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The Political Philosophies Since 1905

The Political Philosophies Since 1905

THEIR ORIGINS AND THEIR TENDENCIES
AN OBJECTIVE AND CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY

Outline of a Course of Lectures given at
The Kashi Vidyapitha, Benares
In October 1927

BY

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

*Author of The Science of History, Politics of Boundaries, Futurism of
Young Asia, Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus,
Greetings to Young India, Economic Development, etc. ;
Editor, Arthik Unnati (Economic Progress) and Journal of
the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce ; Membre
correspondant de la Société d'Economie
Politique de Paris*

WITH A FOREWORD BY

MAJOR B. D. BASU, I.M.S. (*Retired*)

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1928

[*Rupees Four*

First published in November 1928

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS publication owes its origin to a course of lectures delivered by me at the Kashi Vidya-pitha, Benares, in October, 1927, at the suggestion of my friend, Shri Shivaprasad Gupta, founder of the institution. The book may be taken to be an enlarged table of contents or rather an expanded syllabus, as I have tried particularly to boil down the bulky material into the shortest possible compass.

The ground covered, however, is more extensive as well as more up-to-date than the prescribed courses of study for any single batch of post-graduate students in India. Indeed, political philosophy as interpreted here comprises five different orders of ideas and ideals. The book concerns itself, therefore, with five different ideological histories, *viz.*, those of (1) constitutional and legal theories, (2) economic thought in its manifold aspects, (3) internationalism, (4) societal speculation and (5) moral philosophy,—with special reference, of course, to the period since 1905.

The subject has been demanding my attention for a book that might easily grow into five times the present size. The present attempt seeks only to single out one or two characteristic ideas or

doctrines from the leading documents of thought and indicate some of the more important secondary sources.

Even where quotation-marks have not been used, I have tried to employ the language of the originals especially for ch. IV, and to a certain extent also for ch. III.

The historic succession of dates, names and titles is a chief object of this survey. But the bony framework has been endowed with as much meaty stuff as possible within the limitations imposed by considerations of space.

In a small book like this the tendency to content oneself with single-word criticisms or interpretations were almost inevitable. But such abstract summing-ups have, as a rule, been held in check. My aim is to exhibit in the main an objective march of ideas and ideals without the shackles of commentarial intrusion.

The ideologies, however, have been presented not as a classified list of *isms* and a history of their fortunes, but as an inductive study of men, institutions and movements in evolution. The value of the personality, the contributions of the individual, the diversities in the individuality of thinkers and statesmen have been sought to be exhibited in their realistic make-up.

I have avoided, moreover, the stereotyped order in which philosophical evolution in politics,

economics and sociology is generally exhibited. A way will perhaps be seen to have been opened for fresh orientations and novel outlooks in the regions of modern thought.

It is time for India to commence studying European as well as Asian and African developments through her own eyes and interpreting them from her own angle of vision. One cannot depend exclusively on Western interpretations even when many of the facts and phenomena happen to be Western.

The essay on Chitta Ranjan Das and Young Asia which appears in the Appendix may be taken as an illustration as well as to a certain extent a verification of the "socio-philosophical equations" discussed in Ch. VI.

The absence of library facilities in India is a paramount handicap to researches in world-problems and world-thought, especially so far as the European continent is concerned. Even as an outline the book might have been improved under better conditions of study, such as prevail elsewhere.

I should not fail, however, to acknowledge the receipt of friendly help in the form of books, pamphlets, journals and suggestive bibliographies from Professor Emmanuel Vidal, Secretary, *Société d'Economie Politique de Paris*, of which I am a member, Professor Charles Gide, Editor, *Revue d'Economie*

Politique, the late Professor Yves-Guyot, Editor, *Journal des Economistes*, Professors Frank Harkins and Harry Barnes of Amherst College, U.S.A., Professor E. R. A. Seligman of Columbia University and Dr. Harry Laidler of the League for Industrial Democracy, New York, Professor Giorgio Mortara, Editor, *Giornale degli Economisti e Rivista di Statistica*, Rome, Professor Conrad Matschoss, Director, *Verein Deutscher Ingenieure*, Berlin, Professor Harms of the *Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr*, Kiel, Professor Haepke of the University of Marburg, as well as Professors Vogel and Schumacher of the University of Berlin.

I am indebted to Major B. D. Basu for the Foreword to this outline. He has been taking a personal and scientific interest in my work since 1910, when, at his suggestion, I undertook the translation of *Sukraniti* (Hindu politics, economics and sociology) for the Panini Office Series founded by his brother, the late lamented Sanskritist and scholar in Hindu philosophy, Sris Chandra Vasu.

Thanks are due to Babu Shib Chandra Datta M. A., B. L., for kindly preparing the index.

A word of apology is necessary for the typographical errors which, in spite of the care, are to be found in the book.

CALCUTTA,
18th Sept. 1928

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

FOREWORD

BY MAJOR B. D. BASU, I.M.S. (*Retired*)

(Author of *Rise of the Christian Power in India*, etc.)

I

THE first-hand investigations and original interpretations of Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar in the achievements and problems of modern civilization constitute some of his special contributions to the thought and literature of Young India. And they have won recognition in Europe and America as well.

As the twelve-year long intellectual work of Professor Sarkar in foreign scientific circles may not be so well known to our countrymen let me begin this foreword with a short account of that phase of his literary life.

His *Economic Development : Snapshots of world-movements in commerce, economic legislation, industrialism and technical education* (based mainly on French, German and Italian sources, pages 464), published in 1926, has been appreciated in the *Sociological Review* of London by the editor Professor Patrick Geddes in the following terms :

"This book is of interest to us, Westerners, on its own merits of extensive knowledge of us ; as well as for its presentation of Indian outlooks beyond those commonly current. For instead of abstract politics we have here concrete economics, and seen as fundamental to politics, largely of a new kind. To the general student of economics this treatment should be suggestive ; indeed at its best it is exemplary.

"Prof. Sarkar has for many years been studying one European country after the other, and from many view-

points : so his book is a result not only of reading, but of wide personal intercourse and travel, and full of economic information and social reflection from all these sources.

"With all his descriptive concreteness there are large and bold generalisations and frequent passages of social criticism and interpretation ; and these ranging over France and Germany, from America to Japan, and of course from India to Britain, and home again : in fact leading up to a broad sketch of an economic policy, very comprehensive for young India.

"Alike as widely informative and as actively stimulating, this book will be found well worth looking through and thinking over both in East and West."

Professor Taussig of Harvard University is of opinion that the scheme referred to above is "a large programme laid out in a statesmanlike way." What it aims to do would "tax to the utmost the capacity of any set of people."

Students of Indian economic thought can notice in Mr. Sarkar's work the advance in methods, materials and messages of economic research that has been made since the days of Ranade and Dutt.

The *Sueddeutsche Monatshefte* of Munich, in its special Asia number edited by Professor Haushofer, says the following, among other things, in connection with Mr. Sarkar's *Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig 1922, pages 410) in the course of a lengthy essay devoted to it :

"It explains perhaps more explicitly than all others the relation of the national ideals of China and India with Pan-Asian currents of thought and their antithesis to the Eur.-American tendencies." The reviewer describes it as "a guide to the ideas of the leaders of Asian movements. Everybody who undertakes a deeper and more intensive investigation in this problem in so far as the exhibition of surging ideas is concerned will have to begin chiefly by analysing Sarkar's philosophical fresco of awakening Asia." In this German

scholar's judgment *The Futurism* "is the most magnificent of all the presentations from the Asian standpoint."

In the *American Political Science Review* Professor Garner describes this book as the work of an "erudite and prolific scholar." He says further: "The wide range of subjects intelligently discussed in the volume reveals evidence of unusual versatility on the part of the author."

Professor Sarkar's essay entitled *The Science of History*, (Longmans, London 1912) is described in *Open Court* (Chicago) as follows:

"The book shows an unusually broad conception of history not commonly found in scholars of oriental birth. The main tendency is to show the paramount importance of world-forces for the development of every single nation."

II

It may be remarked *en passant* that the culture-historical and sociological works of Professor Sarkar, a subject in which the Panini Office established by my brother, the late Rai Bahadur Sris Chandra Vasu, translator of the *Astadhyayi of Panini*, takes the keenest interest, have served to raise Indian scholarship in the estimation of the scientific world as well as create new methods in the approach to Indian civilization.

In regard to the *Positive Background of Hindu Sociology* Vol. I. (Panini office 1913, pages 389) Sir Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford says: that it is "not only full of learning but full of points that may throw light on the problems of my own studies."

Professor Marett, President, Folk-Lore Society of London opines that "it will be of the greatest value to an anthropologist."

Professor Marshall, the economist, described it as an "important contribution to our knowledge of India."

The *Isis*, the scientific quarterly of Brussels, is "pleased to find in the postulate of the author a novel and fruitful method in the study of Indian civilization."

At a time when the scientific world, both Indian and foreign, was obsessed by one-sided and almost exclusive interest in the alleged other-worldliness, pessimism and unpractical character of Hindu genius and civilisation, this book of Professor Sarkar's served indeed very powerfully to divert the attention of scholars to the materialistic, secular, unmythical and worldly achievements of the Hindus both in thought and practice. Since then it has become the philosophical nucleus of studies in different phases of Hindu materialism. Naturally, this is one of the most noteworthy publications of our Panini Office.

The *Literary Digest* (New York) reviewing Mr. Sarkar's *Folk-Element in Hindu Culture* (London, 1917, 332 pages) says that it is a "book for the specialist and for him has unique value."

The *Scotsman* characterizes it as an "interesting and profoundly learned study" and thinks that it will be "welcomed by all students who wish to be well informed as to what modern scholarship is doing for the reconstruction of Indian history." The book is regarded in this review as "an important contribution to the scientific study of Hindu sociology."

Indiaman (London), describes it as a book "of substantial value" and remarks that "much that he writes is suggestive and his point of view is generally interesting."

About his *Hindu Achievements in Exact Science* (London, 1918, page 98), the *British Medical Journal* says :

"The work is clearly arranged and pleasantly written and will be found both interesting and instructive."

Indian Education (London) remarks :

"The author gives a large amount of information citing

authorities and stating the case with calmness and moderation that inspire respect. The statement is condensed and stimulating at the same time."

La Nature (Paris) recommends the book to European readers as a *bon resume de la science hindoue ancienne et medievale*, "very little known as it is in Europe."

III

While travelling in foreign countries Prof. Sarkar was invited by Columbia, Clark and other Universities of America to lecture on cultural problems (1916-19). He was introduced to the academic world by Professors John Dewey and Seligman in the following terms :

"The undersigned take great pleasure in bringing to the attention of the college and University authorities a knowledge of the presence in this country of Mr. Benoy Kumar Sarkar. * * * Especially in these troublous times when a broader knowledge of oriental and occidental relations is desirable we should unhesitatingly urge the authorities of our educational institutions to afford their students an opportunity of coming into contact with so distinguished a representative of the intellectual life of the Orient."

The *Columbia University Institute Magazine* describes him as "an authority in the interpretation of Hindu culture from the standpoint of world-thought and in the perspective of developments in Europe and America."

The University of Paris invited Professor Sarkar to give a course of lectures at the Faculty of Law under the chairmanship of Dean Larnauze (1921). The *Academie des Beaux-Arts*, the *Societe Asiatique*, the *Academie des sciences morales et politiques* and other French institutions likewise invited him to lecture before them on subjects specially interesting to them. All these lectures in France were given in French.

La Renaissance of Paris says about these lectures :

"The contacts with the East have been multiplying incessantly. It is noteworthy that for the first time an Indian Professor has lectured at the Sorbonne. While listening to the lectures of M. Benoy Kumar Sarkar in the amphitheatre of the Faculty one found that the alleged mysterious India was after all quite familiar to us. He presented us with a message from which we could hope for the constitution of the United States of the World."

In Germany Mr. Sarkar was invited by the University of Berlin, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft*, the *Deutsche Morgenlaendische Gesellschaft* and other institutions to deliver lectures on social philosophy and comparative politics (1922). German was the language used for these lectures.

The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of Berlin says about one of these lectures: "In the Aula building of the University a guest-lecture was given by Benoy Kumar Sarkar * * * He spoke in fluent German and was warmly applauded on account of his interesting statements. It is to be hoped that Professor S. will avail himself oftener of the opportunities coming to him to make the interested circles acquainted with the conclusions of his researches."

IV

The lectures before European and American Universities and Academies were all officially arranged and the terms on which Mr. Sarkar gave his discourses are the same on which the professors of foreign countries are invited by these institutions. In this regard his work has brought honour and distinction of the highest grade to the intellectuals of India. If we remember that in the scientific and educational circles of the West Indian visitors are as a rule known to be only students and candidates for degrees it will be evident that Professor Sarkar has succeeded in creating the impression of a new order with regard to the attainments of Young India.

M. Paul Appell, the renowned mathematician, rector (president) of the University of Paris, and member of the *Institut de France*, has sent through Mr. Sarkar a letter of comradeship to the intellectuals of India, which in English reads thus: "It is from the bottom of my heart that I send to the savants and students of India the warm sympathies of the professors and students of the University of Paris. We shall work with them for the advancement of a humane civilization such as will be directed henceforth to the service of liberty and justice."

A similar message has been sent through Mr. Sarkar to the economists of India by M. Yves-Guyot, ex-minister of public works, and president of the *Societe d'Economie Politique de Paris*.

V

Professor Sarkar's contributions to the Journals of learned societies in Europe and America number over thirty (1917-1925) and may be regarded as constituting some pioneer-work for the Indian intelligentsia in the realm of "international scholarship." The *Scientific Monthly*, the *International Journal of Ethics*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, the *Journal of International Relations*, *Giornale degli Economisti e Rivista di Statistica*, the *American Political Science Review*, *Seances et Travaux de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques*, *Deutsche Rundschau*, *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* are some of the journals in which his writings have appeared.

The *Societe d'Economie Politique de Paris* has elected him as one of the *membres correspondants* at the suggestion of the president, Senator Raphael-Georges Levy, banker and currency-expert, as well as professor of finance at the *Ecole libre des sciences politiques*. And he was for some time elected to be one of the contributing editors to the *Journal of International Relations* edited by President J. Stanley Hall of Clark University, U. S. A.

VI

Since his return to India towards the end of 1925 after a continuous absence of nearly twelve years Professor Sarkar has been devoting his special attention to the theories and achievements of applied economics. He is convinced that "whatever has happened in the economic sphere in Eur-America during the last half-century is bound also to happen more or less on similar and even identical lines in Asia and of course in India during the next generation or so" (cf. *Economic Development*, p. ix). This indeed is one of the fundamental generalizations in his scheme of "societal equations" which are often referred to in the present book.

Accordingly he has started a monthly journal in Bengali, *Arthik Unnati* (Economic Progress), which is being financed by some enlightened members of the Bengali landed aristocracy, with the object of introducing world-economy in Indian economic enterprise and speculation. He is likewise editing a quarterly *Journal* in English financed by the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce. Here also the aim consists in bringing Indian business thought and practice into intimate intercourse with the latest happenings in economic legislation and material welfare in the larger world.

Through the medium of these journals he has succeeded in creating a nucleus of studies in world-economy. He is planning to establish a *Bangiya Dhana-Vijnan Parishat* (Bengali Institute of Economics) under the auspices of which a number of scholars will be regularly maintained to carry on systematic investigations in contemporary economic problems on the strength of international outlook and world-view, but with an eye to India's advance. The language in which this Institute is to publish its studies is Bengali.

Some of his own recent economic monographs (in English) bear the following titles : *Trusts and Rationalization* (aspects

of the new industrial revolution), *The Law and the Cultivator* (the example of France with special reference to the transactions of the *Banque de France*), *Empire Development and World-Economy* (a study in the new foundations of national economy for India), *The Bank-Notes and Note-Banks of Germany* (a comparative study of the German, French and British Reserve Banks), *Shipping and Railway Policies in Economic Legislation, World-Economy and Commercial India*, *The Social Values of Clerical Labour*, *Types and Tendencies in American Banking*, *Investments and Business Organisation*.

His *Memorandum on Post-Graduate Studies* (with special reference to Economics and the allied sciences), available as a chapter in *Greetings to Young India* (1927), indicates how short the highest educational institutions of India happen to fall of scientific and efficient pedagogic requirements. He considers the present Post-Graduate classes of Indian universities to be in the main under-graduate and demands a two-year "regular schooling" after the M. A. or M. Sc. standard for genuine post-graduate work. The present M. A. and M. Sc. courses should according to him be leavened with larger doses of general culture. Specialized, intensive and detailed studies are to be left for post-M. A. and post-M. Sc. The scheme of academic reform that he has submitted, in so far as economics is concerned, will serve to furnish the sincere educational patriots of our country with ideas for University-reconstruction for some long time to come.

VII

The epoch that began with 1905 has been a theme of constant study with Professor Sarkar. The twelve volumes of *Vartaman Jagat* (Modern World) in Bengali covering some 4000 pages are based on his travels and personal experiences. In these he has sought to make a survey of the present-day

tendencies in industry, education, literature, art, science and social service. The different volumes are named below :—

Vol. 1. Egypt, Vol. 2. Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 3. The Great War, Vol. 4. The United States of America, Vol. 5. Japan, Vol. 6. China, Vol. 7. France, Vol. 8. Germany, Vol. 9. Austria, Vol. 10. Switzerland, Vol. 11. Italy, Vol. 12. The Atmosphere of the World.

It is to these volumes in Bengali that the present publication is oriented for its general cultural background. The author is engaged in a larger work on the subject. But in its present form we expect that it will help in creating among our intellectuals and public men an interest in the philosophical tendencies of the world around them, and stimulate investigations in the international politics of the day.

As far as we are aware, no Indian scholar has written on the subject or subjects dealt with in this book. And the subject matter has been treated by the author in such a comprehensive manner that those who are familiar with the contents of corresponding European or American works dealing, as they do, however, as a rule with only portions of the topics of the present book will find it novel in plan and execution.

The chronological treatment, especially, will be found to be a feature of characteristic usefulness in so far as it allows the visualization of different ideas and ideals growing up in juxtaposition to and in conflict or collaboration with one another. This is a point of view generally lost sight of in the books that have appeared on the history of political theories. But Professor Sarkar has sought to exhibit the growth of the modern mind from stage to stage.

And in this connection it may be observed as a special point that he has always sought to place the political philosophies in the perspective of the developments in modern and

contemporary history, constitutional and international life, as well as industrial and commercial policies.

Then, the growth of political life and thought in modern Japan, China, India, Persia, Western Asia, Turkey and Egypt as exhibited by the author in the background of the world-developments will appear to be an item of exceptional interest to students of contemporary political philosophy.

Besides, the author has tried to do justice to the claims of Continental and American thought, a feature that will be regarded as noteworthy not only in India but in other countries as well.

Last but not least in importance is the fact that the book renders accessible to us a number of original French, German and Italian documents. It enables us thus to realize how spiritually impoverished Indian intellectuals and publicists must live on account of exclusive dependence on Anglo-American thought.

VIII

Professor Sarkar's own position in political philosophy is to be found in his *Science of History* (London, 1912), *Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922), *Politics of Boundaries and Tendencies in International Relations* (Calcutta, 1926, page 340) and *Greetings to Young India* (Calcutta, 1927, page 184).

In the words of the *Modern Review* "the chief sources of information" for the *Politics* are "the great dailies in French, German and Italian which suggest points of view startlingly new to the Indian reader. Mr. Sarkar is the one Indian who has studied international relations especially in their economic aspect at first hand in France, Germany and Italy. He does not merely copy news but has his own original contributions to make, and he can take in the whole situation at a glance, and deliver himself boldly as to the conclusions to be drawn from it. * * *

The first chapter expounds the author's views

on the nation-idea. As against the romantic Mazzinian cult of the nation with unity of language, race and culture Prof. Sarkar presents the realistic and positive theory of the state."

Outside of these works dealing, as they do, with modern problems there are *The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology* Vol. II (Political, Allahabad, 1921-27, pages 240. Royal Oct.,) and *the Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (Leipzig 1922, pages 266), two books dealing with old categories in the perspective of comparative politics. Mr. Sarkar's personal views are available in the interpretations which constitute the core of these volumes.

The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus is described by the *International Review of Missions* (London) "as a remarkably incisive and learned piece of scholarship."

The *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (London) says:

"This book is a study in comparative Hindu political constitutions and concepts.....He seeks to give a readable account and this he has done with frequent allusions and much elegant writing."

And Professor Jadunath Sarkar, at present Vice-Chancellor, University of Calcutta, says as follows in an extensive notice for the *Modern Review* :

"It is difficult to conceive of a man more fully qualified than he is to treat of ancient Indian political institutions comprehensively and correctly. He knows Sanskrit and has translated and critically commented on one of the ancient works of polity, the *Sukra-niti*. He has deeply and widely studied European history, politics and economics, and, what is of priceless value, he has lived among the greatest and most progressive European thinkers on economics and politics, some of the makers of modern European history. He has inhaled the life-giving atmosphere of their company. The result is one of the happiest. Our author is an ardent Indian nationalist, his life-story is a testimony to the fact,—but he is singularly

free from national prejudices ; he realises that the greatest dis-service that one can do to his country is to flatter its self-love, hinder the removal of the abuses in its institutions, and induce it to hide its head ostrich-like in the sand-heap of ignorant self-complacency and proudly shut its eyes to the modern world and its march of mind.

“ Benoy Kumar’s account of the political institutions of the ancient Hindus is correct and full and enriched by frequent comparisons with those of ancient Greece and modern Europe and America. But even more valuable is his fresh and independent outlook. Like the Hero-Prophet of Carlyle he insists on discarding all shows, all painted idols and laying bare the heart of things, and reaching the bed-rock of fact. Such an honest physician, such a teacher inspired by love of truth, is needed by India to-day in the hour of her national awakening. . . . In fact a fully scientific and philosophical treatment of the subject has been here attempted by a man equipped with modern political knowledge and the modern outlook. The book, therefore, marks a distinct and long step in our knowledge of ancient India in its *true* bearing on human thought.”

It may be observed that these works of Professor Sarkar’s embody virtually the starting-point of modern Indian studies in the contributions of the ancient Hindus to political philosophy or *theory* strictly so-called. The categories that he has introduced in the analysis of ideas as well as in the method of investigation have succeeded in furnishing intellectual discipline as well as guiding principles to subsequent writers whether as contributors to journals or as authors of books.

IX

We venture to hope that like the previous publications from the pen of Professor Sarkar, namely, *Economic Development*, *Politics of Boundaries*, etc., the present one also will be appreciated by our countrymen as a timely contribution con-

veying as it does fruitful suggestions in theory and practice such as the readers cannot fail to deduce from the author's clear-cut, unbiased and objective presentation.

Sixteen years ago I had the occasion to introduce Professor Sarkar's literary and educational work to the world of letters in connection with his *Science of Education* published by Messrs. Longmans Green & Co., London. For two decades his life has remained one strenuous dedication to the service of the motherland at home and abroad in the realm of scientific pursuits. It is with pleasure that I associate myself in this foreword with his present endeavours in the allied fields of economics and political science.

Bhuvaneshwari Ashram,
Panini Office,
Bahadurganj, Allahabad,
16th February, 1928

B. D. BASU



The Huxley Press, Madras



The Political Philosophies Since 1905

CHAPTER I A KEY TO THE INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

I EXPERIENCES AND PHILOSOPHIES

The Problem of Truth

WHENEVER I find two persons trying to agree with each other I feel inclined to suspect that there is a chance for some moral or spiritual injustice happening in the world.

Truth is individual, personal, concrete, not universal, general, abstract.

Not "Truth," but *truths* constitute the objective verdict of philosophy.

Diversities in Philosophical Complex

The subject matter of this course is not political institutions, but political thought,—a distinction generally well understood in Western scholarship but often ignored by scholars in the field of ancient and mediæval indology.

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At what point does the modern world begin?—1919, 1905, 1886, 1870, 1832, 1815, 1789, 1776, 1648, c 1600, c 1300, c 500? Almost anywhere according to one's interpretations.

I am interested in the tendencies and these indicate movements as opposed to finished products. In the first place, political philosophy as exhibited here consists in a stream or streams of diverse currents as contrasted with systems.

And in the second place, the philosophical world will be found to be a pluralistic universe and is not to be comprehended in the singular number even during short periods.

Nature of Personality

Human psyche or rather personality is essentially a dynamic entity, ever on the go. And by nature it is a differentiating organism,—carrying within itself the mechanism of a “transformer.”

Differentiation, transformation, re-creation or transvaluation of values, in one word, revolution,—is the one grand message of speculation in politics.

The New Political Philosophies

In the speculative world to-day, growing as it is, the tradition from Machiavelli to Rousseau, nay, from Bodin to Hegel, would appear to be almost an antiquarian curio.

New problems in the making of personality constitute the social data of the modern and contemporary world. Hence new truths have

made their appearance as orientations to the changed circumstances.

II

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS ETHICS

Philosophy = science, generically speaking. But there can be made out some differences, so far as politics is concerned.

Political philosophy is a body of ideas, theories and ideals *re* the state, whereas political science is an examination or critical study of the state concerning (i) constitutions as well as (ii) doctrines, *i.e.* theories.

Political philosophy is thus the concern of one man, one thinker, one philosopher, whereas political science is essentially descriptive-historical, comparative, universal.

Political philosophy is essentially propagandistic, ethical or normative ; political science, in the main, an objective presentation, of all historical facts and theoretical viewpoints, with indication of tendencies.

Plato, Kautilya, Mencius, Al Farabi, Locke, Rousseau, Marx, Lenin,—every body is a propagandist or moralist. Even Machiavelli, the *amoral*, is a moralist. Only, his morality is at poles asunder, say, from the morality of Spencer, the anarchist.

The history of thought presents us with innumerable moral propagandas in politics ; some of which are mentioned below. For example,

Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651) is pro-monarchic,

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Locke's *Civil Government* (1690) pro-revolutionist while

Rousseau's *Contrat Social* (1761) pro-egalitarian.

Political philosophy as "pure thought" is a contradiction in terms. It is by nature "applied", dynamic, practical, "goal-ful",—dealing with ends and purposes as well as motivations and energizings, living actions and experiments. The basis of political parties, constitutions and law-making is to be found in political philosophy as a branch of ethics.

III

THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Our fundamental method consists in scepticism. Philosophy, thought, or speculation, in politics as in other fields, begins just when you are up with an ultimatum.

A philosopher or thinker cannot justify his existence unless his intellectual personality or speculative complex succeeds in creating an atmosphere of doubt as to the soundness of the *status quo*. A challenge to the established order is the minimum to be expected of all philosophical experience.

Category vs. Substance of Thought

A category is the mode or form of thought, an item in the intellectual mechanism or logical framework.

Substance is the matter or actual content of thought, representing the life lived, the real

biological experience of an individual, the system of man's reactions or responses to the world in its entirety.

Category is to content (substance) as word or term is to meaning, significance or value.

One and the same category may indicate a number of different contents. The identity of category does not necessarily imply the identity of thought-content or life's value.

Anthropologically and historically, the categories such as village, property, marriage, king, democracy, freedom, nationality, justice, law, good, beauty, God, etc. have meant different substances in different epochs and regions.

To-day, even if some of the categories of political thought happen to be identical with those of yesterday, there is no justification for automatically considering them to be identical in the implication of values. The categories like "people," "sovereignty," "popular sovereignty," "democratic government," "general will" etc. although quite conventional or traditional, have been endowed with epoch-making contents in our own times.

Revolution in political philosophy (no matter in what age or region) consists in :

- (i) the creation of altogether new categories, such as were utterly unknown, and
- (ii) the imparting of new values, meanings or contents to well-known categories.

IV

TYPES OF CATEGORY IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY

(a) Some old Hindu categories (Kautilya, *Mahabharata*, Manu, *Sukraniti*, etc.) are exhibited below in different groups.

1. Theory of the State :

- (i) Doctrine of *Matsya-Nyaya* (logic of the fish)
- (ii) Doctrine of *Danda* (punishment, coercion, sanction)

2. Theory of Property, Law and Social Order:

- (i) Doctrine of *Mamatva* (property)
- (ii) Doctrine of *Dharma* (law, justice and duty)
- (iii) Doctrine of *Varna-srama* (classes and stages)

3. Theory of International Relations :

- (i) Doctrine of *Mandala* (sphere of influence)
- (ii) Doctrine of *Sarva-bhauma* (world-sovereign)¹

(b) Languet (1518—1581): *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* (Defence against the Tyrant) has the following problems :

- 1. Ought subjects to obey their princes if they command any thing contrary to the law of God ?

¹Sarkar : *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*. Leipzig, 1922.

2. Is it lawful to resist a prince who violates the laws of God and lays waste His church?
3. May one resist a prince who oppresses or ruins the state, and how far?
4. May neighbouring princes help subjects who suffer for religion or are oppressed by tyrants?¹

(c) Machiavelli (1469-1527), Hobbes (1588-1679) and Kamandaka (c 500?) are united in regard to the following considerations:

1. Mankind is governed more by passions than by reason. Hence the "state of nature."
2. Sovereignty is by nature absolute and irresponsible.
3. The relations between the nations are the relations of a "state of nature."
4. State considerations are more paramount than religious or moral.²

¹For ancient and mediæval European categories, see Barker: *Greek Political Theory* (Plato and his Predecessors), London 1918; Carlyle: *Mediæval Political Theory in the West*, London, 1903-15; Poole: *Illustrations of the History of Mediæval Thought*, London, 1884; Gierke: *Political Theories of the Middle Age* (Maitland's transl. London, 1900).

²Formichi: *Salus Populi* (Welfare of the People), Turin, 1908; Sarkar: "Hindu Politics in Italian" in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Calcutta, 1925-1926.

V

EPOCHS OF MODERNISM IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY

From the standpoint of content or substance of thought *i.e.* of moral and spiritual values, the categories of contemporary political philosophy have been taken to begin at 1905 with the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

The currents that are predominant to-day may be traced historically not *very far* back except it be for archæological or antiquarian purposes. The crude beginnings are to be sought in the socio-philosophical complex of 1776-1832.

But for all practical purposes their actual origins are to be found in the period commencing about 1870.

Modern political philosophy, then, divides itself into two or three well-marked stages or phases :

(i) Primitive beginnings indicating, so to say, the period of gestation (1776-1870).

(ii) Recent developments tending to the establishment of characteristically modern ideologies (1870-1905).

(iii) Contemporary phases (1905-)

The test of the distinction between contemporary (and modern) and previous political philosophies is twofold. First, certain categories are absolutely new. And secondly, even where the categories are

old their contents, substances, values or meanings are new.

The distinction is to be seen objectively in the contrast between (1) the political parties of to-day and those of yesterday, (2) the post-war constitutions (*e.g.* those of Jugoslavia, Tchechoslovakia, Poland, Germany, Russia etc.) and the American constitution (1787-1870) and (3) the public finance, economic legislation etc. of our own times and those previous to 1870-1886.

VI

YOUNG INDIA AND MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The *main currents* of political philosophy as manifest in the Bengali, Hindi and other literature of Young India or in the body of its speculation through the medium of English language are, *generally speaking*, representatives of the thought that prevailed in Eur-America previous to 1870-1886, say, somewhere between 1832 and 1870.

The constitutional, legal, economic and international experiences of the Western world since 1870 have hardly touched to any considerable extent the fringe of higher intellectuals in India.

The nationalistic philosophy of politics from the American Revolution (1776) to Joseph Mazzini (*c* 1870) continues to furnish the chief spiritual urges in Indian public life and speculative idealism, confined as they happen to be within the

circle of the "educated middle class." Even in 1927 elementary education is neither universal nor compulsory nor free (*cf.* the Education Acts of 1870, 1878, 1891 in England).

The deepening and expansion of democracy such as have been achieved in the advanced countries of Eur-America under the influence of constructive socialism during the last fifty years or so, have succeeded in influencing the thoughts and activities of India to a very small extent. Educated India can indeed cultivate the acquaintance of modern and recent Eur-American ideals and attainments through schools, journals, travels and social intercourse. But Indian labour power is as yet as weak as capitalistic industrialism.¹ Hence the fundamental limitations in the political thought and achievement of Young India.

The strands of Western thought such as are represented by the radical labour tradition from the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 down to the Bolshevik theories of to day have but commenced in India to excite the interest of a few intellectuals and certain sections of the agricultural and workingmen classes probably more as novelties, however, than as vital forces in social reconstruction.

¹All Eur-America is not one in "modernism," however. *Re* the constitutional, economic and cultural backwardness of Southern and Eastern Europe compared to Central and Western Europe see the chapters on Italy, the Balkans and Russia in Sarkar's *Economic Development*, Madras, 1926 and *Politics of Boundaries*, Calcutta, 1926 and the chapter on "India and Western countries" in his *Greetings to Young India*, Calcutta 1927. For the strength and weakness of the labour force as well as labour movement in India see Sarkar's *Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922) and *Economic Development*.

VII

THE WEB OF MODERN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY

Political philosophy is an ideological complex in the weaving of which at least five different forces may be discerned : (i) ideas and ideals of sovereignty as well as public and private law, (ii) ideas and ideals of economic welfare, (iii) ideas and ideals of international relations, (iv) ideas and ideals of human development and societal evolution, (v) ideas and ideals of mental and moral personality.

Constitutional and legal aspects of the state have furnished the basis of theorizing during all the epochs.

Economic aspects have been equally prominent throughout the modern period. Constitutional and legal thinkers may have often over-looked the economic significance of their problems but economics has sought always to function in the political domain.

Economic forces in politics may be grouped under the following heads :

- (i) Labour Economics : (a) factory legislation,
(b) trade-unions as economic associations,
(c) trade-unions in politics,—labour and socialistic parties.
- (ii) Commercial policy: free trade *vs.* protection.
- (iii) Taxation and other items of public finance.
- (iv) Business organisation or economic morphology: rural economy, cottage industry,

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joint stock companies, world-market, monopolies, trusts, etc.

(v) Land legislation.

(vi) Control of currency, credit, crisis, etc.

Internationalism, although mainly imperialistic in character, became a fact of modern civilisation, economic, political and social, during the period from 1870 to 1905. But it is only since 1905 that it has been acquiring an importance in theory, both imperialistic and anti-imperialistic.

Sociology has indeed been the background of political philosophy all through the ages of the world's history and in every region. But it is during 1870-1905 that it began to assert itself as an independent science and influence political thinking from its own angle of vision. The role of sociology in political philosophy has been remarkable since 1905.

Philosophy, strictly so called, has considerably influenced political thinking only during two epochs; (i) 1776-1832 and (2) 1870-1905. But as a matter of course, the bearings of philosophical attitudes on political theory are constant items in the history of speculation.

Wars and political revolutions constitute not only the *milieu* in the midst of which the political philosophies run their course; they are in a vital sense very often the practical applications of the philosophies and deserve to be taken along with them as thoughts embodied. To the same category of "political philosophy embodied" belong all

economic legislation and constitution-making. An analysis of the tendencies in political thinking cannot be complete without adequate orientation to the wars, revolutions, laws and constitutions.

These five formative forces are always interlaced, at times independent of, often in conflict with, one another.

The classification of these politics-making agencies is bound to be arbitrary. An economist is almost invariably a politician and a philosopher is very often a sociologist. Sociology may furnish the common basis of politics, economics, international law and philosophy, and so on. The right to list a thinker or a treatise in one group to the exclusion of the other groups is in any case an open question.

The web of political philosophy, especially in its modern and contemporary phases, is the joint and cumulative product of international co-operative adventure in theory-making. The nations that have contributed substantially to these international philosophical goods during the periods under survey are, in alphabetical order, as follows: American, British, French, German, Italian and Russian.

The co-operative character of contemporary and modern political philosophy should be a sufficient warning to the student of political *science* against the tendency of being obsessed by any particular nation and refusing to appraise the philosophical achievements of the different nations in the proper international perspective.

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One word about American thought that is as a rule likely to be ignored in the East as well as in the West on account of the absence of strong doses of metaphysics in its make-up.

American political philosophy is not perhaps marked by the fineness, subtlety and originality of French creative imagination or the depth and versatility as well as encyclopaedic grasp of German genius. But as regards agencies in the clarification of intelligence and energizing of will on the vital issues of life and duty and as regards spiritual factors in the objective re-making of man, the annals of political philosophy can point to some of the world's greatest exemplars in the direct, realistic and perspicuous thoughts of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, Calhoun and Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson and John Dewey,—all pragmatic and straight-forward thinkers, in whom the ideas and ideals of liberty, democracy and national welfare have been broadening down from precedent to precedent.

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N. B.—Specialized references are to be found in the foot notes.

CHAPTER II

THE EMBRYOLOGY OF MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Industrialization, Bourgeois Democracy and National
Independence (1776-1870).

SECTION I

THE BEGINNINGS

The Philosophy of Industrial Revolution, Individualism
and Representative Democracy (1776-1832).

THE dominant tendencies of political thinking during this period may be summed up in the following categories: (1) national independence, (2) bourgeois or higher middle-class democracy, (3) industrial capitalism in England, (4) *laissez faire* or Manchester School (5) Utopian or philanthropic socialism, (6) romantic abandon, (7) absolutist sovereignty, external and internal, (8) optimism, (9) transcendental idealism.

I

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF SOVEREIGNTY AS WELL AS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW

The ideology in constitutional and legal matters is furnished by the following problems: (1) nationalism *vs.* alien control, (2) industrial aristocracy *vs.*

landed aristocracy, (3) individualism or "liberty" *vs.* state-control or socialism.

1776. American Revolution: The fundamental slogan is "no taxation without representation". Emancipation from foreign control, *i. e.* nationalism, is the chief achievement. The beginnings of a moderate, "bourgeois," halting democracy in the modern world are to be found in the "aristocratic" constitution framed for the new state. Property qualification is the bed-rock of that constitution. THE FEDERALIST (1787-88) with contributions by HAMILTON, FRANKLIN, WASHINGTON, MADISON, JEFFERSON and others is the leading document of political philosophy for the period.¹

1776. BENTHAM (1748-1832): *Principles of Morals and Legislation, Fragment on Government* (1789). Utility or expediency *i.e.* the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the goal of political endeavour. He preaches individualism, *laissez faire* and horror of government interference.²

1789. French Revolution: The summoning of the States-General (later transformed into the National Assembly) is the essential element in this

¹Beard: *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, New York, 1915. Bowers: *Jefferson and Hamilton. The Struggle for Democracy in America*, London, 1925. McIlwain: *American Revolution*; New York, 1923. Merriam: *American Political Theories*, New York, 1926. Oliver: *Alexander Hamilton; An Essay on the American Union*, London, 1906. Van Tyne: *Causes of the War of American Independence*, London, 1922.

²Vol. 1. of Leslie Stephen's *English Utilitarians* (London 1900) is devoted to Bentham and preliminary considerations.

'revolution" strictly so called ; cf. Sieyes '*Qu'estce que le Tiers Etat?* 1790 (What is the Third Estate)? Thomas Paine's (1737-1839) *Rights of Man* (1791-92) popularizes the tenets of the revolution and advocates, among other things, a 10% inheritance tax from all landowners. "Liberty, fraternity and equality" becomes the slogan of the day. The *volonte generale* (general will) of Rousseau's *Contrat Social* (1762) in which sovereignty of the people is the first postulate may be considered to be the spiritual force behind all the happenings. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) is followed by the Constitution (1791 and 1793).¹

1805-1813 : The War of Liberation in Germany : Inspiration is furnished, among others, by the romanticism of SCHILLER (1759-1805), and the idealism embodied in FICHTE'S *Young Germany* movement. Revolt against Napoleon is the outstanding positive fact. Nationalism acquires a dynamic force in world-thought.

1809 ADAM MUELLER (1779-1829): *Elemente der Staatskunst* (Elements of the Art of Politics): He is a child of the age in his romantic appreciation of medieval "associations". But opposition to hierarchical absolutism is a very marked feature of his speculation.

He does not believe in the universalistic philosophy of the times but is a pronounced "relativist." Each nation, according to him, is to shape its

¹Janet *Histoire de la science politique*, Vol II (Chapter on Rousseau).

economic policy according to its own conditions. The future as well as present welfare in both its material and spiritual aspects is to be the end in view of all statesmanship.¹

1829 Greece is emancipated from the yoke of Turkey.

1832 AUSTIN : *Province of Jurisprudence Determined*. Law is command of the sovereign enforced by sanction. His ideas have become classical as embodying the monistic conception of an omnipotent state.²

1832 First Reform Bill in England : It provides representation of "new interests." The industrial North's claims are recognized as against or rather in addition to those of the agricultural South. Democracy of the "higher middle-class" is in part established.

II

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF ECONOMIC WELFARE

Ideology : (1) labour *vs.* capital, (2) free trade *vs.* protection, (3) manufacture *vs.* agriculture, (4) town *vs.* country, (5) state *vs.* individual.

1776-1815 : Industrial Revolution in England ushers in the beginnings of capitalism, a new aristocracy and labour questions as social forces.

1776 ADAM SMITH(1723-1790) : *Wealth of Nations*. Like Bentham's, his ideas are those of "natural

¹Spann : *Der wahre Staat* (The Real State), Leipzig, 1921.

²Brown : *Austinian Theory of Law*, London, 1912 ; Pound : *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*, New Haven, 1922.

liberty" and individualism. He champions free trade ("physiocratic") as against mercantilism and is popularized by SAY (1767-1832) in France through *Traite d' Economie Politique* (1803).

Against the physiocratic theory of a single tax, *impot unique*, leived exclusively on the "net product" or surplus of landed property he establishes the theory of "multiple taxation." The first of his famous four canons runs thus: "The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities, *i. e.* in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of state".

1791 HAMILTON, American statesman: His *Report on Manufactures* becomes the Bible of protection in the New World against Adam Smith's free tradism.

1800-1809. The *Banque de France* is organized by NAPOLEON as a notebank or bank of issue. The theory is that advocated by Adam Smith and Ricardo, *viz.* that the notes are "substitutes for money", and that they are not to be treated as identical with it. Hence an issue-bank is in essence but an ordinary bank and need take simply the usual precaution that commercial banks as a rule take in the case of cheques, bills and other instruments of credit issued by them. The notes may therefore be issued to any extent provided the bank sees to it that they are convertible into coin on demand. This is the "banking principle" which

implies absolute freedom in the amount of note issue, as contrasted with the "currency principle" which is accepted later by Peel for the British Bank Charter Act (1844) in order to control the "limit" of note-circulation.¹

1801 The First Factory Act in England embodies encroachments upon *laissez faire* and "Benthamism" or "Manchester school".²

1810. SISMONDI (1733-1842), Swiss, *Nouveaux Principes d'Economie Politique* (New Principles of Political Economy) presents a vigorous opposition to Adam Smith's individualism as calculated to the exploitation of the weaker classes, *e. g.* the labourers.

1816. ADAM MUELLER (1779-1829), *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Geldes* (Attempt at a New Theory of Money) establishes the idea that it is the fiat of the state, law or society that transforms a piece of metal into money. Its monetary character does not depend on its weight or fineness. The same idea is promulgated in his contemporary Hufeland's *Lehre vom Geld und Geldumlauf* (Theory of Money and Monetary Circulation), 1819; cf. Knapp's *Die staatliche Theorie des Geldes* (The state theory of money), 1905.

1819 RICARDO (1772-1823): *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*. The "economic man"

¹*Lois et Statuts qui regissent la Banque de France*, Paris, 1926. Courcelle-Seneuil: *Les Operations de Banque*, Paris, 1922.

²Knowles: *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1926. Hutchins and Harrison: *History of Factory Legislation* (British), London 1907.

is established by him as a category of social life and science. He considers labour to be the source of value. The iron law of wage is one of his generalizations. "Comparative cost" determines the exchanges in international trade. The quantitative theory of money is another of his epoch-making findings as well as the doctrine of "natural traffic." He advocates "banking theory" as opposed to "currency theory" *re* the issue of notes. His tariff policy is based on free trade. Rent is not an element in the cost of production. Landlords tend to become richer through progress of civilisation.

According to him the power of paying taxes is in proportion to the net and not in proportion to the gross revenue. The net income is of course total gross income minus expenses of production (including the cost of subsistence). He may thus be regarded as an upholder of the idea held later both by "proportionalists" as well as "progressivists" that it is only the "clear-income" that should be taxed. This exemption of the minimum of subsistence from taxation which is generally associated with the name of BENTHAM can, however, be traced back to the middle of the eighteenth century in French, German and British thought (Rousseau, Robespierre, Sonnenfels, Steuart, etc.), as Seligman points out in *Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice* (1884, 1908).

In his *Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency* (1816) Ricardo adumbrates the system of

gold-bar standard which in 1926 is to be found in the gold-bullion standard of the Hilton Young Currency proposals for India.¹

1820 ROBERT OWEN (177-1858): *Book of the New Moral World*. Welfare-work, labour exchanges, co-operative producers' societies, and revolutionary trade unions are some of the modern institutions in which his thoughts and activities have pioneered the world.²

1824-1827: HUSKISSON'S tariff reforms in England lead to the reduction of duties and removal of restrictions. To this extent the legal embodiment of free trade principles may to a certain extent be regarded as an initial achievement within very limited fields.

1825 ST. SIMON (1760-1825): *Nouveau Christianisme (New Christianity)*. His socialism consists mainly in philanthropy and love of neighbours. There is no demand for abolition of private property. But he preaches the abolition of inheritance.

1825. Law in England relaxing the restrictions in regard to the formation of "Joint Stock Companies."

1832. The First Reform Bill in England. Economically, it furnishes only a sop to the industrial aristocracy. The triumph of the "bourgeoisie" over "feudalism" or agrarian capitalism is, however, a *fait accompli*.³

¹Machlup: *Gold-Kern Waehrung*, Halberstadt, 1925.

²Cole: *Short History of the British Working Class Movement* Vol. I. 1789-1848, London, 1925. Laidler: *History of Socialist Thought*, London, 1927.

³Marriott: *English Political Institutions*, London, 1925.

III

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

Internationalism as a force is prominent neither in theory nor in practice.

Ideology : (1) states are sovereign, independent and equal, (2) warring alliances, (3) beginnings of commercial internationalism.

(a) Public International Law

1788. VON MARTENS (1756-1822), German professor. He systematizes in French (*Precis du droit des gens moderne de l' Europe*, (Sketch of modern international law in Europe) the positive aspect of the law on the lines of Zouch (1590-1660) the English judge, and Bynkershoek (1673-1743), the Dutch lawyer, as opposed to the " natural law " ideas of Grotius (1583-1645) and Pufendorf (1632-1694). This proves to be perhaps the most influential text book of the 19th century. According to him the law of nations, as a positive law, is binding solely on the states which accept it, hence is relative in value, The attempt to establish by some general conventions a " code of positive international law for Europe " would be as " chimerical " as the project of " perpetual peace," " as long as men remain men." Sovereignty is unlimited. Independence of states from one another leaves no supreme authority to control them all. Arbitration is desirable but ordinarily inadequate on account of the absence of executive power.¹

¹*Les Fondateurs du droit international* edited by Pillet, Paris 1904.

1815. The Congress of Vienna creates Holland, neutralizes Switzerland and fixes the boundaries of several European states.¹

1815. The Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia and Austria is organized in order to preserve the "legitimate" interests of dynasties and functions really as an anti-democratic league (intervention to put down revolution).²

1823. The Doctrine enunciated by the American President Monroe. Europe is not to interfere in the affairs of the American continent. America is likewise to let Europe alone.³

(b) *Private International Law*

1815. The Congress of Vienna: The Rhine and other international rivers are declared toll-free. Trade in slaves (Negro) is abolished.⁴

¹Phillimore : *Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace*, Boston, 1918.

²Lawrence : *Documents Illustrative of International Law*, London, 1914.

³Lawrence's *Documents*, illustrative etc.

⁴Chamberlain: *Regime of International Rivers* (Danube and Rhine), New York, 1923.

It must be noted that the distinction between "public" and "private" as applied to international law and intercourse, is not clear in any case. According to Pillet, for instance, in *Traité Pratique du Droit International Prive*, every attempt made to isolate the one from the other *contient en germe un erreur de methode* (contains in germ an error of method). For the questions in the domain of private international law invariably have bearing on the *rappports des souverainetes* (relations of sovereignties). All "conflicts of law" are ultimately conflicts of sovereignties. In fact the more extreme position is held among prominent jurists to the effect that there is no such thing as private international law binding on the nations. See Beckett: "What is Private International Law?" in the *British*

IV

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
AND SOCIETAL EVOLUTION*(a) General Theories of Progress.*

Ideology : (1) growth *vs.* *status quo*, (2) the future is considered to be in the main hopeful.

1784-179. HERDER (1744-1803). *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte* (Ideas towards the Philosophy of History). He believes in evolution. Man is declared to be a part of nature. Progress is conceived to be possible.

1793. CONDORCET (1743-1794): *Tableau du progres de l'esprit humain* (Picture of the Progress of the Human Spirit). Human perfectibility is his slogan. The possibilities of progress are considered to be infinite.

1798. MALTHUS (1766-1834): *Essay on Population*. Man increases faster than food. Pessimism is the keynote of his investigations.

1830. COMTE (1798-1857): *Philosophie Positive*. He is an exponent of humanism and reacts against the evils of industrialism. Three stages of progress, *viz.* theological, metaphysical, and scientific are considered to be manifest in the history of civilisation.¹

Year Book of International Law, 1928. In the first place, according to him, what passes for private international law is not at all international but in reality only a section of municipal law. And secondly, it treats only of matters within a state's exclusive sovereignty to legislate upon as it pleases.

¹*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th Edition (Herder, Condorcet, Comte) Flint's *History of the Philosophy of History*, New York, 1893.

Antipathy to *laissez faire* and acceptance of St. Simon indicate his political affiliations.

(b) *East and West*

1820-26 SCHLEGEL (1772-1845): He is the founder and popularizer of romanticism in philosophy. He creates the vogue, among romanticists, of laying undue emphasis on the alleged Oriental spirituality. His Indic studies are to be found in essays and editorial work on the *Ramayana* and the *Gita* (1829) cf. *Indische Bibliothek* (Indian Library) 1820.

1825. HEGEL (1770-1831) *Philosophie der Geschichte* (*Philosophy of History*). In the Orient, says he, the internal law and moral sense are not yet distinguished, still form an undivided unity; so also do religion and the state. The Eastern constitution is generally a theocracy, and the Kingdom of God is to the same extent also a secular kingdom as the secular kingdom is also divine. China, Persia, Turkey,—in fact, Asia generally is the scene of despotism, and in a bad sense, of tyranny; but in these countries tyranny raises men to resentment. But in India tyranny is normal; for here is no sense of personal independence with which a state of despotism could be compared and which would raise revolt in the soul; nothing approaching even a resentful protest against it is left.

1827. MICHELET (1798-1874), *Precis d'histoire moderne* (Sketch of Modern History): In India man is utterly overpowered by nature, like a feeble child on its mother's breast, alternately spoiled and beaten

and intoxicated rather than nourished by a milk too strong and stimulating for it.

V

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF MENTAL AND MORAL PERSONALITY

Ideology : (i) metaphysics at the service of nation-making and human welfare, (2) dignity of man, (3) freedom, both moral and political, (4) revolution and preparedness for change.

