kept their promise faithfully. On arriving at Jhung, the Bhaee’s force had diminished to about 1000 or 1200 men; the Misr’s party immediately attacked them, and, though really inferior in numbers, they were fresh, while their opponents were hungry, and tired by a long and harassing retreat. A great many of the rebels were killed in the encounter, and three or four of the Misr’s men, and ten or twelve wounded. The whole rebel force was driven into the Chenab, a difficult river to cross at all times, and now formidable from being much swollen by the rains and the melted snow. It is calculated that from 500 to 600, horse and foot, perished in the river,—among the rebels, Bhaee Maharaj. Three hundred of the rebels were taken by the Misr’s soldiers in boats, and put into confinement in Jhung. The Bhaee’s four officers, Sikhs of some note, were among the prisoners, and are now on their way to Lahore in irons.”†

Lord Dalhousie writes to the Secret Committee that “the destruction of the outlaw, Bhaee Maharaj, and the utter discomfiture of his followers, is an event which has greatly tended to the support of British authority.”‡

The death of Bhaee Maharaj on that occasion became afterwards a matter of doubt;§ but his fame and influence were annihilated; and Lord Dalhousie, in his final Minute

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 444.

† *Ibid.*, p. 187.

† *Ibid.*, p. 213.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 625.

declaring the annexation of the Punjab, admits that "the measures taken against Bhace Maharaj Sing, who, with some thousand followers was raising the country in the Rechna Doab, and the flight and dispersion of his followers, combined to keep down any manifestations of disaffection in the neighbourhood of Lahore."*

Thus even his own words, extracted from the Blue Book, contradict Lord Dalhousie's complaint that "the Regency, during these troubles, gave no substantial or effective assistance to the British Government."†

It is true that the Resident at one time speaks of his Councillors as merely "acquiescing" in the plans he was pursuing,—as deficient in "zeal, energy, and judgment."‡ On the 14th July, 1848, however, he writes:—"A great change has come over the spirit of the Durbar: they have been making the most decided and very successful exertions to procure carriage of every description for the use of the British troops, and to aid in the conveyance of the siege train."§ One member of the Regency, Rajah Deena Nath, was sent from Lahore on a mission into the Hazara Province in September, 1848; and after his return the Resident writes to the Governor-General:—

"His presence in that part of the country had the effect of assuring the inhabitants, and he certainly appears to have used his influence, in every way, to defeat the machinations of Sirdar Chuttur Sing. Since his return he appears to have entered, zealously and earnestly, into the measures adopted for punishing the rebels, by the confiscation of their jaghires, and the attachment of their houses and property, and for counteracting the plots of the insurgents."||

On August 16th, 1848, the Resident writes as follows to Lord Dalhousie: "The conduct of the Durbar, collectively and individually, has been entirely satisfactory in everything connected with this outbreak, and, indeed, in all other respects for the last two months."¶

Lord Dalhousie, always overlooking the fact that the control of the finances was in the hands of the British Resident, places first and foremost among the "gross violations" of Treaties of which "the Sikhs" had been guilty, the non-payment of our military subsidy.

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 657.

† *Ibid.*, p. 660.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 379.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

“In return for the aid of British troops, they bound themselves to pay to us a subsidy of 22 lakhs per annum. From the day when the Treaty was signed, to the present hour, not one rupee has ever been paid. Loans advanced by the British Government to enable them to discharge the arrears of their disbanded troops have never been repaid.”*

And in the Proclamation declaring the Punjaub to have become British territory, he says ;—“Of their annual tribute no portion whatever has at any time been paid ; and large loans, advanced to them by the Government of India, have never been repaid.”†

The Blue Book contradicts the assertion that “not one rupee,” that “no portion,” had ever been paid. On February 23rd, 1848, the Resident reports as follows to the Governor-General. “The Durbār have paid into this treasury gold to the value of Rupees 13,56,837. By this payment they have reduced their debt to the British Government from upwards of forty lakhs of rupees to less than twenty-seven.”‡

In this same despatch, written about six weeks before the outbreak at Mooltan, the Resident recorded his satisfaction with the financial arrangements and prospects of the Durbār.

“They have thus, by economy and care, been able to make good four months’ pay of the Irregular Cavalry, to discharge the whole of the arrears of the men who have been pensioned and disbanded, to meet their current expenses, and have still, at this moment, full eight lakhs of rupees in the different treasuries to meet the public exigencies.”§

If a financial equilibrium had not been restored, and if the regular payment of the tribute had not commenced, when the rebellion of 1848 once more threw everything into confusion, it was no fault of the Council of Regency. Not only had the British authorities accepted the trust with their eyes open to the disordered state of the finances, but the Resident—opposed by the Council of Regency and supported by the Governor-General,—had introduced extensive changes into the fiscal system, leading, as had been anticipated, to a very serious loss of revenue.

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 659.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 111.

† *Ibid.*, p. 654.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

In a letter dated July 3rd, 1847, the Resident states as follows to the Governor-General :—

“ I propose only to give half salaries, until the State is clear of its debts, which I now estimate at thirty-five lakhs.

“ I found the treasury empty.

“ Deficiency of cash, as I said before, and entire want of public credit, have tied my hands; indeed, but for the loan of seven lakhs of rupees granted by our Government, I do not know what I could have done.

“ Estimating the debt of the Durbar for last year at nine lakhs, the account will stand, at the end of the present year, leaving a balance of Rs. 13,95,265, which, I fear, cannot be paid off under a year and a half, exclusive of the twenty-two lakhs subsidy yearly.”*

The financial reforms introduced by the Resident were certain, as he admitted, to entail an immediate, though perhaps only a temporary, sacrifice of revenue. These are his reports to the Governor-General on August 28th, and December 16th, 1847, and January 12th, 1848.

1. “ The finances of the Lahore Durbar are certainly not in a prosperous condition. By the returns lately submitted to the Governor-General, there is a surplus of twenty-nine lakhs and upwards, but out of this sum the annual commutation, payable to the British Government, and the extra expenses consequent on the new system of paying Councillors, Adawluttees, and Nazims must be defrayed. *A reform of the Customs as well as the land-tax, all absolutely necessary, will probably not involve a sacrifice of less than from twelve to fifteen lakhs of rupees.*†

2. “ The finances are still in a very unsatisfactory state; it is the one great difficulty which now remains. *The introduction of the new system of land-tax; the reform in the Customs; the loss attending on reforming the currency, and calling in all the depreciated coinage; with the sums necessary for paying up the arrears of the Irregulars, and the civil officials, cannot but amount to a large sum. Much of this pressure, no doubt, is but temporary; still in the exhausted state of the treasury, it is with the greatest difficulty that the Durbar can meet its demands.*‡

3. “ The revenue settlement is rapidly progressing.

“ The difference between the real and nominal revenue will, probably, be little less than a fourth; and *from the former must again be deducted the reductions on the summary settlement.* The

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, pp. 22, 23, 24. † *Ibid.*, pp. 56, 57.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

savings from the decreased expenses of management will go far to meet the last noted deficiency ; but still the income will, I fear, inevitably fall short of the expenditure.”*

On January 31st, 1848, he reports some further reductions in the Customs duties.

“In the Customs I have reduced the duties on dried fruits and other articles, from five rupees per maund to three rupees ; on silk, from forty to twenty-four rupees ; on English coarse calicoes, from thirty to twenty rupees ; and on sugar from two rupees to one rupee per maund.”†

All these measures received the Governor-General’s approval and confirmation. They were not so favourably viewed by the Council of Regency, but no opposition was attempted, or would have been permitted. The Resident makes the following remarks in a despatch to Lord Dalhousie of April 6th, 1848.

“The settlement was, of course, most summary, and its details have yet to be filled up. Its working must be most carefully watched. The Durbar was averse to its introduction, but yielded, as they always do ; and contented themselves, with the exception of Rajah Deena Nath, with standing aloof from its execution ; leaving the whole matter to the Resident and his Assistants.

“Rajah Deena Nath sees the financial embarrassment of the State, and feels that the more we interfere with details, especially where the revenue is concerned, the less will be the Durbar’s responsibility for financial difficulties and deficiencies.”‡

There is no reason to doubt the wisdom of these revenue settlements ; they prove, however, that the temporary failure of the Punjab State to meet its pecuniary engagements was not wilful or faithless ; they prove not merely the full knowledge and participation of the British Government, in those fiscal and administrative changes which made immediate solvency impossible, but its sole responsibility for those changes.

Yet Lord Dalhousie places the regular payment of the Subsidy among “the main provisions of the agreement,” which “the Sikhs” had “either entirely evaded, or grossly violated.”§ There was neither evasion nor violation. The only cause of the subsidy having fallen into arrears, was that the Resident, in the plenitude of his powers, had thought fit to lessen the receipts of the State, and to di-

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 99.

† *Ibid.*, p. 128.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 104. 105.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 659.

vert the expenditure into other channels. These financial measures were, doubtless, most judicious, but they were entirely the Resident's work, approved by the Governor-General, reluctantly accepted by the Durbar. They were of temporary effect ; and ample assets remained available, at the end of the war, for the gradual liquidation of all possible demands on the part of the British Government.

Lord Dalhousie totally fails to make out any violation of the Treaty against the Lahore State,—the only specific instance he adduces, the non-payment of the subsidy, being, as we have seen, a mere matter of account, a circumstance by which the case is not in the least modified to the prejudice of the State of Lahore.* He contrives to fasten a plausible stigma of perfidy and violation of treaties upon the State of Lahore, only by ringing the changes through several paragraphs, upon the terms, “the Sikh nation,” “the Sikhs,” “the Sikh people,” and “the Government” or “State of Lahore,”† until a thorough confusion is established. For these are not convertible terms.

What “the State of Lahore” was, and what “the Government of Lahore” was, during the British occupation and management, under the Treaty of Bhyrowal, we have just determined.

“The Sikh people,” as we have already remarked,‡ is not a phrase synonymous with “the people of the Punjaub,” the great majority of whom took no share in the revolt, and felt no sympathy with it ; while at least 20,000 subjects of the Lahore State, enrolled in its service, fought on the side of the Government, and assisted in suppressing the rebellion.

Lord Dalhousie evidently perceived the forensic and moral difficulty in the way of annexation, created by the relation of Guardianship under the Treaty of Bhyrowal, between the two States,—between the infant Sovereign of the Punjaub and the Governor-General of British India. He saw the necessity of meeting that difficulty somehow. He could not leave it entirely unnoticed. But he did not state it fully or fairly ; and the solution offered in the following passages is quite inadequate.

* *Ante*, p. 165.

† *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 661, 662.

‡ *Ante*, p. 158.

"It has been objected that the present dynasty in the Punjaub cannot with justice be subverted, since Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, being yet a minor, can hardly be held responsible for the acts of the nation. With deference to those by whom these views have been entertained, I must dissent entirely from the soundness of this doctrine."*

No such unsound doctrine lay before him. The objection was not to the subversion of a minor, but to the subversion of a Ward by his Guardian. Nor was it merely a question of "subverting a dynasty," but of subverting a State, protected and administered, under Treaty, by the British Government. I have already shown that Lord Dalhousie had no right to speak of the acts of the rebels, either as "the acts of the nation," or of "the State of Lahore."†

Lord Dalhousie went on to argue that this imaginary false doctrine,—the irresponsibility of a minor Sovereign,—had "been disregarded heretofore, in practice, and disregarded in the case of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing himself." He continues thus :—

"When, in 1845, the Khalsa army invaded our territories, the Maharajah was not held to be free from responsibility, nor was he exempted from the consequences of his people's acts. On the contrary, the Government of India confiscated to itself the richest provinces of the Maharajah's kingdom, and was applauded for the moderation which had exacted no more.

"Furthermore, the Maharajah having been made to pay the penalty of the past offences of his people, due warning was given him that he would be held, in like manner, responsible for their future acts. The Maharajah, in reply, acknowledging this warning, says, 'If in consequence of the recurrence of misrule in my Government, the peace of the British frontier be disturbed, I should be held responsible for the same.

"If the Maharajah was not exempted from responsibility on the plea of his tender years, at the age of eight, he cannot, on that plea, be entitled to exemption from a like responsibility, now that he is three years older."‡

It is strange that Lord Dalhousie should have so completely overlooked the real difference between 1846 and 1849. The question of age was immaterial at both periods. There was no plea of exemption in 1846 when the warning

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 663.

† *Ante*, p. 159.

‡ *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 663.

was given and acknowledged, because the Maharajah was the reigning Prince of an independent State. Although he was a minor, his mother, his near relatives, and their chosen advisers, were the actual Rulers of the State. In 1849 the actual Ruler of the State was the British Resident, under the Governor-General's instructions.

Of course a minor Prince is the personal representative of the State, and must stand or fall with its fortunes. But a minor Prince under the tutelage of a powerful neighbour, cannot justly be held responsible for the acts of the nation which his Guardian has undertaken to guide and control.

In 1846 the Maharajah was a conquered enemy. In 1849 the Maharajah was a Ward; the British Government was the Guardian. His mother, his natural Guardian and late Regent, was banished from the Punjaub; several of his relatives and former ministers were in prison or exile. The Maharajah was now entirely exempt from responsibility, simply because all responsibility had been assumed by the British Government.

From the 16th of December, 1846, the date of the Treaty of Bhyrowal, down to the 29th of March, 1849, when the Proclamation annexing the Punjaub was issued, the Government of Lahore was in strict subordination to the British Government; and its subordination was never interrupted, suspended, or relaxed for a single day. If, indeed, the Government of Lahore could justly have been made responsible for any of the untoward events of 1848 and 1849, Sir Frederick Currie, the Resident, must have been the first person indicted, for he was the absolute head of that Government. This is a fair *reductio ad absurdum* of that sophistical and fallacious rhetoric, by which Lord Dalhousie confounded "the Sikhs," "the Sikh nation," "the people of the Punjaub," "the Lahore Government," and "the State of Lahore," as if they were synonymous and co-extensive terms, with the object of justifying the violation of Treaties, and the evasion of a sacred duty.

Lord Dalhousie's motives, as avowed by himself, for abandoning the office of Guardian, and the noble work of restoring order and self-government to the Punjaub State,

when so much progress had already been secured, were not of the highest order. To me they appear morally low, politically short-sighted, and altogether unworthy of a great and generous nation, claiming to play the part of Imperial Instructor and Exemplar to India and the East. He argued that if our Government continued to maintain "the Sikh nation as an independent State," and instituted a reformed administration by "a larger measure of British control," "we should have all the labour, all the anxiety, all the responsibility, which would attach to the territories if they were actually made our own; while we should not reap the corresponding benefits of increase of revenue and acknowledged possession."*

That labour, anxiety, and responsibility we had undertaken; those benefits,—imaginary enough, as we now know,—we had foregone by the Treaty of Bhyrowal. As to "a larger measure of British control," there could be no larger measure than those "unlimited powers" in every department, which we held under that Treaty, and which the Resident had never ceased to exercise.

On the other hand, Lord Dalhousie observed, "the revenues are very considerable in the aggregate. A large proportion has, hitherto, been diverted from the public treasury in jaghires to the Chiefs. A considerable amount of revenue will now be recovered from the confiscation of the jaghires of those who have been engaged in hostilities against us."† He has "no hesitation in expressing a confident belief that the Punjaub will, at no distant time, be not only a secure, but a profitable possession."‡

"At no distant time,"—before Lord Dalhousie's tour of office expired,—this "confident belief" was signally contradicted.

In addition to this delusive hope of profit, and the desire to evade a burdensome obligation, Lord Dalhousie alleges a regard for "self-defence," and "the security of our own territories," as compelling us "to relinquish the policy which would maintain the independence of the Sikh nation in the Punjaub."§

"There never will be peace in the Punjaub," he urges,

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, pp. 662, 663.

† *Ibid.*, p. 665.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 664.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 661.

“so long as its people are allowed to retain the means and the opportunity of making war. There never can be now any guaranty for the tranquillity of India, until we shall have effected the entire subjection of the Sikh people, and destroyed its power as an independent nation.”*

The same equivocal use of the terms, “the Sikh people” or “nation,” and “the people of the Punjaub,” is employed here, as throughout this despatch. The people of the Punjaub in general were not hostile, as Lord Dalhousie acknowledged.† The Sikh army and the turbulent portion of the Sikh people, had been effectually subjected, and deprived of the means of making war. Reduced in numbers, subdued to orderly discipline, the Sikh army never could have regained its insolent pre-eminence in the State, as the embodied representative of the Sikh religion and Commonwealth,—the Khalsa Punth. And its conspicuous humiliation was sure to operate in a very wholesome manner upon the Sikh population, not only in the Punjaub, but throughout Sirhind, the Jullundhur Doab, and the feudatory States on both sides of the Sutlej.

Deprived of all supremacy and influence over many of these minor States, whose resources were now transferred to the British Government, and proved of material assistance during the campaign of 1849, weakened by the loss of Jullundhur and Cashmere,—the former in our possession, the latter placed on her flank as a jealous rival,—the Punjaub State, even if freed from the British occupation, could hardly be considered independent after the Treaties of 1846. Certainly her independence was not of such a character as to afford reasonable grounds of apprehension for “the tranquillity of India,” or for “the security of our own territories.” Lord Hardinge had taken good care of that.

By Articles II, III, and IV, of the Treaty of the 9th of March, 1846, the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing renounced for himself, his heirs and successors, “all claim to, or connection with the territories to the south of the Sutlej,” and between the rivers Sutlej and Beas, (the Jullundhur Doab,) ceded to the British Government; and also gave up Cashmere and the Hill Countries, designed to form a

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 662.

† *Ante*, p. 158.

Principality for Rajah Golab Sing. By Article VII, the "Regular Army of the Lahore State" was "henceforth limited to twenty-five Battalions of Infantry, and 12,000 Cavalry," and this force was never to be increased without the express permission of the British Government. By Article IX the control of the rivers Beas, Sutlej, and Indus, in respect to tolls and ferries, was to rest with the British Government. By article X, British troops, due notice being given, were to be allowed to pass through the Lahore territories. By Article XI, no European or American was to be taken into the service of the Punjaub State without the permission of the British Government. By Articles XII and XIII "the independent Sovereignty" of Rajah Golab Sing was recognised, and any dispute or difference between him and the Lahore State was to be referred to the British Government, whose decision was to be final. By Article XIV no territorial acquisitions were henceforth to be made "without the concurrence of the British Government."*

The "independence" stipulated in this Treaty for Rajah Golab Sing, tributary and feudatory of the British Government, signifies, of course, merely independence of Lahore. This is an instance of the looseness and want of precision with which the terms "independent" and "independence" have been used in our Indian Treaties and State papers, and by no one more frequently than Lord Dalhousie. But even if the meaning of the term "independence," which he applies to "the Sikh nation," be confined to that freedom of internal administration which was to be restored to the Punjaub at the end of the Maharajah's minority, there certainly was nothing in the prospect to alarm a British statesman.

Lord Dalhousie, in fact, could not have constructed his specious case of "self-defence" against the dangerous "independence" of the Punjaub State,—he could not even have deceived himself on the subject,—if he had not employed that misleading formula, "the independence of the Sikh nation."

The Sikh nation,—if a sect can be called a nation,—

* *Papers, the late Hostilities*, 1846, pp. 99, 101; and *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta (London, Longman & Co.,) vol. ii, pp. 261, 263.

neither constitutes the population of the Punjaub, nor is confined to the Punjaub. It was not the Sikh religion, nor the Sikh nationality within the Punjaub, that rendered the establishment of a strong and orderly Government in that country so difficult, but the large floating population of recently disbanded soldiers, and their favourite leaders, belonging to the dominant sect, and accustomed to political supremacy. The organisation of the Sikh army was not thoroughly broken up; the defeated Khalsa had not forgotten their old habits, nor lost their old hopes. All that they wanted was that second lesson, which we had promised to administer, if necessary.

The pacification of the Punjaub after 1849, is not in the least explained by its becoming a British Province, but by the simple fact that the Sikhs had been well beaten, and that they knew it. Whatever doubt may have been left on their minds after the campaign of 1846, was now effectually dispelled. They could not contend against the British Government. They had been made to lay down their arms; they had lost all their guns; their proudest and most trusted Chieftains were all discomfited; their saints and prophets were all discredited; their union was dissolved. They had been defeated without disgrace; a great deal of fanatical nonsense had probably been knocked out of them; and, by all accounts, they bore no particular grudge against us for the lesson we had taught them.

There is, in fact, no reason to doubt that the Punjaub would have been as peaceful and friendly under a Native Prince during the last nineteen years, as the States of Nepaul and Gwalior have been, the former for fifty years since its last defeat, the latter for twenty-four years since its final subjection to the British Government.

The Nepaulese, animated by a long career of conquest, and with an overweening confidence in their own power and resources, made war upon us in 1814. Their successes against our troops in the first campaign, induced them to protract the contest for nearly two years; but they were taught the error of trusting in the inaccessibility of their mountain fastnesses, and their Envoy was compelled to present on his knees at the British General's Durbar,* the

* *Prinsep's Marquis of Hastings' Administration*, (Allen, 1825), vol. i, p. 205.

Treaty of peace ratified by the Maharajah, giving up all the points in dispute, and ceding a large tract of territory. Since this humiliation in March, 1816, a British Resident has been constantly at the capital of Nepaul; that Government has maintained the most amicable relations with us; and in 1857-8 a force of 20,000 Goorkhas, commanded by the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, Maharajah Jung Bahadoor, cooperated with Lord Clyde's army in suppressing the rebellion in Oude.

The military operations of 1843 in the territories of Maharajah Scindia of Gwalior, had for their pretext and object the coercion of a turbulent and unmanageable army, unnecessarily large for the purposes of the Native State, and massed so as to threaten our frontier near the important city of Agra. Two battles were fought; the defeated army was disbanded, and reorganised on a limited scale under a new and more stringent Treaty. Since that time the State of Gwalior has given no ground of complaint; and in the crisis of 1857, Maharajah Scindia and his ministers, though placed in the vortex of insurrection, surrounded by mutinous and clamorous troops, "raised, paid, disciplined, and" (recently) "commanded by British officers," in the style which, in Lord Dalhousie's opinion, could alone make native troops safe; *—contrived to render most valuable services to the British Government.

Every historical analogy, every contemporaneous event, all the probabilities of the case, indicate that the Sikhs, under the reformed Government of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, would have been as proud and as eager to cooperate with British troops in 1857, as were the Sikhs under the Sikh Rajahs of Puttiala, Jheend, Nabha, and Kupperthulla, as were the troops of the Rajah of Cashmere, or the Nepaulese under Jung Bahadoor. Delhi was the accursed city of the Mogul, the centre of Mussulman arrogance, the place of martyrdom of the great Sikh prophets, and devoted by their predictions to the vengeance of their disciples. Animated by these traditional animosities, with the hope of plunder, and "the old scorn for the Poorbeah Sepoy," † the Sikhs rallied to our banner in the newly raised

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 662.

† *Trotter's History of India from 1844 to 1862*, vol. ii, p. 70.

Punjaabee Regiments, and pressed towards Delhi with confidence and good will. But these notorious inducements would have operated with double force under the rule of their own Rajah. As it is, the extensive re-employment of the Punjaabees in 1857, their share in the glory and plunder of Delhi and Lucknow, unquestionably revived much of their soldierly self-respect, but with it, by all accounts, somewhat of a bitter sense of their inadequate military rewards, and of their degradation as a race,—feelings that are by no means conducive to abject and contented submission.

Lord Dalhousie argued, that “warlike in character, and long accustomed to conquest, the Sikhs must, of necessity, detest the British as their conquerors.”* But if the administration of the Punjaub during the Rajah’s minority, had been continued, there would have been no “conquerors” to detest. It was Lord Dalhousie who, by a violation of the Treaty, converted our protective occupation into a so-called conquest. If the Treaty had not been violated, the defeated insurgents would have been simply a vanquished party in the State, and, as I believe, finally vanquished. No humiliation would have fallen on the Maharajah, upon the Board of Regency, or upon the Sardars, their followers, and the troops, who had supported the constituted authorities. And even for the vanquished party,—the fanatical lower class of Sikhs,—if the Punjaub State had been maintained, the participation of its army in the military exploits of the British Government, would have taken out all the sting of defeat in the pride of a common victory.

The fact is that the Government of the Punjaub, so long as there was a regular Government, never had the least inclination to go to war with us. The State of Lahore, throughout the time of its greatest pride and prosperity, under Runjeet Sing, had remained on the best terms with the British Government. Even after the great Maharajah’s death, amidst the excitement of our disasters in Affghanistan, and the operations to retrieve them and withdraw our troops, amicable relations were preserved for several years, until what Lord Hardinge correctly described as

* *Papers, Punjaub*, 1849, p. 662.

“a democratic revolution”;* threw all the power of the State into the hands of the army. The military Panchayuts used their power in a manner that was most offensive and alarming to all adherents of Runjeet Sing’s dynasty. They “issued their orders, under the designation belonging to the Sikh sect, before Runjeet Sing became a monarch, viz. :—the Khalsa Punth, (Khalsajee-ka Punth)”—the Company of the Elect. “They formally assumed the Government, and sent letters bearing their seal, inscribed merely with the name of God, to all local officers, military leaders, and members of the Durbār, requiring their presence and obedience.”† The Princes, the ministers, the nobles, even the superior officers of the army, all who had anything to lose, were on the side of peace with us, and good order within their own frontier. It was so in 1845, and equally, or more so, in 1849.

We have seen how long, and how stoutly, Rajah Shere Sing resisted the growing impulse,—with what reluctance, under what an imperative summons, amid what confusion and despair, he at last yielded. And, after all, he alone, out of the eight leading Sirdars of the Punjaub, selected to form the Council of Regency, took part in the insurrection,—and then, not as a voluntary participator in the common cause, but closely touched by special motives of personal honour, and the Oriental sense of implicit filial obedience.

Many of the Sirdars withstood for a long time every incentive to rebellion, and were at last dragged or forced into it by the soldiery who surrounded them. The army was, in fact, the sole obstacle to be overcome before a reformed and self-sustaining Government could be established in the Punjaub. Under our protective management,—with or without a second struggle,—that obstacle would have been overcome. The reorganisation of the army, and pacification of the Sikhs and other warlike tribes, were merely matters of time. The intervals of the Rajah’s minority would probably have been sufficiently long. The negotiators of the Treaty of Bhyrowal certainly contemplated the possibility of a second struggle. Lord Hardinge and Sir Henry Lawrence were prepared for it,

* *Papers, the Late Hostilities*, 1846, p. 6.

† *Ibid.*, p. 8.

though they did not expect it ; and but for a strange succession of mishaps and errors of judgment, I firmly believe the second struggle would have been avoided. In either case, whether the second struggle was unavoidable, whether it was provoked or aggravated by our shortcomings or faults, we ought to have borne the brunt of it without complaining.

The spirit, the habits, the traditional pride of the old Khalsa troops, in the ranks of the local army, and in the districts chiefly inhabited by the Sikhs, were the unruly elements we had undertaken to curb and coerce. It was our duty to conquer those unruly elements ; but having done so, we had no right to say, as Lord Dalhousie did, that we had “conquered” the territories under our tutelage. That was not a conquest,—it was a breach of trust. We availed ourselves to the utmost, and to the last moment, of our advantageous position as the civil and military administrators of the Punjab ; we held its strongholds, and disposed of all its resources, including 20,000 soldiers recruited from its population ; we disarmed many wavering and doubtful opponents by appealing to their conservative interests and loyal sentiments, and disavowing hostility to their Sovereign and institutions ;—all this we were authorised and bound to do, with the object of quelling the insurrection, but not with the object of violating the Treaties, as soon as the crisis was over, by turning our occupation into possession.

The results of that ill-advised acquisition up to the present time, seem to me to have been of a mixed character,—absolutely injurious and exhausting to the British Empire, relatively beneficial in some respects, prejudicial in others, to the people of the Punjab ;—but I can perceive no advantage, material or moral, that has been gained by any person or class, that could not have been more fully and effectually conferred and secured, without annexation than with it.

Lord Dalhousie objected, that “hesitation on our part would be attributed, not to forbearance, but to fear ; it would be regarded, not as the result of a magnanimous policy, but as the evidence of a pusillanimous spirit.”*

* *Papers, Punjab*, 1849, p. 664.

This is a most frivolous and unstatesmanlike objection. Magnanimity after success never presents the appearance of fear, and is not in the least liable to be mistaken for it. All India was thoroughly impressed with the complete subjection of the Sikh army. There were manifold means available for making that subjection, and the submission of the entire people, a visible object to the whole Peninsula, and for turning it to the honour and credit of the Imperial Power. According to the Oriental ideas the greatest Sovereign is he who can make Princes, and who has the largest number of Princes under his command and protection. Lord Dalhousie might have gained the hearts of Princes and people by a plain statement of what had been done, and what it was intended to do in the Punjaub. Instead of doing so, he violated Treaties, abused a sacred trust, threw away the grandest opportunity ever offered to the British Government, of planting solid and vital reform up to the northern limits of India, and by an acquisition as unjust as it was imprudent, entailed a heavy burden upon the Empire. That, I believe, will be the verdict of posterity and history, upon the transactions which have just passed under our review.

CHAPTER VII.

ANNEXATION, ITS AUTHORS AND APOLOGISTS.

BOTH the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson seem desirous of impressing two somewhat ill-assorted notions upon their readers,—firstly, that a deliberate policy of gradually absorbing all the Native States has always been the wisest policy for the British Government of India, and will continue to be so for the future ; secondly, that Lord Dalhousie did not form any such deliberate policy. They tell us that “he did not originate the doctrine of ‘lapse;’ that he did not extend it;” that some of the annexed States simply “lapsed by operation of law ;” and that the Governor-General could not throw away “a golden opportunity;”* while in the most notable instance of all, that of Oude, he “deprecated annexation,” and “is not responsible” for it.†

With the alleged scruples and misgivings of the chief agent in these territorial acquisitions, and their legal and accidental character,—I have already dealt.‡ I shall only add here that it is quite true that Lord Dalhousie did not “originate the doctrine of lapse;” but by his eager and unquestioning adhesion to that doctrine with its visionary array of precedents, which a fair and candid inquiry would have immediately dispelled, he made it his own, and gave it practical efficacy. “The doctrine of lapse” was originated by some Bengal and Bombay Civilians, and first applied to a Sovereign State with which a Treaty of perpetual alliance existed, by the late Sir J. P. Willoughby, then a Member of Council at Bombay, in the matter of the Sattara succession. Some years ago I remarked, “Mr. J. P. Willoughby was the real parent of Annexation ; Lord Dalhousie was only its nursing father.”§ But that cannot

* *A Vindication*, pp. 41, 42.

† *Ante*, p. 46.

‡ *Ante*, pp. 50, 51, 72, 74 ; and pp. 10 to 20.

§ *The Empire in India*, chapter on “Sattara.”

diminish his responsibility in the least. The "doctrine of lapse" was a cruelly effective process, but without a policy of annexation accepted by the Supreme Government it would never have been applied.

The Duke of Argyll denies that there ever was "a policy of annexation" at all;* and Sir Charles Jackson declares that, if there ever was such a policy, by the time Lord Dalhousie left India, no reigning Prince remained who had any reason to dread it, except the Rajah of Mysore.

"Then it is suggested that all the Princes of India were alarmed by these annexations, and feared the application of the doctrine of 'lapse' to their own successions; but the truth is that the doctrine was capable of a very limited application among Princes. Lord Dalhousie repeatedly declared that it was applicable to dependent States only.

"I do not believe that one independent Sovereign was alarmed by these lapses of territory, but if there was such a Sovereign, his fear was most unreasonable, and might have been removed by ten minutes' conversation with the Resident at his Court, or a reference to Calcutta. But the range of this supposed dread was still more limited, for the doctrine, requiring the consent of the British Government to adoptions by dependent Sovereigns, is inapplicable to those of the Mahomedan faith, and it was Lord Dalhousie's fate to gather in nearly the whole crop of dependent Hindoo territories. I believe that Mysore was the only one remaining at the close of his administration."†

I shall take the last two sentences first,—both because, if they held good, they would, indeed, confine within very narrow bounds the alarm and anxiety among native Princes at the special process of rejecting adopted heirs, and because they present a strange example of the incompetence, and want of preparation for the business he has taken in hand, betrayed by Sir Charles Jackson, as soon as he wanders from the particular Blue Books, on which he and the Duke of Argyll would have every one pin their faith. Yet there are Blue Books in existence,—not to say school-books,—that might have saved Sir Charles Jackson from the error in question. He says that Lord Dalhousie "gathered in nearly the whole crop of dependent *Hindoo* territories," and believes that "Mysore was the only one remaining at the close of his administration." There are

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, pp. 4, 5, 16.

† *A Vindication*, p. 33.

literally more than a *hundred* dependent Hindoo States left. I exclude from consideration those Princes or Chieftains who only possess what is called "second class jurisdiction,"—of whom there are at least another hundred,—and refer to those who maintain a military force, and have the power of life and death within their own dominions.

Though I cannot admit that there is any "*independent*" Hindoo Prince within the geographical limits of India, except the Maharajah of Nepaul, I shall exclude, for the present, the greater Princes of Rajpootana, the Rajahs Scindia of Gwalior, Holkar of Indore, and others, the extent of whose territories, and their internal autonomy, may have led Sir Charles Jackson to suppose that they did not come under the head of "dependent Sovereigns."

Mr. J. C. Marshman, mentioned several times in Sir William Sleeman's letters as the writer of "rabid articles" in the *Friend of India*, in favour of the absorption of native States,* has recently published a History of India, in which he naturally takes up the defence of Lord Dalhousie's administration. He, likewise, tries to deprecate censure on the unjust restrictions of the Hindoo law of inheritance, by contracting their sphere, but he is less vague than Sir Charles Jackson, and deviates into a decided misrepresentation.

"It appears to be forgotten that the application of this law of succession was confined to extremely narrow limits. It did not affect any of the Mahomedan Princes of India; and the Court of Directors and Lord Dalhousie explicitly declared that it was applicable exclusively to those subordinate and dependent Principalities which had been created by the 'spontaneous generosity' of the British Government, and not to any of the independent Sovereigns. It was, in fact, restricted to the States of Mysore, Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansi, and possibly to one or two others of minor account."†

This statement is utterly inaccurate. Neither the Court of Directors nor Lord Dalhousie ever made any such declaration. The pretended prerogative of rejecting adopted heirs was extended by Lord Dalhousie, in a passage which I shall quote at full length a little further on, to the

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. ii, pp. 390, 395.

† *History of India*, (Longman and Co.) vol. iii, p. 400.

"States which recognise formally the supremacy of the British Government,"* a formula which would include every Native State in India, with the exception of three or four.

Sir Charles Jackson, who has "been in India," does "not believe that one independent Sovereign was alarmed by these lapses of territory." Let us hear the opinions of some persons whom he would himself allow to have had better opportunities than himself of judging.

General Sir John Low,—the last surviving pupil and Assistant of Sir John Malcolm, who passed more than thirty of the most active years of his life among Native Princes and their subjects,—tells us that "the confidence of our native allies was a good deal shaken by the annexation of Sattara," and that it roused feelings of discontent and alarm throughout Malwa and Rajpootana, where he was at that time Agent to the Governor-General.† And Sir Frederick Currie, Resident and Councillor under Lord Dalhousie's Government, and now in the Council of India, in his Dissent from the despatch of 1864 on the Mysore question, remarks:—"The decision in the Sattara case, whatever its merits may be, undoubtedly caused surprise and alarm throughout the length and breadth of India."‡

The Duke of Argyll is strangely unwilling to give Lord Dalhousie the full credit of the policy which he defends and upholds.

"It is indeed true that the annexation of the Punjaub proved to be the first§ of a series of annexations. What is not true is precisely that which is most commonly believed, viz., that this was the result of a policy preconceived and deliberately pursued. No policy was, or could be formed, applicable to the very different circumstances which, in these various cases, terminated in a like result."||

If for "policy," the Duke of Argyll would substitute the word, "process," in the last sentence, his statement would be quite correct. The policy was the same throughout; the process was varied according to the different circumstances of each case. We have just seen Sir Charles Jack-

* *Kerowlee Papers*, 1855.

† *Paper, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 43.

‡ *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 46.

§ This is a mistake; the annexation of Sattara was the first of the series.

|| *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 4.

son, after assuming that Lord Dalhousie had cleared off all the "dependent" Princes, except Mysore, and satisfying himself that no "independent" Sovereign could have been alarmed at the clearance, observing that "the range of the supposed dread was still more limited, for the doctrine," of lapse, "is inapplicable to those of the Mahomedan faith." Mr. Marshman makes the same observation. It is quite true that the custom of adoption, though recognised in their law, is not a binding duty upon Mahomedans, does not form the essence of their inheritance, does not exclude collaterals, and thus did not offer the convenient handle for Lord Dalhousie's operations among Mussulman, that it did among Hindoo families. But he surely extended "the range of the supposed dread" quite sufficiently by his treatment of the Mussulman King of Oude, the Nizam, Ameer Ali Morad, and the Nawab of the Carnatic. He showed that the doctrine of "lapse" was not the only weapon in his armoury, and that he could vary his process according to circumstances. The policy was avowedly the same in every case; the pretext alone varied.

The policy was "preconceived and deliberately pursued," and is clearly enough announced in Lord Dalhousie's own words, penned within six months of his arrival in India, and quoted by the Duke of Argyll.

"It was in the discussion of the Sattara question that Lord Dalhousie recorded his dissent from the doctrine—apparently implied though not directly asserted by Sir George Clerk—that the maintenance of native Governments in the midst of our own dominions was in itself politic and advantageous:—

"There may be conflict of opinion (he says) as to the advantage or propriety of extending our already vast possessions beyond their present limits. No man can deprecate more than I do any extension of the frontiers of our territory which can be avoided, or which may not become indispensably necessary for considerations of our own safety and of the maintenance of the tranquillity of our own Provinces. But I cannot conceive it possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories which already belong to us, by taking possession of States which may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of those petty intervening Principalities which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength; for adding to the resources of the public treasury; and

for extending the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests, we sincerely believe, will be promoted thereby.”*

“This,” the Duke adds, “is *the nearest approach* in any of Lord Dalhousie’s writings to the advocacy of ‘a policy of annexation.’” In a subsequent part of the Essay he says that this passage was quoted, “as containing *the broadest assertion* of his principle.”†

The Duke is quite wrong in supposing this to be either “the nearest approach,” or “the broadest assertion,” to be found in Lord Dalhousie’s writings though it is near enough and broad enough to prove a deliberate policy of “getting rid of intervening Principalities,” and is by no means limited in the manner Mr. Marshman pretends, to those of our own creation. “The nearest approach” and “the broadest assertion” will be found in two short paragraphs (28 and 30) immediately preceding and following that one (29) which the Duke has extracted. Here they are :—

“28. In like manner, while I would not seek to lay down any inflexible rule with respect to adoption, I hold that *on all occasions where heirs natural shall fail, the territory shall be made to lapse,‡ and adoption should not be permitted*, excepting in those cases in which some strong political reason may render it expedient to depart from this *general rule*.

“30. Such is the *general principle*, that, in my humble opinion, ought to guide the conduct of the British Government in its disposal of independent States, where there has been total failure of all heirs whatsoever, or where permission is asked to continue, by adoption, a succession which fails in the natural line.”§

In these two paragraphs Lord Dalhousie advises that the doctrine of “lapse,” in default of a lineal male descendant, shall be considered as “a *general principle*,” to be applied “*on all occasions*,” “*in the disposal of independent States*.”

Sir Charles Jackson thinks it unfortunate, that “in one of the most important passages” (of this Minute) “the word ‘independent’ appears instead of ‘dependent,’” and declares

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 27. † *Ibid.*, p. 39.

‡ “*Made to lapse*,”—the quintessence of arbitrary confiscation lies in that phrase.—E. B.