1795. KANT (1724-1804): *Zum ewigen Frieden* (Towards Eternal Peace), *Rechtslehre* (Theory of Right) 1797.

His ethics teaches the "categorical imperative" or duty for its own sake (corresponding to the *niskama karma* of the *Gita*). In his psychology reason = will, an end in itself, not conditioned by time, space, and causality. Man, because of reason, is a free person, a noumenon. This is the metaphysical basis of Kantian individualism. Man in society is free among the free. "Don't prevent the freedom of others" is the social moral. Non-intervention is to be the policy of the community.

The state secures or rather compels this freedom. The pre-statal condition is a "state of nature" followed by original contract. No state, no wealth.

No resistance is to be allowed against the state. Hobbesian absolutism is the natural consequence. But the state is not to be all-interfering. Kant believes,

however, that the republic is the best form when people are ripe.

His economic system recognises a primitive common ownership of land which has been replaced by private. The state is entitled to tax land owners and corporations in public interest.

Contracts and exchange as well as money have been analyzed somewhat in detail. The ideas are those of Adam Smith. He comes to the conclusion that trade leads to permanent peace and *jus cosmopoliticum*.

Kant's sociology is optimistic enough to assert that all human capacities are destined to be developed. The individual chooses and makes his own happiness. The objective of human endeavour should be to found such a society as will realize law everywhere. Wars are but experiments in the direction of the world-state. Though civilized we are not yet made moral, says he. Experience tells us how things are and have been but does not tell us that they cannot be otherwise in the future.¹

1796-97. FICHTE (1762-1814) *Grundlage des Naturrechts* (Foundation of Natural Law), *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat* (The Closed Commercial State) 1800. *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (Addresses to the German People) 1808. *Rechtslehre* (Theory of Law) 1812. Even the down-trodden slave is a temple of the Holy Ghost. Revolution is a necessary phase in

¹Janet : *Histoire de la science politique*. Paris, 1913. Bonar : *Philosophy and Political Economy*, London 1893.

evolution. The state has responsibilities for the poor. Fichte is thus a pioneer of state-socialism. Philosophical anarchism in a world-state is the goal. He is in favour, however, of propaganda carried on by the state (cf. Stein and Humboldt's educational reforms). "The closed state," in which industry and labour are "protected," represents the transitional ideal stage. Exclusion of foreign competition is the essential feature of that state.

1810. MME DE STAEL (1766-1819) *De l'Allemagne* (On Germany): She popularizes German thought in France and does for France what Coleridge and Carlyle do later for England. She adopts the word "romantic" from Schlegel, her friend, who coins it to mean "chivalrous and Christian" as characteristic of the "North" in opposition to the "paganism" of the classic South.

1818. BALLANCHE (1776-1847): *Essai sur les institutions sociales dans leurs rapports avec les idées nouvelles* (Essay on social institutions in their relations with new ideas). He introduces Goethe, Schiller, Herder and Schelling to French literature. He is a romanticist. His faith in "heroes" is Hegelian.

1820. HEGEL (1770-1831), *Staatslehre* (Theory of the State): Freedom is not complete without the state. He expatiates on divinity of the state and considers the monarch to be above moral obligations. In his philosophy state interference is a normal phenomenon.

His state is "socialistic" as a matter of course, the antipodes of the Kantian state. The state is consid-

ered to be a "natural necessity." It is the absolute reality, and the individual himself has objective existence, truth and morality only in his capacity as a member of the state. World-history is the world-judgment. The actual is the rational, the rational is the actual (absolute idealism = absolute realism).¹

¹Bonar: *Philosophy and Political Economy*; Chapter on "social ethics" in Stace's *Philosophy of Hegel*, London, 1924;

Chapters on Kant, Fichte and Hegel in Vaughan's *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy*, Vol. II. London 1925. Dewey: *German Philosophy and Politics* (Kant, Fichte and Hegel) New York, 1915.

Baxa's *Einfuehrung in die romantische Staatswissenschaft* (Introduction to the Political Science of Romanticism), Jena, 1923, discusses the following topics :

I. The Epoch of Enlightenment (Montesquieu, Rousseau, Adam Smith and Kant).

II. The Prelude to Romanticism (1794-1798) : Fichte's sociology based on his *Lectures on the Opinions of Scholars*, 1794, (2) Fichte's political philosophy based on his *Law of Nature*, 1796-97; (Frederick Schlegel's political philosophy based on his *Meaning of Republicanism*, 1796, (4) Goerres's political philosophy based on his *Jacobin Writings*, 1797-1798, (5) The influence of Schelling's *Philosophy of Nature* 1797, (6) The Influence of Edmund Burke.

III. Early Romanticism (1798-1814) : (1) Frederick Schlegel's *Romantic Fragments* 1798-1800, (2) Novalis's romantic *Fragments* 1798-1799, (3) The transformation in the ideas of Goerres 1800, (4) Fichte's economics based on *The Closed Commercial State*, 1800, (5) Frederick Schlegel's *Philosophical Lectures* 1804-1806, (6) The national problem, 1807-1810, (7) Adam Mueller's *Elements of the Political Art*, 1809, (8) Adam Mueller's lectures on *King Frederick II*, 1810, (9) Adam Mueller's *Attempt at a New Theory of Money*, 1816, (10) Goerres's political ideal in the *Merkur of Rhineland*, 1814.

IV. Later Romanticism (1813-1830) ; (1) Fichte's theocracy based on *Political Philosophy* 1819, (3) Adam Mueller's criticism of capitalism, (4) Frederick von Gentz, (5) Ludwig von Haller, (6) Frederick Schlegel's *Philosophy of Life* 1827, (7) Baader's *Social Philosophy*. (8) Brentano's religio-social writings, 1827, (9) Tieck and the revolution 1835, (10) Eichendorff's political writings, 1818.

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His dialectic of the conflict between "thesis" and "antithesis" naturally leading to "synthesis" in a cyclical order furnishes the logic of revolution in social, economic and political life.

SECTION II

THE GROWTH

**The Philosophy of Socialism, Nationalism and Anarchism
(1832-1870).**

Dominant categories of this period: (1) nationalism (2) democracy widening and on trial, (3) industrial revolution well established in France and Germany, (4) socialism (political and economic) militant, (5) slavery, (6) anarchistic individualism (7) problems of federation, (8) free trade *vs.* protection, (9) physics, biology and climatology in social thought, (10) internationalism in its infancy, (11) race-chauvinism a new element, (12) idealism.

I

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF SOVEREIGNTY AS WELL AS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW

Ideology: (1) reaction against individualistic liberty, (2) expanding functions of the state, (3) undemocratic suspicion of equality, (4) nationalism a religion, (5) sovereignty, divisible or indivisible? (6) theory of federations, (7) anti-statalism, (8) slavery controversy in America.

1835. TOCQUEVILLE (1805-58): *De la démocratie en Amérique* (On Democracy in America). In his critical attitude to popular government he exhibits the dangers of equality and lays an aristocratic stress on quality. This anti-democratism is represented later by Maine, Lecky, Le Bon, Mallock, Faguet, Joseph-Barthelemy, Bryce, Spann, Mussolini and others from different standpoints. According to him sovereignty is divisible. In the United States, he believes, there are two sovereignties, one of the Union and the other of the States (contrast Calhoun). But he would not recommend this division for this side of the Atlantic, for it would be ruinous to the states in Europe, surrounded as they are by mighty neighbours.¹

1839. SAVIGNY (1779-1861): *System des heutigen roemischen Rechts* (System of modern Roman Law). Law is a historical growth. The state arises by origin and nature in a people, through the people and for the people. The people as such possess no political power but must first acquire a real personality by being organised into a state. Law is a product of national life and can be understood only in its organic connections. Law "grows" through the operation of unobserved agencies and is not consciously "made" by legislators. Jurisprudence should try to interpret the law of every people with reference to its history and the development of its national peculiarities. He develops the historical study of Roman law and is responsible

¹Merriam: *History of the Theory of Sovereignty* N. Y. 1900. Flint: *History of the Philosophy of History*, London, 1893.

for much of the one-sidedness under which jurisprudence has had to suffer until the researches of Jhering (1818-92) and others succeed in emphasising the contributions of non-Roman laws and customs. Altogether, Savigny exerts a reactionary influence on Prussian public life.¹

1840. "People's Charter" or Chartism² (British) arises in opposition to the Reform Act of 1832. Its principal tenets, namely, (i) equal representation, (ii) universal suffrage, (iii) annual parliaments, (iv) no property qualification, (v) vote by ballot, (vi) payment to members, constitute the Bolshevism of those days, so to say.

1830-43. CARLYLE (1795-1881): His literature voices the most powerful war-cry against *laissez faire*. His "economics of the heart" condemns the "cash-nexus" of the "dismal science." The individualistic "economic man" becomes a byword. He sponsors medieval revival. His *Heroes* propagates the suspicion of democracy; cf. *Signs of the Times* (1829), *Chartism* (1839), *Past and Present*³ (1843).

1830-50. GUIZOT (1787-1874) *Histoire de la civilisation en Europe* (History of Civilisation in Europe), *Histoire du gouvernement représentatif* (History of Representative Government), 1851. From the standpoint of democracy he is reactionary in political

¹Mayr: *Römisches Rechtsgeschichte* (History of Roman Law), vol. I. Leipzig, 1912.

²Hovell: *The Chartist Movement*. London, 1918. For Chartism in literature see Carlyle's *Chartism* (1839), Disraeli's *Sybil* (1845), and Kingsley's *Yeast* (1848) and *Alton Locke* (1850).

³Roe: *The Social Philosophy of Carlyle and Ruskin*, London 1921.

doctrines, as evidenced in his championing the *Charte Constitutionnelle* (Constitutional Charter) issued by Louis XVIII (1814). Sovereignty of truth, reason and justice as contrasted with that of the people or the monarch, is the abstraction popularised by his lectures.

1844. STIRNER (1806-1856): *Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum* (The Only One and his Property), "I want to become all that is within my power to become and to have everything that I am entitled." Might is right, and there is no right, without might. "I have a right to overthrow every authority, whether of Jesus, Qehovah, or God, if I can."

1844-60. MAZZINI (1808-72), *Duties of Man, Faith and the Future*¹ (1855) *Sistemi e la democrazia* (Systems and Democracy): He is one of the arch-exponents of nationalism in culture as well as politics, like Fichte. His teachings are profoundly Catholic, spiritual and mystical. But republican democracy and socialism constitute the two positive planks of his political propaganda. He inspires Young Italy by the spiritualization of politics through the slogan, "not rights, but duties." In the gospel of duty he is Kantian and Carlylean. Opposition to communism is a chief feature of his thought. But right to revolt is the fundamental bed-rock of his philosophy.

1848. The year of revolutions. "nationalistic" "constitutional" and "socialistic," is marked by the activities of KOSSUTH (Hungarian), UHLAND

¹King: *Mazzini* in the Everyman's Library Series, London; Chapter on Mazzini in Vaughan's *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy* Vol. II. London 1925.

(German), LAMARTINE (French), MAZZINI (Italian), KARL MARX (communist) and BLANC (experiments at Paris in national workshops).

The idealism of the epoch is reflected in LAMARTINE (1790-1869): *Histoire de la révolution de 1848* (History of the Revolution of 1848). The following articles of faith are characteristic: (i) every French man of full age is a citizen, (ii) every citizen is an elector, (iii) every elector is sovereign.

1850. CALHOUN, American: *Disquisition on Government*. He stands for autonomy or home rule for the members of a federation or national whole. The principle is described differently in different countries, *e.g.*, "particularism" (German), local self-government (British), sovereignty of the "cantons" (Swiss) or "states" (American). In German terminology, he is a champion of the rights of the units in a *Staaten-bund* as contrasted with the centralization of *Bundesstaat*. Sovereignty resides in the people and not in the government. He rejects the contract theory of society, and condemns the theories of Madison, Tocqueville and Webster *re* the alleged division of sovereignty between the thirteen states and the Union. Sovereignty is an entire thing; to divide is to destroy it. The Union is in his judgment an association of States each of which possesses full sovereignty. "Delegation" of certain powers to the Union does not amount to the cession of sovereignty by the States. Sovereignty is not the sum of all these powers but the vital principle of the state out of which all these powers arise and on which they rest. It is

this sort of particularistic reasoning that furnishes the philosophy of the civil war in America, only to be overpowered by a more unitarian theory of federation.¹ On the slavery controversy he is Aristotelian and anti-abolitionist.

1851. *Della nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti* (On nationality as the basis of international law), a lecture at the University of Turin by Professor MANCINI.² In nationality the spiritual or psychological phenomenon is absolutely more important than physical, *e.g.* language, race and territory. Mancini's doctrine is not popular in contemporary France but popular in contemporary Germany. But after 1870 it becomes unpopular in Germany and popular in France; *cf.* Renan (1882).

1853. WAITZ: *Grundzuege der Politik* (Fundamentals of Politics). Sovereignty is "limited" in a federation—in each of the members as well as in the union. The state governments are as much sovereign each in its own sphere as the federal in its own. Thus there may be two sovereigns in one state *e.g.* in a federation. In this doctrine of a state with many sovereigns he is influenced by Tocqueville's (1835) interpretation of earlier American ideas (Madison, Webster, etc.) as contrasted with those of Calhoun (1851). In a federation it is the *extent* not the *content* of sovereignty that is limited. This theory is

¹Merriam: *History of the Theory of Sovereignty* N. Y. 1900; *History of American Political Theories*, 1926.

²Mancini: *Il principio di Nazionalita* Rome 1920. Foignet: *Droit International Public*, Paris 1923.

replaced later by the " legal self-determination " theory.

1854-66. LINCOLN (1809-64), American President : " I believe this government cannot endure permanently half-slave, half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved. It will become all one thing or all the other ". " It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the great task remaining before us that government of the people by the people and for the people shall not perish from this earth ".

1859-70. JOHN STUART MILL (1806-73): *Representative Government* (1860) declares that " government of one people by another is a contradiction in terms".¹ He is an exponent of nationalism. As for democracy he makes his *debut* with individualism (Benthamite) in *Liberty* (1859) and ends with socialism (Marxian?) in *Autobiography* (1873). His feminism is embodied in *The Subjection of Women*.

1895-68. LORENZ VON STEIN: *Die Verwaltungslehre* (The Theory of Administration) discusses the principles of local government such as are involved in the federal as well as unitary states.

1867. BAGEHOT: *English Constitution* presents an aristocratic or bourgeois analysis of " dignified " as contrasted with " efficient " parts.

1868. BAKUNIN (1814-76), Russian : *Federalisme Socialisme et anti theologisme ; Alliance Internationale de la democratie Socialiste ; Dieu et l' Etat* (i.e., " God

¹Douglas: *John Stuart Mill : A Study of his Philosophy* (London 1882).

Leslie Stephen's *Utilitarians* Vol. III (London 1900) is devoted to John Stuart Mill.

and the State") 1871. "We reject all legislation, all authority, all privileged, chartered, official and legal influence,—even if it were created by universal suffrage,—in the conviction that such things can but redound always to the advantage of a ruling minority of exploiters and to the disadvantage of the vast enslaved majority. In a sense we are in truth anarchists."¹ The progress of mankind from a less perfect existence to the most perfect existence is quite possible. One of the next steps will be the disappearance not indeed of law but of enacted law. The state will likewise disappear in the near future and be replaced by social human life on the basis of the legal norm, that contracts be lived up to. He preaches the disappearance not indeed of property but of property's present form, unlimited private property. The change will come to pass by a social revolution, a violent subversion of the old order which will be automatically brought about by the power of things but which those who foresee the course of evolution have the task of hastening and facilitating.

¹*Oeuvres de Michel Bakounine* (works of M. B.) 1895; Eltzbacher: *Anarchism* (translation from German by Byington), New York 1908. On anarchism in politics and economic and social philosophy (British, French, Russian, German) since the end of the eighteenth century as well as on Bakunin and his relations with Proudhon and Karl Marx see Damaschke *Geschichte der Nationaloekonomie*, Jena, 1910. For Bakunin's propaganda in Italy see Rossini *Mazzini e Bakunin 12 anni di movimento operaio in Italia* (1860-72) (Mazzini and Bakunin: 12 years of labour movement in Italy) Turin 1927.

II

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF ECONOMIC WELFARE

Ideology : (1) labour philosophy gaining ground, (2) protectionism as strong as free trade, (3) internationalism among working classes, (4) anarchism *vs.* Marxism (communism or scientific socialism), (5) tug of war between gold and silver, (6) proportional *vs.* progressive taxation.

1832-37. RAU (1792-1870) *Finanz wissenschaft* (Science of Finance). He considers "proportional" taxation to be the most equitable and just. The term "proportional" is, however, to be understood as proportional taxation of "clear income" only. The exemption of minimum necessary for subsistence is implied. But this minimum to be exempted is difficult to define. Hence the "whole income" is to be taxed. But "up to a certain point" the tax is to be "graduated" *i. e.*, "progressive".¹ Thus we get "degressive" taxation, *i. e.*, a system that, first, admits an exemption, then introduces progression or graduation, and finally proportion.

1834. New Poor Law in England: It lays down the principle that the relief should not exceed the earnings of the poorest paid labourer and introduces the workhouse test for the able-bodied. Generally speaking, it is opposed to state-intervention on the idea that sufficient work is always available and that individual initiative is the chief requirement.

¹Seligman: *Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice*, New York, 1908.

1834. *Zollverein* (Customs Union) is established in Germany. It begins with the "free trade" principles of Adam Smith more or less embodied in the Prussian tariff system introduced in 1818. But by 1840-41 the protective principle is imbibed from Frederick List whose teaching inspires the "new industries" in iron and cotton-spinning. With the Cobden-Chevalier treaty (Napoleon III, 1860), however, an epoch of free trade commences for Europe and the *Zollverein* enters into treaties on the new, "most favoured nation" lines with France (1865), England etc.

1839. LOUIS BLANC (1813-82): *Organisation du travail* (Organisation of Labour). Socialisation of industry is the war-cry popularized by him. He introduces the idea of *ateliers nationaux* (state-workshops) in the social philosophy of the time and succeeds in instituting experiments in this line for a short time (1848).

1840. LIST (1789-1846), *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie* (National system of political economy): Wealth is according to him not so important as wealth-making power. It is on such non-economic, "spiritual" postulates that his protectionism is based. The book has proved to be the Bible to all those who enjoy denunciation of *Smithianismus*, *Manchestertum*, *laissez faire* "natural liberty" and individualism. He is recognized as one of the fathers of American economics. His propaganda leads to the unification of the German states in a *Zollverein* (customs union).¹ The

¹Plaut: *Deutsche Handelspolitik* (German commercial Policy) Leipzig 1924.

nationalists of every country in Europe and elsewhere (including India) have hailed him as a saviour.

1840. PROUDHON (1809-65): *Questce que la propriete?* (What is Property?). Property is robbery, says he unequivocally. He is powerful in his denunciation of money and interest. Barter-bank is advocated. His anarchism is manifest in *Confession d'un revolutionnaire, Idee generale de la revolution au XIX sicle*, 1849, *General idea of revolution in the 19th century*. To him the supreme law is justice i.e., "respect for human dignity." Contracts must be lived up to. "The government of man by man is slavery." "Whoever lays his hand on me to govern me is a usurper and a tyrant. I declare him my enemy." Property is repugnant to justice. The new order will appear "as soon as the idea is popularized." That it may appear we must popularize the idea.

1841-46. PEEL and COBDEN's tariff reform carries forward the free trade legislation of Huskisson and prepares the way for GLADSTONE'S achievements in the same direction (1853-60).

1844-45. Bank Charter Act regulates the operations of the Bank of England (established 1694) on the "currency principle," viz. "no gold, no note" (Contrast *Banque de France*, 1800-1809).

1848. *Communist Manifesto*: KARL MARX (1818-83) and FRIEDRICH ENGELS (1820-95). The Hegelian dialectic of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis is applied to the analysis of social phenomena. A "materialistic interpretation of history" or economic determinism is thus established. They

enunciate the doctrine of class struggle and teach that the interests of the working class throughout the world are one. The revolt of labour against those who "exploit" it, *i.e.* enjoyers of surplus value, rent, interest, and profit is the burden of their philosophy. In "communism" or scientific socialism, as they understand it, the state is to expropriate all agents of production and distribution, abolish the rights of inheritance and institute progressive income tax.

Every state is an organisation of class-rule. The present bourgeois state is an organ for the oppression of the masses by the classes.¹ The revolutionary proletariat will abolish this state and set up a dictatorship over the bourgeoisie. This dictatorship will mark only a transitional stage.² Finally, with the establishment of communism and abolition of classes the state will "wither away." "We German socialists", says Engels, are proud of our descent not only from St. Simon, Fourier and Owen but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The German labour-movement is the heir of German classical philosophy."

¹Spann: *Der wahre Staat* (The true State), Leipzig, 1921 offers an objective summary as well as adverse criticism of *Marxismus*.

²Sombart (1863—) *Der Sozialismus und die soziale Bewegung* (Socialism and the Social movement). Sombart says: "Turn it as we will the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be made to fit into a historical, realistic view of society. It is a foreign element, coming from a system entirely different. That Marx held the theory so long, I do not know how long, is only another proof of my thesis that in the doctrines of Marx there are contradictory elements, and all the sophistry in the world will not be able to bring them into agreement."

1848. JOHN STUART MILL (1806-73): *Principles of Political Economy*. He would restrict the right of inheritance. "Each person should have power to dispose by will of his or her whole property; but not to lavish it in enriching some one individual beyond a certain maximum". In his social system the rent of land also is highly objectionable. He would have it confiscated by the state through taxation.

1850. Gold discoveries in California and Australia enable theorists as well as statesmen to participate in the propaganda against the age-long, traditional silver-*raj* in the world's currencies. The tug of war between silver and gold begins.

1855. "Limited liability" principle is admitted by British law in the constitution of "joint stock companies"; and extended to banks (1858).

1858. Garnier: *Traite des Finances*. The protection afforded by the state increases faster than the increase of property.¹ Taxation must therefore increase "progressively." According to him the really legitimate and rational tax should be equal to the advantages enjoyed by the individual from the society and especially to the value of the security which is guaranteed to him.

But see Lenin's interpretation of the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship in its different phases 1848-1851, 1871 and 1891 in *State and Revolution* (1917).

¹Seligman: *Economic Interpretation of History*, New York 1917.

With this "benefit" (protection, security etc). theory one may legitimately compare the old Hindu theory of taxation. See Sarkar: *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*, Leipzig, (1922).

1860. COBDEN Treaty (Anglo-French) leads to the removal in France of restrictions to imports and popularizes the "most-favored nation" clause. With it begins the epoch of commercial treaties of a like character between France and other countries, German *Zollverein* and France (1865), as well as between the *Zollverein* and England.¹ This, however, is practically the only period in the history of the world when "free=tradism" may be said to have had some sort of a vogue. The trend of economic development among the nations is fundamentally protectionist.

1864-67 Factory Acts in England. The Reform Act (1867) extends the franchise.

1864-72. The First International² (Labour) is organised under Mark's influence in London (later known as the Geneva International). Altogether six congresses are held. Marx's party is challenged by the anarchists of the Bakunin group who although Marxist in economics have no faith in the state.

1865. The so-called Latin Monetary Union (France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland) invites gold to a position beside silver. All the gold coins and the silver francs pieces are declared to be "legal tender" everywhere within the Union.

1867. The First International Monetary Conference is held at Paris in which 18 states of Europe and the U. S. take part. Gold is declared to be the only standard. The experiment in the "dyarchy" of

¹Plaut : *Deutsche Handelspolitik* (German Commercial Policy) Leipzig, 1924.

²Stekloff : *History of the First International* (transl. Paul), London.

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gold and silver (*i. e.* bimetallism) introduced by the Latin Monetary Union is held to be unacceptable.

1869. The opening of the Suez Canal raises other European countries to the level of England in regard to facilities for overseas trade. An epoch of imperialistic rivalries commences.

III

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ideology: (1) treaties acquire a prominence in economic and political life, (2) but internationalism is ten yet a force in speculation.

(a) PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

1856. The Declaration of Paris regulates, among other things, warfare at sea.

1864. The Convention of Geneva attends to the treatment of the sick and the wounded in land war.

1868. The Declaration of St. Petersburg prohibits the use of explosive bullets.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

1856. Treaty of Paris opens the Danube.

1860. Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between England and France (Napoleon III) promotes the abolition of restrictions to free trade.

1865. General Telegraph Union.

1867. Brazil Decree opens the Amazon.

IV

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
AND SOCIETAL EVOLUTION

Ideology : (1) interpretation of progress with the help of the physical and biological sciences, (2) race-chauvinism a force in theory.

(a) *General Theories of Progress*

1849. LORENZ VON STEIN: *Der Begriff der Gesellschaft and die sociale Geschichte der franzoesischen Revolution bis zum Jahre 1830* (The Meaning of Society and the social history of the French Revolution down to 1830).¹ He believes that class-war is inevitable to-day as it has always been. But reform, not revolution, is according to him the method of progress. Statesmen should accept the demands of the oppressed classes, e.g., communism, socialism, social democracy, etc.

1850-57. SPENCER (1820-1903): *Social Statics* (1851) adumbrates an utopian, ideal state. He attempts a thorough-going application of physics and also of biology to the problems of politics and morals. The goal of progress is anarchy, the condition of perfect "equilibrium" in a society. Government is the embodiment of evil. If there is to be any state, let it be a mere police-state. He advocates equal freedom, nationalization of land and feminism. Two stages are indicated in political evolution : (1) military (barbarous), and (2) industrial (civilized). Of

¹ Dunning : *Political Theories*, Vol. III.

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the latter the basis is "contract." The state is an organism like an individual.¹

1856. BUCKLE (1821-62): *History of Civilisation*. Progress is attained through intelligence and scepticism. The influence of climate on man is enormous. Like Spencer he is anti-statal.

1859. DARWIN (1809-82): *Origin of Species*. Natural selection is the cause of evolution.²

1860-70. QUINET (1803-1875): *La Creation* (Creation). The history of nature and the history of man enlighten each other. Natural history and human history are subject to common laws. The future is to be better and more glorious than the past. History is the unfolding of the spirit of freedom. Like Michelet he upholds democracy in the interpretation of the French revolution in *La Revolution* (1865).

1864. LE PLAY (1806-82): *La reforme sociale en France* (Social Reform in France). He is opposed to excessive individualism or *laissez faire* e.g. that of Leroy-Beaulieu, Bastiat and Chevalier. His opposition to state-socialism is equally strong. He advocates the rights of the "family" and the "gild" but would not allow a return to the "patriarchal" system or medieval gild-economy. The restoration of the now limited freedom of bequest is one of his slogans. The abolition of the equal division of land is another reform in economic legislation demanded by him.³

¹A critical study of Spencer is to be found in Barker's *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the present day*, London 1915.

²Ritchie: *Darwinism and Politics*, London, 1895.

³Cossa: *Introduction to the Study of Political Economy*, London, 1893.

(b) *Racial Dogmatism*

1853-55. GOBINEAU (1816-82), Frenchman domiciled in Germany : *Inegalite des races humaines* (Inequality of the Human Races). Aryanism (superiority of the white to coloured races) is his fetish. He is anti-democratic in political views.¹

(c) *East and West*

1815-33 COUSIN (1792-1867) : *Histoire de la philosophie* (History of Philosophy). The epoch of the infinite is the epoch of the East. In the East everything is more or less immobile, industry feeble, the arts gigantic and monstrous, the law of the state fixed and immutable, religion a longing after absorption in the invisible, and philosophy the contemplation of absolute unity. He continues the romanticism of the German philosophy.

1857. BUCKLE (1821-62) : East is different from West. "The tendency of the surrounding phenomena was in India to inspire fear, in Greece to give confidence. In India man was intimidated. In Greece he was encouraged. In Greece everything tended to exalt the dignity of man while in India everything tended to depress it."

V

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF MENTAL AND
MORAL PERSONALITY

Ideology : German Idealism Abroad.

¹See criticism in Hankins's *Racial Basis of Civilisation*, New York, 1926.

1833. COUSIN (1797-1867) *Histoire de la philosophie*: He adopts the Hegelian ideas on historical optimism, war, great men, etc. Three regulative principles of reason are enunciated by him: (1) idea of the infinite unity, substance, absolute, etc., (2) idea of the finite, plurality, phenomenon, conditional, etc., and (3) idea of the relation between the two. There are three historical epochs corresponding to these three ideas.

1836. BARCHOU (1801-57): *Histoire de la philosophie allemande depuis Leibnitz jusqu'à Hegel* (History of German Philosophy from Leibnitz to Hegel). He presents an appreciative account of idealism, and popularizes the concept that the life of every race is dominated by an idea.

1837. COLERIDGE (1772-1834): *Spiritual Philosophy*: He expatiates on philosophical necessity and talks of process in human affairs. His ideas on transcendentalism constitute a bridge between German idealism and British romanticism.

1845. CARLYLE (1795-1887): He preaches the the gospel of duty and considers ideals to be embodied in heroes. "Close thy Byron, open thy Goethe" is the prelude to his Germanism. His propaganda against materialism is comprehensive and profound.

1854-64. RENOUVIER: *Essais de Critique Generale* (Essays of General Criticism). In his judgment primitive man cannot be assimilated to the modern savage. It is by the exercise of his liberty that man becomes either truly good or truly evil. The history of man is the product of the use or abuse of freedom.

Progress is possible but neither continuous nor necessary. France still requires to struggle with anxiety if she would even retain the liberties and advantages which she has gained with so much labour and difficulty. He is Kantian in the conception of duty; cf. *La Science de la morale* (1869).¹

¹Flint: *History of the Philosophy of History*, London, 1893.

CHAPTER III

THE MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy of Imperialism (political and economic), State Socialism and Race-Chauvinism ("White Man's Burden"). (1870-1905).

DOMINANT categories of political thinking: (1) nationalism of a mystical character, (2) legal recognition of labour's demands, economic and political, (3) proletariat self-conscious, (4) "great powers" and imperial rivalries, (5) trade unions and professional groups as units of society, (6) Asia touched by industrial revolution, modern science and bourgeois democracy more or less of the 1776-1832 type, (7) technical and legal unification of the world, (8) contributions of sociological analysis to political science, (9) "orientalism" and colonialism united as anti-Asian forces, (10) Neo-Hegelianism.

I

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF SOVEREIGNTY AS WELL AS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW

Ideology: (1) nation-making, (2) state-socialism, (3) local, central and federal governments, (4) problem of groups, (5) constitutional movements in Asia, (6) labour a political power, (7) anarchism, (8) partition of Asia and Africa, (9) imperialism and colonialism, (10) critical attitude towards democracy, (11) the New East.

1871-90. BISMARCK (1815-98): He promotes national unity and empire-building. Treitschke's *Politik* may be regarded as his own gospel. He combats *Marxismus*,—the "Social Democratic" Party,—by meeting Marx half-way, so to say, in and through comprehensive socialistic legislation.¹ His work embodies state socialism on the lines of SCHAEFFLE'S *Quintessenz, de Sozialismus* and the *Kathedr Sozialismus* (professorial socialism) of WAGNER, SCHMOLLER,² and others organized in the discussions of the *Verein fuer Social politik* (Association for Social Politics) which is established in 1872 as a result of the Congress at Eisenach.

1870. FORSTER'S Education Act in England, supplemented by the Act of 1876:³ Elementary education is rendered compulsory and universal; later it is rendered free (Act of 1891).

1872. The *Communist Manifesto* is revised by the authors themselves, MARX and ENGELS, in the light of the experience of the revolutionary Paris Commune of 1871: "Especially did the Commune demonstrate that the 'working class cannot simply seize the available ready machinery of the state and set it going for its own ends,'" says Lenin in *The State*

¹Lowe: *Prince Bismarck* (London, 1898). Ludwig: *Bismarck* (transl. Paul), London, 1927. See the comparative study of De Maistre "the Catholic" and Bismarck the "anti-Catholic" in Laski's *Problem of Sovereignty* 1918. Ely: *French and German Socialism*, New York, 1883.

²Traill: *Coleridge* (English Men of Letters Series)

³On the politics of this legislation see Green's two lectures (1878) on the "elementary school system of England," *Works*, Vol. III, (Miscellanies and Memoir) edited by Nettleship, London, 1900.

and Revolution (1917). According to him this is a "fundamental and principal lesson" of "enormous importance". It does not mean, as the "moderate" socialists or "opportunists" interpret it, that Marx is here opposing a sudden seizure of power and emphasising the idea of gradual development but exactly the reverse. "What Marx says is that the working class must break up, shatter the available ready machinery of the state and not confine itself merely to taking possession of it."

1873. SEYDEL. *Grundzuege einer allgemeinen Staatslehre* (Fundamentals of General Political Theory). He opposes Waitz's "compromise theory" of "divided sovereignty" as the characteristic of federations (cf. the American CALHOUN *vs.* WEBSTER, MADISON, *The Federalist*, etc.) According to him sovereignty has no definite extent. Like Calhoun he considers sovereignty to be indivisible and champions the sovereign rights of the original States in the German federation.

1873. STEPHEN (J. F.): *Liberty, Equality and Fraternity*. He is critical like Tocqueville and Guizot in his attitude to democracy. The emphasis is laid on discipline, political and religious, rather than on liberty or progress. Cf. MAINE'S *Popular Government* (1884), which in the same strain preaches the anti-democratic, authoritarian and aristocratic gospel of the state and teaches one to be cautious in regard to the extension of suffrage.

1874. TREITSCHKE (1834-96): *Politik* (Politics). According to him war will endure to the end of history.

He states categorically that the laws of human thought and human nature forbid any alternative, nor is one to be wished for." The "ravings" about "everlasting peace" are accordingly condemned. One of his articles of faith says: "To a monarchy should appertain a house which has grown together with the nation. Only such a ruling family as this is able to rise superior to parties." In his judgment it is individual men who make history, such men as Luther, Frederick the Great or Bismarck. His patriotism finds expression in the following postulate: "We Germans are as a matter of fact a more democratic nation than the English ever were and our official system is based upon these lines." In his philosophical analysis the state does not identify itself with physical power for its own sake. "It is Power in order to protect and further the highest welfare of the human race". His international *credo* teaches that all the restraints to which states bind themselves by treaty are voluntary and all treaties are concluded on the tacit understanding *rebus sic stantibus* (i.e. other circumstances remaining the same). The importance of military preparedness is vindicated, since, as he believes, no courts of arbitration will ever succeed in banishing war from the world.

1875. GIERKE (1841-1923): *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (German Association Law). Every individual bears a double character, personal and communal. The individual belongs only in part to the state; he has a domain of free existence unassail-

able by the state. There is a series of associations connecting the state and the individual. The associations are "real persons." In every form of association—religious, cultural, political, racial he finds a real and independent "community" life, consciousness and will over against and distinct from the lives, consciousnesses and wills of the individual members of the group. But all the same the dignity of the state remains entire. "The state is distinguished from other social bodies—from the minor political associations in particular by its position above them. For the state alone there is no limit through a higher collective existence. "All other political unions are subordinate to it; its will is the sovereign general will."

1875. German Social Democratic Party is established at Gotha. LIEBKNECHT and LASSALLE, the two leaders, represent two original factions now united.

1876. Constitution is granted to Turkey by the Sultan. It languishes during the Russo-Turkish War (1877) and is stifled under Sultan Abdul Hamid.

1877-1883. JHERING (1818-92), *Der Zweck im Recht* (Purpose in Law): The "nature" of law is not the only important item in political life. The *purpose* of every law has to be discovered. Hence the necessity of emphasising the "interests" served by the legal institutions. The formal legal machinery by which these interests are secured must not monopolize the attention of jurists and statesmen. The traditional jurisprudence of "conceptions" or "formal

apparatus" of law is modified and to a certain extent replaced by the jurisprudence of the "ends," desires and wants of human beings. The doctrine of absolute and natural rights is replaced by that of weighing or evaluating the interests. He considers law to be the "conscious" creation of man and hence opposes the extreme historical view of law as being mainly tradition embodied in custom.

1878. TOLSTOY (1828-1910), Russian: *My Confession, What shall we do then?* (1885), *Kingdom of God is within you or Christianity not a mystical doctrine but a new life-conception* (1893): "Our supreme law is love: do not resist evil by force." Law is "upheld by violence" and hence is to be rejected by the "more highly developed peoples of our time" who "acknowledge the commandments of philanthropy, of sympathy with one's neighbour and ask only the possibility of friendship." "For the more highly developed nations of our time," the legal institution of the state is unnecessary. The state is the "the rule of the bad raised to the highest pitch." The rule in the state is based on physical force. Property is an "anachronism" "for the more highly developed nations." Property means the dominion of possessors over non-possessors. This dominion is based on physical force. Those men who are convinced of these truths are to convince others as to the "necessity" of the change "for love's sake." Finally, the law, state and property are to be abolished "with the help of the refusal of obedience."

1880-98. Catholic Movement in Italy. Congresses of the Church are held. They take interest in the interests and aspirations of the middle and working classes. Rural savings banks, working men's societies, university groups, young men's societies, diocesan and parochial committee, etc., are established under Church auspices. Professor TONIOLO (Pisa). is an exponent of this Christian Socialism Under the pontificates of LEO XIII and BENEDICT XV (1914) the Church breaks away from its alliance with the parties of absolutism with which since 1789 it had made common cause against the Revolution and recognises representative institutions as the legal and legitimate form of government.¹

1882. RENAN (1823-1895): "*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*" (What is a nation?): lecture at the *College de France*. Nationality is dependent on (1) the positive will of the people, and on (2) possession of common memory. His exposition leads to the repudiation of the "physical" "objective" elements viz. race, language, territory. (cf. MANCINI, 1851).

1882. British occupation of Egypt.

Muhammad ABDU the Grand Mufti of Egypt, is banished on account of his participation in the nationalist struggle.

Le Lien Indissoluble (1884) a weekly paper in Arabic (French title), is conducted from Paris by

¹ Ferrero: *Da Fiume a Roma* (Four years of Facism), London, 1924.

SAIYAD JAMALUDDIN of Persia and his disciple Muhammad Abdu of Egypt.¹

1882. JELLINEK. *Staaten verbin dungen* (Unions of States). Obligation exclusively through its own will is the juristic mark of the sovereign state. The sovereign power can be limited,—but only by itself. This is self-limitation through legal self-determination. States may continue to be states although they are no longer sovereign. Sovereignty is not a characteristic mark of the state. He propounds the doctrine of non-sovereign states in a federal union.

1884-85. The Third Reform Bill in England institutes universal suffrage in politics. A working class democracy is thus initiated.²

1885. KROPOTKIN (1842-1921), Russian: *Paroles d'un revolte* (Words of a rebel), *Anarchist Communism* (1891), *La Conquete du pain* (The Conquest of Bread), 1892, *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1901). In general philosophy he is practically identical with Bakunin. The “next phase of evolution”, the “higher form of social organization,” will “inevitably” be not only “anarchism” but “anarchistic comunism”. He preaches the abolition of capital and private property. His social system is based on mutual aid and co-operation. The state is negated of course.

1885-87. Indian National Congress: First three sessions,—Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. First

¹ Gibbons: *New Map of Africa*, New York, 1916.

² Marriott: *English Political Institutions*, London, 1925.

Presidents: W. C. BANERJEE, NAOROJI, BADRUD-DIN TYABJI. Resolutions: (1) Adequate representation of the people, (2) Encouragement of Indian manufactures in order to combat the poverty of the people, (3) Admission of Indians to higher ranks of the military service, (4) Protection of the interests of the Indian settlers in South Africa (Poona Session, 1895, President SURENDRA NATH BANERJEE).¹

N. B. Indian Councils Act, 1892.

The Indian National Congress activities of the period mark the beginnings of the "constitutional agitation," which implies "association with and opposition to the Government" on the part of the "people's leaders."

1886-89. The Japanese Constitution is established. Prince ITO takes the prominent part.

PARTIES IN JAPAN²

1880. Jiyu-to: Liberal, founded by Itagaki.

1882. Kaishin-to: Reform by Okuma.

1896. Shimpō-to: Progressive by Okuma.

1883. Teisei-to: Imperialist Conservative by Fukuchi.

1898. Kensei-to: Liberal Progressive Combination by Fukuchi.

1900. Seiyu-kai: Constitutional Government Association by Ito.

¹Banerjee S. N. *A Nation in Making*, London, 1926.

²G. E. Uyehara: *Political Development of Japan* (1867-1909), London, 1910. S. Uyehara: *The Industry and Trade of Japan in Modern Times*. London, 1926.

1889. PREUSS: *Gemeinde, Staat, Reich als Gebeetskoerperschaften* (Community or Locality, i.e., Parish, Town or District, State, i.e., Province and Empire as Territorial Corporations). He attempts to interpret the constitution of the German Empire according to the theory of *Genossenschaften* (corporations), cf. GIERKE. The theory of sovereignty is eliminated by him from the categories of political science. Sovereignty as "absolute and perpetual power of a state" (Bodin, Hobbes, Austin, Hegel) is inconsistent with international law which by nature deprives the states of their independence (through contracts and agreements). It is incompatible with the idea of "federation" in which it is difficult to precisely locate the highest authority. It is inconsistent with constitutional law which by nature imposes restraints on the authority of the state (cf. DUGUIT *L'Etat*). It is incompatible with the existence of other associations and corporations in the body politic. It was consistent with the absolute state of the past but can have no place in "modern" states which consist in a series of mutual rights and obligations.¹

1890. LEROY-BEAULIEU (1843-1916): *L'Etat moderne et ses fonctions* (The Modern state and its functions). He presents a hostile criticism of state-socialism, and expatiates on the heavy financial burdens of the "new state." He is pro-Kantian and anti-Hegelian in his advocacy of *laissez faire* and liberty. His thought is marked by Spencerian

¹See Holtzendorff: *Die Voelkerrechtliche Verfassung* (1887), *infra*.

individualism but with no touch of anarchism. He admires Chevalier and Mill for their moderate socialism and condemns Lorenz von Stein, Schaeffle, Wagner and Bluntschli for their adoration of the state. The "organismic" idea of the state is stoutly opposed by him. He believes in the existence of an infinite number of free intermediate associations between the state and the individual. The state is entirely devoid of inventive genius, says he. It is not the highest form of personality. The state does not create right. The theory of Bossuet and Fenelon is less false than that of Bentham. The legislator comes last to sanction and specify. Lero Beaulieu preaches the necessity of bringing the legislator into a more modest frame of mind.

1890-91. SAIYAD JAMALUDDIN'S (1838-97) activities in Persia. He is expelled on account of anti-foreign agitation (1891). "The sword of unrighteousness has not suffered me to see the awakening of the peoples of the East, and the hand of "ignorance has not granted me the opportunity to hear the call of freedom from the throats of the nations of the Orient."

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

1. Foreign concessions in Persia (1888-89): (i) the Karun River Concession, November, 9, 1888, is granted to England, (ii) the mines to Baron Julius de Reuter, January, 1889, (iii) the river of Tabriz, etc., to Russia, February 1889, (iv) Tobacco Concession, March 1890.

2. Anti-foreign agitation in Persia (1888-89) culminates in the *Fatwa* of December 1891 against the use of tobacco. The *Fatwa* is issued by Haji Mirza Hasan of Shiraz—under the inspiration of Jamaluddin.

3. Maladministration in Persia is manifest in the tyranny and exactions of the governing classes, corruption of all branches of administration, sale of Government offices, prevalence of torture, etc. The soldiery is unpaid and accordingly undisciplined. Robbery and plunder by soldiers is a normal social fact. The country is depopulated. Emigration to Turkey and Russia is a natural consequence.

NEW ASIA (c 1886)

Evolutionally speaking, in terms of modernism in constitution, economic life, political experience and general outlook on life, the following sociological equation will appear to be the verdict of comparative culture-history :

ASIA (1880-90) = EUR-AMERICA (1776-1832)¹

i.e. the modern East is about half a century behind the modern West. New Asia is born through (1) contact with and example of modern Western progress, (2) industrialisation, however slow and halting, and (3) hatred of foreign domination, intervention or concession.

The inspiration derived from the political and cultural achievements of ancient and medieval Asia is another formative force in the New Orient. This "romantic" appreciation of the past is, however, intimately associated with modern historical, archaeological and anthropological scholarship. Nationalism, in so far as it is an aspect of romanticism, is

¹For a later period the socio-political equation will be represented approximately as follows (for certain purposes excluding Japan) :—

YOUNG ASIA (1927) = EUR-AMERICA (c 1832-1875).

This conclusion may be arrived at by a comparative study of life's "curves" in diverse spheres. See ch. I. pp. 9-10 for a statement of the result based on comparative social statistics with special reference to India.

ultimately to be traced, therefore, in the main to Western education such as began to bear fruit among the pioneers of new life and thought in Asia between 1850 and 1886 and has been more or less democratized filtering down to the masses since then.

The process of Asia's rebirth may be said to have begun c 1850 and taken about one generation or so, thus :—

1. Western Asia (Turkey, Egypt, and Persia) 1857 (Crimean War) to 1876, 1882, 1890.

2. Southern Asia (India) : 1857 (Mutiny) to 1886:

3. Japan : 1853 (Commodore Perry) to 1867-1889.

4. China : 1842 (Nanking Treaty) to 1898.

1892. BURGESS, American : *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*. A federal government may be created, but a federal state is impossible. Sovereignty is single and indivisible. The American Union is a single state. The old States possess to-day only the "residuary powers of government" which do not constitute sovereignty. ¹

1896. LECKY : *Democracy and Liberty*, presents an aristocratic criticism of popular institutions ; cf. MAINE : *Popular Government*, 1884, LE BON *Crowd*, 1891. Faguet's *Cult of Incompetence*, etc.

1898-1901. KANG YU-wei's propaganda promotes reforms, constitutional and educational. The

¹ The American and German theories of federation, "concurrent" sovereignty vs. indivisibility of sovereignty leading finally to the unitary concept of federal states in JELLINEK and BURGESS are narrated in Merriam's *History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau*, New York, 1900.

period is marked by the Boxer Revolt against foreign aggressions. A characteristic document is the EMPRESS DOWAGER'S Edict. It says in part: "The various Powers cast upon us looks of tiger-like voracity, hustling each other in their endeavours to be first to seize upon our innermost territories. They think that China, having neither money nor troops, would never venture to go to war with them. They fail to understand, however, that there are certain things which this Empire can never consent to, and that if hard pressed, we have no alternative but to rely upon the justice of our cause, the knowledge of which in our breasts strengthens our resolves and steels us to present a united front against our aggressors."

ENGLAND IN CHINA

1842. Nanking Treaty opens Amoy, Canton, Fuchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, and compels China to cede Hongkong to Great Britain.

1858. Tientsin Treaty establishes extra-territoriality, opens up the Yangtze as well as other parts of China.

1863. The Maritime Customs Department is organized by England to help China against the Taiping rebels.

1886-97. Great Britain counteracts the French treaty of Tientsin (1885) by counter-concessions obtained from China in 1886, 1890, 1893, 1894, 1897.

1886. Burma becomes British.

1890. Sikim becomes British.

1898. England is assured of the non-alienation of Yunnan and Kwantung by China.

1898. The Yangtsyekiang becomes a British sphere. England gets 2,800 miles railway concession.

1898. Russian and German spheres are delimited at England's overtures. England gets Wei-heiwei in order to balance Germany's seizure of Kiaochiao.

1900. Boxer Rebellion against the foreigners.

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1902. Anglo-Japanese alliance against Russia.

1902. Anglo-Chinese Mackay Treaty.

RUSSIA IN CHINA

1854. The Amur River is seized by Russia because of the blockade of the Black Sea during the Crimean War.

1860. The so-called Maritime Provinces are ceded by China to Russia. The beginnings of Vladivostok are taken in hand.

1891. The Siberian Railway is completed except the Pacific Branch.

1894. The Korean War between Japan and China induces Russia to become friendly to China.

1895. Russia deprives Japan of the fruits of her victory in Manchuria.

1895. Carsini the Russian diplomat organises a Convention with China through Li Hungchang at Petrograd.

1896. The Chinese Eastern Railway is a concession to Russia through Li because of help against the Japanese Treaty.

1898. Port Arthur is leased to Russia as against German Kiaochiao.

1901. The Harbin to Port Arthur Railway is opened : Russia dominates the North by the whole Manchurian Railway.

1902. The Russian "Chinese Eastern Railway" hastens the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

1905. The Treaty of Portsmouth; deprives Russia of the South Manchurian Railway.

FRANCE IN CHINA

1858. Annexation of Cochin China by France.

1862-63. France establishes protectorate over Cambodia.

1874. Annam is compelled to cede the territories of the South to France who likewise compels China to recognise the independence of Annam. In other words, Annam becomes a French vassal.

1885. Protectorate over the southern frontiers of Tongking is declared by France who at the same time assumes responsibility for the maintenance of order in Annam.

1895. Convention *re* mines and railways is entered into between France and China. France occupies Tongking.

1898. As against Germany's occupation of Kiao-chiao France obtains Kwang-chau-wan. The non-alienation of the provinces bordering on Tongking is at the same time promised by China.

EASTERN ASIA IN 1898

On the mainland: the battle for spheres in China constitutes the most characteristic politics of the period.

On the Pacific: Hawaii, Guam, Samoa and the Philippines come to the United States from Spain. American imperialism and colonialism begin.

1900. KOHLER (1849—), *Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie* (Text-book of the Philosophy of Law): Civilization has been advancing both in extent and in content from stage to stage. It is the function of law to promote this advance by creating new ideals and values. Law is in perpetual progression. Social history is not to set the standard for law but is to be exploited in the interest of remaking law.

1900. MAITLAND'S *Introduction* to the translation of GIERKE'S *Political Theories of the Middle Ages* popularizes in England the idea of groups as "real persons" and gives a fillip to pluralism or federalism in political theory already well established in German political philosophy (cf. Preuss).

1920-5. J. A. HOBSON (1858—), *Imperialism*: The sliding scale of diplomatic language, hinterland, sphere of interest, sphere of influence, paramountcy, suzerainty, protectorate, veiled or open, leading up to acts of forcible seizure or annexation which sometimes continue to be hidden under "lease," "rectification of frontier," "concession" and the like is the invention and expression of the cynical spirit of imperialism, says he. According to him the antagonism with democracy drives to the very roots of imperialism as a political principle. "The Foreign, Colonial and Indian

Secretaries in Parliament, the permanent officials of the departments, the governors and staff who represent the Imperial Government in our dependencies are not and cannot be controlled directly or effectively by the will of the people. This subordination of the legislative to the executive and the concentration of executive power in an autocracy are necessary consequences of the predominance of foreign over domestic politics."

1904. President ROOSEVELT'S *Message to Congress*: "The Filipinos do not need independence at all, but do need good laws, good public servants, and the industrial development that can come only if the investment of American and foreign capital in the islands is favoured in all legitimate ways."¹

1904. RABINDRA NATH TAGORE (1862-): *Swadeshi Samaj* (Indigenous Indian Society). He poses the society against the state. In his attitude of indifferentism to the state, almost in the manner of Leroy-Beaulieu, he is an exponent of Spencerian individualism verging, as it does, on anarchism. An antistate attitude in India is tantamount, however, to anti-Britishism. His philosophy thus becomes a feeder of extremist or radical tendencies in the political thinking of Young India as contrasted with the traditional, "moderate", more or less submissionist Indian National Congress view of India's relations with the British Government.

¹ A. C. Coolidge. *The United States as a World-Power.*

1904-5. Russo- Japanese War : It compels the first mentionable set-back to the logic of the "white man's burden" and ushers in the birth of Young Asia. Along with it one notices the beginnings of sanity in Eur-American Philosophy.¹

II

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF ECONOMIC WELFARE

Ideology : (1) trade unions constitute the basis of social organization, (2) right to strike, (3) establishment of the gold-*raj* in currency, (4) protection of the interests of the weaker classes by law, (5) tariff higher and higher, (6) progressive *vs.* proportional taxation, (7) constructive social legislation, (8) trusts a powerful force, (9) co-operative movement, (10) "reformist" or "revisionist" socialism, (11) triumph of the "currency principle" in Reserve Banking, (12) revolutionary syndicalism.

1870-85. The "Knights of Labour" are organized in America. They form socialistic trade-unions. The eight-hour day movement is associated with their activities.

1871-76. The First Trade Union Acts are passed in England. The legalization of combinations and strikes is their foremost feature.²

1871. Gold standard is established in Germany as well as in Northern Europe. Silver is the only standard legalized in India (1870).

¹ For the significance of Japanese victory and the "ideas of 1905" in social science see Sarkar's *Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922).

² Hutchins : *History of Factory Legislation* (English), London, 1907.

1874-1885. SCHAEFFLE, *Quintessenz des Sozialismus*: The eighth German edition (1885) mentions the advance made towards a policy of "positive socialism" and "my own scientific participation in the movements connected with it" The Bismarckian programme of state-socialism is implied here. He rejects Marx's theory of "democratic collectivism" i.e., "social democracy" as (a) impracticable and tending to economic chaos and (b) as indifferent to that "authority" which the legally organized public production would render necessary. Cf. his *Die Aussichtslosigkeit der Sozialdemokratie* (The Helplessness of Social Democracy), 1885. It is absolutely impossible, says Schaeffle, to ascertain "how much" of the value of the common produce each individual has produced. He condemns the "fanatic craving for equality among the masses" and the faith in a sudden and revolutionary introduction of collective production. The "intellectual" services rendered by "democratic socialism" (Marxism) are, however, appreciated as having critically and politically suggested the "positive social reform" which has been taken in hand by the Government in Germany since the last edition of the *Quintessenz* was published. (See also his *Compulsory Incorporated Benefit Funds and Incorporation of Mortgage Credit*).

1874. NEUMANN. *Die progressive Einkommensteuer im Staat-und Gemeindehaushalt* (Progressive Income Tax in State and Local Budgets). According to him the "faculty" or "ability"

theory of taxation is virtually identical with the doctrine of "equal sacrifice." He would apportion taxes in such a manner as to correspond to the ability to contribute to public purposes with generally equal efforts and equal sacrifices as over against other needs. The phrase, "equality of taxation" is rejected by him as lacking in precision. To him progressive taxation is the only legitimate system. His progression is moreover degressive (cf. Rau's *Finanzwissenschaft* 1832-37).¹

1874. The so-called Latin-Union (established 1865) suspends the free coinage of silver and virtually becomes monometallic on the gold basis. Bimetalism is not a question of practical politics any longer (See 1865).

1875. The *Reichsbank* is established in Germany. The British Bank Charter Act (1844) is accepted as the model for note-legislation ("currency principle" as contrasted with "banking principle"). But modifications are introduced which enable the German institution to function more elastically than the British. The principle is not so severe as "no gold, no note" but simply "no cover, no note," the gold cover being compulsory only for a third of the issue (*Dritteldeckung*).²

¹ Seligman: *Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice*, New York 1908.

² Sarkar: "Bank-Notes and Note Banks of Germany" in the *Journal of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce* (December, 1926); Obst: *Geld-Bank-und Boersenwesen*, Stuttgart, 1921; *Die Reichsbank 1901-1925* Berlin.

1877. Gold-exchange standard is introduced in Holland and in the Dutch East Indies (Sumatra, Java, etc.). This standard implies essentially the dethronement of silver and the transfer of allegiance to the new power, gold.

1879. HENRY GEORGE (1839-97), American : *Progress and Poverty*. He is an agricultural socialist and believes in the confiscation of rent. The abolition of private property in land is his panacea for economic evils. He is a radical "single-taxer"¹

1880. The Fair Trade League (modified protectionism) in England is directed against the growing German and French commercial expansion and promotes inter-Empire free trade idea.

At the same time free trade is abolished in Germany by BISMARCK.

1880. WAGNER, *Finanzwissenschaft* (Science of Finance): The public finance of the ancient states was governed by "fiscal" considerations,—i.e., the objective of enough revenue for public purposes. Modern states, on the other hand, are functioning in what may be called the "socio-political" epoch of public finance. Revenue is not the sole consideration to-day. The modern states seek to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth interfering with the rights of private property. Proportional

¹Ramnaud's : *La Histoire des doctrines économiques*, Paris 1909.

Land-nationalization has been advocated by Loria (1857-1926) in *La teoria economica della costituzione politica* (Economic Foundations of Society), Turin 1886, and by Oppenheimer in his *Siedlungsgenossenschaft, Colonising Co-operation*, (Berlin 1896).

taxation is the system of the "fiscal" period, whereas in the modern socio-political epoch progressive taxation is the rule, because it is an effective instrument in the readjustment of relations between the different classes.

1881. The Third International Monetary Conference is held at Paris. Nineteen countries (excluding Germany) take part. *Cf.* the Second International Monetary Conference, likewise at Paris (1878) in which 12 countries (excluding Germany) take part.

Gold and Silver Commission is instituted in England (1888).

1881. American Federation of Labour is established.

1882. The Bank of Japan is founded on the German model (*cf.* 1875).

1884. Syndicates or trade unions are legalized in France. Right to strike is conceded (*cf.* England 1871-76).

1884. The Fabian Society is established by (Sidney and Beatrice WEBB, SHAW, WELLS, Mrs. Annie BESANT, Graham WALLAS, R. H. TAWNEY). Reform rather than revolution is the slogan of this Society. Neutrality in politics or non-political economism and social service is the public policy. "Unearned increment" of capital and land is to be nationalized (*cf.* Mill and Henry George). "Social service" activities tend to municipal and state socialism. The Society propagates collectivism—such as is later condemned as the characteristic of the "servile state" by Belloc (1912) and the *New*

Age group (guild-socialists). The chief literature is to be found in *Fabian Essays in Socialism* (1889) with the gospel of state ownership of land and capital.

1884-85. The Third Reform Bill provides universal suffrage. A working-class political democracy is for the first time rendered possible in England.

1886. LORIA (1857-1926), Italian: *La teoria economica della costituzione politica* (Economic Foundations of Society). Democracy is a mere word, says he, as long as inequalities exist in property. Class-exploitation is guaranteed to-day by recourse to "connective institutions," viz., morality, law and politics. He promulgates a monistic, 100 per cent economic determinism. Contrast SELIGMAN'S *Economic Interpretation of History*, New York, 1902, which presents a more reasonable because pluralistic view.

1886-92. Social assurance is initiated and "new" land-legislation enacted in Germany. The world witnesses the embodiment of socialism in diverse economic spheres. The period is marked, however, by anti-trade union measures. The legislation attends to sickness insurance (1883), accident insurance (1884), and old age insurance (1889).

Renten-guts gesetzgebung (Rent-land legislation), 1890, leads to the establishment of "colonists" on small "family-farms" with state aid. Professor SERING'S "*Innere Kolonisation*" or Internal Colonising (Leipzig, 1893) furnishes the theory of the

movements. In the legislation inspired by state-socialism or "*solidarisme*" one comes into contact with the *transformations du droit civil* (the transformations of civil law) such as are described later by CHARMONT in a book under this title and by DUGUIT in *Le Droit social et le Droit individuel et la transformation, del'etat*, Social law, individual law, and the transformation of the state, 1908.¹

Prussian Central Co-operative State Bank is founded (1895).

1886. National Federation of Syndicates is established in France. GUESDE, the leader, is Marxist. The object of the Federation is to carry on effectively the economic war of the workingmen against the employers. It succeeds in popularizing the idea of the "general strike."

The rival associations are amalgamated at the Limoges Conference (1895) into *Confederation Generale du Travail* (C. G. T.) or General Confederation of Labour. Non-political economism is formulated as the policy of the C. G. T. during the very first years of its existence. General strike is taken to be the fundamental weapon. The *syndicats* are to be kept independent of political parties (1895). The C. G. T. accepts boycott and sabotage as weapons of offensive and defensive war (1895-97). Positively

¹Kaskel: *Die Sozialpolitische Gesetzgebung* (Socio-political Legislation). Berlin 1921. On the beginnings of social insurance as well as modern land-reform in Germany, see Sarkar: *Economic Development* (Madras 1926). It is German state-socialism that virtually appears as *solidarisme* in French thought (cf. Durkheim, Bourgeois, Bougle and Gide).

anti-political tenets are developed between 1897 and 1900. The suppression of standing armies is demanded. The internationalism of labour *vs.* that of capital is preached. And patriotism is definitely condemned as a means of exploiting the weak in the interests of the strong (1899-1900).

The C. G. T. exposes the socialistic pro-labor attempts at legislation by WALDECK-ROUSSEAU and the "pseudo-socialist" MILLERAND as schemes for restraining the revolutionary action of the *syndicats* (1900-1902). The syndicalists would have nothing but "direct action" by strikes, sabotage, etc. against employers.

The C. G. T. is amalgamated with the *Federation des Bourses* which ceases to exist separately (1902). The weekly organ is *La Voix du Peuple* or *Voice of the People* (started 1900 with POUGET as editor).

1887-98. Tariff war rages between Italy and France. The DINGLEY Tariff Act (1897) in the U. S. A. provides higher protection than the MCKNLEY Act (1890).¹

1889. The Second International (Labour) is established at Paris (later known as the Berne International). Nine congresses are held until 1914. It has been revived in 1919 (at Amsterdam) and is known to be "moderate" as contrasted with the Bolshevik or Communist International (Moscow, 1919).

¹Taussig : *Tariff History of the United States*, New York 1923, Gignoux *L'après-guerre et la politique commerciale*, Paris, 1924.

1890-1904. The SHERMAN Anti-Trust Act penalizes trusts in the sense of guardians or trustees such as take over the business from different companies whose shareholders cease to function as voters. "Holding companies" are treated as identical with trusts and declared illegal.

1891. ENGELS'S preface to Marx's *Civil War in France* gives a resume of the lessons of the revolutionary Paris Commune of 1871 and provides the *last word* of Marxism against the "superstitious faith" in the state" (according to Lenin).¹

1892. The Fourth International Monetary Conference, Brussels. The second (1878) third (1881) and fourth Conferences fail to establish bimetallism.

1892. Gold Exchange standard is introduced in Austria-Hungary, and Russia as well as India (1893-98) and the Philippines (1903). We have here a series of victories for gold (cf. Holland 1877) as against bimetallism.

The monarchy of gold is finally accepted as the first postulate in the currency-thought of the world. The tug of war between gold and silver (1850-1892) ends in the establishment of (i) direct or 100% gold-*raj* and (ii) indirect or partial gold-*raj* (gold-Exchange standard).

1892. LEROY-BEAULIEU *Traite des Finance* (Treatise on Finance), The state should not attempt inflicting more or less equal sacrifice on the individuals. It ought rather to recover from them the just price of the services rendered to each and the

¹Saint-Leon: *Syndicalisme Ouvrier et Syndicalisme Agricole*, Paris 1920. Foignet: *Legislation Industrielle*, 1925.

just share of each in the interest and liquidation of the national debt. He is thus an exponent of the more or less traditional French theory of taxation, namely, the theory of benefit. Progressive taxation is condemned. His ideal is proportional taxation.

1892. *Federation des Bourses du Travail* (Federation of Labour Exchanges) is established at Paris to find employment and to unify the demands of the workingmen's syndicates :

PELLOUTIER (1867-1901), Secretary of the *Federation des Bourses du Travail* (1894-1901). is an anarchist-communist *i.e.*, opposed to Marxism. He promotes the idea of non-political, purely economic interests. The Report of 1896 is his work. "The task of the revolution, says he, is to free mankind not only from all authority but also from every institution which has not for its essential purpose the development of production." In his *Historie des Bourses du Travail*, "History of Labour Exchanges" (1902) he accepts PROUDHEN and BAKUNIN as *gurus* in opposition to Marx, and has no place for the state in his ideology.¹ Trade unions of producers

¹The "reformist" (as opposed to extremist or 100 per cent-Marxist) views of JAURES (1859-1915), the great French leader of the Second International (1889-1914), are available in English as *Studies in Socialism*. London, 1908.

According to Jaures, complete socialization of capital and authoritarian organization of production would be detrimental to progress. He prefers a decentralized collectivism in which the "professional groups" would enjoy the administration of property.

constitute the only authority in his eyes. He would combine vocational with territorial representation in the organization of unions.

1893. FLORA : *Scienza delle Finanze* (Science of Finances), Italian.

The sentiment of constitutional liberty that generates the need for discussing the questions of public finance is not yet sufficiently diffused among the Italian people, says he. Representative government itself is in Italy the "product rather of brain than of conscience and of the organic evolution of the constitutional idea." Equality of all members of the political society before law is the characteristic feature of modern states. The ancient state was the veritable organization of one class, the nobility, and it was in the exclusive interest of this class that the state exercised its power. The modern state, on the contrary, is the organization of all the social classes, that directly or through special associations minister to the satisfaction of the collective needs. From this doctrine of equality, proclaimed as it was by the French revolution, are derived in public finance the doctrines of generality ("universality") and "uniformity" of contribution. The observance of these two doctrines constitutes financial justice and the basis of modern financial legislation. According to the principle of universality every member of the society is compelled to contribute to the public exchequer, and privileged and exempted classes are inconceivable. This principle is, however, violated to a certain extent in the exemption of the

"minimum of subsistence" from taxation. But it need be observed, says Flora, that this exemption is "more apparent than real," because indirect taxes on consumption are paid by even the poorest classes who are as a rule exempt from the direct tax. According to the principle of uniformity every citizen, no matter what be the amount of his wealth or income, experiences an "equal sacrifice" on account of the contribution paid by him to the state. This ideal of equality of taxation involves the problem of assessment according to the proportional or progressive system. From the *fiscal* standpoint the problem is important solely as a means of "attaining equality in the distribution of taxation" between the different members of the community. But from the *social* standpoint the question has bearing on the possibility of militating against inequality in distribution, which is the result of free competition, or on that of gradually converting private capital into collective and thus accelerating the solution of the social question.¹

1894-99. MELINE Act: *Credit Agricole* is established in France under the ministry of agriculture to distribute "short" and "intermediate" credit on easy terms to members of local co-operative societies on the strength of advances made by the *Banque de France*.²

1894. Progressive taxation on inheritance is introduced in England (the "death duties"), also in

¹ Sixth edition, Livorno, 1921.

² Sarkar's "Law and the Cultivator: The Example of France" in the *Journal of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce*, December, 1926; de Saint-Genis' *Propriete Rurale en France* (Rural Property in France), Paris 1902.

different states of Germany and finally in the German Empire (1899-1906).

1896-99. BERNSTEIN: *Probleme des Sozialismus* (Problems of Socialism), articles in the *Neue Zeit*; *Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (Preconditions of Socialism and the aims of social democracy): He makes a deliberate and conscious attempt to "interpret" and "revise" the Marxian gospel as finally embodied in the creed promulgated at Erfurt Congress (1891). He is a "moderate" or "reformist." This "revisionism" is opposed by KAUTSKY as "heresy"—but wins ground.

1897. SOREL (1847—) *L'Avenir Socialiste des Syndicats* (The Socialist future of the syndicates): He accepts Marx as the *guru* but begins by revising and modifying him to suit the "recent" conditions and furnishes his own key to Marxism. Socialism is to be developed within the bosom of capitalism itself. He would provide moral education of the working class in and through the syndicates. "General strike" is in his terminology a "social myth" *i.e.* powerful dynamic image or sentiment. According to him such myths are indispensable for revolutionary movements. The working class must work against existing democracy which is based on the fiction of general will.¹

¹That Sorel is neither a creator nor a representative, official or non-official, of the syndicalist movement is well established in Levine's *Labour Movement in France*, New York 1912. The error is due to Sombart, the German economic historian's well-known book available in English as *Socialism and the Socialist Movement*.

Le Mouvement Socialiste, a monthly founded by Lagardelle, (1899), becomes the organ of revolutionary syndicalism after 1904 (cf. *The New Age*, London, as organ of guild-socialism since 1907): Contributors, Berth and Sorel.

1898. Germany gets concession in Turkey for the Bagdad Railway.

1900. GIDE (1847-) *La Cooperation*: He preaches the abolition of intermediaries with special reference to consumption and gives a fillip to what is developed by others as "solidarity"—"each for all" in the place of "each for himself." Division of labour and human interdependence are considered to be the foundations of modern economic order. Cf. DURKHEIM'S (1858-1907) *De la division du travail social* (Division of social labour), 1893; *Essai d'une philosophie de la solidarite* (Essay on a philosophy of solidarity) edited by Bourgeois (1851-), 1902. PAUL-BONCOUR (1873-) *Le Federalisme economique: etude sur les rapports de l'individu et des groupements professionnels* (Economic federalism, a study on the relations between the individual and professional groups), 1900.

1900 Agitation is directed against the power of trusts in the United States of America.

Kartellen-Enquete (Inquiry into cartels) is instituted in Germany, by the Government (1903).

1902. German tariff is established on a protective basis and becomes highly specialized.¹ Prof. WAGNER furnishes the theoretical backing.

England's position is represented by CHAMBERLAIN'S protectionist duties and "colonial preference" (1903).

1902. SOMBART *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (Modern Capitalism) focuses attention on the

¹ Plaut: *Deutsche Handelspolitik* (German Commercial Policy), Leipzig, 1924.

influence of modern economic organizations in political activities.

1902. KAUTSKY (1854—), *Soziale Revolution*: The proletarian state would “abolish all rights of inheritance.” Graduated income tax would be a feature of reforms in taxation. He prefers “compensating” the capitalists and landowners to “confiscating” their properties.

III

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ideology : (i) development of contractual relations between nations, (ii), internationalism an accomplished fact of daily life in law, commerce and political obligations, (iii) colonial rivalry of the Great Powers—the tug of war between imperialisms, (iv) alliances and ententes, (v) traditional theory of external sovereignty challenged.

(a) *International Milieu*

1879. Austro-German Alliance.

1882. “Triple Alliance.” Italy joins Germany and Austria in order to protect her African interests against France.

1882. German Colonial Society is established. England, inimical to Russia since the Crimean War (1857), checks Russia in the Russo-Turkish War (1878). She is also the traditional enemy of France, and hence indirectly friend of the Triple Alliance. Germany is not a colonial or

naval power yet, hence not a serious rival to England during the first stage of the Triple Alliance.

1882. British occupation of Egypt is resented by France.

1894. Dual (Franco-Russian) Entente is formally signed. France is the "natural" enemy of Germany (and Italy), Russia the "natural" enemy of Austria. Hence Franco-Russian alliance against German-Austrian-Italian.

1894. China-Japan War.

1898. Seizure of Kiao-chiao in North China by Germany. The movement for the systematic partition of China, territorial and financial, manifests itself in an open manner.

1898. Spanish-American War. America becomes a colonial power.

1898. The Fashoda incident in Egypt. France, brow-beaten by England, is as bitter as after Waterloo.

1900. Boer War. Russo-French, German and American sympathies with the Boers indicate new tendencies. England discredited, in "splendid isolation", begins to seek friends and allies.

1902. England settles her Panama Canal dispute with America. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is instituted. Germany is already a great industrial power and a formidable commercial rival to England.

1904. Hence England forgets the traditional enmity with France and concludes an *Entente*.

1905. The Morocco crisis tests the sincerity of the Anglo-French Entente and leaves Germany unpopular with all except Austria and Morocco. (The independence of Morocco had been guaranteed by the Conference of Powers at Madrid, 1880).

(b) *Public International Intercourse and Law*

1888. Suez Canal Convention.

1899. The Hague Convention regulates, among other things, war on land and Red Cross work at sea.

1899. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is established at the Hague.

(c) *Private International Intercourse and Law*

(i) *In regard to Communications*

1871. Treaty of Washington: The St. Lawrence River is "opened" (internationalized).

1878. World Postal Union.

1884. Protection of submarine cables.

1885. West African Conference: The Congo and Niger Rivers are "opened".

1885-1890. Railway understandings (cf. 1874-1884).

1888. Suez Canal Convention.

(ii) *Re Commercial Treaties*¹

1870-1890. Protective Tariff Treaties.

¹For international conventions and treaties bearing on communication, conveyance, navigation, fishing, river-transport, health, emigration, commerce, tariff, credit, currency, workingmen, patents, copyrights, piracy, and white slave traffic see Friedrich's *Grundsuege des Voelkerrechts*, Leipzig, 1915; Schilder: *Entwicklungstendensen der Weltwirtschaft*, 2 vols. Berlin 1912, 1915. Re the distinction between private and public international law see *supra*, p. 27.

1890. International Union for the publication of Customs Tariffs.

1890. Convention for the suppression of slavery.

1902. Sugar Convention (Brussels).

1900-1914. International understandings of all sorts.

(d) *Theories*

1886. NOVICOW (1849-1912), Russian, *La politique internationale* (International Politics), *La Fédération de l'Europe* (1901). According to him the "nation" is a cultural and spiritual entity and is far more important than the "state" in the furtherance of human welfare. He considers the state to be a necessary evil,—the positive agency being the nation. The militaristic and capitalistic state-systems of to-day are to be condemned. In his judgment commerce, intercommunication and interdependence have rendered internationalism inevitable. He advocates the elimination of war and the establishment of a world-federation. The doctrine of absolute sovereignty can lead but to international anarchy, says he.¹

1887. HOLTZENDORFF: *Die voelkerrechtliche Verfassung und Grundordnung der auswaertigen Staatsbeziehungen* (External Relations of States: Their Constitution and Fundamentals according to International Law). There are degrees of completeness in a state's possession of sovereignty. Half-sovereignty is a fact. It may be (i) effective as well as (ii) fictitious, e.g. that of the Indian tribes in the United States of America. Besides, sovereignty is

¹Novicow, *infra*.

always relative from the standpoint of international relations.¹

1896. RIVIER: *Principes du droit de gens* (Principles of International Law). International law is modified by the exigencies of international life. Imperfect sovereignty—also called half-sovereignty—may exist. If not theory, at any rate utility, nay, necessity, compels the admission of such a phenomenon.

1898. ULLMANN: *Voelkerrecht* (International Law). Sovereignty has two aspects, internal and external (cf. WHEATON, 1846). These two sovereignties are separate and separable. This position is challenged by JELLINEK and HOLTZENDORFF. A state may be sovereign internally but semi-sovereign or non-sovereign externally (*e.g.* Madagascar *re* France). On the other hand, a state may be sovereign externally and non-sovereign internally (*e. g.* German Confederation of 1815).²

IV.

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETAL EVOLUTION

Ideology: (i) sociology established as an independent science; (ii) impact of biology, anthropology, eugenics, psychology and criminology on political categories; (iii) the dogmas of the "white-man's bur-

¹Preuss: *Gemeinde, Staat, Reich* (1889), *supra*.

²On the subject of semi-sovereignty as well as states at the same time sovereign and non-sovereign see the theories in Merriam's *History of the Theory of Sovereignty*, New York, 1900.

den" and of "colonialism;" (iv) chauvinistic messages of "Orientalists."

(a) *General Theories of Progress*

1870. MAINE (1822-1888): *Ancient Law, Early History of Institutions* (1875), *Village Communities* (1876). Patriarchal organization is the earliest form in social life. Progress consists in change from status to contract. His investigations bearing on comparative anthropology and historical jurisprudence combat the "general will" of ROUSSEAU and the "utility" of the analytical jurists. He is too cautious regarding democratic slogans.¹

1875-78. SCHAEFFLE: *Bau und Leben des sozialen Koerpers* (Structure and Life of the Social Body). He develops the analogy between human and animal societies. To him the family is the social unit. He considers "social legislation" to be a necessity and is an inspirer of BISMARCK in "state socialism." Society is not a higher organism but different from animal and vegetable organisms. The same laws, however, govern them all. The state represents the organs of social will and power. Neither absolute centralization nor absolute decentralization is the normal political condition. A hierarchy of offices and representative bodies is inevitable. The goal of political evolution is democracy.²

¹ Evans: *Theories and Criticisms of Sir Henry Maine* (London 1904).

² Coker: *Organismic Theories of the State*, New York, 1910.

On Schaeffle see "Les theories de l'organisme social" and "le socialisme scientifique" in Rambaud's *Histoire des doctrines economiques*, Paris 1909.

1876-85 LOMBROSO, Italian : *Uomo delinquente* (The Criminal Man 1878-76); Ferri, Italian : *Sociologie Criminelle* (Criminal Sociology) 1881, GAROFALO, Italian : *La Criminologie* (Criminology) 1885.

Their investigations establish the "positive" as contrasted with the "metaphysical" school, of criminology. This school, also known as the Italian school, has made of criminology a "science of positive observation, which supporting itself upon anthropology, psychology, criminal statistics, as upon penal law and penological studies becomes the synthetic science which I myself have called criminal sociology," as says Ferri. Positive criminology proposes to bring into the science of offences the life-giving breath of the "latest" discoveries made by the science of man, and revived by the doctrines of evolutionism,—the researches of DARWIN on the variations obtained in the raising of domestic animals and the observations made by HAECKEL in embryology.

This new school,—evolutionist, scientific, exact, naturalistic—attempts to revolt against the "classical" school. The most representative exposition of that school is to be found in *Dei delitti e delle pene* (Crimes and Punishments) 1764, by the Italian legal philosopher BECCARIA (1735-1794), whom TARDE in *La Philosophie Penale* (1890) describes as a "child of our (French) eighteenth century" and in whom are reflected and concentrated all its sentimental philanthropy, un-affected optimism and excessive indi-

vidualism, as well as humanitarian enthusiasm. Beccaria's ideology, a *priori* as it is, formulates or rather postulates two doctrines: (1) man's will is free, and (2) man is born good and becomes criminal under circumstances, but may be corrected. In this philosophy the treatment of the criminal is to be determined by the crime committed and not by the nature of the criminal.

According to the "positivists", on the contrary, the delinquent is not a man of some description at all but a physiological as well as a psychological anomaly of human nature. And as for the offence, it is a natural and necessary phenomenon which has its physical, anthropological and social causes and cannot be neutralized, except to a very slight extent, by the fear of punishment, however severe it may be. The "positive" school is thus consciously pessimistic. Education, says Lombroso in *Crime: Its causes and Remedies*, ought not to be extended to inmates of prisons. Elementary education is according to him positively harmful as applied to the ordinary criminal; it places in his hands an additional weapon for carrying on his crimes and makes a "recedivist" of him. "The introduction of schools into the prison explains the great number of educated recidivists." To instruct the criminal means to perfect him in evil.

Many of the fundamental doctrines of the positive school have been challenged by TARDE, ASCHAFFENBURG, PARMELEE and others, who however, generally agree with it in denouncing the free will

postulate of Beccaria, the Rousseau and Adam Smith, so to say, of their science.

1876. SPENCER (1820-1903): *Principles of Sociology, The Man vs. The State* (1884). He presents a most elaborate formulation of the "organismic" theory of the society and state. The state is an organism with limited functions, namely war and contract. The industrial state—the state of contract—will replace the war-state. Natural rights, individual freedom, limitation of authority, etc. furnish the ultimate goal of evolution. "Specialized administration" is the one function of the state and would consist in negative regulation, *viz.*, doing hardly anything.

1877. MORGAN, American: *Ancient Society*. He combats MAINE'S thesis *re* patriarchal origin. According to him primitive social organization is marked by chaotic sexual promiscuity. "Group-marriage" develops into the "clan" with its matriarchy. "Gens" with patriarchy represents the next stage. The village community and the family appear later. Finally, the territorial state arises to assimilate the "outsiders" (non-tribes-men). He establishes a unilinear evolutionary anthropology. This is the deterministic anthropology with its inevitable "cultural stages."

1883. GUMPLOWICZ (1838-1909): *Der Rassenkampf* (Struggle of Races). He studies the relations of groups and laws of group-action. In his analysis society creates the individual. The state of nature is a state of war. Progress is achieved through group-

conflicts. All government is the rule of a minority representing the leaders in wars of conquest over the majority, the conquered. The origin of the middle class is due to trade and industry. All trade is a mode of exploitation. There is no progress and there is nothing essentially new in the realm of mental knowledge. Our cognitions respecting virtue, custom, happiness etc. are no more mature than those of the oldest peoples of antiquity. Sociology lays the foundation for the morals of reasonable resignation. A fundamental pessimism is the keynote of his thought.

1884. ENGELS (1820-95): *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staates* (Origin of Family, Private Property and State). He furnishes the "economic interpretation" of the anthropological material furnished by MORGAN in *Ancient Society* (1877). This book exhibits the application of the "laws of stages" to the data of Greek, Roman, Celtic and Teutonic "pre-history." It is almost a joint work of MARX and Engels.¹

1886. WUNDT (1832-1920): *Ethik*. The psychical world is continually growing and is characterized by a creative synthesis. Acts of the will go beyond original impulses and create "new values." Hence an objective world of morality is manifest in the social evolution from primitive to developed forms. According to him there is no such thing as the

¹ Available in Bengali as *Parivar, Gosthi o Rastra* (transl. Sarkar), Calcutta, 1926.

"folk-soul" or "social mind" apart from the minds of the individuals in the group.¹

1886. TOENNIES: *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Community and Society). He distinguishes between two opposite types or forms of groups, namely, "society" and "community." His interpretation of industrial revolution, capitalism, urbanization, etc. is Marxian but is marked by an appreciation of medieval, pre-industrial rural life. He is influenced by GIERKE in regard to pre-medievalism, but exhibits antipathy to Gierke's guilds and other medieval corporations, because these "group persons" are "artificial." He has appreciation only for "natural" group-persons. The natural *vs.* artificial groups are "communities" *vs.* "Societies." The community is private, personal, intimate, whereas the society is public, external, business-like. "society" is the product of egoism as embodied in Roman law or of individualism, and freedom of competition as characteristic of *Smithianismus* or classical economics. According to Toennies the state is the institution of the dominant "social" class. As every *Kultur* (culture) degenerates into "civilisation" (cf. SPENGLER *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (Decline of the West), 1918-20 so also does community into society in all ages.²

¹ Hall: *Founders of Modern Psychology* (Zeller, Lotze, Fechner, Hartmann, Helmholtz, Wundt). Merz's *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* Vol. IV ("of the good" and "of society").

²For Simmel, Toennies, Vierkanndt and Weber see Rumpf: "*Von rein formaler zur typologisch-empirischer Soziologie*" (From purely formal to typologico-empirical sociology) in *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, Leipzig, 1924.

1880. FOUILLEE (1838-1912): *La Science sociale contemporaine* (Contemporary Social Science): Society is a contractual organism. Physiologically every individual is a society and every society an individual. Society is higher than natural organism because men can will the whole of which they form parts, the state in which they live. Society does not possess psychological individuality. There is no social self-consciousness. The individual is the only *psyche* i.e., subject of society. The biological view of society is one-sided. Ideas are active or propelling forces (*Ideas-forces*).

1886-1889. DE GREEF (1842-), Belgian: *Introduction a la sociologie* (Introduction to sociology): Progress is achieved through consent and contractual relations. States advance from the stage of despotic authority to voluntary contract. Voluntary consent replaces force and physical conflict. He is interested in the promotion of international relations and elimination of war, and believes in world-federation. The doctrine of absolute sovereignty is incompatible with international interdependence, treaties and conventions. The social frontiers are the resultants of a continual but changing equilibration between the internal molecular composition of each social group on the one hand, and of the external and equally molecular composition of the groups, on the other. A reciprocal limitation is manifest in the inter-group equilibrium.¹

¹ On De Greef see Barnes's *Sociology and Political Theory*, New York, 1924.

1886. TARDE (1843-1904): *La Criminalite comparee* (1886), *La philosophie penale* (1890), *Les lois de l'imitation* (1890): Every individual is under social control or coercion but the "social" element consists in the inter-cerebral relation of *two* individuals. He establishes the laws of imitation, opposition and adaptation. According to him progress is brought about by inventions and their imitation (expansion and diffusion). On the subject of crime and war Tarde's *ideas* are noteworthy. He says that war exerts a *moral* influence and tends to diminish crime. "An army is a gigantic means of carrying out, by massacre and pillage on vast scale, the collective designs of hatred, vengeance or envy which one nation stirs up against another. Condemned under their individual form, these odious passions, cruelty and greed seem to be praiseworthy under their collective form." He discovers crimes in all professions. From the out and out criminal to the most honest merchant we pass through a series of transitions,—the cheating tradesman, the adulterating grocer, etc. Among the upper classes people reputed to be honest are committing extortions and making doubtful bargains.

1889. GALTON (1822-1911): *Natural Inheritance. Hereditary Genius* (1869), *Inquiries into Human Faculty* (1883). His work is characterised by the application of statistical methods to biological data. He finds that human nature is very flexible and varies according to classes and epochs. Heredity is a powerful factor in these human variabilities.

As eugenicist he establishes the "selective" part played by organic traits. He believes in the possibility of "improving the human breed." He is the founder (cf. WEISMAN) of the theory of "germinal continuity,"—like begetting like,—because of the persistence of a specific organization. He advocates the segregation and inter-marriage of the intellectuals and suggests late marriage in the case of the weak and early marriage in the case of the strong. The world belongs to the race that marries at twenty-two instead of at thirty-three. He makes propaganda for "birth control" in the sense of increasing the better types and decreasing the worse.¹

1889. COGNETTI DE MARTIEIS: *Socialismo Antico* (Ancient Socialism) to a certain extent supplement to *Le Forme primitive nella evoluzione economica* (Primitive forms in economic evolution), 1881: He is interested in the economic interpretation of anthropological phenomena (on the lines more or less of ENGELS'S *Family Property and State*). The present work is a comparative study of social utopias in Greece, Rome, Persia, China and India and exhibits the democratic and fraternitarian ideas in Buddhism and Vaishnavism.²

1893. WARD (1841-1913), American: *Psychic Factors of Civilisation, Dynamic Sociology*. (1883); He is a statalist, and believes in the "magic of educa-

¹ Chapters on "Social Control of Heredity" in *Social Problems and Social Policy* (edited by Ford), New York 1923.

² Sarkar's "Hindu Politics in Italian" in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1925-1926.

tion " and scientific knowledge. In his works we are presented with the demonstration of the paramount necessity for the equal and universal distribution of the extant knowledge of the world. The environment transforms the animal, while man transforms the environment.

1893. NOVICOW (1849-1912), Russians : *Les luttes entres societes humaines et leurs phases successives* (Conflicts between human societies and their successive phases), *Le Federation de l'Europe* (1901). War is not a biological necessity (as maintained by Gumpłowicz). The Darwinian struggle for existence for the survival of the fittest does not hold good in human relations. He is a prophet of pacifism and internationalism and preaches the cultural autonomy for national groups, the political federation of European states and abolition of war. The European national state represses subject nationalities. The claim of the state to absolute and unlimited sovereignty is an obstacle to effective international organization. The state should function as a collective policeman. He is a champion of individualism—almost Spencerian,—verging on anarchism.

1895. DURKHEIM (1858-1917), *Les regles de la methode sociologique* (Rules of Sociological Method), *De la division du travail social* (Division of social labour), 1893: Social homogeneity precedes heterogeneity and creates it because of (i) the struggle for existence and (ii) the division of labour. At first there is no individual but a common consciousness, social representations and institutions dominating

the individual. He propounds the idea of professional groups or associations. The intensity of punishment increases according as the society is less elevated and as the central power is more absolute. Restraint on personal liberty (*i.e.* imprisonment) for varying periods according to the gravity of the crime is becoming the normal type of punishment, says he.¹

1896. LAPOUGE: *Les Selections Sociales* (Social Selections). He is opposed to "social legislation" as a *pucca* eugenicist. Aryanism is his race-cult.

1896. WESTERMARCK (1862-), *History of Human Marriage*. He opposes MORGAN'S hypothesis of primitive sexual promiscuity and believes that the clan or gens comes later than the family in social evolution.

1896. LE BON (1841-): *La Psychologie des foules* (The Psychology of the Crowd), *La psychologie politique et la defence nationale* (Political Psychology and National Defence) 1910.

Our conscious acts are the outcome of an unconscious substratum created in the mind in the main by hereditary influences, says he. The greater part of our daily actions are the results of hidden motives which escape our observation. The individual forming part of a *foule* (crowd or group) differs from the isolated individual. He is no longer himself but has become an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will. Merely

¹ Gehlke: *Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory*, New York, 1915.

numerical considerations, contagion of a hypnotic order, and suggestibility of which contagion is an effect are the three factors that operate in this transformation. Isolated, the individual may be a cultivated person; but in the *foule* he is a barbarian, a creature acting by instinct. The mind of the *foule* is identical with that of primitive man. A lower standard of intelligence and truth is the one followed by the crowd. It behaves as an obedient herd and would submit to anybody who appoints himself its master.

1896. GIDDINGS (1855-), *Principles of Sociology, Democracy and Empire* (1900). He exhibits the biological evolution of social will. "Consciousness of kind" is the leading subjective item in the human constitution. He is one of the "imperialists" of America. "Unless the whole course of history is meaningless for the future there is to be no cessation of war—of extra-group competition—until vast empires embrace all nations." This is his verdict. Only when the democratic empire has compassed the uttermost parts of the world will there be that perfect understanding among men which is necessary for the growth of moral kinship.

1898. KIDD (1818-1916), *Control of the Tropics. Social Evolution* (1894). Imperialism and colonial expansion are the means of propagating "higher culture." "If we look to the native social systems of the tropical East, the primitive savagery of Central Africa, to the West Indian Islands in the past in process of being assisted into the position of modern states by Great Britain, or the black republic of Hayti

in the present, or to modern Liberia in the future, the lesson everywhere seems the same: it is that there will be no development of the resources of the tropics under native government."

1898. RATZENHOFER (1842-1904), *Die Sociologische Erksnntniss* (Sociological Knowledge). *Sociologie* (Published posthumously 1908): Like GUMFLOWICZ, Ratzenhofer believes in the struggle of races as underlying the origin of society. Like G, again, he considers the process of the cross-fertilization of cultures to consist in (1) the subjugation of one race by another, (2) the origination of caste, (3) the gradual mitigation of this condition leaving a state of great individual, social and political inequality, (4) the replacement of purely military subjugation by a form of law, (5) the origin of the state under which all classes have both rights and duties, (6) the cementing of the mass of heterogeneous elements into a more or less hemogeneous people, (7) the growth of patriotism and formation of a nation. He does, not like G, take a special interest in the relations between groups. To him the chief theme is the group-making process, the essence of group-solidarity. He studies more the reciprocal relations of human beings than, as G. does, the inter-group phenomena. He is interested not so much in ethnology like G. as in biological and psychological data. The origin of all inter-relations is to be found in the " blood-bond ". Absolute hostility is the psychical guardian over the continuance of a community of interests. The state originates in subjugation by

rulers. Propagation, sustentation and exploitation are the causes; war, culture and commerce the means, and harmonious satisfaction of interests the end of social development. The *Urkraft* (original energy) in the creative process is a psychic entity known as "interests." These interests are racial, physiological, individual, social and transcendental. He considers the individual to be more important than the group.¹

1902. SELIGMAN (1861—), American: *Economic Interpretation of History*. He analyzes the Marxian doctrine in its logical content and traces its history. His verdict goes against extreme determinism or economic monism (contrast LORIA, *supra*).

1904. ROSS (1866—), *Social Control*: "Social psychology deals with the psychic interplay between man and his environing society. Social ascendancy consists in domination of the individual by the society. Individual ascendancy implies the reverse and involves invention, leadership, role of great men, etc. Social ascendancy may be (a) mere social influence implied in custom, public opinion, fashion, mob mind, etc. or (b) social control, *i.e.* the conscious and deliberate transformation of individual by the society. Ross analyzes the extent to which order is the making of individual personality and discusses also the contributions of the social surroundings to the same product. "Suggestion, education and publicity, the choice

¹Ward: *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1909. Jacobs: *German Sociology*, New York, 1909. Lichtenberger: *Development of Social Theory*, London, 1924.

instruments of the new folk-craft will be used in the future perhaps even more freely and consciously than they now are." Kinship has lost its old sacred significance. Social erosion has worn down the family. Everywhere we see the local group—the parish, the commune, neighbourhood or village decaying. The better adaptation of men to one another is brought about by the improvement of the apparatus of social control. The goal of social development is better adaptation.

(b) *Racial Dogmatism*

1883. SEELEY: *Expansion of England*. The exposition is chauvinistic.

1890. BURGESS: *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*. He is an American expansionist.

1895. AMMON: *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natuerliche Grundlagen* (Social Order and its Natural Foundations). The concentration of dolichocephals (longheads) in the city is one of his laws.

1899. CHAMBERLAIN (English-born, domiciled in Germany): *Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts*. (Foundations of the Nineteenth Century). Teutonism is his race-cult.

1900, CRAMB: *Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain* is another chauvinistic contribution to historical literature.

1901. SERGI: (1841)—*The Mediterranean Race* demolishes the doctrine of the so-called Aryan race.¹

¹See the summaries of Ammon, Chamberlain and other race-chauvinists in Hankins: *Racial Basis of Civilization*, New York, 1926.

(c) *East and West*

1870-76. MAINE (1822-1888). *Ancient Law, Early History of Institutions* (1875), *Village Communities* (1876): All Oriental communities have been despotisms, and the commands of the despots at their head, harsh and cruel as they might be, have always been implicitly obeyed. These commands, save in so far as they served to organise administrative machinery for the collection of revenue, have not been true laws. The one solvent of local and domestic usage has not been the command of the sovereign but the supposed command of the Deity.

1880. JANET: *Histoire de la science politique*. The Orient in general and India in particular never realized the idea of the state. The state appears for the first time in Europe and on Greek soil.

1883. MAX MUELLER, *India What can it Teach Us?* This book is a Bible of chauvinism and race-dogmatism to all those Westerns who for one reason or another have to take interest in India and the East. In it is concentrated the conventional philosophy of civilization that the logic of the "white man's burden" has found it reasonable to propagate through philologists and mythologists. He is to a great extent responsible for the absurdities and non-sensical ideas that have become ingrained in the consciousness of Orientalists and through them, of sociologists, culture-historians, philosophers and statesmen in regard to the alleged absence of manly, energistic, rationalizing, political, and economic features in Hindu civilisation and history. His work has helped *orientalisme*

indology and the study of things Asian to function as a handmaid to the purposes of Western colonialists and Empire-builders in the East—by furnishing them with a gospel as to the innate disqualifications of the Orientals (Indians) for economic energism and political self-assertion.

He expatiates on quietism, pacifism, etc. as the exclusive and dominant characteristics of India and on that basis makes out a distinction between the Indian and European types of civilization: "At first sight we may feel inclined to call this quiet enjoyment of life, this mere looking on, a degeneracy rather than a growth. It seems so different from what *we* think life ought to be. Yet from a higher point of view it may appear that these Southern Aryans have chosen the good part, or at least the part good for them, while we Northern Aryans have been careful and troubled about many things." He suggests a hemispheriodal classification of race-characteristics: "It is at all events a problem worth considering whether, as there is in nature a south and a north, there are not two hemispheres also in human nature, both worth developing, the active, combative and political on one side, the passive, meditative and philosophical on the other; and for the solution of that problem no literature furnishes such ample materials as that of the Vedas, beginning with the hymns and ending with the Upanishads. We enter into a new world not always an attractive one, least of all to us. We are not called upon either to admire or to despise that ancient Vedic literature;

we have simply to study and to try to understand it”.

Secular virtues, materialistic joys and economic enterprises are considered by him to be the monopoly of the Europeans and he manages to discover the exact opposite among the Hindus: “We all lead a fighting life; our highest ideal of life is a fighting life. We point with inward satisfaction to what we and our ancestors have achieved by hard work, in founding a family, or a business, a town or a state. We imagine we have made life on earth quite perfect. But the lesson which both Brahmans and Buddhists are never tired of teaching is that this life is but a journey from one village to another, and not a resting place.”

He harps on the climatic influences on race-character and ignores the objective historical data while instituting comparison between ancient India and ancient Europe,—in fact forgets the ancient and medieval conditions of Europe altogether and places India in a wrong sociological and cultural perspective by comparing it with “modern” Europe. Thus, says he, “If we turn our eyes to the East, and particularly to India, where life is, or at all events was, no very severe struggle, where the climate was mild, the soil fertile, where vegetable food in small quantities sufficed to keep the body in health and strength, where the simplest hut or cave in a forest was all the shelter required, and where social life never assumed the gigantic, aye, monstrous proportions of a London or Paris, but fulfilled itself within the narrow boundaries of village communities—was

it not, I say, natural there, or if you like, was it not intended there that another side of human nature should be developed—not the active, the combative, acquisitive, but the passive, the meditative and reflective? ¹

1893. FLINT (). *History of the Philosophy of History*. The idea of progress is unknown in the Orient. The idea of humanity is undeveloped in Indian thought except in Buddhism.

V. IDEAS AND IDEALS OF MENTAL AND MORAL PERSONALITY

Ideology: (i) Neo-Hegelianism and Neo-Kantianism, (ii) virtually a reproduction, under British and “modern” conditions, of the German standpoints of two generations ago, so far as political ideals are concerned.

1876. BRADLEY, *Ethical Studies*: “My Station and its Duties” (cf. Hindu *swa-dharma* and Plato’s “virtues”). The individual’s self-realization is conceivable only in and through the social relations. His “station” in the state is the summation of his relations. The individual achieves his greatest growth when he fulfils his station in the state well.

1877-1889. CAIRD’S works on Kant promote an idealistic atmosphere in British philosophical circles.

1879-80. GREEN (1836-82). *Principles of Political*

¹ A challenge to this position on all fronts is offered in Sarkar’s *Positive Background of Hindu Sociology* Vol. I (1914) and other writings down to *The Futurism of Young Asia* (1922).

Obligation. The English Commonwealth. Prolegomena to Ethics, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract (1881), *Introduction to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature* (1874) in which the philosophies of Kant and Hegel are discussed. He is an exponent of individualism (Kantian). State intervention is to be an exception but to be admitted by all means (cf. Mill). He is Rousseauesque in the conception of "general will." War is not always right and is to be avoided, says he. Compulsory education is to be enforced by the state. He defends the institution of property and inequality in wealth but desires a class of small proprietors tilling their own land and would not admit the appropriation of "unearned increment" by the state. He believes in the manner of GIERKE that the groups have certain inherent rights. Unlike BOSANQUET he considers the state to be a member of the "universal brotherhood"—the larger group. His touchstone of liberty consists in the "removal of all obstructions to the free development of English citizens." Though the dream of an international court with authority resting on the consent of independent states is very far from realisation it is important to bear in mind that there is nothing in the intrinsic nature of a system of independent states incompatible with it, but that on the contrary every advance in the organisation of mankind in states in the sense explained is a step towards it.¹

¹See *The Memoir of Green in Nettleship's Works of T. H. Green* Vol. III, London 1900. *Two Lectures of the Elementary School System of England* by T. H. Green, (1878). See *Works* Vol. IIL

1885 NIETZSCHE (1844-1900):

Als sprach Zarathustra (Thus spake Zarathustra. *Goettendaemmerung* (Twilight of the Idols), 1888, *Der Anti-Christ* (Anti-Christ), 1888.

"I am not narrow enough for a system and not even for my system." "Everything goes, everything returns, eternally does the wheel of being roll. Everything dies, everything blossoms again, eternally does the year of being run its course. Everything breaks, everything is put together again, eternally does the house of being built itself anew. All things separate, all things greet one another again, eternally is the sway of being true."

"Beyond the ruling class loosed from all bonds live the highest men; and in the rulers they have their instruments."

"If things went according to my will it would be time to declare war on European morality and all that has grown out of it. We must demolish Europe's existing order of peoples and states."

"Also in the things of mind I wish war and oppositions; and more war than ever, more opposition than ever."

"Everywhere, where slave morality gets the upper hand, language shows an inclination to bring the word, 'good' and 'stupid' near together."

Neitzsche consider the Hindu MANU to be the proponent of an affirmative religion,—the religion of the deification of power as contrasted with Christianity,

the creed of the slave, the pariah, the *Chandala* (*Will to Power*).

"The Law book of Manu is replete with noble values, it is filled with a feeling of perfection, with a saying of yea to life. The sun shines upon the whole book. All those things which Christianity smothers with its bottomless vulgarity, procreation, woman, marriage are here treated with earnestness, with reverence, with love and confidence."

"Manu's words again are simple and dignified: virtue could hardly rely on her own strength alone. Really, it is only the fear of punishment that keeps men in their limits and leaves every one in peaceful possession of his own." Further, what Manu says is probably truer: we must conceive of all the states on our own frontier and their allies as being hostile and for the same reason we must consider all of their neighbours as being friendly to us."

1899. BOSANQUET (—1923). *Philosophical Theory of the State*: In his conception the individual is absorbed in the state. He is 100 per cent. Hegelian. The state is not bound by ordinary ethics. The 'real will of each citizen is alone expressive of historic individuality. Now the real will is identical with the collective will. And since the general will is best realized in the state, obedience to the state is self-imposed and therefore free. "The state has no determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme community, the guardian of a whole moral world." Hence no moral obligations to

other states (contrast GREEN). "The state is a complete idea of the realization of all human capacity" (See HOBHOUSE'S attack in *Metaphysical Theory of the State*, 1918). Green is to Bosanquet what Kant is to Hegel.

CHAPTER IV

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

THE Philosophy of Proletarian Sovereignty, Internationalisation and Asian self-assertion. (1905-).

Dominant categories: 1. rivalries of imperialisms, 2. Labour Internationals, 3. mammoth industries and cartels, 4. the voice of workingmen in factories and parliaments, 5. agrarian reform and land policies, 6. progressive taxation, sur-taxes, capital levy, 7. parliamentary institutions re-examined, criticized and justified, 8. devolution of functions on local and professional assemblies, 9. political irredentas and communal minorities, 10. stabilizing the monies and currency reform 11. neo-protectionism, 12. world-economy and neo-imperialism 13. Reserve Banking, 14. war-preparedness, 15. Asian demand for racial equality, 16. Immigration Laws of America and the colonies, 17. Challenge to classical anthropology, eugenics, psychology and criminology, 18. war against colonialism in politics and orientalism in science, 19. philosophy pragmatic, objective and realistic.

I. IDEAS AND IDEALS OF SOVEREIGNTY AS WELL AS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW

Ideology: 1. conquests of bourgeois democracy in Asia, 2. nationalities and minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, 3. labour triumphant as a political

force, 4. criticism of democracy and socialism, 5. Asia's revolts against Eur-America, 6. intensive analysis of internal sovereignty, 7. problems of representation local, geographical (regional), class, occupational, etc., 8. centralisation *vs.* decentralisation of authority, 9. local habitation of sovereignty, 10. revival of autocracy and dictatorship.