§ *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83. As for the meaning in Lord Dalhousie’s mouth of “natural heirs,” “the natural line,” etc., see *ante* p. 42.

that "the whole argument of the Minute requires that it should be 'dependent.'"* The word "independent" appears in important passages of that paper, not *once* only, but *three times*.† In one of these (para. 32) the word could not be altered into "dependent" without destroying the argument, such as it is. The Governor-General argues that "the territories" (of Sattara) "are interposed between the two principal military stations in the Presidency of Bombay; and are at least calculated, in the hands of an *independent Sovereign*, to form an obstacle to safe communication and combined military movement."‡ The argument is worthless, as was immediately pointed out by General Sir John Littler, one of the Supreme Councillors, but if the proper word, "dependent," had been used, the absurdity of supposing the little subordinate State of Sattara to be a military "obstacle," would have been transparently obvious. "Independent" sounded like something formidable, and, therefore, it suited Lord Dalhousie's rhetorical purpose to employ it. In the other passages of this Minute, and elsewhere, however, he seems to use the word as if it were synonymous with "separate." His phraseology is frequently vague and equivocal.§

But Sir Charles Jackson, who believes that "the whole crop" of dependent States, except Mysore, was gathered in by Lord Dalhousie, does "not believe that one independent Sovereign was alarmed" at the harvest. He uses the terms "dependent" and "independent," as loosely and indeterminate as Lord Dalhousie did; and I can only guess that he would designate as "independent," those Hindoo Princes who have the largest territories and revenues. If so, it will be easy to show, firstly, that Scindia and Holkar, the two most important Hindoo Princes out of Rajpootana, were directly threatened by the "doctrine of lapse;" secondly, that they were intensely alarmed by its practical results during Lord Dalhousie's reign.

In his Minute on the Sattara Succession, Mr. (afterwards

* *A Vindication*, p. 33.

† Paragraphs 1, 30, and 32, *Sattara Papers*, 1849, pp. 80, 82.

‡ Paragraph 32, *ibid.*, p. 83.

§ This requires no alteration, but I must admit that I have found numerous instances scattered through Indian state-papers, in which others, besides Lord Dalhousie, use the word "independent" as if it meant "separate."

Sir) J. P. Willoughby dwells upon "the social evils resulting from adoptions," and especially the bad effects of a long minority,—never giving the least thought to the perfect opportunity thereby afforded for the effectual reform of a Native State by British agency and influence. The following ominous passage occurs here :—

"A more striking exemplification of the evils above referred to is afforded by the dissensions in the family of Dowlut Rao Scindia. On the death of this Chief, his widow, her Highness the Baiza Baeo, adopted a son, and continued to exercise regal powers for some years, until at last a struggle for the supremacy occurred between them, terminating in 1833 in the adopted son being proclaimed Sovereign, his mother being obliged to seek an asylum in British territory. This Chief dying on February 7th, 1843, *another adoption was allowed,** and the political evils resulting therefrom, and a violent collision with the British Government, terminating in war and bloodshed, are of too recent an occurrence to require to be dwelt upon. These are strong facts in support of those who are of opinion that the annoyance by adoptions of sovereign and territorial rights, ought in the present state of India to be discouraged as much as possible, and that all fair lapses should be annexed to the British Empire, when no absolute right will thereby be violated. The existence of so many Sovereignties and Chiefships, interspersed with our own territory, is in many ways inimical to good government, and to the welfare and prosperity of the people; and if this is admitted, it follows that, on every fair occasion, their number ought to be diminished."†

I commend this decisive and summary avowal of a general policy of annexation to the attention of Mr. Marshman, who has very recently, in reply to strictures on his History, declared once more that the doctrine of "lapse" "referred to the 'subordinate States' of Mysore, created by Lord Wellesley, to Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansie, which owed their existence or restoration to Lord Hastings, and to Sumbulpore; and to no others," and that the late Sir John Willoughby was "the great patron of Native Princes," and "one of the most strenuous advocates of their rights."‡ I particularly commend to his attention the fact that in Mr. Willoughby's Minute the great Principality of Gwalior, in the possession of the Scindia family,

* That of the reigning Maharajah, Jyajee Rao Scindia.—E. B.

† *Sattara Papers*, 1849, pp. 70, 71.

‡ Letter in the *Homeward Mail*, February 6th, 1868.

is declared to be one of those Hindoo States in which an adoption must be "allowed" by the British Government, before it becomes valid for a succession ; and regret is expressed that an adoption was so "allowed" in 1843. It is recommended that this "annoyance" should be discouraged for the future, and that "all fair lapses should be annexed."

Thus the State of Gwalior, and the dynasty of Scindia, are menaced with extinction on the first favourable opportunity. Mr. Willoughby's Minute was called by Lord Dalhousie "a text-book on adoptions," and Sir Charles Jackson informs us that "he was in the habit of referring to it, when similar questions subsequently arose."*

And other people, there can be no doubt, were in the habit of referring to it. Hear Lord Canning on that point.

"It must not be supposed that because these documents are published in Blue Books and in English, they are beyond the knowledge of Native Courts. They are, on the contrary, sought for and studied by those whose dearest prospects they so closely affect. It is not many months since I was informed, by the Governor-General's Agent in Central India, that a Native Court had received from England the Parliamentary Papers on Dhar before they had reached my own hand."†

In the Sattara, Jhansi, and Nagpore Blue Books, Scindia, Holkar, and other Hindoo Princes, would have found abundance of matter more alarming than anything we have yet quoted. Mr. Willoughby was less cautious in his language than Lord Dalhousie, but the Bengal Civilian in the Supreme Council were more outspoken than either of them. The following extract is from a Minute on the Sattara question by Mr. F. Millett :—

"The intersection of our territories by many native States, interferes with measures of general improvement. I believe it to be for the best interests of the people that *our direct administration should gradually extend itself over the whole country comprised within the bounds of British India.*"‡

And this is the opinion of Mr. J. A. Dorin on the occasion of Nagpore being annexed :—

* *A Vindication*, p. 12.

† Paragraph 7 of the *Adoption Despatch* of April 30th, 1860.

‡ *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 85.

"So far as we can foresee the ultimate destiny of this great Empire, its entire possession must infallibly be consolidated in the hands of Great Britain. Thoroughly believing in this dispensation of Providence, I cannot coincide in any view which shall have for its object the maintenance of native rule against the progress of events which throws indisputed power into our possession."*

In addition to the testimony of Sir John Low and Sir Frederick Currie, as to the discontent and alarm among our allies, "throughout the length and breadth of India,"—besides the obvious certainty that the successive "lapses" of Sattara, Jhansi, and Nagpore, the contents of the Blue Books, and the rumours about Rajpootana, must have terrified Scindia, and *a fortiori* his weaker neighbour, Holkar,—we have the positive evidence of Lord Canning, the Governor-General, and of Colonel Macpherson, the Resident at Gwalior in 1857, that Maharajah Scindia, in common with other Hindoo Princes, was in a state of great anxiety on the subject of the succession in his family.

In the well-known *Adoption Despatch*, of the 30th of April, 1860, Lord Canning, after alluding to the "haze of doubt and mistrust in the mind of each Chief as to the policy which the Government will apply to his own State in the event of his leaving no natural heir to the throne," says :—

"It is to this alone that I can attribute the extraordinary satisfaction with which my assurance to Scindia that the Government would see with pleasure his adoption of a successor if lineal heirs should fail, and that it was the desire of the Paramount Power that his House should be perpetuated and flourish, was accepted by those attached to his Court, to the extent that at Gwalior the news was received with rejoicings very like that which would have marked the birth of an heir.

"To the same cause I ascribe the manifest pleasure of the Maharajah of Rewah, when a like assurance was given to him. He said to me that his family had been in Rewah for eleven hundred years, and that my words had dispelled an ill-wind that had long been blowing upon him."

Can any one doubt what that "ill-wind" was? Sir Frederick Currie,† when a member of Lord Dalhousie's

* *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 38.

† Now a Member of the Secretary of State's Council of India.

Government in 1852, opposed his Lordship's desire of annexing the little Rajpoot Principality of Kerowlee, by refusing to recognise an adoption, which the Governor-General's Agent, a few days before the Rajah's death, had been desired to discountenance,* but which, nevertheless, took place. The adopted son, as usual, was "a distant relative of the late Maharaja, and a lineal descendant from the founder of the Kerowlee Raj."† Had Lord Dalhousie been permitted to begin nibbling at the States of Rajpootana,—had the decree of confiscation gone forth,—feelings of despair and hatred would have been roused, which might have incalculably enhanced our difficulties in 1857. Fortunately Sir John Low and Sir Henry Lawrence were successively Agents to the Governor-General in Rajpootana during the two years of suspense. Their powerful representations gave great weight to Sir Frederick Currie's opposition; and these efforts were supplemented at home by the India Reform Association, recently established and actively at work, under the guidance of Mr. John Dickinson, Mr. Henry Seymour, M.P., and the lamented Mr. J. F. B. Blackett, then M.P. for Newcastle. A threatened motion in the House of Commons turned the scale,‡ and secured a majority of the Court of Directors against the proposed inroad on the ancient States of Rajpootana.

Mr. Kaye justly remarks that "Sir Frederick Currie's Minute on the Kerowlee question is an admirable state-paper—accurate in its facts, clear in its logic, and unexceptionable in its political morality."§ It is all that, and much more. If carefully examined, it will be found to go to the very root of "the doctrine of lapse," and to mark an epoch after which Lord Dalhousie can have no longer remained under any delusion on that subject.

The Kerowlee discussion took place in 1852: it followed the annexation of Sattara, but preceded those of Jhansi and Nagporè. Sir Frederick Currie had left for the time his seat in Council, to act as Resident in the Punjaub, when the Sattara Raj was annexed, and, therefore, took no part in that debate. Considering, as we may presume, the

* *Kerowlee Papers*, 1855, p. 7.

† *Ibid.*, p. 11.

‡ *Quarterly Review*, 1858, p. 269.

§ *History of the Sepoy War*, vol. i, p. 93, (note).

annexation of Sattara to be a settled case, approved and confirmed by the Court of Directors, he touches it somewhat cautiously, but in paragraph 10 of his Minute he implicitly attacks the pretended prerogative by which that measure was justified.

"I will admit that the general law and custom of India do, usually, require the recognition of the Paramount Power to the adoption of an heir to a dependent or protected Principality; *but so do the law and custom require the same recognition to the succession of a natural heir; and I am not prepared to admit that the Supreme Power is more competent to withhold its recognition of the one than of the other.*"*

The "recognition usually required," in Sir Frederick Currie's opinion, is merely that regulative recognition, "for the purpose of averting dissensions and bloodshed,"† which Sir George Clerk admitted in the Sattara question, and which both of these eminent men declare cannot be withheld. Both of them also pronounce "an adopted heir to stand in exactly the same relation as a natural heir."‡

No one can doubt that Sir Frederick Currie, having said so much in his recorded Minute, must have spoken much more clearly and fully to Lord Dalhousie in verbal consultation. He must have shown the Governor-General the nonentity of the imaginary "law and custom of India," with its pretended list of precedents, upon which the extinction of the Sattara State was founded. He cannot have attacked the supposed law and precedents in any other way than that in which I have attacked them, by denying their existence.§ Their existence is a matter of fact, not of opinion. Challenged to produce those precedents, Lord Dalhousie must have fallen back upon Mr. Willoughby's Minute, the "text-book on adoptions," and it must have been brought home to him that its confident assertions, upon which he had relied,—in good faith, but with culpable carelessness,—were utterly unfounded.

And we find that the Governor-General does not base his proposal to annex Kerowlee on "the ordinary and invariable practice" of the "Sovereign State," as he had done

* *Kerowlee Papers*, 1855, p. 11.

† *Ante*, p. 18.

‡ *Sattara Papers*, 1849, pp. 63, 64.

§ *Ante*, pp. 9 to 20.

in the Sattara case.* He no longer ventures, in the face of Sir Frederick Currie, to cite "the immemorial law and custom of India." Even in a second Minute, written in reply to that of his colleague, he says :—

"After considering the arguments of Sir Frederick Currie, I still think that the right is clear of withholding confirmation, founded upon the decision of the Honourable Court in 1849."†

The conclusion seems hardly avoidable that after the 31st of August, 1852, the date of Sir Frederick Currie's Minute, Lord Dalhousie must have been well aware that "the doctrine of lapse" did not rest on any ordinary practice or immemorial law, but solely on that verdict of the Honourable Court in the Sattara case, which had been drawn forth by his own hasty misdirection. The Kerowlee case fixes the time, after which, if Lord Dalhousie enforced against any Hindoo State the sham prerogative of rejecting an adopted heir, he sinned against knowledge. And he did so. Sir Frederick Currie's opposition terminated by his return to England, and the doctrine of "lapse" was applied to the friendly and faithful States of Jhansi and Nagpore in 1854.

"But," observes Mr. Kaye, referring to the narrow escape of Kerowlee, "it is not to be supposed that because no wrong was done at last, no injury was done by the delay. Public rumour recognises no Secret Department. It was well-known at every native Court, in every native bazar, that the British Government were discussing the policy of annexing or not annexing Kerowlee."

"The Rajpoot Princes lost their confidence in the good faith of the British Government. Kerowlee had been spared, they scarcely knew how; some were fain to attribute it to the well-known justice and liberality of Henry Lawrence. But the same moderation might not be displayed again; there were childless men among them; and from that time a restless uneasy feeling took possession of them, and no man felt sure that his House would not perish with him. It was not strange indeed that a year or two afterwards there should have been in circulation all over the country ominous reports to the effect that the policy of Lord Dalhousie had eventually triumphed, and that the gradual absorption of all the Rajpoot States had been sanctioned by the Home Government."‡

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 82. † *Kerowlee Papers*, 1855, p. 13.

‡ *The Sepoy War*, vol. i, pp 96, 97.

Sir Charles Jackson will not believe that there was any "dependent" Prince, except the Rajah of Mysore, left in India, to be alarmed at "the doctrine of lapse," or that any "independent" Prince could have been so "unreasonable" as to be alarmed, either at the doctrine or the practice, and he casts doubt upon Mr. Kaye's report of the general alarm throughout Rajpootana. He requires "a little more particularity as to the date and venue of the rumour;" thinks it "very improbable that a native rumour would be couched in the exact language used by Mr. Kaye," and pronounces that "it was, like most Indian rumours, totally destitute of truth."* I am not so sure of that. Of the prevalence of such a report in the last year or two of Lord Dalhousie's administration, couched in the exact language used by Mr. Kaye, there can really be no question.† It may not have been based on any official communications, or upon any plan reduced to writing, and yet it may,—and I suspect it did,—represent very accurately the "large views,"‡ at which the Government of India, and probably the Ministry at home, and perhaps a majority of the Court of Directors, had arrived, by the time the Dalhousie "series" was completed in the annexation of Oude.

When the case of Kerowlee came before Lord Dalhousie and his Council, the series had only just commenced. The Punjaub being called a conquest, they had only acquired Sattara by "the doctrine of lapse." In his Minute, dated the 30th of August, 1852, the Governor-General himself suggests that "the refusal of sanction to adoption in the case of Kerowlee might create alarm and dissatisfaction in the elder and more powerful States of Rajpootana, as being apparently significant of the intentions of the British Government towards themselves. Such an alarm," he continues, "would be unfounded. For I presume that the Government of India would not at any time be disposed to interfere with the customary mode of succession among

* *A Vindication*, p. 50.

† I presume Sir Charles Jackson does not mean to remind us that rumours do not circulate among natives in the *English* language.

‡ "He had large views." *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 67. "Lord Dalhousie was a great administrator and statesman, with large views"—*A Vindication*, p. 3.

these old Rajpoot States, whose antiquity, whose position and feelings, would all make it our policy to leave them in the possession of such independence as they now enjoy.”*

Still, though he admits that Kerowlee is “a Rajpoot Principality, and, unlike the existing Mahratta and Mahomedan dynasties, has the claims of antiquity in its favour,”† he cannot allow these scruples and misgivings to turn him from his general policy. “The arguments appear to me to preponderate in favour of causing Kerowlee to lapse.”‡ He argued that “the supremacy of the British Government” over this little Principality, was “practically declared,” in the Treaty of 1817, “by the remission of tribute payable to the Peishwa,” and was, moreover, “specifically acknowledged by Kerowlee in the 3rd Article of the Treaty.” And, he said :—

“In the Minute upon the case of Sattara in 1818, I recorded my own opinion that the British Government should not neglect such rightful opportunities as might occur, of extending its rule over Native States which fell to its disposal, either by total lapse, or by the succession depending on the recognition of an adoption. I did not advise that adoption should universally be refused the sanction of the Government, *but I was of opinion that it should not be admitted in States which recognised formally the supremacy of the British Government in India*, unless strong political reasons recommend the exception in any particular case or cases.” §

If the supremacy of the British Government over Kerowlee was practically declared by the remission of tribute, the declaration must have been still more practical where tribute was actually paid. ALL the States of Rajpootana, including “the elder and more powerful States” of Oodeypoor, Jyepoor, and Jodhpoor, either pay tribute, or have tribute remitted, under their Treaties with the British Government. By these Treaties they *all* “acknowledge the supremacy” of the British Government, and promise to act in “subordinate cooperation.”|| The elder and more powerful States enjoy no more independence than Kerow-

* *Kerowlee Papers*, 1855, p. 9. † *Ibid.*, p. 9. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 9. § *Ibid.*, p. 8.

|| *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864, (London, Longman and Co.) vol. iv, pp. 1 to 100. The accidental and merely nominal independence of the Rana of Dholpoor is scarcely worth mentioning as an exception,—see pp. 121, 122, of the same volume of Treaties.

lee; the terms by which they are bound are quite as stringent as those which bind the smaller Principalities.

The demise of the Kerowlee Sovereignty, from which the doubtful succession arose, took place in July, 1852. The final decision of the Court of Directors is dated the 5th of July, 1854.* The Blue Book did not appear till 1855. However alarming may have been the rumours during the two years of suspense, they were amply justified by the positive disclosures of the Parliamentary Papers. Here was perilous stuff enough to poison the drop of consolation to be derived from the reprieve of Kerowlee. For it was evidently a mere reprieve. The Rajpoot States, great and small, having "recognised formally British supremacy," were *all* pronounced liable to extinction, on the first failure of a lineal male heir. It was declared advisable to neglect no opportunity of annexing native States, "unless strong political reasons recommend the exception in any particular case or cases." Thus *all* were denied any right of permanent existence; *all* were left dependent on the tender mercies of the British Government, and the political notions which might prevail when "a rightful opportunity" occurred. For the time being they were protected only by certain vague scruples, founded on their "antiquity, position, and feelings," which, mentioned by Lord Dalhousie with the greatest indifference, had been overcome by him on the first temptation.

Kerowlee, however, Lord Dalhousie admitted, was "isolated," and "would not consolidate our territories like Sat-tara."† The same might be said of the other States of Rajpootana, though, by the bye, we have a large Province, Ajmeer, in the very centre of them. But how long would this isolation continue, if the process of absorption were carried on among those "Mahratta and Mahomedan dynasties," which, according to Lord Dalhousie, had not even "the claims of antiquity in their favour"? If at any future "rightful opportunity," the dominions of Scindia, of Holkar, of the Powars of Dhar and Dewass, or of the Nawab of Tonk, scattered in detached portions, up and down Rajpootana, were to be "made to lapse," the more ancient

* *Kerowlee Papers*, 1855, p. 5.

† *Ibid.*, p. 9.

States would immediately be wanted, in order "to consolidate our territories."

In addition to these very obvious considerations, the Rajpoot Princes and their advisers could not fail to observe that between 1852, when Lord Dalhousie's Minute was written, and 1855, when the Papers were published, a great advance had been made in the process of consolidation. Jhansi, one of the few Principalities ruled by a Brahmin family, had been "caused to lapse," in spite of the regular adoption of a kinsman by the Rajah, and without consulting the Home Government. The great and important State of Nagpore was annexed, not only without any reference to the widows and other relatives of the Rajah, but, as in the case of Jhansi, without any reference to the Court of Directors, as if their concurrence was considered as a matter of certainty.* The annexation of the Kingdom of Oude, and dethronement of the reigning King, without war, without a quarrel, without a complaint, without any pretext that was intelligible or credible to the Hindoo mind, gave the finishing stroke to the new aspect of affairs. No Rajpoot Prince could now believe that there would ever be two years of suspense again, if any one of the brotherhood should die without male issue.

During the last two years of Lord Dalhousie's administration, and especially about the time of his departure from India, that portion of the Calcutta Press which represented the opinions of the Bengal Civil Service, resounded with exultations at the success of the acquisitive system, and assurances or predictions of its speedy and symmetrical completion.

On the 12th of January, 1854, when the fate of Nagpore was supposed to be under consideration, the *Friend of India* declared that "the decision of the Governor-General" would "decide whether the country which has been committed to our charge is ultimately to be fused into one great and progressive Empire, or to continue split into Principalities, in which two hundred and eighty Rajahlings exhaust the energies left them by debauchery in every species of oppression." The writer pronounces

* *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 37; *Jhansi Papers*, 1855, p. 5.

every Native State to be merely "an exceptional jurisdiction," as were the Palatinates of Lancaster and Chester. These Indian Palatinates have the additional disadvantage of being invariably ruled by a debauched despot, and must be got rid of as rapidly as possible. He refers to what he considers to have been the doubtful and timid action of our Government before 1848, but "at last," he says, "a policy was found," and is recorded in Lord Dalhousie's Minute on the Sattara succession. Under the doctrines there laid down, "the whole of India must pass gradually under our rule":—"we shall gain Province after Province." Alluding to the possibility of some opposition, he concludes thus:—"We cannot believe that Lord Dalhousie will yield one inch to the clamour of an ignorant section of the last of English political parties, or hesitate to maintain a policy which is at once great, righteous, and his own."

When the fate of Nagpore was no longer in suspense, the *Friend of India*, on the 16th of March, 1854, rejoices over the decision, because it settles "three great principles,—unity of dominion, equality of taxation, and centralisation of the executive." He explains what he means by unity of dominion. "The two hundred and fifty Kinglings, whose names and territories have been recorded by the Court of Directors, must inevitably disappear, and that speedily."

The same writer, on the 18th of May, 1854, remarks on the annexation of Jhansi, that "to change India from a congeries of States into an Empire one and indivisible, it is only necessary to maintain the policy which Lord Dalhousie has laid down. It must, however," he continues, "to be just, be *invariably* adhered to. The system must be rigidly enforced, till the Indian Palatinates become what the English Palatinates now are, evils whose extent is known only to the antiquary."

But this able editor rises to the highest degree of satisfaction on the 13th of December, 1855, when he quotes a recently published article from the *Edinburgh Review*, recommending the annexation of Oude, then on the eve of its accomplishment. With such powerful support the good work cannot stop there. "Oppression," he says, "will not be extinct with the monarchy of Oude." And he points

out, as the Princes whose misrule most urgently demands the abolition of their Principalities, the Rajah of Travancore, the Nizam of the Deccan, and the Guicowar of Baroda. The accession of "the great Whig Review" to the cause of Imperial consolidation, appears to the Editor, and justly so, most significant and important. The Whigs were then in power, and the *Edinburgh Review* had long been regarded as their organ. And if that fact, as is very probable, had never been understood or heard of before in Rajpootana, and at the Durbars of other native States, this hint in the *Friend of India*, everywhere anxiously consulted, is sure to have enlightened them, and never to have been lost sight of. The idea was by no means a novel one to Indian politicians, for the *Friend of India* itself was generally reputed, and flourished to some extent on that reputation, to be the organ of the Calcutta Foreign Office.

A time was to come, when the hint of the *Friend of India* was to be verified, and the alarm of the native Princes renewed and redoubled,—after a brief period of security,—by an Edinburgh Reviewer, the apologist and advocate of annexation, stepping forward and announcing himself to the world as a Whig Cabinet Minister, his Grace the Lord Privy Seal.

On the 3rd of January, 1856, referring to a Native State, which was then not badly managed, and is now one of the best governed Provinces in India, our own not excepted, the *Friend of India* said :—"Annexation is the only remedy for the great disorders of Travancore."

On the 24th of July, 1856, the same journal predicts, that "the knell of the Princes of India" has sounded ; and that "men now living may see the Empire one and indivisible."

Perhaps Sir Charles Jackson may now be disposed to confess that the Princes of Rajpootana, and other Princes of India whom he calls "independent," may have had some slight grounds for fear, without deserving to be reviled as "unreasonable."

The Duke of Argyll will, perhaps, now admit, that there really was "something which was called 'Lord Dalhousie's policy,'" by others besides those "fifth-rate writers," whose

injustice and ignorance of Blue Books he denounces. The previous extracts from the *Friend of India* prove that during Lord Dalhousie's administration, his admirers and supporters understood that there was a settled policy of annexation, and that this policy was emphatically Lord Dalhousie's—"his own."

Mr. J. C. Marshman, whose connection with the *Friend of India* still continues, and who was proprietor and Editor of that journal until 1854, coolly writes in 1867 of "the annexation policy, as it has been somewhat insidiously termed,"* as if it were a novel term of reproach, which he could not recognise at all.

The following passage, published in the *Friend of India* about three months after Lord Canning assumed the Government, may serve as another specimen of the triumphant tone that then prevailed, and may also remind the Duke of Argyll, Sir Charles Jackson, and Mr. Marshman, that the phrase, "policy of annexation," to which they now seem to object, was invented by its advocates and not by its adversaries.

"The policy of annexation may be considered secure. One by one its opponents are convinced, or otherwise confess by their silence, that they are logically defunct. The dreamers who feared that the Empire would be weakened by extension, and the Orientalists who believed native governments better than civilised rule, are already, for practical politics, extinct."†

Sir Henry Lawrence, at the time Lord Dalhousie left Calcutta, was the Governor-General's Agent in Rajpootana, where those doubts and fears existed, stigmatised by Sir Charles Jackson as utterly "unreasonable." Let us hear what he thought on the subject :—

"The Serampore weekly paper, the *Friend of India*, which was Lord Dalhousie's organ, and is conducted with great ability, is a perfect Filibuster. Almost every number contains a clever article on the duty of absorbing Native States, resuming jaghires, etc."‡

Nor is the effect of these citations to be neutralised by the averment, that, whatever may have been the alarms excited by rumours of a connection between the Govern-

* *History of India*, vol. iii, p. 399.

† *Friend of India*, June 6th, 1856.

‡ *Kaye's Lives of Indian Officers*, vol. ii, p. 311.

ment of India and a certain weekly paper, we have no right to make Lord Dalhousie answerable for its leading articles, or to assume that he approved of them. Lord Dalhousie himself took the very unusual step,—unprecedented, I believe, except by Sir Robert Peel's letter to the Editor of the *Times* in 1835,*—of informing the Editor of the *Friend of India*, that, to say the least, he had found nothing to disapprove in the doctrines taught by that journal in the last two years of his Government. The gentleman who, as he tells us, had conducted that paper, "single-handed," during the whole of that period, published in its columns on the 31st of December, 1857, the following interesting letter addressed to himself:—

Government House, March 3rd, 1856.

My dear Sir,

Before I quit this land I am desirous of offering you my thanks for the fairness with which you have always set your judgment of my public acts before the community, whose opinions are largely subject to your influence, for the frequent support you have given to my measures, and for the great and invariable personal courtesy you have shown to myself.

I regret exceedingly that while at Barrackpore I was so close a prisoner as to be unable to receive the guests whom I should have desired to see. On the one occasion on which I made the attempt I broke down, and was obliged to forego all further attempts of the same kind.

I should be glad if I thought there was any chance of my seeing you in Calcutta before the evening of the 6th, when I embark for England.

If not, I pray you to accept my parting thanks, and to believe that, if they have seemed tardy, they, nevertheless, are cordial and sincere. I beg to remain, my dear Sir,

Very truly yours,

Meredith Townsend, Esq.

DALHOUSIE.

The letter does honour both to the writer and to the recipient,—to Lord Dalhousie, because he deferred this graceful acknowledgment of his obligations to the *Friend of India*, until its support had become almost a matter of indifference to him, until the moment when his own power and influence were about to disappear,—to the Editor, because the contents of the letter prove the disinterested and public spirited character of his pernicious counsels.

* *Carlyle's Collected Works*, vol. i, p. 376.

Lord Dalhousie would certainly have tendered no such expressions of respectful thanks and greeting to a man whose labours on his behalf had already been requited, directly or indirectly, by the bestowal of favours, in any of the numerous forms at the Governor-General's command. The letter proves that not even the charm of "gilded saloons,"—supposed to have its influence in some regions of the globe, and peculiarly attractive in general at Calcutta to one not belonging to the official aristocracy,—can have fostered the singular community of thought and feeling between the two men. But the letter, and its publication, prove the existence of that strong sympathy, and its full appreciation on both sides, and explain, in some measure, how that sympathy still shows itself every now and then, by a few words of reminiscent eulogy or regretful comparison, in the writings currently attributed in the present day to the former Editor of the *Friend of India*.

So long as the friends and admirers of the late Lord Dalhousie, confine themselves to such general and passing panegyrics, it is not easy, nor would it often be useful or becoming, to challenge their effusions. But when, like the authors of the two apologies which have hitherto formed the chief theme of our remarks, they reiterate and reassert the worst of their client's political heresies,—even those recanted by his successor,—we can no longer remain silent. Some English politicians—perhaps the majority,—not deeply versed or interested in the details of Indian affairs, have arrived at a general conviction that the deliberate policy of annexation was a mistake, or was, at any rate, carried on too far and too hastily; but they have no clear notion of the legal merits of any particular case, and believe the more important territorial extensions to have been all but unavoidable. It is in order to assist this large class to form a more decided judgment, that I have given so much space to the annexations of Oude and the Punjab. With the same object in view, I must now make a few remarks on a more insidious, because less indiscriminate style of apologetics, much in use with those who have changed their opinions, but cannot submit to acknowledge that they ever were wrong, or that their

former opponents ever were right. They have, indeed, changed their opinions, but not, they flatter themselves, for the reasons so persistently urged upon them by their adversaries. Their former policy may have been partially erroneous, but it was a noble and a generous policy, and only failed from circumstances which nobody could have foreseen.

Thus a very acute and vigorous writer in the *Spectator* of October 6th, 1866, advises Lord Cranborne, then the Secretary of State for India, to arrest the annexation of Mysore, "though for reasons other than those upon which so much stress has been laid." He makes light of "Treaties, promises and Hindoo rules of succession," but doubts the prudence of closing every field to native ambition, and of "sowing distrust over an entire Continent," by "changing our policy every six years." He admits that the policy of annexation failed, but then Lord Dalhousie's projects were magnificent, and he was "the most statesmanlike Governor-General, except Lord William Bentinck, who ever reigned in India."

"He intended to make of the Continent one vast military monarchy, the right arm of England in Asia, ruling a rich and orderly people, who, slowly disciplined by British sway, slowly permeated by British education, and slowly, if possible, brought to perceive the superior claims of Christianity, might in the end be ready for self-government as a thoroughly civilised and progressive Asiatic people. If that was a small policy, where there a great one to be found? It failed, first, because Lord Dalhousie retired; secondly, because it lacked one essential datum—the acquiescence of Northern India; and thirdly, because it had one radical, and, we fear incurable defect. It barred up native careers."

It may be admitted that this *sounds* like a great policy, but as the writer confesses that it was impracticable, unacceptable to the people, and crushing to all honourable aspirations, I cannot understand why it is to be called statesmanlike. To suggest that it failed, "because Lord Dalhousie retired," is a mere bravado of posthumous adulation. The policy of annexation broke down conspicuously amidst the awful lessons of 1857,—most conspicuously when the bulk of the population of Oude joined heart and soul in the rebellion. Lord Dalhousie could

have done nothing to check or quell the rebellion, that Lord Canning omitted. But let the writer in the *Spectator* himself tell us what he conceives to have been the great lessons of 1857.

"The mutiny did teach us that the natives prefer their own system of government, with its open careers and occasional injustices, light taxation, and frequent robberies, to our more orderly, more rigid, but leaden rule; that it was dangerous to produce so awful a scene as a Continent occupied only by officials and peasants; that the Native Principalities acted as breakwaters when a surge of native feeling—we will say, at the risk of being misunderstood, of national feeling—threatened to overwhelm the foreigners. Madras was saved by the Nizam. Bombay was saved because Gwalior broke the rush of the wave which had the able coward, Tantia Topce, on its crest. The Punjab was saved because the old Sikh Princes of the Protected States stood honestly by our side."

How could a more severe condemnation be passed upon the policy of "getting rid of petty intervening Principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never," Lord Dalhousie ventured to think, "be a source of strength"?* Yet the Editor of the *Spectator* wants us to confess that this was not "a small policy," but "great" and "statesmanlike." I cannot agree with him; and he evidently cannot agree with himself.

As to the alleged intention of "slowly disciplining" the people of India "for self-government," the Editor of the *Spectator* may have exclusive sources of information regarding Lord Dalhousie's esoteric doctrines and ulterior designs, but assuredly nothing of the sort can be gathered from his published Minutes. There is a great deal said about "adding to the resources of the public treasury," about swelling the revenues of the annexed countries by confiscating the estates of all malcontents, but nothing about visions of "self-government," even in the most distant future. When Sattara was to be annexed, he said:—"The district is fertile, and the revenues productive. The population, accustomed for some time to regular and peaceful government,"—the Rajah's, be it remembered,— "are tranquil themselves, and are prepared for the regular government" (which by his own account

* *Ante*, p 184.

they had got already), "our possession of the territory would give."* On two occasions, when Nagpore was to be annexed, and when the Nizam's richest provinces were to be sequestered, the Governor-General boasted, as Sir Charles Jackson reminds us,† of having acquired the best cotton-growing districts in India; and thus, said Mr. J. B. Norton, "cotton stultified the ears of Justice, and made her deaf as well as blind."‡ But there was not a word of "self-government," or "progressive civilisation," or "the superior claims of Christianity." Those fine words would not have made the policy more just or more statesmanlike, but still they were not there.

This clever writer, unable to reduce his old and his new opinions to harmony, at once repentant and reprobate, tries to give up the practice and maintain the principle,—to exalt the theory and cry down the conclusion,—to abandon the policy of annexation as inexpedient for the time, but to leave the question open for the future. He seems to make a great point of having no decided policy for the treatment of Native States in India at present; he considers that since the failure of the great and statesmanlike policy of annexation, we have drifted into a period of transition and experiment, and he only dreads lest the experiments should be varied too often. He objects to the rejection of the Mysore Rajah's adopted son, because the Princes and people of India understood from the terms of the Royal Proclamation of 1858, that adopted heirs would always be recognised. And, he asks :—"Is it wise or right, for the sake of one Province, to abandon so suddenly in so apparently crafty a style, a policy meant for an Empire?" Still he anticipates the possibility that it may be abandoned.

"It may be necessary one day to unsettle it, the new policy may fail, as the old one failed, a third policy of appointing picked native rulers for life may prove wiser than either, but till we resolve, and announce that we resolve, that the mixed system shall end, let us at least adhere to it."

He cannot make up his mind to acknowledge, that the policy of annexation is either unjust, or absolutely inex-

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83.

† *A Vindication*, p. 40.

‡ *The Rebellion in India*, p. 98.

pedient. In discussing whether Mysore shall or shall not be annexed, he says, that "the single point at issue is whether the existence of subordinate hereditary jurisdictions is beneficial to all India or not. That is a very difficult and, with all deference to the very able Indians who signed the petition presented by Mr. Mill,* by no means a settled point." He still doubts whether autonomy should be allowed to any Native State, except on condition of its paying what he calls "a fair tribute." "In the case of a State not paying a fair tribute, autonomy is injustice, for the people of Bengal are taxed to exempt the people, say of Guzerat." With blind persistence in the errors of Lord Dalhousie and Mr. George Campbell, he still hankers after the revenue belonging to Native States, and thinks that with it the British treasury might be replenished. He is strangely ignorant, or unmindful, of the actual results of that acquisitive policy, which in one breath he admits to have failed, and in another declares to have been great and statesmanlike. Instead of the resources of the public treasury being augmented, as Lord Dalhousie promised, a monstrous tribute is annually extracted from our older possessions, and poured into the recently-annexed Provinces. The people of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, are taxed to supply the financial drain of the Punjaub, Oude and Nagpore, and not to meet any expenditure created by Native States. "The Bengalees, being our subjects," says the Editor of the *Spectator*, "are taxed for the general defence of the Empire, while the Guzerattees are not."† That is an extraordinary assertion for one who believes that in our most desperate hour of need "the Nizam saved Madras," the Maharajah Scindia saved Bombay; that the Punjaub was saved by the old Sikh Princes; that "a signal from the Rajah of Mysore would have brought the descendants of Tippoo's soldiers down upon Madras, and he did not give it; and that the despised Nawab of Moorshedabad could have imperilled our possession of Cal-

* Petition to the House of Commons, presented by J. S. Mill, Esq., M.P. for Westminster, on August 10th, 1866.

† As a matter of fact, the Guzerattees pay a good deal of direct tribute to the British Government, but that is an immaterial inaccuracy, for many Native States do not, and he might, with a little more care, have chosen one of them for his illustration.

cutta." Were not the "subordinate hereditary jurisdictions beneficial to all India" then? Did they not then contribute to the "general defence of the Empire"? Are they not contributing now, so long as they keep themselves prepared to render similar services, if ever rebellion, internal war or foreign invasion, should again, in the *Editor's* words, "threaten to overwhelm the foreigners with a surge of national feeling"?

The Editor of the *Spectator*,—clearly identified with the former "single-handed" Editor of the *Friend of India*,—affords a good example of the truth of the following words written on the 20th of December, 1857, by the venerable Mountstuart Elphinstone to Sir Edward Colebrook:—"I think the ardour for the consolidation of territory, concentration of authority, and uniformity of administration, which was lately so powerful, must have been a good deal damped by recent events. Where should we have been now, if Scindia, the Nizam and the Sikh Chiefs, had been annexed?"*

His ardour has been damped. The loudest spokesman during the annexing mania gives up the policy as a failure, but he cannot bear to admit that it deserved to be a failure,—that it was not only a violent injustice, but that it was mean, petty and short-sighted.

The most seriously objectionable feature in this, as in other essays by the same hand, is not so much the effort to make the policy of annexation appear great and statesmanlike, as the persistent assumption that it was just. The Queen, according to him, is "the only true Sovereign" in India. The Native States are merely "subordinate hereditary jurisdictions."

"If, therefore, the general welfare of India required that Mysore should be directly administered by her"—the Queen's,— "agents, no right whatever could be pleaded in bar of that supreme necessity, any more than the right of the Highland Chiefs to hereditary jurisdiction could be pleaded against an Act taking it away from them."

What would be "pleaded in bar" of the arbitrary annexation of Mysore, or any other Native State, in time of peace, would be "a Treaty of perpetual friendship and al-

* *Asiatic Journal*, vol. xviii, p. 334.

liance;" and that is considerably "more" than can ever have been pleaded in favour of any Highland Chieftain's heritable jurisdiction. The proposed analogy is absurd. He goes on :—

"The natives have never denied this, never questioned the right of the Mogul to remove any Mohammedan Ruler or invade a Hindoo State, if considerations of general policy required it,—lay down in fact as a general principle that a Sovereign must be expected to increase his direct dominion by all fair means, one of which, they add, is force."

If by this he means to say, that the natives of India have never questioned the right of a Sovereign to carry on a war of conquest, it is true. But if he means to say, that the Mogul ever possessed the unquestioned right of removing any Ruler in India, Mohammedan or Hindoo, except his own appointed Deputies, or ever pretended to the right of restricting the law of inheritance in Hindoo Principalities, it is utterly untrue, and without the smallest foundation. He brings forward "the doctrine of lapse" once more, as if it were intact.

"The annexation of Mysore may be, in our judgment is, perfectly legal, but it appears to every Native Prince, and therefore to every native, an unfair, underhanded attempt to cancel the Golden Bull. Whether the Rajah of Mysore had a right to adopt or not, without the consent of the Paramount Power, does not signify a straw; we do not believe that he had, but we readily acknowledge that to prove he had not, Lord Craunborne must quote Mussulman precedents directed against Hindoo Houses."

That which he "readily acknowledges" is totally incorrect. There are *no* "Mussulman precedents" for the pretended prerogative of rejecting adopted heirs. There was *no* precedent at all, until, as Sir George Clerk said, Lord Dalhousie's Government "led off with that flagrant instance of the bare-faced appropriation of Sattara."*

The other analogy which this writer attempts to draw,—between the absorption of Mysore, or any other Native State, in British India, and the extinction of Hanover, as a separate State, by Prussia,—though not so ridiculously disproportionate in *scale* as that of the Highland Chieftainships, is totally inadmissible. He says :—

* *Ante*, pp. 9 to 20

“The analogy is not perfect, for in India the Queen possesses a special and admitted right in every Native State which the King of Prussia did not possess in Germany, namely, a right to control all foreign affairs, and to appoint an Envoy whose ‘advice must be followed on every occasion,’ great and small. She is, in fact, the only true Sovereign.”

In many Native States the British Resident has no right to interfere in internal affairs. This inaccuracy, however, may be passed over, for substantially the irresistible influence of our Government is not much overstated. But a very little reflection will convince any one, that the more stringent is the controlling power over the minor States, the less excuse, morally, the less reason, practically, must there be for destroying their separate existence. The treaties which secure certain cessions of territory, tribute and supremacy, to the British Government, secure also certain equivalent services and reserved rights to the protected Sovereignities,—among which, surely, permanent existence must be presumed, were it not expressed clearly enough in the terms “perpetual friendship and alliance.” And if they can be controlled, they can be reformed.

If a treaty between Prussia and Hanover had secured to the great German Power the right to control all foreign affairs,—as in the new treaties of the Northern Confederation,—and if Hanover had scrupulously remained within the scope of this engagement, as the Native States of India have always done, the King of Prussia would have had no right, according to any doctrine or process hitherto devised at Berlin, to abolish the separate Sovereignty. We need not enter upon the merits of the quarrel; suffice it to say, that Hanover was undoubtedly *conquered* in a war with Prussia. Without fighting for it, the King of Prussia would have had no pretext for annexing Hanover. Without popular support in Germany, he would have had no power to do so.

The last words at once suggest the utter inappropriateness of the comparison. We did not fight for Oude, Nagpore, Jhansi, or Sattara. We did not obtain those territories by conquest, but by prevarication, backed by force. The abolition of those separate States was called for by no popular want or complaint, was sanctioned by no popular

approval. The forty millions of Germans speak one language. The hundred and eighty millions of India, diverse in race and creed, speak upwards of twenty distinct languages. There was no national movement for unity in India. The impulse of the annexation policy came from the English professional administrators, instigated by the pride of race, and the lust of patronage and promotion. It is true, in a certain sense, that Lord Dalhousie, as Sir Charles Jackson says, did not "invent," or "originate" that policy. He was, unwittingly, the tool of "the Services." The *Friend of India* was their mouthpiece.

To that extent, a very good case might be made out in Lord Dalhousie's exculpation, from the purely official point of view, if once the misleading and mischievous attempts to exalt him into a great statesman were dropped. But the apologists are not satisfied to argue that much light has been thrown upon the controversy within the last ten years,—that above all the rebellion of 1857 was a political revelation,—they are not content to plead that Lord Dalhousie seemed to have good grounds for his erroneous doctrines at the time, that he was supported by the general opinion and feeling of his advisers and subordinates. They acknowledge no error or excess. They do not palliate, they extol, both the policy and the process, both in the past and for the future.

If this were nothing more than a question of historical glory,—if Lord Dalhousie's political canonisation were merely a matter of sentimental interest,—no one would care to play the part of Devil's Advocate. But by this time it has been made sufficiently manifest, that the pretensions and principles we denounce, are by no means extinct, and are explicitly reaffirmed by the vindicators of Lord Dalhousie's reputation. The Duke of Argyll in some degree represents a powerful class of politicians, and his name carries great weight. Sir Charles Jackson's pamphlet was well calculated to produce a considerable effect on current English opinion. The *Spectator* has deservedly won an influential position among the more cultivated Liberals. The study of Indian affairs is very unattractive, and a feeling of national self-reproach is very unpleasant;

so that to be told, firstly, in a Review of recognised authority, like the *Edinburgh*; secondly, by his Grace the Lord Privy Seal in person; thirdly, by a retired Indian judge so much respected as Sir Charles Jackson, and, occasionally, by a journal of high character, like the *Spectator*, that we have never been to blame at all ; that if our policy has failed, it was yet a great and statesmanlike policy, and deserved to succeed, is eminently soothing and satisfactory to most people.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE TEST OF PREVISION.

THE Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson in their pamphlets, and Mr. J. C. Marshman in his History, all protest against any charge of want of foresight being brought against Lord Dalhousie, for not having provided against such a convulsion as the Mutinies of 1857, and for having allowed the more important posts in Northern India to be denuded of European troops. All three go very far in their protestations.

The Duke of Argyll declares that the native Army "had never been regarded in connection with even the possibility of a contest of race against race," and that "no such thoughts had ever entered into the minds of Indian statesmen or of Indian soldiers."* This, as I shall prove, is a very great mistake.

Mr. Marshman's views can hardly be reconciled with those last quoted. He says, that "the repeated acts of insubordination by the Sepoys convinced Lord Dalhousie that the native Army was no longer to be depended on."† It may be so: the former Editor of "Lord Dalhousie's organ," may have better materials for judging than are generally available; but nothing to that effect is to be seen in any of Lord Dalhousie's published Minutes or despatches.

Sir Charles Jackson says that "fifteen months before the Mutiny began," Lord Dalhousie had protested against the reduction of the European force which took place in his time, and had recommended "a very considerable increase to that force, as well as a large reduction of the native Army."‡ I have no correction to offer to Sir Charles Jackson's statement, except one of *degree*. For "a very considerable increase" of the European force, I should sub-

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 51.

† *History of India*, vol. iii, p. 448.

‡ *A Vindication*, p. 158.

stitute, "a very moderate increase." For "a very large reduction of the native Army," I should substitute "a very small reduction."

From the accounts given by the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson, we find that Lord Dalhousie, about a month before he left India, proposed to raise the nominal Indian establishment of European Infantry from thirty-three to thirty-five battalions, and to disband about 14,000 Sepoys, out of a native army numbering 233,000 men.*

These seem to have been the most remarkable suggestions contained in the "nine Minutes" on military affairs, produced by Lord Dalhousie on the 28th of February, 1856, the last day he presided in Council. The contents of these Minutes, as described by Mr. Marshman and Sir Charles Jackson, afford proof positive that Lord Dalhousie was totally blind to the real dangers of the day,—the results of his own policy.

He brought forward certain plans for modifying the organisation of the army; he recommended a trifling addition to the European force, to bring it up to its former standard, but merely on grounds of general efficiency. He had not the least notion of the increased military strain arising from the newly annexed territories. So little did any such anxiety cross his mind, that in the most important of these nine Minutes, (No. 2) he assigns European troops to specified places, and assigns *none* to Oude, though European troops were actually there at the time, to support the Resident in carrying out the annexation, then in process of execution. Sir Charles Jackson thinks this Minute was written some time before its date, and that "if Lord Dalhousie had adverted to the approaching annexation of Oude when he signed the Minute, he *would* have altered his suggestion" (of adding two European battalions to the Bengal establishment,) "into a positive demand for a still greater increase."† This is a perfectly gratuitous supposition, and I see no reason whatever for acceding to it. The fact of no permanent force of European troops being allotted to Oude long after the annexation had been

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, pp. 51 to 63; *A Vindication*, pp. 158 to 167; *Marshman's History*, vol. iii, pp. 448, 450..

† *A Vindication*, pp. 164, 165.

arranged and was in progress, proves that Lord Dalhousie considered that territorial acquisition to have imposed no additional military burden upon the Empire. We have every reason, in fact, to assume that he thought the annexation of Oude, as he had said of the annexation of Nagpore and Sattara, would "consolidate our military strength," and "absorb a separate military Power."* He really believed that he could take into our direct administration these new Provinces, covering two hundred thousand square miles of territory, with twenty-five millions of inhabitants, without the services of one additional soldier being required. He was enabled to keep up the temporary and superficial appearance of not having entailed a heavy burden on the Imperial resources, solely by not calling for a proper augmentation of European troops to occupy the new Provinces, and by the whole charge of the Regular troops in the Punjaub being laid on the revenues of Bengal. Had he demanded a reinforcement of 15,000 British soldiers for the Punjaub, Nagpore, and Oude, had the Punjaub accounts not been cooked, the expence would have opened all eyes to the ruinous nature of his policy.

He did not insist upon any reinforcement as a precaution that was urgently and imperatively required, nor did he allude to the extended area of the Empire as having rendered any augmentation necessary. He really asked for no augmentation at all, over and above the number of European soldiers that were in India before the annexations of Nagpore and Oude. He only asked for the return of four Battalions that had been sent to the Crimea and to Persia. The Duke of Argyll tells us that "the urgent necessities of the Russian war had compelled the Government at home to diminish sensibly the number of European Regiments in India,"† so that "the total number of European troops had suffered a gradual diminution from 48,709, at which they stood in 1852, to 45,322, at which they stood when Lord Dalhousie closed his government in India."‡ Thus the four Battalions required to complete the establishment which Lord Dalhousie considered to be essential, would merely have brought up the number of

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83; *Rajah of Berar, Papers*, 1854, pp. 35, 36.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 61.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

British soldiers to what it was in 1852. Indeed all Lord Dalhousie's remonstrances in his Minute of the 5th February 1856, were directly against "the withdrawal of European troops from India to Europe and Persia." The Duke of Argyll acknowledges this very clearly :—

"Lord Dalhousie saw with regret the necessity for a temporary reduction of the European Force ; but the risk which was actually incurred thereby was not the risk against which he had it in his mind to guard. There was not, indeed, any danger which he considered imminent."*

The apologists are not quite in accordance among themselves. The Duke of Argyll says that in remonstrating against a reduction of the British troops, Lord Dalhousie was guarding against no "danger which he considered imminent." Mr. Marshman, perhaps from better sources of information, assures us that "the repeated acts of insubordination had convinced him that the native Army was no longer to be depended on."† The Duke not only denies that Lord Dalhousie felt any anxiety as to the fidelity and obedience of the Sepoys, but roundly asserts that no fear on the subject had ever been expressed by any one.

"No such thought ever entered into the minds of Indian statesmen, or of Indian soldiers. They knew that without the Native Army our Empire never could have been acquired, and they knew, too, that without it that Empire could not be maintained for a single year. To doubt its fidelity would have been to doubt our own powers of rule.

"It is not surprising, therefore, that we look in vain for any symptom of a fear which would have gone so deep and would have implied so much."‡

If the Duke never looked beyond his infallible Blue Books for information, he may well have "looked in vain"; many "thoughts" and "symptoms" may well have escaped his inquiry. He certainly would "look in vain" among the self-glorifying despatches and Reports of the annexing period, for any "doubt" or "fear" as to the good-will of the native troops, or the content of the newly acquired Provinces. But if he had extended his reading a little, he

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 61.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 51.

‡ *History*, vol. iii, p. 448.

might have found the "symptoms" of which he was in search, not only in the writings of the most eminent Indian soldiers and statesmen, from Warren Hastings downwards, but in books and pamphlets, written during Lord Dalhousie's Government, and expressly connecting the danger of military revolt with the policy of annexation and resumption.

Sir Thomas Munro wrote as follows :—

"Even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike neighbours to combat, would gradually lose its military habits and discipline, *and that the native troops would have leisure to feel their own strength, and for want of other employment, to turn it against their European masters.*

"We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the protection they have received, or attachment to our mild government, would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us *in a struggle with the native army.*"*

Here is the opinion pronounced in 1832 by Sir Henry Russell, for many years Resident at Hyderabad :—

"A well conducted rebellion of our native subjects, or *an extensive disaffection of our native troops*, is the event by which our power is most likely to be shaken ; *and the sphere of this danger is necessarily enlarged by every enlargement of our territory. The increase of our subjects, and still more of our native troops, is an increase not of our strength, but of our weakness.*"

Lord Metcalfe, after speaking of "the disaffection dormant, but rooted universally among our subjects," says :—

"It may be observed that the tried services and devotion of our native Army furnish a proof to the contrary of the preceding assertion. Our native Army is certainly a phenomenon, *the more so as there is no heart-felt attachment to our Government on the part of our native troops.*

"We can retain our dominion only by a large military establishment ; *and without a considerable force of British troops the fidelity of our native Army could not be relied on.*

"Our danger does not lie in the military force alone of Native States, *but in the spirit by which they are actuated towards us ; and still more in the spirit of our subjects, from one end of India to the other.*"†

* *Gleig's Life of Sir T. Munro*, vol. ii, p. 33.

† *Selections from Lord Metcalfe's Papers*, (1855) p. 144.

The Sepoys were our subjects, and to a great extent representative men among them, and they were peculiarly exposed to be personally taunted in places of public resort, with being accomplices in the destruction of all the historical dignities and ancient institutions, which every native with a spark of honour and national pride, was bound to admire, to love, and to respect. Let us hear what Sir Henry Lawrence said on that subject, after the annexation of Oude, but before the outbreak of the rebellion ;—

“The Sepoy is not the man of consequence he was. He dislikes annexations,—among other reasons, because each new province added to the Empire widens his sphere of service, and at the same time decreases our foreign enemies, and thereby the Sepoy’s importance. The other day an Oude Sepoy of the Bombay Cavalry at Neemuch, being asked if he liked annexation, replied : ‘No. I used to be a great man when I went home ; the best in the village rose as I approached ; now the lowest puff their pipes in my face.’”*

General Briggs, in 1849, when the annexation of Sattara, the first in Lord Dalhousie’s series, had just taken place, warned the advocates of consolidation that if they did away with “the right of adoption, with respect to the Princes of India, they would tread on delicate ground.” No one would believe that they were going to confine the process to sovereignties.

“If you are to do away with the right of individuals to adopt, you will shake the faith of the people of India ; you will influence that opinion which has hitherto maintained you in your power ; and that influence will thrill through your army ; and you will find some day, as Lord Metcalfe more than once said, ‘we shall rise some morning, and hear of a conflagration through the whole Empire of India, such as a few Europeans amongst millions will not be able to extinguish.’ Your army is derived from the peasantry of the country, who have rights, and if those rights are infringed upon, you will no longer have to depend on the fidelity of that army. You have a native army of 250,000 men to support your power, and it is on the fidelity of that army your power rests. But you may rely on it, if you infringe the institutions of the people of India, that army will sympathise with them, for they are a part of the population ; and in every infringement you make upon the rights of individuals, you infringe upon the rights of men, who

* *Kaye’s Lives of Indian Officers*, vol. ii, p. 320.

are either themselves in the army, or upon their sons, their fathers, or their relatives. Let the fidelity of your army be shaken, and your power is gone."

When the proposed annexation of Kerowlee was under consideration in 1853, Mr. John Sullivan, formerly a Member of Council at Madras, wrote as follows :—

"We must remember that in order to keep India at all, we are obliged to hold it by a strong military grasp ; that our chief military instrument is the Sepoy ; and that a very large portion of the Bengal and Bombay armies are Rajpoots, whose feelings of clanship are as strong as those of Highlanders, and who still retain a lively recollection of the ancient grandeur of their race. *If we sap the foundation of our rule by acts of injustice to the Rajpoot Princes, we shall surely awaken a sympathy for them in the hearts of the native army ;* and the greatest of Indian authorities has told us what the consequence will be, whenever our native army is roused to a sense of its own strength."*

The following extracts are taken from *India, its Government under a Bureaucracy*, a pamphlet by Mr. John Dickinson, published in 1853, before the annexations of Nagpore and Jhansi, and when the question of confiscating Kerowlee, which would have been the first encroachment on Rajpootana, was yet undecided.

"There are many signs and warnings in India at this moment, and if the present system is allowed to go on, it will soon expose our Empire to a greater peril than it has ever yet encountered (p. 8.)

"The present system is not only ruining and degrading the natives of India, but is bringing our Empire into a more critical situation every day. (p. 27.)

"The natives seem what they know we expect them to appear ; we do not see their real feelings : we know not how hot the stove may be under its polished surface. For the fire is not out ; *we are obliged to keep it up by our native army, which may blaze into a conflagration and burn the Empire. There may be some conspiracy, of which, as at Vellore, we have not even a suspicion, until the native Regiments open their fire on our barracks : and, as a merchant who is obliged to throw all his treasure overboard to save the ship, a storm may arise in India which will cost us more to maintain our power, than all we have gained, or can ever hope to gain, by our confiscations.* (p. 166.)

"Would not a violation of religion and the rights of property,

* *Are we bound by our Treaties ? A Plea for the Princes of India*, (Effingham Wilson, London,) 1853, p. 70.

which lit a flame of insurrection in Rajpootana, *and sent over three-fourths of our Bengal Sepoys to the enemy*, instantly paralyse the right arm of England?" (p. 177.)

This warning was plain enough. It may, perhaps, be objected that Lord Dalhousie could not be expected to listen to every volunteer adviser in England. I shall show, therefore, that, besides Sir Henry Lawrence, whose opinions were no secret, there were others in constant official communication with him in India, who uttered the same warnings, and urged the same remonstrances.

General Sir William Sleeman wrote in these terms to Sir James Weir Hogg,—very fruitlessly, for that gentleman was Lord Dalhousie's strongest supporter in the Court of Directors,—on the 12th of January, 1853 :—"The Native States I consider to be breakwaters, and when they are all swept away, *we shall be left to the mercy of our native army, which may not always be sufficiently under our control.*"*

The following passage is taken from a letter addressed by Sir William Sleeman to Lord Dalhousie himself, on the 10th of April, 1852 :—

"In September 1818, I took the liberty to mention to your Lordship my fears that the system of annexing and absorbing Native States,—so popular with our Indian service, and so much advocated by a certain class of writers in public journals,—*might some day render us too visibly dependent upon our native army; that they might see it, and accidents might occur to unite them, or too great a portion of them, in some desperate act.*"†

Some of these expressions of opinion, especially those of General Briggs,—remarkable for its calm sagacity,—Sir William Sleeman, and Mr. John Dickinson, seem to me to approach as closely to the character of prophetic warnings, as has ever occurred, or can be expected to occur, in the efforts of human intellect.

What becomes now of the Duke of Argyll's very confident and very extravagant assertions, that "no Indian statesman or soldier" ever entertained a doubt of the fidelity of the native army; that "no such thought ever entered into their minds;" and that "we may look in vain for any symptoms of such fear"?

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. ii, p. 392.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 362.

"Looking back," says the Duke of Argyll, "as we now do, upon the years of Lord Dalhousie's rule through the light of subsequent events, we naturally search for anything in the transactions of the time which can have had any bearing on the condition of the Native Army." "It cannot be said that during those years any new influence was brought to bear upon it."*

If the Duke will "search" in those same passages in which I have just shown him the "symptoms" of that fear, for which he had "looked in vain," he will also find what "new influences" were "brought to bear" upon the native Army during "the years of Lord Dalhousie's rule." There was something "in the transactions of that time," that made the native troops, in the words of Sir Thomas Munro, "feel their own strength,"—that altered, to use the words of Lord Metcalfe, "the spirit by which the native States," and, therefore, "our subjects, from one end of India to the other, were actuated towards us." It was "Annexation," which Sir Henry Lawrence tells us, "the Sepoys disliked," and which Sir Henry Russell had warned us, would prove "an increase not of our strength, but of our weakness." When the adopted heirs of Hindoo Princes were repeatedly rejected, "the faith of the people of India," as General Briggs predicted, "was shaken," and "that influence thrilled through the army,"—when the most sacred rights of the Native Sovereigns were "infringed," we could "no longer depend upon the fidelity of the army;"—when "the institutions of the people of India" were "infringed," to the detriment of the greatest families, "the Army sympathised with them," for they too had families, and many of them had lands. When, in the words of Mr. Dickinson, "a violation of religion and the rights of property," had been systematically carried on for some years against our faithful and submissive Allies, the native troops could no longer trust that the religion and property of our subjects would be respected; and on the first occasion of their suspicions being roused, "the native Army blazed into a conflagration," and "three-fourths of the Bengal Sepoys" became our enemies.

Such was "the new influence" that was "brought to

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, pp. 49, 50.

bear" upon the native Army during "the years of Lord Dalhousie's rule," and were it not for the Duke of Argyll's personal responsibility in the worst "transactions of that time," he would have learned the lesson without any assistance.

The Duke talks about "looking back through the light of subsequent events," and about "every fifth-rate writer having his say," during the agony of the Great Indian Mutiny, "against something which he called 'Lord Dalhousie's policy'." Let me remind him, and the other apologists and eulogists, who all raise a similar cry, that I have now not only displayed what was really called "Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation" by his Lordship's friends and supporters, but have shown that some, at least, of "the fifth-rate writers," whose "ignorant injustice" is denounced by his Grace, did not wait for "the Great Indian Mutiny" to condemn that policy, and cannot now be accused of judging it "by the light of subsequent events."

That light, however, can enable any one now to see, that there was more statesmanlike foresight and moral dignity, and a higher sense of national honour, in the grave censures and gloomy forebodings of General Briggs and Mr. John Dickinson, than in the shallow exultation of the retiring Governor-General, who boasted that "in eight years, four Kingdoms,"—besides "various Chiefships and separate tracts,"—"had been placed under the sceptre of the Queen of England," that he had added "four millions sterling to the annual income of the Indian Empire," and that he should leave it in peace, "without and within."*

It is not enough to say that Lord Dalhousie manifested no statesmanlike foresight. All his most confident promises were contradicted and falsified in the most unequivocal and conclusive manner, within fifteen months after his departure from India. His financial anticipations had already been sufficiently refuted, for those who could form an impartial judgment, by the evident results of his policy before his departure.

In opening the series of annexations in 1848 with that of Sattara, Lord Dalhousie declared that "by taking pos-

* *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, February 28th, 1856, Reviewing his Administration, (paragraphs 11, 12, 19.) p. 7.*

session of Native States," under the doctrine of lapse, he would "add to the resources of the public treasury."* When about to relinquish the reins of government, he boasted of having added "four millions sterling to the annual revenue of the Empire." But what is the true picture? "We were not prepared," the Court of Directors wrote to him in 1852, "to find that the annexation of Sattara would prove a drain on the general revenues of India." In the eight years of Lord Dalhousie's administration he added £8,354,000 to the public debt: in the three last of these years there was a heavy deficit, amounting in 1853-4, though India was at peace, to £2,044,000, and in 1854-5 to £1,850,000.† In his flourishing financial summary Lord Dalhousie only gave the gross receipts of his territorial acquisitions, and said nothing at all about the expenditure. He even included in this alleged addition to the revenue of the Empire, £500,000 from the Assigned Districts of Hyderabad, administered in trust for the Nizam,‡ not one penny of which could fall into the British Treasury.

He declared that "petty intervening Principalities" might be made "a means of annoyance," but could "never be a source of strength," and that by "getting rid of them" we should "acquire continuity of military communication," and "combine our military strength."§ The time of trial soon came, and it was then found that one great source of strength lay in those "petty intervening Principalities," which not only gave us no "annoyance," but afforded the most serviceable aid in men, money, and moral influence, so that one of Lord Dalhousie's former thick-and-thin partisans is now compelled to admit that "Madras was saved by the Nizam," "Bombay by Maharajah Scindia," and "the Punjaub by the old Sikh Princes."||

On the other hand, instead of our military strength being combined or consolidated, it was so scattered and dispersed, as a direct result of Lord Dalhousie's policy, that the great strategic and political centres of Delhi, Bareilly and Cawn-

* *Ante*, p. 184.

† *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie*, 1856, para. 23, p. 8. *The Rebellion in India*, by John Bruce Norton, pp. 162, 167.

‡ *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie*, 1156, para. 19, (note) p. 7.

§ *Ante*, p. 184. *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83.

|| *Ante*, p. 203.

pore, fell into the hands of the rebels almost without a struggle; the small forces at Lucknow and Agra were beleaguered; and Allahabad and Benares were barely saved in time.

There was not a single British soldier in the Kingdom of Oude from 1846 to 1856, when it was annexed, including the period of our Sutlej and Punjaub wars, when every man was urgently required. We have now in Oude one Regiment of Dragoons, seven Batteries of Artillery, and four Battalions of Foot, at an annual cost of about £600,000, or nearly half the revenue of the Province, without counting the native troops. This is the way we "have consolidated our military strength," and "added to the resources of the public treasury."

During the great rebellion, the immediate offspring of Lord Dalhousie's injustice and imprudence, which broke out with the mutiny of the Bengal Sepoys in 1857, and was not finally suppressed till 1859, it became necessary to augment the British forces in India to the enormous number of 122,000 men; of whom 35,000 disappeared entirely from the muster-rolls in those three years, having either died or been discharged from wounds or ruined constitutions; and during the same three years upwards of forty millions sterling were added to the public debt of India. Thus did Lord Dalhousie's policy "consolidate our military strength," and "add to the resources of the public treasury."

In 1848 Lord Dalhousie said:—"The assumption of the Raj" (of Sattara) "will cause no ferment or discontent among other Native Powers."* In 1854 he was told in Council by Sir John Low, speaking from his own personal knowledge and experience, that "the confidence of our Native Allies was a good deal shaken by the annexation of Sattara," and that it had roused feelings of "dread and discontent."† Sir Frederick Currie, also, has recently stated,—and he must have said the same thing to Lord Dalhousie when the Kerowlee case was before the Supreme Council, that "The decision in the Sattara case, whatever

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 82.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, pp. 42, 43.

its merits may be, undoubtedly caused surprise and alarm throughout the length and breadth of India.”*

Mr. Mansel, the Resident at Nagpore, in his despatch of the 14th of December, 1853, quoted by Lord Dalhousie himself, said :—“The subject of adoption has been one of much interest and anxiety to the Court people, *especially since the close of the Sattarah discussions.*”†

The prevalence of discontent and dread among the Native Princes, contrary to Lord Dalhousie’s expectations, is thus confirmed by Lord Canning, in his very cautiously worded Adoption despatch of 1860 (paragraph 2) :—“There appears to be a haze of doubt and mistrust in the mind of each Chief as to the policy which the Government will apply to his own State in the event of his leaving no natural heir to his throne, and each seemed to feel, not without reason, that in such case the ultimate fate of his country is uncertain.” Such was the political effect of Lord Dalhousie’s policy of annexation.

He asserted, in the Farewell Minute reviewing his own measures, that the extinction of the Nagpore Principality “was hailed with lively satisfaction by the whole population of the Province.”‡ He greeted Lord Canning on his arrival at Calcutta with the telegraphic message, “All is well in Oude !”§

And Sir Charles Jackson puts it to us, as an unanswerable question, if we suppose the annexations to have caused general discontent, and to have been “a principal cause of the rebellion,”—

“How was it that Nagpore and Sattarah remained faithful to our rule? Surely the inhabitants of Sattarah had as much cause of complaint as those of Jhansi, and Nagpore as Sumbulpore, and yet during the rebellion neither Nagpore nor Sattarah joined the insurgents. It was no fear of British troops that caused the difference, for the European Regiment had long been withdrawn from Nagpore, and Sattarah never had such a garrison.”||

Before proceeding further, let us first put Sir Charles Jackson’s facts right a little. It is true that there was no Regiment of European Infantry at Nagpore,—there is

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 46.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, pp. 17, and 54.

‡ *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie*, 1856, paragraph 27, p. 9.

§ *Ibid.*, 1856, p. 21.

|| *A Vindication*, p. 39.

one there now,—but there were “British troops” of the most imposing description, though not of great numerical strength. There was a splendid Troop of Horse Artillery, and the Head Quarters and one Company of a Battalion of Foot Artillery,—altogether more than 250 men with twelve guns. The native Regiments all belonged to the Madras Presidency.

“Sattara,” he says, “never had such a garrison.” No,—never until 1857, when the dangerous conspiracies that were discovered, and the general agitation and excitement of the Mahratta Provinces, compelled Lord Elphinstone to take the earliest opportunity of stationing European troops at Sattara. Detachments of the 14th Dragoons and 3rd Europeans arrived there on the 19th of June, 1857.

Mr. Marshman, formerly of the *Friend of India*, makes similar assertions in his History.

“That the annexation by war or lapse did not create the mutiny, appears evident from the fact that except in the case of Oude, and the little Principality of Jhansi, under the instigation of the enraged Ranees, none of the annexed Provinces manifested *the slightest disposition* to turn against us in the great crisis. Sattara and Nagpore were tranquil.”*

There were sixteen executions for treasonous conspiracy at Sattara in 1857 and 1858, besides numerous sentences of transportation and imprisonment. If this is not indicative of “the slightest disposition to turn against us,” what does it indicate?

The following account of a scene that took place at Sattara in June, 1857, appeared in the *Bombay Telegraph* :—

“Several arrests have been made; the ringleaders are being brought in prisoners almost daily. The gallows-tree has hard work awaiting it. Its services were put in requisition this morning. The prisoner in a bold fearless manner mounted the drop, and during the process of adjusting the noose and pinioning, he, in a loud firm voice, addressed the crowd in the following words (my informant knows Mahrattas as well as English):—‘Listen, all! As the English people hurled the Rajah from his throne, in like manner do you drive them out of the country. This is murder. This example is made to frighten you, but be not alarmed. Sons of Brahmins, Mahrattas and Mussulmen, revolt! Sons of Christians look to yourselves!’”†

* *History of India*, vol. iii, p. 450,

† Quoted in *The Rebellion*, by John Bruce Norton, pp. 96, 97.

Sir Charles Jackson says that "Nagpore was faithful to our rule,"—Mr. Marshman that "Nagpore was tranquil." In the Province of Nagpore, without counting those killed in open rebellion or summarily put to death by military authority, there were nine executions in 1857 for high treason, and seventeen officers and soldiers of the Local Force, formerly the Rajah's Army, were hanged for mutiny. The English Sergeant Major of one native corps was killed by mutineers. An English official of the Electric Telegraph Department was murdered by rebels. Two petty Chieftains, the Zemindars of Arpeillee and Sonakhan, were engaged in open rebellion, the latter of whom was hanged. As compared with the stirring events, and brilliant exploits farther North, Mr. Marshman may still choose to call this "tranquillity," but even he can scarcely persist in saying that there was not "*the slightest disposition* to turn against us."

It is very natural that those who did their best, in office or in the Press, to promote the rapacious schemes which at once broke down our moral supremacy, and dispersed our military strength, should shut their eyes to all those facts which prove a very general disaffection, and should speak of the great Indian Rebellion as a mere mutiny of Bengal Sepoys. In their anxiety to shake off the painful feeling of self-reproach, they have been led to make some remarkable declarations. The Duke of Argyll, for instance, who as a Cabinet Minister might have had access to the best information, most erroneously asserts that "the infection of the mutiny never reached the Presidencies of Madras or of Bombay," and that "the entire armies of Bombay and of Madras escaped the plague."* When the Duke penned these lines, he cannot have heard of the Field Forces that were actively engaged for so many months in suppressing insurrection, not without much bloodshed, in the Rewa Kanta, in the Satpoora district, on the Goa frontier, in Kolapore, Nargoond, Shorapore, Jumkhundee, Kopal, and other parts of the Mahratta country; or of the murder of Mr. Manson, the Collector,

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning* (Longman and Co.) 1865, pp. 118 and 92.

by the rebel Chieftain of Nargoond, who had been refused permission in 1851 to adopt a near relation as his heir.

The Duke, when he wrote these sentences, cannot have heard of the mutiny of the 27th Bombay Native Infantry at Kolapore, when three of their officers were murdered, and of the terrible retribution inflicted on the mutineers by General Le Grand Jacob;* or of the mutiny of the 21st Bombay Regiment at Kurrachee, for which seven men were hanged and three blown from guns; or of the Golundauze Artillery at Shikarpore and Hyderabad in Scinde, where a Havildar was blown from a gun;† or of the 2nd and 3rd Bombay Cavalry at Neemuch and Nusseerabad; or of the disaffection and plots among the 10th and 11th Infantry in the city of Bombay itself, when two Sepoys were blown from guns and others transported; or of the attempted mutiny of the 2nd Grenadiers at Ahmedabad, for which upwards of twenty men were executed. These trifles had escaped his notice, and yet he censures his opponents for not, as he alleges, studying the Blue Books!

Immediately on the publication of *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, the Duke of Argyll was taken to task, as to the alleged tranquillity of the Bombay Presidency and Army, by General Le Grand Jacob, who had promptly addressed the Editor of the *Edinburgh Review* on the appearance of the original articles in 1863, in a letter which, it appears, the noble contributor had not the advantage of seeing before his Essays were reprinted. In the correspondence which ensued, the Duke made a partial and very inadequate admission of his errors. He expressed his readiness, if he had the opportunity, "to qualify the statement made in the Review, and to mention the appearance and effectual repression of the mutinous spirit in Bombay."‡ This mention of a "mutinous spirit" very insufficiently recalls transactions for which, as General Jacob had reminded him, "some hundreds of Sepoys and native officers, in divers corps, were tried and executed, or transported, besides those shot or cut down in fight."§ Al-

* *Correspondence as to Mutiny and Rebellion in the Bombay Presidency*, 1865, pp. 11, 12, 13.

† *The Indian*, September 21st, 1857.

‡ *Correspondence between Major General Jacob and the Duke of Argyll*, (Privately printed, 1865,) p. 8.

§ *Idem.*, p. 5.

though the Duke acknowledges "the mutinous spirit" and its "repression," he says nothing of the actual outbreaks of mutiny and rebellion.

Under the form of a criticism on Mr. Kaye's *Sepoy War*, an article in the *Edinburgh Review* of October, 1866, continues and reiterates the same justifications of the acquisitive policy, the same assertions that the insurrection of 1857 was "simply" and "merely a military mutiny," and by no means "a popular rebellion,"* the same denunciations of all dissentients, which pervade the two Essays reprinted by the Duke of Argyll. Such a harmony and consistency with the previous articles is kept up throughout, that at first one would confidently attribute all three to the same author, until certain indications of style negative that supposition. The Duke of Argyll, for instance, would never lay claim to local experience and personal observation, as the writer does who contrasts the strange notions of "*those who have no practical acquaintance with the people of India*," with the more enlightened ideas of "*those who know*" all about "*the faith of ignorant Hindoos*."†

This Edinburgh Reviewer "regrets" and "laments" that Mr. Kaye should have "made himself, to a great extent, the mouthpiece of a party small in numbers and smaller in ability, Englishmen too,—for the verdict of thoughtful foreigners has been very different,"—that he should have "lent the credit of his high reputation to abet those party-writers" who attack the memory of Lord Dalhousie.‡ Of course the spirit of party never enters the pages of the *Edinburgh Review*; and an Edinburgh Reviewer, even though for twenty years he had been successively the leader and spokesman of the annexation policy in the Court of Directors, the House of Commons and the Council of India, cannot be "a party-writer," and must bring a perfectly unbiassed judgment to the defence of that policy, and the discussion of its results.

Just as the Duke of Argyll denounces all the assailants of Lord Dalhousie's measures as "fifth-rate writers," the more recent Reviewer, with equal depth and refinement of sarcasm, sets them down as "a party small in numbers

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 98; *Edinburgh Review*, October 1866, p. 300. † *Edinburgh Review*, October 1866, p. 304. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

and smaller in ability." Like the other vindicators he carefully avoids grappling with any of his opponents,—restrained, no doubt, by "a proud sense of what is due to himself,"*—and though he quotes one of them, neither mentions his name nor gives a reference to the book.

The Reviewer taunts us with being "a small party." He is right, and if he had added that it was not a very popular party, he would not have been far wrong. There cannot be a more ungraceful and thankless position than that of an accuser and detractor,—one who denounces national exploits, decries recognised merit, and prophesies evil things. It would have been much more pleasant to have joined, many years ago, that much larger and more popular party which hailed and echoed the confident assurances of Lord Dalhousie, his colleagues in Council, Mr. R. D. Mangles and the *Friend of India*, that by destroying Native States we should add to the resources of the public treasury, combine our military strength, and gain the cheerful allegiance of the unfortunate people, "impatient for the rule of the stranger, rather than suffer" any longer from "the rod of iron" with which their Native Princes had "scourged the nationality out of them."† We did not believe in either the highly coloured obloquy cast upon native rule, the supposed desire of the people to exchange it for British administration, or the imaginary benefits that our own Government would derive from its ill-gotten acquisitions. Let the Reviewer and the Duke of Argyll call to mind that this party, "small in numbers and smaller"—if they will have it so—"in ability," did not spring up, wise after the event, amid the lurid lights of the Rebellion of 1857, but had raised the voice of rebuke and warning during several previous years. Let them call to mind that all the confident hopes and promises of the great party, strong in place and power, to which they belong, have been falsified,—that instead of having added to the public resources, they have added to the public debt and expenditure; that instead of combining our military strength in India, they weakened it, and by their consequent demand for British soldiers, have, for the time, paralysed the military strength and political influence of

* *Ante*, p. 4.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 52.

the Empire in Europe, and throughout the world. On the other hand, the small party who received the splendid visions and premature exultation of Lord Dalhousie and his supporters with cold incredulity and bitter remonstrance, have given the best proof of their more sound political science, by having manifested the power of prevision. And without ascending to the period before 1848, the political school stigmatised by the *Edinburgh Review*, is now seen to be the school of Henry St. George Tucker and Mountstuart Elphinstone, of Sleeman, Samuel Macpherson, George Clerk, and Henry Lawrence.

On one point it must be admitted that the *Edinburgh Reviewer* of 1866 does us more justice than we could well expect at his hands. Instead of branding us with the extremely effective epithet of "un-English," he admits our nationality. The "small party" is described by him as consisting of "Englishmen, for the verdict of thoughtful foreigners has been very different." But if our party is so small, and his own, it is to be supposed, comparatively large, how is it that the Reviewer is reduced to quote "thoughtful foreigners" in support of his views? How is it he cannot cite the opinions of thoughtful and independent Englishmen on his side? How is it that every one who comes forward, even behind the screen of a Review or a newspaper, to defend Lord Dalhousie's policy, is always sure to be, like the *Edinburgh Reviewers*, implicated in the progress of that policy, and interested in denying its disastrous results? The Reviewer cites as a high authority Sir John Lawrence. He might as well have cited Mr. Mangles. In many respects Sir John Lawrence is undoubtedly a high authority. He has been a successful administrator in peace; and in time of war,—in 1849 and 1857,—he showed himself as bold and clear-sighted in his plans, as he was skilful and provident in organisation. Few men more able, more honest, more lofty in character, ever entered the public service in India. He is a man of whom his country may well be proud. But in every fibre of his heart he is a functionary. He is nothing if not a Bengal Civilian. He was trained in the school of Mr. Thomason. He was the favourite Lieutenant of Lord Dalhousie. He cannot be expected to

pronounce the most active and eventful period of his public career a mistake. Of course he can draw no lesson from the Rebellion but that of military precautions, and can see no cause but the greased cartridge for that tremendous convulsion.

We return, therefore, to the two "thoughtful foreigners," M. de Montalembert and M. de Tocqueville, than whom, the Reviewer assures us, there can be "no higher or more impartial authorities." M. de Montalembert's character commands universal respect; he is eminent as a scholar and as a man of letters; but his public career at home has not been either so successful or so consistent as to make him a political oracle for the world. I am not prepared to bow to his authority in Indian any more than in Italian politics.

The eloquent brochure from which the Reviewer quotes was notoriously written as a vehicle for an attack on the French Government, with no real reference to the affairs of India. The hackneyed eulogy of the East India Company, and assertion that the insurrection was entirely the work of the Sepoys, adopted from some of the English journals of the day, carry no greater weight because repeated by M. de Montalembert, who had no special means of knowing the truth, and had made no special inquiry into the subject.

M. de Tocqueville was, indeed, a master of political science; but then his opinion, far from helping the Reviewer, is entirely in our favour. M. de Tocqueville, we quote from the Review, "has compressed his opinion into a single sentence, as vigorous as it is profound. 'Je crois,' he observes, speaking of the mutiny, 'que les horribles événements de l'Inde ne sont en aucune façon un soulèvement contre l'oppression; c'est une révolte de la barbarie contre l'orgueil.'"^{*}

"A revolt of barbarism against pride!" The struggle of despised Asiatics against the arrogance of Western civilisation,—that is exactly the concise description of the Rebellion of 1857 that we could accept. Does the Reviewer accept it? Does he really think that it corresponds, or can be reconciled, with the assurance of himself and Sir

^{*} *Edinburgh Review*, October 1866, p. 302.

John Lawrence, that the Rebellion was caused by "the cartridge affair and nothing else."† Does he suppose that M. de Tocqueville uses the term, "orgueil," pride, in a sense eulogistic of British rule?