SECTION I

FROM THE BIRTH OF YOUNG ASIA TO THE END OF THE GREAT WAR (1905-1918)

1904-05. Russo-Japanese War: A self-conscious Asia is born. The First Russian Revolution embodies itself in the establishment of the Duma.¹

1904-1915. GIOLITTI Ministry in Italy is a system of "Dictatorial Parliamentarism." "30 million men are governed by 30 persons for the benefit of 300 thousand families." The Senate is a non-entity, the Chamber apathetic. Germany is taken to be the model and state socialism the goal. Universal suffrage becomes law.

1905-07. Indian National Congress: Sessions at Benares, Calcutta, and Surat.

Presidents: GOKHALE, NAOROJI, RASHBEHARI GHOSE. The New Party (Extremist) is founded by BAL GANGADHAR TILAK, BIPIN CHANDRA PAL, LAJPAT RAI and others. AUROBINDO GHOSH'S *Bandemataram* (daily) is the chief organ. Planks

¹Trotsky *Die Russische Revolution 1905* (The Russian Revolution of 1905), Berlin, 1924. Okuma (editor): *Fifty Years of New Japan*, London 1909, Okakura: *Awakening of Japan*, London:

of the new movement: 1. Swaraj (self-government on colonial lines) 2. Boycott of British goods. 3. Swadeshi (promotion of indigenous industries according to modern methods). 4. National education (emancipation of schools and colleges from Government control and establishment of general culture and technical institutions along national lines. The period marks the beginnings of the revolutionary movement among the intelligentsia.¹

N.B. Minto-Morley Reforms, 1909.

1906. Constitution is wrested from the Shah by Young Persia. The First Medjlis (Parliament).²

PERSIAN REVOLUTION

Aug. 5, 1906: Constitution wrested from Muzaffaruddin Shah: The First Medjlis June 1908: Destruction of Medjlis by Muhammad Ali July 13, 1909: Capture of Teheran: Expulsion of Muhammad Ali (July 16): The Second Medjlis. July 1911: Ex-Shah's invasion Dec. 1911. Abolition of Medjlis (Second) by the Cabinet for rejecting Russia's ultimatum *re* Shuster.

1906. British Labour Party established.³

1907. TIGGIS (1866-) *From Gerson to Grotius, Churches in the Modern State* (1913): Corporate personalities of churches and other associations *e.g.* family, club, union, college are inviolable. The state can recognize and guarantee the life of such societies, but it no more creates that life than it creates the individual although it orders his birth to be registered. He initiates an appreciation of the medieval

¹ Majumdar: *Indian National Evolution*, Madras, 1916, Lajpat Rai: *Young India*, New York, 1917.

² "Persia and the Persian Gulf" in Sarkar's *Futurism of Young Asia* (Liepzig 1922). Gibbons *The New Map of Asia* N. Y. 1918.

³ Humphrey: *History of Labour Representation*, London, 1912.

authority of the church and of its anti-statal position.

1908. DUGUIT (1859-), *Le Droit social le droit individuel et la transformation de l'etat* (Social right, individual right and the transformation of the state), *L'Etat, le droit objectif, la loi positive* (The state, objective right, and positive law), 1901, *L'Etat les gouvernants et les agents* (The state, governors and agents), 1903; *Les Transformations generales du droit prive* (General transformations of private law), 1912, *Les Transformations du droit public* (The transformations of public law i.e. the constitution), 1913. Social interdependence is a verified fact. It is based psychologically on the identity of interest of human beings. It is inevitable also because of division of labour. The weighing or valuation of our claims, rights, interests, duties and obligations must have reference to the extent to which they promote social interdependence. The goal in every instance is the "productive efficiency" of the social group. It is the function of law to further this efficiency. There is no such thing as absolute rights. If there be such a thing as sovereignty it must be limited by law. The groups and associations possess real authority or sovereignty each in its own sphere.¹

1908. Nationalist activities of Young Egypt.

¹ See the translations of texts from Fouillee, Charmont, Duguit and Demogue in *Modern French Legal Philosophy* edited by Spencer and Winslow, Boston, 1916. Duguit's *Transformations due droit public* is available in Laski's transl. as *Law and the Modern State* 1910 New York.

Egyptian Nationalism: Corn (1871) to check the Khedive's autocracy and foreign intervention. Revolt of Arabi Pasha 1882; British Occupation 1882.

Egypt (1882-1914)

1892. Khedive Abbas Hilmi is discontented under the British regime : but is compelled to oppose Turkey in Sinai.

1899, *Lewa*, Arabic newspaper is started by Mustapa Kemal the nationalist.

1906-8. Nationalist unrest.

1911. Egyptians resent Britain's prevention of Turkey's soldiers passing through Egypt against Italian invasion of Tripoli.

1914. Hilmi is deposed while in Turkey during the Great War.

Egypt during the War.

1914. Deportation of patriotic agitators to Malta by Maxwell who replaces Kitchner. Nov. 2 War with Turkey, Dec. 17 : Egypt a British Protectorate : Hussain Sultan.

Feb. W. 1915 : Turks at the Canal, British failures in Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and Salonika hearten the Egyptians.

1916. Australasian and Indian troops defeat Turkey at the Isthmus.

1908. Constitution is "restored" in Turkey (cf. "granted," 1876).

Turkish Revolution.

1. The origin is to be sought in the Reval journey of King Edward VII (May 1908), and his advice *re.* the appointment of a governor for Macedonia with the approval of the Powers. 2. The Constitution is proclaimed at Salonika July 24, 1908 by Enver Bey. Abdul Hamid submits. 3. Counter-Revolution (Royalist) is subverted by Shefket Pasha, Abdul deposed.

Young Turk Leaders.

1. Major Niazi Bey leads the revolt at Resna (July 1908) 2. Enver Bey proclaims the Constitution (July 1908) at Salonika 3. Ahmad Riza Bey—founder of "Union and Progress" with the slogan : "All in the Koran." 4. Shefket Pasha, Commander.

The New Turkey.¹

1. Abdul deposed 1908.
2. Union and Progress Congress at Salonika 1910: i. "autonomy" is separation: "United Turkey" is the goal, ii. Abolition of "capitulations" iii. Bulgaria the "fomenter of Macedonian discord" must be crushed.
3. Discontent in Syria, punitive wars in Albania (1910-1911),
4. Tripoli is surrendered to Italy 1911.
5. The First Balkan War, October 18, 1912 under the leadership of Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Peace of London, December 16, 1912.
6. The Second Balkan War, 1913.

1911. HOBHOUSE (1864-): *Social Evolution and Political Theory* opposes extremist eugenic propaganda directed against "social" (humanitarian) legislation, anthropologically indicates the progress achieved by states in passing from the kinship through the authoritarian to the citizenship-stage, and discusses the imperfections of the citizenship-state of to-day: (1) economic inequalities, (2) dependencies, e.g. India, (3) "nationalities" and minorities. He argues in favor of socialistic control and state-intervention as embodied in life and thought since 1885 and believes that "liberty" is not an antithesis to "social control" but like it one of the conditions of harmonious development.

Hobhouse's political philosophy is thus akin in a general manner to the philosophies of KEYNES and PIGOU, although they function in altogether different fields. It has its German allies in all state-socialists from Wagner to Spann, French allies in BOURGEOIS, BOUGLE and FOUILLÉE, the "solidarists," and American allies in WARD, ROSS and other

¹ Jastrow: *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, N. Y. 1918.

champions of social control or "sociocracy." Naturally it possesses no affiliations with the individualism of Spencer, Leroy-Beaulieu and Sumner. This socialism or social progressivism or socialized liberalism has advanced very far, from the halting state-interventionism of Mill and Green and is almost the exact antipodes of the positions maintained by Adam Smith, Kant, Bentham and Say. And although on official war-footing with the "metaphysical theories" of Bosanquet and Hegel, Hobhouse is absolutely at one with them in the faith in the dignity of the state and the importance of its functions. The system can be challenged in contemporary thought by all those who do not believe in mutual aid and co-operation, in short, by the proletarianists and advocates of class-struggle; cf. RUSSELL, 1918.

1911-12. Revolution and Republic in China: SUN Yat-sen, General LI Yuan-hung, and LIANG Chi-Chiaou the scholar are the leaders of the movement against the Manchus.¹

[At this point the present author takes the liberty to place his own contribution on record as follows:]

¹ Dingle: *China's Revolution*, New York, 1922. Reinsch: *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East*, Boston, 1912. See "The Beginnings of the Republic in China," "Young China's experiments in Education and Swaraj" "Fortunes of the Chinese Republic (1912-19)" and "International Fetters of Young China" in Sarkar's *Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922). Tyau: *The Legal Obligations arising out of Treaty Relations Between China and other States*, New York, 1917; *China's New Constitution and International Problem*, N. Y. 1917; Sun Yat-sen: *International Development of China*, N. Y. 1922.

1912. SARKAR: *The Science of History and the Hope of Mankind*. The nature and form of sovereignty, nationality and democracy are dependent to a very great extent on the conjuncture of international circumstances. The problems of applied nationalism in every country consist in the utilisation of the world-forces (*Vishvashakti*) in its own interest. Foreign policy is an important and essential basis of freedom movements.

1913. WOODROW WILSON (1856-1923): *New Freedom*. One of the most alarming phenomena of the time is the degree to which government has become associated with business. By tyranny, as we now fight it, we mean control of the law, of legislation and adjudication by organisations which do not represent the people by means which are private and selfish. Freemen need no guardian. The government of the United States at present is a foster child of the special interests. Life comes from the soil. Legislation, as we nowadays conduct it, is not conducted in the open. The protective tariff has been taken advantage of by some men to destroy domestic competition, to combine all existing rivals within our free trade area. What I am interested in is having the government more concerned about human rights than about property rights. Without the watchful interference, the resolute interference of the Government there can be no fair play between individuals and such powerful institutions as the trusts. Freedom to-day is something more than being let alone. Business

we have got to untrammel, abolishing tariff favours and railroad discrimination and credit denials and all forms of unjust handicaps against the little man. Industry we have got to humanize—not through the trusts—but through the direct action of law guaranteeing protection against dangers and compensation for injuries guaranteeing sanitary conditions, proper hours, the right to organize.¹

1914. OPPENHEIMER (1864—): *Der Staat* (The State), first American edition; *Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft* (Colonizing Co-operation), 1896, *Grossgrundeigentum* (Large Landed Estates), 1898, *Theorie der Reinen und Politischen Oekonomie* (Theory of Pure and Political Economy), 1910. Like BAGEHOT (*Physics and Politics*, 1877), GUM-PLOWICZ *Der Rassenkampf*, (The Struggle of Races,) 1899,) SIMMEL (*Soziologie*, 1908) and others he considers competition and struggle between the groups to be the basis of social evolution. He develops also the Marxian "economic interpretation of history" and advocates land-nationalization almost in the manner of the Italian economist LORIA *La Teoria economica della costituzione*, (Economic Foundations of Society, 1886).

The "law of previous accumulation" coming down from Aristotle, the Stoicos and the Epicureans to ROUSSEAU implies among other things that

¹WHITE: Woodrow Wilson, *The Man, His Times, and His Task*, Boston 1924. For an adverse criticism of Wilson see the two chapters in Barnes's *History and Social Intelligence*, New York 1926. Merriam: *American Political Ideas*, 1865-1917, New York, 1920.

"in the beginning individuals were free and equal both politically and economically" and that "out of this original social order there had developed, through gradual differentiation, the fully developed state with its class hierarchy." Oppenheimer combats both the postulate of "original equality" as well as the concept of "gradual differentiation." In his interpretation "class formation" is the result not of gradual differentiation through pacific economic competition but of "violent conquest and subjugation." He agrees with MARX in deriding the Rousseauesque law as but a "fairy tale".

The state, completely in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during the first stages of its existence, is a social institution *forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated group*, says he. Its main function consists in regulating the dominion of the victorious group over the vanquished, and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad. And this dominion has had no other purpose than the *economic exploitation of the vanquished by the victors*.

According to Oppenheimer no primitive state known to history originated in any other manner. He makes extensive use of anthropological data such as are furnished by RATZEL in *Voelkerkunde* (Anthropology), GROSSE in *Formen der Familie* (Forms of the Family), etc. to establish his thesis through the different ages of universal history. His *guru* in this line of investigation is declared to be Gumplowicz. But he improves upon Gumplowicz in so far as his

own interpretation of the evolution is not pessimistic. Gumpłowicz considers the "class-state" to be an "immanent" and an eternal fact of societal existence. Like the anarchists he cannot conceive any government without exploitation. But Oppenheimer's futurism considers the class-state to be a mere "historical category." He believes that the class-state will disappear. In his analysis both the tendencies of history and philosophy as well as those of economics point to a new order in which government is likely to exist without class exploitation.

All through the ages the "economic means",—*viz.*, exchange, barter, merchants' law, movable capital, etc.,—have been gaining ascendancy over the "political means", *i. e.*, the right to equality and peace over the rights to war and aggression. The time may come when the political means and all its works will be completely ousted and the economic means enjoy the monopoly of rule. The "constitutional state" of modern times is already a half-way house to that consummation. One great hindrance to its realization is the existence of large landed properties, but it is tending to be subverted. The rule of "pure economics" is bringing into existence a new type of societal organization to be no longer called a state but a "free man's citizenship",—*i. e.*, "society" guided by self-government. There will be no "state" but only "society". The Marxian "withering away of the state" is encountered here in a new form.

The ascendancy of "society" *i. e.*, economic means (which equality and peace) to the negation of "state,"

i.e., political means (which = class-exploitation and war) will, it is believed, render the ideals of great philosophers realizable. His conclusion contains the "progress from warlike activity to peaceful labour" (St. Simon), "development from slavery to freedom" (Hegel), "evolution of humanity" (Herder) and "penetration of reason through nature" (Schleiermacher).¹

1914. FAGUET (1847-1916).

".....et l'horreur des responsabilites" (And the Horror of Responsibilities), sequel to *Le Culte de l'incompétence* (The Cult of Incompetence), 1911. *Le Socialisme en France* (Socialism in France). According to him the principle of democracy is the worship and cultivation of incompetence or inefficiency. The ideal advocated by him is an "aristocratic people and a people-loving aristocracy." His *En lisant Nietzsche* (Reading Nietzsche), and *Pour qu'on lise Platon* (Why Plato is Read) indicate his anti-democratic affiliations. The philosophy of this disparagement of democracy is perhaps best to be seen in his *Le Liberalisme* which presents a criticism, item by item, of the two "declarations" of the "rights of man" issued by the French people in 1789 and 1793. He begins his thesis by casting ridicule on Rousseau's dictum that "man is born free but is everywhere in chains"

¹ On the subject of *Grossgrundeigentum* (large estates) as an element in contemporary *Kapitalistische Akkumulation* (capitalistic accumulation) and socio-economic inequality see Damaschke: *Boden-reform* (Land Reform), Berlin, 1923.

and replacing it by his own postulate, namely, that "man is born in society, and as such, is born slave." To him, therefore, "despotism is the natural form of human societies". There are no rights of man, says he, but there is a society, and this society has all the rights. The state is an evil but a necessary evil,—a smaller evil designed by man as a remedy against larger evils, namely, the dangers of human combativeness. But an evil it is by all means. It is a fetter to the individual. The state should try to function in the most circumscribed sphere in order that it may perpetrate the least injury upon the individual. Its proper functions are police, justice and defence. Everything else is considered by him to be but the pretension not the function of the state.

1914-18. The Great War: (1) WOODROW WILSON'S 14 points, (2) Self-determination (3) Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (4) Republics, in Germany, Austria, etc, (5) "Minorities" in the newly created so-called "nationality-states", (6) German irredentas (7) League of Nations.¹

1915. KRABBE, Dutch jurist writing in German: *Die moderne Staatsidee* (The Modern Idea of the State), *Die Lehre der Rechtssouveraenitaet* (The Theory of the Sovereignty of Law), 1906. According to the German jurist LABAND in *Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs* (The Law of the State in

¹ GIBBONS: *Introduction to World Politics* N. Y. 1927. Re the fourteen points see Wilson's speech (8 January, 1918) in Bolling's *Chronology of Woodrow Wilson*, New York, 1927).

German Empire), 1876, the state can require no performance and impose no restraint, can command its subjects in nothing and forbid them in nothing "except on the basis of a legal prescription." This theory of the "legal state" (*Rechtsstaat*) is carried forward by Krabbe to the furthest logical consequences. He says that "there is only one ruling power, the power of law." The law is not superior and the state not subordinate. But the "authority inherent in the state and the authority of the law are indetical." He denies the existence of a sovereign having inherent power and rejects the opposition between "public" and "private" law.

The supremacy of "positive law" has been established, says he, step by step: first, a mere *limitation* of the sovereign authority, then, a *replacement*, although in part, and finally the *exclusion* of all original sovereign authority. A "spiritual" power has taken the place of personal authority. "We no longer live under the dominion of persons, either natural persons or fictitious legal persons, but under the dominion of *norms*, of spiritual forces.' More and more, political communities are ruled "not by external powers, but by inner spiritual forces dwelling in men and working out from them."

This sort of "mystical" deification of man's 'inner forces,' may however be said to introduce, a "new" concept only within certain limitations.¹

¹ For the Hindu category of *Dharma* (law, justice and duty) and its European counterparts see Sarkar: *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*, Leipzig, 1922.

For, in one form or another the idea of the majesty of law, custom, "folk-ways" "natural right," moral order, sense of justice, feeling for right and so forth is a strong medieval category. Nay, it is an almost universal item, although not the sole item, in the political or moral ideology of races in their primitive beginnings such as, at any rate, can be detected in the early literature of mankind.

But this so-called *Rechtsstaat* (the state as a "legal community") theory serves, in any case, to emphasize the enormous amount of "conscious" law-making and the growing number of law-making "organs," councils, boards, committees, "public services" etc. which have become prominent features of social or organized life during the last half a century. It is but to be expected that this "epoch of law" or age of the reign of law should induce a more or less characteristic form of speculation in the relations between law and sovereignty or law and the state.

It need be observed, however, that the antithesis between sovereignty and law as posed by Krabbe is essentially nothing but the polarity, absolutism *vs.* democracy, although his language does not make it clear. Indeed there is hardly any dualism between sovereignty and law so far as the different epochs of political speculation or practice are concerned. At any rate, his analysis does not establish this dualism; Instead of concluding that law is encroaching upon or replacing sovereignty, as Krabbe does, one should rather argue on the strength of his premises that the demos is getting used or

rehabilitated to the enjoyment of both sovereignty *as well as* law-making. It is the people, the people's control, the people's interests and voices in legislation, the sovereignty of the people that, in spite of Krabbe's terminology, constitute the chief elements in the "modern idea" of the state as explained by himself.

Thus in the place of sovereignty *vs.* people which is ostensibly the thesis of his book what is really established by him is "popular sovereignty" or democracy as the fundamental feature of "modern states." The "modern state" is found to be not only a "legal state" but at the same time a "popular sovereignty state" or a "sovereign people and state" many other things as well. "Sovereignty" as such has neither been eliminated in any way, nor replaced by "law" or law-making power, but has been coming more and more into the hands of the masses. As a "category" of thinking, law is as old as sovereignty. The modernness consists in the fact that each is being impregnated with new "contents." "Sovereignty" as well as "law" are both being transferred to the "people" (community, *civitas*) from the powers that be, and both are being "groupified," decentralized and what not.

As for the nature and validity or binding force of law Krabbe is of course fundamentally idealistic. "The spiritual nature of man" is his starting-point. In his social psychology the *Rechtsgefuehl* (feeling for right),—including as its less developed form, the *Rechtsinstinkt* (instinct for right) and its more

developed form, the *Rechtsbewusstsein* (sense or consciousness of right) is as effective among men as the moral, the aesthetic and the religious sense, as well as love and friendship. It is a "universal human impulse." It is upon this "natural mental faculty,"—this feeling for right, that all law,—positive, customary or unwritten—is said to be based. Now the sense of right is intrinsically a power which creates "obligations," says he. Law is thus "essentially a moral force,"—an ethical concept implying, as one should think, nothing short of the "categorical imperative" of KANT.

But the "phenomena" of the actual world do not avoid Krabbe's grasp. He moves away from the rigidity of Kant's system and understands the limitations of the sense of right. "Owing to the influence of numerous factors both material and ideal and because of an imperfect insight into the nature of the interests to be evaluated by law" he declares that the "sense of right may be different now from what it formally was" and vary also in different individuals "under the pressure of divergent experiences and interests." The sense of right is thus conceded to be "more or less imperfect." The idea of these relativities and imperfections brings Krabbe's concept of law into line with Neo-Kantianism, *i.e.* fundamental idealism such as is tempered with the sense of the objective and the utilitarian and hence shorn of the absolutist and universalistic validity. It is as Neo-Kantian that he accepts STAMMLER'S adage in *Die Lehre vom dem richtigen Rechte*, "The Theory of

Just Law" (1902), namely, that all positive law is but an "attempt" at just law. Practice, according to him, must have to be satisfied with legal systems such as are based on the defective sense of right.

The sense of the objective is very apparent in Krabbe's analysis of interests, law-making, development of law, decentralization in law-making, administrative decentralization, etc, none of which is undertaken with strong doses of metaphysics. And in these items his position is undoubtedly "modern" and constructive. Indeed hardly any reference to the "feeling for right" is required.

He begins his study with the announcement that his "conclusions are directed especially against those of German political science." It is certainly questionable if there is anything in the world of thought known as "German political science." But Krabbe's book shows at any rate that it makes use of certain German ideas in order to combat certain *other* German ideas. In his own ideology, there is hardly anything un-German.¹

1915. BARKER: Lecture at Oxford on "The Discredited State" an article in the *Political Quarterly*, London; *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the present day*. The state is not more important than other "associations" "groups," etc. in which individuals participate. But whatever rights such groups may claim or gain, the state will still remain a necessary adjusting force ;

¹POUND'S paper on jurisprudence in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (ed. Barnes) New York, 1924.

and it is even possible that if groups are destined to gain new ground, the state will also gain perhaps even more than it loses, because it will be forced to deal with even graver and even weightier problems of adjustment. When the strict theorist urges that the state ought not to do so and so or ought even to stop doing so and so he is doing exactly what the conservative and the reactionary desire. Voluntary co-operation is only made possible by the state. The more there is of voluntary co-operation the more need there is of the state. Internationalism must pursue a legal development, not based on (though it may be aided by) economic facts, but based (as all legal development is based) on a sense of right inherent in a common conscience—the common conscience of the civilized world.

1915. MICHELS (1876—) Italian-Swiss : *Political Parties*. Modern democracy tends sociologically to be oligarchic. The masses are as a rule unthinking. The crowd-psychology tends towards domination, hypnotic influence by “supermen.” The very need for organisation tends also to hierarchy, discipline, leadership, etc. which are anything but democratic (cf. Lecky, Le Bon, etc. *supra*).

1916. LENIN (1870-1924) Russian, *Imperialism* : He offers a Marxian interpretation of the European developments since 1870. In his analysis imperialism = the politics of finance-capital, the latest form of capitalism.

The exposition is based chiefly on German economic literature and not marked by aggressive

radicalism or Bolshevik propaganda. Sharp criticism of KAUTSKY'S "moderatism" is, however, an indication of the passing of ways that is coming.

1917. Two Revolutions in Russia in the course of the year,—the second (November) known as the Bolshevik or Communist Revolution.

1917. On the eve of the November *i.e.*, Bolshevik Revolution. LENIN publishes *The State and Revolution: Marxist Teaching on the State and the Task of the Proletariat in the Revolution*. He begins by condemning Plekhanoff, Rubanoitch, Tehernoff and co., in Russia; Scheidemann, David and others in Germany; Renaudel, Guesde, Vandervelde in France and Belgium; Hyndman and the Fabians in England and so on and so on," the so-called "leaders of socialism" as "socialist in words, chauvinist in deeds," "opportunists and perverters of the genuine socialist gospel. Then he analyzes the teachings of the founder-prophets of socialism, namely, Marx and Engels, item by item,—thus: The State as the product of the irreconcilability of class-antagonism, as an instrument of the exploitation of the oppressed classes—The Withering away of the state and revolution by force—The Experience of 1848-51.—The Experience of the Paris Commune of 1871 (Marx's analysis)—What is to replace the machinery of the state? The destruction of parliamentarism; Supplementary Explanations by Engels—The housing question—the dispute with the Anarchists—The letter to Bebel 1875,—Criticism of the draft of the Erfurt programme 1891,—The *Preface* of 1891 to Marx's

Civil War in France—Engels on the suppression of democracy—The economic foundation of the withering away of the state is elucidated (cf. Marx's *criticism of the Gotha Programme*, 1875, published 1891)—formulation of the question by Marx; transition from capitalism to communism through the "transitional" period of revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat; first phase of communist society; highest phase of communist society ("from each according to ability, to each according to needs"); while the state exists there can be no freedom, while there is freedom, there will be no state.

The heretical fallacies of the "opportunists," corruptors of Marxism such as dominated the Second International (1889-1914) are examined. Plekhanoff the Russian's *Anarchism and Socialism*, 1894, which tried to coerce anarchism but not in the spirit of Marx and Engels is condemned. The brunt of the attack falls on KAUTSKY, a German, who although a pucca Marxist is alleged to have "distorted" and betrayed Marxism in the controversies with the moderates or opportunists, e.g., the attack on BERNSTEIN'S *Socialist Fundamentals* in Kautsky's *Bernstein and the Social Democratic Programme* (1899) and in his "more nature work," the pamphlet, *Social Revolution* (1902) is not radical enough. Although Kautsky admitted the "possibility of the conquest of the power of the state" he did not speak of the "destruction of the state machine." This is a "concession to opportunism," says Lenin; indicating a "superstitious reverence" for the state,

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And again in his best work against the opportunists, the pamphlet, *The Road to Power*, (1909) Kautsky is said to have failed to rise to the height of the occasion.

The essential distinction between Marxism (Bolshevism, communism or scientific socialism) and anarchism was misunderstood by Kautsky in the controversy with Ponnekock (1912) and is made clear by Lenin. (a) Marxists, like anarchists, aim at the destruction of the state but believe that a social revolution is first to destroy the classes. Anarchists want the destruction overnight and do not understand the process involved in it. (b) Marxists recognise a transitional stage in which the proletariat is dictator and establishes a new machinery of "armed workers" on the model of the Paris Commune. Anarchists have no idea as to what the revolutionary proletariat is to do and deny that it will have to undo the state and establish a dictatorship. (c) Marxists insist upon using the modern state as a means of preparing the workers for revolution. Anarchists reject this.¹

1917. FREUND (1864-) *Standards of American Legislation*: These are to be found in the following seven items: (i) abrogation of personal slavery

¹Lenin and Trotsky's *Proletarian Revolution* (1920), is virtually a manifesto of the Bolshevik *coup d'etat* (1917) in Russia. E & C Paul *Creative Revolution A study of Communist Ergatocracy* (Workers' rule) London 1920, Postgate *Revolution* (London) 1920, Eastman: *Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution*, London, 1926.

For adverse criticism see Miliukov's *Bolshevism An International Danger*, London 1920. Kautsky; *Terrorism and Communism*.

and freedom, (ii) disappearance of legal class-distinctions, (iii) recognition of the legal rights of aliens, (iv) emancipation from domestic subjection, (v) freedom of thought, (vi) protection of public health and safety, (vii) growth of social legislation.

1918. JOSEPH-BARTHELEMY: *Le probleme de la competence dans la democratie* (The problem of efficiency in a democracy). Democracy is by nature inefficient compared to monarchy. Hence France's weakness contrasted with Germany's strength (cf. Athenian democracy *vs.* Spartan royalty). Altogether he presents a conservative estimate of republics. Cf. *Le role du pouvoir executif dans les republiques modernes* 1906. He is conservative also re woman suffrage and feminism (*Le vote des Femmes* 1924).

1918. RUSSELL. *Roads to Freedom; socialism, anarchism and syndicalism*. Whatever bitterness and hate may be found in the movements which we are to examine, it is not bitterness or hate but love that is their main spring, says he. It is difficult not to hate those who torture the objects of our love. If ultimate wisdom has not always been preserved by socialists and anarchists, they have not differed in this from their opponents. In the source of their inspiration they have shown themselves superior to those who acquiesce ignorantly or supinely in the injustices and oppression by which the existing system is preserved. Marxian socialism gives too much power to the state; syndicalism would be forced to reconstruct a central authority in order to

put an end to the rivalries of the different groups of proceedings ; the best practical system is that of guild socialism, which combines syndicalism with socialism by a system of federalism among trades. In his *German Social Democracy*, 1896, he offers the whole hearted appreciation, in general, of Marx's " social democracy " as " not a mere political party nor even a mere economic theory " but as a complete self-contained philosophy of the world and of human development," in a word " as a religion and an ethic." His condemnation of Bismarck's " state-socialism " as military and bureaucratic despotism tempered by alms-giving, is equally strong.

1918. MALLOCK (1849-1923). *Limits of Pure Democracy, Critical Examination of Socialism* 1907. *Aristocracy and Evolution* 1898. He opposes equality and democracy and champions authority and obedience. Cf. the anti-democratic tradition in political philosophy since Tocqueville.

SECTION 2

POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS (1919)

1918-22. New Constitutions are established in Soviet Russia, the German Republic 1919, the Tchechoslovakian Republic 1920, the Polish Republic 1921, the Austrian Republic 1920, the Jugoslavian Kingdom 1921, and the Irish Free State 1922.¹

1919. Elections to Italian Parliament : 150 " communists " (Leninists) and 100 " *popolari* " (democratic

¹Select Constitutions of the World, Dublin 1922, Marriott: *The Mechanism of the Modern State*, 1927.

Catholic popular party,) are returned. There is a genuinely democratic parliament for the first time in Italy. Russian influence is preponderant. The NITTI Ministry fails in one year and is succeeded by the GIOLITTI Ministry which attempts legislating against the war-profiteers—"a sort of sugared Bolshevism." Workingmen on strike take possession of factories 1920.

1919-27. ZAGHLUL PASHA (1861-1927): *Autobiography* and *Letters* in Arabic manuscript, in part summarized in German by an Egyptian friend Dr. Sabit. He begins to take interest in politics in 1911 with the commencement of the Kitchener regime, establishes the National Party in 1918 and is interned by the British in Malta while proceeding to Paris to take part in and otherwise influence the Peace deliberations (1919).

According to him no political party should consider the interests of the party superior to those of the country. Every party should always attempt to unite all the political groups. Party-fanaticism is to be thoroughly condemned. The best statesmen are those that keep close to the joys and sorrows of their people and avoid mysterious and secret cabinet politics.

He attaches no importance to the "political education of the youth" of which so much is talked of everywhere to-day. The greatest statesmen have had hardly any political schooling in their younger days. The politician is different from the poet. The latter has to give expression to emotions and needs the faculty of speech, but the politician has to

express himself through deeds and needs character.

Zaghlul imports a "nationalistic" bent to Egyptian politics and earns the opposition and hatred of the religious coteries that are the staunch upholders of extra-national tendencies in Islam. Against the attacks of the religionists, from the Pan-Islamist camp, he defends his nationalism on the ground of requirements suited to the modern age. In regard to the universalistic, international tradition of Islam his nationalistic attitude is clearly embodied in the following slogan: "March separate, but strike united." It is not possible to achieve anything to-day, as in the Middle Ages, through fanaticism and religious wars. The construction of strong states is the first desideratum of modern times.

Japan should be the object of imitation to all Asian races on the question of relations with Western civilisation. Zaghlul spurns the idea of boycotting or standing aloof from European culture and advises all oriental nations to assimilate as much as possible all the advantages afforded by it. In his judgment the countries and peoples of Asia have derived more benefit than loss, both economic and political, from the influence of Europe. He believes also that the economic and financial development of Egypt through English co-operation since Lord Cromer's time is remarkable.

Zaghlul's nationalism is positively against pan-Islam, as indicated above. But it is quite pan-Asiatic. The presenting of a united front by all the Asian peoples when it should come to be a reality,

would mean not an aggressive war upon Europe but only an act of self-defence against all imperialistic attacks.

One reason why the Asian is behind the culture of the West lies in his unreasonable repression of women. Zaghlul endorses with sympathy Kemal Pasha's efforts to emancipate the Turkish woman and would like to see the same attempted among the other Moslem nations.

Zaghlul knows that politics is only the art of what is possible. He is a *Realpolitiker* even in his orientations to the British Government. In other words, he is not an "extremist."¹

1919. *Fasci italiani di combattimento* (Italian Fasci of Soliders) established at Milan, amalgamates all the different groups of Fasci in Italy. The extremists are known as *futuristi* and *arditi*. The programme is determined by MUSSOLINI in consultation with MARINETTI, BIANCHI, ROCCA and others, as follows: 1. Political: proportional representation, woman suffrage, lowering of age-limit of deputies from thirty-three to twenty-five, abolition of Senate, a three-year National Assembly to draw up a new constitution for Italy, National councils for labour,

¹Dr. Essad Sabit's article on "*Zaghlul Paschas Memoiren*" in *Deutsche Rundschau*, Berlin, January 1928. Zaghlul is known to have been as an inspirer of Sarwat Pasha's negotiations with Sir Austin Chamberlain in regard to an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. In March 1928 the provisions of the proposed treaty are found to be too moderate for Young Egypt since Great Britain is not prepared to renounce the control over Egypt's foreign relations, communications with world as well as intercourse with the Sudan.

industry, transport, etc. 2. Social : eight-hour day for working men and peasants, participation of workers' representatives in the technical and organizational management of factories, administration of railways by railway men's union. 3. Military : formation of a national militia, nationalization of munition and equipment factories. 4. Financial : heavy supertax upon capital, sequestrations of a percentage of the wealth of religious bodies, appropriation of 85 per cent. of war profits. Fascism "in power and office" (since) 1922 has, however, almost completely repudiated the whole of this radical proletarian programme.¹

1919-22. D'ANNUNZIO captures Fiume. The *fasci di combattimento* (association of soldiers) begins to get support from the "war-profiteers" and other sections of the financial aristocracy in order to work against (i) the rising tide of socialism (Leninism) and (ii) the Giolittian legislation of semi-expropriation. Propertied classes destroy the socialistic organisations in Southern Italy 1920. An epoch of Fascism *vs.* Socialism 1921 begins Fascist opposition to Parliament, universal suffrage and democracy is growing. MUSSOLINI marches on Rome (October 1922).

1919-21. Indian National Congress : Sessions at Amritsar, Calcutta, Ahmedabad.

Presidents : MOTILAL NEHRU, LAJPAT RAI,

¹Prezzolini, *Fascism* (London, 1925). See the criticism on Nitti and Giolitti as well as the chapters on "Other Leading Men in Fascism" and "Fascism and Culture."

CHITTA RANJAN DAS (in gaol, replaced by AJMAL KHAN). The ideology is embodied in the following items: 1. protest against the Government of India Act, 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford Act), 2. preparedness for individual and mass "civil disobedience" (non-cooperation with the existing Government implying (i) the giving up of official titles, (ii) the boycott of official Darbars, (iii) the boycott of Government schools and colleges and (iv) renunciation of candidature and voting for councils as constituted by the Act (4) revival of hand-spinning,— *charkha* — to combat imports of British cloth.

India protests against the Treaty of Sevres in behalf of Turkey and starts a vigorous Khilafat agitation, thus, taking an active part, for the first time perhaps in modern history, in international diplomacy. Altogether, the activities inspired as they are by both internal and external stimuli, assume the character of a more or less "mass" movement in which the popular elements in both Hindu and Moslem communities function as self-conscious and politically minded items. The Indian nationalism of these days is no longer an aspiration of the mere middle class and English-educated circles but is to a great extent, and this also for the first time since 1905, a genuinely popular (peasant and workingmen) ideology. This mass upheaval in India is in no inconsiderable degree to be interpreted as an after-math of the feelings and ambitions awakened by the Great War and the Russian Revolutions throughout the world and has its Eur-American

counter-parts in the ultra-radical, socialistic and labour achievements of the period.

This is the epoch of Mohandas Karamchand GANDHI, who, in spite of external and circumstantial differences, plays the role of a half-Lenin and a half-Mussolini in the utilization, to a certain extent unconscious although, of the mass-forces. In his social philosophy, his ostensible anti-Westernism notwithstanding, Gandhi is, besides, a disciple of RUSKIN as regards condemnation of industrialism and an almost literal paraphraser of Tolstoy as regards denunciation of the state and advocacy of non-violence. Stripped of all metaphysics, his non-co-operation=away from the state=anarchism, (cf. BAKUNIN, KROPOTKIN, TOLSTOY). One remembers likewise the anti-statal Spencerian indifferentism of TAGORE'S *Swadeshi Samaj* (1904).

It need be observed, however, that LENIN, the *avatar* of proletarianism is the exact antipodes of MUSSOLINI, the destroyer of bolshevism and embodiment of aggressive neo-nationalism. Likewise is Ruskin, the anti-democratist and upholder of the authoritarian state as well as champion of social control, paternal interference and "state-socialism"(?) the farthest removed from Tolstoy and the other democrats individualists and anarchists. But the eclectic alchemy of Gandhi's political philosophy has evolved an amalgam out of heterogeneous world-forces, not excluding the traditional *ahimsa* (non-killing) of his ancestral Jainism. And paradoxically enough, his idealism of love and soul-force

finds the most realistic expression in his un-mystical and perfectly positive cult of enmity to the textile industry of Lancashire.¹

1920. NEWBIGIN: *A Geographical Study of the Peace Terms* analyzes the territorial boundaries of the European states as fixed by the Treaty of Versailles and comes to the conclusion that neither the War nor the Peace has succeeded in solving the fundamental political and economic problems. The boundaries will have to be re-drawn according to the principle of nationality, says he. Southern Tyrol which has been given away to Italy should be transferred to Austria. But he opposes the movement for the union of Austria and Germany in a single state. The new German "irredentas" and "minorities" in the states are likely to lead to fresh wars, he fears.²

1921. BRYCE (1838-1922): *Modern Democracies* presents a conservative and cautious estimate of the achievements of the republics.

1921. LASKI (1893-); *Foundations of Sovereignty, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, 1917. *Authority in the Modern State* (1919). Justice is more important than government,—hence anarchy preferable to injustice. Justice is a question of "inherent" natural rights of the "individual." Some of

¹Rowlatt's *Report on Revolutionary conspiracies in India*, 1918; *The Government of India Act*, 1919. *Indian National Congress (1920-23)*: Collection of resolutions, Allahabad, 1924.

²Kraus: *Das Recht Minderheiten* (The Right of the Minorities), Berlin, 1927; Lockhart *Seeds of War* (A political study of Austria-Hungary, Tchechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia), London, 1925, Mair: *Protection of Minorities*, London, 1927.

the "natural rights" of to-day are freedom of speech, living wage, proper amount of leisure, power to combine for social effort, economic minimum for all. Decentralization of authority or diffusion of freedom among individuals or groups is one of his slogans. Administration is to be subject to law. Sovereignty of the state is negatived. He makes extensive use of French thought bearing on the sovereignty of law (cf. translation of Duguit's *Les Transformations du droit public* as *Law in the Modern State*, 1917, and popularizes De Maistre, Bonald, Lamennais, etc. His philosophy is, like COLE'S, although on different lines, directed against the contemporary forms of the capitalistic society. He would replace profit, private profit, profiteering, organization for profit etc., by an industrial organization based on "service." Production of wealth is to be "socialized," "statalized." The "nationalization" of the agents of production belongs naturally to the programme. The "monopolies" like railroad, etc. are to be nationalized at once, next, the industries connected with bread and milk, etc. This virtually "communistic" state is the ideal, the utopia, towards which, according to Laski, advanced countries like England, should move in order that individuals may enjoy their "inherent right" and achieve "self-realization,"—in so far at any rate as self-realization is "dependent on material factors" and "inherent right" has reference to these things.

The new state would besides hardly possess any sovereignty even in matters of defence. Sovereignty, if it exists at all, for these questions Laski's *guru*

DUGUIT, is to be internationalized. Idealism in this field finds expression in the following advice: "England ought not to settle what armaments she needs, the tariffs she will erect; the immigration she will permit to enter. These matters affect the common life of peoples, and they imply a unified world-organization to administer them." A super-state, communistic as well as international, is thus to replace the sovereign-state,—the traditional capitalistic and nationalistic state of the modern industrial era. (See also *The Grammar of Politics* 1925).

1921. VIERKANDT: *Staat und Gesellschaft in der Gegenwart* (State and Society in Modern times) first edition 1916. This German sociologist is, unlike, SPANN, a champion of democracy and socialist endeavours although opposed to 100 per cent. Marxism. He accepts the thesis of PREUSS'S *Das deutsche Volk und die Politik*, "The German People and Politics," 1915, to the effect that the pre-war German state is an authoritarian state (*Obrigkeitsstaat*) whereas Western Europe has developed the *Volksstaat* (the people's state), the democratic state. Each of these types of states is governed by one political party. In the democratic state, however, all the parties are treated as equal, whereas in the authoritarian state the ruling party is the only national, patriotic party and the parties not on this side are treated as inferior, nay, unpatriotic and inimical. The authoritarian state compels a paralysis of many energies. In the people's state the distinction between rulers and subjects, or officers and citizens is less than in the other* which

may be described as a ruler-state (*Herrenstaat*) and privilege-state. The *Volksstaat* abolishes privileges, promotes comparative equality and appears as the organization of the entire people and not as something imposed upon the people.

The modern national state was born in Western Europe in 1800, say, with the French Revolution. But in Germany citizenship (*staatsbuergertum*) was virtually unknown in the nineteenth century. The feudal-absolutist-patriarchal-authoritarian state is what the Germans had down to the Great War.

No political parties existed in the old absolutist state because then the ruler was the state. It is only in the folk-state, the one in which the people participate in the state, that parties can arise. In a "people's state" every body wishes to have his own will served by the state. Now the wills are different according to the "classes." This diversity gives rise to "conflicts" which arrange themselves into groups. Political parties are nothing but conflicting groups representing the different interests in a community. With the exception of a few idealists each and every party is essentially an organization for the furtherance of a particular "class-interest." The welfare of the entire community is naturally as a rule out of the question in modern states governed as they are according to the *Parteibetrieb* (party organization).

But the conflict of parties, mirroring forth as it does the conflict of social classes and group-interests registers a progress compared to the conditions of the absolutist state when only one class lorded it over

the community. To-day the rivalries and propagandas of the diverse organizations prevent the emergence of any one-sided or preferential will into solitary prominence.

Economic programmes seem to be the exclusive features of political parties. But in reality the differences are deeper. The diversity of *Weltanschauung* (i.e. world-view) or general philosophical outlook is no less profound as between party and party. The "conservative" party represents not only the landed aristocracy but also its conception of the state as something holy, and king and authority as something God-ordained or divine. The "liberal" party is the party of commercial and industrial people and is used to looking upon the state as nothing more than an association, a union for watch and ward. Obedience, law and order, discipline constitute the slogan of the "conservatives" while freedom is the watch-word of the "liberals." The one is addicted to the *status quo* while the other is equipped for change. For instance, the "conservatives" were for the maintenance of particularism and regional independence of the different German states while the "liberals" prepared the way for a unified Germany.

These two parties made their appearance in Germany in the 40's of nineteenth century. The third party, the "social-democratic" came into existence in 1869. It represents working classes,—the so-called "fourth class," the king, the landed aristocracy and the capitalistic bourgeoisie being the first three. The "social-democratic" party is an advocate of change

like the "liberals" but believes in the necessity and usefulness of the state like the "conservatives." On the other hand, it is "positive" like the "liberals" in having faith in "this world" and differs from the "conservatives" whose interest in the "other world" is a characteristic feature.

Vierkandt condemns the conservatives as trying to perpetuate the ideals and methods of the patriarchal-absolutist state and ignoring the most important aim of modern life, viz., *die Volle Entfaltung aller Kraefte* (the complete development of all powers). Their vice consists in practising *Vormundung* (guardianship) which can but lead to the paralysis of self-consciousness and independence.

"Liberalism" is anti-absolutist and anti-conservative in origin. Its first philosopher is LOCKE who allows the state nothing more than the function of protecting life, freedom and property. The same philosophy is preached by SPENCER,—but at a time when even in England the state is already a legal protector of working men and on the continent "social assurance" under the auspices of the state has grown into a reality. HUMBOLDT'S liberalism as expounded in *Die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates* (The Limits of the Usefulness of the State) forbids the state to interfere in the spiritual life of the individuals. Liberalism is most pronounced in the economic field, e.g. in the doctrines of "natural freedom" and "free competition" taught by ADAM SMITH. Abolition of guilds and privileges, introduction of free trade, abolition of apprentice laws, aboli-

tion of laws protecting the working men against exploitation, etc, have constituted the programme of economico-political "liberalism" known generally as MACHESTERTUM ("the Manchester Schod")

The contributions of "liberalism" are both good and evil, but the good is on the whole more in amount. Repression of the spirit, against which liberalism has fought, is a positive evil. The war for freedom is not yet at an end. Freedom is a good that is always in danger and must always be fought for over again.

But so far as economic liberalism is concerned, the ruthlessness of natural freedom or free competition is to be seen in MALTHUS'S law of population and DARWIN'S natural selection. The "fullest freedom for all" is absolutely impossible under conditions of inequality such as are natural with the society based on classes. BISMARCK clearly saw that the freedom preached by the "liberals" is really but "freedom to oppress the weaker" and for the weaker nothing but "freedom to starve." The world war has opened our eyes to the fact that state intervention is a necessity to save the individuals from the ravages of freedom, *viz.* high prices, corners, etc. Altogether, "liberalism" is to be appreciated as a pioneer in the fight against fetters. But it erred while thinking that fetters are absolutely unnecessary.

In Western Europe as well as in extra-European countries the evolution of industry has passed through three stages. The first stage marks the one-sided "patriarchal" conditions in which the working man

is a patient, passive agent while the employer the exploiting master. Unrest on the part of the employees begins to manifest itself in the second stage but they are sharply put down by the employers as well as by the society and the state. The third stage is characterized by constructive practical measures of relief, self-help among the workingmen themselves or reform introduced by the state and society.

About 1850 the third stage was already reached in England. In the 60's of the last century—with the beginnings of the "social democracy" movement Germany entered upon the second stage. The third stage commenced in German industrialism with the 80's which witnessed the Bismarckian *Schutz gesetzgebung* (legislation to protect the interest of workers). In post-war or rather post-revolution Germany (c 1919) the beginnings of a fourth stage are to be noticed.

The "social-democratic" and allied movements have appeared everywhere as an aspect of the industrial revolution and in the second stage of its development. Social democracy is thus an "historical necessity." Nothing can be more absurd than to describe it as the result of a few interested agitators and ambitious adventurers or revolution-mongers. It is a reaction against certain definite evils in the social system and by all means represents a class-interest, the interest of the fourth class, exactly in the same manner as other parties represent other class interests.

"Social democracy" is opposed to the capitalistic organization of society but is not opposed to private property. It believes in the nationalization of "large enterprises" and leaves the "smaller concerns" as well as the "family life" untouched. In pre-war Germany "social democracy" was legally more or less under the ban, and virtually excluded from active political life. The German masses have therefore hardly any schooling in practical politics. Preachers like BEBEL have taught them only the "ideals" of a future state, which is nothing but a Utopia, the furthest removed from reality. Their methods of work and thought are abstract and comparable to the "rationalism" of the eighteenth century philosophers who had extraordinary faith in the power of reason and believed that "mankind is all governed by reason." The German masses and their leaders have yet to learn that the instincts, passions, emotions, etc., are no less powerful in human nature than reason, rational thought and good will. It is only a school of realities that can teach them that on very many occasions, the problems of life are too complicated for any solution. In other words, Vierkandt asks the contemporary champions of social democracy in Germany to cultivate the attitude of "compromise" to which their colleagues in other lands have got used.

According to the MARXIAN economic interpretation of history, capital has to bear the main brunt in the class-struggle. And this is the gospel of "social democracy" too. But Vierkandt believes

that capital cannot altogether be abolished and that even Bolshevism has failed to abolish it. Capital, profits, and inequality of income are going to stay, as far as one can see. All that can be accomplished is to reduce huge incomes, "living on rent" etc. by high taxes, especially "inheritance taxes." Besides, the working classes themselves must learn how to cultivate in spirit an un-capitalistic way of life. And this can be accomplished only "if money ceases to be appraised as the highest good."

It need be observed that Vierkandt does not furnish an adequate interpretation of "social democracy" such as an orthodox Marxian would do. Marx's "social democracy" is really "communism" and involves the "withering away of the state," which is not within the scope of the legally constituted and officially recognized *Sozialdemokratische Partei*. There seems to be some confusion of thought here, which may be solved by reference to LENIN'S *State and Revolution*.¹

1921. CHARMONT: *Les Transformations du Droit Civil* (Transformations of Civil Law), first edition 1912; *La Renaissance du Droit Natural* (The Renaissance of Natural Law), 1910; *Le Droit et*

¹In affiliation with Vierkandt's ideas the German sociologist and economist Oppenheimer expounds his conception of the state as an organization "originating" in the subjugation of one class by another and as actually "consisting" in one class dominating over other classes. c.f. in this connection Engels's *Origin of Family*, etc., and Lafargue's *Evolution of Property* for the economic interpretation of anthropological data.

l'Esprit Democratique, (Law and Democratic Spirit), 1908.

He traces the revolutionary departures that have been introduced in civil (family and property) law under the influence of movement social (socialization) since the Code Napoleon organized the legal system on the individualistic basis. The family of "yesterday" was more stable and more solidly organized. The landed property was conserved and transmitted integrally in order that it might serve *tous les membres de la famille* (all the members of the family) as *un centre permanent de protection* (a permanent centre of protection). The family of to-day is more mobile and less rigorously organized. The law of partition might reduce the family to indigence. Industrialism, again, has disintegrated the family by giving separate employments to the man, the woman and the child. In the interest of the family the law has had to interfere. As regards property, one notices, first, that it grows out of the "agrarian communism" of medieval times into an exclusive individualistic phenomenon. But at the same time property begins to be controlled by restrictions more and more in the interest of the community and public utility. The Great War and post-war conditions have not created any new ideas. The laws of to-day embody but the results of a long evolution, merely sanctioning as they do, *une pratique et une jurisprudence preexistants* (pre-existing practice and jurisprudence).

It is in keeping with these ideas when PATON~~NET~~LET

and LAMBERT remark that the Codes of Soviet Russia, so far as civil law and the family code are concerned, are but continuations of the laws and customs already prevalent in Western Europe and America (*Les codes de la Russie Sovietique*, Paris, 1925). In other words, there is not much of alleged "Bolshevism" in Soviet Russia.

1921. SPANN (1878-) Austrian, *Der wahre Staat* (The True State) *Gesellschafts lehre* (Theory of Society). He condemns Darwinism because of its absence of metaphysics and materialism because of its antipathy to "moral worth." The three types of individualism, namely anarchism (*e. g.*, Stirner's *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* 1844, The Only One and his property), Machiavellism and Natural Right are theoretically untenable in his judgment. The prevailing types of universalism *e. g.*, (i) the environmentalism of Buckle, Taine, Gumplowicz and Karl Marx, (ii) the "social instincts or impulses" theory of the psychologists who begin with Aristotle's definition of man as a "political animal," and (iii) the "ideal" philosophy of Plato, the Scholastics, Hegel and the Romanticists are likewise inadequate to explain the value of the individual, says he.

"Kinetic" universalism is established by him as a theory that does justice as much to the independence of the individual as to the vitality and genuineness of the whole. He believes that the spirit of an individual realizes itself and begins to function only when it is enkindled and excited by another spirit. A

pure *i.e.*, exclusive individualism is psychologically inconceivable. No spirit without the contact of other spirits *i.e.* a "two-ness" (*Gezweiung*) or community. The child and the mother create each other's individuality, so also do the pupil and the teacher. He analyzes the categories of justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, functions of the state, and law from the standpoint of this kinetic universalism, and advocates the *Kultur-staat* as opposed to the minimum-functioned police-state of individualists but objects to the all-interfering, "to-death-governing" state of Plato. Free play is allowed to "revolution" in order that the society-forming processes in individuals may be reorganised, reformed and re-knit.

He complains that the leading German economists *e.g.* SOMBART, BUECHER, BRENTANO, PHILIPPOVICH, SCHÆFFLE, WAGNER, and others have failed to expose the theoretical fallacies of KARL MARX and have virtually surrendered themselves to him and although to a certain extent critics of Marxism are spiritually half-Marxists or Marxists in disguise. A front-attack is attempted by Spann on the Marxian theories in economics, sociology and politics.

His own political philosophy is based on two postulates: (1) equality among the equals, (2) the spiritually (mentally and culturally) higher to discipline and rule the spiritually lower. Internal equality is the characteristic of all communities. This leads automatically to the formation of "small groups" or associations. In opposition to individualism

which encourages "atomistic equality" as well as direct and centralized state-organisation the philosophy of kinetic universalism believes in the dictum "to each one his own."

Characteristics of this system of politics : (1) organic inequality although equal importance of the parts, (2) hierarchical differentiation in values i.e. inequality of the different parts according to their worth, (3) the members of the state are not individuals but "communities" in and through which the individuals have their existence. These communities function as wholes, although partial wholes, in a larger whole. Hence the constitution (a) is not to promote centralisation but must respect the independence of these partial wholes, (b) is to help forward "indirect" instead of direct participation, and (c) is to further the organic interdependence of the partial wholes and discourage their atomistic separatisms. Instead of one people the theory recognises "many communities," "groups," societies, circles or classes (*Staende*). Hence instead of "one government" there are to be "many partial governments" or group-administrations.

He analyses these "partial wholes," "communities," "groups" or "classes" psychologically as well as anthropologico-historically with reference even to ancient Iran and India, criticises Plato's class-state or group-state as defective because it makes no distinction in economic class between the leader and the others and because it gives the philosophers the right to lead in political matters.

Spann's decentralized *Staende-staat*, community-state or group-state will render a complex bureaucracy unnecessary. The primitive peoples did not possess an alleged communism as taught by LAVELEY, BUECHER, MORGAN, ENGELS-MARX, KAUTSKY, BEBEL, etc. but possessed group-hierarchical community-states. In the place of the old "communities" new communities have arisen in the epoch of capitalism. These are (1) cartels and monopoly organisations among employers, (2) trade unions among workingmen. He discusses the future potentialities in the organisation of groups or communities from the standpoints of the existing classes including the latest *Arbeiter-rat* i.e. "works-council." According to Spann this institution, although "Sovietic" in external form, can in reality be to a certain extent traced back to BISMARCK who wanted to get some substitute for "boring parliamentarianism."

The *Staende-staat* (class-state, community-state, or group-state) will give so much of the economic and administrative functions to the groups that the central state itself will be left in charge mainly of the "idealistic" functions (higher politics and culture), e.g. religion, education (not technical, however, which belongs to the group, but general), law (not economic legislation however), army, etc. Political parties of contemporary types will cease to exist. This community-state possesses only an external affinity with the gild-socialist-state but is essentially different from it. He considers gild-socialism to be defective because it tends to create equality among the unequals by establishing

national productive societies, abolishing the distinctions between proprietors and property-less and allowing every individual the right to consume out of the public wealth. The gild-socialist state is in the last analysis very centralized and therefore as utopian as communism. In his judgment the tendency of political reconstruction in recent times has been in the direction of establishing the groups or communities as political factors; *e.g.* the *Reichswirtschaftsrat* (Imperial Economic Council) of Germany is an anticipation of an Economic Parliament, a House of *Staeude* *i.e.* groups, communities or classes.

1923. POUND (1870-), American: *Interpretations of Legal History*, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* (1922), *The Spirit of the Common Law* (1921). He develops JHERING'S theory of the satisfaction of human interests, claims or demands as the chief item in law. Compromise between the group interests is an objective reality. Social engineering as achieved in legal history is not all "conscious" law-making but includes tradition and custom as well. He lays stress on "social purposes" rather than on "sanctions."

1923. FERRERO, *Tragedia della Pace* (Tragedy of Peace), *Da Fiume a Roma* (From Fiume to Rome) 1919-23. For a century the peoples of Europe have recognised only two principles of authority, the dynastic and the democratic principle. They do not yet recognize as a principle of authority the dictatorship of any organized minority, either of the proletariat, or the trade unions or the saviours of

the country. Now that the world-war has virtually destroyed the dynastic principle there remains only one principle, the democratic. Everything outside is sheer force or terrorism, Red or White. Fascist government is "illegitimate." The constitution was violated: an act of revolution. But it was not overthrown; the revolution was thus not complete. The constitution remained but tolerated a reduplication of the principal organs of the state: parliament and Fascist Grand Council, army and Fascist National Militia, prefects and Fascist delegates. A parliamentary democracy with a small private army in its midst, at the disposition of one party is an absurdity which cannot have a long life. Liberty, understood as the right of opposition is a vital organ of the modern state. There are too many people in the world, there is too much diversity and confusion of passions, ideas and interests. Every country will be split up into at least three or four great parties, some even more. The two-party system is no longer a possibility. The Mussolini regime is a system of personal government reproducing that of Giolitti and his predecessors.¹

1924. Deposition of the Caliph and abolition of the Caliphate by the National Assembly of Angora. The humiliating Treaty of Sevres (1920) is set at naught by KEMAL PASHA'S triumph over Greece and the Treaty of Lausanne (1922). Abolition of

¹ An anti-Fascist view is presented in Salvemini's *Fascist Dictatorship in Italy*, London, 1927.

policy. And this is embodied in (1) co-operation with Soviet Russia, (2) assimilation of Chinese communists as an integral limb of the nationalist party, and (3) promotion of the working class and peasant movements.

His mantle falls on CHANG KAISHEK, who for a time combines bolshevism with nationalism and is well supported by Russia. But by the end of 1927 Chang develops a thoroughly anti-bolshevik policy and attempts purging the *Kuo Mingtang* party and Southern China of all communistic and pro-Russian elements. He is in fact alleged to be responsible for the "white terror" which has involved the execution of 5,000 to 28,000 communists.¹

There are, then, three leading currents in Chinese politics to-day (end of 1927). First, there is the thoroughly anti-bolshevik and perhaps "anti-democratic" nationalism of the northerner, CHANG TSOLIN head of the Government at Peking. This current is condemned as militaristic and unconstitutional by Sun Yat-sen's party. The second current is that represented by the "moderate" Southerner, Chang Kaishek, who is perhaps democratic and constitutional as far as Sun Yat-sen might have wished to go, but who is not idealistic enough to carry on the latter's labour-philosophy, communism or pro-Russian sympathies. He is an ally and promoter of "captialistic" interests, both Chinese and foreign, and is therefore condemned as a "traitor" and "betrayer" of Young China's

¹Nearing: *Whither China?*, New York, 1928.

cause by the radicals or extremists. These latter represent the third force and consider themselves to be the inheritors of Sun Yet-sen's last political testament and will, namely, democratic *plus* communistic nationalism. It may be noted that the widow of Sun Yat-sen is an extremist and an exile in Russia, while the son a "moderate" or "realist" belonging, as he does, to the Chang Kaishek group.

*Political Developments in China*¹

During the Great War, the district of Shantung is won from Germany by Japan (1915). But Japan is compelled by the Washington Conference (1922) to part with it and restore it to China.

In the meantime civil war breaks out in China, as several times before since the republican revolution of 1911-12. By 1920 in the struggle against Tuan Si-huem's dictatorship, China becomes the battle-ground of four parties in four more or less wellmarked regional jurisdictions. The whole of South China belongs to the "nationalist" "democratic" and anti-foreign party, the *Kuo-Mingtang*, headed by

¹"The Eternal Chinese Question" in Sarkar's *Politics of Boundaries* (Calcutta 1926) and "The Problems of Young China" in *Greetings to Young India* (Calcutta 1927); Millard: *Conflict of Policies in Asia*, London 1924; Dubarbier: *La Chine contemporaine politique et économique* (Contemporary China, political and economic) Paris, 1926;

Duboseq: *La Chine en face des puissances* (China facing the Powers) Paris, 1926; Mazzoleni: *L'antagonismo anglorusso in Asia nell'ultimo ventennio* (1907-1927), Anglo-Russian Antagonism in Asia during the last two decades, Pavia, 1927.

In spite of the political feuds China has been steadily advancing in industrialism, says Dubarbier. The love of the fatherland that has been awakened in China need not necessarily become anti-alien, but its character will depend upon the attitude of the powers, according to Duboseq, who says, further, that Southern China is not a mere tool in Soviet Russia's hands, as generally suspected but is nationalist and statesmanlike enough to be able to utilize Russian assistance in her own way.

Sun Yat-sen, who establishes the government at Canton. Sun Yat-sen enjoys the friendly support of Soviet Russia, especially since the treaty of 1924. In the North there are three generals contending for supremacy. General Chang Tso-lin holds Manchuria in the extreme north. His supporter is Japan. Chihli, Shantung and Kiangse *i.e.*, the middle-north is occupied by General Sao-Kun who enjoys American friendship. The third power in the north is General Wu Peifu, who holds the south-western districts. His patron is Great Britain.

In 1926-27 "mass" activities in the "communistic" sense are prominent features in the political life. The main brunt is borne by the Chinese capitalists and landlords. Besides, the *Kuo Mingtang* party, officially established in the government at Nanking (as opposed to the government at Peking), cultivates financial and military *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia and succeeds in de-concessionizing Hankow—virtually through the "direct action" of the mob. And this leads to the rupture of diplomatic relations in Europe between England and Russia. The representative of the Southern China government, Chen, confers with O'Malley *re* the retrocession of the British concession and comes to an agreement (Feb. 1927).

The agreement marks, however, the end of communistic revolutionary activity, and Chang Kai-shek, the leader of the Southern government becomes a "moderate" or "reformist", in his orientations to Soviet Russia and in regard to foreign political and economic influence, especially that of Great Britain and Japan. In the North, the head of the Peking Government, Chang Tsolin, continues during the entire period quite amenable to British and Japanese influence, and thoroughly immune to bolshevik overtures.

At the end of 1927 Soviet Russia is dislodged from Southern China and the main block of the *Kuo Ming-tang* becomes non-communistic and even aggressively anti-bolshevik and anti-soviet. And both in the North and the South the foreign powers seem to regain their traditional prestige, both economic and political, with slight modifications, if any. The problems of extra-territoriality, concessions, tariff autonomy and political sovereignty remain as they ever were.

Young China's history, so far as nationalism and constitutional democracy are concerned, is tending to repeat itself once more. The situation is rendered complicated on account of the existence of the "left wing" of the *Kuo Ming-tang* party as a radical communistic element, although for the time being muzzled and inarticulate, in the

political life of the people both at home and abroad. Be it noted that in the summer of 1928 Peking falls to the Southerners, and the Nationalist Party is triumphant.

1924. MEINECKE: *Die Idee der Staatsraeson* (The Idea of the Reasons of the State). This historical study of the political philosophies from Machiavelli to Frederick the Great, Hegel, Fichte, Ranke, and Treitschke with sidelights on Bismarck, Nietzsche and Bernhardi is not merely historical. It is critical and constructive as well and may be regarded as possessing a formative value in contemporary thought. Meinecke's affiliations are to be sought in the progressive tendencies of post-war German political philosophy such as are manifest in Vierkandt. He discovers epoch by epoch an "eternal dualism" in the philosophies bearing on the "reasons of the state", *viz.*, those swayed by the considerations of *Macht* (power, strength, force etc.) and those oriented to the considerations of *Sittlichkeit* (morals, virtue, etc.) *Machtpolitik* however, has in the main been the dominant feature in the history of speculation and practice,—culminating in the three *Gewaltigen* (forces) of the modern world namely, militarism, nationalism and capitalism. He raises his voice against the "wrong idealization of *Machtpolitik* and the wrong deification of the state" such as have influenced German thought since Hegel in spite of Treitschke's warning. He wants the "reasons of the state" to be regulated more and more by larger doses of *Sittengesetz* (law of morality) and ethical motives, such, for instance, as those with which

Bismarck is said to have controlled the other considerations and established a "harmony" between the polarities, the two contending forces in civilization.

1924. BOUGLE: *Le Solidarisme*. According to him individualism of the "classic" type was, as pointed out by Michel in *L'Idee de l'Etat*, quite social, as manifest in the "public granaries" of ROUSSEAU, "mutual assurance" of CONDORCET, "public education" of ADAM SMITH, and "right to maintenance" proclaimed by MONTESQUIEU. Those individualists considered the state to be a servant and not a master. But in the nineteenth century a new individualism has arisen which is positively antistatal, *e.g.* the administrative nihilism of SPENCER, the anarchistic individualism of STIRNER and the anti-democratic immoralism of NIETZSCHE. It is against this type of individualism of "solidarism" rises to preach the cult of "mutual aid," "social life," "social dependence," etc. But the dignity of the individual is maintained in tact, *e.g.* in the "liberalist" thoughts of TAINE, FAGUET, BUISSON and DURKHEIM, who, although attaching value to the society and social influences bring the world "back to individualism." Solidarism would give a fresh lease to the individualism of the classic school.

Solidarism considers inequality to be both a "natural" and a "social" fact. Liberty, also, is not more a fact than dependence. The state is not to be regarded as an entity outside the individuals against whom or over whom it may be said to

function. The only reality is the *reciprocal* relations of the individuals. Hence "public law" should virtually cease to exist and be absorbed in "private law." Or at any rate, the distinction between the two should be reduced to the smallest proportions. From the positive fact of human interdependence emerges the problem of "quasi-contract" and "social debt." These are to be discharged in the form of "social assurances" and other methods by which the inequalities may be removed and the minimum conditions of life guaranteed to the "disinherited." The interventions of the state in economic and social life become normal phenomena. Solidarism hardly differs, if at all, from state-socialism and "reformist" or revisionist socialism. But since it neither destroys private property nor believes in or promotes class-struggle it has nothing in common with Marxian socialism.

1925-27. The New Arabia and Mesopotamia constitute for the time being five more or less politically and ethnically separate regions carved out of the carcass of the defunct Turkish Empire by the world-war (1914-18) and peace-treaties down to Lausanne (1922). These states may be compared to the nationality-states created out of Austria-Hungary by the same process. But while the new states of Central Europe possess *de facto* sovereignty and independence, as much at any rate as small and young states can possibly possess in this epoch of world-economy and military naval-aerial prepared-

ness, the new states of Western Asia (the "Near East" as it is known in Eur-American parlance) are marked by varying degrees of subjection to the great powers, especially Great Britain and France, who function as the "mandatories" of the League of Nations. The least dependent *de jure* of these regions appears for the time being to be Hedjaz and the most dependent Syria, Palestine and Iraq. And so far as economic and cultural developments are concerned there is no doubt that *de facto* all these regions without any distinction are dependent on foreign guidance in the matter of brain and bullion.

Political *philosophy* in these countries (cf. also Persia and China) is but the *history* of nationalistic, *i.e.*, anti-foreign and industrial movements on the lines of the earlier experience of Eur-America. "Speculation" in politics seems to have hardly gone beyond the day-to-day preachings of the "patriots" as to the duties of their countrymen to the fatherland.

*Development in Western Asia*¹

HEDJAZ and NEID : The Wahabite Sultan Ibn Saud captures Mecca and Medina (1925), enters into treaties with the British Government through Gilbert Clayton (1927), and invites engineers and doctors from Egypt to "modernize" the country. His ambition of being recognized as the Caliph of all Islam is frustrated at the caliphate Congress held at Mecca (1926). But his interest in secular reforms seems to be keen.

(2) PALESTINE : The British Government issues a £ 4,500,000 Palestine Loan in order to develop the country (1925). The enterprises com-

¹For facts and documents bearing on 1926 and 1927 see Jung's *L'Islam et L'Asie devant l'Imperialisme* (Islam and Asia before Imperialism), Paris, 1927 which continues the story in the author's *L'Islam sous le Joug* (Islam under the yoke). Paris, 1926.

prise among other items the construction of a harbour at Haifa on the Mediterranean which is to rival or perhaps eclipse Beirut in Syria (French) and Smyrna (Turkey) to the North. The exploitation of the resources of the Dead Sea is another great project in this line. Fully "elected" municipalities are established in 1927 on which Arabs and Jews, the two fighting indigenous elements, officially co-operate perhaps for the first time in modern history

(3) IRAQ : The Brussels agreement of 1924 between Turkey and Great Britain over the Mosul question settles the situation in Iraq. As the result of King Faisul's visit to London, Iraq is further defined as "an independent sovereign state" by the treaty of 1927. A conscription bill is on the anvil, although opposed by the Shiahites. A pipe line some 500 miles long to connect Mosul with the Mediterranean somewhere near Haifa (in British-mandated Palestine) through French Syria is being projected by Anglo-American finance in co-operation with French and Dutch interests. A parallel line of railway is a part of the scheme.

(4) SYRIA : The French High Commission has almost succeeded in pacifying the rebellious elements under Sultan El-Altrash (1926-27). The Nationalists are coming to terms with the "mandatory" authority in regard to a constitution which is likely to be of the federal type but perhaps not as democratic or progressive as the "extremists" wish.

(5) YEMEN : Italy recognizes Imam Yahia as king and enters into commercial treaties with him. It is to be noted that Eritrea on the African side of the Red sea is an Italian "Colony" and hence possesses political and economic interest in the Yemen corner of Arabia lying as it does as a neighbour.

1925. PREZZOLINI II *Fascismo* (Fascism) *Amen-dola* (the statesman of Mazzinian and democratic views). *La culture italienne*. (Italian culture).

The Fascist revolution had much in common with the Russian in so far as it arose out of activity coming from the minority who were out to conduct reforms and to sweep away the old electoral, parliamentary and democratic systems. But there were differences too. Fascism did not wipe out the old constitution but merely added to it, whereas communism (in Russia)

set up a new constitution in the place of the old. Fascism has not fulfilled all its promises, it has sometimes even acted contrary to them. But it has achieved some very famous reforms. Many of these reforms would have come about without the aid of fascism, for Italy had already made great advances in political economy and labor conditions. The social peace and order brought about by the Fascist regime, and so advantageous not only to commerce and industry but also to the everyday life of the middle classes, have been obtained at the sacrifice of liberties; *e.g.*, (i) liberty of reunion, (ii) liberty of association, (iii) liberty of the press, (iv) liberty of the individual. Parliamentary institutions do not come spontaneously into existence in Italy : they are borrowed from England or from France. The Italian people never sought liberal institutions, their political institutions are the commune, a government (founded on class and party), the aristocracy (a government founded by a great man and carried on by successive members of his family). Fascism has never had a set programme. It has adopted the programmes of other parties adapted to the temperaments of its own leaders. The reforms had been prepared by the Liberals, everything was in readiness, all the statistics had been worked out, all that was lacking was the will, and this Fascism was able to provide. Mussolini's genius lies in his resolution, in satisfying the extremists with promises and then forcing them to accept the reasonable course and abandon the dangerous course which their principles and their temperaments dictated.

Fascism is the revolt of the middle classes inspired by nationalist and conservative ideals to range themselves against the pretensions of the proletarian classes and against the ill-distributed fortunes of the capitalists, the revolt of a mass disillusioned by a peace which had failed to realise in internal politics those rewards in which they had been led to put their trust, and which in foreign politics had failed to obtain for them what they considered their right and dues.¹

[At this point the present author takes the liberty to place his own contribution on record, as follows:

1926. SARKAR: *Politics of Boundaries* Independence and sovereignty are limited as a matter of course. The contract, psychological although not historical, that brings a state into being can create also a system of international law, arbitration and such other institutions of positive law. The facts of "intervention" from the outside have now to be assimilated to the concept of sovereign territorial jurisdiction.

External sovereignty is always limited and conditional. By its very origin, *i.e.* historically speaking,—it is a bye-product of international conjuncture, and conflicts between neighbours. By its very nature, *i.e.* psychologically or analytically speaking, it is dependent on, and conditioned by the express or tacit approval of the neighbouring powers. Finally, it is limited also factually by

¹Genitle: *Che cosase il fasci mo* (What is fascism)? Florence 1926, Rocca, *Idee sul fascismo* (Ideas on Fascism), Florence 1924. Marinetti, *Fascismo e futurismo*, (Fascism and Futurism), 1924.

international agreements and positive contracts (public and private) in recent years.

1926. Imperial Conference establishes the "equality of status" between Great Britain and the Dominions as members of the British Empire. They are "in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs." Great Britain and the Dominions are both "autonomous communities within the British Empire," "united by a common allegiance to the Crown" and "freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." The Dominions are thereby thoroughly emancipated from the Colonial Office which administers the "crown colonies" and "protectorates" of old and the "mandated" regions of to-day. A new administrative department known as the Dominions Office has accordingly been established (1925).

1926-28, STALIN and BUKHARIN, official leaders of the Communist Party in Post-Lenin Russia, find themselves openly challenged in the theory of Bolshevism and philosophy of party politics by TROTSKY who has been in opposition since Lenin's death in 1924. Trotsky condemns the existing Soviet state as nothing but an ordinary "bourgeois state" which exhibits only a lip-sympathy with the working classes. Stalin is criticized as simply exploiting the toilers in the interest of the few rulers. The measures that have been taken by the Soviet government to promote in certain instances the collective ownership of land and deprive the richer

farmers of the right to membership in collective holdings as well as shorten the lease of land generally are considered by Trotzky to be inadequate. He himself is specially interested in urban workingmen and is considered by the Stalin group to be a dangerously influential person.

To combat the growth of Trotzkyism and a new party Bukharin, as spokesman of the communist party, declares at the tenth anniversary of the revolution (November 1927), that more than one political party may exist in a Soviet state, but that only one of them can rule and the others must be in prison. This philosophy is indeed to be found in the Leninian gospel itself. The threat is taken seriously by Zinoviev and Kameneff, two personal adherents of Lenin, who, however, joined Trotzky against the Stalin group. They forsake their new leader and join the official party. And Trotzky is banished to Turkestan (February 1928).

The Troika or triumvirate of ZINOVIEV, KAMENEFF and STALIN, on whom the mantle of Lenin fell at his death, seems once more to be the undisputed heir of Leninism and Bolshevik philosophy of one-party rule. For four years, nay, since the revolution Trotzky has been standing up for the ideas of freedom in discussion and democratic equality (at least between the "the leaders") such as characterize party organizations in the republics and monarchies of Western Europe and America. It appears that democratic discussion and free ventilations of opinion are inconsistent with the dictator-

ship of the proletariat. Lenin the proletarianist, and Mussolini the bourgeois nationalist, ostensibly the two poles of political philosophy, meet thus on a common platform of absolutist despotism. And curiously enough, both shake hands with Hegel and Bosanquet.

Trotsky's extremism is, of course, more fundamental than implied in the question of democracy *versus* absolutism in the relations between the torchbearers of communistic world-reconstruction. The very conception of communism that he represents is found to be too radical for the doctrines of Lenin and his followers. Trotsky is out and out industrialist and urbanist, and believes that real socialism cannot be accomplished in agricultural countries. And if Russia happens to be as yet in the medieval conditions of agrarian and rural economy he would, therefore, industrialize the country at break-neck speed, so to say, in order that a proletarian working population may arise in towns and Marxian communism be consummated.

But the "new economic policy" initiated by LENIN in 1921-22 and the gospel of those communist leaders of to-day who are administering the philosophical legacy of Lenin are conservative enough to follow the principle of proceeding cautiously and tentatively. As long as the villages continue to be the backbone of the social system, and agriculture the main profession of the population Leninism is not prepared to ignore the realities of the situation and concentrate its attentions exclusively on industrialization at any cost. The interests of the rural peasants demand as much

care on the part of the Leninists as those of the urban proletariat.

But in the meantime they believe in promoting industries, industrialising agriculture as well as fostering industrialism and urbanism in other ways. The "new economic policy" is indeed a policy of industrialization with foreign capital, concessions to foreigners in trade and industry, promotion of the export of agricultural produce and the import of manufactured goods, introduction of machinery in agriculture, and utilization of the co-operatives in farming, banking and commerce. But in Trotsky's judgment the industrialization has not been promoted by the Leninists with a reasonable amount of enthusiasm. They are charged by him with pandering to the peasantry in opposition to the proletariat and thereby renouncing their allegiance to the gospel of Marx and helping to establish a commonplace "bourgeois state" of the agrarian type.

It is desirable to note in this connection that the communism of the Leninists, condemned as "moderate" as it is by Trotsky, can show by the end of 1927 an imposing record of governmentalization or nationalization in economic activities. Thus all the rail roads, steamship lines, telegraph and telephone services, electric light and power plants as well as all of the export and import trade, and all of the banks are controlled directly by the central or local governments. Of industrial production 83 per cent. is controlled by government trust or syndi-

cates. Of retail trade in industrial goods 70 per cent. is in the hands of government trust or co-operative stores. And of the agricultural output 10 per cent. is in the hands of government farms or producers' co-operatives.

There is a third count on which the Trotzkyan philosophy appeared to Lenin while alive (during say 1918-1923) and appears to his political heirs of to-day somewhat too idealistic and unpractical or rather bookish for the actual circumstances of the political world. True to his Marx to the very letter, Trotzky believes that communism, if it is to be successful anywhere, must have to be an international phenomenon. The workingmen of other countries, especially of the industrially advanced nations in Eur-America must rise against the bourgeoisie in their respective spheres in order that bolshevism may be established in Russia. An international revolution, or at any rate, communistic propaganda on a world-basis is the very foundation of the Trotzkyan thought. But Lenin and the Leninists are objective enough to understand that just as capitalistic economy is not uniformly to be found in all the countries of the world at the same stage of evolution, so also socialism, communism or sovietism may be consummated even in a single country while the other countries happen to be in the half-socialistic or capitalistic or even pre-capitalistic stage.

Altogether, the fall of Trotzky in Soviet Russia spells the eclipse of radicalism and the triumph of

moderate or conservative elements in bolshevik thought.

1926. MOON, American: *Imperialism and World Politics* indicates how post-war colonialism is entirely akin to the colonialisms of previous epochs. Neither the logic nor the urge of imperialism has changed, in so far at any rate as the economic aspects are concerned. Imperialism is still regarded as the "sovereign solution for providing the mother country with raw materials and food stuffs, with opportunities for marketing surplus goods, for investing surplus capital and for relieving surplus population."

1926. HOLD-FERNECK: *Der Staat als Ue bermensch* (The State as Superman), *Der Kampf ums Recht* (The Fight over Law), 1927. He criticizes Kelsen's theory of law and considers the latter to have virtually annulled the the conception of law. Kelsen's idea of the "source of validity" of law is according to Hold-Ferneck nothing but the conception of natural law. Further, while Kelsen speaks of "legal positivity" he talks really in terms of "philosophical positivism," a category entirely distinct from law. Altogether his conception deprives law of its solid content. The distinction between "real" and "ideal" is blurred in his analysis. Rather to him the "natural entity" is the exclusive item of importance. "Duty" and "validity" are in his system absolutely set apart from existence. Accordingly he finds himself in a position which denies the "reality of the very subject matter of political philosophy." To this anti-statal, anti-

sovereign, ultra-legal, ultra-natural conception, Hold-Ferneck poses his sociological theory of the state. The problem is as follows: Is the state a "real fact" or only an "idea"? Does it possess a "causal reality" or simply a "normative ideality"? Can the state be comprehended, in the last analysis, as a sociological or as a juridical entity? Kelsen presents us with an unfettered formalism which can lead but to the annihilation of all respect for law and the state. Hold-Ferneck attempts to demonstrate the philosophical necessity for the state as a social group.¹

1926-28. Afghanistan emerges in post-war Asia and in contemporary world politics with the marks of virility such as characterized Japan between 1867 and 1886. The apostle of this *Meiji* (enlightenment Epoch for the young Afghan is King AMANULLA who ascends the throne (1919). A war with Great Britain, although ending in defeat for him in the battle-fields, brings him in the long run the world-recognition of "complete independence" for his people as well as the title of "His Majesty" for himself (1922). One of his most important early measures consists in the despatch of two diplomatic missions to Europe and America under General Mohammed Wali (1919, 22).

Afghan energism has been manifesting itself on all fronts of civic life. Secular courts of law have been established, slavery has been abolished, equality of the races and religions before law has been decla-

¹ Horneffer: *Hans Kelsens Lehre von der Demokratie* (Kelsen's Theory of Democracy) Erfurt, 1926.

red. Female emancipation also is on. Besides, schools are being started, roads built, mines prospected, engineering works projected, commercial treaties contracted, American finance invited, and the army reorganized. Cultural co-operation has been sought and obtained from Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey and India. Afghans have been sent to foreign countries as scholars and apprentices while at the same time foreign experts have been entrusted with jobs at home for developmental work. And financially, to watch with his own eyes the technical progress of the modern world and enjoy a bit of the "modernism" of his friends and allies. Amanullah starts on a European tour in the spring of 1928.

Altogether one notices the features of all "enlightened despots" from Asoka to Peter, Frederick and Mutsuhito. But "constitutional monarchy" or representative democracy is yet to come.

1926. March-May. LAVERGNE: *L'Anne Politique française et étrangère* (French and Foreign Political Year). He considers the parliaments of to-day to be defective for two reasons. First, the legislators are ignorant of economic and social questions. Secondly, the *corps sociaux* (social bodies) are not integrated in the state. The professors and engineers possess hardly any political voice. And while the state oppresses the individual, the individual oppresses the state. The "individual" has been saved by "universal suffrage." It is now time to endow the "social groups" with authority.

Professional representation may correct the abuses of the modern parliamentary systems. According to Lavergne, three different ideas are involved in the concept of professional representation. First, it may imply the representation of professional "interests." This may be either (i) individualistic, for instance, when the principle of "universal suffrage" is enjoyed by electors not territorially (*i.e.* as inhabitant of district, provinces, etc), but as agriculturists, commercial people and members of the other professions, or (ii) syndicalistic, *i.e.* associational, by which the electors vote not as individuals but as members of professional unions or groups. Secondly, professional representation may imply the representation of technical skill or professional technique, *e. g.* of the artisan, the engineer, the scholar, etc. And in the third place, it may imply the representation of competences (efficiencies) or "social values" such as are embodied in persons "sufficiently educated," "who possess real education and the maximum of personal disinterestedness," *e. g.*, scientific associations and so forth. The third item, which assigns, as it does, importance to the men of science had been emphasized by RENAN in *Reforme Intellectuelle et Morale*.

Lavergne strongly recommends the reconstruction of both houses, the *Chambre* and the Senate, on the professional basis thus explained. Each house is to be composed of members representing, half and half, the interests of the "individuals" as well as of the

“groups.” The groups or social bodies would be (i) scientific associations, (ii) economic associations, and (iii) associations of “general interest.”

There will thus be three different kinds of universal suffrage in operation. The first is the one with which the world is familiar and this in regard to the representation of individual interests. Secondly, there will be the corporate suffrage comprising the economic and scientific associates. Finally, the social suffrage would touch the associations of general interest. Parliament thus reconstituted would be at once territorial and professional.

The idea of professional groups and professional representation is to be seen in MARTIN'S *L'Organisation professionnelle* (Professional organisation), 1905. All the members of a profession in every region ought to be organized as units for the purposes of public life, says he. The electoral and constitutional regime of the country might be reformed on that basis. The interdependence of two persons functioning in the same industry is more intimate than that of two inhabitants of the same place. It would be natural if the professional groups were represented in the councils of the state.

An extremely idealistic scheme of parliamentary reorganization on the professional basis was furnished by BENOIST in *La Crise de l'Etat moderne* (The Crisis of the Modern State) 1897.

According to him the universal suffrage ought to be the basis of the modern state. And the professions should be the basis of the constituency. For

a *Chambre* of 500 members he would, according to the French population of 1893, therefore grant 225 seats to the cultivators at a time when they have only 38 places), 164 to the industrial classes (at a time when they have only 45), 17 to transport, 48 to commerce and so forth. The liberal professions should in his calculation get only 13 seats (while they actually possess 196), the public administrators only 8 (while they actually possess 43). But in several articles contributed to the *Echo de Paris* during 1926 Benoist criticizes his own scheme of 1897 as being too "quantitative" without reference to "quality." "It was contented with counting, it did not weigh."

1926. SCHNEE: *German Colonisation: Past and Future*. An ex-Governor of German Colonial Africa publishes this book in England and has it armed with a foreword by W. H. Dawson, a British expert on Germany. Schnee seeks to prove that the argument of alleged maladministration on which the Peace of Versailles robbed Germany of her colonies is unsupported by facts. The colonies should therefore be restored to Germany as a "mandatory" under the League of Nations. cf. SCHACHT: *Neue Kolonial-Politik* (New Colonial Policy), 1926.

1926. FREYER: *Der Staat* (the state) possess the problems of political existence in the *milieu* of faith, language, science, law, etc. The concepts of leader, statesman and politician are analyzed psychologically. Both the topics as well as the treatment are unconventional and there is a dynamic message of the most energistic character pervading these philo-

sophical discussions. According to Freyer, those who want the state must know at least one thing, namely, that the "state will have to be willed" in order that "it may become." The state "does not happen" (*i.e.* is not born naturally) but "has to be made." Those works that, strictly speaking, require to be made or constructed "lay hold of the creative soul with a powerful force." They do not appeal to the activity of man "but to his strength for passion." They fulfil themselves and require only to be "carried forward until fruition" (as in a womb) by men who moreover have to "suffer along with them." It is only the masculine will "that can furnish the realization to the acts." In the absence of this will the actions may fail to realize themselves. And the will must have to function "until the last moment;" because most of the battles are lost or won in the last half an hour. To have understood the necessity of an action implies thus to harness the will to it. To have understood the necessity of a state implies likewise "a call to the will of the generation to its realization." It would but betray a weakness and insincerity of this appeal if one were to cry and wait piteously for the rise of the "great man." This sort of anxiety as to whether he comes or not is the political attitude of "old maids." The history of the spirit is not a web of pious wishes and unattainable means. The forces are always ready when the aims and objects are set forth. The aims and objects can be carried out by

"free will," and surrounded as they are with dangers they require for their realization a generation of men that is conscious enough and strives to be up to the discharge of this responsibility.¹

1926. In August the First Pan-Asian Congress sits at Nagasaki. Propagandists from China, Siam, Korea, the Philippines, Japan and India take part as delegates. Equality of races, abrogation of unilateral treaties, emancipation of Asian peoples from the yoke of foreigners and other items form the subject of resolutions. Something like an Asiatic League of Nations is projected.²

This non-official meeting in the Far East is followed in November of the same year by an official (?) congress held at Odessa in Russia in which the statesmen and ambassadors of Russia, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and China take part. A pan-Oriental League has been established with the object of promoting united defence against aggressors.

1927. HEYKING, *La Conception de l'Etat et l'Idee de la cohesion ethnique* (The conception of the state and the Idea of ethnic cohesion). He condemns the *snobisme raciste* (racial snobism) *i.e.* the cult of ethnical nationalism, from the standpoints of public law and international law. This racialism is, however, a product of the Treaty of Versailles which has

¹ See "The world's greatest Men" in Sarkars *Science of History* (London, 1912), "The positive Theory of Nation-making" in his *Politics of Boundaries* (Calcutta, 1926) and "The Philosophy of the Naughty" in his *Greetings to Young India* (Calcutta, 1927).

² Jung: *L'Islam et l'Asie*, Paris, 1927.

created the so-called the "nationality-states" and along with them the "minority-question." The new, ethnical conception of the state is opposed to the traditional conception which considers the state to be an organisation of public law. It is according to this law that Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France, and Russia have been going on. All these states are composite in the sense of racial diversity and yet none of them have cared to create these new-fangled theories of race, minority, etc. Racial intolerance should disappear as religious intolerance has done.

1927. The humiliating Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 which was annulled by the Nationalists (1921-22) has however been virtually restored by RIZA KHAN who is crowned and recognized as Shah (1925). His "moderatism" is as anti-Soviet as pro-British (cf. Chang Kaishek in China). Radical risings are being suppressed with vigour, *e.g.* at Khorasan, Gilan, Khorasan, etc. The Persian question as the Chinese leads to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Bolshevik Russia (April 1927). But in the meantime the controversy over the Bahrein Islands excites nationalist feeling and Persia abrogates the "capitulations" (May, 1928). The terms seem to indicate, however, that this alleged abrogation does not imply any great recovery of sovereignty from foreign control.

Whatever be the fortunes of nationalism in Persia and the Persian factor in international complications economic development in the sense of industrialism and capitalism should appear to have been making a headway in this country as in China. Here as in the Far East the role

of foreign capital is moreover an important feature. For instance, the Government of Riza Khan has sanctioned the construction of a network of roads under British auspices. The roads are intended on the one hand to unite the Mesopotamia roads through Teheran with Tabriz, and on the other to link up Persia with the Indian system. This network of roads will greatly lighten the projected railway construction especially in the laying down of the Trans-Persian track, Mohammerah-Teheran-Bender-Gaz and the Bagdad branch Khanikin-Hamadan. It creates a network of approach roads and intersecting roads, foreshadowing an extensive development of motor transport. A point of special economic importance is the creation of internal markets by linking together provinces distant from one another. The problem of transit through the territories of Soviet Russia for North Persia, affording the possibility of directing the production of the north to the internal markets and the ports of the Mediterranean is also being partially solved. Besides, these roads, being a continuation of Indian and Iraq railways in the direction of the Trans-Caucasian and Turkestan frontiers of Russia will have some strategic importance as well.

Conditions are thus being established whereby at any moment thousands of armed men can be transported by motors from India and Mesopotamia.

1927. J. A. HOBSON (1858—): "Must we scrap Democracy?" in the *Nation* (London, Dec. 3).

He combats Bernard SHAW'S denunciation of "democracy as a delusion" and incidentally also Bryce's doubts as the feasibility of any real democracy except in a few of the smaller European countries such as Switzerland and Scandinavia and condemns Shaw's thesis that government of the people is necessary, government for the people possible but that government by the people a permanent impossibility. According to Shaw the ordinary man "only wants to know what to do," is always prepared to accept an authority. He does not mind whether the autocrat imposes himself

forcibly (like Mussolini) or through a "conscious minority" or whether some formality of election is gone through. Hobson opposes this Fascist philosophy of human nature and the characteristics of the masses by enunciating his own articles of faith; thus: (1) The common folk is not to be contemptuously treated as the "swinish multitude" in the manner of Burke. (2) The electorate is not a single inert, ignorant mass. Every electorate consists of many grades and sorts of intelligence and public spirit. In every electorate there are "groups of politically minded persons with constructive as well as critical minds." Even in the case of those who are mere followers or party adherents one can notice a somewhat conscious and intelligent appreciation of the interests at stake. (3) The demos does not always ignore "measures" and does not always vote for "men." "No doubt a Napoleon or a Mussolini may at a critical juncture capture the imagination of the crowd. But history affords no evidence that he can hold it. The normal mind of democracy does not give blank cheques to tyrants. (4) Though the "people" cannot draft a Bill or negotiate a foreign treaty in the manner of experts they can make themselves fairly articulate on lines of policy directly affecting their interests.

1927 Indian National Congress: Session at Madras. President ANSARI. The assembly decides upon "complete national independence" (as contrasted with the "Swaraj" of the period since 1906) as the goal of Indian political struggle. It associates itself

with the World's League against Imperialism established at Brussels in February. It initiates also an Asian policy for India by demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops, officers, police and consulate guards from China, Mesopotamia and Persia. It condemns the war-preparations of Great Britain in the North Western Frontier Province of India and in the Eastern Seas and calls upon the people to refuse to be exploited by Great Britain in and for her imperialistic wars in Asia or abroad. A boycott of the forthcoming Simon Commission for enquiry into the Government of India is declared. The deliberations lead to the focusing of attention on constitution-making and on a suitable constitution for free Swaraj in India.

The literature on the subject has been growing
cf :—

1. Chitta Ranjan Das and Bhagavan Das: *Outline scheme of Swaraj*, Benares, 1923.
2. Annie Besant: *Commonwealth of India Bill* (presented by Mr. Lansbury to the British Parliament, December, 1925).
3. Tej Bahadur Sapru: *Indian Constitution*, Madras 1926.
4. Independent Labour Party (British): *Swarajya for India Bill*, draft for discussion, not yet presented to Parliament, 1927.
5. C. Vijayaragavachariar: *Swaraj Constitution*, Madras, 1927.
6. A. Rangaswami Iyengar: *Draft Constitution of India Bill*, Madras, 1927.

7. S. Srinivas Iyengar, *Swaraj Constitution*, Madras. 1927.

1927. Recent political thinking in Japan concerns itself mainly with issues raised by the passing of Baron Koto's Universal Suffrage Act in 1925. No "general election" has yet been held on this new, manhood franchise basis. But the shufflings among the old parties and creation of new ones testify to the stir and turmoil in public mentality. Japan has to face bourgeois democracy as well as more or less organised bolshevism simultaneously, and this for the first time in her constitutional life.

Three Bourgeois Parties

1. *Kensei-Kai* is the party in power headed by WAKATSUKI.

2. *Seiyu-Kai* Party forms the Opposition headed by GENERAL TANAKA and is a little inferior to the Government Party in numerical strength.

3. *Seiyu honto*, headed by TOKONAMI, consists of 90 members only but is influential as deciding the strength of the other two parties.

These three parties possess no separate platforms and their constituencies are virtually the same. The three props supporting the constituency, says the *Asahi* of Osaka, are militarism, the almighty dollar and the peerage. There cannot be any fundamental difference between them. But yet the Taiwan Bank question leads to the fall of the *Kensei-Kai* and the establishment of the Tanaka-Ministry (*Seiyukai*) in April 1927.

Split in the Labour Organization

In 1925 during the early days of the universal suffrage the *Sodomei* (General Federation of Labour) develops "moderate" or "reformist" tendencies. A split takes place in the labour organization.

The *Hyogikai* (National Council of Labour Unions), a small section, extremist and revolutionary, secedes from the *Sodomei* (November 1925). The leader, FUKUMOTO, is a radical Marxist.

Four Proletarian Parties

1. Chronologically speaking, the first so-called proletarian party is the Japan Peasants' Party formed in October 1925. It comprises both farmers and landowners, but excludes factory workers, and may be regarded as the extreme right of the proletarian parties.

2. In December 1925 the *Sodomei* establishes the Peasants' and Workers' Party, which, however, is suspected as communistic and is dissolved by the police. But in November 1926 the *Sodomei* succeeds in founding a party called the Social People's Party by eliminating radical elements of all sorts. The membership comprises expert mechanics and the "intellectuals." Professor ABE of Waseda University (Tokyo) is the leader of this party.

3. The extremists are at the same time organized in the Peasants' and Workers' Party. It comprises three radical groups : (1) the *Hyogikai*, (2) *Suiheisha* (Young Men's League), (3) *Seiji Kenkyu-kai* (Labour Political Research Association).

4. Japan Labour-Agrarian Party (also established

in November 1926) is described as centrist by non-proletarianists. KONO and NIWA are the leaders.¹

¹In February 1928 the Tanaka Ministry (*Seiyukai*) suddenly dissolves the Parliament. The *Kokumin* of Tokyo has the following to say in regard to this :

The dissolution of the Diet is not new in Japan, and the present one is the twelfth to be dissolved in the history of our Diet. But the present dissolution has much more meaning than those of the past, as it closes the last session of the Diet under restricted suffrage. Of course even without the dissolution the general election would have been held in May and the dissolution only brought it a few months earlier. But to have the first election under general manhood suffrage even a few months earlier is indeed very happy news. We do not think that the general manhood suffrage election will bring a radical change in our political condition. The existing parties have all become degenerated, and are considering party and personal interests before the welfare of the country. The only way to remedy this situation is to hold elections under general manhood suffrage. The Government and other large parties will do everything to increase their power in the Diet to be formed as the result of the coming election. Also proletariat parties may be planning to gain their footing in the Diet, and if they are able to forget petty differences of opinion and sentimental conflicts and to come to some agreement to take concerted action together, they will be able to give their efforts towards the national welfare. "

The Tokyo *Asahi's* remarks are given below :

"If the policies of the great parties cannot be trusted and are against the interests of the public, we can vote for proletariat candidates at the coming election. The more proletariat members are sent to the House of Representatives, the greater influence will they have in the Diet. In one sense, the coming election is very important as an indicator of how many proletariat candidates would be elected. Those who have been disappointed with the existing political parties will vote for the proletariat parties, and it makes the amalgamation of all proletariat parties absolutely necessary.

"The present dissolution has another meaning having given the first opportunity to try the election under general manhood suffrage. General manhood suffrage was not desired by the existing parties and

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1927. LAUTAUD and POUDENX : *La Représentationnelle* (Professional Representation).

because of the compromise reached between the political parties and the House of Peers, suffrage has not been extended as much as the public demands. The present general manhood suffrage regulations have many defects but under the new regulations there are 12,500,000 voters while under the restricted suffrage the voters were only 3,500,000. Thus the new election regulations have marked a new epoch in the Japanese political and parliamentary history. If new voters who have been refused suffrage in the past will exercise their right properly and effectively, the Diet will be improved. Because of this meaning the coming election should be held fairly under the supervision of the public. If the result of the election does not bring any change in the Diet then it shows that the public interest in constitutional politics has been lost and the country will come to a political crisis."

The *Young East* (March 1928). Tokyo has the following :

"In consequence of the dissolution of the House of Representatives in January, a general election was held in JAPAN on FEBRUARY 20. Being the first ever carried out in this country under the new universal manhood suffrage law, it aroused very deep interest both at home and abroad. Of more than twelve million new voters, nearly ten millions turned out to cast their ballots. The following table shows the results of the voting as compiled by the Home office :

Seiyukai (Pro-government)	221
Minseito (Opposition)	214
Independents	16
Proletarians	8
Businessmen's party	4
Kakushin Club	3
	<hr/>
	466

"The following table shows the number of votes secured by the various parties :

	Votes.
Seiyukai	4,414,749
Minseito	4,122,411
Proletarian parties	476,440
Independents	326,860
Businessmen's party	163,335
Kakushin club	81,336

The French revolution (1789) established *parliamentarisme* in France on the British model. Parliamentarism had been established in other countries of Europe during the nineteenth century. In the meantime, as says SEE in *Les Origines du Capitalisme moderne*, "Origins of modern capitalism" (1926), the industrial revolution had given rise to the working men's question "in the place of the eighteenth century" problem of the peasant. "The working class question has led to the "syndicalist" (trade union) movement which, according to BENOIST in *L'Organisation du Travail*, "Organization of Labour," is not an entity within the framework of the state but stands beside it, facing it, nay, in opposition to it. Hence the *crise de l'Etat moderne* (crisis of the modern state).

Since the days of St. Simon there has been no end of criticism of parliamentarism *i. e.* of "purely political institutions." Especially during the post-war period the *critiques* are legion in every country. The very fact that the British Labour Party has to interfere in politics shows that even in England, the "mother of parliaments," parliament has become "relatively impotent." The "purely political institutions" are incapable of solving the economic

"As all these figures show, the Government has emerged victorious, but by a very narrow margin. It may even be said that with such a small majority over its principal opponent, the victory of the Government is akin to defeat. In the circumstance, it is hopeless to see political stability established in this country for some time to come, the general expectation being that the Government under Baron Tanaka will not be able to remain long in power."

problems. Hence the attempts in different countries to try "other forms," of government in the place of "parliamentary democracy": viz. (1) the dictatorship of a class *e.g.* in Russia, (2) the dictatorship of an individual, *e.g.* in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland and Greece, (3) the parliamentary system "tempered by the military dictatorship," devoid in any case of democratic government, *e.g.* in Germany. As regards the "methods," of government, one can notice in most of these dictatorships the creation of "professional representation" *by the side* of the parliament which they have "strangled but not radically suppressed."

The fundamental problem consists in translating the social and economic revolution of the nineteenth century into the political constitutions. "An economic and social 1789" is the objective. Parliamentary facts and ideas are to be harmonized with the idea of association and the syndical (trade union) fact. Further, the idea and fact of multiplicity of corporate groups are to be harmonized with the idea and fact of the unity of the state.

The political revolution of 1789 has had its expression in the universal suffrage, representation of parties and of multiple opinions. The industrial revolution which has given birth to modern capitalism ought to have its own political expression; and that is professional representation—the representation of efficiency, interest and profession. There are two forms in which it is likely to embody itself: (1) that of mere consultative committees without sovereign

powers, and (2) a representative system based on new orders or types of constituency enjoying powers of sovereignty through the parliaments. The first form, that of a committee of experts, is, however, not to be regarded as deserving the name of genuine professional representation, because, these experts do not possess any delegation or mandate from their organizations. Without delegation there is no representation.

The *Reichswirtschaftsrat* (Imperial Economic Council) established by Bismarck was a mere council of experts. By the Weimar constitution (1919), according to which the German republic of to-day is being governed, the *Reichswirtschaftsrat* was to have been developed into a veritable Economic Parliament. But it has in the course of five or six years (1925) degenerated again into the old Bismarckian assembly of experts, dependent on the Reichstag as well as the government.

The Consultative Commission of Tchechoslovakia, (1919), the Economic Council of Poland (1925), the Higher Council of National Economy in Italy (1923-1925), the Economic Council of Japan are likewise consultative bodies.

The National Economic Council of France (1925) is also mainly a *laboratoire d'etudes économiques* (laboratory or economic studies) with the right to examine certain problems, suggest solutions and transmit them to the government and the legislature.

The Council of National Economy in Spain (1924) has a more ambitious programme, approaching that

of the economic parliament. The Higher Council of National Economy in Soviet Russia is not so much a parliament as an executive,—a commissariat controlling the industry of the entire system of the Soviets.¹

It is clear that these councils are not economic parliaments. But they have already demonstrated, according to the authors, that the Marxian doctrine of "class-struggle" is superannuated and bids fair to be replaced by a new system. The world is getting used everywhere to the system of corporate associations that rise step by step, from the small local group to the federations and to the national confederations. We have thus the "economic federalism" foreseen by PAUL-BONCOUR in his book of that name (1900), according to which the social, regional and corporate groups would reconquer the fullness of their autonomy suppressed as they have been under the centralized state. In his judgment this would give rise to "economic decentralization" which, based as it is on the sovereignty of the syndicates or trade unions, is even more opportune than the political decentralization longed for by Barres, Maurras and Brun; because it is the "professional groups that are the most diverse in their tendencies and vary according to the complexity of economic facts themselves."