On the other hand, where did the Reviewer find that the assailants of Lord Dalhousie considered the Rebellion of 1857 to be "un soulèvement contre l'oppression,"—a rising against oppression, or in his own words "the consequence and retribution of civil misgovernment," "the insurrection of an oppressed people"? Not in Mr. Kaye's book, the only work opposed to his own views to which he gives a reference; certainly not in my book, *The Empire in India*, which he quotes without naming, nor in any book of mine. The Reviewer might know from Mr. Kaye, whom he styles "to a great extent, the mouthpiece of the party," that they attribute the outbreak to "manifold causes" producing a general feeling of suspicion and disaffection, upon which the cartridge affair acted as the spark to a mine, none of the causes amounting to what is properly called "oppression," but rather to what M. de Tocqueville terms "orgueil,"—pride or contempt. This pride of race and culture,—disguised, even from the British rulers themselves, by benevolent though cheap consideration for the masses, who never come really into competition or contact with them, led them to dislike and scorn all rights and claims which impeded their plans or checked their undivided supremacy. Consequently the natives of the country were excluded from all share in the Government of the British Provinces, and from every administrative office of honour and emolument; while the tendency of our rule from the first was to lower the position, and destroy the public career of great nobles and proprietors. At later periods, varying in the different Presidencies, in the Punjab, and in Oude, the native landed aristocracy saw ruin, immediate or prospective, brought to their doors, by our revenue settlements, resumption laws, and Inam Commissions,—strenuously supported by Lord Dalhousie, "the Services," speaking through the *Friend of India*, and the Mangles party in the Court of Directors. But even when they lost property or income, the natural leaders of the

* *Edinburgh Review*, October 1866, p. 303.

people did not lose their influence. The masses found no cause for gratitude towards the British Government. They everywhere not only sympathised but suffered with the despoiled landlords.

With increase of power, the same pride of race and culture led us to regard direct British possession as the sole remedy for the defects of Native States, and produced an impatient contempt for the Treaties by which we had secured every step of our advance. They now seemed to fetter our progress. The *Friend of India* derided them as "musty old parchments."

By the extinction of allied and protected Principalities, and by the resumption of landed estates, for the most part under the false doctrine of "lapse," "the rights and institutions of the people of India," represented by their Princes and nobles, were "infringed upon" systematically, and, as General Briggs had predicted, "the native army, being a part of the population, sympathised with them."* A general suspicion of bad faith in all our dealings was spread through the land; the air was thick with rumours, imprecations, and threats.

When Lord Dalhousie left Calcutta, after perpetrating the annexation of Oude, the moral influence of Great Britain in India was, for the time, annihilated. On the first direct provocation applied to their own religious prejudices, the Sepoys led the way in revolt, expecting the Princes and the people everywhere to answer to their signal and to follow their example.

The following extracts from the letters of the late Major Samuel Charters Macpherson, who was Resident at Scindia's Court during the crisis of 1857, give at once the opinions formed by that distinguished and lamented officer, and those of Rajah Dinkur Rao, the able Minister of the Gwalior Principality :—

"It was the opinion of the more intelligent Chiefs of the Gwalior State, who were but few in number, that the Bengal native army believed our Government to have intended, through the greased cartridges, to strike at the Hindoo and Mahomedan religions in favour of Christianity. But they held that the army was predisposed to revolt through the disaffection of the population, and that the chief causes of the popular dissatisfaction with

* *Ante*, p. 216.

our rule were—the extinction of Native States and our consequent measures, the depression of Chiefs and heads of society.

“Every cause assigned for the revolt has tended to produce it; but dissatisfaction with our rule, common to the army and the people, was the preliminary condition *sine quâ non*. The main cause of that dissatisfaction was actual and apprehended disturbance of rights connected with the soil.

“The mutiny arose in the villages, not in the cantonments.

“You see that Lord Ellenborough quite understands that the population are hostile to us—that the rising has been a revolt of the people, not of the army. I alone ventured to say this here for a long time.”

Mr. W. Edwards, of the Bengal Civil Service, a Judge of the High Court of Agra, printed in 1859 for private circulation an interesting account of his Personal Adventures during the Rebellion with reflections on its origin and cause. These chapters are embodied in a work published by him in 1866, when, as he says, “his subsequent experience of seven years in India had tended to confirm him in the views and opinions therein expressed.”*

The following passages will give some idea of the conclusions at which he has arrived. After speaking of certain recently lost privileges and other new grievances of which the native troops complained, especially of “the vast distances they now had to travel in going to their homes on furlough and rejoining their Regiments,” in consequence of the Punjaub having become a British possession, the higher rate of pay they had received while it was foreign territory being stopped, he says:—

“While our native army was in this state of discontent and restless suspicion, Oude was to their astonishment and extreme dissatisfaction annexed. There is not the slightest doubt that this act was regarded by the native army as one of rude and unjustifiable spoliation, and I believe that they would have resented it at first, had they not been under the conviction that the home authorities would annul the decision of the Governor-General, and restore Oude to the King.

“As soon as it became known that the mission of the Oude royal family to England had proved ineffectual, and that no hope remained of the restoration of the country to the King, I noticed a marked change in the feelings and demeanour of the Mahomedans of my district, and of the Sepoys in particular.

* *Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian*, (Smith, Elder and Co., 1866) Preface, p. viii.

"While the minds of our Sepoys were, from the causes I have already detailed, full of resentment against the Government, and suspicious of its good faith, the report was spread among them by the instigators of the rebellion that the Government intended to take away their caste, and compel them forcibly to adopt Christianity, and for this purpose had cartridges ('cartouch,' as they called them,) prepared with pigs' fat to destroy the caste of the Mahomedans, and with cows' fat that of the Hindoos.

"The rural classes, who afterwards broke out into rebellion, had other causes (to which I will hereafter allude) which moved them, but as they themselves were not affected by the cartridges, they were indifferent on the subject, although they freely expressed deep sympathy with the Sepoys, having no alternative between losing their caste and mutinying."*

In explaining "the condition and feelings of the people in general, and particularly of the agricultural classes in the North West Provinces at this time, which predisposed them to rebellion,"† he enters into detailed criticism of our revenue, judicial and police system, and of many recent changes, "beautiful on paper," which "caused the most bitter resentment and disaffection among the agricultural body."‡ The most mischievous of these he considers to have been "the action of our Resumption laws, the abolition of Zemindary and Talookdarce rights," and the processes of our civil Courts, by the combined action of which, he says,

"Society in the North-Western Provinces had become in late years thoroughly disorganised. The ancient proprietary body remained, it is true, but in the position of tenants on their hereditary estates, smarting under a sense of degradation, and holding intact their ancient feudal power over their old retainers, who were willing and ready to cooperate with them in any attempt to recover their lost position."§

The personal observation, inquiry, and experience of two such men as Major Macpherson and Mr. Edwards, placed far apart, with perfectly distinct spheres of duty, and under very different circumstances, will, I think, carry considerably more weight than the second-hand repetitions of M. de Montalembert, even though pressed upon us by "the high and impartial authority" of an Edinburgh Reviewer, who, for all we know, may be personally as much

* *Personal Reminiscences*, pp. 313, 314, 315.

† *Ibid.*, p. 321.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

responsible for the policy of annexation, and as deeply concerned to clear it from every stain of blood, as the Duke of Argyll or even as Mr. R. D. Mangles.

We look upon the policy of annexation as one great cause, perhaps the greatest, but by no means the only cause that accumulated the mine of combustibles to which the cartridge affair acted as a spark. We point out not only the connection between the policy of annexation and the terrible outbreak of 1857, but that in that outbreak the policy failed in every sense of the word,—and in its failure proved the falsity of all Lord Dalhousie's promises and expectations, the futility and inadequacy of all his preparations.

The enthusiastic partisan of Lord Dalhousie's reputation who writes in the *Spectator*, assures us, however, that the first and principal reason why the "great" and "statesman-like" policy of "one vast military monarchy" in India "failed," was "*because Lord Dalhousie retired.*"* This means, if it means anything, that Lord Dalhousie possessed faculties for dealing with mutiny and rebellion far beyond what can be claimed for his successor, Lord Canning.

Now, during the eight years of his administration, it fell three times to Lord Dalhousie's lot to deal with mutiny, once with a petty insurrection, and once to cope with a succession of mutinies, culminating in a formidable rebellion; and in every instance he proved himself unequal to the occasion,—incapable of appreciating the danger, feeble and irresolute in his measures of repression and retribution, tardy and confused in his control of military operations.

The first of these occasions arose out of the dangerous combination of the Bengal Regiments in the Punjaub in 1849 and 1850, when at last the 66th Native Infantry attempted to seize the Fort of Govindghur. The mutinous spirit was subdued for the time by the judicious method, partly of stern correction, partly of just concession, adopted by Sir Charles Napier, and in a great degree by his commanding personal influence. Few will now question the

* *Ante*, p. 202.

happy inspiration which prompted that great soldier to disband the mutinous 66th on the spot, and to place their colours in the hands of an Irregular Battalion of Goorkhas, admitted to their place in the Line. Few will now join with Lord Dalhousie in his doubts of the necessity of that step, or in his expression of regret that the Commander-in-Chief should have acted on his own responsibility in the matter. In the conflict which followed as to the summary suspension, pending a reference to Government, of an order withholding certain extra allowances from the Sepoys, there can be little doubt that Napier's action was practically right, although officially unauthorised. But mark how contemptuously Lord Dalhousie treated the idea of a conspiracy among the Native Regiments, and of the Empire having been in peril. He presumed to charge Sir Charles Napier, a soldier seventy years of age, renowned through Europe, and covered with honourable wounds, with having made use of "extravagant and mischievous exaggerations," with having brought "unjust and injurious imputations" against the Bengal Army.* He had read "the statements" of the Commander-in-Chief with "incredulity." Yet the testimony of all the superior officers in the Punjab, including Sir Colin Campbell, afterwards Lord Clyde, was to the same effect, that "the mutinous spirit was very formidable," and was only kept down by the presence of a powerful European force.† "There is no justification," continued his Lordship, "for the cry that India was in danger. Free from all threat of hostilities from without, and secure, through the submission of its new subjects, from insurrection within, the safety of India has never for one moment been imperilled by the partial insubordination in the ranks of its army."‡

When we add that in his Farewell Minute the sole reference to the Sepoy was to say, that "the position of the native soldier in India has long been such as to leave hardly any circumstance of his condition in need of im-

* *Papers (printed by the East India Company) Discussions between the Marquis of Dalhousie and Sir Charles Napier*, 1854, p. 15.

† *Defects of the Indian Government*, edited by Sir William Napier, 1853, p. 59.

‡ *Papers, Discussions between Dalhousie and Napier*, (Minute by Lord Dalhousie, paragraph 37) p. 15.

provement,"* Sir Charles Jackson may, perhaps, be able to understand "on what authority Mr. Kaye speaks of Lord Dalhousie's 'rooted conviction of the fidelity of the Sepoy.'"†

Can anyone believe that Lord Dalhousie, so blind in 1850, so regardless of warning, so confident in "the submission of our new subjects," would have been more watchful and more far-sighted than Lord Canning in 1857, when the first symptoms of mutiny appeared, and when Oude was on the eve of insurrection?

The second of these occasions was in 1852, when the 38th Bengal Native Infantry refused to proceed on foreign service to Burmah. Lord Dalhousie yielded to them, and supplied their place by a Regiment of Sikhs.‡ The following remarks on this incident are from the *Hurkaru*, one of the Calcutta daily papers:—

"Our readers will not forget that Lord Dalhousie was the first Governor-General who succumbed to mutineers. When the 38th N. I. (the corps which raised the cry of mutiny in Delhi) refused to go to Burmah, Lord Dalhousie gave in; from that instant the feelings of the Sepoys, in all probability, underwent a change towards their masters. That act was sufficient to demoralise an army: who can say that it did not do so?

"It has been the fashion in certain circles to abuse Lord Ellenborough. Whatever may have been his faults, he never allowed himself to be conquered by mutineers. There are many in India who recollect that when the 4th§ and 6th Regiments refused to go to Scinde, they did not meet with the same mild treatment as the 38th, when they declined to go to Burmah. The difference of conduct on the two occasions showed the difference between the two men. Lord Ellenborough compelled the Sepoys to carry out his order; the Sepoys compelled Lord Dalhousie to put up

* *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie*, 1856, (para. 151) p. 39. Even with regard to the material condition of the native troops, he was quite wrong. They had many substantial grievances, among others the increased length and frequency of marches, entailing great expenses, particularly upon the Madras troops, who are always accompanied by their families. The pay of the Irregular Cavalry was at starvation point. Since Lord Dalhousie left India, the emoluments of almost every branch and every rank of the Native army have been augmented, directly or indirectly. Lord Dalhousie most injudiciously lowered the pay and injured the prospects of the Hyderabad Cavalry, some of the finest corps in India.

† *A Vindication*, p. 169; *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. i, p. 324.

‡ *Marshman's History of India*, vol. iii, p. 367.

§ I think this must be a misprint for the 34th, which was disbanded with ignominy by Lord Ellenborough in 1844 at Meerut, in presence of all the troops of the station.

with their resolves. The one saved India, the other brought it to the verge of ruin.”*

The third of these occasions was in 1855, when the 3rd Hyderabad Cavalry mutinied at Bolarum, and cut down Brigadier Colin Mackenzie, the Commandant of the Division, and Captain Murray, one of their own officers. Brigadier Mackenzie was left for dead with no less than ten wounds. Let us hear Lord Dalhousie’s own description of what took place after the first outbreak and attempted assassination.

“It is clear to the Governor-General in Council, from the evidence before him, that the greater part of the Regiment in the Lines was in a state of open mutiny; some rushed into the streets, cutting and hacking at the passers-by, and brutally assailing even women in their course.

“Their European officers were not allowed to approach them. They paraded without orders from their European officers, and without any of the usual calls to parade, but by the direction of their Rissaldar. They were armed, and mounted and equipped. They sent out videttes to watch the approach of other troops sent for from Secunderabad, and acted as a military body guided by other orders than those of their regular European superiors.

“Such proceedings are manifestly destructive of all discipline, and tend not less to destroy all confidence in the fidelity of troops that serve the Government. They appear to the Governor-General in Council to call for grave animadversion and for severe punishment.

“They appear to his Lordship in Council to call the louder for animadversion and punishment, that this is not the first time that the Hyderabad Cavalry has been guilty of violence towards their European officers.”†

And then—most lame and impotent conclusion!—after the long-winded “animadversion,” came the decree of what he called “severe punishment.” Six native officers were dismissed the service, without a Court-martial; while three of the ringleaders in the murderous attack on Brigadier Colin Mackenzie were, in Lord Dalhousie’s words, “arrested,” and “with them,” he added, “the law of the land will deal.” They were eventually sentenced to fourteen years’ transportation.

* Quoted in *Norton’s Rebellion in India*, 1857, p. 176.

† *General Order*, Fort William, No. 132, January 23rd, 1856; *Calcutta Gazette*, January 26th, 1856. I am not aware whether this General Order has been given in any Parliamentary Return.

The mutiny had broken out on September 21st, 1855. Lord Dalhousie's verbose judgment was promulgated on January 23rd, 1856, after a delay of four months. All possibility of a striking example had then gone by; but the weakness and tameness of the Governor-General's grave lecture to these mutineers and assassins on the impropriety of their conduct,—“manifestly destructive,” as he said, “of all discipline!”—taken in conjunction with his slow and inconclusive proceedings, by no means convey the impression that in a tremendous crisis, like that of 1857, he would have exhibited more promptitude, firmness or vigour than Lord Canning.*

The petty insurrection was that of the Sonthals, the wild aboriginal tribe of the Rajmahal Hills, who possessed scarcely any arms but pickaxes and bows and arrows.† In consequence of most discreditable vacillation and mismanagement this revolt was kept alive from July to December 1855, to the great alarm and injury of the peaceful inhabitants, and was not suppressed without the employment of a considerable military force, at a very great expense, and with much more bloodshed and more severity towards the misguided insurgents than ever ought to have been necessary. Lord Dalhousie was at Ootacamund on the Neilgherry Hills, and probably trusted, for some time, the subordinate Government of Bengal to put down a disturbance within its own limits. He cannot, however, be relieved from responsibility; and in this instance, also, he clearly showed no aptitude for planning operations, and no just appreciation of the damage done to the dignity and authority of Government by dilatory measures in the face of rebellion.

The most formidable insurrection during Lord Dalhousie's vice-royalty was that of the Punjab. We have shown how that insurrection was intensified and extended,

* I am not to be told that I have “concealed” anything in this case. I know that Brigadier Mackenzie's conduct in personally confronting the men who had disobeyed his very reasonable orders regarding the route of a procession, was questioned. I am quite prepared to go into that point, and fully to justify the Brigadier's proceedings. I take the fact of open mutiny, as stated in Lord Dalhousie's own words, and I show that he paltered with it.

† *Marshman's History of India*, vol. iii, p. 376.

how a petty outbreak grew into a rebellion, and was protracted till it assumed the proportions of a war, in consequence of a succession of blunders and delays for which the Governor-General was fully answerable. He hesitated to support Edwardes until it was too late; he sent no succour to Hazara or Peshawur; he hampered Lord Gough by misdirections, and held him back by positive orders, giving time, and opportunity and confidence to the rebels, and contributing directly to the disasters of Chillianwalla. So much has already been said in these pages on this subject, that it will suffice to add here a few extracts from an author strongly prepossessed in favour of Lord Dalhousie, Mr. J. C. Marshman, formerly Editor of the *Friend of India*. The first refers to the period of vacillation and inactivity immediately following the outrage at Mooltan.

“The emergency for which the foresight of Lord Hardinge had made provision by his moveable Brigades had now arisen; but there was no longer Sir Henry Lawrence at the head of affairs in the Punjaub, or Lord Hardinge at the head of the Government. The Resident at Lahore was an amiable and intelligent Civilian, the Governor-General was an able statesman, but young in years, and new in authority. He was as yet but partially acquainted with those who held posts of importance in the Government, and was, moreover, without any of that military experience which enabled his predecessor to maintain, without presumption, a powerful control of our military movements. Had Sir Henry Lawrence been at Lahore, he would have moved the Brigade upon Mooltan, with the same promptitude which he had exhibited in his march to Cashmere at the beginning of the winter, to crush Inam-ood-deen, and doubtless with the same success. Had Lord Hardinge been at the head of the Government, he would have taken upon himself to despatch the large force he had massed on the North West frontier and collected at Bukkur, and invested Mooltan before Moolraj could make any adequate preparations for resistance. A march through Scinde and from Lahore in the month of May would doubtless have occasioned many casualties, but our Empire in India had been acquired and maintained, not by fair-weather campaigns, but by taking the field on every emergency, and at any season.”*

After setting forth the original orders given by the Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, for an advance on Mooltan, the withdrawal of those orders, the reference to the Com-

* *History of India*, vol. iii, p. 313, 314.

mander-in-Chief, and Lord Gough's opinion that military operations should be postponed to the cold weather, Mr. Marshman adds :—

"Lord Dalhousie gave his concurrence to this decision. Sir Henry Lawrence aptly described this procrastination as 'a resolution to have a grand shikar (hunt) in the cold season under his own lead.'*

"The paltry outbreak of Moolraj, fostered by the folly of delay, had grown into a portentous war."†

In his description of the final Puujaub campaign, which opened so inauspiciously with the indecisive affairs of Ramnuggur and Sadoolapore, Mr. Marshman has the following passage :—

"Throughout the month of December," 1848, "and the first half of January," 1849, "the British army remained inactive between the Jhelum and the Chenab. This policy, which has been the subject of much censure, was in some measure owing to the restrictions imposed on the movements of the force by Lord Dalhousie, who had requested Lord Gough, after the battle of Sadoolapore, 'on no consideration to advance beyond the Chenab except for the purpose of attacking Shere Sing in the position he then held, without further communication with him.' He had, in fact, injudiciously interfered with the military dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief, on whom the responsibility of the campaign rested.

"But, however injudicious may have been this act of interference on the part of the Governor-General, subsequent events gave reason to regret that it was not prolonged. Indeed, the whole plan of the campaign has been condemned by the judgment of the highest military authorities."‡

It may be very possible in each and all of these instances to say a great deal in extenuation of Lord Dalhousie's shortcomings, and even to trace one or two of them to persons and circumstances quite beyond his control. All that I am concerned to urge is that the uniformity of these negative results cannot produce in the mind of any reasonable inquirer a positive impression of Lord Dalhousie's great capacity. Whenever an emergency arose, he was manifestly found wanting. From the enormous means at his disposal, a successful result was ultimately attained, where the object was merely that of

* *History of India*, vol. p. iii, 314.

† *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 320.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. iii, pp. 331, 332.

overcoming material resistance,—as in the great and little wars against the Sikhs and the Sonthals,—but at a disproportionate cost, and after a long and injurious delay. In the three cases of military mutiny he was manifestly deficient in firmness and discrimination. On not one of these five occasions, all presenting some analogy with the far more serious crisis of 1857, can Lord Dalhousie be said to have evinced either breadth of vision, promptitude in action, or fertility of resource.

Nothing can be found in the annals of India, during or since the administration of Lord Dalhousie, to justify that invidious reflection, half eulogy and half apology, that the annexation policy failed, “firstly, because Lord Dalhousie retired.” That policy never could have succeeded, if Lord Dalhousie had remained twenty years at Calcutta. It failed at its first trial, not because its author had retired, but because it was rotten at the core, materially and morally. It had destroyed our persuasive influence and ruined our high reputation. It had tainted every organ, and weakened every function of the Empire. While it made our power almost exclusively dependent on physical force, it had scattered our European soldiers, and exasperated the native troops. As a financial and military policy it had so utterly failed before Lord Dalhousie left India, that, unless he shut his eyes very closely, he must have begun to suspect it himself.

The writer in the *Spectator* who considers Lord Dalhousie's policy, although it failed, to have been “great” and “statesmanlike,” admits that during the mutinies “the Native Principalities acted as breakwaters when a surge of national feeling threatened to overwhelm” the British rulers. The same writer acknowledges that “Bombay was saved because Gwalior broke the rush of the wave which had Tantia Topee on its crest.”* But how was it that Scindia of Gwalior did us such good service? He was childless: he had no “natural heir,” according to the new law of succession enacted by Lord Dalhousie for Hindoo Princes who enjoyed the advantage of our protective alliance. He had seen during the late Governor-General's tour of office the Principality of Sattara abolished, of which

* *Ante*, p. 203.

the Rajah was not only regarded as the head of all the Mahratta tribes, and the living memorial of their glory, but was known to have been quite irreproachable in his relations to the Paramount Power, and towards his own subjects. He had seen the State of Nagpore extinguished,—“one of the substantive Powers of India”*—of which the Rajah was, beyond dispute, of higher rank, both by descent and by the historical origin of his sovereignty, than himself or any other Mahratta Prince,† and who, also, had given no cause for complaint, either as a subordinate Ally or as a Ruler. He had seen, close to his own door, the Principality of Jhansi, ever faithful and serviceable to the British Government, snatched without mercy from a Mahratta Brahmin family by the rejection of an heir adopted from the founder's kin. He had seen the two greatest Mussulman potentates of India, both of them friendly and submissive to our Government, subjected to the cruellest treatment, on grounds quite unintelligible and indefensible according to the rude political notions of Gwalior,—the Nizam despoiled of his richest provinces, the King of Oude dethroned, and his Kingdom confiscated. What reason had Maharajah Jyajee Rao Scindia to expect a better fate for his own family and Kingdom? They were actually threatened, and marked down for extinction in Mr. Willoughby's Minute, “the text-book on adoptions.”‡

Colonel Macpherson, who was Resident at the Court of Gwalior in 1857, has explained the reason very clearly in an interesting Report dated February 10th, 1858. He attaches the greatest importance to the impressions received by the Maharajah, his chief Ministers and advisers, during their visit to Lord Canning at Calcutta early in 1857, shortly before the outbreak of the rebellion. “Besides gratification from the courtesies of the Governor-

* *Ante*, p. 29.

† Both the Sattara and Nagpore families of Bhonslas claim descent from the Sesodia Ranas of Oodeypoor, the most illustrious Rajpoot line of India, whose sovereignty can be traced for 1700 years. In both cases there is a blot in the scutcheon, but the descent seems to be acknowledged by the genealogists of Oodeypoor,—see the *History of Megwar*, by Captain Brookes (Calcutta, 1859,) pp. 10 and 13. Until the same distinction was conferred upon the Gaekwar by Lord Canning in 1859, the head of the Bhonsla family at Nagpore was the only Mahratta Prince, besides the Rajah of Sattara, who presumed to wear a golden anklet

‡ *Ante*, p. 188.

General, and the great enlargement of their views of our power and resources," they obtained the strongest assurances that it was Lord Canning's policy to maintain "the stability of Scindia's House and rule, in conformity with Hindoo usages. Had the Maharajah and his people," continues Colonel Macpherson, "now apprehended the extinction of their State by our disallowing the adoption of an heir, I conceive that it would have been impossible to induce them to make the efforts in co-operation with us which the crisis required."*

Is it possible that, so long as Lord Dalhousie was at Calcutta, the Maharajah and his people should have ceased to apprehend the extinction of their State? Can any one believe that Lord Dalhousie, holding that "on all occasions where heirs natural shall fail, the territory should be made to lapse, and adoption should not be permitted,"† and looking upon Mr. Willoughby's Minute as "a text-book on adoptions," could have given the Maharajah the strong assurances that Lord Canning gave him? Mr. Willoughby, in a passage we have already quoted, expressed the greatest regret that two recent adoptions had been permitted in the Scindia family, especially that of the reigning Prince himself, and trusted that this "annoyance" would be "discouraged" for the future. The Maharajah and his Ministers, well versed in the Sattara Blue Book, would never have ventured to visit Calcutta at all, if Lord Dalhousie had remained there.

Sir Charles Jackson says that if any "independent Hindoo Sovereign" had been so "unreasonable," as to be alarmed at the progress of annexation, "his fear might have been removed by ten minutes' conversation with the Resident at his Court."‡ Mr. Marshman, also, with singular accordance, maintains that "if any alarm had arisen in the minds of the independent Princes, a few words of explanation from the Resident would have been sufficient to dispel it."§

Mr. Marshman, I suspect, has had better means of knowing the works and ways of the Calcutta Foreign

* *Return to the House of Lords, Honours and Rewards to Native Princes*, 1860, p. 94.

† *Ante*, p. 185.

‡ *Ante*, p. 181.

§ *History of India*, vol. iii, p. 400.

Office, than Sir Charles Jackson. I must really appeal to his candour to reconsider this very imaginative proposition. Does he, on further reflection, mean deliberately to affirm his belief that Lord Dalhousie would have permitted the Resident at the Court of Scindia, Holkar, the Gackwar, the Rajah of Rewah, Kolapore, Travancore, or any one of fifty other Princes that might be mentioned, to quiet the apprehensions of a childless Sovereign by an assurance, "in ten minutes' conversation," that the adoption of an heir by himself or his widow would be recognised by the Paramount Power? Will he be so good as exert his imagination a little more, and try to picture to himself the reception Lord Dalhousie would have given in 1856 to the report by any Resident of "a few words of explanation" to that effect. I must ask Mr. Marshman to tax his memory a little. Does he really mean to assert that, between 1853 and the end of 1856, when he and his successor in the editorial chair,—whom Lord Dalhousie thanked for "the fairness with which" he had "set" his Lordship's "public acts before the community," and for "the frequent support given to his measures,"*—were constantly ringing "the knell of the Princes of India,"† and declaring that "the two hundred and fifty Kinglings must inevitably and speedily disappear,"‡ Lord Dalhousie himself would have calmed the fears of those two hundred and fifty Kinglings, (with the exception of Mysore, and perhaps "one or two others of minor account,"§) and would have offered them such reassurances as Lord Canning offered to Scindia, or would have sanctioned the offer of such reassurances by the Residents at their Courts? No,—now that I have refreshed his memory, Mr. Marshman no more believes it than I do.

Scindia would not have gone to Calcutta, nor would Colonel Macpherson have advised him to take such a step, if Lord Dalhousie had remained there. If, however, the Maharajah had summoned up resolution, in spite of all the discouragement that would have been thrown in his way, to visit the Governor-General, and had ventured to give full expression, as he did to Lord Canning, to his fears for "the stability of his House and rule," there can

* *Ante*, p. 200.† *Ante*, p. 198.‡ *Ante*, p. 197.§ *Ante*, p. 182.

be little doubt as to the treatment he would have experienced. He would have been treated as the Rajah of Puttiala was, when he visited Calcutta in 1855, and presumed to bring forward a grievance, and even to speak of appealing to London. The Mahratta Rajah, if not more easily silenced, would have been told, as the Sikh Rajah was, that if he did not go home immediately, and mind his own affairs, his country would be sequestered, and managed for him by a British officer. Probably he would have been reminded, in that grand and statesmanlike style, so much admired by some people, that the Governor-General could "crush him at his will."*

Not only have we no reason whatever to believe that if Lord Dalhousie had not retired when he did, he would have been more able to meet and quell the rebellion of 1857 than his successor, but we have every reason to believe that his presence at Calcutta would have aggravated its perils and horrors immeasurably, by inflaming our enemies, giving strength to adventurous spirits, and paralysing the conservative interests of the country. It is highly improbable that the Native Princes in general would have behaved so well towards our Government, if the destroyer of so many of them had remained at the head of affairs.

* As Lord Dalhousie told the Nizam,—see *Empire in India*, p. 348.

CHAPTER IX.

MERITS AND MOTIVES.

IF then, it may be asked, you refuse credit to the Marquis of Dalhousie as a constructive and progressive statesman in time of peace, and even as an energetic and skilful ruler in time of war, what position do you assign him? Do you deny him all merit whatever? Do you question his great abilities? Certainly not. The description given of him by the Duke of Argyll seems to me to be just and accurate, so far as it goes, with the exception of two words. "Lord Dalhousie," says his friend, "had *large views*, a rapid intellect, indefatigable industry, admirable habits of business, great self-reliance. He was a vigorous writer, and had the faculty of ready speech."* All this may be conceded except the "*large views*." Lord Dalhousie had not large views; his views were invariably the nearest and the narrowest possible. Will any one point out some of Lord Dalhousie's large views?

Lord Dalhousie was a clever, energetic public functionary, with considerably power of expression. Under a constitutional Government, with a watchful, well-informed public opinion to keep him and his colleagues in the right path, he might have been an efficient Minister. In a secondary position he might have been a valuable public servant. He was quite unfit to be Master anywhere, even with all the checks and restraints of a free country. In spite of the Duke of Argyll's suggestions of "the sacrifice he made in accepting even that 'Imperial appointment' which is the greatest office England has to give, except the Government of herself,"† I do not believe he had either the tact, or the temper, or the earnestness to guide a Cabinet, to hold a party together,

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 67. † *Ibid.*, p. 67.

or to manage a popular assembly. His overweening self-confidence and intolerance of opposition would have soon struck him out of the list of leaders. But he was deficient in more solid qualities. He had no originality, and no foresight. He neither penetrated causes, nor calculated consequences. He was manifestly incapable of taking a larger view of any proposed measure than the merely empirical view of a professional functionary. All his declared purposes were superficial, all the means he employed to effect them, were mechanical.

In the state-papers of almost every Governor-General since Warren Hastings, we obtain now and then a glimpse of some great principles of government,—something that betokens an insight into human character, into the feelings and interests of the strange people, whose ancient civilisation and complicated forms of society must be so largely modified by the extension of British supremacy. Nothing of the sort can be found in the political Minutes of Lord Dalhousie. You may search them in vain for a single new idea, for a single striking thought, for one word of generous regret, or genial hope,—for anything but the peculiar dialectics, at once peremptory and tortuous, by which he made out his case for annexation, and the cold-hearted, formal arrangements by which his plan was to be carried out. He abolished a Kingdom as coolly, and with as little compunction, as he abolished a Board. This was much admired at Calcutta during the last three years of his administration; but it was simply a proof of those imperfect sympathies and that total blindness to everything but some immediate, showy result, which are utterly irreconcilable with any pretension to statesmanship.

Of course when Lord Dalhousie had determined on annexing a Native State,—after positively declining to undertake its reform, because he objected to “the labour and anxiety,” without “the benefit of increased revenue,”*—he dropped a few commonplaces as to “the real good” of the uncomplaining inhabitants, “whose best interests, we sincerely believe, will be promoted by the uniform application of our system of government;”† and Sir Charles Jackson reminds us that in his Nagpore Minute, Lord Dalhousie observed :

* *Aule*, pp. 69 and 72.

"I place the interests of the people of Nagpore foremost among the considerations which induce me to advise that that State should now pass under British Government; for I conscientiously declare that unless I believed that the prosperity and happiness of its inhabitants would be promoted by their being placed permanently under British rule, no other advantages which could arise out of the measure would move me to propose it."*

Mere decency required some such declaration as this; besides which there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the avowal. It was the conscientious belief—none the less because it upheld their personal and class interests and professional prejudices—of all those who surrounded him at Calcutta. But no one can pay much attention to Lord Dalhousie's Minutes without perceiving,—apart from his refusal to reform Native States,—that administrative improvement was a very secondary consideration compared with the acquisition of territory and revenue. Except in the case of Oude,—which obviously required very delicate treatment and a careful avoidance of all suggestion of its being a profitable affair,—he never dwelt much on "the inestimable blessings" which, in the official cant of the day, were to be conferred on the new subjects, but always on the immense material advantages he was about to acquire for his own Government,—“a secure and profitable possession,” “increase of revenue,”† “additional resources to the public treasury,” “consolidation of our military strength,”‡ “enlarged commercial resources,” “a steady and full supply of cotton wool,”§—such were the true incitements to annexation, some of them utterly frivolous, all falsified in the result.

Mr. Marshman affords us, in the following anecdote, a fair opportunity of measuring the height and depth of Lord Dalhousie's genius, his lofty aim, the broad range of his Imperial vision.

"When Mr. Cobden, soon after the conquest" of Pegu, "published a pamphlet to denounce its iniquity, Lord Dalhousie remarked to a friend, 'the British nation will one day find that Pegu pays, and the crime of having placed it under British protection will be condoned.'"||

* *A Vindication*, p. 21. † *Ante*, pp. 98, 171.

‡ *Ante*, p. 221, and *Papers, Berar*, 1854, p. 36.

§ *A Vindication*, pp. 39 and 41.

|| *Marshman's History of India*, vol. iii, p. 375.

When we call to mind the historian's antecedents as Editor of the *Friend of India*, we are less surprised at the innocent unconsciousness with which he strips the guilt off his hero's policy, and exposes the common idol of their political faith in all its sordid nudity. It pays! How little did Lord Dalhousie, the official clique and their organ at Calcutta, know of the standard of national morality by which Mr. Cobden, and ultimately the British people, would judge their proceedings! How little does the veteran partisan of annexation understand it now!

The anecdote is too characteristic for us to doubt its authenticity. Whether these words actually escaped Lord Dalhousie's lips on this, and on several other occasions, (*as has been said*,) or not,* they strike the key-note of his acquisitive policy. With whatever variations and accompaniments, his Minutes are all set to that tune. It pays! And the English officials and journalists of India, with a few noble exceptions, all joined in the chorus. It pays!

But it did not pay. With this very low aim, and this very short range, he missed his mark. Before the Rebellion came, with its forty millions of debt, augmented expenditure, clumsy experiments in taxation, and financial difficulties of which we see only the beginning, the balance sheet, if fairly analysed, had condemned Lord Dalhousie's policy. It did not put money in our purse; and by destroying our good name and moral influence throughout India, it made us poor indeed.

An undignified, ungenerous tone, unworthy of the kingly place he occupied, characterises all Lord Dalhousie's dealings with the great families he dispossessed. It proves much more than a want of magnanimity, it proves, as Mr. Kaye has well expressed it, that he "had no imagination," and thus never came to "understand the genius of the people among whom his lot was cast."

"He could not understand the tenacity of affection with which they cling to their old traditions. He could not sympathise with the veneration which they felt for their ancient dynasties. He could not appreciate their fidelity to the time-honoured institutions and the immemorial usages of the land.

* It has never before, to my knowledge, been said by any of his friends. Without Mr. Marshman's corroboration, I should never have thought of imputing it to him. "Save me from my friends."

“ With the characteristic unimaginativeness of his race, he could not for a moment divest himself of his individuality, or conceive the growth of ancestral pride and national honour in other breasts than those of the Campbells and the Ramsays.”*

This was not the man to rule an Empire. Incalculable heart-burnings and indignation were excited throughout Northern India, and among all the Mahomedans as far South as Hyderabad, by his ungenerous treatment of the King of Delhi. The abolition of the Royal dignity at the demise of the reigning King, which he recommended, was disapproved by the Court of Directors, but still left to his discretion. The plea which he advanced to strengthen his recommendation, and to enforce the removal of the next King and his family from the Palace at Delhi, and the reduction of their privileges, was eminently characteristic of his habitual use of words of equivocal meaning, or of no meaning, if they seemed to give a specious legality to some measure of confiscation. He said that the King's eldest son having suddenly died, the heir apparent to the Crown was “ *not born in the purple*.”† As if that insignificant term, borrowed from the phraseology of the Greek Empire, could weaken the claim of the Prince in question !

No argument in favour of Lord Dalhousie's proposal can be drawn from the point made so much of by the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson, that the presence of the House of Timour at Delhi “ gave to the mutineers a standard and a name, and the semblance at least of a political object.”‡

Without any necessity for going into the question of our obligations to the House of Timour, or of their obligations to us, their existence was a great fact with which the Viceroy had to deal,—or to let it alone. There was the King at Delhi, in possession of certain revenues and privileges, surrounded by a tribe of relatives. Lord Dalhousie did not propose to annihilate them, but only to annoy them. He did not propose to make them state-prisoners, or to remove them to some safer locality, but merely to turn them out of their Palace.

* *The Sepoy War*, vol. i, pp. 356, 357.

† *Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie*, 1856, para. 41, p. 11.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 97.

CHAPTER IX.

The vast advantage gained by the mutineers in the unresisted occupation of Delhi and possession of the King's person, was thrown into their hands, not by any error that Lord Dalhousie's proposal would have counteracted, but by the strange neglect that left Delhi, the centre of historic glory and political change, unguarded by European troops.

Sir Henry Lawrence, ever vigilant both as a soldier and a statesman, observed in 1844 :—

“The Treasury at Delhi is in the city, as is the Magazine; the latter is in a sort of fort,—a very defenceless building, outside of which in the street, we understand, a party of Sepoys was placed, when the news of the Cabul disasters arrived. We might take a circuit of the country and show how unmindful we have been that what occurred in the city of Cabul may, some day, occur at Delhi, Benares, or Bareilly.”*

The wretched old King was certainly unprepared for the actual outbreak; he was from first to last a mere tool in the hands of the mutineers. And if the Princes in general threw in their lot with the rebels, it must not be forgotten that they were naturally exasperated by Lord Dalhousie's recent and impending decree for their removal and degradation. The rumour of that ill-advised measure had spread throughout India, and, taken in conjunction with many similar acts, had done a great deal to excite disaffection.

Sir Charles Jackson observes that Lord Dalhousie advised the abolition of the Nawabship of the Carnatic, because “a Court at the Presidency, though destitute of authority and power, must be inimical, or at all events discontented, and capable of being made a nucleus for intrigue.” These were the Governor-General's words, and his apologist adds :—“The conduct of the titular Sovereign of Delhi in 1857, and the gathering of the disaffected around that shadow of the Great Mogul, have sufficiently illustrated the wisdom of these remarks.”†

He forgets that Lord Dalhousie did not propose to tie up the Wallajah family in sacks and throw them into the sea, to keep them in Madras Jail, or to dispose of them by

* *Essays*, p. 51

† *A Vindication*, p. 105.

any safe process that would have prevented them from forming "a nucleus for intrigue." He could not get rid of them; he only turned them out of their Palace, and reduced them to comparative beggary. Lord Dalhousie said that they "must be inimical, or at all events discontented,"—a perfectly groundless imputation,—but Sir Charles Jackson himself can hardly deny that Lord Dalhousie took the best means in his power to *make them* "inimical and discontented."

If during the crisis of 1857 Prince Azeem Jah, *de jure* Nawab of the Carnatic, instead of using all his influence to suppress the fanatical spirit among the Mussulman population of the Carnatic,* had formed "a nucleus of intrigue," or had become as openly "inimical" as the Princes of Delhi were, that would not have "illustrated the wisdom of Lord Dalhousie's remarks." It would simply have proved that bad faith and political ingratitude had produced their natural results,—had converted friends into foes, had transformed a centre of conservatism into a nest of conspiracy.