¹ This functions in collaboration with the highly specialized technical institution directed by 16 economists, known as the "Gosplan" which seeks to "chart" and "direct" the future of industry agriculture, commerce and employment on the basis of statistics, curves and index numbers such as are more or less being collected in the Crisis-Institutes of Western Europe and America.

The councils are to collaborate with the executive in the matter of executing the laws, as Paul-Broncour suggests. The authors do not want the "economic councils" to possess sovereignty even in part, which ought to belong exclusively to parliament. The councils are not to usurp the functions of parliament. As BOUGLE says: a professional parliament replacing the parliament elected by the majority is almost inconceivable; but a council as aid to parliament is quite admissible."

But there are theorists in favour of a real economic parliament, *i.e.* a parliament elected by strictly professional representation. To-day LAVERGUE (see above) is one of the keenest advocates of this system which was sponsored a generation ago by BENOIST in *La Crise de l'Etat moderne* (1897).

1928. General WALI, the Afghan Envoy, lectures at Cairo to the Egyptian ministers and various other notables:

"The general awakening in the whole Orient, the unanimous feeling of relationship and inter-alliance is not the outcome of mere change. It is prevailing all over the Oriental from the mountains of Taurus to the cedars of the Lebanons, from the heights of the Pamir, to the plains of Afghanistan, to the wilderness of Arabia, to Mesopotamia, Persia, India, China, Siberia and Japan.

The kingdoms of the Orient, in their new alliance and liberty, have no object but to get closer and nearer to the nations of the Occident, in order that

both sides might work and toil for the welfare, peace and happiness of mankind.

It is with a real feeling of pain and regret that I discovered, that the members of the League of Nations are altogether disconcerted and undecided as to the best means and methods to employ for the consolidation of world-wide peace. Unfortunately they have not as yet achieved any part of their great human mission, and I might be so optimistic as to state that the presumptive Asiatic League of Nations will greatly help the European League of Nations, and will influence them in the accomplishment of the said task. I trust that before long, I shall make my voice heard from the said League of Asiatic Nations, proclaiming that this task must and will be accomplished.

I feel great satisfaction in saying that, as a result of the recent visits of H.M. the King of Afghanistan, we have concluded friendship and relationship with the Belgian Government, Polish Government, and the Republic of Switzerland. We had already treaties of friendship with the British Government, Soviet Government, Italian Government, French Republic, German Government, Turkish Republic and Persian Government.

In Africa, we had no friends or connections, but I have been charged with the mission of making a treaty of friendship with the Egyptian Government, which is now finally concluded and signed.

Likewise, I hope that a similar treaty might after-

wards be made with the Republic of the United States of America also. I might also mention a fact that will not be out of place, namely, that one of the objects of our treaty with the Egyptian Government is nothing but to create and establish relations of friendship and co-operation between the nations of Africa and Asia.

No Oriental who respects and honours his fatherland could help rejoicing or could keep back the sentiment of innocent pride and satisfaction. Once mention is made of Japan's progress, the "leap" of Turkey, the awakening and rising of Afghanistan, the resurrection of Persia, the development and wealth of Egypt and the revolution of Syria.

Why should an Oriental rejoice and feel proud in this manner when the above narration is made? Is it because the time is not far off when Oriental nations shall stand face to face with the nations of the Occident, and say to them, "Our intention is not to compete with you, but to copy all that is good in your civilization and leave anything that may not be useful, no doubt this being good to both countries.

It is neither for the one nor for the other. Such pleasure and rejoicing is because Oriental nations have torn up the veils of ignorance and fanaticism, have stopped slaughtering each other, because they have taken full conception of their duties towards their homeland and towards the rest of humanity, because they have in them the sentiments of sympathetic and fraternal feelings towards their fellowmen, regardless of

the differences of language and the variety of religion.

Afghanistan is trying to make connection of friendship with all the nations of the world so that, as much as she can, she will try to work for the peace and unity of the human race.

I have great pleasure and satisfaction in saying that our beloved King, H.M. Amanullah Khan, all my countrymen and myself are not prejudiced in favour of or against any religion or sect. We have friendly relations and sentiments towards all nations and persons. We are friends to any power or nation that extends its hand of sincere friendship to us."

II

IDEAS AND IDEALS OF ECONOMIC WELFARE

Ideology : (1) trade unions, trusts and tariffs are important categories in public life and social thought ; (2) the anatomy of society is furnished by (i) capitalistic organisations (joint stock companies, chambers of commerce, etc), (ii) co-operative societies and (iii) labour associations ; (3) world-finance and colonialism ; (4) progressive taxation ; (5) labour's revolt against the state:—(i) radical: anarchistic-syndicalism, (ii) moderate : guild-socialism ; (6) protectionism ; (7) public ownership and municipal trading ; (8) labour internationals, (9) currency, credit and "central banking" (Reserve), (10) inflation, deflation and devaluation.

SECTION I

FROM THE BIRTH OF YOUNG ASIA TO THE END
OF THE GREAT WAR (1905—1918).

1905. I. W. W. (Industrial Workers of the World) established in the United States. The leading part is played by the Western Federation of Miners. According to them the working class and the employing class have nothing in common. Between the two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production and abolish the wage system. The objects of the I. W. W. are (i) to subserve the immediate interests of the working class, (ii) to effect their final emancipation, and (iii) to promote *class*-consciousness as contrasted with the "craft"-consciousness of the American Federation of Labour (A. F. L.). They believe that organizations of the "industrial union" type as contrasted with the "craft union" type would render it possible to wage the class war under favourable conditions.

"Craft union" is an association which unites the workers engaged in a single industrial process. "Industrial unions" are associations in which all the different classes of workers engaged in the different processes of a whole industry are united.¹

1905. DUFAY: *L'Impôt Progressif en France* (Progressive Tax in France). It is not only an economic role but a "moralizing" role as well that

¹Brooks: *American Syndicalism: The I. W. W.*, N. Y., 1913. Brissenden: *The I. W. W.: A Study of American Syndicalism*, New York 1919.

taxation has to play. It has to emancipate labour by removing the excessive power from capitalists and rendering unto labour a social and economic power that it possesses very inadequately at the present moment. Taxation has the function of maintaining within a just limit the particular appropriation of the wealth produced at least indirectly by the labour of all.

1905. KNAPP: *Die staatliche Theorie des Geldes* (The Statal i.e., Legal or Political Theory of Money) adumbrates the idea that money has "validity" but no "value." A certain stuff passes for money not because it has some intrinsic value but because it is a "social fact," a part of the legal system of the land. It is the fiat of the state that endows a material with the character of currency.¹ This theory, systematized as it is by Knapp, can be traced as far back as ADAM MUELLER'S *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Geldes* (Essay on a New Theory of Money) 1816, and to mention the moderns, is to be found in HEYN'S *Papier-waehrung mit Goldreserve fuer dem Auslands-verkehr* (Paper-money with gold reserve for foreign transactions), 1894, and MARK'S *Das Gold nicht mehr Geld* (Gold no longer money), 1897. Knapp's conception of the state-fiat or will of the community as maker of money appears to be verified objectively during the Great War (1914-1918) and the post-war period when paper-money and inflation became the characteristic currency features of the

¹Chapter on "Theories of Money Old and New" in Sarkar's *Economic Development* (1926); Wagemann's *Allgemeine Geldlehre*, Berlin, 1923.

belligerent nations. The divorce of money from gold (and in fact from all metals) becomes a reality and furnishes theorists like KEYNES with inspiration as to the final abandonment of the gold standard, the thesis of his *Tract on Monetary Reform* (1924). The metallists, however, get the upper hand in currency reconstruction in every country, and "back to gold" becomes once more the basis of sound money (cf. HAWTREY: *Gold Standard in Theory and Practice* 1927). An epoch of the "gold-bullion standard" begins (England, 1926), Italy and France (1928).

1905. Non-official studies on cartels are instituted in Germany under the auspices of *Verein fuer Social politik*. Professors BRENTANO and SCHMOLLER suggest that (i) the affairs of cartels should be officially known to the government for the purpose of control, and that (ii) the state should intervene in order to regulate fair wages.

1906. PENTY (1873-) : *Restoration of the Gild system*. He promotes the appreciation of "mediæval economy" on the lines of Ruskin and Morris, and suggests the conversion of trade unions into craft guilds. He would have political government replaced by industrial government. Opposition to large scale production is one of his slogans. In his scheme the craftsman is to own the instruments of production. He is a champion of excessive mediævalism, guilds being the basis of society. "Cottage industries" are to be the ideal. "Away from machineries," is another slogan.

1907. JACK LONDON, American novelist, *The Iron*

Heel. He represents revolutionary socialism and is Marxian in outlook. His message may be summed up thus: "We want all that you possess. We want in our hands the reins of power and the destinies of mankind. Here are our hands. They are strong hands."

1907-12. ORAGE (1873-) reorganizes the *New Age* weekly, opposes Fabianism, collectivism and state-socialism (cf. Belloc, 1912) and proposes control of industry by workers. He would develop trade unions on the lines of mediæval guilds and demands abolition of the wage system.

1907-1914. German socialism becomes preponderantly "revisionist" *i.e.*, moderate or reformist and sympathetic to imperialism and nationalism, protection and war budgets. The socialists HAASE and SCHEIDEMANN assume the role of "patriots" (nationalists) and reject the tenets of class-struggle and internationalism.

1908. SELIGMAN (1861-), American: *Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice* (First edition 1884).

The general sentiment in many places is in favour of proportional taxation. But in almost every country the principle of progressive taxation has been introduced to some extent.

This is true not only in monarchies like those of continental Europe (1908) and Japan, but in democracies like those of America, Australia and Switzerland. One finds progressive income taxes in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Belgium as

well as in Switzerland ; progressive rental taxes in France and Australia ; progressive property taxes in Switzerland, Holland and Australia ; and progressive inheritance taxes in France, Germany, England, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and elsewhere. Even in the United States, which is supposed to be *par excellence* the home of proportional taxation, there have been developed a progressive property tax, like the federalist house tax, and some decidedly progressive income taxes, both national and local ; besides, progressive income taxes, progressive inheritance taxes and progressive land taxes. According to Seligman, the opponents of the progressive principle, like Leroy-Beaulieu, forget that it is the function of progressive taxation " not so much to obtain increased revenues as to apportion the burden more equably among the taxpayers." If the progressive tax is more just than the proportional tax, the fact that it would not yield a penny more of revenue would itself constitute no valid objection. " It is erroneous to assume that progressive taxation necessarily implies socialism and confiscation. It is possible to repudiate the socialistic theory of taxation and yet, at the same, time to advocate progressive taxation—on purely economic grounds."

The simple fact of the gradual decrease of marginal utility does not necessarily lead to progressive taxation, nor on the other hand necessarily to proportional. From the equality of sacrifice doctrine it is not possible to deduce any mathematically exact scale of taxation.

A purely economic theory of taxation is as

impossible as a purely economic theory of value. Equality of taxation connotes an ethical problem in the same sense that the general law of value and price does, says Seligman. And he concludes as follows: "While it is highly probable that the ends of justice would be more nearly subserved by some approximation to a progressive scale, considerations of expediency as well as the uncertainty of the inter-relations between various parts of the entire tax system should tend to render us cautious in advocating any general application of the principle."

1908-II. Socialistic legislation.¹ (Bismarckian) in England even under Liberal (LLOYD GEORGE) regime: (1) old age pension (1908), (2) minimum wage (1909), (3) national insurance (1911). cf. the French laws: 1905 (old age pension for persons over 70), 1910 (pension to working men at 60).

1908-II. Syndicalist thought in France is represented by (1) workingmen and their own leaders such as Griffuelhes, Pouget, Pataud and others and (2) intellectuals associated with the monthly *Mouvement Socialiste* such as the editor Lagardelle and Sorel, Berth, etc.

GRIFFUELHES, secretary to the C. G. T. (1901-8) is the author of *L'Action Syndicaliste* (1908) *Les Objectives de nos luttes de classes* (The Aims of our Class Struggle), 1909, *Voyage revolutionnaire* (Impressions or career of a revolutionist) 1910. General

¹ "Le Socialisme d'Etat," in Rambaud's *Histoire des doctrines économiques*. Paris 1909; See Knowles *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in England during the nineteenth century*. London, 1926.

strike is the only weapon capable of assuring the triumph of the proletariat. It is the objective of all wills, the spirit that moves, and the ferment that works the spirits.

POUGET, assistant secretary to the C. G. T. (1900-8), is the author of *La Confederation Generale du Travail* (1908) and *Sabotage* (1910) and editor of *La Voix du peuple*, weekly organ of the C. G. T. since 1900.

PATAUD and POUGET are the joint authors of *Comment nous ferons la revolution* (How we shall make the revolution), 1909.

LAGARDELLE, founder of the monthly, "*Mouvement Socialiste*" syndicalist since 1904, is the author of *Le Socialisme Ouvrier* (Workingmen's Socialism), 1911, *La greve generale et le socialisme* (General Strike and Socialism) 1905.

SOREL: *La Decomposition du Marxisme* 1908: In his interpretation Marxism has never sought to create an authoritarian State but intends rather to institute free associations with the object of organizing production. Proletarian revolution would remove the state. His *La Violence* (1910) says that socialistic legislation has dampened the ardour of the working-class to a certain extent. But, in order to achieve proletarian dictatorship, it is necessary to cultivate the spirit of violence, fervour and enthusiasm such as characterised the primitive Christians as well as the soldiers of Napoleon.

BERTH: *Les Nouveaux Aspects du socialisme* (New Aspects of Socialism), 1908. According to him

Marx wished that syndical life should not dissipate itself in political action. The real social cell is not the party, the club, or political committee but the workshop. The "party" is the organisation of the bourgeois, the merchant, the lawyer who seeks a parliamentary position. But the "syndicate" is the organisation of the workingmen, the proletariat. It is the workingmen's syndicate that will create the society of the future. It would be stupid attempting to describe that future regime with precision. He champions the abolition of the state and wants collective property of the producers.

TVETOT: *Manuel de Soldat* (The Soldier's Manual) preaches pacifism and antipathy to war, makes corresponding propaganda among soldiers, attracts them to the *Bourses du travail* (labour-exchanges), promotes international action of the syndicalists against war.¹

1909. Poor Law Commission in England: Majority report is directed against state intervention (cf. the old view 1834). Minority report is in favour,—would abolish the poor law and would institute special machinery to deal with unemployment. It believes that "public" (state) assistance is a good rather than an evil. The ministry of labour is established in 1916.

¹Saint-Leon's *Syndicalisme ouvrier* (Workingmen's Syndicalism) Paris, 1920. Pataud and Pouget's *Comment ferons nous la revolution* is available as *Syndicalism and the Co-operative Commonwealth* with a foreword by Tom Mann (British Syndicalist) and preface by Kropotkin, the Russian anarchist, London 1913. Jouhaux: *Le Syndicalisme et le G, G, T*; Moon: *The Labour-Problem and the Social Catholic Problem in France* N, Y. 1921.

The minority report has the public opinion behind it and in fact is the basis of the MACLEAN Report (1918) which demands the abolition of the Boards of Guardians and virtually of the Poor Law itself.¹

1909. KAUTSKY (1854-) German socialist, a leader of the Second International (1889-1914): *The Road to Power* points out the intensification of class antagonism in general and the growth of imperialism in particular and describes how after the "revolutionary period of 1789-1871" in Western Europe an analogous period begins for the East in 1905. He believes that a world-war is coming nearer with threatening rapidity. The revolutionary era is beginning. "The present situation contains this danger that we, the German social-democrats, may easily be considered more moderate than we are in reality."²

1909. Principles of taxation adopted by the British Labour Party: (1) Taxation should be in proportion to ability to pay and to the protection and benefit conferred on the individual by the state. (2) No taxation should be imposed which encroaches on the individual's means to satisfy his physical and primary

¹Webb (S & B): *English Poor Law Policy*, London 1910.

²Note how in spite of his staunch devotion to Marxism revolutionary fervour and fights with the "opportunists" or "moderate" socialists such as Millerand, Bernstein, etc. (cf. his *Bernstein and Social Democratic Programme*, 1899, *Social Revolution* 1902) Kautsky is condemned as "opportunist," corrupter and perverter of Marxism by Lenin in his *Imperialism* (1916) and *The State and Revolution* (1917). See Kautsky: *Sozialismus und Kolonial-politik* (Socialism and Colonial Policy) Berlin, 1907. Simkhovitch: *Marxism vs. Socialism*, New York 1913. Stroebel: *German Revolution and after*, New York 1923. Laidler: *History of Socialist Thought*, London 1927.

needs. (3) Taxation should aim at securing the unearned increment of wealth for communal use. (4) Therefore taxation should be levied on earned incomes and should aim deliberately at preventing the retention of great fortunes in private hands.¹

1912. BELLOC: *Servile State* condemns the collectivism—the municipal and state socialism—of the Fabians (Shaw, Wells, the Webbs etc.) and proposes a distributivist state. The “instinct of ownership” is to be distributed as widely as possible. He appreciates the peasant proprietors and guilds of the Middle Ages and opposes all *socialistic* legislation (cf. Orage and the *New Age*).

1913. The Federal Reserve Bank System is inaugurated in the U.S.A., the theory being in the main that of the German *Reichsbank* (1875).²

1914. Trusts (such as are legal) come under the control of the government in the U.S.A. The Federal Trade Commission replaces the Bureau of Corporations (established in 1903) in the same fashion as the Inter-State Commerce Commission does. The CLAYTON Anti-Trust Act strengthens the Sherman Act.³

1914. *Report on State and Municipal Enterprise* by the WEBBS: 12 million people in England in collectivist business.

¹ Snowden: *Labour and National Finance*, London 1920.

²Sarkar: “Types and Tendencies in American Banking” in the *Journal of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce* (March and June, 1927).

³Carter: *Tendency towards Industrial Combination* (in England), London, 1913; *The Federal Anti-Trust Laws*, Washington, 1923. Wilson's *New Freedom*, New York, 1914.

1914-18. The Great War promotes the "key industries" movement (Lord BALFOUR).

1915. National Guilds League, London, is founded.¹

1918. Pethick LAWRENCE: *A Levy on Capital*.

He believes that the hardship inflicted on the very rich by a severe levy on capital at the end of the War will be a less evil to the country as a whole than any other measure that might be adopted to meet the situation. "Rich men have increased their wealth during the war without special exertion and as a result of the necessities of the nation; they can hardly complain if they are called upon to give the whole or part of this increase." The levy is to be extracted *once and for all* for the "specific purpose of expunging or *reducing* the National Debt (£m 6000). The rate will be "graduated" on *all the wealth* in the hands of individuals but "fixed" on *part of the wealth* in the hands of clubs and institutions. The "general capital levy" thus raised can not only sweep away the entire national debt but render unnecessary the corporation tax, profits taxes and taxes on food as well as remove the floating debt and reduce normal income tax from 6s to 4s and the other rates of income tax and supertax to two-thirds of their present level.

SECTION II

POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS (1919—1928)

1919. The Committee on Trusts appointed by the Government (British) suggests (i) publicity about

¹G. S. Hobson (1885—) *National Guilds and the State* 1919, London.

trade associations through the Board of Trade as well as (ii) the establishment of official machinery to deal with abuses.¹

1919. League of Nations, Bureau of Labour promulgates nine principles of labour : (i) labor not a mere commodity, (2) right of association among both employees and employers, (3) wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life, (4) eight-hour day, (5) weekly rest of 24 hours, (6) abolition of child labour, (7) equality between men and women *re* payment, (8) equitable treatment of employees, (9) inspection in which women are to take part.

1919. J. A. HOBSON. (1858—): *Taxation in the New State*. He thinks that though modern state finance has been moving empirically towards a recognition of the fundamental truth that, only surplus income *i.e.*, economically unnecessary payments to owners of some factor of production, possesses a true ability to bear, economists and statesmen alike still cling to the looser and defective statement of this principle conveyed in the first of Adam Smith's four maxims of taxation. In his judgment, all economic rents of land, whether scarcity or differential rents, all interest, profits and other payments for the use of capital, brains or labour which are due to superior economic opportunities and are not necessary incentives to secure such use, will rank as surplus,

¹Fitzgerald : *Industrial Combination in England 1927* ; Sarkar : "Stinnes Complex in German Industry " in *Economic Development* (Madras 1296) and " Trusts and Rationalization: Aspects of the New Industrial Revolution" in the *Calcutta Review* (Sept. 1927).

and, accordingly, have a full ability to bear taxation. He would make the state the "residual owner of all income which exceeds the requirements of maintenance and normal growth." It need not be observed that Hobson endorses the capital levy.

1919. The Third International, with headquarters at Moscow, (also known as Communist International or "comintern" issues the *New Communist Manifesto*. The solution of the world crisis is possible through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The only possible league of nations is a world-wide federation of workers' republics. Genuine self-government is to be granted to all colonies. The proletariat must create its own political machinery, *e.g.*, workers' councils. The Soviets, "Disarm the bourgeoisie, arm the proletariat." Direct action, is the method advocated.¹

1919. Imperial Preference becomes positive law in England. cf. Chamberlain, 1902-3.

1919. *Betriebs-räte-gesetz* (Law of Works—Councils) in Austria, in Germany (1920) and in Tchechoslovakia (1921). In every concern, with an employment of 20 or more workingmen and clerks, there is to be a works-council to look after the economic, social and cultural interests of the working-

¹Eden and Cedar Paul : *Communism*, Labour Pamphlet No. 3. London, 1921. Bukharin : *A.B.C. of Communism*. Longuet *La Politique internationale du Marxisme*, Paris, 1918; Hyndman *Evolution of Revolution* (Marxian approach to the questions of justice); 1920; Bukharin : *Economic Theory of the Leisure Class*; 1927; Postgate *Bolshevik Theory* 1920. *Re the philosophy*, Geneva vs. Moscow, see Sarkar *Politics of Boundaries* (chapters on the League and the Third International), 1926.

men. The works-council is to consist of representatives of the workingmen as well as of the employers. This joint council of the employers and workingmen has the right to examine the balance-sheet as well as suggest and introduce improvements in the technical administration of the business. These councils are not to replace the trade-unions but supplement and strengthen them.¹

1919-23. MARSHALL (1842-1924), *Industry and Trade*: (a) His investigations indicate socialistic "leanings"; he is convinced of the marvellous development of the working class faculty, but, according to him, no socialistic scheme is calculated to *raise* the real income of the working-classes although it may lead to *equalization* in the distribution of a country's total income. He popularises an eclectic approach to all those movements—both of employers and employees—which seek to promote the "selfish," "sectional" interests. "Class"—philosophy is the basis of his social investigations. (b) His conclusions are essentially capitalistic. In his judgment, benefits conferred by private capital on the society (including working classes) are increasing, while interest enjoyed by private capitalists is not increasing. He argues in behalf of the necessity of providing facilities for the promotion of private capital." Progress depends on the taking of risks by private capital. New technical advances are not, as a rule, appreciated by governments. Every new idea in government enterprise is

¹ Adler : *Betriebsraete-gesetz*, Vienna, 1925.

borrowed of private. Governments are competent only for routine work. Guild socialism is condemned by him as utopian and impractical, thus: "Mr. Cole seems to follow closely in the paths of St. Simon, Fourier and other early socialists of noble character and vivid poetic imagination. The task of regulation is to be as simple as it would be if all men were as unselfish and earnest as the writer himself. The vast difficulties of modern business organisation are so completely left out of account as to imply that they have never been seriously studied." (c) Marshall's social philosophy is profoundly nationalistic (patriotic): *Money, Credit and Commerce* (1923): Sentiments are not always firmly based on reason; but economic reasonings which ignore them are likely to mislead. Labour and capital tend to migrate less easily between country and country than between different parts of the same country. The problems of national defence and national finance necessitate a firm control over a country's frontiers and dictate fiscal and financial policies.

1919. Land-reform in Germany. The government dictates limits to the amount of landed property to be held by single individuals. This is but another instance of the class of modern phenomena described in CHARMONT'S *Les Transformations du droit civil* (Transformations of private or civil law).¹

¹ On land-reform in Germany, Denmark, Great Britain and the Balkan States see Sarkar's *Economic Development* (Madras 1926). See *Die Bodenfrage in Russland*, " *Die Bodenfrage in England* " and " *Die Bodenfrage in Deutschland* " "(Land questions in Russia,

1919. French Syndicalist Congress at Lyons. The nationalization of land and water transport, mines, water power and credit organization is decided upon as the goal. The association of producers and consumers is to be the authority. Syndicalism is attempting to go beyond pure economism and venture into political fields.

1919. The Harvard University Research Bureau is established under the direction of Professor PERSONS in order to study the economic cycles. The organ is entitled *Review of Economic Statistics*.

The methodology consists in the establishment of an "economic barometer," so to say, comprising three different "indices" such as are likely to announce or "predict" the arrival of the "crisis." The first index is represented by the curve of "speculation" which has bearings on the finance-market and on values. The second curve indicates the "business" situation implying thereby the state of industry and commerce and has bearing on the commodity-market. The "money"-market (rate of interest) is indicated by a third curve. The theory has been advanced that at short intervals the three curves follow one another in succession, a rise in the speculation-curve being followed by a rise in the commodity-curve and this second again by a rise in the interest-curve. The "automatic" character of this alleged "order of succession" in the curves

England and Germany) before and since the Great War in Damaschke *Bodenreform* Jen, 1923; Aainisch: *Die Landflucht* Jena 1924; Von Schullern *Agrarpolitik* Jena 1923.

is, however, open to question and is not made much of at the German crisis-institute (established 1926), where each curve is evaluated on its own merits with reference to the general economic situation.¹

1920. COLE (1889-): *Guild Socialism Restated* (1920), *Social Theory* (1920), *Reorganization of Local Government*. *World of Labour* (1913), *Self-Government in Industry* (1917).

The state is to own business plant. The operations of industry are to be controlled by operatives in a guild. The guild is to consist of labourers, manual and intellectual, on the functional basis. Economic sovereignty is to be shared between guilds and the state. Central control : (a) guild congress is to represent producers, (b) parliament is to represent consumers and (c) a central organisation is to settle controversies between (a) and (b). Functional democracy is the goal. Sovereignty of the state is to be nullified. The state is really to be replaced by a "commune" consisting of a number of func-

¹Lenoir : *Etudes sur la formation des prix* (Studies on the formation of price), Paris, 1913; Mitchell : *Business Cycles*, Berkeley 1913; Moore: *Economic Cycles*, New York, 1914, *Forecasting the Yield and the Price of Cotton*, 1917, *Generating Economic Cycles*, 1923; Persons and others : *The Problem of Business Forecasting*, New York, 1924; Lacombe : *La Prevision en matiere de crises economiques* (Forecasting in the matter of economic crises), Paris, 1925; Aftalion : *Le probleme des previsions economiques aux Etats Unis*, (The problem of Economic Forecasting in the U. S. A.), in the *Revue d'Economie Politique* for May-June, 1927; Bowley and Smith : "Comparative Price Index-Numbers for Eleven Principal countries" in *London and Cambridge Economic Service* (issued in co-operation with the Harvard University Committee on Economic Research), Special Memorandum, No: 24, London, July 1927.

tional bodies. The vocational administration of industries and services, is to be the essential feature.¹

1920. WEBB: *Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*. The commonwealth would levy "revenue on the citizens in proportion to their relative ability to pay." It would offer compensation for the industries expropriated. In regard to the burden of compensation the idea is that the taxes are to fall almost entirely on the property-owners as a class. The same principles are advocated by Kautsky in *Labour Revolution*.²

1920. Law of *Syndicats professionnels* in France modifying the law of 1884 allows the formation of syndicates without previous sanction of government.³

1920. SNOWDEN: *Labour and National Finance*: Proposals of capital levy have been made in Germany in 1919 as well as by the Giolitti Ministry in Italy. Snowden does not want the capital levy to be a permanent feature in the public finance. It is not to be periodical. "The possibility of a periodic levy on capital would discourage saving; it would keep the commercial world in a continual state of uncertainty and it would arrest trade enterprise." The words "capital levy" convey to the popular mind the idea that it is proposed to tax only capital

¹Reckitt and Bechhofer: *Meaning of National Guilds* London, (1920); Carpenter: *Guild Socialism*, New York, 1922.

²Laidler: *History of Socialist thought*, London 1927.

³For this and previous laws of workingmen in France see Foignet's *Legislation Industrielle* Paris, 1925.

invested in industry. The scheme would be "more accurately described as a tax upon accumulated wealth in all its forms, *e.g.*, land, minerals, houses, Government and municipal bonds, shares, mortgages, stocks-in-trade, furniture, pictures, jewellery, etc.

1920. DOUGLAS and ORAGE : *Credit Power and Democracy*. Industrial democracy demands control over finance. Control over credit must come to the consumer. Communalization of credit is a supreme necessity. The establishment of labour banks is a practical step in this direction.

1921. Split in the French syndicalist movement at the Tours conference. A new association, *confederation Generale du Travail Unitaire* "C.G.T.U." (United Confederation of Labour) is constituted on the Bolshevik principle. It becomes a member of the Third International (Moscow) and accepts the philosophy of direct action, sabotage and revolution. CACHIN and VAILLANT-COUTOURIER are two of the prominent communist-bolshevik syndicalists. They regard Anatole France as one of their *maitres*. Organs : *L'Humanite* (daily) and *Clarte* (weekly).

The old C.G.T. becomes "reformist" *i.e.* moderate, with allegiance to the revived Second International (Amsterdam).

1921. CIASCA, Italian : *Il Problema della terra* (The Problem of Land). The book is fortified with a preface by PRATO. The standpoint of these two authors is directly opposite to that of recent tendencies in land-legislation and land-theory.

According to Prato the French system promotes the stability of social equilibrium contrasted with the Russian excesses of to-day (of which the first symptoms could be seen in 1905). Direct proprietorship in France leads to progress in agriculture and economic life, whereas the Russian conditions constitute but the prelude to a catastrophe and re-barbarization. Italy is oscillating between the two systems. Speaking of recent Italian developments he says that there was sequestration by Government during the war-period. The *decrets* and schemes of laws (Vissochi, Micheli, Falcioni) aim at (i) transformation of the *latifondi*, large estates or Zamindaris, (ii) intensification of cultivation, and (iii) reduction of the price of bread.

These recent tendencies indicate an absence of confidence in the capability of individuals to make the best use of private property and point to the "coercive intervention" of the state as a more efficacious mode in the creation of wealth. They thus embody the principle of despotism as anticipated by Tocqueville, to which "*la violence est legitime*." The "economic-social problems" are being sought to be solved, says Prato, "exclusively by politico-juridical" means.

But what are the lessons of economic history? asks Prato. In Curis's *Storia del latifondo italico* (History of Italian Zamindari or Larger Land-ownership) we find that absolute individual property was the rule in pre-Imperial times. The *diritto dominicale* which meant territorial over-lord-

ship, concentrated possessions, as well as stability and *garanzia* assured to cultivators, was the rule in the Imperial period. The modification of the above system was synchronous with "*burocrazia, fiscalism, monopolio, Stato petrofico.*" And along with it began the degeneration of agriculture.

The principle of *collettivizzazione parziale delle terre* coincided in point of time with the downfall of the Roman world, according to PARETO. The "*uniformita*" or "*legge storica*" i.e., the historic law that according to Prato can be deduced from ancient Roman experience says that individual proprietorship is conducive to rational and intensive production.

Prato then discusses the conclusions of the studies in village communities (Seeböhm, Maine, Landau, Meitzen). He finds that collective property bears the impress of the "common slavery" group, and at best indicates a form of "pastoral economy." It can rise up to the archaic system of coercive and inelastic equality. The "enclosures" of the Renaissance constitute but the expression of "social necessity" consisting in the withdrawal of lands from the promiscuous wastage under the conditions of "ruinous cultivation."

The advantages assured to the peasants during periods of depopulation and chronic agrarian crisis (of the third and fourth centuries under the Empire, and the fourteenth and seventeenth in Europe) are strictly "contractual" phenomena intended to induce the labourers to stay on the land and do not

indicate any abstract philosophical sympathy with a communistic system.

In Prato's analysis economic opinion also has been anti-collectivist. For example, in the eighteenth century the abolition of archaic "communism" was held to be indispensable in the interest of "technical progress." Increased production and individual proprietorship were considered to be intimately associated. The Napoleonic civil legislation assuring as it did proprietorship but abolishing general privileges has promoted agricultural progress of the nineteenth century. PROUDHON (1848) also admires the "mutuality" consisting in the spontaneous associations of small and free farmers as opposed to the "communal centralization" of property.

Ciasca examines the state "providence" that has been instituted in the poorest parts of Italy. He points out the inefficiency and stupidity of the methods of empirical intervention, for example, as manifest in deforestation which is really ruinous. The experiments of agrarian legislation are disappointing on the whole. The varied forms of compulsory control can show at best but negative results. On the other hand, progress is due almost exclusively to private initiative. After such precedents, to invoke the state is absurd.

The real problem, according to Ciasca, is not whether the present movements arise "out of old laws" by way of "direct derivation," or whether they re-appear to-day under the stimulus of "similar operating forces." He would rather advise theorists and

legislators to investigate to what different phases of technical and economic evolution, to what different needs and circumstances these two types, individualism and collectivism, correspond. The chief problem consists in studying what forces and motives have led to the disappearance of patriarchal and communistic residues of the land-economy with the advent of industrial civilization. The object should be to ascertain whether the perpetuation of this industrial civilization is reconcilable with a return to the "troglodytic forms" re-established by violence and superimposed by law.

Ciasca quotes MORTARA on the significance of land in Italy's present-day economic system. Land is considered to be the most essential element in Italy's productive capacity, according to this authority. It is the chief source from which to recuperate the "passive side" in the Italian "balance of accounts:" says Mortara. The exports of agricultural produce are large and may grow. As the source of exportable wealth like hemp, oil, fruits, kitchen, and garden products, cheese, eggs, poultry, wool, land's place in national economy is very high.

That being so, an increase in the productive capacity of land should be the chief concern of legislation and patriotism. But, asks Ciasca, is it likely to be promoted by revolutionary communistic schemes?

State interference in land can only lead to its systematic destruction. It implies an arbitrary regime of requisitions and government prices and compels the cultivators to adopt less remunerative methods of

cultivation. For instance, it prohibits the alleged "luxury" of cultivating non-food vegetables (*e.g.*, textiles) and orders all fields to be given over to food-stuffs, although by selling hemp, hay, etc. the cultivators can get more wheat from abroad than by producing it at home. It likewise forbids the exportation of cheese, olive oil, etc., and compels their sale at home at very low prices, and interrupts judicious specialization in farming (as in Sardinia). Finally, it offers a subsidy to idleness. Rice fields have been reduced from 140,000 hectares to 100,000. The Visocchi, Falcioni and Micheli *decrees* to regulate the transfer of land to cultivators have led to mal-cultivation.

The farmers of Emilia and Ferrara, "guilty" of introducing improved methods in cultivation have been dispossessed on the charge of negligence in cultivation although they were forbidden by Government to sow and thrash. And peasants have been allowed to occupy lands in Cremona and destroy the tools and implements without hindrance from the Carabinieri (police force).

The authors furnish a strong plea for existing conditions and offer a stout resistance to the inroads of Soviet Russia's ideology.

1921. Italian tariff becomes "specialized," and protective in regard to industries. FORDNEY Tariff Act (U.S.A.) is anti-dumping (1922). The Safeguarding of Industries Act in Great Britain has special reference to key industries and is anti-dumping (1921).¹

¹ Hirst: *From Adam Smith to Philip Snowden*, London, 1925.

1921-22. The "New Economic Policy" in Soviet Russia. Right to own property is conceded by LENIN, and along with it other non-communistic, traditional bourgeois rights. At this stage he believes that "capitalism is an evil in comparison with socialism, but capitalism is a blessing in comparison with mediævalism, with small industry with fettered small producers thrown to the mercy of bureaucracy." He would not prevent the development of capitalism but, "direct it in the path of state capitalism."

The N. E. P. comprises, among other things, the abolition of "nationalization," the replacement of confiscation by a regular system of taxation, the grant of concessions to private businessmen, and the organization of trusts.¹

1923—28. Post-war currency-reform, consisting in "deflation" and in the march "back to gold" begins with Soviet Russia (1922-23), is then consummated in Germany (1923-24) and finally reaches Great Britain (1926), Italy (1927-8) and France (1928).²

¹ Fuckner: *Russland's Neue Wirtschafts-Politik*, Leipzig, 1924; Freund: *Russlands Friedens und Handelsvertræge* (1918-24), Leipzig, 1924; Patouillet: *Les Codes de la Russie Soviétique* (1) *Code de la Famille* (Law of Family) (2) *Code civil*, Paris, 1925. Note Patouillet's remark re Duguit's influence on the civil law of Soviet Russia. Diehl: *Die Diktatur des Proletariats und des Raetsystem* Jena, 1924. On Soviet Russia and the "New Economic Policy" of the Bolsheviks see Sarkar's *Politics of Boundaries* (1926) and *Economic Development* (1926); U. R. S. S. *Annuaire politique et économique pour l'année 1925-26*, Moscow 1927. Zimand: *State Capitalism in Russia*. New York, 1926.

² For the theories and experiments, see the chapters on Currency in Sarkar's. *Economic Development* (1926). Bellerby: *Monetary Stability*

The question as to whether the "return of gold" is desirable or whether money should not finally abandon its gold-moorings arouses keen interest in theory as well as statesmanship. In England, for example, KEYNES'S *Tract on Monetary Reform* (1924) champions the abolition of the gold-basis in currency systems. But the faith in "metallism" furnishes the keynote of HAWTREY'S *Gold Standard in Theory and Practice* (1926). In Germany the non-metallistic idea is promoted by KNAPP'S legal or political theory of money as the creation of the state, which was adumbrated in 1905. The emancipation of money from metal (*e.g.* gold, constitutes the thesis of LIEFMANN'S *Das Geld als Zeichen* (Money as Sign *i.e.* not Substance), 1920. And the legal theory is carried further in GERBER'S *Geld und Staat* (Money and the State) 1927.

The monetary situation in France forms the subject of a conference of economists (May, 1927) under the chairmanship of HOMBERG. ROCCA believes that "revalorization" of the franc is possible at the present moment because of the growing enrichment and prosperity of the people, the rate of increase being about 4% per year. But the more powerful and

London, 1925; Cassel: *Das Stabilisierungsproblem* Leipzig 1926. Worbs: *Deflation oder Devaluation?* Greifswald, 1926.

Bonnet: *Les Experiences monetaires contemporaines*, Paris 1926; Aftalion: *Monnaie, prix et change, Experiences recentes et theories* Paris, 1927. The entire April (1928) number of the *Giornale degli Economisti* is given over to the different aspects of the *stabilizzazione della lira* consummated by the decrets of 21 December 1927 and 26 February 1928.

representative view is that of theorists like POMMERY who oppose revalorization as likely to be dangerous to the budget and public finance. An argument against revalorization is furnished by VALOIS who considers that the conditions for stabilization are not yet prevalent, as apparent from the fact that the state has still to depend to a certain extent on advance from the *Banque de France*. The proceedings are available in the publication *La Stabilité monétaire*.

In 1928 Poincaré stabilizes the franc on the "gold-bullion standard" basis, such as has already been introduced in England and Italy. At the same time the *Banque de France* is deprived of its age-long freedom *re* the issue of notes and is compelled to accept the German principle of "proportional cover" (40 per cent.)

1924. CULBERTSON, American: *Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations, International Economic Policies*. He takes stand against British preferential tariff. The position of British Colonies as almost independent members at the League of Nations is inconsistent with the preferential tariff enjoyed by them within their Empire, says he.¹

1924. HAINISCH, Austrian: *Die Landflucht* (The Exodus from Agriculture and Rural Areas). The requirements of capitalistic business-economy are well met by manufacturing organizations. But neither psychologically nor technically is agriculture

¹On population movements see Key Helmer: *New Colonial Policy*, 1927.

as yet well suited to capitalism. In the struggle for existence and self-assertion between agriculture and manufacture, therefore, the former has every chance of being weeded out. The exodus from "land" is thus an inevitable necessity of modern economy, says Hainisch.

The chief problem consists in making agriculture an economically worth while proposition. The importance of having a large number of people employed in farming belongs, in Hainisch's economic system as in that of many other theorists, Continental and British, to the minimum of sociological postulates. But the labourers will stick to their lands only so long as they are liberally remunerated. Now, higher wages for agricultural labour can become normal phenomena only under conditions of high incomes for farmers. The question of higher prices for agricultural produce becomes automatically a part of this economic ideology. Nor is this all. Logic compels us to bring in the problem of land-values in this theoretical complex. It is a precondition for this system that the land-value should not rise. We are, therefore, counselled to a comprehensive scheme of agrarian reform such as through legislation would dictate "fair" remuneration in regard to land, wages and prices.

The desired and desirable relations between land-value, wages and prices cannot come through "natural" laws. State intervention is postulated to be an indispensable method in agrarian reform. Hainisch is especially in favour of an "agricultural monopoly"

to be exercised by the state. And this he considers to be much more worth while, socially speaking, than protection. As soon as a State monopoly is introduced in regard to the goods to be imported, the way is thrown open to the fixing not only of prices and wages in connection with the land to be cultivated within the country but to the fixing of the land-values as well. The State thus comes to the rescue of agriculture in a national economy by rendering it worth while to all the parties concerned.

1924. MELLON, Secretary to the Treasury (American): *Taxation The People's Business*:

He takes his stand against the sur-taxes, the inheritance from the Great War. During that time normal tax rates were increased, and a system of surtaxes was evolved, in order to make the man of large income pay more proportionately than the small taxpayers. He wants people to understand that high rates of taxation do not necessarily mean large revenue to the government and that more revenue may often be obtained by lower rates.

Most of the European countries, except Great Britain, attempted to finance the war largely on borrowing. America, on the other hand, attempted to raise one-third of the current war expenses by taxation. New taxes, such as income and excess profits taxes, were developed. But there is a limit to the amount of taxes that can be levied without absorbing the profits which should be put back into business for increased production. Altogether, the argument is directed against the "levy on wealth"

(cf. "capital levy" of British Labour). Taxation, says he, is "not a means of confiscating wealth but of raising necessary revenues for the Government." "Our civilization, after all, is based on accumulated capital." "Any policy that deliberately destroys that accumulated capital under the spur of no necessity is striking directly at the soundness of our financial structure."

Just as labour cannot be forced to work against its will so it can be taken for granted that capital will not work unless the return is worth while. It will continue to retire into the shelter of tax-exempt bonds, which offer both security and immunity from the tax collectors.

The Treasury has accordingly recommended that a maximum surtax of 25% plus 6% normal tax be imposed in lieu of the 50% tax now levied on the largest incomes. Such a reduction is necessary in order to attract the large fortunes back into productive enterprise.

1924. The project of a comprehensive law of social assurance¹ (on German-English lines) in France, with the object of extending the existing law of 1910.

1925. MEISEL: *Die britische und deutsche Einkommensteuer* (British and German Income Tax).

A tax-reformer for Germany, DIETZEL, advocates the British system of levying the tax at the source of income, in a publication of the *Verein*

¹ Foignet : *Legislation Industrielle*, Paris, 1925.

fuer Social politik (1919). But Meisel says that the German system of levying the tax from the taxpayer himself yields more revenue than the other system. The British system is, besides, not well adapted to the technique of progressive taxation which involves the complete knowledge of a person's "total income." As the principle and practice of progressive taxation have been gaining ground in the world, the problem of estimating a person's total income is sure to come to the forefront, and along with it tax-reformers will be forced to admit the superiority of the system (German) of collecting from the person to that of collecting at the source (British).

1926. The HILTON YOUNG Currency Commission advises for India (1) the introduction of the gold bullion standard and (2) the establishment of a Reserve Bank. In regard to the first item the theory is 100% Ricardian as embodied in the *Proposals for an economical and secure currency* (1816). Ricardo's gold-bar standard, as the ideally best came into actual existence in a modified form in the "gold exchange standard" of Holland (1877), since then followed in other countries including India (1893-98). There is greater independence and more gold in the gold-bullion (or bar) standard than in the gold-exchange standard. In regard to the Reserve Bank, the title is taken from the U.S.A. (1913), but the theory from Germany (the Reichsbank Act of 1875). In other words the principle of the British Bank Charter Act of 1841 is accepted in its

elastic and improved form such as has been rendered popular for the banking and currency world in the German legislation (cf. Japan, 1882).¹ On this item, therefore, the Ricardian (and Smithian) theory *viz.*, the "banking principle" which was accepted by the *Banque de France* is rejected as was likewise done by Peel for the Bank of England (1844-45) in favour of the "currency principle."

1926. *Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung* (Institute for research in "crisis," industrial "fluctuation" or trade "cycle") is established at Berlin under the direction of Professor WAGEMANN. A crisis-institute for Austria is later founded at Vienna in 1927. (cf. Harvard University Research Bureau, 1919).

[At this point the author takes the liberty to place his own contribution on record, thus :—

1926. SARKAR : *Economic Development*. In this account of world-movements in commerce, economic legislation, industrialism and technical education, there are a few sections given over to India's foreign trade, agricultural renaissance and manufacturing power. The chief object in these sections is to furnish an objective basis of interpretation and to attempt an estimate of India's present place in the scale of materialism, establishing thereby certain societal "equations" for guidance in statesmanship. As a result of inductive study one can come to the conclusion that Italy is a bridge between the mediæval and the

¹Deckert : *Die Notendeckungs-vorschriften der wichtigsten Zentralnotenbanken* (Rules for the cover of notes in the most important central note-banks), Berlin, 1926.

modern. Italy continues to be an essentially agricultural country. So far as the industries are concerned Italy has the same hard problem before her as any other semi-feudal semi-developed country, for instance, Japan. . . . In the scale of social dynamics Italy does not belong, therefore, strictly speaking, to the economic system prevailing in trans-Alpine Europe (Teutonic States, France and Great Britain). . . . Indeed, the Italian people is in terms of economic development but an elder brother, so to say, to the Balkan group." An analysis of the economic life in the Balkans leads to the conclusion that Jugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, etc., represent almost the same stages in economic evolution in which India finds herself at the present day.

Each one of the new States that lie between the German and Russian spheres and between the Baltic Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean is an "India in miniature." Economically speaking, each of these States "embodies the efforts of semi-developed and more or less chiefly agricultural peoples at imbibing the culture of more advanced Western Europe and America. They represent "the processes by which Eastern Europe is tending to bid adieu finally to the lingering vestiges of the feudal-agrarian system, the the mediæval economic organisation and technique which disappeared in England, the United States, France and Germany between 1780 and 1850".

Civilisation has been advancing from the West to the East. There is no other region to-day more

significant for the development of India than the Balkans, Central-Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Russia. "The problems that are being fought over and settled in these territories are identical, in every way with, the problems that await solution and are challenging the patriots, industrial experts and social workers of India."

The conclusion from an examination of the earlier stages of "modern" banking in France and Germany is as follows:—"When one studies all these European figures with special reference to Indian conditions one should suspect that in banking, as in other aspects of economic and social (perhaps also cultural) development, India has yet to commence mastering the ideas of 1870 or thereabouts and traverse the ground covered by the moderns since then."

The cumulative effect of all these investigations is embodied in the following futuristic equation:—"Whatever has happened in the economic sphere in Eur-America during the last half-century is bound also to happen more or less on similar and even identical lines in Asia, and, of course, in India during the next generation or so." This, indeed, is the message to which the sociological equations in the author's previous works, *e.g.*, *The Futurism of Young Asia*, have inevitably led.

The problem before applied sociology and economic statesmanship, so far as India is concerned, consists in envisaging and hastening the working

out of the "next stages" in socio-economic and socio-political life.¹]

1926. LAVERGNE: *L'Ordre Cooperatiff* (Co-operative system of social organization). The state or political organization is a vast consumers' society. The whole body of citizens is its members. The goods furnished by this consumers' society are security, liberty and all other rights generally described as the rights of man. It is in their capacity as consumers

¹ cf. The following on India and the Great Powers in Sarkar; *Greetings to Young India* (1927):

"Germany and the United States are certainly two rising cultural and economic factors in the world. But for all practical purposes, these two countries, together with England, constitute a trio of the first class. To the same rank, but perhaps slightly lower in the scale, belongs France. In my judgment, it is these four nations that are creating the civilization of the contemporary world. I am excluding here the little states like Switzerland, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries as being small. But they are by no means of second grade.

"The next class in the scale is constituted by three countries which, however, superficially, should be regarded as having hardly anything in common with one another. These are Italy, Japan, and Russia. The problem in each of these countries is to catch up to the industrialism of the first class and bid final adieu to the lingering vestiges of the mediæval feudal-agrarian conditions.

"India comes just after these three countries, and were it not for the vastness of our population, I might almost have said that our developments, so far as they go, have already reached the stage attained by the second class of nations. For us, therefore, England, America, Germany and France are too high. It is Italy, Japan and Russia which, lying, as they do, just a step ahead of us, should be regarded as capable of furnishing practical object lessons in the working out of one's way from mediævalism to modernism."

The "equations," the "stages," and the "scale" discussed in these and other works have been stated categorically in Ch. I pp. 9-10, Ch. III, with reference to *New Asia* (1886), pp. 65-66, as well as in the last chapter entitled "Socio-philosophical Equations."

of these immaterial goods that the citizens have a right to control production. Universal suffrage rests, therefore, on solid foundation. A political philosophy of co-operative order is thus brought into being which, as GIDE admits, goes further than he has dared (*Revue d'Economie Politique*, Mai-Juin., 1927).

1926. KEYNES (1883-). *The End of Laissez Faire* presents a re-statement of the proper functions of state, rejects protectionism, and opposes "socialism" (Marxian). The importance of semi-autonomous associations "lying somewhere between the individual and the state" e.g., Universities, Bank of England, Port of London, and the Railway companies is recognised. Such associations are embodiments of "sublimated capitalism" from whose deliberations, motives of private advantage are excluded. The State is (1) to control credit, currency and "cycles," (2) to organize and disseminate statistical information, and (3) to control the growth of population as regards quantity and quality.

1926. LAUCK, American: *Political and Industrial Democracy* (1776-1926) discusses for America the ideals of a new trade unionism, seeks to introduce on a large national scale the system of what is known as *Betriebsrat* (works-council) in Central Europe, an institution such as may offer the working men chances of controlling the industrial concerns. He would set limits to and if possible eliminate "bankocracy" by offering the industrial shares for sale to the workingmen and consumers. The existing systems of "employee representation" and

"employee stock holdings" are discussed in a realistic manner.

1926 Italian law of syndicates. BOTTAI, under-secretary of the ministry of corporations, lectures at Florence on the political and economic trend of this *Carto del Lavoro* (Labour Charter) of the Fascist state.

Syndicalism, as embodied in the voluntary associations of workers, first clandestine, then open, but always irregular and outside the law, represents the reaction of the irrepressible human instinct of association in opposition to liberal and individualistic theories, says he. The Liberal state, reduced to impotence by its own idealism, was forced to tolerate the uncontrolled action of syndicalism both in the ranks of labour and of production, with the result of a terrible waste of productive energies and abolition of every principle of authority.