I am not at all called upon to go into the Carnatic question here. Sir Charles Jackson, Mr. Marshman and other vindicators have adhered to their usual course of quoting and paraphrasing the official papers, without attempting to deal with the arguments on the other side.†

I will, however, endeavour, to set those right who have been persuaded that the Treaty of 1801, made with Azeem-ood-Dowlah, the father of Prince Azeem Jah, is a personal Treaty, because it does not contain the words "heirs and successors." Article II of that Treaty expressly "confirms and renews" the old Treaties which contain ample guarantees of succession to the Nawab Wallajah's "heirs and successors." Lord Dalhousie, indeed, with that marvellous audacity of assertion which succeeded so well with his private conclave of three or four well-disposed Councillors, wrote as follows :—

* In a despatch of September 1st, 1858, the Court of Directors mentioned as one reason for increasing the stipend offered to Prince Azeem Jah, "the influence of his name and position over the numerous Mahomedan population of Madras, and the excellent conduct of that population during our recent difficulties."

† *The Empire in India*, Chapters on *The Carnatic*, and *The Musnud in Abeyance*, and also Chapter xvii, *Rights and Titles*.

“In the determination of the future disposal of the Musnud of the Carnatic, it is quite unnecessary to make any reference to the Treaties of 1785, 1787 and 1792. Subsequently to the date of those Treaties, it was declared by the British Government that the detected treachery, and secret but active hostility of the Nawabs Mahomed Ali and Omdut-ool-Oomra, had placed them in the position of public enemies, had rendered their territories justly liable to forfeiture, and had, therefore, abrogated the Treaties which had previously been in force.”*

And then he proceeds to quote two passages from Lord Wellesley's Despatches in which there is not one word as to the Treaties being abrogated. No such declaration in fact was ever made anywhere before 1856. We have only to contrast Lord Dalhousie's assertion with Article II of the Treaty of 1801, and we shall see at a glance that the former is quite contrary to the truth. Lord Dalhousie states that the old Treaties were “*abrogated*,” and that no reference can now be made to them. Article II of the Treaty of 1801 “*confirms and renews* such parts of the Treaties heretofore concluded between the East India Company and their Highnesses, heretofore Nabobs of the Carnatic, as are calculated to strengthen the alliance, to cement the friendship, and to identify the interests of the contracting parties.”† This confirmation appears to me to be the very reverse of abrogation.

By the Preamble of the same Treaty the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah, father of the present claimant, was “established by the East India Company in the rank, property and possessions of his ancestors, heretofore Nabobs of the Carnatic”; and by Article I, “in the state and rank, with the dignities dependent thereon, of his ancestors.” The state and rank of his ancestor, the Nawab Wallajah, with whom the first Treaty was made, was that of hereditary Nawab and Sovereign of the Carnatic. The Proclamation issued by the Government on the 31st July, 1801, to the Zemindars and people of the Carnatic, expressly states that Azeem-ood-Dowlah “has succeeded to the *hereditary* rights of his father, and by full acknowledgment of the Honourable Company, to the possession of the said Musnud.”‡

* *Carnatic Papers*, 1860, p. 47.

† *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta (Longmans, London) vol. v, p. 249.

‡ *Carnatic Papers*, 1860, p. 105.

The Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah, his eldest son Azum Jah, and his grandson, Gholam Mahomed Ghous Khan, were successively recognised and proclaimed as Sovereigns of the Carnatic and as Allies of the British Government. When the late Nawab, then an infant, succeeded his father, who died on the 12th November 1825, a letter was addressed by the Court of Directors to Prince Azeem Jah, the present claimant, on his being appointed Regent during the minority of his nephew, from which the following extract is taken :—

“The accession of Ghoolam Mahomed Ghous Khan Bahadoor, the legitimate son of the late Nabob, *to the throne of his ancestors*, we readily confirmed, and we pray God that he may long live to *enjoy the honours and perpetuate the line of the ancient and illustrious family of which he is the descendant and heir.*”

A letter of similar purport was sent to the Prince by His Majesty King George IV, countersigned by Lord Ellenborough, as President of the Board of Control, in which the following words occur :—

“We cannot but admire the beneficent dispensation of Providence, which in taking from his Highness his illustrious father, our friend, has given to him in your Highness a second father, endowed with equal virtues, *and capable of maintaining in the splendour and dignity which are its inheritance, the illustrious House of the Nabobs of the Carnatic.*”

Moreover, during the life-time of his nephew, Prince Azeem Jah had been officially recognised in public documents as the heir presumptive of the Musnud. In 1829, on the occasion of the appointment of Mr. Scott to be Physician to the Nawab, the Court of Directors wrote as follows :—

“We disapprove of the principle of this arrangement, but under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Nawab being an infant and in delicate health, and the Naib-i-Mookhtar (Azeem Jah) *being the next heir, in case of his demise*, the appointment of Mr. Scott admits of justification.”*

And in 1843, when the list of persons claiming exemption from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was revised, the Governor (the Marquis of Tweeddale) in Council observed,—

* *Carnatic Papers*, 1860, p. 15.

"His Highness the Prince Azeem Jah Bahadur (the late Naib-i-Mokhtar) does not hold that place in list No. 1, to which he is entitled, in consideration of the position he has lately occupied in communication with the British Government, and of that which he still holds in relation to his Highness the Nawab, *and to his succession to the Musnud*. It is, therefore, resolved, that the name of Prince Azeem Jah be placed first on the list of such relations of his Highness."*

Lord Dalhousie treated these unequivocal acknowledgments of the Nawab's dignity being hereditary, and of Prince Azeem Jah being next in succession, in the following elevated style, a good specimen of the political casuistry which he found so cruelly effective :—

"To indicate an expectation, or even an intention, is not to recognise or confer a right. The words, therefore, which have been quoted, conferred no right on Azeem Jah, and conveyed no pledge or promise of the succession to him; and, although they indicated a favourable intention on the part of the Government towards him, the Government has since had but too much reason to forego all such intentions in favour of himself, and the members of his family."†

He completely misconceives the effect of these incidental admissions of hereditary right. Undoubtedly to indicate an expectation or an intention does not confer a right, but it constitutes the plainest admission possible of an existing right. Prince Azeem Jah never professed to found his claim on those incidental admissions. He based his right on the Treaties concluded with his ancestors and his father, and produced these documents simply to prove what was the actual construction put upon those Treaties, years before Lord Dalhousie's arrival in India, by those British authorities who now, under Lord Dalhousie's instructions, sought to deny their validity.

Lord Dalhousie says that "the words which have been quoted, indicated a favourable intention of the Government towards" Prince Azeem Jah. They indicated nothing of the sort. There is not the least suggestion of grace or favour, of good or bad feeling in either of the documents. They are perfectly cold and formal. The position of Prince Azeem Jah as heir presumptive is mentioned as an ordinary matter of fact, applicable to the matter in hand, and open

* *Carnatic Papers*, 1860, p. 9.

† *Ibid*, p. 35.

to no doubt or question. Lord Dalhousie gratuitously suggests that there was "a favourable intention" towards the Nawab in 1843, in order that he may in some measure account for the altered views of our Government in 1856. He says :—"The Government has since had too much reason to forego all such intentions in favour of himself and the members of his family." This imputation was as unjust, and as ungenerous, as the previous one that "they must be inimical, or at all events discontented." The conduct of Prince Azeem Jah, of his nephew the late Nawab, and the members of his family, in their relations with our Government, since 1843, had been positively faultless. That Lord Harris and Lord Dalhousie fancied they could add some strength to their case by introducing the utterly irrelevant and impertinent question of the late Nawab's private morals and manners, only shows how weak they felt that case to be when confined within its true limits. That the late Nawab, notwithstanding some redeeming features in his character, was dissipated in his habits and reckless in his expenditure, cannot, I believe, be denied. From his infancy he was the Ward of our Government. Their utter and inexcusable neglect to provide for his proper education, and to surround him with suitable companions, was the incessant theme of indignant remark among the enlightened natives of the Presidency. His alleged loose morals, however, never led to any public scandal, never caused the slightest inconvenience or embarrassment to our Government. The extension by Lord Dalhousie of these injurious aspersions so as to include Prince Azeem Jah "and the members of his family," can only be adequately described as calumnious. Prince Azeem Jah's private character has always been irreproachable.

What sort of reception would a Radical Member of Parliament or journalist meet with, who should propose to annul the hereditary sinecure, or pension, or charge upon the Post Office or Excise revenues, or to resume the Crown or Church lands, enjoyed by some noble family, on the ground of the immoral life of the actual or late possessor? And yet what comparison can there be between the tenure of such possessions, held by a Royal grant or mere

prescription, and of that which rests upon solemn treaties,—treaties, moreover, upon which alone depends our title to occupy and govern the Carnatic, guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 to the Wallajah family.

There is not a family in India to which we are so deeply indebted, to which we are bound by so many reiterated promises, recorded in treaties, and confirmed by a series of autograph Royal letters, as that of the Nawabs of the Carnatic. As our power grew more secure, their support became less necessary. The demands and encroachments of the East India Company gradually increased, and are marked by the successive Treaties. The relative positions of the contracting parties were very peculiar, and hardly compatible with the good government of Southern India in settled times. Still, making every allowance for the difficult situation, we did not treat the Wallajah family well; and having at last made an opportunity, in a manner far from creditable to ourselves, in 1801, we extorted from them a new Treaty, by which all executive and administrative power was resigned into the hands of the British Government.

We might have been satisfied now. No one thought or disturbing that settlement until Lord Dalhousie arrived in India. It struck him that it did not “*pay*.” He observed that “a large share of the public revenue” was “*allotted*” to the Nawab.* In another part of the same Minute he said that “no grant of anything is made by this Treaty to any one but the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah himself.”† Lord Dalhousie was very fond of calling a Treaty a “grant.”‡ He misunderstands the Carnatic Treaty of 1801 altogether. Nothing was granted by it to any one but the East India Company. The Nawab was the grantor, the Company was the grantee. Azeem-ood-Dowlah being established in his ancestral possessions, granted “the civil and military administration” of them to the Honourable Company, a certain annual income being “allotted,” or rather reserved for the Nawab. Twenty years after the date of that Treaty, during the reign of

* *Minute of February 28th, 1856, para. 43, Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 50.*

† *Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 48.*

‡ *Ante, p. 22.*

Azeem-ood-Dowlah's son, Sir Thomas Munro, then Governor of Madras, wrote as follows :—

“By the first Article” (of the Treaty of 1801) “the Nawaub Azeem-ul-Dowlah Bahadoor is formally established in the state and rank, with the dignities dependent thereon, of his ancestors.

“By the 3rd Article the Nawaub does not relinquish his sovereignty; he merely renews the Article of former treaties, by which he engages not to correspond with foreign States without the consent of the Company.

“By the fifth Article, one fifth part of the net revenue of the Carnatic is allowed for ‘the maintenance and support of the said Nawaub.’

“The fifth part is his claim as Sovereign of the whole Carnatic.

“By the tenth Article, the rank of the Nawaub as a Prince and as an Ally of the British Government, is declared. No change in the political situation of the Nawaub has taken place since 1801. He is still Prince of the Carnatic, and he is a party to the Treaty by which one-fifth part of the revenue is secured to him.”*

Lord Hastings describes in his Private Journal an interview he had in 1813 with the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah and his four sons, one of whom was Prince Azeem Jah. When the Nawab, by an expressive Oriental obeisance, threw himself and his children under the protection of the Governor-General, Lord Hastings observes that he felt the most lively emotion, “from the reflection on the altered state of that family through its adherence to British interests,—a family so grievously humiliated by us.” The Nawab, says Lord Hastings, “having adverted to the Treaty, and professed his anxiety for an assurance that I should cause its provisions to be observed,”—“I answered that a treaty pledged the faith of the nation, so that it must be my duty to maintain its terms according to their true spirit, which ought always to be construed most favourably for the party whose sole dependence was on the honour of the other.”†

Lord Dalhousie's views as to the construction of Indian Treaties differed widely from those of his gallant predecessor. Far from agreeing with him,—and, I may add, with all writers on International Law,—that Treaties should

* *Gleig's Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, vol. ii, p. 356.

† *Private Journal*, (1858) vol. ii, p. 11.

always be construed most favourably for the weaker party, he seems to have adopted, perhaps he originated, the Duke of Argyll's formula, that they "expressed nothing but the will of a Superior imposing on his Vassal so much as for the time it was thought expedient to require."*

It is an absolute certainty, not to be shaken by any plausible misrepresentation, that before the death of the late Nawab in 1855,—when Lord Dalhousie wrote from the Neilgherry Hills to Lord Harris at Madras that there was "*no direct heir to the Musnud*,"†—no doubt as to the hereditary nature of the Nawab's dignity had ever been expressed or hinted at by any British authority. No word of grace or favour had ever been employed at either of the two successions that had taken place since the Treaty of 1801. Neither the phrase nor the idea of "a personal Treaty,"—of binding force only during the life of the present claimant's father,—can be found in the transactions of any Governor of Madras or Governor-General, from Lord Wellesley down to Lord Hardinge.

In a Memorandum drawn up in 1806 by the Duke of Wellington (then Sir Arthur Wellesley) for the information of the Ministry, and as materials for a Parliamentary defence of his brother, the Marquis Wellesley, it is expressly stated that the Treaty of 1801 was concluded so that "the civil and military government of the Carnatic was transferred for ever to the Company; and the Nabob Azeem-ood-Dowlah, *and his heirs*, were to preserve their title and dignity, and to receive one-fifth part of the net revenues of the country."‡ Prince Azeem Jah is a son of the Nabob Azeem-ood-Dowlah.

Lord Dalhousie wanted this "large share of the public revenues."§ Having determined on getting it by a perverse interpretation of the Treaty, never contemplated before, and which never has been, and never will be sanc-

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 11.

† *Carnatic Papers*, 1860, p. 17.

‡ *Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington*, vol. iv, pp. 564, 565

§ It may be as well to explain that although termed, for the diplomatic purposes of the time, "a fifth share of the revenues of the Carnatic," a Separate Explanatory Article transformed the Nawab's share into a fixed income, which at the time of the late Nawab's death was not a fifteenth share. Of course Sir Charles Jackson does not understand this.—*A Vindication*, p. 84.

tioned by any jurist,*—having decided on turning the Wallajah family out of their Palace into the streets, he raked in all the gutters of Madras for dirt to throw at them.

And for what? Is it necessary to say another word to point out the utter imbecility of the notion that by making an influential family poor and discontented you can prevent it from becoming “a nucleus for intrigue”?

The deposition of the Wallajah family, viewed simply as a question of political expediency, was a most shortsighted and unstatesmanlike proceeding. Not only did it bring great dishonour upon our Government, but it deprived us of a substantial security. It has shaken the allegiance and estranged the feelings of a large section of the people,—a sober, orderly, and industrious class, whose historical antecedents and progressive aspirations give them a more important place in the social equilibrium of India than might seem warranted by their comparative numbers. So closely does the reception of all questions of law and politics among the Mussulman community depend upon religious considerations,—so accustomed are they, in the absence of a priesthood, to pay the profoundest deference in such matters to the decision of the highest established dignitary of their own faith,—that it was an inestimable advantage to our Government to have a person of Princely rank, associated with us by ancient ties, traditionally and habitually attached to British interests, placed at the head of the Mahomedans of Southern India, as their Imaum or religious leader. Residing at one of the great centres of our power, with so much to lose, and so little to expect

* The following opinion of Mr. Lush, Q.C., (now Mr. Justice Lush) refers to much longer and more elaborate Opinions by Sir Travers Twiss, now the Queen's Advocate, and the Hon. J. B. Norton, Advocate-General and Member of the Legislative Council at Madras. “I entirely concur in the opinions expressed by Dr. Twiss and Mr. Norton, that the Treaty is an enduring contract, binding on both sides, so long as there exists any member of the family of the Nabob Azeem-ul-Dowlah capable of succeeding to the rank. And I come to this conclusion upon consideration of the terms of the Treaty itself, read with reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and without regard to the Letter, Proclamation and Despatch which followed it. These documents, however, might be called in aid, were the language of the Treaty ambiguous, as a contemporaneous exposition of its meaning. But whether read with or without them, it does not appear to me to admit of any other construction than that contended for by His Highness Azeem Jah.”

Temple, December 1st, 1864.

(Signed)

ROBERT LUSH.

from any disturbance or change, he could not be otherwise than conservative in politics and moderate in religion.

The ruin of the Wallajah family has operated to the detriment of our Imperial system in various directions, and these evil effects will be aggravated rather than diminished by the lapse of years. The Mahomedans in general are indignant and disgusted at seeing their spiritual Chief, the patron and guardian of their religious rites, impoverished and degraded by the British Government. How much these feelings are embittered, and to what a large extent they are shared by the Hindoos of the Carnatic, in consequence of the question of Sovereignty, set at rest under the last Treaty, being stirred up again by our flagrant breach of faith, is well understood by those who are best able to inquire.

But this is not all. It may be difficult for many of us to commiserate a man with an income of £15,000 a year, the increased stipend offered to Prince Azeem Jah.* For several years, however, he refused to touch it, and was at last reduced to draw sums on account, only under protest, and by the sheer starvation of his servants and small creditors. And it must be remembered that this stipend was merely a life income for a man nearly seventy years of age, with four sons, a tribe of near relatives, and innumerable hereditary adherents and dependents. The Nawab's annual revenue had been about £120,000. When, therefore, the representative head of this great family was reduced to penury, the Palace converted into Public Offices, the Royal establishments broken up, and all that "pageantry and buffoonery" abolished which offends the Duke of Argyll's severer tastes, the occupation of many a Mussulman of stalwart frame or ready wit, was gone. We had no place for him; he had "no claim on the consideration of Government." Some few may learn to dig; some, especially the old, are not ashamed to beg; but all those of a higher spirit and of the best qualifications, went off, sooner or later, to Hyderabad. Doctors of the Law, professors of Arabic learning and science, men of the sword and of the pen,—pedants and swash-bucklers, if you will,—found no refuge nearer than the Nizam's Dominions. A

* Lord Dalhousie proposed £10,000

good riddance! it may be said. Indeed! They were well in hand at Madras, employed, tolerably contented, and under control. Lord Dalhousie's policy has thrown them, a most unwelcome burden, on the Nizam's resources,—for many of them brought claims and recommendations that a Mussulman Sovereign could not resist,—and it may easily be conceived what pleasing pictures of British rule they must have brought with them, and what grateful sentiments towards the Paramount Power they are likely to entertain and to propagate. There were quite enough of these classes at Hyderabad, without these hungry refugees from Madras to swell the crowd and to heighten disaffection.

The Nawab of the Carnatic in our hands was a very serviceable instrument : the attractions of his Court most usefully counterbalanced, to some extent, the preponderating influence exercised by the Nizam over the Mussulman population of the South. The British Government, under Lord Dalhousie's guidance, has done its best to transform this preponderating influence into an absolute and undivided supremacy, to suppress old rivalries and jealousies which were by no means injurious to the cause of order, and to set up in their stead new sympathies and common grievances, to knit more closely the social and religious ties between the Deccan and the Carnatic, and to make Hyderabad the centre of political and religious thought and authority, to which the eyes of all Southern Mahomedans are henceforth to be turned.

For results such as these, so honourable and so advantageous to Great Britain and to India, the family of our oldest Ally was degraded and despoiled. It may serve as a fair specimen of Lord Dalhousie's statesmanship. We shall be told perhaps, that "*it paid*." Well—the Indian Exchequer has been deriving an apparent profit every year of rather more than £50,000 by repudiating the Treaty, and if Lord Dalhousie's arrangements were maintained, the annual gain would increase as the life-pensions lapsed.

But can Lord Dalhousie's arrangements be maintained? Have they been maintained? Prince Azeem Jah's stipend was increased by one-half in 1858, without the effect of

inducing him to renounce his rights. A large grant of money has more recently been made for the payment of his debts, and it is understood that some plan of compromise is now under consideration by which a hereditary title with a permanent annual income will be settled on him and his heirs.

Sir Charles Jackson says that "the Government undertook to pay the Nawab's debts."* The Nawab's debts amounted to nearly £400,000, or about three years' income, and could, of course, have been easily paid off by good management, which it was always within the power of our Government to enforce. Those debts were contracted on the credit of the Nawab's revenue, and when our Government was pleased to sequester that revenue, they were clearly bound to answer for the debts. But they were not satisfied with the revenue; they confiscated everything that could be turned into cash. All the lands, gardens, buildings and personal property belonging to the family, every relic and heirloom, down to the musnud of state and other insignia of the Nawab's dignity, were either appropriated to the purposes of our Government, or sold for their benefit. In this way about £350,000, nearly the amount of the debts, was raised. The principal Palace—where Prince Azeem Jah was born, and the last three Nawabs, his father, brother and nephew, died,—is turned into a range of Public Offices, while the Prince is compelled to pay a heavy rent for one of the minor residences, granted for his use by the late Nawab, and which he has occupied for the last forty years. Sir Charles Jackson must have been quite unaware of these facts when he gave our Government credit for having paid the Nawab's debts.

Credit and praise for what is represented as unexampled liberality and generosity, are often demanded for our Government, and especially for Lord Dalhousie, on grounds quite as insufficient as in that of the Carnatic. Thus the Duke of Argyll, after declaring that in the case of Sattara, "private rights and private property were not called in question," adds:—

"Lord Dalhousie not only admitted the adopted boy to be the

* *A Vindication*, p. 105.

Rajah's private heir, but he went out of his way to recommend that a special allowance should be assigned to him by the Government of India."*

Surely Lord Dalhousie did not go "out of his way" very far, when he recommended that some provision should be made for the adopted son and heir, according to the law of the land, of a friendly Prince, exemplary in all his public relations towards us and his subjects, whose territories we had confiscated, and whose Civil List,—almost the only source of income to the Royal family,—we had suppressed.

Sir Charles Jackson writes as follows:—"Lord Dalhousie never disputed the validity of adoptions as such. He never denied their alleged spiritual effect,"—this was, indeed, truly liberal!—"and nothing he said or did could affect their validity as acts done in the performance of a religious duty. He recognised them as facts, and was careful to give effect to them so far as the private property of these Princes was concerned."†

Lord Dalhousie frequently made much more liberal professions than he was prepared to carry into practice. Whatever he may have said, it is certain that he was *not* "careful to give effect" to the rules for the proper retention or descent of private property in the several instances of acquisitions of territory and revenue.

On every occasion, including the Punjaub, there was more or less spoliation of private property. Of the Carnatic confiscations we have already spoken. Notwithstanding the confident assertions of the two apologists, it is quite certain that the whole of the Sattara Rajah's plate, jewels and other personal property, was not given to his adopted son. Lord Dalhousie himself tells us that the Honourable Court,—who, we cannot doubt, merely approved and confirmed, as usual, the suggestions from India,—“while they declared their desire to provide liberally for the Sattara family, and their wish that the ladies”—not, be it observed, the adopted son,—“should retain jewels, furniture and other personal property suitable to their rank, still objected that so much property *which was fairly at the disposal of the Government*, was greatly in excess of what was

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 29. † *A Vindication*, p. 8.

required.”* And he employed this case as a precedent for the spoliation of the Nagpore Palace.

Sir Charles Jackson devotes a whole Chapter of his *Vindication* to the defence of Lord Dalhousie from the charge of having despoiled the Bhonsla family of Nagpore. I have already treated that subject very fully, but Sir Charles Jackson, though quoting me two or three times, does not attempt to deal with my arguments.†

I showed that although the sum realised by the sale of the personal property of the Bhonsla family, and the seizure of their private treasure, only amounted to about £270,000, Lord Dalhousie had good reason to expect a much larger sum, and that, according to his plan,

“The private personal property of the Bhonsla family, computed by Mr. Mansel at some fifty-five or sixty lakhs of rupees” (£550,000 or £600,000,) “was declared to be the first source from which the Rances’ life-annuities were to be supplied, and it was only in case of any deficiency that the annexing Government was to be called upon to bear any part of the expense. In short, the private property was sequestered and sold, to provide the public stipends granted as compensation for the loss of their sovereignty; their capital was confiscated, their valuables sold by auction, and life-annuities were conferred upon them out of the proceeds!”‡

That Lord Dalhousie’s object is correctly interpreted in this passage appears clearly enough from the following sentence in the despatch of the Court of Directors on the subject :—

“From the very considerable *personal property* of the Rajah you have decided to allot to the Rances, jewels, furniture and other articles suitable to their rank; and, as we understand your intention, to form the remainder into a fund, *from which the pensions will be defrayed*, your Government making up any deficiency.”§

My comments were thus continued :—

“Setting aside for the moment the utter iniquity of the annexation, and assuming that there was a genuine lapse for want of an heir capable of reigning, I find it very difficult to trace the process of reasoning, by which Lord Dalhousie and the Court of Directors contrived to persuade themselves that the immediate family of a friendly Sovereign whose territory we had annexed, were not entitled to the custody and management of their own

* *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 13.

† *A Vindication*, p. 81, and see *The Empire in India*, “The Bhonsla Fund.”

‡ *Empire in India*, p. 230.

§ *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 1.

private property, but were entitled only to a life-interest in such a proportion of it as the annexing Government chose to consider sufficient for their maintenance. Most people, I think, would on mature consideration decide, that the intrusive Power was bound in honour and in justice to provide from its own revenues, augmented as they were by the revenue of the new acquisition, an adequate and becoming income for the representatives of the ejected dynasty, for these members of the Royal family who had formerly depended upon the Civil List of the Sovereign. Most people would come to the conclusion, that even if the representatives of the friendly dynasty were, or were assumed to be, merely the widows of the last Sovereign, the obligation to provide for them would remain equally strong. And this being granted, it appears by no means equitable that the whole, or any part, of this provision should be derived from the confiscated personal property of the deceased Sovereign.”*

On all this part of my argument Sir Charles Jackson has not a word to say.

I then went on to point out that there was a “singular inconsistency of statement both in Lord Dalhousie’s original instructions, and in Mr. Temple’s recent Report on this financial master-piece.”

“In his very natural desire to overlay this ugly deed with a little moral gilding, Lord Dalhousie betrayed himself into some inconsistency of language, but his practical object is not at all ambiguous. He intended absolutely to appropriate the private property of the family, and with the proceeds to supply, or reduce as much as possible, the annual expense of their maintenance. He does indeed repeatedly declare that the proceeds shall not be ‘alienated from the Bhonsla family.’ But as he simultaneously employs in these very Minutes, and in the orders issued at the same time to the Commissioner, other terms implying a totally opposite meaning, these pretty expressions become mere prevarications, and fail entirely to give an air of decency to what was, in fact, a daring act of spoliation.”†

Sir Charles Jackson “can find nothing in Lord Dalhousie’s Minutes to justify these remarks,” against which he indignantly protests. Let me assist him once more. Lord Dalhousie did indeed say that the money realised by the sale of “the jewels, furniture and other personal property,” should be “constituted a fund for the benefit of the Bhonsla family.” But his further instructions show

* *Empire in India*, pp. 230, 231.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 240, 241.

that the only "benefit" to be conferred on them was to be given in the shape of pensions for life ; that the pensions were to be drawn from the Bhonsla Fund, so far as it would go, and that if "the value likely to be realised" (by the sale of the jewels, etc.) should prove to have been "over-estimated, the Government should be prepared to make up any sums that may be wanting to afford adequate stipends to the family."* Thus as our Government was clearly bound, whether the Rajah had left much or little personal property, to provide an adequate income for his widows, the money realised by the sale of the personal property would conduce to the benefit of our Government and not of the Bhonsla family, more especially as the Ranees could not live for ever, and one of them was more than seventy years of age.

Sir Charles Jackson, admitting that Lord Dalhousie was "not sufficiently explicit as to the destination of this Fund eventually," that he "did not explain how the Fund was to be dealt with when the pensions were paid off,"—*i.e.* when the pensioned widows were all dead,—still believes that the Fund was intended "to be an inalienable deposit," "an inalienable fund for the benefit of the Bhonsla family."† Mr. Marshman, in the following passage, seems to entertain the same opinion :—

"There can be little doubt that this mode of disposing of the jewels and gems which had been accumulated by that Royal House for more than a century, by the hammer of the auctioneer, was revolting to the feelings of the native community, and open to all the censure that has been passed upon it ; but the proceeds, amounting to twenty lakhs of rupees, were considered a sacred deposit for the use of the family."‡

The Bhonsla family would no doubt be highly gratified to hear that this Fund is considered to be a sacred and inalienable deposit for their benefit, by Mr. Marshman and Sir Charles Jackson, and might be encouraged to renew their claim to have, to say the least, some voice in its disposal ; but the apologists have simply been misled by the ambiguity of the language that has been used. Lord Dalhousie cer-

* *Further Papers, Berar*, p. 10. † *A Vindication*, pp. 78, 79.

‡ *Marshman's History of India*, vol. iii, p. 395.

tainly said that the Rajah's personal property should "not be alienated" from the family, but at the same time he said that the proceeds should be employed for certain public purposes, which ought to have been, and otherwise must have been, defrayed from the public revenue. Mr. Temple,* when Chief Commissioner of the Nagpore Provinces, in his Administration Report for 1861-62, terms the Bhonsla Fund "*a deposit* in the hands of the British Government for the benefit of the Bhonsla family." But in a subsequent passage he claims this Fund as "*a set-off*" against the expense of pensioning the family and its retainers."

Although, therefore, Lord Dalhousie deprecated "the petulance and vexatious opposition" of the Rajah's widows, and declared that "*a Fund for the use of the Ranees* is to be formed out of the value of property to be sold for their behoof,"† nothing can be more clear than that he never intended them to have the use of it. The private moveables of the Bhonsla family,—the Ranees' own personal jewels, the clothes in their possession, and the furniture of the rooms they occupied, excepted,—all went to the hammer for the benefit of the British Government. The money realised was nothing more than an extraordinary source of revenue, brought to account, and kept for some years, as "the Bhonsla Fund." The application of that name to the Fund was nothing more than a financial equivocation. The declaration that it was "for the use of the Ranees" was intended to smooth difficulties, to prevent violent opposition and resistance, and to cover a scandalous and shameless act of plunder with a temporary veil of propriety and benevolence.

But Sir Charles Jackson has still a few words to say:—

"While this sheet has been in the press, the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* announces, that Sir C. Trevelyan has 'absorbed' this Fund, and 'capitalised' it. I suppose this means that the money has been taken by the Government, and Government Paper substituted for it."‡

* Now Sir Richard Temple, K.C.S.I., who since a great part of this book was printed has accepted the office of Financial Member of Council,—Chancellor of the Exchequer for India.

† *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 30.

‡ *A Vindication*, p. 79.

Not at all,—it means something very different.

On the 1st of April, 1865, Sir Charles Trevelyan, explaining the Regular Estimate for the current year in the Legislative Council of India, observed on an increase of £117,776 under 'Miscellaneous Civil Receipts,' that "it arose from the transfer of the balance of the *Bhonslu Fund* to Revenue, after deducting £30,849, invested with a view to disconnect the Government from certain permanent religious endowments. The pensions chargeable on this Fund much exceed the annual proceeds, and the excess was paid out of Revenue. The whole of the pensions have now been charged against Revenue, and the Fund has ceased to exist,"*—that is to say has been openly appropriated by the Government of India. The solemn mockery of "a deposit" has disappeared, and the personal property of the dispossessed Royal family is quietly absorbed as "a set-off" to the expense of their stipendary maintenance.

The Duke of Argyll is indignant that the assailants of Lord Dalhousie should profess "allegiance to some great principle of morality which was not evident to a Statesman of as high a honour as ever ruled in India, to the great majority of his Council, to the Court of Directors, or to the members of the Queen's Government at Home."†

No Governor-General has ever met with substantial opposition from his Council of functionaries. As to the Court of Directors, many of whom strove in vain to resist the tide of annexation, the Duke of Argyll himself shall relieve them from all responsibility.

"Whatever errors had been committed in the Government of India had been the errors of the Crown—of its responsible Ministers in England or in India. The Company, as a governing body, had been dead for more than seventy years. It had been dead, but not buried. Its skin had been preserved, and set up as if it were still alive."‡

Whatever blame may attach to the administration of any Governor-General must rest on his own shoulders, just as he is fully entitled, on the other hand, to enjoy the credit

* *Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of India for making Laws and Regulations*, 1865, p. 152.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, preface, pp. vii, viii.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

of all his successes. So long as he retained the confidence of the Home Government, a man of Lord Dalhousie's ability could always have his own way.

As to the "high honour" of Lord Dalhousie, no one ever thought of impugning it. It is not his honour, but his capacity, that is questioned. He was fully equal to the duties of office; he was unequal to the higher functions of government. There can be no doubt that his intentions were excellent. His errors arose from his taking a mean and mechanical view of Imperial supremacy, scarcely rising above the notion of making it "pay." And his only idea of making it "pay" seems to have been that of getting as much revenue and ready money as possible, regardless of establishments and expenditure.

The Duke of Argyll wants to know in what "great principle of morality" Lord Dalhousie's policy was deficient. Its deficiency was not so much in any lofty principle, appreciable only by European saints and philosophers, as in certain primary doctrines of social and political morality, which come home to the heart of every peasant in India, and which no competent Ruler of Oriental nations could have ever misunderstood or forgotten. The mutual obligations of Sovereign and Vassal, of protector and dependent, of master and servant, have constituted in India, from time immemorial, the very keystone of society and of the State. Those relations and the corresponding obligations, may have become dim and confused in the great Anglo-Saxon communities of the two Worlds, and some of us may have begun to look upon them as transitory phenomena. But wherever they still subsist, and are respected as fundamental principles of politics and law, in the manners and customs of the tribe and the family, as among Asiatic nations, and eminently in India, they cannot be disregarded or rudely shaken without disastrous results.

It was by transactions like those we have just discussed,—by deposing friendly families to whom we had promised perpetual protection, and by adding to the extinction of their Sovereignty the desecration of their Palaces, and the spoliation of their wealth,—that Lord Dalhousie outraged decency as well as justice, and roused disgust and resentment all over India. It was by the contemplation and

recollection of the painful scenes and humiliating results arising from some of these transactions, that the present writer was provoked some years ago into using some strong language with reference to Lord Dalhousie's public conduct as a British Viceroy, against which Sir Charles Jackson, Mr. Marshman, and the *Edinburgh Review* of October, 1866, all remonstrate.

Feeling strongly that the most distinctive measures of Lord Dalhousie's administration were acts of unexampled political baseness,—raising many of our most faithful, submissive and unobtrusive feudatories into the conspicuous position of victims and martyrs, placing ignorant Mahratta women on a moral elevation far above their despoilers, debasing the name and lowering the dignity of the great Sovereign and nation whom he represented, in the eyes of the people of India,—I said he was “the basest of rulers.”

Sir Charles Jackson, who twice quotes the passage in question, protests that “these remarks might have been excusable, if Lord Dalhousie had done his great deeds to aggrandise his own fortune,” but it should be “remembered that all his acts were done in the service of his country.”* In another place he complains of “the imputations which have been so freely cast upon the memory of a great Statesman.”†

The *Edinburgh Reviewer* of October, 1866, quoting the same passage without naming the book or the author, says :—“Mr. Kaye, it gives us pleasure to record, writes in a very different spirit. He has given Lord Dalhousie full credit for the entire singleness and purity of his motives.”‡

Those who assailed Lord Dalhousie's measures, both while he was in power and since his retirement and death, assailed him as a public man and on public grounds, and none of them are, to my knowledge, open to the charge of making unfair imputations. They attacked his character as a Ruler, not his private character, his “high honour,” or “the purity of his motives.” Nor ought they to be deterred by such unfair remonstrances, or by appeals,—doubtful in truth as well as in taste,—to his alleged “sacri-

* *A Vindication*, pp. 176, 177, and p. 2.

† *Ibid.*, p. 42.

‡ *Edinburgh Review*, October 1866, p. 301.

fices," to his "life prematurely worn out in the service of his country,"* from applying the most searching criticism, and, if necessary, the severest reprobation, to a policy which has had such momentous results, which is still held up for our admiration and recommended for future completion.

No one would deny or doubt Lord Dalhousie's public spirit in accepting the office of Governor-General, or the untiring energy with which he gave himself to the work. But there is a spice of that abject reverence for titular distinctions which taints the manliness of English life, in the scarcely disguised assumption that the official labours of an Earl of long descent are sanctified by an element of disinterested heroism, to which no claim can be laid by men of coarser clay. Almost any one of the educated classes, who accepts office in India after having commenced his avocation at home and attained to some degree of success in it, may be said to make a sacrifice. The sacrifice must be very large that is not compensated by the position of Viceroy of India, with emoluments of nearly £40,000 a year,† and the prospect, according to numerous precedents, of a large donation or pension at the end of the usual term. The greatest prize to be won on the political field of Great Britain would not have given a comparatively poor nobleman a large personal fortune in eight years, and Lord Dalhousie would have been more or less than human if he had been utterly indifferent to such homely considerations.

No one, to my knowledge, has ever impugned "the singleness and purity of his motives," or doubted that he always had in view what he supposed to be "the service of his country." But we object that he took a confined view of what was good for the country,—that he always had his eye on forms of administration and not on the substance of government; that he always preferred, in perfect sincerity, the narrow measure of the permanent official to the broad survey of the statesman. Whatever aggran-

* *A Vindication*, p. 2.

† The salary is £24,000 per annum, but great establishments are maintained at the public expense, and contingent allowances made for purposes of entertainment and representation.

dised the great official Department of which he was the Head, must be expedient and just, good for the people of India, good for the British Empire. In short,—to compare great things with small,—I look upon Lord Dalhousie's motives and conduct in prosecuting his policy of annexation, very much as the Duke of Argyll, some three years ago, looked upon the motives and conduct of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests in pursuing their policy of annexing the Foreshores of Scotland. I think of his "proceedings," as his Grace did of theirs, that they were "not creditable," and that they were carried on by what was "not a legitimate method." Like the Commissioners of Woods and Forests against whom the Duke appealed, Lord Dalhousie "stretched and extended" the claims of the Imperial Government "by a system which aims at securing the acquiescence of individuals on the calculation that they will not resist." Like those officials, he constantly "held the most confident and peremptory language," when he would, "nevertheless, have shrunk from defending the claim before a court of law,"* and even from referring it for the opinion of his own law officers. I think that the general tendency of the foreign policy of India, instigated by the Civil Service and prosecuted under Lord Dalhousie's guidance, was that of introducing everywhere "an expensive and vexatious management for the sake of extending business."† It was—I still borrow the Duke's appropriate phraseology,—“a policy deliberately and actively pursued,—a policy not consistent with fair dealing.”‡ It was a policy “offering many temptations to proceedings of a very doubtful character,” and which, unless “played with perfect fairness and candour towards individuals, must tend to unjust and oppressive dealing. It then becomes a policy not merely for establishing the just claims of the Crown, but for breaking down and usurping both public and private rights.”§ I think of Lord Dalhousie, as the Duke did of a highly respectable officer of the Woods and Forests, that “in his eagerness to assert and establish what he conceived to be the rights of the Crown, he took very little pains to ascertain the local facts and the rights of others.”||

* *Papers, Foreshores of Scotland*, 1866, p. 6.

† *Ibid.*, p. 15.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 16.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 7 and 10.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 32.

In the words of the Duke of Argyll when called to account by my Lords of the Treasury for having "imputed motives" to the Woods and Forests and its officers,*—"attributed their proceedings to improper motives,"†—I reply to similar remonstrances that "I have never expressed any doubt that all the officers of the Department acted according to their own views of public duty." Like his Grace, I urge that "it is one thing to point out that a public officer is placed under a natural and unconscious but powerful bias in a particular direction, and it is quite another to accuse him of consciously recommending improper proceedings for the purpose of procuring gain,"‡ or, I may add, of being deficient in "some great principle of morality."§ When charged with impugning "the singleness and purity" of Lord Dalhousie's "motives," I answer, with the Duke, that "I have never attributed to him any other motive than zeal to secure what he considered" a great public object. "But," still in his Grace's words, "I have represented, and do still represent, that he and his Department pursued that object in a spirit and in a method injurious to the just rights of individuals and the public."||

The Duke of Argyll explains that "the motive" which he really "attributed to the Department of Woods and Forests," was "the desire to establish, upon a series of successful precedents, certain claims on behalf of the Crown in respect of Foreshores, which, in Scotland at least, have only been recently asserted, which it is notorious that the most eminent writers on the law of Scotland have not recognised."¶ Referring to "the precedents" brought forward in the official report, he observes that "so far as quoted by Mr. Howard, they are all of very recent date,"** and that the Department is gradually "founding a general principle by securing successive cases of individual acquiescence."††

These objections to the official procedure of a Department are singularly analogous to my own strictures on "the doctrine of lapse," so "recently asserted" in India,

* *Foreshores of Scotland*, 1866, p. 15. † *Ibid.*, p. 18.