After the war, the most enlightened politicians in all the countries of the world realised that the old parliamentary conception of the State no longer corresponded to the crying needs of collective life and that new ways must be sought and found. It was inconceivable that any nation could continue to exist, continually rent by class strife and gnawed by the cancer of speculation.

The pivot of the new legislation, insisted on by MUSSOLINI and elaborated by ROCCO, is the imposition of juridical discipline on capital and labour as well as on collective labour contracts. This forms the basis of a profound transformation of national

life, far beyond what is expressed in the actual legal formulae of the enactment.

In the Fascist State, syndicalism, once an incitement to anarchy and to the dispersion of economic wealth, now becomes a public institution, a State organ, which regulates and guarantees the professional discipline of the different categories of workers and employers, besides educating the popular conscience and encouraging those sentiments of providence and mutual aid that cement human solidarity.

In this new organisation, collective labour contracts made by the autonomous groups of workers and employers, are legally recognised. The state does not intervene to regulate the conditions of these contracts except when there is disagreement between the parties. In that case the appeal is to the labour magistrate whose decision is final and has all the force of law.

The state law on collective labour contracts prescribes penalties for strikes and lock-outs. Strikes and lock-outs can be effectively dealt with through the disciplinary powers conferred upon the syndicalist associations by their own statutes.

National life will be organically disciplined in the highest and most complete way through the working of the "corporations" which are now declared by law to be organs of the state. The aspiration towards class-collaboration, instead of class-strife, was never wholly lost sight of even during the worst moments of syndicalist anarchy, but the experiments

then attempted, which led to the so-called "mixed syndicates," were bound to fail, as they could not give the necessary guarantees for the autonomy of the working-classes as opposed to their employers.

Only the State can ensure perfect equality of treatment between all classes, for only the State has the power of safeguarding the interests of the workers, when the executive power is restored to its rightful place and ceases to be either the expression of a narrow oligarchy, as it was during the liberal cycle, or the expression of groups of irresponsible politicians as it became during the more recent social-democratic period.

It must not be forgotten that while the syndicates are juridically recognised and empowered to act as the legal representatives of labour legislation, they will only do so within the restricted circle of the specific interests that concern them. The state will still control general legislation on labour questions and will set the limits within which syndicalist powers can act.¹

1926. OTLET, Belgian : *Pour une monnaie internationale* (For an International Money). The value of money is constantly changing. To remove these variations an international money may be brought into being. This, however, is not to be based on gold

¹Re the economic ideals and achievements of Fascism (tariff, industrialization, merchant marine etc.) see the chapters on Italy in Sarkar's *Economic Development* (1926) and *Politics of Boundaries* (1926); also Bachi's *L' Italia Economica nel 1921* (Economic Italy in 1921), Citta del Castello, 1922 and Mortara's *Prospettive Economiche*, 1927, (Economic Prospects for 1927), Milan, 1927.

but on the value of commodities, serving as the basis of securities. The system will comprise an international metallic coin, an international credit-bank with the power of issuing international bills of credit, as well as an international system of postal cheques. The last item will succeed in replacing transactions in cash payments to an enormous extent.

1927. Scientific Management (TAYLOR SYSTEM) of Labour. The International Congress is held at Rome. Previous congresses (Paris 1923, Prague, 1924, Brussels, 1925)¹

1927. World-Congress on Population, held at Geneva, discusses emigration, immigration, eugenic questions and birth-control.

1927. MARSAL: *Les Dettes interalliées* (Inter-allied Debts) analyzes the origins of the war-debts and considers them to be *sui generis* in character. These war-debts cannot be compared to any other loans. On political and economic grounds he recommends the declaration of these debts as null and void.

1927. PIGOU: *Industrial Fluctuations*. The free play of self-interest is not strong enough to prompt human beings to take steps by which the social evils involved in "trade cycles" or "economic crises" may be remedied, *viz.* to "distribute their demand among different times to the best advantage." In regard to the control of these cycles the governments have a great part to play. They are in a position

¹ "L'organisation scientifique du Travail dans ses congress" in *Revue d'Economie Politique*, Nov.—Dec. 1927.

to "transfer orders from good times to bad times" and to lead to a transfer of the demand for labour in the corresponding manner.

Boards of Guardians order so much stores, says he, the Board of Admiralty so many ships, municipalities so many school and other buildings and so much repair work on roads ; and there is no rigid compulsion on them to order these things at a particular instant.

He endorses the policy initiated by the Prussian ministry of commerce in 1904, which says in part as follows : " If all public administrations" in making their arrangement, would take timely care to choose, for such works, times in which want of employment is to be expected, the real occurrence of wide-spread want of employment would certainly be prevented in many cases and serious distress warded off." The same policy has been adopted by the Poor Law Commission. The State actions are to be so designed as to " fit the peaks of its own demand into the depressions of the general demand." He supports in this connection BOWLEY'S suggestion that the central government should compel the local governments to follow this principle of " transfer from good to bad times " by " making or withholding grants, granting or refusing power to borrow and providing capital on easy terms at times when it is desirable on national grounds that public works should be set in hand."

From this standpoint he considers the principles of the British Trade Facilities Act of 1921 (designed,

as it is, to furnish "guarantee" to certain undertakings calculated to promote employment) as well as of the Export Credit Scheme of the same year (by which exporters get a Government "guarantee" under certain conditions) to be sound, although practically not very efficacious. But the principle of "bounties" (as contrasted with guarantees) as embodied in the grants made by the Unemployment Grants Committee of 1923-24 to private undertakings engaged in the construction of gas, water, harbours, tramways, etc. or in the grants for certain export industries advocated by Lord BALFOUR is considered to be beset with practical difficulties, although applicable under certain circumstances.

1927. International Economic Conference convened at Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations (cf. the similar conferences at Brussels, 1920, and Genoa, 1922). It discusses the problems of world-economy with special reference to international trade, industry and agriculture. An important contribution to theory is to be found in *Methods of Economic Rapprochement*, a paper submitted by Professor GROSSMANN of Zurich. He maintains that the industrial and social advantages of large scale production are to-day militated against by the appearance of new sovereign States, changes in the European boundaries, and nationalistic tariff walls as well as by the institution of customs duties for purely fiscal purposes in order to meet the demands of post-war budgets.

Three methods of international co-operation are

being tried at the present moment. In the first place, 180 commercial treaties have been concluded between 1920 and 1926, but most of them extend for less than a year. Secondly, preferential tariffs have been organized between the U. S. and Brazil, between the Republics of Central America, and last but not least, between the members of the British Empire. But any attempt to introduce a system of preference between the members of the League of Nations would be tantamount to declaring open economic hostilities with, say, the United States, a great power that is not a member of the League. The third method is the establishment of *Zollvereins* or customs unions. The principle of these unions has been in operation since 1819, but they are the veritable causes of international friction.

The efficacy of these three political methods is questioned by Grossmann. He would like to see economic *rapprochement* established by purely "economic" agreements,¹ e.g., on the principles of the Brussels Sugar Convention of 1902. Private industrialists of different nations who are the real competitors are to agree between themselves as to the terms of competition or co-operation. By championing the movement of producers' agreements as an element in economic and political conciliation of the world he is really arguing for international trusts and cartels, for example, the continental steel cartel (established 1926).

¹ On "rationalization" as a new economic category with special reference to cartels and trusts see Sarkar's "Trusts and Rationalization: aspects of the new industrial revolution" p. 212.

1927. In September, Germany enters upon the third year of reparation payments under the Dawes Plan (adopted in 1924), the first year of payment being 1925. In September 1928 will begin the so-called "normal" or "standard" year charged with the annual payment of 2,500,000,000 marks (one Mark is approximately equal to one shilling) for an indefinite period together with a *Zuschlag* or supplementary amount to be calculated according to *Wohlstandsindex* (prosperity index).

The Dawes Plan embodies a regular and systematic international control over the finance, economic resources and administration of Germany. But according to SCHACHT, president of the Reichsbank, in *Die Stabilisierung der Mark* (The Stabilization of the Mark), Berlin, 1924, it registers the "beginning of a new development" in so far as it has succeeded in "erecting a barrier of *wirtschaftlicher Vernunft* (economic reason) against political and military hatred."

Post-war economic reconstruction in Europe is indeed to a great extent to be attributed to the Dawes Plan. The industrial recovery of Germany on a sound currency basis, regular reparation payments, the Locarno pact (1925), German loans in England and America, Germany's entrance into the League, currency reforms in different countries (including the talk of introducing the gold bullion standard in India), and the general restoration of confidence in industry and commerce, all these have to be traced

to the event of 1924, if not as a cause, at least as a starting point.

The present situation is indicated in the *Memorandum* submitted to the finance minister of Germany by PARKER GILBERT, Agent General of the Reparations. The Memorandum purports really to be a criticism of Germany's public finance and foreign loan policy from the standpoint of reparations and international economy.

He thinks that the German authorities are developing and executing constantly enlarged programmes of expenditure and borrowing, the effect of which is an artificial stimulus to economic life, causing increased cost of production, increased prices and increased costs of living. These developments will tend to diminish the capacity of the German economy to compete for export and thus pay the reparations.

On the one hand, the effect of foreign borrowing by the *Reich* (Empire) as well as the States and the Communes can but lead to increased import. And, on the other, the money thus obtained is alleged not to be spent on the sorely needed "development of industry and agriculture" but is said to be absorbed in what may be described as "social" and "national efficiency" items.

To these charges KOEHLER, the finance minister, has replied to the effect that the borrowings by States and municipalities are spent on "public utilities" and are thus "productively" employed. Some of the the social and efficiency expenditures are inevitable because of the national troubles engendered by the

War. Besides, it is not possible for the *Reich* (Empire) to control too rigidly the internal financial arrangements of the States and the Communes at the present time. This would raise constitutional issues of a far-reaching character. On the whole, however, he is in favour of retrenchments and economies to which Schacht as well as the prime minister Marx have given their approval.

The committee which supervises the applications for permission to negotiate foreign loans has therefore become very critical and stringent. No loans are from now on to be permitted as are not needed for immediate "productive" purposes. Besides, the loans must contribute to the general economic development of the *Reich* (Empire), *e. g.* by promoting exports. To argue solely that the loans are helpful to some local industry would not be admitted by the committee as a sufficient justification for foreign borrowing.¹

1927. TAUSSIG (1859-), American : *International Trade, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question* (1915).

In the case of protective duty, there is a balancing of loss and gain ; a loss which is overt and obvious, in the higher price of goods whose domestic production is stimulated by the duty, and gain, much less obvious, through the more favourable terms of trade. There is no way of ascertaining which is the greater, whether the net result is positive or negative. Even-

¹ Helander : " *Zur Theorie der Transferierung*" (Towards the theory of Transfer in Reparation-payments) in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, October 1924.

tually the outcome would be affected on the one hand by the extent to which a disadvantageous domestic industry is brought into existence and on the other hand by those conditions of demand which determine the barter term of trade in general. In the exposition of this subject at the hands of the younger MILL, it was said that no gain at all accrues to a country from protective duties, these being believed to be "purely mischievous, both to the country imposing them and to those with whom it trades." This seems to be an error. For, those goods which continue to be imported are obtained on the better term of trade. There does exist this gain, to be reckoned as offsetting the direct loss caused by the protective duties.

All the general indications from the economic history of the United States are that protective duties in the great majority of cases have not served to bolster up antiquated establishments or to retard improvements, though it may not be so clear that they have so often actually stimulated improvement in the way and to the extent contemplated by the "young industries" argument.

It might be alleged that the iron industry would have advanced, during the forty years (1870-1910), in much the same way, protection or no protection. And yet the unbiassed inquirer must hesitate before committing himself to such an unqualified statement of what would have been. Rich natural resources, business skill, improvements in transportation, widespread training in applied science, abundant and manageable

labour supply,—these perhaps suffice to account for the phenomena. But would these forces have turned in this direction so strongly and unerringly but for the shelter from foreign competition ?

And here Taussig meets MARSHALL in a round-about way ; for the latter's last word on the tariff controversy may be given as follows : In order to develop immature industries a tax on imports may be a necessity although it may involve some sacrifice of the present income. And " when no other means are available for bringing national resources to the aid of a particular backward industry, a State may act wisely and rightly in subsidizing it at the expense of the population at large." Protection to nascent industries is then desirable on non-economic grounds (*Money, Credit and Commerce*). The disciples of Adam Smith and Ricardo are thus found to shake hands with Frederick List, the arch-enemy of *Smithianism* ; and protectionism (cf. anti-dumping, key-industries, competitive tariff etc.) is the ultimate verdict of neo-Ricardian free-trade philosophy.¹

1927. A practical application of what may be regarded as the theories and principles of Crisis-Institutes is being made on a " world-wide " semi-continental scale in Soviet Russia under the name of the " Gosplan." The organization has been functioning since the formulation of the " new economic policy " by Lenin (1922) in replacement of the " war communism " (1918-1921). It is on this institution that the Supreme Economic Council

¹ Hirst: *From Adam Smith to Philip Snowden*, London, 1925.

depends in the last resort for expert advice in regard to economic schemes and measures.

The "Gosplan" is a board of sixteen experts appointed by the council of the People's Commissars. At Moscow the central staff consists of some five hundred members. The board constitutes really the top of a hierarchy of statistical-economic information bureaus scattered over the length and breadth of the country. The reports of factories and agricultural centres also come into the clearing-house of the Gosplan.

On the strength of crop reports, factory production figures, trade turn-over figures, etc., and corresponding charts, diagrams and curves, the statisticians of the Gosplan are trying to "plan ahead" the future economic developments of the country. "Rationalization" has been proceeding on all fronts, the objective being maximum production with minimum waste. The comprehensive schemes of "forecasting the future" and consciously directing evolution, of the people comprise for the time being (1) the location of industries near their sources of raw material, (2), the elimination of competitive cross-hauling, advertising, and salesmanship, (3), the encouragement (by grants of new capital) of those industries (like iron and steel) which have hitherto been underdeveloped, (4), the discouragement (by withholding capital) of any duplication or excess capacity of industrial equipment, (5) the erection of no more textile mills, no more sugar factories and no more shoe factories

than are sufficient to provide shoes for the people of Russia, (6) the encouragement of electrification as the basic source of power, and (7) the exploitation of oil fields and coal mines "as economic units" *i.e.* without interference of "property lines."

The Gosplan authorities report that the pre-war level for "all industry combined" has been reached and passed. Certain special industries are indeed still below, but others are far above the 1913 standard.

"Economic self-sufficiency" happens at present to be the goal of the Gosplan. A five-year programme has come into operation in October 1926. The plan involves a 78 per cent. increase in the physical volume of industrial production together with only a 30 per cent. increase in agricultural production. Industry is to grow faster than agriculture. The aim consists in furnishing the peasant with an adequate flow of textiles and hardware in exchange for his wheat and beef. Industrial prices are thus likely to get reasonably adjusted to agricultural prices. The results of work during the first year of this five-year programme have fulfilled the expectations of the statistical "futurists."

It need be observed that the "rationalization" of resources and control of the economic future projected and partially carried through by the Gosplan are to a very great extent dependent on the "centralization, unification and trustification that have been accomplished in the different enterprises of the country. These centralizations are, more-

over, mostly "nationalisations," *i.e.* state-controlled or state-owned and state-managed amalgamations or mergers.

"Russia is far from a communist or even a pure socialist State, but it does carry on with a larger amount of socialization than any other modern community except possibly Denmark." In agricultural "production" indeed about 90 per cent. is the work of the individual peasant, the "private trader," functioning outside of the government farms or producers' co-operatives. But it is only through government-controlled wholesalers and government export monopolies that a great part of this private produce can be "distributed" *i.e.* sold at home or shipped abroad. And so far as "industrial production is concerned at least 83 per cent. is "publicly controlled." The private factory-owner and foreign *concessionaire* do not manufacture more than 5 per cent. of the total Russian industrial output. More than 90 per cent. is in the hands of the trusts, which are semi-independent concerns, compelled, however to surrender the profits of the government treasury. "You may call it state socialism or state capitalism, as you prefer; but it is certainly industrial socialization on an enormous scale."

An aspect of this nationalized trustification nationalization is embodied in the character of employment statistics. In 1927 about 81 per cent. of the working-men are employees of the government or co-operatives. Only about 10 per cent.

work for private industry. For 1928 the Gosplan has arranged to force the employment percentage for private industry to a lower figure.¹

III IDEAS AND IDEALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ideology : (i) technical unification of the world, (2) arbitration not yet popular, (3) International Court, (4) sovereignty "limited" or contractual in external affairs, (5) economic interdependence or solidarity of mankind, (6) neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism, (7) war-preparedness everywhere.

(a) *International Milieu*

1906. Anglo-Japanese Alliance is renewed.

1907. Franco-Japanese Treaty.

1907. Russo-Japanese Treaty.

1907. Anglo-Russian Alliance (pooling of interests in Tibet, Afghanistan, Persia, Persian Gulf and China). Russia, weakened by defeat. is no longer a serious menace to India. Hence England is favorably disposed to Russia. This treaty combined with the Anglo-French Treaty of 1904 presents a real Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance (1882).

1908. Revolution in Turkey.

1909. Bosnia is annexed to Austria.

1911. France captures Fez in Africa. German demand for concession is not satisfied.

¹Chase : "How Russia charts her economic course" in the *New York Times*, December 11, 1927 ; Sarkar : "Trusts and Rationalization," in the *Calcutta Review*, September, 1927.

1911. Tripoli is ceded by Turkey to Italy.

1912. The First Balkan War: four Christian States are united against Turkey.

1913. The Second Balkan War: Serbia and Greece *vs.* Bulgaria.

1914-18. The Great War ends with the creation of new States.¹

1919-27. The post-war period may be described as an epoch of treaties and understandings. Thus during 1925-26 there were 12 different classes of treaties:

1. Peace, friendship and alliance; *e.g.*, (a) Germany and Poland, (b) Washington Conference on Chinese customs, (c) Japan and Russia, (d) England and Iraq (e) England and Nepal, (f) Turkey and Tchechoslovakia.

2. Arbitration: (a) England and Sweden (b) Switzerland and Hedjaz, (c) Uruguay and Venezuela.

3. Consular services: (a) Italy and Tchechoslovakia (b) Denmark and Tchechoslovakia.

4. Commercial Treaties: (a) Holland and Poland (b) England and Austria, (c) Japan and Mexico, (d) England and Greece (e) Poland and the U. S.

5. Communication and Intercourse: (a) World Postal Treaty, Stockholm, (b) Germany and Poland, (c) China and Russia.

6. Boundaries: England and Italy (in East Africa)

7. Financial.

¹ Gibbons: *Introduction to World Politics*, 1922.

8. Judicial.
9. Patents, Marks, etc.
10. Nationality and Naturalization.
11. Sanitary measures.
12. Technical.¹

Two kinds of internationalism are in evidence today as before. First, the idealistic and fraternitarian type preaches the negation of differences between class and class, race and race, religion and religion etc. It is anti-militaristic and believes in millennial world-peace. Secondly, there is what may be described as "positive internationalism." It is based on agreement between nations in regard to certain things to be done and certain things to be avoided. Every state is conceived to be a member of the society of nations. A consensual curtailment of national independence is implied.²

(b) *Public International Intercourse and Law*

1907. The Second Hague Conference formulates thirteen conventions *re* warfare at sea.

1909. The Declaration of London tries to regulate contraband, blockade, prize, etc.

1919. League of Nations (Geneva). Third International (Moscow).

1921. The Permanent Court of International Justice, under the League of Nations, is established

¹ *Welt wirtschaftliches Archiv*, October, 1926

For the growth of contemporary internationalism see the quarterly "Chronicle of international events" (including international conventions") in the *American Journal of International Law* as well as the annual summary of "general international agreement" in the *British Year-Book of International Law*.

² J. A. Hobson *Problems of a New World*, 1920.

(in addition to the Court at the Hague established in 1899.)¹

1921. The Washington Conference is convened (i) to arrive at an international understanding regarding the proportion to be observed in the world's navies and naval armament (the so-called Disarmament Conference), and (2) to discuss the "Pacific and Far Eastern question."²

1923. The Lausanne Treaty consolidates Turkey's victories and emancipates her from the possibilities of foreign intervention.

1924. The DAWES Plan places the payment of reparations on a systematic basis and initiates a post-war economic stabilization.³

1924. Geneva Protocol: The project of arbitration which the protocol embodies is opposed by Great Britain.

1925-26. The Locarno Pact and the understanding at Thoiry virtually modify the Treaty of Versailles and render the "dictated peace" somewhat bearable to Germany.⁴

(c) *Private International Intercourse and Law*

1909. Automobile Convention.

1919. Air Convention.

¹Strupp: *Grundzüge des positiven Völkerrechtse*, Bonn, 1922.

²Gardner *International Law and the World War*, (London, 1928), *Development of International Law in the Twentieth Century*, Calcutta, 1928.

³Schacht: *Die Stabilisierung der Mark*, Berlin, 1927.

⁴Strupp. *Das Werk von Locarno*, Berlin, 1926.

For general orientations see Butler: *Hand-book of the League of Nations* (London), and Sarkar: *Politics of Boundaries*, Calcutta, 1926.

1921. Transit Conference at Barcelona.

1920. The International Chamber of Commerce is established. This, however, is an institution neither of public nor of private "law" but a private international undertaking.

1922. Genoa Conference (not a law but a private understanding) on world-economy (cf. the previous international economic conference at Brussels, 1920).

1927. International Economic Conference, held at Geneva, examines the world's economic situation and indicates some of the lines to be followed in order to attain solidarity in economic life. The lowering of tariff is recommended in commerce. In industry "rationalization" and international trusts are suggested as the means of lowering the costs. And in agriculture, co-operative production and organization of credit are the methods recommended.¹

¹ Pribram's "*Die weltwirtschaftliche Lage im Spiegel des Schrifttums der Weltwirtschaftskonferenz*" (The World's Economic Situation as reflected in the official and non-official papers submitted to the International Economic Conference) in the *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, October 1927. See also *Supra* for Grossmann's paper at this Conference.

For an interpretation of the theories underlying the administrations of the Universal Postal Union, the International Rivers. (Danube Rhine, etc.), Reparation Commission, League Secretariat, International Labour Office, see Burns' "International Administration" in the *British Year-Book of International Law*, 1926. Oxford.

"New Orientations in Commerce" in Sarkar's *Greetings to Young India*, Calcutta 1927; Chapter on "Internationalisation de la politique commerciale" in Gignoux's *L'Après-Guerre et la politique commerciale* Paris, 1924. Flick's *Modern World History* (N.Y. 1926).

(d) *Theories*

1907. SARTORIUS: *Kapitalanlage im Auslande* (Investment of Capital Abroad). The old free-trade optimism was an abstract theory,—based on the wrong assumption that different countries possess equal economic strength. The policy of world-economy, if it is to endow internationalism with a reality, would depend on actual historic developments in the transactions between nations and treat them as elements or phases in its own growth. It consists in the complex of relations arising out of emigration, immigration, travels, exports and imports of goods, communication, transportation and balance of accounts. In spite of the most persistent efforts on the part of nations to be economically self-sufficient, they have been compelled to depend on one another on account of climatic, physiographic and technical reasons in the matter of production and consumption.

1909. NORMAN ANGELL: *The Great Illusion, Foundations of International Polity* (1914). The nations which form the European community are not sovereign, nor independent, nor entities, nor rival, nor advantageously predatory. The need for widespread co-operation to find our sustenance and the decline in the effectiveness of physical force as a means of securing service have, first, destroyed the economic homogeneity of States, and secondly, rendered the exercise of force by one State against another ineffective and futile. The elaboration and extension of world-wide credit system

have created a condition of interdependence between the nations never before known.

1912. HARMS: *Volkswirtschaft und Weltwirtschaft* (National economy and World-economy). International conventions and treaties constitute the basis of world-economy. World-economy is rendered possible because of the latest developments in the methods of communication and transportation.¹

1912-15. SCHILDER: *Entwicklungstendenzen der Welt wirtschaft* (Tendencies in the Development of World-economy). World-economy is a unit, a "cosmos" like national economy. There is no essential difference in character between the two, because the "balance of accounts" renders each dependent on the other and converts them into two parts of the same system. National economics are consciously influencing one another and creating the sense of "welfare for the world-economy."

1915. KRABBE, Dutch jurist, *Die Moderne Staat-sidee* (The Modern Idea of the State). Like civil law international law also is the creation of men's sense of right. The state is subordinate to this law, both internal and international (cf. DUGUIT). Future international law is likely to limit not only the external powers of the State but even its internal powers in regard to the citizens.²

1917-30. Soviet Russia's formulation of policy towards subject and semi-subject races comprises (I)

¹ "Welt wirtschafts recht" (Law of World-Economy) in the *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Jena, October 1924.

² Kelsen: *Das Problem der Soveranitaet: Theorie des Voelkerrechts*, 1920.

the abolition of concessions and extra-territoriality in China, Persia, Afghanistan, etc., and (ii) a message of independence to dependencies and protectorates. Anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic idealism, both economic and political, is the keynote of this message which is to be found in the "Proclamation of the All-Russian Congress of Workers' Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, November 1917, announced by the chiefs of the Oriental Division of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs."¹

1921. HARLEY, American: *The League of Nations and the New International Law*. The theory of absolute and unlimited sovereignty has been modified by the actual relationships established by the League. Certain attributes of sovereignty have been handed over to the League, *viz.*, right of conquest, right to make war and right to remain neutral. The League establishes the "central authority" that was lacking in the structure of the Hague. It establishes also a system of sanctions and penalties (art. xvi.)²

1921. LAMBERT, Belgian: *Le Nouveau Contrat Social* (The New Social Contract), *Pax Economica* (Economic Peace). The organisation of individualistic democracy is the goal. The internal life of every nation is to-day connected with the entire world. The international relations are mostly economic. Free trade is the natural founda-

¹Lenin and Trotzky : *Proletarian Revolution 1920* ; *The Nation* (New York), Dec. 28, 1918 Oct. 13, 1920.

²Butler : *Handbook of the League of Nations* (London 1925).

tion of international peace. Nature does not know nations. They are the result of the changing fortunes of history. Nature knows only human interests, human aspirations and human economy. The universal play of equality and individual responsibility will create in all domains the co-operative institutions calculated to foster universal economic solidarity.

1923. BRYCE (1838-1922): *International Relations*. The world is now one in a sense in which it was never one before. Electricity is the most potential of the unifying forces for the purposes of knowledge and interchange of thought, as steam began to be for the commerce a century ago. The wealth that was destroyed in the Great War accumulated by the labour of many peoples during many years was lost to all the peoples. Every civilized nation is bound for its own sake to take interest in the well-being of others. What all the nations now need is a public opinion which shall, in every nation, give more constant thought and keener attention to international policy and lift it to a higher plane.

1923 FOIGNET: *Droit International Public*. The League of Nations is not an "alliance" of powers. It is not a "super-state" placed above the member-states which automatically abdicate their sovereignty. It is an international person with certain well-defined sovereign rights which alone the members agree to abdicate.

1923. NITTI, Italian: *Decadence of Europe*. Europe will have no peace as long as a single

foreign soldier treads the soil of the defeated countries or so long as armies of occupation and devastating hordes, disguised as commissions of control or as Reparations Commission, continue the shameless course which is the greatest disgrace of our time. The Germans never committed deeds like those which have been committed against them in the four years which have elapsed since the war. An occupation on a large scale is a disgrace and a scandal; an occupation which grows instead of diminishing, and which has already lasted for four years is a new and abominable deed.¹

1923. LAWRENCE: *Principles of International Law*. Unless law of any kind subverts freedom, international law based on general consent assuredly does not. The League of Nations is therefore quite compatible with the Grotian doctrine of sovereignty. cf. BURNS'S statement: "The League is not a super-state; it is the necessary extension of each state in the formation of a world system of government. The Secretariat is the natural and inevitable outcome of the increasing extent and complexity of modern government,"—Article on "International Administration" in the *British Year-Book of International Law*, 1926.

1924. GIGNOUX: *L'Après-guerre et la politique commerciale* (Post-war conditions and Commercial policy). An international entente between the "producers of the world is an urgent necessity for commer-

¹ Brailsford: *After the Peace*; 1920, Keynes: *A Revision of the Treaty*, 1922; Norman Angell: *The Fruits of Victory*, 1921.

cial revival. Free-trade on world-basis is not yet a question of practical politics. But in regard to tariff practices, currency systems, reparations and inter-allied debts the different nations can freely come to a reasonable understanding. The United States of the World, in matters economic, may function in the interest of general harmony without harming the local interests. Real peace can be founded only on such economic equilibrium as has its inspiration in internationalism.

1925. CULBERTSON, American : *International Economic Policies*. World-society rests on the nation. The preservation of the nation depends on the establishment of principles and methods of international co-operation. The League of Nations at Geneva is a most hopeful effort. Whether it be this particular League, some modification of it, or some other means, the ultimate organisation of world government must provide for (i) a process whereby substantive international law is regularly and adequately enacted, (ii) a machinery for its administration and (iii) a court to construe and interpret it.

1926. RAYNAUD : *La Vie Economique Internationale* (International Economic Life). No economic or social phenomenon of to-day is understandable without its international aspects. International organisation of the world is furnished by conventions, treaties and associations. A universal economic union is going to furnish the most solid foundation for the League of Nations.

1927. LIEFMANN : "International Kartelle" in

the *Weltwirtschaftliches Archive*. Mankind is as yet very far off from "rationalization" in regard to the division of labour among the nations. We have to wait long before an "Economic League of Nations" might function as a clearing house or exchange for all economic interests and be in a position to induce one nation to renounce a certain industry and another nation to renounce a second. International cartels and cartels of international trusts are perhaps but initial attempts in this direction. For the present, however, they constitute the foundation of a new imperialism consisting in the monopolisation of raw products and labour force in colonies and undeveloped regions.

1927. SCELLE: *Une crise de la société des nations* (A Crisis of the League of Nations) The League is becoming more and more Europeanized. The extra-European States are getting indifferent and even hostile to it. The unity and universality of the League are therefore jeopardized. The danger can be met by decentralization and regionalism. A still more serious danger is perhaps to be noticed in the return to the "old methods" of diplomacy to which the League has been pandering. Imperialistic manoeuvres, spheres of influence, "balance of power" alliances, etc. constitute the order of the day and militate against the ostensible principles of the League.

1927-28. The Indo-South African Agreement relieves, to a certain extent, the tension created by the Anti-Asiatic Bill of South Africa (1926). But

some fundamental problems remain where they were, *e.g.*, those in regard to (1) the prohibition of Indian immigration, (2) the categorical refusal of franchise to the Indian settlers, and (3) the exclusion of Indian settlers from social life on the ground of colour.¹

1928. League against Imperialism (Brussels) passes resolutions :

ON THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE LEAGUE: The Executive Committee of the League against Imperialism regards the creation of strong mass organisations of the League in the capitalist countries as an essential pre-condition for an effective anti-imperialist movement in the whole world.

The Executive Committee receives with satisfaction the declaration made by the British Delegation under the leadership of James Maxton, that in Britain also the League will proceed to secure the recruitment of thousands of workers as members.

ON INDIA: The Executive Committee of the League against Imperialism congratulates the Indian National Congress on having declared the complete independence of India as the goal of the Indian national movement, as all other formulæ of so-called "freedom within the Empire" are but camouflaged forms of foreign domination.

The Executive Committee further welcomes the fact that, as the logical outcome of that declaration, India has unanimously adopted a vigorous boycott of

¹ "India's South African Question" in Sarkar's : *Greetings to Young India* (Calcutta, 1927).

the Simon Commission, thereby emphatically denying the insolent claim of the British Parliament to frame or to decide upon a constitution for the people of India.

The Executive Committee hopes that the Indian National Congress will devote itself whole-heartedly to the task of organising the workers and peasants of India, without whose active co-operation for economic and social emancipation Indian independence cannot be secured.

The Executive Committee appeals to the British workers to realise the disastrous effect upon their own standards of life and trade-union rights of allowing imperialist exploitation in oriental countries, and calls upon the organised workers of Great Britain to take steps to secure that their representatives use their power in support of the unanimously expressed desires of the Indian people instead of aiding the imperialist manoeuvres of the British capitalist government.

ON EGYPT: The Executive Committee of the League against Imperialism denounces the methods of violence and terror adopted by the British government to prevent the Egyptian people from exercising their legitimate right of framing laws for their own benefit, including laws guaranteeing freedom of association.

The Executive Committee supports the people of Egypt whole-heartedly in their demand for complete independence, for the immediate withdrawal of all British troops from Egypt and the Sudan, and for the

international recognition of Egypt as a sovereign State.

The Executive Committee takes this opportunity of warning the Egyptian people that these demands cannot be realised so long as they allow their affairs to be decided by statesmen whose economic and social interests do not coincide with those of the broad masses of the population.

The Executive Committee calls upon them to form a united front with all the other oppressed nations and classes of the world for the final overthrow of imperialism.

ON ARABIA. The Executive Committee of the League against Imperialism condemns the aggressive military operations conducted by the British government against the Arabs, both on the borders of Aden, in the south of Arabia, and on the Iraq frontier, in the north, in order to strengthen further the hold of British imperialism on Iraq, Transjordan and the Persian Gulf.

It appeals to the National and Labour organisations in India to prevent, by all means in their power, the employment of Indian troops by the ruling class of Great Britain to destroy the independence of the Arab people.

The Executive Committee calls upon the organised workers of Great Britain to express their solidarity with the people of the Arabian countries, by adopting all such measures as may compel the British government to abandon its imperialist policy of exploitation, aggression and annexation, which has

already brought untold sufferings to the millions of Asia and Africa, and constitutes a growing menace to the standard of life of the European working-class.

ON CHINA: The Executive Committee of the League against Imperialism draws the attention of the workers of the great powers to the determined imperialist policy pursued by their governments in China, where, they either undertake direct military attacks upon the people of China struggling for freedom, or where they carry out the recently inaugurated policy of backing up all the reactionary generals of the *Kuomintang* to Leaders of the organised Chinese workers and peasants, who had taken refuge in the foreign concessions and have been mercilessly handed over to the *Kuomintang* generals. These reactionary generals have perpetrated wholesale massacres of the workers, as, for instance, in Canton last December, where they killed more than 6,000 persons in three days. Similar atrocities have been committed in Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangsi and Honan. It is the confirmed opinion of this League that, unless the workers of Great Britain, America and Japan bring active pressure to bear upon their governments to withdraw from China, these acts of cruelty and barbarism will continue.

ON INDONESIA: The Executive Committee of the League against Imperialism protests emphatically against the constant and systematic suppression of the Indonesian movement for independence by the Dutch government, and especially against the incessant deportations for life to the concentration camps

of Boven-Digul in the midst of the jungles and malarial marshes of New Guinea.

The Executive Committee demands full amnesty for all militant fighters for the independence of Indonesia who have been sentenced for so-called political crimes.

The Executive Committee calls upon the working-class in Holland to give energetic support to this demand for full amnesty and to help the Indonesian people by every possible means in their fight for complete independence from the yoke of Dutch capitalist-imperialist domination.

ON LATIN AMERICA: The Executive Committee of the League against Imperialism welcomes with great satisfaction the struggles of the nations of Latin America against the growing imperialist aggression of the United States of North America and especially expresses its fullest sympathy with the Nicaraguan peasants and workers led by Sandino in their heroic fight against the invasion of their country by American troops.

The Executive Committee calls upon all the anti-imperialist forces in all the countries of Latin America to form a single united front in order to resist successfully the threatening imperialist danger of North American oil-capitalism, and urges the workers of the United States and of all European countries to stand by the workers of Latin America in their fight and give them all possible support, especially to the Nicaraguan people in their fight for independence, to the workers of

Venezuela in their fight for the overthrow of the tyrannical Gomez Government, and, to the Mexican peasants and workers in the efforts to build a wall against the constant attacks on their economic and political independence by the big finance and the oil capitalists of the United States of America.

IV. IDEAS AND IDEALS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETAL EVOLUTION

Ideology: (1) analysis of instincts, interests, emotions, etc., in social relations, (2) comparative psychology (including animal psychology and psycho-analysis) as an aid to the deeper study of human institutions, (3) race-mixture, race-assimilation, race-deterioration, (4) segregation, sterilization, birth control, (5) optimum, density, over-population, population movements, (7) heredity *vs.* environment on party platforms, (8) challenge to older anthropology, criminology culture history, (9) "Oriental question" in science and politics, (10) legislation in social affairs (family, child, old age, maternity, housing, etc).

(a) *General Theories of Progress*

1905. STEIN (1859-): *Der soziale Optimismus* (Social optimism). He is a champion of "social legislation" as carried out in Germany and Switzerland. The theoretical support for State socialism as promoted by Bismarck is furnished in his writings. According to him the functions of the State are bound to expand in the future. Authority is the essential element in society. And

the source of authority in modern times is "institutions" and not individuals as formerly.

1905. PEARSON (1857-) *National Life from the stand point of Science, the Problem of Practical Eugenics*. Eugenics as a doctrine of national welfare is a branch of national economy. Sound parentage and healthy motherhood must be given a substantial economic advantage over unsound parentage and feeble motherhood. Factory acts and other humanitarian social legislation have tended to the increase of degenerate and pathological stocks at municipal and state expense. We have not only hindered Nature from weeding out social wastage but we have made the conditions increasingly more favorable to the multiplication of this degeneracy. Practical eugenists must urgently demand the restriction of all charity which favours the parentage of the unfit. Pearson is the exponent of anti-democratic chauvinism as opposed to environmental reform (contrast Hobhouse, *infra*).

1906. STANLEY HALL (1846-1924), American: *Youth, its Education, Regimen and Hygiene, Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct* (1917-20). He makes a study of the mind (i) in its development in the child and (ii) in its evolution in the race. He believes that although the mind is by far the most wonderful work of nature it is still very imperfect. The barbaric and animal impulses are still left in it. The law of recapitulation formulated by him says that the individual in his

development passes through stages similar to those through which the race has passed, and, in the same order. The chief end of man is to keep body and soul, and the environment always at the tip-top of condition. This super-hygiene best designated as *morale* implies the maximum of vitality, life abounding, and minimizing all checks and inhibitions to it. He analyses the emotions—fear, anger, pity, ecstasy, bashfulness, as well as children's lies, corporal punishments, etc., according to the methods of differential or individual psychology (detailed inductive study of countless individuals). The methods of genetic and pluralistic psychology have also been employed in the examination of profiteering, labour economics, feminism, alcoholism, crime, penology, war and international relations.¹

1906. ASCHAFFENBURG (1866-): *Das Verbrechen und seine Bekämpfung* (Crime and its Repression), first edition, 1903, establishes poverty and alcoholism as the two most powerful causes of crime. He offers a formidable opposition to the "positive" criminology of LOMBROSO which attempts, among other things, to establish a connection between ethnology and criminality. Apart from the fact, argues Aschaffenburg, that as regards the term race, we have not yet come to conclusive results, and further that we no longer find unmixed races, the economic conditions in the different countries vary to such an extent that it is almost impossible to determine what part

¹Wilson: *Stanley Hall* (1914); Partridge; *Genetic Philosophy of Education* (1912)

difference of race plays in criminality. He likewise finds Lombroso's doctrine of the "born criminal" (*delinquente nato*) being an "atavistic" step in the development of mankind as anatomically and physiologically "unproven."

As regards punishment he strongly recommends "conditional sentence" (known as "suspended sentence" in America), the parole, and abolition of fixed terms of imprisonment. He is positive, however, that brutality, recklessness and licentiousness are growing and that these can be combated mainly by measures calculated to reduce poverty and increase prosperity, by diffusion of education, establishment of recreation centres, as well as care of neglected children and released convicts. He advocates reform in criminal law on the ground that penal responsibility should be determined according to a biological and social criterion and not at all according to a metaphysical or theological theory of free will.

1906. HOBHOUSE (1864-): *Morals in Evolution, Development and Purpose* (1915), *Elements of Social Justice* (1922). Progress is achieved through the "conscious" promotion of "harmony" between the classes. Common good is the foundation of all personal rights. Democracy is the best form of political organization but is not suited to all peoples and at all times. His ethics establishes the relativity of good. The comparative study of ethics is apt, in its earlier stages, says he, to impress the student with a bewildering sense of the diversity of moral judgments. One

ends, however, by being impressed with a more fundamental and far-reaching uniformity. Some physical (*racial*) stocks, undesirable in themselves, may contain strains that suitably blended with others are of value to the *national* character as a whole. The new biology (Bateson and De Vries as opposed to Galton and Pearson) teaches that definite "mutations," the real basis of racial progress, are not impaired even if an individual possesses them in an imperfect degree. "Social opportunities" may be helpful to the thriving of desirable mutations and are thus real "eugenic agencies."

1906-8. WESTERMARK (1862-): *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*. Severity of punishment in criminal codes is connected with despotism or religion or both. Punishment gives the multitude a severe lesson in public morality.

1907. TENNEY (1876-) *Social Democracy and Population*. He studies the sociology of immigration from the American standpoint. "Assimilation" is possible when the immigrants come from classes and nations possessing more or less the high American economic and social standards. But he objects to "race-discrimination" and political chauvinism on the part of the American government.

1908. SIMMEL (1858-1918) *Soziologie: Untersuchungen ueber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (Sociology: investigations into the forms of society-making). He makes a special study of the individual in relations to society and of smaller groups in relation to larger groups. The mutual relations of

human beings in varied forms,—higher and lower orders, conflicts, leadership, opposition, secret societies, crossing of social circles, the poor, expansion of the group, etc.; in other words, the “social forms” or “social processes” constitute his chief themes.

Sociology, according to him, is neither a social philosophy, a philosophy of history, nor a synthesis of the social sciences. It is a special science with a well-defined field of investigation. While economics, says he, is distinguished from politics merely by the difference in *content* of the social phenomenon which it investigates, sociology is distinguished from both by the fact that it treats the *form* of socialization and not its content.¹

1908. MCDUGALL (1871-): *Introduction to Social Psychology, Group Mind* (1920). He places undue emphasis on “instincts” in the making of human conduct.² The instincts are inherited, or, are innate psycho-physical dispositions” “deterministic” in their character. In his analysis there are seven instincts with corresponding emotions *e.g.* flight (and fear), repulsion (and disgust), curiosity (and wonder), pugnacity (and anger), self-abasement (and subjection), self-assertion (and elation), parental instinct (and tenderness). He enumerates four other instincts (reproductive, gregarious, acquisitive and constructive).

¹ Rumf: “*Von rein formaler zur typologisch—empirischer Soziologie*” (essay on Simmel, Toennies, Vierkandt and Weber) in *Schmollers Jahrbuch* Leipzig 1924.

²Thorndike: *Original Nature of Man*, New York, 1913.

Public opinion, praise or blame of our fellows is a tremendous force in human conduct,—but it “contains within itself no elements of progress,” tending rather to degenerate into rigid customs.

1908. WALLAS (1888-): *Human Nature in Politics, Great Society* (1904), *Our Social Heritage* (1921). He institutes a psychological approach to the problems of public life. In his estimation progress comes through consciously directed social inventions. He is interested in the promotion of international co-operation. His politics postulate the utilization of the state as an instrument. He defends the territorial unit as the basis of representation and opposes the recent ideas of professional, vocational, group or interest representation as a general proposition.

1908. SIGHELE (1868-1913) *Litterature et criminalite* (Literature and Crime), 1908, *La foule criminelle* (The Criminal Mob) 1901. The propagation of crime through literature can be prevented by conscious propaganda against it. The creation of a sound and healthy public opinion is the remedy. The press need not be gagged. Crimes are committed by normal persons under the influence of crowd suggestibility.

1909. LICHTENCERGER, American, *Divorce: A Study in Social Causation*. Divorce is not an evil or a disease but a symptom and a medicine to social evils. The growing number of divorces indicates a disharmony between the economic (as well as political) standard and marriage. Social life has advanced in lines other than marriage. Hence the

friction which embodies itself in separations. Marriage laws and *mores* require to be brought up to the already raised level of industrial and political legislation. Increasing divorce rate is not due to degeneracy or decline in social morality. Divorce movement is the sign of a healthy discontent and marks the struggle towards a higher ethical consciousness.

1912. FREUD, Austrian: *Totem und Tabu* (Totem and Taboo); *Traumdeutung* (Interpretation of Dreams); *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (Three contributions to Sexual Theory), 1905, *Psychology of Everyday life*; *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* 1915-1917; *Die Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse* (Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego), 1921.

Man is governed by unconscious and subconscious no less than conscious and rational impulses. Personality is not a single undivided entity. The ego is really a bunch of different egos which correspond to the diverse groups to which an individual belongs as a member of the society. There is a perpetual conflict in every person between the impulses of the varied orders. Some of the impulses get the upper hand and others get submerged *i.e.*, driven underground, in order to reappear as dreams. The Freudian wish has its foundations in these unsatisfied desires and repressed emotions. Constituted as the society is, more or less every individual, nay, every personality is the theatre of such warring egos, repressions and the play of the subconscious. The

tyranny of the dominating social groups compels a very large number of the egos in every personality to retire into the background,—the most prominent of which is the sexual. Society's control over sex, as over other elements in the human make-up, gives rise to maladjustments of all sorts and explains not only the *tabus* and many other morals and manners but a large number of mental and nervous derangements as well. The social complexes of infancy are so constituted as will engender the awe for authority in the soul. The antagonism between the individual and the society is an eternal fact of the human mind and accounts for the phenomenon of control, on the one hand, and revolution, on the other (cf. SOROKIN, 1925).

LE BON'S description of the group-mind fits in well with his own psychology, says Freud, in the emphasis which it lays upon unconscious mental life. But, according to him, none of Le Bon's statements bring forward anything new. Everything that Le Bon says to the detriment and depreciation of the manifestations of the group mind had already been said by others before him with equal distinctness and equal hostility, and has been repeated in unison by thinkers, statesmen and writers since the earliest periods of literature. The two thesis which comprise the most important of Le Bon's opinions, those touching upon the collective inhibition of intellectual functioning and the heightening of affectivity in groups, had been formulated shortly before by SIGHELE. At bottom,

all that is left over' as being peculiar to Le Bon are the two notions of the unconscious and of the comparison with the mental life of primitive peoples, and even these had naturally often been alluded to before him.

Freud observes that MCDOUGALL's analysis of the simple "unorganized group" in his *Group Mind* (1920) is no more friendly than that of Le Bon's. McDougall, however, distinguishes between the group as a mere crowd and an "organized group." The "organization" serves to remove the defects of crowds by withdrawing intellectual work from the group and entrusting individuals with it. According to Freud the process would, in reality, consist in procuring for the group "precisely those features which were characteristic of the individual, and which are extinguished in him by the formation of the group." And here he agrees with Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (1916) in so far as the latter considers the formation of groups to be "biologically a continuation of the multicellular character of all higher organism."

The fundamental factor in group-formation, according to Freud, is deeper than the "imitation" of TARDE, the "primitive induction of emotion" of MCDOUGALL, the "herd instinct" or gregariousness of TROTTER and the "suggestibility" of Le Bon and may be analyzed intensively. It is to be sought in *libido*, the love-force, the sex-instinct, the *Eros* of Plato. It is Eros that holds together everything in the universe. And, "if an individual gives up his

distinctiveness in the group and lets its other members influence him by suggestion, he does it because he feels the need of being in harmony with them, rather than in opposition to them, so that perhaps after all he does so *ihnen zu Liebe* (for love of them, for their sake)."

The primitive form of human society was that of a horde ruled over despotically by a powerful male. The fortunes of this horde have left indestructible traces upon the history of human descent. The development of totemism, which comprises in itself the beginnings of religion, morality, and social organisation is connected with the killing of the chief by violence and the transformation of the paternal horde into a community of brothers.

1916. PARETO, Italian: *Trattato di Sociologia Generale* (Treatise of General Sociology). It is unscientific to admit that man is exclusively a rational being. Inconsistency and illogicality are some of the fundamental traits in the make-up of the human mind. It is easy and quite natural for man to commit the worst crimes in the name of the noblest sentiments and under the inspiration of most idealistic catchwords. There is nothing psychologically strange, for instance, in scoundrels posing as patriots and philanthropists. The logic of feeling is as great a reality in the *psyche* as the logic of reason. Its influence perhaps is greater. The influence of passions, emotions, feelings, etc., the influence of the "subconscious," the "instincts" and so forth in human conduct are tremendous. And these impulses

are not all godly, angelic and benevolent. The devilish, beastly, brutal elements are equally fundamental. *cf.* SOROKIN 1925.

1916. MYRES, American : *Influence of Anthropology on the Course of Political Science* (Berkeley, U.S.) helps concentrating the attention of scholars on a new and growing aspect of contemporary political philosophy. *cf.* BARNES, 1924.

1916-19. CROCE (), Italian : *Theory and History of Historiography*. History is knowledge of the *eternal present* and as such is identical with philosophy which is always the thought of the *eternal present*. History, properly understood, abolishes the idea of *universal history*. So philosophy, immanate and identical with history, abolishes the idea of a *universal philosophy i.e.* of a *closed system*. Neither age nor race is universal or permanent. Philosophy of history is as wrong as historical determinism. We recognise the reality of power in the act, and in the shadows the solidity of the ideas, and on earth heaven. Every attainment is the formation of a new prospect whence we have at every moment the satisfaction of possession and arising from this the dissatisfaction which drives us to seek a new possession. Reality does not stay still but rather is never as the whole in any one of its particularizations and therefore its true being is just its circular movement, which in its perpetual rotation produces the perpetual increment of itself upon itself, the ever new history. The true conception of progress must fulfil at once the two opposite conditions, of an attainment at every

fresh instant of the true and good, and of raising a doubt at every fresh instant, without however losing what has been attained; of a perpetual solution and of a perpetually renascent problem demanding a new solution. It must avoid the two opposite one-sidednesses of an end completely attained and of an end unattainable.

1917. MACIVER: *Community*. "Some have said that in community all is struggle, others that all is adaptation, some that selfishness rules, others that common interest prevails, some that environment is supreme, others that race is the master of environment, some that economic interest is the primary determinant, and others that the law of population determines economic law. Social science will never advance except by freeing itself from subjection to the methods and formulae of both physical and biological sciences. Social relations can never be adequately stated in quantitative terms. Militarism has been the enemy of modern social development and on the other hand all social development makes militarism more evil. Socialisation and individualisation are the two sides of a single process. It is a serious mistake to regard primitive peoples as more socialized than the peoples of civilisation. Each form of association has its distinctive place and character which cannot without social loss be usurped by any other association.

1918-22. SPENGLER: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (Decline of the West promulgates a philosophy of historic progress and cosmic revolution which in Indian terminology may be described as

a philosophy of *yugantara* (transformation of the epoch). It is based on the idea that "life is only fulfilled in the death" and that the "world's end is the completion of an inwardly necessary evolution." This is his doctrine of *Entropy*. From the standpoint of to-day he believes that he can see the "gently-sloping route of decline." He predicts that the decline will be consummated in the course of this very century. One feature of the present-day degeneracy consists in the fact, says he, that "since Kant,—indeed since Leibniz—there has been no philosopher who commanded the problems of all the exact sciences." But the regeneration of life that is going to take place in the twentieth century, or perhaps later in the near future will consist, first, in the overthrow of the will-to-victory of the exact sciences by "a new element of inwardness," and in the second place, in the development of an "infinitesimal music of the boundless world-space" which will enable Western science to "return to its spiritual home."