§ *Ante*, p. 270. || *Foreshores of Scotland*, 1866, p. 31.

** *Ibid.*, p. 19. †† *Ibid.*, p. 15.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

"which it is notorious that the most eminent writers on the law" of India, "have not recognised," which it was sought to establish as "a general principle," partly on an imaginary series of precedents, and partly on precedents "of very recent date," obtained by "securing the acquiescence of individuals on the calculation that they could not resist."*

I had a two-fold object in bringing forward this parallel between the principles involved in the several claims of Government,—here to barren strips of coast, there to broad and fertile Provinces,—and the official procedure to enforce them, in Scotland and India. Firstly, I wished to show that when what appears like official sharp practice is brought near to our own doors in matters in which we take a personal or neighbourly interest, even so calm and dispassionate a person as the Duke of Argyll may manifest considerable indignation, use pretty strong language, be supposed to impute "unworthy and improper motives," and yet may not have intended to make any "personal charge,"† or to accuse an officer or a Department of acting with deliberate injustice, and of being deficient in some "great principle of morality."

Secondly, the Duke's complaint against "the spirit and method" of the Department with which he came in collision, may aid us to define the nature and extent of the defective appreciation of right and wrong which I attribute to Lord Dalhousie and his official advisers. For what is that "unconscious but powerful bias in a particular direction," leading to "a policy not consistent with fair dealing,"—"a policy for breaking down and usurping both public and private rights,"—of which the Duke and I complain, although neither he nor I "accuse" any one of "recommending improper proceedings for the purpose of procuring gain"? It is the professional spirit,—the tendency of every organised body of officials, and of every separate Department, to magnify its own value and importance, and to enlarge the sphere of its authority. The Civil Service of India, from its great emoluments, from the peculiar independence and irresponsibility given by its "covenants" and

* *Ante*, p. 275, and see *ante*, pp. 10 to 20.

† *Foreshores of Scotland*, 1866, pp. 10, 18.

its statutory privileges, from the frequent intermarriages, and close family ties with the Directors and great Proprietors of the East India Company, which had made it almost a caste, was the proudest and most powerful official hierarchy recorded in history. Though somewhat shorn of its beams by the disappearance of the Company, and the recruitment of its ranks by competition instead of patronage, the Indian Civil Service still possesses the virtual control of every Department in its ordinary workings, and a virtual monopoly not only of all the judicial, financial and administrative offices of any consequence, but of every post equivalent to that of Minister or Councillor of State in a European Government. No other Civil Service in the world, unless it be the Chinese, approaches so nearly to the character of a Governing Guild. The tendency to self-exaltation that assails the members of such a peculiar body,—bad enough if they were subject to all the social influences of a free national life,—is immeasurably aggravated by their position as highly educated strangers, in the midst of an inferior civilisation, withdrawn by their habits and tastes, as much as by language and religion, from all but official relations with the people around them. Naturally and inevitably they are practically indifferent to any public opinion but that of their own class. With equal certainty, and almost in proportion to each one's honest consciousness of good work performed, comes the feeling that whatever is "good for the Service," must be good service for the country. Hence arises an extraordinary confusion of official aggrandisement with national advantage, which has always prompted the Indian Civil Service, like those officials of whom the Duke of Argyll complains, to promote the establishment of "their expensive and vexatious management" all over India, not merely "for the sake of extending business,"* but with a thorough conviction that it was the true panacea for all political disorders, Imperial and local, that it would fill the British treasury, and make the country prosperous. Constituted as the Government of India has been since the consolidation of our supremacy, it has ever stood in need of vigilant supervision and restraint by the Executive and Legislative

* *Ante*, p. 274.

powers of Great Britain, and of an enlightened statesman at the helm as Governor-General, to save it from degenerating into mere officialism. Imperfect and intermittent as this restraint has always been, it almost entirely ceased to act during Lord Dalhousie's Viceroyalty. He was no statesman; all his mental and moral predilections fell in with those of the professional hierarchy which he should have tempered and controlled. Circumstances and events conspired to throw absolute power into his hands. His own talents and business energy, his personal and political connections, aided by the strong Calcutta party in the Court of Directors, gave full relief to successes, real and apparent, cast a veil over failures and lavish expenditure, and silenced all opponents. There were not many of them.

No man who took a statesmanlike or original view of Indian affairs in any Department, was ever admitted to the confidence of Lord Dalhousie, or ever obtained the slightest influence over him. He was incapable of understanding them. He shunned them, or shook them off, with instinctive aversion. He quarrelled with Sir Charles Napier, and snubbed General John Jacob,—two soldiers of widely divergent attributes, who, if he had fairly estimated their qualities, and availed himself of them, might have done much for the Indian Army. He completely ignored and neglected Sir Arthur Cotton, a true man of genius,—the greatest Engineer that ever entered the public service in India,—whose counsels would have saved millions of money and millions of lives, would have covered India with a network of navigable rivers and canals, pouring fertility over its plains, conveying its bulky goods to the coast, and swelling the public income without taxation, at half the expense of a few lines of Railway, utterly inefficient for the transport of produce, delusive as a military measure in time of war or insurrection, a perpetual burden on the revenues in time of peace. He silently declined consulting with Sir William Sleeman.* He shelved Sir Henry Lawrence.

The few eminent men in the Indian Services who deprecated the policy of annexation before 1857, had all been removed by their sphere of duty from the petty forms and

* *Ante*, p. 68.

details of a regular Collectorate or the routine of an established office. In the field of Indian diplomacy, and in the management of newly acquired and unsettled tracts of country, they had been made to deal with States instead of districts, and had been often brought face to face with natives of all classes, who were neither their suitors nor their subordinates. These were not the men to find favour in Lord Dalhousie's eyes. He did not want originality or liberality. He wanted unquestioning acquiescence. His sole idea of policy was to "extend the business" of the Department, at the head of which he found himself placed. That was his great motive. The chief merit which he recognised in those who served under him was one which he possessed himself in a marked degree—dexterity in getting through business. There is not the least trace in any of his political Minutes that he ever looked upon the mighty task of Government as anything but that of enforcing administrative regularity.

And thus it was that while no man, probably, was ever less disposed to be led by his Secretaries and Councillors, his narrow views coincided so exactly with those of the elder Civilians that they easily managed him, without, perhaps, either party being quite aware of the process. Sir John Willoughby, as we have seen, was the author of "the doctrine of lapse," and worked out the ruling precedent of Sattara. Mr. (now Sir John Peter) Grant, as Secretary to Government, framed a Note on the Jhansi succession, which, being accepted by the Governor-General as "a very full and clear exposition,"† may be said to have settled the case. Sir John Grant, when subsequently admitted to a seat in Council, held his own opinion on several occasions more strenuously and effectually than Lord Dalhousie was accustomed to or liked. Some signs of irritation at Mr. Grant's argumentative success in the Oude question can, I think, be traced in the very inconsistent sentences, already quoted, in which he declared his "honourable colleague's views" to have seemed "so erroneous" to him, that, "if it had unfortunately found favour with the Honourable Court," he "must have declined to take part in any policy founded upon it;" and

* *Jhansi Papers*, 1855, p. 19.

yet immediately afterwards, in the Duke of Argyll's words, "he agreed to a course which was logically defensible on no other principle than that which Mr. Grant maintained."* He protested that he could never carry out Mr. Grant's policy, and, in the same Minute, "murmuring 'I can ne'er consent', consented."

The truth is that Mr. Grant, though spoiled for statesmanship by too many years of Indian office-work, was a man of much greater ability, more extensive experience, and more solid acquirements than Lord Dalhousie. Granting the false premisses and false principles from which they both started, and the illicit assumptions in which they were both agreed, Mr. Grant's *Oude Minute* was far more logical, more straightforward, altogether stronger, than the Governor-General's. He very conclusively exposed the weakness of Lord Dalhousie's declaration that "the King's consent" was "indispensable," and that it would not be "right to extract this consent by means of menace,"† while the very essence of the plan recommended consisted in holding over him the terror of his own assassination and the pillage of his capital. "Certainly," said Mr. Grant, "in the supposed case, he would have little reason in the end to thank us for our scruples in his favour on the question of his rights."‡

Finally, waiving the question—too large for discussion here—of the comparative and relative advantages of railroads in India,§ it seems necessary to remind some people that Lord Dalhousie did not invent railways, or the electric telegraph, or the penny postage.

Whatever merit may attach to the vigorous prosecution of that badly planned and badly constructed work, the Ganges Canal, belongs to Lord Hardinge.|| Sir Macdonald

* *Ante*, pp. 49, 50. † *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 187. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

§ No one, I presume, would dispute the positive benefits conferred by the expenditure of eighty millions of capital, almost entirely drawn from Great Britain, in India, or by the improved means of locomotion. The only question is whether they are worth the money, and whether the money might not have been more advantageously laid out. Meanwhile, the investment of such a vast sum, supplemented by twenty millions of public money, in an unremunerative and precarious undertaking, dependent on an annual subsidy to make up its moderate dividend of 5 per cent., has thrown a serious obstacle in the way of great works more suitable for the country and the people, certain to give handsome returns, and hardly exposed at all—as railroads are—to destruction or damage, involving a cessation of earnings, in the event of war or rebellion.

|| *Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays*, pp. 330, 331.

Stephenson and his staff had laid the foundations of the first railroad, and the system of guaranteed interest to shareholders had been conceded by the Court of Directors at Lord Hardinge's suggestion, two years before Lord Dalhousie arrived at Calcutta.* A scheme of cheap postage, almost exactly on the terms ultimately adopted, had been framed by Mr. Riddell, the Postmaster-General of Agra, and submitted to the Court of Directors, with Lord Hardinge's strong recommendation in its favour, in the year 1846.†

The introduction of these improvements during Lord Dalhousie's administration was simply a chronological accident. No doubt he pressed them on with his usual vigour, and threw the new Departments at once into working order with his rare aptitude for organisation and for the details of public business.

Lord Dalhousie's official nominations and promotions were invariably made with great care, with an exclusive and scrupulous regard to claims and qualifications, according to his own conscientious appreciation of them. The exercise of his patronage was generally judicious. But it must be remembered that he did not discover the Lawrences. Lord Hardinge had placed the three brothers in the Punjaub. All that Lord Dalhousie did was to transfer the greatest of the three, Sir Henry, because he would not carry on the work of confiscation fast enough, to a place which for him, and in comparison to that which he left, was almost a sinecure. The removal was effected with as much consideration as possible, but Sir Henry Lawrence, as Mr. Kaye tells us, felt himself to have been "unfairly and ungratefully treated."‡

* *Ibid.*, pp. 332, 333; *Trotter's History of India from 1844 to 1860*, vol. i, pp. 93, 94.

† *Sir Henry Lawrence's Essays*, p. 339.

‡ *Sepoy War*, vol. i, pp. 62, 63.

CHAPTER X.

REFORM OR DESTROY ?

AFTER completing his paraphrase of those infallible and all-sufficient documents, the Blue Books, with reference to each of Lord Dalhousie's more important acquisitions of territory, the Duke of Argyll concludes that part of his dissertation with the following words :—

“Such were the principal territorial additions by which the frontiers of British India were carried to the line at which they still remain, and at which, in all human probability, they will continue to remain for many years to come.”*

Why does the Duke anticipate the sudden discontinuance, “for many years to come,” of the gradual process by which Native States are extinguished? If that process, as planned and practised by Lord Dalhousie, be justifiable and beneficial, why should it be discontinued for a single year? It is true that the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, and the Adoption Despatches of 1860,—to neither of which the Duke was a party, and both of which he distinctly deprecates,—have raised considerable obstacles to the future enforcement of the “doctrine of lapse,” but those obstacles are by no means insurmountable, as we have seen in the recent narrow escape from extinction of the ancient Raj of Mysore, at the hands of a Cabinet in which the Duke of Argyll had a seat. Nor would it be at all difficult to seize upon many “rightful opportunities,” quite as specious as any of Lord Dalhousie's era, for claiming “a perfect lapse,” and refusing, in his language, to “throw away territory,”† or for declaring the Government of a Native State to be “hopelessly bad,” and absorbing it out of sheer benevolence.

How can we, in justice and humanity, neglect any occasion of annexing one of those badly governed States, which

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 40.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 36.

Lord Dalhousie thought were not worth the trouble of improving,* and the Duke of Argyll considers to be unimproveable ? If “the vices” of “native Governments” are “systematic, and their virtues casual,”—if “the dependent position to which they are reduced by our power in India, does not contribute to make them better,”†—if annexation is “the only security for good government,”‡—why should the good work be intermitted “for many years to come ?”

In justice to the Duke’s consistency, it must be admitted, that in alluding to the “probability” that there will be no “territorial additions” for “many years to come,”—a limited term, after all,—he evinces no personal inclination or intention to interrupt the good work ; he would rather seem to regret the weakness of the present generation, and to trust that their eyes may be opened ere long to the great blessings derivable from a policy of annexation, which, though suspended for a time, may be wisely resumed, when “the violent reaction” now “beginning to subside,”§ has subsided entirely.

From the commencement to the end of his two Essays, the Duke of Argyll acknowledges no defect or excess of principle or of procedure in the territorial acquisitions of Lord Dalhousie’s Government. He considers it “more than doubtful whether it was expedient” to send forth the Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 to the Princes and People of India. “As regards the administration of affairs in India, no change whatever of principle was required.” “The Government was not a new one, neither were its principles of administration new.” “It would have been better to stand on the character which the Government of India had never forfeited, and which it required no new Proclamation to define.”||

And his objection to Lord Canning’s Adoption Despatch of 1860, wherein “the doctrine of lapse” was substantially recanted, runs in the same direction :—

“One question immediately rises to our lips on reading this proposal :—What room is left for the discharge of our obligations to the people, as distinguished from the Rulers, of Native States ? What is to be done in such a case as Oude ? Is disloyalty to our-

* *Ante*, pp. 69, 72, 73.

† *Ibid.*, p. 86.

† *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 30.

§ *Ibid.*, Preface.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 105, 106.

selves to be the only crime recognised in our dealings with Native Governments? Is incompetence, or cruelty, or corruption—the ruin of a country, and the misery of its people—are these to be tolerated, and if tolerated then virtually protected, by the Paramount Power in India.”*

In this passage, and in the next one which I shall quote, the Duke reiterates that confused notion of the reigning Prince being the embodied State, and of the State being dependent for its existence from day to day upon his personal character and qualifications, that we have already discussed in our comments on the Oude question.† If we consider the Ruler to be “corrupt,” or “cruel,” or “incompetent,” we must no longer protect or tolerate the State! One bad Native Prince renders a Native Government impossible! The only improvement of which a Native State is susceptible, is that of being improved off the face of the earth!

Lord Canning having observed that in the case of “serious abuses in a Native Government,” threatening “anarchy or disturbance,” the proposed measure will not debar the Government of India from stepping in to set matters right, “nor from assuming temporary charge of a Native State,” but that, in his opinion, “the penalty of sequestration or confiscation should be used only when the misconduct or oppression is such as to be not only heinous in itself, but of a nature to constitute indisputably a breach of loyalty or of recorded engagement to the Paramount Power,” the Duke of Argyll objects strongly to any such reservation:—

“This is the assertion of a principle which is more than doubtful, and which, in extreme cases, it will never be possible to maintain. There was no breach of loyalty towards the British Government on the part of the Rulers of Oude. Except, therefore, upon a higher principle than this, we could not have permanently rescued the people of that distracted country. But surely the duty of protecting the people of India from Rulers who are hopelessly bad, is a duty at least as binding on us as the duty of maintaining our own dominion.”‡

Thus the Duke of Argyll, recently a Cabinet Minister, not only justifies the annexation of Oude, but holds out the prospect of an indefinite series of similar cases. Con-

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 121.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 77, to 96.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 122.

sidering the native Rulers to be "hopelessly bad," he would annex any minor State whose Prince may prove to be "incompetent." His "higher principle" enables him to disregard all the maxims of International Law, and to nullify solemn engagements, even when there is "no breach of loyalty" on the other side.

The Duke's fundamental error is that of overlooking what Mr. J. M. Ludlow has aptly termed "the corporate character of Sovereignities."* This corporate character is well asserted in the following passage from Sir Frederick Currie's valuable Minute on the Kerowlee succession:—

"The Kerowlee treaty is not one of a personal character between the British Government and Maharajah Hurbuksh Pal, and the heirs of his body. It is a treaty, in my view at least, between the British Government and the Kerowlee State.

"The engagement is between the British Government on the one hand, and the Kerowlee Government on the other, the contracting party in each case being the representative for the time being of the respective Governments."†

In order to maintain for every State included within the Indian Empire the right of individual existence, so long as it is able and willing to fulfil its engagements, we need not claim for it an absolute independence, or assert its international equality with the Imperial Power. A feeble State is as much entitled to existence as a strong one.

The Duke of Argyll, in a passage already noticed, reminds us that Jhansi was not one of "the old independent States of India."‡ Although his Grace is completely mistaken in supposing that "Jhansi had been erected into a Principality by ourselves;" although Lord Dalhousie's statements, by which the Duke was misled, that Jhansi was "held under very recent grant from the British Government as Sovereign," "under a grant such as is issued by a Sovereign to a subject,"§ were totally unfounded, it

* *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India*, p. 141.

† *Kerowlee Papers*, 1855, p. 11.

‡ *Ante*, p. 21.

§ *Ante*, p. 21. Mr. Marshman, with admirable audacity, says that this case of Jhansi was settled by "the *lex loci* of the Province, as expounded by Sir Charles Metcalfe;" and asserts that Sir Charles Metcalfe interfered in the disputed succession of 1835. (*History*, vol. iii, pp. 396, 397.) Both assertions are incorrect. *Ante*, pp. 24, 25.

is true, and has never been denied or doubted, that it was a dependent Principality, debarred from external action, except in "subordinate co-operation," with the Protective Power. But this fact, instead of—as the Duke seems to imagine—rendering the State of Jhansi *more*, ought to have rendered it *less* liable to extinction than any of "the old Independent States." Under the rude political maxims and traditions of India, a faithful feudatory has stronger securities for its integrity and permanence than an independent neighbour. So long, for example, as its obligations are fulfilled, the alliance by which it is bound to the Paramount Power is essentially, and not formally, perpetual. Hostilities cannot be declared against it. It cannot be swallowed up by conquest.

The little Raj of Jhansi had been conspicuous in its loyal attachment and useful services to the British Government. Its absorption by the Suzerain, under the shallow pretence of a "lapse," was a proceeding not only most hateful and offensive in the eyes of all Native Princes and their Ministers, but quite unintelligible to them, except on the supposition of bad faith. Unacquainted, as they are, with English interests and prejudices, the misconceptions of Hindoo law and history, the illusive precedents founded thereon, and the benevolent, though mistaken, solicitude for the supposed good of the people, by which the claim to reject adopted heirs was supported, were always so unreal and unreasonable in their eyes as to seem quite insincere. They could understand the conquest of a hostile or alien State—the more independent the more open to attack—they could understand the confiscation of a delinquent State; but they could never understand the unprovoked destruction of a faithful dependency.

If examined in the light of the International Law of Europe, which fully recognises the "imperfect sovereignty" of tributary and dependent States, the process of terminating their separate existence by mutilating the law of succession in the reigning family will be seen to be equally illegal and iniquitous.

And if we look at it from the higher point of view of our national morals, and our national mission in the East,

the policy of causing "lapses," in order to gain territory and revenue for the British Empire, will be found to be obstructive and retrogressive, as well as unjust.

The victories and treaties of Lords Wellesley and Hastings proclaimed the final superiority of British arts and arms, and gained for the East India Company a regulative supremacy both in external and internal affairs over all the Native Principalities. This has been turned to very little account. Whatever credit we may claim, since the subjection of our rivals and opponents, for administrative reforms and material progress within the limits of our own Provinces, we have done very little for the improvement of the allied and tributary States. In this direction our shortcomings and self-seekings are but too manifest. So long as peace and quiet are preserved, the Subsidy paid regularly, or secured by a territorial cession, no great scandal thrust into view, and no obstacles offered to commerce by excessive customs or transit duties, the Native Ruler has been left very much to his own devices. The Court of Directors—and up to this day the same notions prevail generally at Calcutta—could never conceive any scheme for correcting the abuses of Native States except that of converting them into Collectorates, and sending out a batch of Writers. Within the last three or four years, however, a change for the better seems to have come over the spirit of the Calcutta Foreign Office, more especially since the final orders of the Home Government as to the restoration of Dhar. Something has been done for the reform of Oodeypoor, though not, it is to be feared, in a style likely to be acceptable or permanent. The management of Bhawalpore, during the Nawab's minority, seems to be conducted on a judicious plan. It is to be hoped that a good use may be made of the opportunity of managing Tonk, after the recent deposition of its Nawab, and the substitution of his infant son.

The Government of Bombay has done a good piece of work in the reform and restoration of the Kolapore State, and the little Principality of Sawunt Warree. The Government of Madras has dealt wisely and justly with the only two Native States—Travancore and Cochin—committed to its charge. The former, in particular, taken in

hand in 1809 after a period of anarchy and open war, was extricated from its difficulties by direct British management, and has improved and prospered steadily under careful supervision. Great attention has always been paid to the education of the Royal family; and, under the enlightened rule of the present Maharajah, Travancore is rapidly becoming a model Principality.

The Calcutta Foreign Office has no such peaceful triumphs to boast of. Had Mysore, which never was in such disorder as Travancore or Kolapore, been managed from Calcutta on the same generous and moderate principles that have guided the authorities of Bombay and Madras, the country would never have been overloaded with those costly establishments—the offspring of patronage—which have formed, and still form, the only true and substantial obstacle to the restoration in that State of a purely Native Government.

Calcutta had for so many years been such a hot-bed of jobbery and place-making, the crop was so rich during the era of annexation, and the appetite so grew by what it fed on, that during the last two or three years of Lord Dalhousie's Government, the notion of undertaking the reform of a Native State from disinterested motives would have been scouted as utterly fantastic and absurd.

Lord Dalhousie, as we have seen, protested against temporary management in every case that came before him. He objected to having “the labour, the anxiety, and the responsibility” of such a charge, unless accompanied by an “increase of revenue and permanent possession.”* Nor were plausible and specious phrases wanting to prove that temporary management was impracticable.

“To supplant the British government of any Province,” says Sir John Peter Grant, in his Minute on the Oude question, “by the best native government that ever yet existed, is in one moment to abolish law, and establish arbitrary power in its place.”† But what is to prevent us from gradually supplanting British management by a *better* native government than “ever yet existed,”—from reversing the procedure considered inevitable by Sir John Grant,—from *establishing* law in a reformed Principality, and

* *Ante*, pp. 69, 72, 73.

† *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 211.

abolishing arbitrary power ? Nothing that I know of, except the private interests and professional prejudices of the covenanted and commissioned Services.

Sir John Grant's objection, highly characteristic of the Bengal Civilian, is, in fact, identical with that more recently advanced by Mr. R. D. Mangles, a retired Bengal Civilian in the Indian Council, against the prospective restoration of a Native Government in Mysore under the present Rajah's adopted son. In that case, he said, the young Prince "must be permitted to become *the actual Ruler* of his country, to appoint his own officers, *and to administer justice and the revenue according to his own views and principles.*"*

The fallacy is transparent enough ; for why should not the Prince be so carefully educated, the forms of his Government and the plan of his administration so constituted, that he should be as much habituated as constrained to govern according to *our* "views and principles." The Rajahs of Travancore and Kolapore,—no thanks to the Calcutta Foreign Office,—have learned to do so.

In the same Minute, arguing against any plan for the temporary management of Oude, Sir John Grant wrote as follows :—

"I confess myself unable to understand those who are convinced that, in a particular case, the Native Government is so extremely bad, and so hopelessly *incorrigible*, that it must be supplanted by a British Government ; but contend that this cannot properly be done, unless it be made an essential part of the scheme, that at some future indefinite time, the British Government shall be supplanted in its turn, by the Native Government, now to be set aside for its *incorrigible* worthlessness."†

The fallacy into which Sir John Grant has fallen in this passage is also transparent enough. It is the very ordinary fallacy of employing a phrase in one sense at the beginning, and in a very different sense at the end of a sentence. He first assumes that a certain corrupt Native Government is "*hopelessly incorrigible*" by internal effort, and that British interference is absolutely necessary,—a case which all his opponents might admit. In the conclusion the word "*incorrigible*" has come to mean that a bad

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 85.

† *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 210.

Native Government is "incorrigible," notwithstanding all the assistance, instruction and guidance of the Protecting Power. His opponents having acknowledged the disorder to be incorrigible *without* temporary management, he quietly assumes them to have acknowledged it to be incorrigible *by* temporary management. He assumes that if a Native Government is ever to be restored, it must be the old corrupt Native Government "of arbitrary power." We are, in fact, called upon to believe that a Native Government must always be dependent on the personal character of the Prince; that the Protecting Power can destroy and coerce, but cannot teach, cannot take securities for good administration, or exercise any supervision or control; that a Native Prince may submit to be dethroned and exiled, but would never submit to be fettered by a Civil List, a Code, or a Council of State. In short, if there were any validity in his argument,—if it were not a mere example of using ambiguous terms and begging the question,—we should have to admit, in defiance of experience, that a reformed Native State is an impossibility.

Mr. J. C. Marshman, formerly Editor of the *Friend of India*, preaches the old Calcutta doctrine in his newly-published History. To restore a Native Government in Mysore would be, according to him, "to sacrifice to a new theory the welfare of a whole people," and "to demolish the fabric of prosperity we have been building up for half a century." He considers the maintenance of this Native State "so repugnant to every feeling of humanity, that before the period for consummating this policy arrives, it is to be hoped that some future Secretary of State will be found to annul it, as the present Secretary of State has annulled the decision of his predecessor."*

Mr. Marshman, it will be seen, writes in very strong language,—in the habitual style of the *Friend of India*. The old leaven of Calcutta cockneyism,—the most insolent cockneyism in the world, for the narrow conceit of a mushroom metropolis is aggravated by the arrogance of race,—pervades every page of his observations on the allied Principalities of India. He can see nothing but a vision of "the follies, vices and excesses of a Native Court."

* *History*, vol. iii, p. 418.

He shrinks from no exaggeration. He speaks of the two cases of Hyderabad and Nagpore,* “where the country had flourished under British management, and had been *desolated* when restored to the Native Princes.”† I am quite sure that Mr. Marshman would find it as impossible as I have found it, to trace any accounts of either of these countries having been “desolated,” in any official or non-official descriptions of Hyderabad or Nagpore.

The Duke of Argyll makes use of a similar and equally inexcusable exaggeration. After observing that some districts of the Nagpore country contained “the best of the cotton-fields in India,” he says, “it was a matter of Imperial concern to the British Government that the fertile territory of this State should no longer be *wasted and spoiled* by the wanton perpetuation of abominable misrule.”‡

A full refutation of Lord Dalhousie’s clap-trap for home consumption on the subject of cotton, would be out of place here. As a point of political economy it was absurd; as a plea for annexation it was equally absurd and immoral. During the Mahratta Government of Nagpore the production of cotton was immense, and one of the great markets for that staple, Hinghenghat, was situated within its frontiers. The Duke has no pretence whatever for suggesting that the people of those districts had not “the peaceful enjoyment of the fruits of industry.”§ The Blue Books contain plenty of highly coloured strictures, but none to that effect. If there were any impediments to trade from bad roads or transit duties—not brought forward in the Blue Books—the Rajah’s Government was entirely subject to our influence for their removal or rectification. The Rajah could have made good roads quite as effectively, and much more cheaply, than could have been done by means of that scandalous repository of patronage and speculation—our Department of Public Works.

Direct British administration has done nothing, could do nothing, in Nagpore, to increase the breadth of land under cotton, that could not, or would not, have been done by a Native Government. The cultivation was, of

* *Ante*, p. 69, 70.

† *History*, vol. iii, p. 425.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 38.

§ *Ibid.*

course, enormously stimulated by the high prices prevailing during the rebellion in the United States. When the dearth of cotton had brought a heavy pressure from Manchester to bear upon our Government, one measure was, indeed, devised, which a Mahratta Rajah would not have thought of, though the Resident might have induced him to carry it out. Cotton Commissioners were appointed with handsome salaries. This measure, as usual, in the mode and details of its execution, savoured of fuss and jobbery, and has produced an inordinate amount of foolscap. There is little reason to believe that this enlightened expedient has ever added one pound to the cotton crop of Berar and Nagpore, and although, by the collection of statistics, and the distribution of seed and gins provided by the Manchester Cotton Supply Association, a considerable amount of good has been done, this could have been done more easily and more effectually by a cheaper native agency.

The Duke's charge against the Native Government, however, goes far beyond the want of a Cotton Commissioner. He makes use, as we see, of a very forcible expression. He says that "*this fertile territory was wasted and spoiled.*"

The Duke of Argyll and Mr. Marshman have quoted from the Blue Book the just invectives of Mr. Mansel, the last Resident at Nagpore, against the most flagrant abuses of the Rajah's administration. Did the following passage in that same despatch entirely escape their notice?

"If the state of things in Nagpore is compared with the condition of Hyderabad or Oude, and if a traveller passing through the country stops but to look at the luxuriant cultivation in the cotton soil, the absence of crimes by open violence, the civil, simple people; or the bustle of the main street of the capital, he will form a judgment favourable to the character of the Rajah, and to the action, if not the principles of his rule."*

This is certainly not a picture of a country "desolated," "spoiled," or "wasted,"—words unwarranted by anything in the whole Report. The unfavourable features of the Rajah's administration, upon which he comments most severely, Mr. Mansel attributes, "above all, to the oscilla-

* *Papers, Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 16.*

tion in the system pursued by the Resident in respect to advice and control,"*--i.e., the neglect of the British Government.

It is satisfactory to be able to adduce the unimpeachable testimony of Sir Richard Temple—for several years Commissioner of Nagpore and the Central Provinces—to contradict the exaggerated calumnies as to the disorder and oppression prevailing in Nagpore, which were allowed to weigh in the balance against that State, when the question of its further existence was debated in 1854.

In his recently published letter of the 10th of August last, written from the Residency at Hyderabad, in answer to Sir John Lawrence's circular of inquiry as to the comparative popularity of Native and British rule, Sir Richard Temple, a man by no means likely to have a bias in favour of Orientalism, tells us nothing of those "desolated," "spoiled, and wasted" tracts, which the lively imaginations of the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Marshman have depicted. He says :- -

"I have on the whole a favourable opinion of the administration of the Nagpore country by the Mahratta Sovereigns of the Bhonsla House. There were many excellent points about their rule ; but some of these were owing to the care of British officers, such as Sir Richard Jenkins, Colonel Wilkinson, and others."†

That is the true work for the Protecting Power to undertake in the minor States—friendly instruction, not sweeping destruction. And Sir Richard Temple, while observing that "the constitution, system, and principles of the Nizam's civil government are really excellent," says nothing of any part of the Hyderabad country having been "desolated," either in the present day or in the past. Yet he mentions a recent case in which British management has been supplanted by the re-establishment of native rule.

"The Raichore and Dharasco districts, which were assigned by the Nizam to our Government, after remaining under our management for several" (six) "years, were retransferred to His Highness' Government" (by the Treaty of 1860). "I certainly have understood, from officers in a position to know, that the people much regretted the retransfer, and were full of apprehension.

* *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 17.

† *Papers, British and Native Systems*, 1868, p. 69.

Such I believe was the fact at the time, *though they have since not had any cause to lament, for the Nizam's civil government in that quarter has been well conducted.*"

The experiment, so much deprecated by Sir John Grant,* does not seem to have led to "the abolition of law," which he dreaded, nor to that "collapse of order and state of confusion," which Sir John Lawrence declared must certainly ensue if the reigning Sovereign of Mysore were replaced at the head of his own reformed administration.† Sir Richard Temple, in fact, contributes his evidence to the truth of what I lately stated, that if our statesmen "would turn their attention—for no research is required—to the real precedents for reforming Principalities, they would find that the 'schemes,' which Mr. Mangles pretends have ended in 'utter and hopeless shipwreck,'‡—the 'experiments' which the Governor-General declares must be 'futile and pernicious,' § *have never failed.*"||

The good results of restoring two reformed districts to the Nizam's Government, in spite of the very small efforts we have made to improve the general administration of Hyderabad, prove at once the beneficial effects of our temporary management, and the possibility of making those beneficial effects permanent.

Are we then to pursue and extend our reforming operations among the Native States of India, or are we to seize every opportunity and pretext for converting them into British Provinces? The Duke of Argyll considers that our supremacy "does not contribute to make them better;" that annexation is "the only security for good government;" and that this security should be exacted whenever a Native Government is "corrupt" or "incompetent," exactly as was done "in such a case as Oude."¶ No mistakes were made by Lord Dalhousie in appropriating Native States; "no change of principle is required."**

Mr. Marshman, adhering to the policy of the *Friend of India*, under which "the two hundred and fifty Kinglings are to disappear," and "the whole of India is to pass gradually under our rule,"†† looks forward with pro-

* *Ante*, p. 288. † *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 59. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 87. § *Ibid.* p. 59.

|| *Mysore Reversion*, 2nd edition, p. 222.

¶ *Ante*, p. 283, 284.

** *Ante*, p. 283.

†† *Ante*, p. 197.

phetic exultation to the time when the British Empire shall "reach the same point of consolidation as that of Rome under the Cæsars, these independent Principalities expire from the extinction of every element of vitality, and the Princes themselves subside into the position of *grandees*."*

I need not dwell on the public importance of any such declaration of principles by the Duke of Argyll. Until distinctly disavowed by some eminent member of his party, it will continue to be regarded with terror in India as a manifesto of the Whig leaders.

Mr. Marshman, personally, has, of course, less weight. The persistent defence of the annexation policy in his *History*—his advocacy of its end and aim, his repetition of all its pleas, his incendiary wishes for its revival and consummation—are chiefly significant from the fact that the Senate of the Calcutta University, a body largely composed of officials, and completely under official influence, has lately chosen this work as the standard for their examinations, a rule which imposes it as a class-book on all the higher schools of Bengal and Northern India. When this fact is viewed by the light of Mr. Marshman's uninterrupted connection with the *Friend of India*, still characterised by incessant slanders and threats against Native States—occasionally renewed by the Editor as Correspondent of the *Times*—still popularly reputed to be a sort of organ of the Indian Foreign Office, it will be seen to afford some little insight into the latent proclivities of the Calcutta bureaucracy.

The quiet approval or indifference with which these vindications and reassertions of the acquisitive policy are received in London, and the hearty greetings with which they are welcomed in official circles at Calcutta, sufficiently prove that I am not wasting my time in attacking them—that there is a real danger, however remote, of the policy of annexation being revived in full force.

This danger is not the less, but the more real, because at present neither the minds that govern the State, nor the minds that govern the Press of Great Britain, have grasped a definite policy for the Imperial rule of India.

* *History*, vol. III, p. 401.

The tone of Parliamentary debates, and of articles in the leading Reviews and journals, whenever the discussion of Indian affairs cannot be avoided, proves this beyond a doubt. Good faith must be kept; treaties must be respected; no unfair advantage should be seized; but still the existence of so many "petty despotisms," interspersed among the more favoured British Provinces, is evidently regarded as a provisional arrangement. No aggressive position is taken up; it is not so much a policy as the total absence of a policy. For instance, according to the clever writer who so often treats of Indian topics in the *Spectator*, the policy of annexation, quite legal and justifiable in itself, failed because Lord Dalhousie retired, and because it did not afford a career to native talent and ambition.* If, therefore, a second Lord Dalhousie should arise, and introduce the plan of "native Chief Commissioners," the policy of annexation might be resumed, without risking the opposition of the *Spectator*, or of those who hold similar opinions.

As another example, here is a passage from the speech made by Mr. Samuel Laing, member for the Wick Burghs, formerly Financial Member of the Viceroy's Council, and so far an authority in the House of Commons on Indian subjects, in the debate of the 24th of May, 1867, when Sir Stafford Northcote announced the decision of Government to maintain the State of Mysore by recognising the Rajah's adopted son.

"The question of annexation was so unpopular that he did not wish to be understood as being favourable to it. He was not a partisan of annexation, and he must say that he thought the policy of annexation had been carried under Lord Dalhousie's administration to an extent which he could scarcely approve. But he thought it due to the memory of that distinguished statesman to say that in his opinion the case, as regarded annexation, was not so clear as it at first sight appeared to some persons to be. The existence of Native States in India, except as far as it was based on treaty and sanctioned by the allowing of hereditary possession, was a very doubtful policy either for British interests or for the welfare of the inhabitants of British India. If we looked at the past condition of the Punjab, Oude, and other districts which had been recently annexed, and compared it with their present condi-

* *Ante*, p. 202.

tion, we should see how much the people themselves had benefited by the change of government. Any one who had read Sir William Sleeman's interesting work would learn how bad had been the condition of Oude under its Native Princes."

It has plainly never struck the honourable gentleman that there can be any method of effecting "a change of government" in a badly managed Native State, except that of annexation. It is equally plain that he merely tolerates Native States, reluctantly, without hope, and without any fixed intentions for the future.

So long as these indefinite notions prevail, so long as we are without a distinct, intelligible, and progressive Imperial policy, the Native Sovereignities of India cannot be considered safe. The annexationists having a very clear idea of what they want, and the beneficial effect of their object upon all parties, if it can be fairly acquired, being as yet hardly disputed or doubted, they have a great advantage on their side, when any question of territorial aggrandisement comes up for immediate decision. Good opportunities and pretexts for the pursuit of their very simple policy are certain to present themselves from time to time, and there is not likely to be any very violent dispute as to what may constitute a fair acquisition. Where all are agreed that the end is desirable, there is little chance of a quarrel about the means.

What we want, therefore, is an Imperial policy for India that shall be more than tolerant of Native States ; that shall recognise their corporate nature, and no longer consider their duration to be dependent on the talents and good behaviour of a Prince, or the vitality of a particular family. We want a policy that shall be proof against every provocation and every temptation—not one that will work smoothly with a Salar Jung or a Dinkur Rao, and break down with the first incompetent Minister or contumacious Prince. We want a policy that shall practically acknowledge the duty of instruction to be inherent in that of protection.

CHAPTER XI.

AN IMPERIAL POLICY.

THE evils arising from the systematic neglect of our Imperial duties of instructing and reforming the allied and protected States of India, had been a frequent topic of complaint and remonstrance for years before Lord Dalhousie jumped to the conclusion that destruction was the only remedy for them. The same considerations were pressed upon him from time to time during the rapid progress of his series of annexations.

Mr. Mansel, the last Resident at Nagpore, imputed the disorders that had crept into the administration of that State to the want of "certainty and permanence"* in the control of our Government.

"My own opinion is that had the same course of interference been carried out from 1840 to 1853 in a uniform, kind and effective manner, much or most, if not all, of this trouble would have been avoided. The argument of the natives with whom I have frequently conferred on this subject is, that the British Residents at Nagpore should participate in the blame charged to the Rajah by myself: for if the same system of advice and check which was contemplated by the last Treaty had been carried out from first to last, the Rajah would never have been tempted into habits of indolence and avarice."†

When the objections made by the Court of Directors to the Oude Treaty of 1837 were under the consideration of the Supreme Council, Mr. T. C. Robertson wrote as follows in a Minute dated the 28th of January, 1839.

"Our persevering indifference towards the lavish profusion and other extravagancies of the late Ruler of that State, was, I apprehend, regarded by the native community, more especially the Mahomedan portion, as flowing from any rather than disinterested motives, and was even imputed by many to a crafty design of bringing his dominions into a condition to afford a pretext for adding them to our own."‡

* *Papers, Berar*, 1854, p. 17.

† *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 7.

‡ *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 52.

And here are some of Lord Metcalfe's reflections on the reforming measures which had been introduced in the Nizam's Dominions by his own influence as Resident :—

"It is remarkable that our interference was then for the first time exercised with a benevolent view to the protection and happiness of the Nizam's subjects. Every former act of interference, however subversive of the independence of the Hyderabad State, was dictated solely by a regard for our own interests, without any care or thought for the welfare of the people whom we had delivered up to a Ruler of our own selection."*

The strange alacrity with which these operations were suspended, at the first suggestion of a young and inexperienced Prince in 1829, and Lord Dalhousie's positive refusal to renew them in 1851, have already fallen under our observation in these pages † We have also remarked upon Sir William Sleeman's appeals to Lord Dalhousie with regard to the Kingdom of Oude, fruitlessly continued through five years.‡

Those who opposed the policy of annexation were actuated by anxiety for the stability of British rule, and the welfare of the people, and not by the absurd sentimentalities now attributed to them by Mr. Marshman, with a great show of candour and impartiality, in the following passages of his History ;—

"There has always been a succession of men in the Direction at home, and in the public service abroad, prepared to advocate the cause of Native Princes as Princes, without any particular reference to the merits or demerits of their government. Among them may be enumerated some of the most eminent men connected with the administration,—Tucker, Malcolm, Henry Lawrence, Clerk, Outram, Sleeman, Low,—all animated with an honourable and chivalrous feeling of respect for the royal families of India."§

Contrasting their views with those of the Dalhousie school, he says : "The feelings of one party incline to the wishes and susceptibilities of the Princes of India ; those of the other to the interests of the people."|| As Mr. Marshman does not tell us from what acts or utterances of these two parties he has drawn this broad distinction

* *Metcalfe's Papers*, p. 225. † *Ante*, p. 69, 70, 73. ‡ *Ante*, p. 65, 68.

§ *Marshman's History*, vol. iii, p. 400.

|| *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 401.

between their feelings, let us hear one or two of those whom he has mentioned speak for themselves. In several passages, previously quoted at greater length, Sir Henry Lawrence objects to our behaviour towards Oude, that we have "interfered in trifles, and stood aloof when important questions were at issue"; and that "this interference has been more in favour of men than of measures."* "We have not been guiltless"; he said, "in repenting of the past, let us look honestly to the future. For once let us remember the people, and not legislate merely for the King."†

Sir William Sleeman, writing in 1853, with special reference to an article in the *Friend of India* by this same Mr. J. C. Marshman, warns his correspondent of the harm that may be done if that gentleman should succeed in spreading the doctrines of "the annexation school" in England, declaring them "to be prejudicial to the stability of our rule in India, and to the welfare of the people, which depends on it."‡ .

No men have ever contended and laboured more earnestly for the welfare of the people of India, and for the reform of the Governments under which they are placed, than those whom Mr. Marshman bedaubs with the epithets of "eminent", "honourable" and "chivalrous", while he brands them with the imbecility of respecting and advocating "the wishes and susceptibilities of royal families", "without any reference to the merits or demerits of their government." No one ever insisted more strongly on the maintenance of British supremacy, and on the necessity of its being exercised for the good of all classes, than Henry Lawrence, Sleeman, and Sir George Clerk—who is happily still with us to answer for himself,—but they believed that British supremacy would be weakened by bad faith. They would have promptly employed that supremacy to reform the institutions of allied and friendly States; while Lord Dalhousie held aloof, refusing to interfere, because no material profit could be reaped, but watching for some trumpery pretext to destroy and despoil.§

In its policy towards badly administered States, which

* *Ante*, p. 81.

† *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. ii, p. 390.

‡ *Ante*, p. 84.

§ *Ante*, p. 65, 72 to 77.

required a little assistance to set them right, our Government has sometimes erred in the opposite direction to that of neglect. We have overwhelmed our patient with nurses at his expense,—until he has almost lost the use of his limbs. When General Cubbon entered upon the duties of sole Commissioner of Mysore in the year 1834, he had five English Assistants, raised in two or three years to seven in number, their united salaries being about £13,000 a year. There are now in round numbers 90 English officers employed under the Mysore Government, and their united salaries are nearly, if not quite, £90,000 a year, or one-tenth of the revenue of the Principality.

When the question of the annexation of Mysore at the death of the present reigning Rajah, was under discussion in the Council of India, one of the most respected and most liberal minded Members of the Council, Sir Erskine Perry, wrote as follows :—

“I cannot help thinking that however popular in the public eye the determination not to annex Mysore may be, however politic the views of Lord Cranborne as to the employment of natives in high places, undoubtedly are, if the opinions of Council had been fully taken on this subject, it would have fully appeared that the interests of the people of India would have been best promoted, and the special claims of natives of rank and education to a share in the government of their country would have been much sooner realised, by the continuance of British Government in that Province.”*

‘Sooner’ and ‘later’ are comparative terms, very indefinite in their acceptance and application. But British management has lasted long enough in Mysore to afford a fair criterion of its tendency, when untempered by native influence, to foster the honourable ambition of native public servants. When after thirty-four years of British management the number of English officials has risen from seven to ninety, while that of superior native officers has dwindled to sixteen, and only one Hindoo has yet been promoted to the charge of a district, the tendency to realise Native aspirations, which Sir Erskine Perry perceives in British management, cannot be said to have operated very “soon” or to be doing its work very rapidly.

* *Mysore Papers*, 1867, No. 271, p. 12.

The same process that has attained to such a pitch in Mysore has been steadily carried on in the Assigned Districts of Berar, still possessed in sovereignty by the Nizam, but managed in trust for him by a British Commission, under the Resident at Hyderabad. Appointments are incessantly multiplied and salaries augmented for European officers of the civil and military services, so that although the two districts of Nuldroog and the Raichore Doab were restored to the Nizam in 1860, there is now a larger and much more costly establishment of English officers for the two Berars than there was for the four Provinces before 1860. And while this utterly unnecessary addition is made to the numbers and emoluments of the European agency, the native officials are overworked, underpaid, degraded and disheartened.

Let us now turn to one of our own minor Governments, the Central Provinces, the greater part of which was annexed in 1854, on the death of the late Rajah of Nagpore without male issue,—not, as we know, without an heir,—and let us see whether Sir Erskine Perry's vision of the advancement of "the interests and special claims of natives of rank and education to a share in the Government," has been realised there or not. There is the usual number of English officers in every Department. Not only has no Native been as yet placed in charge of a district, but not one has been admitted to that list of Assistants who are eligible for further promotion. Yet that list contains the names of seven Uncovenanted Europeans. There are altogether 25 Natives holding respectable fifth-rate appointments in the Central Provinces, with no prospects, according to routine and custom, of ever rising to any charge such as that of a district. On the other hand, besides seven Assistants and twelve Extra Assistants whom we know by their names to be Uncovenanted Europeans or East Indians, there are 4 officials of the same class in the Customs, 3 in the Revenue Settlement, 3 in the Conservation of Forests, 12 in the Police, and 22 in the Public Works Department,—in all 63 Uncovenanted Europeans.

One might naturally suppose that within the bounds of a State like Nagpore which, to say the least, was tolerably well governed, there might have been found by this time

one or two native officials fit for the charge of a district, after a probation of fourteen years. If not, surely there must have been some deserving persons in other Provinces, who might have been brought in. The Saugor and Nerbudda Territories, forming a large part of the Central Provinces, were conquered from the Nagpore Rajah in 1818. Nagpore was annexed in 1854,—the native Sovereignty abolished, and all the Rajah's great officials pensioned or turned adrift. Eight or ten of the second-rate officers were employed as Extra Assistants.

And now in 1868 how is the official hierarchy of these reunited Provinces constituted? Fifty years have elapsed since the conquest of one portion; fourteen years since the so-called "lapse" of the other. All the best offices, nearly a hundred in number, utterly unattainable by natives, are held by Civilians and military officers, in addition to whom no less than sixty-three Uncovenanted Europeans and East Indians have been introduced into the country. Twenty-five fifth-rate appointments are enjoyed by natives.

The constant multiplication of offices in favour of English gentlemen, entirely defeats what ought to be the chief object of managing the whole or part of an allied and protected State. That object ought to be that of forming a school of public servants for the Native State, who might be capable of carrying on and perpetuating the reformed institutions which are introduced by the Paramount Power. The system that has hitherto been pursued in many such cases renders the vital engraftment of reformed institutions impracticable in itself, and unpalatable to those whom it ought to be our aim to convert to our views. By all the higher appointments being reserved for English officers, the native officials have no opportunity of practising or proving their abilities to uphold and work the new institutions. The working of the machine is made to depend so entirely upon English correspondence and forms, that if the English officers were suddenly withdrawn, the whole fabric would fall into confusion and ruin. At the same time British administration presenting to the Prince and his Ministers, and even to the native officials who have taken part in it, a scene of proscription and contempt for

their own race, none of them feel any great wish to preserve so much of it as they have been able to understand.

This was the very mistake in our administration of the Punjaub, detected by the experienced eye of Sir William Sleeman, and subsequently admitted by Sir Henry Lawrence, which, in the words of the former, "created doubts as to the ultimate intention of our Government with regard to the restoration of the country to the Native Ruler, when he came of age. The native aristocracy," he continued, "seem to have satisfied themselves that our object has been to retain the country, and that this could be prevented only by timely resistance."*

He wrote as follows to a friend in a letter dated the 18th of May, 1848 :—

"Things are not going on so well as could be wished in the Punjaub; and it appears to me that we have been there committing an error of the same kind that we committed in Afghanistan,—that is taking upon ourselves the most odious part of the executive administration.

"Our duty would have been to guide, control and check; and the head of all might have been, like the Sovereign of England, known only by his acts of grace.

"By keeping in this dignified position we should not only have retained the good feelings of the people, but we should have been teaching the Sikh officers their administrative duties till the time comes for making over the country; and the Chief and Court would have found the task, made over to them under such a system, more easy to sustain.

"All the newspapers, English and native, make the administration appear to be altogether English,—it is Captain This, Mr. That, who do, or are expected to do, everything; and all over the country the Native Chiefs will think, that the leaving the country to the management of the Sirdars was a mere mockery and delusion."†

That Sir William Sleeman would not have recommended, and did not contemplate, the annexation of the Punjaub, is sufficiently clear in this extract from another letter.

"Of course, the outrage at Mooltan must be avenged, and our authority established; but, when this is done, Currie should be advised to avoid the rock upon which our friend Macnaghten was wrecked. We are too impatient to jump down the throats of those who venture to look us in the face, and to force upon them

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. i, p. xliii.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. xxxv.

our modes of doing the work of the country, and to superintend the doing it ourselves in all its details, or having it done by creatures of our own, commonly ten times more odious to the people than we are ourselves.”*

The same blot had been hit many years before by Sir Thomas Munro, who besides being a fine soldier and a practical administrator, had much of the statesman in his composition.

“It is too much regulation that ruins everything. Englishmen are as great fanatics in politics as Mahomedans in religion. They suppose that no country can be saved without English institutions. The natives of this country have enough of their own to answer every useful object of internal administration, and if we maintain and protect them our work will be easy.”†

Sir Henry Lawrence never approved the extinction of the Punjaub State. He doubted the justice of the measure; he was convinced of its imprudence. A friend and brother officer of his tells us that “with a refinement of the justice and moderation which were such conspicuous features of Sir Henry’s character, he dissented from the policy of annexation. He thought that another effort might have been made to save the Sikh Empire from destruction.”‡ Soon after that step was decided on, he wrote as follows to Mr. Kaye:—

“I am sorry you have taken up the annexation cry. It may now, after all that has happened, be in strictness just; but it certainly is not expedient, and it is only lately that I have been able to bring myself to see its justice.”§

It was Chillianwalla that turned many minds in favour of annexation, and this consideration had evidently been pressed upon Sir Henry Lawrence. “After all that has happened,”—after witnessing actions in which the carnage and the trophies were almost equally divided, when the din of battle had scarcely ceased, and under the close personal influence of Lord Dalhousie, he can only “bring himself” to say that “it *may be*, in strictness, just.” He has no doubt that it is inexpedient.

On the question of our administration, though he had

* *Sleeman’s Oude*, vol. i, p. xxxvi.

† *Gleig’s Life of Sir T. Munro*, vol. iii, p. 252, 253.

‡ *Kaye’s Sepoy War*, vol. i, p. 50, 51.

§ *Kaye’s Indian Officers*, vol. ii, p. 303.

taken a great part in it, and, as Mr. Marshman observes, "his name was one of auspicious omen in the Punjab, where, in popular opinion, the rebellion arose on his departure and was quelled on his return,"* his views were substantially the same as those of Sir William Sleeman.

"Looking back on our Regency career, my chief regrets are that we did so much.

"Whatever errors have been committed have been, I think, from attempting too much—from too soon putting down the native system, before we were prepared for a better."†

Our statesmen, of all parties, have from time to time declared that the aim of British supremacy in India ought to be, as desired by Sleeman and Henry Lawrence, that of preparing the people for self-government. Few and far between have been the steps taken in that direction. Whenever, either by direct management, or by judicious and authoritative counsel, we have introduced reformed institutions into a Native State, we have made a step forward. Whenever, in time of peace and without some stern political necessity, we have taken direct and permanent possession of territory, which might otherwise have remained a coherent Native State, we have taken a step backward.

There cannot be a more incorrect assumption than that which is so frequently made, that British rule alone is progressive, and that Native rule is either retrogressive or stationary. Such vainglorious notions are contradicted by historical facts no less than by all that we know of the laws of human development. At the critical period when our power first began to be felt in India, the Hindoo nations were passing through a great political and social revival, of pure home growth, which destroyed Mussulman ascendancy throughout the Continent. Our intervention, and that of the French, checked and diverted, to some extent, the course of Mahratta revolution, but its popular and progressive tendencies are evident enough. In the Mahratta camps, where Hindoos and Mahomedans of every tribe combined on equal terms against the partisans of the old order of things, and against foreign in-

* *History*, vol. iii, p. 352.

† *Kaye's Indian Officers*, vol. ii, p. 297 and 306.

vaders from Persia and Afghanistan, the germs of national feeling were laid, and religious toleration was established. Under what circumstances of unity or diversity, of Federation or autocracy, the States of Hindostan would have settled down,—into what prevailing form their institutions would have been moulded, after the complete disintegration of the Mogul Empire, if they had been undisturbed by Western influences, it would be useless to attempt to speculate. Anarchy never lasts long; and war cannot go on for ever. Sooner or later an equilibrium must have been restored. As it was, sixty-two years of almost incessant warfare, in one quarter or another, elapsed, between 1757 and 1819, before British supremacy was firmly secured. We cannot therefore claim to have effected the pacification of India within a period much shorter than would in all probability have sufficed to bring about a similar result by natural and internal action.

Since the Treaties of 1819, negotiated by Lord Hastings at the end of his great campaign, progress in India has depended almost entirely on the administrative achievements and example of the British Government. Constituted as the Native States are at present, restricted by their Treaties with a Power of overwhelming strength and inscrutable purposes, they have become incapable of spontaneous expansion. Ambition and emulation are repressed in all classes, from the Sovereign to the clerk and private soldier; the force of public opinion, the sense of public responsibility, are weakened till they almost disappear. Relieved by us from all fear of rivals or rebels, the Prince, feeling his greatest danger to lie in the misconstruction of his conduct by our representative at his Court, finds his ease and safety most fully secured by keeping things as they are. Left entirely to themselves, the Native States would work out their own destinies, slowly and painfully, not, perhaps, without dynastic or personal changes. Debarred from external action and reciprocal intercourse, not so much enlightened as overshadowed by British domination, they cannot advance without our initiative, and will not take a step without our instructions.

Lord Dalhousie refused, on principle, to give any instructions, and in the indiscriminate rapacity of his policy

threw down all distinction between friends and foes, removed every incentive to regular and orderly government, annulled all belief in British good faith, and gave to every piece of admonition from Calcutta the appearance of a menace or a trap. He was right both logically and practically, from his point of view, in refusing to undertake the reform of Native States. If the vices of these States are incurable, it would be a waste of time to attempt to cure them. If the sort of principle on which Lord Dalhousie acted be true and just, it is not worth our while to interfere, unless we can obtain full possession and command of their revenues;* for partial improvements would but postpone that salutary "crash",† which we—with, of course, "a scrupulous regard to the claims of justice and equity",—should rather seek to precipitate.

Again, looking at the question practically, it would be impossible to combine two policies so radically incompatible. The reforming process could not be carried on in the more important States, nor could its effects be expected to prove permanent in any, without some efforts of persuasion on our part, without some faith in our good intentions on theirs. What persuasive inducements could be brought forward by us, what act of faith could be extorted from them, when the published Minutes of the Governor-General disclosed his plan that "on all occasions", where there was no lineal male descendant in "States which recognised formally the supremacy of the British Government", "the territory should be made to lapse"?‡ Any acknowledgment of British supremacy, or submission to British authority, that could be, by any contrivance, evaded or postponed, would obviously be political suicide in a Prince, and treason in a Minister. Every tendency in the Native States to profit by such lessons as we could give was swept away by the policy of annexation. British Guardianship in the Punjaub had, to say the least, a disastrous result for our Ward. British management, as exemplified in Mysore, appeared to native politicians to be a process very similar to that by which the boa constrictor lubricates his victims before swallowing them. There could be no doubt or question as to Lord Dalhousie's views

* *Ante*, p. 72, 73.

† *Ante*, p. 76.

‡ *Ante*, p. 185, 194.

with regard to this Principality;* and until the 22nd February, 1867, when Lord Cranborne made his memorable declaration in the House of Commons that the Maharajah's adopted son would be recognised, nothing had occurred to relieve any one's mind on the subject. Sir Erskine Perry very fairly describes the general opinion that prevailed:—"I have been twice in Mysore, and saw a good deal of its administration under Sir Mark Cubbon, and I firmly believe that, at the time Lord Canning's Proclamation appeared, not a statesman in India ever contemplated the restoration of Mysore to a Native dynasty."†

There is little in the Mysore question, even as it stands at present, to reassure Native Princes and Ministers, or to reconcile them to the process of reform. It tells them that if—to allow free course to the new system,—the personal authority of a Sovereign is once suspended, there is great danger of its never being restored. They see that although succession is promised to an infant heir, the reigning Prince is virtually deposed, and the whole framework of a Native State broken up, for the benefit of an ever increasing number of English officials.

Besides Mysore, there is another instance of British trusteeship, which has naturally formed a frequent subject of painful and anxious consideration in many parts of India. In particular, the Government of Hyderabad has never ceased to watch with interest our treatment of their former dependent, the Nawab of the Carnatic. The present Nizam's father in 1853, when pressed to cede territory for the pay of the Hyderabad Contingent, made these singular observations to the Resident, General Low:—

"‘I have heard that one gentleman of your tribe considered that I ought to be quite contented and happy if I were put upon the same footing as Mahomed Ghous Khan’ (meaning the present Nawab of Arcot), ‘to have a pension paid to me like an old servant, and have nothing to do but to eat, and sleep, and say my prayers.’ Here His Highness made use of an exclamation in Arabic, which expresses both surprise and anger, and with a manner and a tone of voice which seemed to me to indicate anger in no ordinary degree.”‡

* *The Mysore Reversion* (2nd edition), p. 41.

† *Mysore Papers*, 1867, p. 10.

‡ *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854, p. 120. The expression was “Astaghfir-ullah,”—God forgive me!—signifying resentment and ironical repentance.

Since that interview took place, even the "pension paid to him like an old servant" has been denied to Mahomed Ghous Khan's heir : the Palace, gardens, country residences, furniture, and other personal property of the family have been sold by auction for the benefit of the British Government,—a very complete justification of the Nizam's suspicions and resentment at the proposal made to him, a renewed warning to the Hyderabad family, its advisers and adherents, to beware of British counsels. The fanatic and ultra-conservative parties at the Nizam's Court,—opponents of the sagacious Minister, Salar Jung,—are able to point to the Punjaub, Mysore and the Carnatic as instances of the natural results of trusting to British professions, and submitting to British management. If the prospect of a long minority, or the fact of dissensions and disorders, in Hyderabad or any other of the more important Principalities, should appear to present a task beyond the capacity of those at the head of affairs, it would be much more difficult now to obtain the acquiescence and concurrence of the most influential persons in the State to the complete control and guidance of British officers, than it would have been before our Government had forfeited its character for fair dealing and disinterested purposes.

In order to regain that character, and to recover the moral influence we have lost, nothing more is necessary than to settle on equitable and generous terms some of those outstanding questions which have been for many years a reproach to the British Crown, and a cause of distrust to all Indian Rulers. The restoration of Mysore to the appearance and condition of a protected State, administered by Natives under the guidance of a British Resident, would be the most striking inauguration possible of the new era. It would be far better in every respect if this could be done, by a prompt and decided process, during the present Rajah's life-time ; but if not, the gradual transmutation should be so timed that the young Prince, on attaining his majority, should find no cumbrous establishments overloaded with English incumbents to impede his installation, and perhaps to form a pretext for his indefinite exclusion from power.

The latest intelligence from Madras informs us that the

Government of India has failed to discover the means of expending the sum of fifteen lakhs of rupees (£150,000) allotted to secure—in the words of the despatch from home,—“the comfort and independence” of Prince Azeem Jah, so as to advance that object; and that there has been no visible result except the appointment of an English gentleman from the Civil Service as Special Commissioner with a salary of £5,000 a-year. Three successive Secretaries of State, from both sides of the House, having agreed to make concessions which amount to an acknowledgment that gross injustice has been done to the Wallajah family, by far the most dignified, the most graceful and the most advantageous step for our Government to take, at the present juncture, would be to restore Prince Azeem Jah to the musnud of his ancestors with such modifications of the existing Treaty as may bring it within the scope of altered times and circumstances.

Two such acts of justice and magnanimity as these, royally announced and royally executed, would give us immense leverage for inducing the commencement of those effective reforms in the larger States, especially in the Nizam's Dominions, by which alone our resources can be strengthened and relieved, and the regeneration of India be placed beyond the reach of danger.

Long experience in Parliament and in office, and some difference of opinion in the Cabinet, may have deterred Lord Halifax from reversing the recent decision of a predecessor belonging to his own party;* but there are many signs and symptoms in the conduct and records of both the Carnatic and Mysore cases, as they were left by Sir Charles Wood, to lead us to suppose that he was very averse to the course recommended by the majority of his Council, seconded by one or two more weighty voices, and that Lord Halifax in Opposition would not be grievously distressed if the Rajah of Mysore and the Nawab of the Carnatic were to be admitted at last to their proper places through the doors which he would not close.

Whether the restoration of Mysore to the political scene

* It fell to the sad lot of Mr. Vernon Smith, now Lord Lyveden, to confirm, as President of the Board of Control, all the worst acts of Lord Dalhousie's administration.

as a separate though subordinate Native Government be completed during the present Rajah's reign or at the end of his son's minority, great care should be taken to avoid all appearance of violating the Partition and Subsidiary Treaties of 1799. Let us beware how we loosen the sanctions of our Indian treaties. We cannot justly or safely attempt to tamper with a treaty of fifty years' standing, on the plea that it was a *bad* bargain. It was a bargain, and must be adhered to. Our only title to the greater part of our possessions in India is a title by treaty. We do not hold many Provinces directly by conquest. Our only title to possession, our only moral claim to the allegiance and subordination of the Princes of India, and, as I believe, all our future power of permanent influence for the education and civilisation of India, depend on the preservation and development of our existing system of treaties.

Lord Cranborne deserves the highest credit for statesmanlike judgment and foresight in having decided, so soon after his advent to office, on overruling the majority of his Council and the proceedings of the Government of India, by the recognition of the Mysore Rajah's adopted heir, thus saving the State from extinction. Sir Stafford Northcote, however, with the great advantage of starting on his journey from that advanced point which had been won by his immediate predecessor, has improved his own position and lost no ground of any value, by "not having thought it necessary to repeat the argument of Lord Cranborne,"—uttered in debate only, and not embodied in a despatch,—"that the Maharajah's right under the Treaties of 1799, was merely a personal one."^{*}

The notion that the Treaties of 1799 are binding upon us only for the life of the Prince with whom they were contracted, because they do not contain the words "heirs and successors," is one that can derive no support from the recognised standards of International Law, and which will never—it may be confidently predicted,—be supported by any opinion from the law advisers of the Crown.

There is a broad distinction between a real and a personal treaty. A real treaty is made for public objects, and

^{*} *Mysore Papers* (No. 271), 1867, p. 5.

is to last as long as those public objects last. A personal treaty is made for the private objects and interests of a Prince or family, and is to last only as long as the person or the family lasts. Thus a treaty made between two Princes for a family alliance or compact—whether relating to a marriage, or a campaign, or joint resistance to revolution, instances of each of these being found in modern history—is a personal treaty. It has no direct reference to the interests of the State or people, but only to those of the King or dynasty, and expires with them. A treaty also, such as we have made at different times in India, granting a pension for life or lives, as reward or compensation, to a Prince or family, is a personal treaty. Under treaties of this sort we secured certain annual payments for their lives to Dowlut Rao Scindia and some ladies of his family.* The Treaty made by the Duke of Wellington with Amrut Rao, and the terms of capitulation between Sir John Malcolm and Bajee Rao, the last Peishwa,† are also instances of personal treaties.

The base of all the attacks on the Mysore and Carnatic Treaties lies in this error, that a treaty is “*personal*” because it does not contain the words “*heirs and successors.*” These words are not essential, though after the fatal advantage that has been taken of their absence, I cannot say they are superfluous. Even an undoubted personal treaty would not necessarily expire, for want of these words, at the death of the individual named in it, if its evident object was to secure certain advantages to his family. A reigning Prince when named in a treaty is the representative of a State, which is permanent, and of sovereignty, which is always hereditary. Grotius lays down the rule:—

“If a treaty is made with a King by name, without any mention of heirs and successors, it is not therefore presently to be reputed personal, for as it is well observed by Pedius and Ulpian, the person is often inserted in the contract, not that the contract is personal, but to show with whom the contract was made.

“If it be added to the treaty that *it shall stand for ever*, or that it is made *for the good of the Kingdom*, it will from hence fully appear that the treaty is real.”‡

* *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, vol. iv, p. 245.

† *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 90 and 188.

‡ *Grotius*, lib. ii., cap. 15 (16).

No words can be stronger than those used in the Mysore Treaties of 1799: they are "*perpetual*;" they are to last "*as long as the sun and moon endure*." What words can be more conclusive? Of their public objects there can be no doubt. The Partition Treaty is said to be made "*to establish permanent security and general tranquillity*." The Subsidiary Treaty declares itself to be made "*to carry the stipulations of the Partition Treaty into effect—for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties or either of them—for the happiness of the people and the mutual welfare of both States*."

According to Wheaton, the greatest of modern authorities,

"Treaties are divided into *personal* and *real*. The former relate exclusively to the persons of the contracting parties, such as family alliances, and treaties guaranteeing the throne to a particular Sovereign and his family. They expire, of course, on the death of the King, or the extinction of his family.

"The obligation of treaties, by whatever denomination they may be called, is founded not merely upon the contract itself, but upon those mutual relations between the two States which may have induced them to enter into certain arrangements. Whether the treaty be termed real or personal, *it will continue so long as these relations exist*."*

In this instance of Mysore the family exists, and the "mutual relations between the States" exist; and therefore, whether they be termed real or personal, the Treaties of 1799 hold good.

Lord Wellesley did some very grasping and arbitrary things, but he never had the sly and underhand intentions that have been imputed, both with reference to the Mysore and the Carnatic Treaties. Lord Wellesley's aim in constructing the Treaties of 1799 was undoubtedly that of gaining the tightest hold possible over Mysore and its resources; and he no doubt thought he could gain a tighter hold by omitting the words "heirs and successors", thus leaving the succession open for decision by the protecting Power. With an infant on the throne, incapable for many years of begetting or adopting a son,—his claim to the throne being disputed, as we know, by other mem-

* *Elements of International Law*, Boston, 1855, p. 39 and 41.

bers of the family,—this seemed a more important point at the time than it does now. But there is literally nothing to show that Lord Wellesley ever thought of appropriating Mysore at the Rajah's death, or of declaring the Sovereignty of Mysore not to be hereditary. Everything recorded in his despatches tells against such a notion. He speaks of restoring "*a family*", "*a dynasty*"; of establishing "*a Kingdom*" and "*a State*." The lead-pencil corrections and erasures in the original draft of the Treaty, discovered by Lord William Hay at the British Museum, and described by him in a speech at the House of Commons on the 24th of May, 1867, do not evince the intention attributed to them by the noble lord; and, if they did, would be quite unavailable, and could not strengthen Lord Dalhousie's doctrine. Not a trace, not a hint of a personal Treaty is to be found in the Marquis Wellesley's papers, or in any official document before 1856, when Lord Dalhousie, in the full career of annexation, sounded the first note of menace against Mysore.*

Sir Stafford Northcote himself, in his despatch to the Governor-General of the 16th April, 1867, distinctly acknowledges the Treaties of 1799 to have been dynastic and not personal. He says :—

"Without entering upon any minute examination of the terms of the Treaties of 1799, Her Majesty's Government recognise in the policy which dictated that settlement a desire to provide for *the maintenance of an Indian dynasty on the throne of Mysore*, upon terms which should at once afford a guarantee for the good government of the people, and for the security of British rights and interests. Her Majesty is animated by the same desire, and shares the views to which I have referred."†

In announcing Her Majesty's desire "to maintain that family upon the throne, in the person of his Highness's adopted son, *upon terms corresponding with those made in 1799, so far as the altered circumstances of the present time will allow*," it is to be hoped the Secretary of State does not propose to change the terms of the Treaty of 1799 for our advantage, on account of the relative strength of the Nizam, the Rajah of Mysore and ourselves having

* *Mysore Reversion* (2nd edition), p. 41.

† *Mysore Papers* (No. 239), 1867, p. 9.

altered in the interval. That would be to revert in another form to the plan denounced by Sir Henry Lawrence, the most illustrious victim of Lord Dalhousie's policy :—

“We have no right, as the *Friend of India* constantly now desires, to break our treaties. Some of them were not wise ; but most were, at the time they were made, thought very advantageous to us. It would be outrageous, now that we are stronger, to break them.”*

After giving instructions for the infant heir's education, the Secretary of State proceeds thus :—

“If, at the demise of his Highness, the young Prince should not have attained the age which you, upon consideration, may fix for his majority, the territory shall continue to be governed in his name upon the same principles, and under the same regulations, as at the present time. Upon his reaching that age, or at an earlier period, if you should think it desirable, it will be the duty of the British Government, before confiding to him the administration of the whole, or any portion, of the State, to enter into an arrangement with him for the purpose of adequately providing for the maintenance of a system of Government well adapted to the wants and interests of the people.”†

For ensuring a reformed and regular system, and even for the readjustment of the subsidy, as suggested in the last paragraph of this despatch, in consideration of the increased expense of supporting troops, our Government might fairly demand some revision of the existing Treaty ; but great moderation ought to be observed in imposing any additional burden on Mysore. The chief authorities on International Law tell us that the provisions of a treaty must always be interpreted in the sense most favourable to the weaker party,—not, be it observed, from motives of magnanimity or compassion, but on the sound legal principle, that we can only consider the intentions of the parties at the time of the transaction ; and that if the stronger party had intended to impose heavier conditions than are literally stated on the face of the Treaty, he, being able to dictate his own terms, would have taken care to have them plainly expressed. The dynastic nature of the Treaty, and therefore its validity after the death of

* *Kaye's Indian Officers*, vol. ii, p. 310.

† *Mysore Papers* (No. 239), 1867, p. 9.

the reigning Rajah, has already been proved, and is, as just pointed out, recognised by Her Majesty's Government. That recognition is implied once more in the paragraph last quoted from the despatch, in which the Secretary of State directs that "on the demise of his Highness, the territory shall continue to be governed in his"—the young Prince's—"name". He is to be at once proclaimed as the Sovereign of Mysore and successor to his father; the existing Treaty is to hold good, and no new arrangement is to be made until the Prince attains his majority. Whether deferred to that period, or whether, as would be far more effective and becoming, the new arrangement should be made at once with the reigning Prince, admitted to a consultative share in the government of his country, it must never be forgotten that the Maharajah, old or young, can only negotiate as the representative of the Mysore State, and that no curtailment of territory or augmentation of tribute ought to be imposed on that State without some just claim or a fair equivalent. No increase of the subsidy could be honestly demanded on any other ground than that of the enhanced cost of maintaining the British troops, or as a commutation for the reduced number of Auxiliary Cavalry kept up by the Mysore Government. No cession of territory could be reasonably required except by way of convenient transfer and rectification of frontiers, as was done by the Supplementary Treaty of 1803,* and as might be done now by the exchange of Seringapatam and some *enclaves* on the borders in our possession for the great military station of Bangalore and the Hill districts where coffee can be grown, and where some eighteen or twenty English planters are to be found.† Anything beyond this would be an arbitrary extortion, whether the opportunity should arise from our own wrong in the hasty and unwarrantably protracted supersession of the old Rajah,‡ or from our sacred duty of Guardianship during the minority of his son. In the latter case it would be the same political crime that we committed in the Punjaub, only without the palliation of war. It would be a prac-

* *Collection of Treaties* (Calcutta, 1864), vol. v, p. 165.

† *Vide* Note at the end of this Chapter.

‡ *Mysore Reversion*, 2nd edition, p. 21 to 25 and 191.

tical application of the Duke of Argyll's theory that our Treaties with the Native Princes of India "expressed nothing but the will of a Superior imposing on his Vassal so much as for the time it was thought expedient to require."*

If we desire to obtain the highest degree of influence in the Native States, with a view to their administrative reform, we must forget all such formulas as these; we must give up the use of inverted commas in writing of "Treaties" with Nawabs and Rajahs; we must use the same standard of weight and measure in dealing with Hindoo communities and individuals that we use in dealing with Europeans. All tendencies in the opposite direction savour merely of contempt, and approach to the introduction of the Dred Scott doctrine into the region of International Law. "The negro race," said Chief Justice Taney, "have no rights which the white man is bound to respect." And we know where that memorable judgment led to.

Many of the replies sent to Sir John Lawrence's circular of July 1st, 1867,—especially those of Mr. R. H. Davies, Chief Commissioner of Oude, Sir Richard Temple, Resident at Hyderabad, Colonel Clerk of Mysore, and Mr. A. A. Roberts, Judicial Commissioner of the Punjaub,—show that a keen sense of the main defects of our system is by no means rare among the ablest and most distinguished of our public servants in India. The Governor-General, having begun by declaring his "opinion that the masses of the people are incontestably more prosperous and (*sua si bona nórint*) far more happy in British territory than they are under Native Rulers," "considers that the present would be a good opportunity for proving this belief by a concentration of" what he is pleased to call "statistics from different parts of India."† He invokes his minor prophets to bless the work of his and their hands; and although most of them, as might have been expected, have responded to his wishes, and none of them have cursed him altogether, the best of them have fully justified the doubts expressed by Lord Cranborne which led to this inquiry.

* *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p 11.

† *Papers, British and Native Systems*, 1868, p. 4.

In reading the strictures on Native Government which abound in the replies to Sir John Lawrence's circular, it must be remembered that, even when they are just and reasonable, they relate only to unreformed States. As Sir Donald Macleod, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, observes :—

“ If the comparison were made with really well governed Native States, and such I believe are to be found, the comparison might not, in the estimation of the people, be altogether in favour of the British Government, save in so far as the continuance of just rule in a Native State where there are no constitutional guaranties must ever be dependent on the character of the Chief, and therefore wanting the stability of British rule.”*

Let it be the object of our Imperial policy to obtain those “constitutional guaranties,” to establish them in every Native State on a sure foundation, and to see that they are not disturbed.

Mr. C. A. Elliott, of Futtchgurh, also appears to have got the true bearings of the discussion.

“ That the British Administration has secured to its subjects a vast increase in security, prosperity and material comfort, compared with those it succeeded to, is gross, open and palpable. The question admits of no discussion. But the comparison Sir John Lawrence wishes to make is not with the Native States, which preceded us, but with those which are our contemporaries and which exist in districts alongside of our districts. Can we prove that our people are more prosperous and happier than those who live in the neighbouring Native States ?

“ My impression is, that the better a Native State is, the more it approaches our system. In Bhopal, which is probably the best Native government in India, I really know of no difference that exists in theory ; practically the government is laxer, less rigid, and more in sympathy with the governed.”†

The most remarkable paper that the occasion has brought forth is, perhaps, the Memorandum voluntarily offered by Sir Robert Montgomery, late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, dated “Athenæum, March 1868,” and published in the *Times* of the 30th March,—when the greater part of this book was in type,—from which I cannot refrain from making a few extracts confirmatory of much that the party of “fifth-rate writers,” “small in numbers and smaller in

* *Papers, British and Native Systems*, 1868, p. 114.

† *Ibid.*, p. 105.

ability," have been feebly attempting to teach during the last fifteen years.

"If the balance be fairly struck, it will undoubtedly be found in favour of our rule as regards the material prosperity of the country and the progress of civilisation. But the point still remains, do the Natives feel themselves happier under our rule than under that of a Native Government? Would those now living under a Native Government prefer it to being annexed to the British territory?

"I unhesitatingly affirm that they would not elect to change their condition, and to forfeit their nationality.

"It is well, I think, that this reflection of popular sentiments should be held up against the temptation of annexation for the supposed good of the people; although it is but fair and due to ourselves that we should justify the continuance of our dominion by the many material advantages it has conveyed.

"The common error lies in our insular proneness to contract and generalise—to embody in one class all the many separate nationalities and distinct races which have been successively added to the rule of England. In an Empire made up of such differing languages and distinct customs, it must be popular, as it is politic, to encourage to a great extent a local administration and a local adaptation of laws.

"The people should be more largely employed in all social and municipal affairs, which they are most competent to manage. Till quite recently this was neglected, and even now it is very partially done. The appointment of Honorary Magistrates, Municipal Committees, etc., only three or four years ago, met with opposition from many officers."

That "local administration" and "local adaptation of laws," which Sir Robert Montgomery sees is so urgently required, can be more effectually promoted by the maintenance, restoration, and enlargement of Native Principalities, than by any system of Provincial Councils or Municipal Committees in the Provinces under direct British rule.

Sir Robert Montgomery, in the sentences just quoted from his Memorandum, observes that "the appointment of Honorary Magistrates met with opposition from many officers." Some remarks by Sir Bartle Frere on Sir Stafford Northcote's despatch of the 8th February, 1868, recently printed as a Parliamentary Return, recommending the employment of Natives in the higher grades of the public service, corroborate what I have said on this subject.

"As regards the past, I think any Native of India must feel that, even under the present law, much more might be done to employ competent Natives in high office, if those who have the distribution and control of patronage were really in earnest in their professions of anxiety to see Native agency more extensively used.

"I cannot think that the spirit in which the subject is handled in many of the papers forwarded to us by the Government of India, indicates any sense of the only means whereby the great gulf between European and Native *employés* of Government can ever be bridged over."

Colonel Hopkinson, Agent to the Governor-General on the North-east Frontier, observes in his reply to the circular, that "if endeavours are ever made to develop the moral nature of the Natives after the fashion of the Anglo-Saxon race, it will be found that for the most part they originate either in England or with Englishmen out of the official pale in India."*

The prevailing tendencies of home legislation, of the Secretary of State's controlling influence, and of English public opinion, so far as they have become operative or demonstrative since the Mutinies were suppressed, have been decidedly liberal and conciliatory towards the people of India. Natives have been admitted, under the Acts of 1862, to the Legislative Councils of the three Presidencies and to the Bench of the High Courts of Bengal and Bombay. Had these very limited measures been proposed for the consideration, had they depended on the decision of the Provincial Governments, they would never have been carried out.

There are, and always have been, marked and brilliant exceptions to the professional narrowness of view generally prevailing in the Indian Civil Service, which has rendered it, as a body, averse both to the maintenance of Native States, and to the advancement of our own Native subjects in the higher grades of public employment. Liberal tendencies are evidently spreading among Indian officials, and will become more common and more confirmed, as English public opinion, both in and out of Parliament, becomes more definite and more clearly pronounced.

Mr. C. A. Elliott, of Futtchurh, seems to perceive the

* *Papers, British and Native Systems*, 1868, p. 16.

vicious circle in which we are entangled, without seeing the way out of it,—seems to observe the goal towards which we should aim, without seeing the road towards it. In his answer to Sir John Lawrence's circular, from which we have already quoted a sentence, he writes as follows :

“ We assume, and history and the consent of the civilised world justify us in assuming, that we are placed by Providence in India for the good and the improvement of the people, to educate and stimulate them up to such a point that they may at last be able to govern themselves.”*

But he adds : “ As long as this work remains to do, we cannot be really popular.” Over one third of India in area, and one fourth in population, the work is ready. The people in the allied and protected States can be allowed to govern themselves, without our cutting them adrift, or neglecting our share in the work. And we can make the Imperial Power “ popular ” by judiciously increasing the area and population of those Principalities that prove themselves worthy of such an augmentation.

The nearest approach to self-government that the people of India can make in their present phase of civilisation, must be made by means of reformed Native States, owing allegiance and subordination to the Imperial Power. By the medium of such States we can exert a far stronger influence over the native mind, and gain a far more secure hold over the resources of India, than we can by means of our direct possessions.

India is a Continent, not a country; and there is no part of the world where provincial self-government is more imperatively required, where uniformity and centralisation may become a greater curse.

If the Imperial Power holds the sea; if she alone conducts the external relations of the Empire, and the political intercourse between the States; if her troops visit and occupy, at pleasure, any and every place and post throughout the land; if no customs or transit-duties can be levied without her concurrence; if by her treaty-right of authoritative counsel, and by her moral influence, she can modify and control the institutions of every State,

* *Papers, British and Native Systems*, 1868, p. 105.

there will be full scope for British statesmanship, an inexhaustible field for British energy and enterprise. In this way only can we rule India without demoralising and degrading her people. If the Paramount Power is not content to be the Head, but will also insist upon playing the part of hands and feet, and lungs and digestive organs,—if every centre of municipal and social life is to be sacked or starved to nourish an official metropolis at Calcutta and another in London,—there may, for a time, be a deceptive appearance of plethora, but the constitution of the Empire will not be permanently strengthened. There will be constant danger of convulsive fits, if not of a fatal apoplexy.

The clever writer in the *Spectator*, to whom we have several times referred, so fully believes in the necessity of training India for self-government, that, with imaginative devotion to his political idol, he makes it the end and aim of Lord Dalhousie's policy.* In the free atmosphere of Great Britain, with the lessons of the last ten years, both he and—in a less degree—his colleague, Mr. Marshman, have lost some of the prejudices and antipathies of Calcutta, but there is a solution of continuity between their old and their new opinions which no amount of vague liberality can now render consistent.

Mr. Marshman admits it "has been the opprobrium of our administration ever since the days of Lord Cornwallis," that "with the progress of our Empire a blight comes over the prospects of the higher and more influential classes of native society," that "there is no room for their aspirations in our system of Government: they sink down to one dead level of depression in their own land." He thinks that "the remedy for this error is to be found, not in perpetuating the power *so constantly abused*, of Native Princes, simply on the ground of finding employment for native intelligence and ambition, but to incorporate these qualities in our own administration, *with all necessary safeguards against the defects of the Oriental character.*"†

Mr. Marshman cannot resist the Pharisaic sneer with which he qualifies his recommendation, and which, recur-

* *Ante*, p. 202, 203.

† *History*, vol. iii, p. 402.

ring frequently in his volumes, must render them peculiarly acceptable to the rising generation of educated Hindoos upon whom they are forced by the Educational Department. He traces the origin of this "opprobrium of our administration" to the days of Lord Cornwallis. The Editor of the *Spectator* seems to admit that it was intensified by the "great" and "statesmanlike" policy of Lord Dalhousie, which "had one radical and incurable defect;—it barred up native careers."*

Since the greater part of these pages have been in type I have learned that this fault in our system had struck even Lord Dalhousie himself, as appears in the following extract from one of his state-papers:—

"It is a cause of constant regret that there do not exist in the public service some offices of large emolument and high position, to which Native gentlemen of ability and character might rise, so that the office and the pay of Principal Sudder Ameen should no longer be the boundary of a Native gentleman's ambition in the British Service."†

It is not, perhaps, very strange that the Governor-General, in the full swing of that career which seemed to be what the Duke of Argyll and Sir Charles Jackson want to persuade us it really was,—“a long and splendid administration”,‡ “one brilliant and uninterrupted success”,§—should not have perceived that he was aggravating, even to hopelessness, the very grievance he professed to regret. The Editor of the *Spectator* does perceive it, but tries very hard to escape from contrition and full recantation by suggesting an impossible compromise. He, as we have seen, clings to the policy of annexation as a theory, while admitting it to have failed in practice.|| He speaks of the present state of affairs as “a mixed system”; thinks “the new policy may fail, as the old one failed”, and it may then “be necessary to unsettle it.” So that although he thinks • we should “adhere” to “the mixed system”, “until we resolve, and announce that we resolve, that it shall end”,

* *Ante*, p. 202.

† I quote from a Memorial to Sir Stafford Northcote, Secretary of State for India, recently sent by the Bombay Native Association. I do not know in what Minute or despatch Lord Dalhousie expressed these views.

‡ *India under Dalhousie and Canning*, p. 67.

§ *A Vindication*, p. 179.

|| *Ante*, p. 202.

he looks forward to a series of experiments, and even proposes one himself, as "a third policy", that of "picked Native Rulers", or Chief Commissioners, "for life."*

We shall never arrive at an Imperial policy, until we entirely abandon these crude notions of attempting political experiments, even upon such a *corpus vile* as India. But have we a *corpus vile* there, upon which we may play tricks and try experiments with impunity? The people of India may be an inferior race, backward in civilisation, degraded by superstition, and incapable of attaining to the intellectual grandeur and social purity of European nations, though these assertions are open to many qualifications. Before absolutely relegating them to a much lower grade in the scale of humanity, we might reflect a little upon the superstition and corruption that are so rife in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Russia, and ask why the moral and political progress of Hindoo communities is to be considered more hopeless than that of European nations. Whatever we may consider *à priori* ought to be the case, neither the criminal statistics nor the social phenomena of India, as compared with our own, entitle us to place ourselves at an immeasurable height above the Indian races. And surely their mere numbers entitle them to some little respect. The Asiatic population under British supremacy, including the Native States of India, nearly trebles that of the whole Russian Empire. The Queen has more Mahomedan subjects than the Sultan of Turkey. Surely it would not be unjust, unreasonable, or imprudent to pay some little attention, to give some kindly consideration, to the wishes and opinions, and even to the prejudices and ambitions, of nearly two hundred millions of human beings. What can be ultimately expected from a policy of contempt, except that judgment which is pronounced against him who shall call his brother 'Thou fool'?

Now two things are sufficiently obvious to those who have learned to see a little below the surface of things in India,—firstly, that the wishes, opinions, prejudices and ambitions of the reflective and sensitive classes do not turn in the direction of "picked Native Rulers" or "Chief Commissioners";—secondly, that no such class of function-

* *Ante*, p. 204.

aries, European or Native, could obtain one tithe of the influence over the people of all classes, for preserving order or for aiding progress, that can be exercised by Native Sovereigns well disposed towards the Paramount Power. Native Rulers for life, "picked" by the British Government,—which, by the bye, possesses no special faculty for picking them,—would have to be supported by British troops just as much as English Governors and Chief Commissioners. A Native Prince can stand by himself. At critical moments the mass of the people will obey no one else. They would think it wrong, dangerous, unlucky, to disobey or oppose a Rajah; they would feel themselves legally, morally and socially *safe* in obeying him. There is no such feeling with regard to a British official, whose influence rests entirely on visible or accredited physical force.* The people will plunge into the dark with their own Prince; they will only go as far as they can see with a Collector. In no part of the world is the "divinity that doth hedge a King" more respected than in India.

Sir Richard Temple, in his letter to the Governor-General of the 10th of August, 1867, recognises this fact with reference to a Mussulman Sovereign who has been the chief butt of the annexationists for many years, whose person and Government have been the subject of their unbounded scorn and slander :—

"With some classes of the people, the feeling of personal loyalty to the Sovereign is intense. I could recall many instances of this. Before me now, at Hyderabad in the Deccan, there is one of the strongest cases in point. The veneration felt for the person and office of the Nizam seems boundless. Though no Native Sovereigns in India can be more secluded, uninformed, and even bigoted, than the successive Nizams have been, yet even these Princes must have about them some kingly qualities, some tincture of statecraft, in order to inspire awe and maintain personal *prestige* as they have done."†

When we consider that the British Government can wield this immense moral power at its will, it does seem

* This assertion is not in the least modified by the vast personal influence exercised by such men as Outram, Nicholson, Abbott, Sir Herbert Edwards and others, for the most part over wild tribes, and for military purposes. Besides, the Services are not made up of such men as these. And of course I do not mean that a Prince is *always* obeyed.

† *Papers, British and Indian Systems*, 1868, p. 74.

extraordinary that any one who pretends to higher motives than the interests of the Service, who has some knowledge of history, some insight into human character, and some idea of political science, can propose either to destroy it, or to turn it against us, can still hanker after the subversion of these hereditary jurisdictions, and think of replacing them either by British Commissioners or by "picked Native Rulers for life". With our fearful responsibilities, with our enormous stake in the peace and prosperity of India, we cannot afford such a waste of power. We want the Native Princes much more than they want us. We want them for the discipline and the education of two hundred millions of Asiatics. We can instruct and manage the two hundred Princes, their families and followers; we cannot sway the millions without the good will of their natural leaders.

In the actual phase of Indian civilisation Monarchy is the only form of government that is suitable or acceptable to the people, that possesses the two essential qualities of stability and impulsive force. No "picked Native Ruler" or British Commissioner, however highly educated,—though strained and sifted by a dozen successive competitions,—could ever maintain order or propagate reform as could be done by a Native Prince, however ignorant, whom we have rendered amenable to our purpose. And there is no necessity that Native Princes should be ignorant. If most of them are so, it is only another proof of our neglect.

In this, as in other affairs, we had better be content with the tools we find ready made to our hands, and make use of the old royal families, without picking or choosing when it can be avoided. We can educate Sovereigns, but we cannot improvise them. Nations can do it, by a process of natural selection, in the stormiest scenes of their struggle for existence; but neither a Sivajee nor a Hyder Ali would serve our turn. Such Princes have not conservative propensities, and would not be easily led into constitutional government.

The capabilities of India can never be fully developed by a process of perpetual dry-nursing. Our pupils, without being released from tuition, or allowed to run riot out

of bounds, must be allowed to grow, to use their limbs and faculties, and to exercise the arts and accomplishments that we may be proud of having taught them. And as they prove themselves able and willing to carry on the good work which we have planned and initiated, we may, with great relief and advantage to our own over-strained establishments, enlarge their bounds, and place more confidence in them. For instance, if the administration of Mysore be judiciously organised during the young Prince's minority, instead of abusing our trust by carving out a small Principality for him, it would be far more advantageous, both for the Imperial Power and for the people of Southern India, if we were to extend the frontiers of the State, perhaps even to the full dimensions of Tippoo Sultan's Kingdom, except the sea-board Provinces. Sir John Malcolm, one of the most far-seeing of our few Indian statesmen, long ago anticipated these views. He said of Mysore :—

“It may, in the course of events, be a consideration of policy to increase, instead of diminishing, the wealth and limits of a State which, while it affords us resources fully equal to the same extent of our own dominions, is exempt from some of the objections to which those are subject.”*

By the marked and acknowledged administrative improvements introduced during the reign of the present Nizam throughout his Dominions, that Prince has fairly earned the boon upon which he is known to have set his heart, the restoration of the two Provinces of Berar, held in trust for him by our Government, to his own occupation and management. Those districts were taken from his father, by means of menace and compulsion, as a material guaranty for the regular payment of a Contingent Force,—a burden which we had, most unfairly and insidiously, “rendered permanent, contrary to the principle of the Treaty, and altered so as to be useful for our own purposes.” “Its commands and staff-appointments”, continues Major Moore, one of the Court of Directors, “have afforded rewards for meritorious officers who had distinguished themselves in our own armies; and it has been altogether a fertile source of patronage.” On the other

* *Malcolm's Political History*, 1811, p. 375.

hand, while we imposed this "incubus on the Nizam's finances", we turned these troops to our own pecuniary benefit in another way. Relying upon the Contingent for preserving peace and good order in the Nizam's dominions, we "disregarded our own engagements", and "for thirty years the number of our troops", the Subsidiary Force, "kept up within the Hyderabad country was more than one fourth less than the number for which we had contracted" under the Treaty of 1800, in return for valuable cessions of territory.*

The Nizam's Ministers were reduced to the greatest extremities in order "to meet our inevitable demand for the monthly pay of the Contingent", controlled by our Resident, and commanded by our officers, whose emoluments, costing our Government nothing, were swelled to a scale of preposterous extravagance.†

"Overwhelmed with financial difficulties, the Nizam was at length unable to pay the Contingent, and we kindly lent him the money from our own treasury, first at 12 per cent., and latterly at 6 per cent. interest; and thus our staunch Ally incurred a debt to us of about 50 lakhs of rupees" (£500,000), "the consequences of which were the present Revised Treaty."‡

The opinions thus expressed by Major Moore were supported in Protests by Sir Henry Willock and Colonel Sykes, who quoted the testimony "of successive Residents at Hyderabad, officers of high character and standing, viz., Sir Charles Metcalfe, Colonel Stewart, General Fraser and Colonel Low", who "severally declared that we were not justified by treaty in making such large calls on the Nizam's treasury."§ Colonel Sykes doubted whether "a legal, equitable or moral responsibility could be fixed upon the Nizam for the repayment of the total advances made by the British Government."|| Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad in 1860, and who had been Assistant Resident in 1853, when the Revised Treaty was extorted from the Nizam, as he says, "by objurgations and threats", declares, that "had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with, we had no just

* *Papers, Nizam's Debt*, 1859, p. 4, 5.

† *Ibid.*, p. 5.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

† *Ibid.*, p. 16, 17.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 11.

claim against the Nizam",—"in 1853 we had little or no real pecuniary claim against the Nizam."*

Such being the origin of the sequestration, and the account being but little modified in our favour by the territorial restoration and exchanges, and the relinquishment of a large balance of alleged debt under the Treaty of 1860, which still left the Nizam's large counter-claims of long-standing untouched,† every dictate of equity and policy should prompt our Government to replace these Provinces, with their reformed institutions and improved revenue, in the direct possession of their Sovereign.

In a despatch dated the 5th of September, 1860, our Government reasserted the Sovereignty of the Nizam in the Provinces, and desired to "explain to his Highness distinctly that the object of the Government of India in retaining in its hands a part even of the Assigned Districts, is simply that it may hold a material guaranty for the performance of the conditions of Art. VI of the Treaty of 1853, and that the Government of India desires to hold this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the Assigned Districts, not in Sovereignty, but in trust for his Highness, so long as the Contingent is kept up, and no longer." It fully acknowledged "the fact that the alienation of this portion of the dominions of his Highness is temporary only, and for a special purpose conducive chiefly to the security of the Hyderabad State, and to the preservation of tranquillity throughout its limits."‡

Assuming the justice and advisability of keeping up the Contingent, on its reduced scale, it may have been necessary, from the disordered state of the Nizam's finances, and the loose mode of administration in 1853, to take such a material guaranty for the regular payment of our demands. Since that time, however, and especially since 1860, partly from the relief afforded by the revenue of the districts restored under the Treaty of that year, partly from the careful economy and judicious measures of the Minister Salar Jung, the finances have arrived at a much more satisfactory condition. Unquestionable security could now be given for the punctual payment of the Contingent;

* *Papers, the Deccan*, 1867, p. 27.

† *Ibid.*, p. 4, 5 and 27.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

and it might be found expedient still further to reduce the expenses of that Force, to withdraw gradually some of the European officers, and to transfer the corps, with their own consent, to the direct service of the Nizam, as soon as efficient Native Commandants could be trained and appointed. This process might be carried on step by step with the conversion of the irregular and ineffective troops now forming the Nizam's army, and who as fast as they were disbanded, would furnish a certain proportion of good recruits for the disciplined Regiments. This plan, roughly sketched here, and intended to occupy several years in execution, might be made a measure of economy at once for the Nizam's Government and for ours. Half the necessity both for the Subsidiary Force and the Contingent would disappear with the reconstruction of the Nizam's Army, and the breaking up of those numerous, disorderly levies which now infest the country. The Nawab Salar Jung has recently taken a most effectual step towards preserving peace and tranquillity, by forbidding the open display of arms, especially in the city of Hyderabad.

If we wish to strengthen the hands of the brave and wise Minister who has done so much to reform the Hyderabad State during the last fifteen years, we ought to return to his charge the two Provinces of Berar. The honour and credit of restoring the integrity of the Nizam's Dominions would redouble his influence with all classes, from the Sovereign downwards, and arm him with irresistible authority to pursue and extend the work of organisation. Besides, the introduction of all the essentials of good government into every Province, and into every department of the administration, might be made the condition of relinquishing the Berars. The results of the partial restitution under the Treaty of 1860, have been most encouraging, both by the continued good management of the retransferred Provinces, and in the stimulus and examples thereby given to the general progress of the country. Complete restitution might be made the means and occasion of regenerating the Nizam's Government. We can gain nothing, while the cause of civilisation loses, so long as this great act of redress and instruction is denied or delayed.

CHAPTER XI.

The Edinburgh Reviewer of October 1866, whose Essay has already fallen under our notice,* has learned nothing from the Rebellion of 1857, except to take precautions against another military mutiny. He has nothing to suggest except that we should reduce our Native troops to the lowest possible degree; arm our European Infantry with breech-loaders, and provide our Artillery with guns and projectiles "of the latest and most approved invention," to be employed, if necessary, "against Asiatics who could not possibly possess themselves of similar weapons." "It would be rash," he adds, "to place these improved arms in the hands of Natives, by whom they might be turned against ourselves." Having then, he says, "reduced our own force, we might well demand that the Native Princes should disband a corresponding number of their own troops." Then he trusts, "in a generation or two, unless we wilfully keep it alive, the military spirit of the people will, for the most part, have died out."†

A noble policy and hopeful prospects! He sees that "the reduction by one-third of the amount of European force now maintained in India would be a very sensible relief to England," but he cannot, of course, admit that the vast area and multiplied posts to be occupied in consequence of Lord Dalhousie's annexations, have anything to do with the burdensome demand for European soldiers. He does not see that the Rebellion of 1857 revealed, but did not create, the want of British troops. While he feels the inconvenience of being compelled to supply so much physical force from England, he can think of no remedy but that of diminishing the armed force recruited in India, whether in our own service or in that of our Allies. In short, the policy of annexation, which the Reviewer is bound to uphold, having begun in bluster and contempt, now sinks down into mistrust and the muzzle.

Clearly the Edinburgh Reviewer, and those who think with him, would declaim vehemently against my suggestion for converting the Nizam's Army into a small but efficient force. My opinion, on the contrary, is that if we make the Native Princes trust us, we can always trust them. Their troops, properly equipped and disciplined,

* *Ante*, p. 227 to 235.

† *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1866, p. 338, 339.

occasionally brigaded in camps of exercise with the moveable columns which should take the place of our subsidiary divisions and garrisons, ought to be a source of military strength, and, still more, a visible display of moral strength in our favour, to the great relief of our finances and our muster-roll.

With these convictions on my mind, I cannot but deprecate as most ill-advised that effort of superior power, by which Sir John Lawrence, about a year ago, compelled the Maharajah Scindia to break up the miniature army, complete in every branch, which he had carefully organised and trained, and which, in unsuspecting complacency, he had invited the British Resident to review at Gwalior. That act, much lauded at Calcutta for its vigilance and vigour, appears to me to have been extremely petty, undignified and impolitic. What harm could that little force have done to us? One of our Divisions could have walked over it any day. A Regiment of Dragoons and a Troop of Horse Artillery, well handled, could probably have dispersed it after a morning's march. On the other hand, in case of real necessity, the cooperation of that small body with the Maharajah at their head, would baffle thousands of insurgents and intriguers, would determine the good conduct of many feudatories and millions of subjects.

By such an open and stinging rebuff to our faithful Ally, he is lowered in the eyes of his own adherents and people. His influence—though of inestimable value to us—was still insufficient in the crisis of 1858 to restrain the bulk of his troops and followers from joining in the Rebellion. The result of the struggle, proving his wisdom and foresight, must have added immensely to the Prince's authority, until our Government was pleased to shake it once more by displaying their want of confidence, and by wounding him in a matter known to be his special pride.

The Imperial Power of India will not grow stronger or more secure by the weakness and humiliation of the feudatory Princes. Nor will the general belief in our strength and security be fortified in the least by the manifestation of mistrust.

Apart from all other objections, that mistrust was altogether misdirected. We need have no fear of the visible armies of all the Native Sovereigns of India. In the words of Lord Canning's last letter to General Sir Mark Cubbon :—"We have nothing to fear from them individually, if we treat them rightly ; while they have individually an influence which is invaluable to us as Supreme Rulers in India, if we will but turn it to account."* Not one of them has the slightest wish to measure his strength against ours. They are neither willing nor able to combine against us. So long as we can see their little armies, we know where to have them, in case of any unavoidable collision or unexpected contumacy. And not being able to concur in the *Edinburgh Reviewer's* expectation that "the military spirit" in India "will have died out in a generation or two," I prefer to see the warlike elements of the population organised and disciplined under responsible leaders, to having them compressed or driven out of sight into predatory courses or hidden conspiracy.

The *Edinburgh Reviewer* of 1866 does not fear "insurrections of the people." "How," he inquires, "are the supposed insurgents to obtain weapons wherewith to face Armstrong guns and breech-loading rifles of the newest construction?"†

There are plenty of arms in India, and they will always be attainable. Three thousand miles of coast can never be blockaded. The Reviewer, and the party he represents, do not, we may suppose, seriously think that by any precautions of diplomacy, police or legislation, they can destroy or neutralise the physical force of two hundred millions of men,—that their hostility, without breech-loaders, or even their disaffection, without any arms at all, would not be formidable ?

If ever, from errors or adverse circumstances that it would be useless to anticipate, there should be anything like a hostile unanimity against us in India, the country might be made too hot to hold us almost without a shot being fired. The insurgents, if there were any, would not be required "to face Armstrong guns". At no time shall

* Note B at the end of this volume.

† *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1866, p. 338.

we have any military dangers, properly so called, to fear from within. A British army of 25,000 men could march from one end of India to the other, overcoming all possible opposition, and providing for its own subsistence. But we do not want to conquer, we want to govern India. Our supremacy would be utterly untenable for a day without Native cooperation on an enormous scale; and if that were withdrawn, or no longer to be trusted, all semblance of a Government would soon be at an end. We should become, in every sense of the word, a foreign body in the system, and should be starved in the midst of plenty. Great Britain is now, unfortunately, dependent upon the revenues and railway earnings of India for large annual remittances,—of which the amount has largely increased within the last ten years. To secure the regular payment of these vast sums, the Government of India must maintain peace, good order and general content.

Our highest efforts should be directed to the reform of Native States as the only solid foundation of an Imperial system, the only effectual means of permanent civilisation. Only so far as our institutions are accepted and established in the allied Principalities, can they be considered secure even in our own Provinces. To carry out the work of reform, particularly in the larger and more important States, with full effect, and with the good will and cheerful aid of those most deeply concerned, we shall require to make use of the much neglected and almost forgotten agency of Native diplomatists.

We have done a great work for India: we have made rough places smooth; we have improved the soil; we have cut down and torn up by the roots many noxious weeds; we have planted many trees of stately growth and useful quality; but we shall lose the fruit of our labour if we refuse to permit the people to carry on the cultivation themselves, when we have shown them how to do it.

APPENDIX.

(A.)

COFFEE-PLANTERS IN MYSORE AND ENGLISH GENTLEMEN IN INDIA.

(Page 317.)

IN *Remarks on the Mysore Blue Book*, pp. 59 to 65, (embodied as Chapter X in the 2nd Edition of the *Mysore Reversion*, pp. 238 to 244,) I fully refuted the plausible argument advanced both in the despatches from Calcutta and in a Minute by Mr. R. D. Mangles, against the restoration of a Native Government in Mysore, on account of the number of English coffee-planters in that Province. I showed that there could not be more than from 25 to 30 persons of that description among a population of about four millions, and that instead of Mysore being, as Mr. Mangles asserted, "full of European settlers," these two dozen or so of planters—not, properly speaking "*settlers*" at all,—were located only in two small hilly districts on the outskirts, beyond which coffee cultivation could never be extended.

Not satisfied with this exposure, Mr. Mangles returns to the charge in a Dissent dated April 24th, 1867, objecting to Sir Stafford Northcote's despatch recognising the Rajah's heir. He repeats his former erroneous statement, though in terms slightly more vague and guarded. He says, that "Englishmen in considerable numbers have been permitted, if not encouraged, to settle in that territory as coffee-planters."* From very recent and authentic information I am now enabled to state that the number of English coffee-planters in Mysore does not exceed sixteen in number, or including their assistants, some of whom are not Europeans but of mixed extraction, about thirty,—not, one might suppose, a very formidable or important body.

But this handful of Englishmen do not, as I pointed out in my original remarks on this topic, constitute a large proportion of the coffee-planting interest in Mysore. We learn from the Administration Report of Mysore for the official year 1865-6, that the collections under the head of "Coffee" amount altogether to

* *Mysore Papers*, (No. 271), 1867, p. 13.

102,781 Rupees, (£10,278) of which 88,470 Rupees (£8847) were paid by Natives, and 14,311 Rupees (£1431) by European planters. Sixteen planters, paying the splendid revenue of £1400 per annum into the public treasury, are magnified by Mr. Mangles into "a considerable number" of British settlers, whose interests should be paramount among four millions of Hindoos paying an annual revenue of a million sterling.

But in justice to Mr. Mangles we must admit that in his second Minute he does not, as he did in his first, dwell exclusively on the jeopardised interests of the English planters. He is concerned for the Rajah and the Principality of Mysore, who, in his opinion, if not protected by annexation, may be crushed by "the superior intelligence and energies" of the terrible sixteen. The whole deserves attention.

"I desire to add, that it appears to me that the impolicy of reestablishing a Native Government in Mysore is much aggravated by the circumstance that, of late years, Englishmen in considerable numbers have been permitted, if not encouraged, to settle in that territory as coffee-planters. It may be regarded as a certainty that, during the long minority of the adopted son, this class will be materially increased. No Native Government, such as India has ever yet seen, would be able to deal equably and consistently with such a body of men. The Englishmen would take their stand, with characteristic strength of will, upon their rights, as recognised or assumed under the British protectorate. Their treatment by the Maharajah, or rather by his ministers or servants, would oscillate, according to the caprice of the hour, between undue favour, involving wrong to the native population, and high-handed justice.* On any occasion of extreme excitement, such as that engendered by the differences between the indigo planters and the ryots in Bengal, the Government would be utterly unable to control the English planters, otherwise than by acts of despotic violence, which would as certainly provoke equally violent resistance. And it is hardly too much to say, that if, in the course of a few years, any large addition should be made, as is highly probable, to the number of such settlers in Mysore, nothing but the constantly recurring interposition of the British Government would prevent them from making themselves practically masters of the country, either with the consent of the Rajah, through the instrumentality of loans of money, or in supersession of his authority, by the abuse of their superior intelligence and energies. The same qualities which have won for our nation the Empire of India, would make our countrymen, if let alone, the virtual masters of Mysore. And incessant interference on the part of the British Government, to obviate such a result, would reduce the Rajah to the condition of the merest cypher, the sport of opposing forces."†

Still persisting, in spite of the information within his reach, in talking about "Englishmen in considerable numbers settled as

* Is not this a slip of the pen, or a misprint, for "injustice"?

† *Mysore Papers* (No. 271), 1867, p. 12, 13.

coffee-planters," he considers it "as a certainty that, during the long minority of the adopted son, this class will be materially increased." Nothing can be more unlikely. The very small class of English planters has decreased, is decreasing, and will probably have all but disappeared before twenty years have elapsed. They cannot exist without those exceptionally high profits which are no longer to be obtained in the face of native competition. The native planters will buy them all out by degrees. From all that we can hear, most of them are in the market already, but as the Editor of the *Friend of India* and correspondent of the *Times* has recently informed us, "their property has so deteriorated in value as to be unsaleable at its proper price." There may be differences of opinion as to what "a proper price" is, and also as to the cause and time of the deterioration, which we will consider shortly, but there can be little doubt as to the falling prospects of the European coffee-planters in Mysore.

Their prospects, however, may revive; there may be a good time coming for them; but even then the argument of Mr. Mangles would not be improved. He ignores the fact, pointed out in my previous correction, that the fearful task of controlling the English planters would not be thrown entirely upon the Rajah and his ministers; that under special capitulations, of which one was concluded with the Nizam in 1861,* the British Resident is always constituted the judge in crimes and disputes arising among Europeans and descendants of Europeans within Native States.

The picture that is drawn by Mr. Mangles of these sixteen coffee-planters, paying the immense sum of £1100 per annum on their holdings, complaining of this tax as "a heavy burden,"† trying in vain to sell their property, and yet "making themselves practically masters of the country, through the instrumentality of loans of money" to the Rajah, may be pronounced brilliant but so highly coloured as to be quite out of keeping. Mr. Mangles says that "by the abuse of their superior intelligence and energies, our countrymen, if let alone, would become the virtual masters of Mysore." Well,—but they would not be "let alone." If every one of the sixteen English planters were a sort of cross between Talleyrand and Shylock, with endless talents for intrigue and boundless funds wherewith to furnish loans to the Rajah, they would not be "let alone" to extort a bond and exact their pound of flesh from the British tributary. His fears, however, may be moderated. The coffee-planters are neither so wealthy nor so ambitious, nor are British Residents so careless or so powerless as he supposes. And we may remind Mr. Mangles that the corrupt

* *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864 (Longman & Co., London), vol. v, p. 117. This concession was, I believe, made by the Nizam chiefly on account of the Railway passing through his dominions.

† *Remarks on the Mysore Blue Book*, p. 62; *Mysore Reversion* (2nd Edition), p. 241.

Englishmen,—the Paul Benfields and others, of whom he is evidently thinking,—who formed the class of ‘Nabobs’ towards the close of the last century, and whose vast fortunes were wrung from the Nawabs of the Carnatic, Bengal, and Oude, and the Rajah of Tanjore, by the imposition of loans, chiefly fictitious, were not coffee-planters, but Covenanted Civilians of the Company’s Service. They acquired and exercised their evil influence over these unfortunate Princes, not by means of any “superior intelligence and energies,” but by the lowest and most infamous practices of fraud and intimidation. They possessed, or were believed to possess, the power of gaining political advantages for the Native Princes, or of saving them from injury and oppression. Even supposing that times and circumstances were in any respect similar, what political power or influence could a coffee-planter be supposed to possess?

The Calcutta Correspondent of the *Times*, for several years, both in that capacity and in his other character of Editor of the *Friend of India*, has kept up an incessant fire of slander and insult upon Native Princes and their administration, and has striven hard to ensure the annexation of Mysore. In a letter to the *Times*, dated the 10th of March, 1866, this public instructor introduced the following veracious picture into a general invective against Native States.

“The Chief, if he is active, squeezes his tenantry and kills their trade by grievous monopolies,—if he is debauched, as is more generally the case, they have half-a-dozen tyrants, in the shape of his courtiers, instead of one. *Mutilation, the ravishing of women, torture, suttee, and sunnath, or burying alive, are the rule*, and the present policy is not to interfere until these evils reach a height which would endanger the peace of our own subjects.”

As to the maintenance of the Mysore State,

“Whatever be the justice of the old Chief’s claim, England ought to know that Mysore *cannot* be restored after being 40 years under English rule.”

“What could we do with the *hundreds of European planters* who, during the last third of a century, have been attracted by our administration to settle there and clothe the slopes of its hills with the coffee plant?”

Baffled for the time, but not vanquished by Sir Stafford Northcote’s decision, he still continues his efforts, in the hope, like his London Correspondent, Mr. Marshman, “that before the period for consummating this policy arrives, some future Secretary of State will be found to annul it, as the present Secretary of State has annulled the decision of his predecessor.”* In a letter dated the 24th of February, which appeared in the *Times* of the 23rd of

* *Ante*, p. 290.

March 1868, he dresses up the old coffee-planting bugbear with "a nice derangement" of epithets and figures far surpassing the first and second style of Mr. Mangles in treating the same subject.

"The coffee planters have taken the alarm in Mysore, where, by the last census, there were no less than 14,302 Europeans and East Indians out of a total population of 3,900,735."

Who would not on a hasty perusal suppose that these 14,302 persons were all coffee-planters?

"They,"—the coffee-planters, whom the ordinary reader now supposes to be 14,302 in number instead of 16!—"say that a breach of faith has been committed by the Secretary of State, that the legality of their titles is now questioned, and that their property has so deteriorated in value as to be unsaleable at its proper price. The correspondence on native rule shows that this feeling prevails among the majority of the natives also. These native officials are at once to be employed wherever practicable, even before the boy-Rajah comes of age. I report these things as likely to be the source of no little future trouble."

The statement as to the number of Europeans and East Indians residing in Mysore may be literally correct, yet it is calculated to produce a very erroneous impression. The *Times* Correspondent does not say whether nearly 2,000 British soldiers stationed in the Province are included among the 14,302 persons, but certainly nineteen-twentieths of that number are petty shopkeepers and camp-followers of mixed extraction, and of both sexes, with their children, in the great military cantonment of Bangalore; not one in five hundred being a coffee-planter or a producer of any description. As to the sixteen actual coffee-planters—not the shadowy "considerable numbers" of Mr. Mangles, nor the 14,302 insinuations of the *Times* Correspondent—"they" may complain that "a breach of faith has been committed," "that the legality of their titles is questioned," and that "their property is deteriorated in value," but they would find it very difficult to trace any connection between the last and only tangible ground of complaint and the recognition of the Maharajah's heir, or to found upon it any claim for compensation. The British Government will, of course, take good care that their titles are not disturbed, and that they have every facility for carrying on their business, or for disposing of their property, as they may feel inclined. There is no reason to fear any "future trouble."

This same letter in the *Times* of the 23rd of March contains another very flagrant example of the untrustworthy nature of "our Calcutta Correspondent's" information, of the utter trash that is forced upon the public mind with all the weight of the powerful organ upon which the Editor of the *Friend of India* has unfortunately contrived to fasten himself. Speaking of the proposed new Government for Bengal, he says —

"If a Council is given to Bengal then a demand will be made by the large non-official community of Calcutta and Bengal to be represented by at least one highly paid outsider; and the Bengalees, too, will probably make a similar request. It is difficult to see how either can be refused. It will not be difficult to find an Englishman of high character and ability, and a Native might be appointed so soon as one in every way qualified could be found. The custom of appointing merchants only to honorary positions in the Legislative Councils cannot be said to be useful either to Government or to the public. Such men are overworked in their own business, which they cannot afford to leave. No non-missionary remains in India an hour longer than he can help. But pay and honour a man of this class like an ordinary Civilian, and very good members will be secured. There are no less than 150,000 pure Englishmen in India. Of these, 58,000 are soldiers and officers, and 3,500 covenanted officials of different orders, civil, ecclesiastical, and medical. This leaves 89,000 English gentlemen, who are settlers and merchants of different kinds, and the great majority of these are in Calcutta and Bengal. Are these 89,000 to be in no way represented anywhere, either in India or England? This question will be put very loudly, I doubt not, if a New Executive Council is to be created."

Let us examine his figures a little. His sum total of 150,000 Englishmen in India is considerably overstated, as I shall show, but we will accept it provisionally. After deducting the soldiers and officials, he says there remain "89,000 *English gentlemen*." Verily, the colour-blindness of a West Indian Creole among Negroes is clear vision compared with that of a Calcutta Cockney among Hindoos. Observe the quiet assumption, that every "pure Englishman" in India must be a "gentleman". It never even struck him that there might be a few "ladies" to keep the "gentlemen" company. If he had thought of that, he might have written—with much more verbal and a little more numerical accuracy—"persons"; for among those counted as Europeans in 1861, there were nearly 20,000 *women*, a large deduction from his "gentlemen" to begin with. It might also have struck him, if he had not been in such a hurry, that there would be a few "young gentlemen", sometimes profanely called "boys", among them.

Even with these modifications, his estimate would be far above the truth; for where did the Calcutta Correspondent get the round number of 150,000 with which he started? The last census of the Europeans in India was taken, I believe, in 1861. The sum total then was 125,945. There were probably more Englishmen in India then, for the simple reason that there were more soldiers. In 1861 there were altogether 84,083, officers and men of all branches of the Army, and if we deduct these from the total, there remain 41,862; from which we must again subtract 19,306 women, which leaves a remainder of 22,556. From these again we must take the Covenanted civil, ecclesiastical and medical servants at

the Correspondent's own figure of 3,500, and there remain 19,056. But from these again we must deduct the Uncovenanted servants of Government, who cannot be reckoned at much less than 1,500 more, which will reduce the number of independent Europeans to about 17,500; from which a further deduction of children under age, and of foreigners, would have to be made before we arrived at the true net result of Englishmen in India not in the service of Government. These may be finally set down at about 12,000 of all classes, instead of the absurdly exaggerated estimate of "89,000 English gentlemen", proposed by the Calcutta Correspondent of *The Times*.

These "89,000 English gentlemen", he says, "are *settlers* and *merchants* of different kinds." Reduce the number to 12,000, and even then *none* of them are "settlers", and not one-tenth of them are either "gentlemen" or "merchants". It is obvious that among the non-official Englishmen in India, a very small proportion can belong to the class, who, by virtue of their education, manners, and profession, are usually called "gentlemen". The great bulk of them are shopkeepers, artisans, small clerks and commercial assistants, railway engineers and drivers, sailors, pensioners from the army, and others of even humbler grades, with not a few of vagabond character.

By the Correspondent's own description there are no "settlers" among them, for he says: "No non-missionary remains in India an hour longer than he can help",—a sufficient answer to the preposterous demand of representation in the Government of Bengal put forward on behalf of these irresponsible visitors to India, the best of whom have no permanent stake in the country, and no object but that of making money and taking it away as soon as possible.

(B.)

EXTRACT FROM EARL CANNING'S LAST PRIVATE
LETTER TO GENERAL SIR MARK CUBBON, K.C.B.,

COMMISSIONER OF MYSORE, DATED NOV. 24TH, 1860.

(Page 334.)

"I have no doubt that the policy of disruption and separation was the right one fifty years ago, when the Rohillas and Mahrattas possessed armies and artillery which they could increase at pleasure with-

out our consent, and, indeed, without our knowledge. But now it is quite different. These Chiefs can scarcely cast a gun,—they certainly could not equip it unknown to us. They feel their dependence on us, since 1857 more than ever. We have nothing to fear from them individually, if we treat them rightly; whilst they have individually an influence which is invaluable to us as Supreme Rulers in India, if we will but turn it to account. To do this we must put them into a position to become useful instruments of civil government, and to take a pride in it. It is not a hopeless task, as some pretend. If it were, Sindia would not, in May last, when I was returning to Calcutta, have taken his place in the mail-cart, to meet me in the Trunk Road, for no other purpose than to show me the results of his own revision of his revenue-assessments, made in compliance with exhortations given to him six months before at Agra. Unluckily he missed me. Nor would Maharajah Maun Sing, the Oude malcontent, and all but rebel, who wisely became loyal just in time, have told me last week with pride, that since he had been a Magistrate he had judged upwards of six hundred cases, in only two of which his judgment had, on appeal, been reversed; speaking, too, with warmth of the kindness and trouble bestowed upon him by the Chief Commissioner, who had taken him into his camp for a fortnight to teach him the forms and spirit of our magisterial administration.

“In one way or another—in every way, in short—we must teach these men unmistakably, that, whether they be Chiefs of States or subjects, no change in the Supreme Power in India will be a gain to them, either as regards property, religion, social position, or national prejudices; and that the largest possible share of consideration and authority which they can have under any Paramount Power, they shall have under ours. If, as is very probable, the day of a European war is not distant, the need to us of such a conviction in their minds will soon make itself felt. To hold our Indian Empire in its present dimensions, through a war with France and Russia, we must hold it by some other means than the few English Regiments which, in such a case, would be spared to us.

“It is the same with our own old dominions in India as with the Native States. We have governed the North-Western Provinces in such a fashion that the Lieutenant-Governor is with difficulty able to find Native gentlemen of such position as to make them useful and influential Magistrates; and in ten or fifteen years more it would be pretty nearly the same with the Punjab. The influence of the landholders, instead of being conciliated and enlisted on our side, has been broken up and diluted till it has all but disappeared in the North-West; and we present the extraordinary spectacle of a Government which has no root in its soil, governing a country mainly agricultural, and one in which the value of landed possessions, and the respect for hereditary tenures, are as strongly felt as in any country in the world, by ignoring the landlord. We have kept a smooth surface upon this unsound state of things longer than could have been expected; and fortunately, when the break-up came, three years ago, we had no enemies in the field but such as did not know how to profit by our dis-

advantage, and we were able to dispose of them before they learnt the way.

“It may not be so in a long European war, with foreign cruiser threatening our Indian ports, foreign emissaries busy in the interior and English recruits hard to come by.”

This extract has already been printed in the *Homeward Mail*.

THE END.

LONDON.

T. RICHARDS 37, GREAT QUEEN STREET, W.C.

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
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