The message should appear thus to be neither unacceptable in the main, although many of the details are to be objected to, nor entirely pessimistic although the title of the book might inject doses of dejection into the hearts of the Westerns at any rate. Spengler's intention is rather to indicate the beginning of the "cultures yet to be." He has made a thoroughly objective attempt to describe "one world-historical phase of several centuries upon which we ourselves are now entering."

GOETHE'S conception of "living Nature" furnishes the key to Spengler's interpretation of "world-as-history." The rhythm, form, duration etc., of every organism are determined by the "properties of its species," says he. An oak is immortal, so to say, but a caterpillar does not grow to be several years old. There is a limit to growth in each instance, and the "*sense of limet* is identical with the sense of the inward form." In the case of higher human history it would be highly irrational to postulate "unlimited possibilities."

Each culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression, which "arise, ripen, decay and never return." World-history is a picture of endless formations and transformations, of the marvellous waxing and waning of organic forms. There is bound to be a system of "civilization" consequent upon every system of "*Kultur*."

Spengler's philosophy of history is a history and philosophy of destiny and is based on an inductive analysis of the Egyptian, Chinese, Classical, Indian, Arabian and Western histories. In the evolution of every race or region he discovers the cycle of fourfold season. The "spring" represents rural initiative; the "summer" gives rise to ripening consciousness, the "autumn" corresponds to the zenith of strict intellectual creativeness, while in the "winter" megalopolitan civilization dawns and the extinction of spiritual creative force takes place. There is a "pre-cultural" period in every race. Then follows an

epoch of "*Kultur*." Finally comes "civilization," which is different from *Kultur*, in which, indeed, *Kultur* inevitably completes itself and into which it degenerates and becomes petrified. Spengler's cycle will easily remind one of the dictum of Polybius and to a certain extent of that of the Chinese historian Sze Machien (c. 100 B.C.): In ideological content the summers or autumns, etc. of the different races are identical although chronologically the summer of one may be centuries ahead of or behind the other, and so on. Similarly no matter whatever the chronological distance between the races or regions the evolution from pre-cultural to the cultural and thence to the civilization stage exhibits in each more or less identical or analogous phenomena of life and thought. It may be remarked that the *qualitative* relation between Spengler's "*Kultur*" and "civilization" has something in common with that between TOENNIES'S "community" and "society."

Equipped with this comparative morphology of societal life Spengler proceeds to describe and evaluate the state of Eur-America about the period 1800-2000 A. C. and considers the condition to be analogous to the transition from the Hellenistic to the Roman age. "Rome—with its rigorous realism—uninspired, barbaric, disciplined, practical, Protestant, *Prussian*—will always give us, working as we must by analogies—the key to understanding our own future." The transition from *Kultur* to "civilization" was accomplished for the classical world in the fourth, and for the Western in the nineteenth century. The

characteristics of the present-day "civilization" in Eur-America are to be found in imperialism, the "formal sway of individuals," "world-cities," predominance of money, matter-of-factness, absence of Platonic or Kantian philosophy, disappearance of the "Greek" idealism of a Don Quixote, and the emergence of the "Roman" features of a Sancho Panza. The type is embodied in the "will to expansion" of the colonialist Cecil Rhodes, "the first man of a new age."

The Western development is taken by Spengler to begin with the Frankish period and Charlemagne (500-900 A.C.). This is characterized as the "pre-cultural epoch." The "cultural" epoch comprises the Gothic (900-1500) and the Baroque (1500-1800) periods. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are taken to represent the epoch of "civilization" which implies decadence in the sense described above. The "winter" has set in and is likely to continue to 2200. But, of course, "if winter comes," as the poet sings, and as Spengler's methodology accepts, can "spring be far behind"? The world will witness about that time a *yugantara* (cosmic revolution or transformation of the age-spirit) and the establishment of its cycle of seasons.

Perhaps yes, because after all it is only a truism that says that one form or style of life is going to be replaced by another. But, evidently, there are few students of objective history who, as Spengler is not unaware, would be prepared to accept the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in point to *values*

as inferior to the preceding centuries, not to speak of marking a definite pathway downwards. Rather, with the Renaissance and more especially with Leibniz, Descartes and Newton (seventeenth century) as the starting-point, Europe is to be credited with a steady, onward progress, the possibilities of which have hardly as yet been exhausted. A philosophy of history or of human destiny would be more true to reality if instead of commencing Western life and thought with the fifth century one were to commence it at, say, 1700. Because, for all practical purposes the period between 500 and 1700 did not develop anything in the West which might be described as epoch-making and at any rate, as essentially distinct from what the East had done in previous epochs or during the same period. The characteristic products of Western history are the gifts of the "modern" epoch, the age represented by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It need be noted *en passant* that the tripartite division of history as "ancient-mediæval-modern" is condemned by Spengler. And there is every reason to believe that the twentieth century is continuing both extensively and intensively the spiritual and the material creativenesses of those two centuries. If the eighteenth century can be conceded to be "Greek" and to represent *Kultur*, there can be no philosophical or sociological justification for considering the twentieth century to be "Roman" and to embody "civilisation."

1920. PARMELEE, American : *Criminology, Principles of Anthropology and Sociology in their Rele-*

tions to Criminal Procedure (1908), *Poverty and Social Progress* (1916). The "born criminal" (*cf.* LOMBROSO) is biologically impossible because criminality is a social phenomenon. The "instinctive criminal" does not exist because there cannot be an instinct for crime. The "habitual criminal" is psychologically inconceivable. "Professional" criminals as well as "insane" criminals are realities. Lombroso has given weight to racial factors in criminality. He characterizes peoples as being racially superior. He thinks that the "atavistic" traits of the criminal take the form of a reversion to the traits of an inferior race. According to Parmelee, Lombroso's statements remain unproven. He warns us against extreme statements *re* the influence of race. Its influence is obviously, or, in all probability, confused with the influence of other factors.¹

1920. LOWIE (1883 -), American: *Primitive Society*. If the highest civilizations emphasise the paternal side of the family so do many of the lowest. Primitive institutions are not invariably democratic. Tribal monarchy or autocracy is not necessarily a mark of higher culture. The territorial state may come into existence even without the transitional stage of "clan" or "gens." His conclusions lead to the subversion of the anthro-

¹Bonger: *Criminality and Economic Conditions*, Boston, 1916 (transl. from French). Mercier: *Crime and Insanity*, London, Home University, Library), Ellis, *The Criminal* (from the anthropological standpoint), London 1922. Parmelee: *Introduction to the English translation of Lombroso's Crime: Its causes and Remedies* Boston 1911.

pology embodied in MORGAN'S *Ancient Society* (1877) and the sociology in ENGELS' *Family. Property and State* (1884.)

1921. THOMSON: *Control of Life*: The contemporary views on heredity are influenced by three modern ideas: (1) the idea of germinal continuity (GALTON and WEISMANN)—like begets like, (2) the idea of "biological" atoms or unit characters (MENDEL and DE VRIES); these behave as if they were discrete entities and might be distributed to the offspring in some degree independently of one another and reunited in new combinations, and (3) the idea that bodily modifications acquired as a result of nurture are not readily transmissible. Man is very modifiable. Nurture means much to the individual.

1921. CONKLIN (1869—) American: *The Direction of Human Evolution, Heredity and Environment* (4th edition 1922), The advancement of civilization has meant only improvement of environment. Neither environment nor training has changed the hereditary capacities of man. Mankind has failed to substitute "intelligent artificial selection" for natural selection" in the propagation of the race. Both the church and the State have encouraged the propagation of idiots, defectives, insanes. There has been an extinction of the most gifted lives by celibacy among religious orders and scholars or by wars which decimate the best stocks. The eugenicist can eliminate the worst human kinds from the possibility of reproduction but is not in a position to employ the methods of plant breeders and animal breeders in regard to

human beings even with the laudable object of producing supermen. The "ideal individual" is not the highly "specialized unit" as in the case of social insects but rather the most general "all-round type" of individual. Such a generalized type cannot be produced by methods of "inbreeding" or "close breeding" as it must include the "best qualities of many types and races." Mendelian inheritance shows how it is possible to sort out the best qualities from the worst. Conklin objects to the Galtonian idea of segregation and intermarriage of the most highly intellectual members of society. Hybrid races are not always inferior to "pure bred" ones, if any such exist. The wholesale sterilization of all sorts of criminals, alcoholics and undesirables without determining whether their defects are due to heredity or to conditions of development would be like burning down a house to get rid of the rats. Not fewer and better children, but more children of the better sort and fewer of the worse variety is to be the motto.¹

1921. GINI, Italian, *Problemi sociologici della guerra* (Sociological Problems of the War) pressure of population is an incentive to war.

[At this point the present author takes the liberty to place his own contribution on record, as follows :

1922. SARKAR : *Futurism of Young Asia* exposes the fallacies of the comparative method as generally used by anthropologists, culture-historians, crimino-

¹ Davenport (1866-) *Heredity in its Relation to Eugenics*, New York 1911.

logists as well as moral and political philosophers. Their fallacies fall within three classes: (1) for purposes of comparative analysis they do not take the same class of facts from the East and the West, (2) they do not apply the same method of interpretation to the data of the Orient as to those of the Occident, and (3) they compare the old conditions of the Orient with the latest achievements of the Occident. A reform of comparative sociology on the lines indicated would lead to a revolution in our ideas about the relations between Asia and Eur-America, and serve to establish the race-questions and the theory of world-progress on the proper, objective and scientific foundations. On the strength of positive achievements in ideology and in institutions (item by item) the leading historical forces, processes and stages are found to have been, in the main, more or less uniform (no matter whether unilinear or multilinear, divergent or convergent) in the East and the West. Whatever has happened in the economic sphere in Eur-America during the past half a century is therefore bound also to happen more or less on similar and even identical lines in Asia, and, of course in India, during the next generation or so (Preface to *Economic Development*, 1926].

1922. CARR-SAUNDERS (1886-): *Problem of Population*. Increase of population need not lead one to pessimism because although it has been continuous and rapid in historic periods it has been very slow, almost stationary, during long periods. Multiplication

has been controlled by customs and conscious methods throughout the ages. *Cf.* also his *Population* 1925.

1922. GOLDENWEISER, American: *Early Civilisation*. He combats the deterministic evolutionary anthropology of MORGAN. The principle of "limited possibilities" in the development of culture may lead to "cultural convergences" from diversity of antecedents. A universal law of evolution is untenable. Political organisation or the state is as old as social organisation (clan or gens) *i.e.*, the society. The state, no matter in what form, is an omnipresent phenomenon in primitive society.¹ It does not arise on the ruins of, and is not posterior to, the kinship organisation. The evolutionary anthropology which considers the state to be a late arrival preceded by pre-statal (*i.e.* purely social) stages is found to be defective. *Cf.* LOWIE, 1920.

1922. VINOGRADOFF: *Historical Jurisprudence*. He makes a comparative study of legal institutions and ideas. There are traditional, unconscious elements in law, says he.¹ Economic influences on law-making are also brought into prominence.

1923. VIERKANDT: *Gesellschaftslehre* (Theory of Society). Personality is not an individualistic or atomistic phenomenon. Traditional psychology considers it to be a unified and well-defined entity. In reality an individual's personality or character is diverse in different capacities. The soul reacts according to the situations. Every new social

¹ See Goldenweiser's paper on "Cultural Anthropology" in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (ed Barnes).

situation means a special centre of strength and activity for the soul. The group is a unit and society is a totality too. Family, ancestral stock, state, nation, manners, language, law and economy, the flag and the altar are no less real nuclei of life than are the individuals, and are at the same time more or less independent of the latter. The group is a closed self-sufficient system of energies and relations. The individual, however, has his soul's doors open to the external world,—natural and social. Every individual carries two souls in his breast, one leading him towards the neighbour, community and the society and the other prompting him to prefer privacy. Vierkandt does not propagate the sociology of optimism and inevitability of progress but of struggle by competition. In contrast with other sociologists he devotes very slight attention to the economic and technical aspects of social life, especially of the modern and contemporary types.

1924. BERNARD (1881-), American, *Instinct: A study in social psychology*. Much of all that passes for "inborn" or "innate" is really "non-inherited action-pattern," "acquired from experience," formed as the result of habit. "The vague employment of the term instinct finds its logical *reductio ad absurdum* in the application of the term to well-developed habit-complexes such as the "instincts" listed in the classification in MCDOUGALL'S *Introduction to Social Psychology* and the various books on educational psychology of recent

years." The future control of the human race and its civilization lies not through selective breeding of the higher social qualities but through their transmission by social contact and control. The overwhelming, and, generally, the immediate pressures upon the character-forming process, especially in its more advanced stages, come from the accumulated psycho-social environment.

1924. BARNES, American: *Sociology and Political Theory*. He presents a short but comprehensive summary of the ideas of leading sociologists ¹ *re* (i) nature of the state, (ii) origins of the state, (iii) forms of government, (iv) scope of state activity, (v) international relations, etc. Cf. MYRES, 1916.

1925. SOROKIN, Russian: *The Sociology of Revolution*. He offers an inductive psychological analysis of the Russian revolutions of 1905, 1917-24 and of the seventeenth century, the French revolutions of 1789, 1848, 1870-71, the German revolution of 1848, the English revolution of the seventeenth century, some mediaeval and antique revolutionary periods, the Egyptian, Persian and other great revolutions. The nationalist anti-foreign revolutions, such as are embodied in the Tchechoslovak of 1918 and the American of the eighteenth century are excluded from this study.

Sorokin is anti-Bolshevik in his interpretation of the Sovietic transformation of Russia. The analysis

¹ Barnes: *History and Social Intelligence*, (1926). *The New History and Social Studies*, (1925).

leads him to the conclusion that excessive conservatism or proneness to stability *i.e.*, law and order, is as vicious as excessive revolution and revolution-mongering. He is a champion of the "golden man" of orderly social control.

The revolution is condemned in the following words: The Russian, the French, the English revolutions, and the revolution of Huss were not stemmed. They ran their full course. Authority remained in the hands of the groups and individuals, who had been elevated by revolution, not in those of their opponents. And yet we find, says he, that this condition of authority remaining in the same hands, does not prevent, but rather accelerates, results diametrically opposed to the promises and watchwords of revolution. The revolution proclaims one thing, but its hands accomplish something very different. To-day it announces something, and the same, or the next day, it tramples upon its own promises and declarations.

Sorokin finds causes of revolution in the Freudian repression of one form or another. Thus, if the desire for food (or the alimentary reflex) of a considerable part of the population is "repressed" by famine, we have one cause of riot and revolutions. If the reflexes of individual self-preservation are "repressed" by arbitrary executions, mass murders or a bloody war, we have another cause of revolutions and troubles. If the reflexes of collective self-preservation of a group, for example, a family, a religious sect, or a party are "repressed" by the

desecration of the holy things of that given group, by the mockery of its members, their arrest and execution, etc., we have a third cause of revolutions. If the want of housing, clothing, necessary temperature, etc., is not satisfied even to the minimum extent—we have a further additional cause of revolutions. If the sex reflexes, together with their variations, like jealousy or the wish to possess for oneself the beloved object of a large group of individuals are “repressed” by the impossibility to satisfy them, by rape and violations of wives and daughters, by compulsory marriages and divorces, etc.,—we have a fifth cause of revolutions. If the instincts of ownership of the mass of people are “repressed” by their poverty and destitution in the face of other people’s wealth—we have a sixth cause of revolutions. If the instinct of self-expression (according to Ross) or individuality (according to Mikhailovsky) of the mass of people is “repressed” by insults, under-estimation, constant and unjust ignoring of their merits and achievements, on the one hand, and over-estimation of the less worthy people on the other, we have a further cause of revolutions. If with the great number of individuals their impulses of fighting and rivalry, of creative work, of variety of experience and adventure and their habits of freedom (in the sense of freedom of speech and actions, or unchecked manifestation of innate inclinations,) are “repressed” by too peaceful a life and too monotonous surroundings, by work which satisfies neither brain nor heart, by continual

restrictions upon freedom of communication, speech and action—we have further conditions contributing to the outburst of revolutions.

In Sorokin's analysis the psychological basis of revolutions is to be so found in the very mechanism of human behaviour. The investigations of psychologists of the most varied tendencies have proved quite destructive to "rationalism". Already, Lange, Petrajitzky, Ribot and others have laid sufficient stress on the part played by feelings and emotions in the psychology and conduct of man. Freud, his school and the whole series of psychologists have given predominance to the immense importance of subconscious and unconscious impulses. On the other hand, Thorndike, McDougall and others have demonstrated the presence, variety and great determining power of man's inborn reflexes or instincts. Among these are not only social, but combative instincts; not only the parental, but that of the hunter; not only that of subordination, but that of dominion and self-assertion. To sum up: Man is the bearer not only of peaceful, gentle, virtuous and social impulses but also of their opposites. On the other hand, the Russian school of the objective method of analysing the behaviour of man and animals and the behaviorists have given still greater predominance to inborn or unconditioned reflexes, showing how completely conditioned or acquired forms of behaviour depend on them.

Revolutions are thus proved to be perfectly natural phenomena.

(b) *Race Questions.*

1907. The Japanese-Canadian agreement limits Japanese immigrants in Canada to 400 persons a year. By the "gentlemen's agreement" Japan is forbidden to grant passports for U.S.A. to labourers.

1910. Indian immigrants are not admitted in Canada except by "continuous journey" from India, a prohibitive ruling because there is no direct steamship between India and Canada.

1911. Universal Races Congress (London).¹

1911. BOAS (1858-), American: *Mind of Primitive Man*. He challenges what may be called the "raciological" interpretation of culture and politics. The inherent superiority of any race cannot be demonstrated biologically, says he. The doctrine of alleged "gifted races" cannot stand critical examination. There is no necessary connection between anatomical features and mental faculty. No direct relation between physical habitat and mental endowment can be established.

1912. LEVY-BRUHL: *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* ² (Mental Functions in inferior or primitive societies). The mental processes of "primitives" do not coincide with those of the advanced moderns. The old belief in the identity of the "human mind" cannot be maintained. He criticises the traditional (English) anthropological

¹ Spiller: *Race Problems*, London 1912.

² Translated under the chauvinistic title, *How Natives Think*, London 1926. A companion volume to this by the same author is available in English known as *Primitive Mentality* 1923.

theory of animism as unscientific. Human aggregations may differ profoundly in their construction, and, as a consequence, their higher mental aspirations will also present corresponding differences. A comparative study of the various types of collective mentality is just as indispensable to anthropology as comparative anatomy and physiology are to biology.

1917. The Immigration Act unconditionally forbids the immigration into U.S.A. of "labourers" from Asia (*minus* China and Japan provided against separately) by latitude and longitude.¹

1918. GRANT: *The Passing of the Great Race* interprets European history in terms of race. Pure-blood super-race is his ideal.

1920. MCDUGALL (1871-) : *Is America safe for democracy?* Nordic superiority is his race-fetish.

1924. HANKINS (1877-) American: *The Racial Basis of Civilization* vigorously attacks the doctrines of race-superiority embodied in Aryanism, Gobinism, Teutonism, Celticism, Anglo-Saxonism and Nordicism but establishes inequality between races with reference to particular qualities. He objects to imputing superiority to "individuals" on the strength of the group to which they belong and discusses the nature and extent of the differences between races with respect to those qualities which are important for the higher cultural activities. According to him racial differences are those of degree

¹ On these chauvinistic exclusion laws see the chapter on "Americanization" in Sarkar's *Futurism of Young Asia* 1922.

rather than of kind. In his judgment, inter-racial comparisons such as are entirely fair and absolutely conclusive do not yet exist.

(c) *East and West*

1905. The accidental discovery of the Kautilyan *Arthasastra* by Shamasastri (Mysore) invites the attention of the academic world to the secular, political and militaristic attainments of the ancient and mediæval Hindus.¹

1906. OKAKURA, Japanese: *Ideals of the East* preaches the unity of Asia on the strength of Buddhism. The East is different from the West in outlook of life, says he, following the conventional sociology.

1907. HUNTINGTON, American: *Pulse of Asia, Civilization and Climate* (1918), *World-Power and Evolution* (1919). He offers a climatological interpretation of history. The problems of Turkey, Persia, Japan etc., are discussed. Some of his postulates are as follows: "Mohammedanism favours immorality," "Persians are prone to lying". He has popularized such chauvinistic and unscientific assumptions in regard to the East unsupported by objective and historical data.

1908. FORMICHI: *Salus Populi* (Welfare of the People). A comparative study of Kamandaka, Hobbes and Machiavelli is presented here. The

¹ Hillebrandt: *Altindische Politik*, Jena 1923. Meyer: German translation of *Arthasastra Das altindische Buch vom Welt-und Staatsleben*, Leipzig, 1926. Sarkar: "The German Translation of the Kautilyan *Arthasastra*" in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, June 1928.

common political psychology of the Hindu, English and Italian philosophers is his theme.

[At this point the present author takes the liberty to place his own contribution on record, as follows :—

1914. SARKAR: *Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*, supplemented by *Hindu Achievements in Exact Science* (1918), *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (1922), *Die Lebens-anschauung des Inders* (1923), establishes the fundamental identities or similarities in ideology and institutional life, the “sociological equations,” between the East and the West in pre-industrial epochs—during well-marked periods.¹

1926. SYLVAIN LEVI; *L'Inde et le Monde* (India and the World). Indian civilization like all other ancient civilizations was greatly a “collective work” of the entire world. He lays stress on India’s intercourse with the peoples from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Modern India should not, says he attempt to isolate herself from the “movements of universal civilization.” But he considers it impossible for the Orient “to borrow of the Occident its technical processes in order to imitate it, be its equal, and finally to compete with it.” The nutshell of his politics is as follows: “The white race must, to speak in the

¹ See the bibliographies on allied works printed in these books. Bottazzi: *Precursori di Niccolo Machiavelli in India and in Greece* Kautilya and Tucidide (Precursors of Machiavelli in India and Greece: Kautilya and Thucydides), 1914;

Sarkar’s “Hindu Politics in Italian” in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Calcutta, 1925-27.

(a) Asia in positive science (c 1600-1750)=
Europe in positive science (c 1400-1600).

(b) Asia in socio-economic life (c 1600-1750)=
Europe in socio-economic life (c 1600-1750).

(4) 1750-1850. Industrial revolution in the West creates a new civilization,—the “modern world.” East and West differ substantially for the first time: Thus,—

Asia (c 1850)=Europe (c 1750).

About 1850 the “East” is behind the “West” by nearly a whole century.

The continuity and uniformity of societal evolution as well as the equations based on them can be illustrated further by reference to the phenomena of Bolshevism in theory and practice. The Manufacturers of Bolshevism have claimed extraordinary things for their patent. And it is primarily because the face value of these claims seems to be accepted by the “outsiders” that they have condemned it in no less extravagant manner. The open repudiation of foreign debts (February, 1918) by the Bolshevik government as well as the “reign of Red terror,” temporary although it was, together with Bolshevik *Comraderie* with the colonies and dependencies including the concession-ridden regions like China, Persia, etc., have perhaps been the most potent sources of Eur-American antipathy to the Soviet regime in Russia.

But so far as theory or ideology is concerned, the fallacy on both sides arises from not recognising the fact that there are two Lenins,—one, the comment-

ator on and modernizer of Marxian metaphysics (*The State and the Revolution*, 1917), and the other, the statesman and patriot, the architect of the "new economic policy" (1922-23). Lenin, the statesman, is sharply to be distinguished from Lenin, the political philosopher.

In the first place, in the field of *Realpolitik*, practical politics, Bolshevism is essentially centralized nationalism and dictatorship or despotism of the few. There cannot be anything new in this patent in the estimation of those who remember the achievements of the "nation-makers" of Europe in the nineteenth century. Bolshevism has accomplished for Russia in the second and third decades of the twentieth century what should have been done for her, as was done for Germany, about a generation or two ago. From this view-point the following equation may sum up the developmental comparison.—

Soviet Russia in politics (1918-27) =

Bismarckian Germany (c 1875-1890.)

In the second place, it should be observed, moreover, that Bolshevism in office, especially since the establishment of the N. E. P. (1923) is economically nothing but the latest form or phase of the "industrial revolution." As such, Bolshevism furnishes the characteristic features of the actual economic legislation and business organization in the advanced countries of the present-day world. The "state-capitalism" (cf, the nationalized trusts and the *Gosplan*) organized under Bolshevism is to all

the society. It is not a being but a mobile complex of varied relations between individuals. It is possible to limit this complex and to make it oppose other complexes. Every individual is different at every moment of his life; he wills always in a new and different way, not comparable with the other modes of his or of others' willing.

1915. DEWEY (1859-), *The Schools of To-morrow*, *Democracy and Education*, *German Philosophy and Politics*, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920), *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922). Neglect of specific situations is a defect in the current logic of social thought. Notions of fixed self or individual as well as organic conception of society lead to unrealities. Dewey is an exponent of international humanism. Society is composed of diverse associations. The state is one such and has but several, minor functions to discharge. The relations between groups and persons constitute the most important items in political life. Freedom includes (a) efficiency in action, ability to carry out plans, absence of cramming and thwarting obstacles, (b) capacity to vary plans, to change the course of action, to experience novelties, and (c) power of desire and choice to be factors in events. Natural science has rendered nature wholly fixed and mind wholly open and empty. "A world that is at times and points indeterminate enough to call out deliberation and to give play to choice to shape its future is a world in which will is free, not because it is inherently vacillating and unstable but because deliberation

and choice are determining and stabilizing factors." Family life, property, legal forms, churches and schools, academies of art and science did not originate to serve conscious ends nor was their generation regulated by consciousness of principles of reason and right. Yet each institution has brought with its development demands, expectations, rules and standards. What authority have standards and ideals which have originated in this way? The authority is that of life. The choice is not between a moral authority outside custom and one within it. It is between adopting more or less intelligent and significant customs.

His futuristic pragmatism is this worded: "In an experimental philosophy of life the question of the past, of precedents, of origins is quite subordinate to pre-vision, to guidance and control amid future possibilities. Consequences, rather than antecedents, measure the worth of theories. Any scheme or project may have a fair hearing provided it promises amelioration in the future; and no theory or standard is so sacred that it may be accepted simply on the basis of past performance."

1918. HOBHOUSE (1864-) *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*. The will of any individual is his own and cannot be identical with the "general will". The state cannot be the embodiment of a unified general will but is the summation of all sorts of individual impulses and accidents. Idealism "idealizes the real" and considers injustice to be part of the "rational whole" and is therefore fatal to progress,

is the philosophy of the conservatives. Idealization of the state kills individuality and promotes authoritarianism.

1919. WATSON: *The State in Peace and War*. He follows Kant-Green rather than Hegel-Bosanquet in his "idealism" and does not consider war to be a necessity and believes in the possibility of a world-state. Undeveloped peoples are to be treated as wards. The state is the totality of institutions by which commonweal is secured. Sovereignty is not absolute but relative. "In truth no institution is sovereign. The relation between church and state, for example, is not one of subordination but of co-ordination." His ideas are monistic although tempered with pluralism.

1923. BERTRAND RUSSELL: *Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (1923). The abolition of private ownership of land and capital is a necessary step towards any world in which the nations are to live at peace with one another. What stands in the way of the freedom of the Asiatic peoples is not their lack of intelligence but only their lack of military prowess which makes them an easy prey to any lust for dominion. A world full of happiness is not beyond human power to create: the obstacles imposed by inanimate nature are not insuperable. The real obstacles lie in the heart of man, and the cure for these is a firm hope informed and fortified by thoughts.

Industrialism is practically inevitable and has to be accepted, but mechanistic conception of society

requires to be opposed. Socialistic industry could be the servant, not the master of the community,—hence socialism is to be preferred to capitalism. From the point of view of any man not possessed of large capital there is an inherent reasonableness in socialism and it is likely to spread even in the U. S. A. Justice and freedom have different spheres: the sphere of justice is the external conditions of a good life, the sphere of freedom is the personal pursuit of happiness. There must be as much self-government in industry as possible. The state must determine prices. It must also determine how much of the commodity is required. But the internal organization of an industry must not be interfered with by the state except on rare occasions.

His *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916) endorses co-operative movement and syndicalism. Home-rule in industry is syndicalism. He argues for the abolition of land-owners and restriction of capitalists but he does not propose equality of earnings. It is only by some such method that the free growth of the individual can be reconciled with the huge technical organizations which have been rendered necessary by industrialism. The existence of strong organizations within the state, such as trade unions is not undesirable except from the point of view of the official who wishes to wield unlimited power or of the rival organizations such as federations of employers which would prefer a disorganized adversary. He would increase the powers of voluntary organizations. "Give every man a sphere of

political activity small enough for his interest and his capacity." The state is to confine its 'functions to the maintenance of peace among rival interests. Liberation of creativeness ought to be the principle of reform both in politics and economics.

1924. GENTILE: Lecture at Palermo on *Il fascismo nel governo della scuola* (Fascism in school-administration), *Che Cosa e il fascismo* (What is Fascism)? 1926. The true doctrine is that which does not express itself in typed words but in the actions and personalities of its exponents. What counts is the man and the line he will take. Fascism and Liberalism are not identical. There are two liberalisms, one British and the other German = Italian. British Liberalism looks for freedom in the individual and sets the individual against the state. MAZZINI stood up against it, damning it with a force which has earned him immortality. The other Liberalism derides this alleged antagonism — between the individualism and the state. "The art of government is the art of making the aims of each a common aim so that the maximum of liberty may exist side by side with the maximum not only of public orderliness but with the fullest acceptance of the sovereignty of law and the necessary agencies of law. The maximum of liberty and the maximum of state control can thus be co-existent and interdependent. It is with this second Liberalism that Fascism coincides. There is no liberty but the liberty inherent in the state. The state is an authorised body for

the repression of arbitrary will and a guarantee to the society and individual that his safety is guarded by the mailed fist of law. The Fascists state is an ethical and moral state.

1926. FREYER: *Der Staat* (The State) discusses some of the fundamental of mental and moral personality in its individual as well as group aspects. The problems of state-making are posed in the perspective of these humane elements and societal complexes. The supreme importance of self-conscious and creative will is established as the *sine qua non* of political reconstruction and remaking of states (*Supra*, pp., 182-184).

CHAPTER V

THE ISMS OF TO-DAY

SECTION I.

EIGHT PHILOSOPHIES OF SOCIETAL RECONSTRUCTION

A bunch of socio-economic and economico-political isms or half-way houses to isms is always on view in the philosophical bazaars of to-day. In alphabetical order they may be enumerated as follows : absolutism, anarchism, anti-colonialism, anti-democratism, anti-imperialism, bolshevism, capitalism, collectivism, colonialism, communism, democratism, *etatisme*, Fabianism, fascism, guild-socialism, idealism, imperialism, individualism, internationalism, legalism, monism, nationalism, neo-individualism, neo-nationalism, socialism, solidarism, sovietism, state-capitalism, state-socialism, syndicalism, trade-unionism. The resources of the English language are not exhausted in this list and of course may be requisitioned in order to create or popularize fresh isms of this order.

The epochal survey presented in this monograph must have made the chronology of the substance underlying these isms quite clear. Their logical and psychological affiliations, however, are not simple. A genuine morphological classification of these ideologies as of all philosophical complexes is difficult ;

and yet some sort of classification has to be attempted, although the possibilities of arbitrary demarcation cannot be altogether excluded.

These isms may be grouped in two broad divisions. First come those which are to be regarded as constituting the efforts at more or less comprehensive social (i.e., economic, constitutional cultural and social,) reconstruction.

From the standpoint of substance or psychological make-up of the contents, eight isms may be singled out. They indicate distinct attempts at speculating constructively on the varied problems of political life. These are anarchism, bolshevism (communism sovietism), collectivism (Fabianism), fascism, guild, socialism, solidarism, state-socialism and syndicalism.

To the second group belong the rest. They indicate perhaps not so much distinct philosophies as view-points, methods of approach, attitudes, etc. in regard to some of the problems dealt with in the other, eight isms. These attitudes are accordingly to be found well-distributed in the eight philosophies.

Capitalism and socialism are to-day two of the most "elastic" terms of social parlance, representing concretely the two poles of society, the bourgeoisic and the proletariat. Each covers, however, so many different strands of societal thought that at many points capitalism=socialism, Philosophy would not, therefore, be poorer in substance if these two categories ceased to exist.

Trade-unionism is a category of socio-economic-

life and constitutes the very foundations of contemporary political and cultural existence in Eur.-America, and to a certain extent also in Japan and other regions of Asia and Africa. It is bound to figure in every ism of political thought as an important item.

ORIGINS OF THE EIGHT ISMS

Historically speaking, the living philosophical isms of to-day may be indicated in the following chronological order, in so far, at any rate, as their origins are concerned :

1848 Communist Manifesto : Scientific socialism = revolutionary communism : Marx, Engels.

1850—60 Anarchism : Proudhon, Bukunin (cf. Stirner 1844, also Kropotkin 1886).

1870—90 State-socialism : Bismarck (and Schaeffle Wagner, Schmoller ; Congress at Eisenach, 1872, *Verein fuer Socialpolitik*).

1884—94 Fabianism (= collective socialism or collectivism) : Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Bernard Shaw.

1889—1907. Solidarism : Gide, Bourgeois, Bougle, Duguit.

1895—1910 Syndicalism : Pelloutier, Pouget, Sorel.

1907—1912 Guild-socialism : Orage, Hobson, Cole.

1918—22. Bolshevism (= Marxian socialism, communism) : Lenin, Trotzky.

1923—25 Fascism (= nationalism + socialism = state-socialism) as opposed to communism and other forms of proletarianism : Mussolini, Gentile.

CONTENTUAL EVOLUTION OF THE ISMS

Ideologically, i.e. in the content of thought, the

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psychological affiliations of the eight philosophies are as follows :—

State-socialism, collectivism (Fabianism) and solidarism are reactions against communism and anarchism.

Syndicalism is the protest of working men as producers against all these etatismes, which are essentially capitalistic.

Guild-socialism is directed as much against collectivism as against syndicalism.

Bolshevism (sovietism) is a restoration or rather, for the first time, a realization of communism *en route* to anarchism (cf. the revolutionary Paris Commune of 1871).

Fascism embodies a revolt against bolshevism.

THE NATION AND THE ISMS

The attitude of these eight isms in regard to the “nation” may be exhibited in two broad groups, thus :—

1. The nation is a unified whole : state-socialism, collectivism, solidarism, fascism.

2. The nation is not a single entity. There are groups, sections and classes. The struggle between the classes is a fundamental societal fact : bolshevism or communism (Marxism), anarchism, syndicalism, guild-socialism. These four isms may be regarded as “proletarian” as contrasted with the nationalistic four in the previous count.

THE STATE AND THE ISMS

The attitude in regard to the “state” coincides

almost literally with the above grouping,— thus :

1. The state is an instrument of social welfare. State-socialism, collectivism, solidarism, fascism,— all the four nationalistic isms are expressions of *etatisme*.

2. The state is an evil, an engine of oppression and class-rule. Communism, anarchism, syndicalism, guild-socialism,—all the proletarian isms are anti-statal (i.e., essentially anarchistic).

State socialism, collectivism, solidarism and fascism, — all these forms of nationalism and etatism are philosophically oriented to Hegel, Bosanquet and Gentile, the “idealists,” absolutists or monists.

TYPES OF ANARCHISM

The four proletarian-anarchistic philosophies are, however, to be sharply distinguished from one another. They can hardly be grouped together as constituting one ideological complex.

ANARCHISM *vs.* BOLSHEVISM

“Pure” anarchism (Bakunin, Kropotkin) is contested by the fathers of communism (Marx, Engels) as firmly as by the bolshevism of to-day (Lenin). The distinction between the “long run” and the “transitional stage” is the special feature of communistic-bolshevistic anarchism as contrasted with pure anarchism.

The following equation will indicate the logical foundations of this diversity :

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100% Marxism (economic=and political) scientific socialism = communism = anarchism, "withering away of the state," in the long run=bolshevism or sovietism (dictatorship of the proletariat, which however means a most centralized nation-state as actually realized in Soviet Russia to-day).

SYNDICALISM *vs.* BOLSHEVISM

The nearest approach to pure anarchism is syndicalism. The communist - bolshevik - soviet state is therefore condemned by syndicalists as any other capitalistic-nationalistic-bourgeois state.

And yet syndicalism is not identical with pure anarchism. The latter has indeed an economic message of equality but it does not furnish any economic programme, whereas syndicalism is essentially a philosophy of economic class-war carried on through trade unions (*syndicats*).

GUILD SOCIALISM *vs.* SYNDICALISM

Neither syndicalism nor guild-socialism has faith in the state and political action. Both are anarchistic in this sense. Each is fundamentally an economic philosophy.

But syndicalism is essentially the philosophy of the producers ; whereas guild-socialism has its inspiration in the interests of the consumers as well.

Guild-socialism, besides, is interested in the other, non-economic concerns of human beings and believes in corresponding institutions. These institutions constitute virtually the departments of what the guild-socialist theory would seek to eliminate, namely, the

state. The "commune" is the term used for the state of guild-socialism.

On the other hand, syndicalism also has begun to take interest in the state. The advocacy of nationalisation in regard to certain economic services is a step in this direction (1922).

Both these isms are, therefore, tending towards *etatisme*, statalism, or at any rate, some non-anarchistic ism.

THE STATE NOT DISCREDITED

Neither the bolsheviks nor the syndicalists nor the guild-socialists are therefore anarchists in the strictest sense of the term. Indeed, anarchism as a political creed exists to-day, if at all, only in the vague discontent with the evils associated with all organized societal life. The state has not been "discredited". The rehabilitation of the state is a marked feature of contemporary thinking in every circle.

SECTION 2.

We shall now take up the other isms and attempt an analysis of their orientation to the eight philosophies cursorily detailed above.

FOUR VARIETIES OF PLURALISM

The terms monism and pluralism may constitute for certain purposes the basis of classification of the political philosophies. They are really methods of approach to the problems of organized societal life and are to be found indifferently in one or other ism without reference to its general psychological make-up.

1. Regarding the nature of the fatherland there is doctrine of the nation as unit *vs.* that of class-struggle. The "nationalists" may be regarded as monists, the upholders of class-struggle as pluralists. Pluralism is in this instance the logic of proletarianism.

2. Regarding the nature of the state (unitary or federal) it is possible to be a monist as well as a pluralist. The theory of federation has furnished this antithesis in American and German thought; and the controversy has been carried forward to the discussion bearing on unitary states. In regard to this group of phenomena the fundamental question of course is that relating to sovereignty.

Pluralists in this field are those who believe in the possibility of divided sovereignty (Webster, Madison, *The Federalist*, Locqueville, Waitz). To the opposite camp belong the monists with whom sovereignty is an indivisible attribute of states (Calhoun, Seydel, Jellinek, Burgess).

3. Regarding the nature of units within the fatherland or the state and their relations with it the conventional view is that of the nationalists. But the position may be challenged by the upholders of "local" rights although they are not necessarily or as a rule proletarianists i.e. advocates of class-struggle (Gierke, Preuss, Leroy-Beaulieu, Duguit, Maitland, Krabbe, Figgis, Laski).

The groups in a community are diverse. There is the mob, there is the organized club. Linguistic bonds, physiognomic affinities, professional associations, religious fraternities are likewise some of the nuclei

of group activity and thought. Then there are the universities, municipal corporations, street or ward communities, and last but not least, political parties and trade unions.

The state is but one of these groups. It is clearly a group among groups. The problem is not only intra-group but inter-group as well. That is, the relations between the different groups constitute a very important item in community, political life. Automatically arises the question of the rights of the groups in relation to the state. The possibilities of their conflict with the state are to be envisaged. The antithesis, groups *vs.* the state, is a new category and must be sharply distinguished from the traditional polarity, the individual *vs.* the state.

In this instance, pluralism happens to be mainly the tenet of nationalists, consisting, as it does, in the idea that there are legal limitations on the sovereignty of the state imposed as a matter of course by the existence of corporations and other groups as "natural persons".

To a certain extent the philosophy of the group pluralists may be said to have given a fresh lease to the classical (Montesquieu), although discredited theory of the separation of powers as well as checks and balances.

4. Finally, regarding the nature of external sovereignty the public international law of to-day is "positively" pluralistic in so far as it postulates, as a factual necessity, the "interference" of other states in the internal affairs of almost every state. The

doctrine of self-determination, which is the basis of contemporary democracy is being infringed upon by the facts and theories of internationalism. External sovereignty is thus limited on account of the existence of other states, exactly as internal sovereignty is on account of the existence of corporations. (see 3. above). These two sets of limitations, invariably legal and contractual as they are, constitute the fundamental planks in the pluralistic theory of sovereignty.

ABSOLUTISM, IDEALISM AND MONISM

For all practical purposes absolutism, idealism and monism are convertible terms. And the view points indicated by these isms stand out in bold relief against those that take a pluralistic view of things. Pluralism rests fundamentally on the idea that the "real" is hardly ever general, universal or absolute but essentially individual, personal and "relative." The very fact that the life of an individual or a group can be regulated by many other than the standardised norms or conventional *mores* to which tradition is used challenges the despotism or infallibility of any recognised system of moral, social or political absolutism.

The Hegelian or neo-Hegelian absolutism of to-day has its counterparts or forerunners in the Catholic reaction in French thought (represented by de Maistre, Bonald, Lamennais) and in the teachings of historical jurisprudence (Savigny), both expressions of political philosophy in the earlier half of the nineteenth century.

This trio, namely, absolutism, idealism and

monism, is not however to be taken to be identical with an alleged "philosophical theory" of the state. For its antithesis, namely, relativism, realism and pluralism, is no less an item in "philosophical theory." Philosophy is not the exclusive monopoly of Bosanquet and Gentile, unless philosophy be regarded as equivalent to "metaphysics." Philosophy is wide enough to include Bertrand Russell and John Dewey as well.

ANTI-DEMOCRATISM IN OFFICE AND THEORY

The conquests of universal suffrage, referendum, recall, etc., in political life and trade-unionism, *Betriebsrat*, works-council, etc., in economic organization have led to an enormous advance in democratic idealism and practice. And yet anti-democratism has not been crushed. To-day indeed it is as powerful as ever and holds its own against the most vigorous champions of democracy.

In the proletarian camp democratism is the honest gospel of syndicalism and guild-socialism, based as they are on the idea of "self-government in industry." But the one is essentially a working-class creed and the other chiefly an experiment in thought with the intellectuals. More radical as upholders of democracy are perhaps the syndicalists.

How does democracy fare in the non-proletarian, nationalistic philosophies?

As for Fabianism or British collectivism the verdict from the democratic side is most unfavourable. Collectivism is alleged to have led to the

"servile state," the negation of democracy and self-determination.

Of the remaining three non-proletarian isms, state-socialism and fascism are frankly anti-democratic.

Not all proletarianism, again, is convictionally democratic. Bolshevism, for instance, is philosophically a dictatorship of the proletariat, which is anything but democratic.

Fascism and bolshevism are, curiously enough, but two aspects of anti-democratism in office.

Finally, among the free-lance thinkers, or at any rate, among those who are not directly associated with these eight isms, almost everybody who is anybody in the philosophical world is anti-democratist. Quality, not equality is the slogan, in one form or another, of Mallock, Michels, Bryce, Le Bon, Faguet, Joseph-Barthelemy, Stein, Spann (contrast Hobson, Dewey, Hobhouse, Prezzolini).

NEW FREEDOM, SOCIAL CONTROL AND NEO-INDIVIDUALISM

Laissez faire or individualism as the doctrine of freedom from "social control" *i.e.*, non-intervention on the part of the state in the affairs of the citizen has virtually ceased to exist. Anarchism is the only stronghold of this individualism as by its very postulate it negatives the state. Individualism continues, however, still to be the creed of the *Societe'd Economie Politique* of Paris in its political and economic theories. All the other seven isms, proletarian and non-proletarian, are social-controlists or intervention lists.

Social control, state-interference or intervention is to-day not looked upon as an antithesis to *laissez faire*, non-intervention or liberty. But like non-intervention, *laissez faire* or individualism, it is but another foundation of, or aid to, the promotion of some great human ends, *e.g.*, social harmony (Hobhouse). Here indeed we enter the sphere of the "new freedom" (Wilson).

To the extent, however, that syndicalism and guild-socialism have anti-statal, non-statal or anarchistic leanings, these isms must necessarily be regarded as upholders of individualism.

But, in the meantime, a new type of individualism has made its appearance. It is to be found in the thoughts of the group-pluralists. In their opposition to the omnipotence of the state, they are transferring their emphasis to the claims of the group-autonomy from those of the individual's liberty. The position may be described as a phase of neo-individualism.

INTERNATIONALISM AND NEO-NATIONALISM

Internationalism as a system of world-economy and cultural world-view as well as political interdependence is the accomplished fact of the present societal order. Neither proletarianists nor non-proletarianists are blind to the actualities of the day.

Internationalism as a system of universal peace, human brotherhood, abolition of wars, world-federation, parliament of man, the United States of the World, etc. is, however, not to be deduced as a matter of course from these developments in

economic, technical, cultural and political solidarity. It is to be found at present only in the idealism of certain types of social thinkers.

The proletarianisms, especially, anarchism, communism (bolshevism) and syndicalism are 100% anti-imperialist. These philosophies are committed to the economic and political emancipation of all classes and races. They are thus anti-capitalist and anti-colonialist.

But in the philosophies of the non-proletarianisms new internationalism is but old imperialism "*writ large*." It is an aspect of contemporary war-preparedness on a wide inter-continental scale and is to be appraised as the latest method in the management of dependencies and colonies.

A phase of internationalism finds expression in the growing juristic view-point (proletarian as well as non-proletarian) that external sovereignty is not absolute, as classical international law knows it, but limited (Novicow, Preuss, Riviere, Krabbe).

Meanwhile nationalism (anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism) has not lost its vigour. It continues to be the dominant philosophy of all subject races. It is fostered among them by the enemies of imperialism and capitalism, for example, the apostles of proletarianism (anti-capitalism and anti-colonialism) although, or rather because, these latter are champions of genuine internationalism.

Moreover, nationalism is the dominant feature of the non-proletarian, capitalistic and imperialistic philosophies themselves, directed as they are against

class-struggle and other tenets of international socialism. Fascism as the anti-thesis of bolshevism may indeed be described as neo-nationalism. And this neo-nationalism is the characteristic tenet of the leading thinkers in the great powers of to-day.

LEGALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

Last but not least in importance as a creative force in contemporary political philosophy is the value attached to law in its relations to the state and sovereignty. Legalism or "legal interpretation of politics" consists in considering the state to be subordinate to law. Politics is not so much a function of sovereignty as an application of law. The position is just antipodal to the classical theory which considers law to be but a creation of the state and a function of sovereignty.

The recognition of the supreme authority of law, both internal and international, to the virtual negation of the state, is one of the most characteristic agencies and yet not the least fruitful in the reconstruction of political theory that is going on to-day (Duguit, Krabbe). The very concept of sovereignty has been outlawed from the state as an anachronism (Preuss).

CHAPTER VI

SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL EQUATIONS

IT has not been possible to dwell at length on the political philosophy of modern and contemporary Asia. But the logical as well as chronological links between the ideologies of Asia and those of Eur-America have been indicated at important points.

The "curves" of life in political theory and practice as manifest in the modern East are more or less similar to those in the modern West. If one were to plot out these curves diagrammatically one would notice that the Asian series ran almost parallel to the Eur-American. The "trends" of evolution would appear to be nearly identical in the most significant particulars and incidents of thought and experience.

The "exactnesses" of the mathematical and "positive" sciences are, however, not to be expected in the human and moral disciplines. But certain socio-philosophical "equations" may still be discovered in a comparative estimate of the East and the West. By placing the Asian curves in the perspective of the Eur-American one can establish a number of identities for the modern period,—although of course, not without "buts" and "ifs".

But, in any case, taking Asia as a whole one would come to the conclusion that the political philosophies in the different regions of the Orient are mainly but

repetitions of Eur-American developments in their earlier stages. In keeping with the conclusions of my previous studies in world-culture and world-economy (*The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*, 1914. *The Futurism of Young Asia*, 1922, *Economic Development*, 1926) the present outline also establishes the following socio-philosophical equations:

(1) New Asia (c. 1880-1890) = Modern-Eur-America (c. 1776-1832).

(2) Young India (c. 1925-27) = Eur-America (c. 1848-1875).

In the first equation Asia comprises Turkey and Egypt, indicating that the entire Orient from Tokyo to Cairo was witnessing a transformation roughly corresponding to the remaking of the West during the epoch of the "industrial revolution."

The second equation has special reference to India, indicating that Japan and Turkey as well as China, Persia and Egypt will have to be comprehended by separate, perhaps five different equations. There are likewise, to be separate equations not only for Hejaz, Palestine, Syria and Iraq but also for Afghanistan which has for some time been enjoying lime-light as a somewhat serious and sincere youngster attempting the alphabet of modernism in administration, culture and economic life.

In other words, although modernization began to influence the Asian continent at different points more or less simultaneously during the decade from 1880 to 1890, the *rate of growth* for the different regions since then has been different.

For instance, the distance of some 50 years that existed between Japan and Eur-America, say, about 1886, has been made up to a very considerable extent ; so that for to-day the appropriate sociological identity would perhaps be indicated by the following equation :

Japan (c 1925-27) = Eur-America (c 1905).

That is, while India continues still to be some 50 years or so behind the modern West in constitution, industrialism, etc., and the allied philosophies,—the distance that existed during the decade 1880-1890,—Japan has succeeded in “catching up to” the go-aheads by about a whole generation. And to that extent Japan to-day is ahead of contemporary India.

Within the limitations to which all sociological equations as attempts at measuring magnitudes bearing on “un-exact” sciences are bound to be subject, it should be equally possible to indicate, for the purposes of comparative social statistics, the rates of growth in the line of modernization for different regions of Eur-America as well. The entire West is not one in industrialism, democracy or the corresponding philosophies. To take one instance, that of Germany, we should find the following equations:—

(1) Germany (c 1848-75) = Great Britain (c 1776-1832), but

(2) Germany (c 1905) = Great Britain (c 1905).

The first equation says that about 1875 Germany was tremendously behind Great Britain, at least, by a whole generation. But by 1905 *i.e.*, in 30 years she first made up the distance and secondly caught

up to the latter. She was indeed on the point of crossing the equation-limit. The war of 1914-18 should appear philosophically to be nothing more than the dramatic demonstration of this disturbance of the equation or societal equilibrium in the international field.

The societal equations discussed here involve two fundamental considerations in the problem of human progress. The first has reference to the fact that during historic periods the evolution of mankind has been continuous,—although not without ups and downs, cuts and breaks. And the second invites us to note that the societal development has been in the main along uniform lines,—although not without diversities in regional and racial context.

For earlier periods the more or less approximate socio-philosophical identities or similarities may be roughly indicated as follows:—

(1) East (- down to c 1300 A. C.) = west (-down to c 1300 A. C.) institutionally as well as ideologically.

(2) Renaissance in the East (c 1400 - 1600)= Renaissance in the West (c 1400-1600).

(3) 1600-1750. The new physical or positive sciences in the West constitute a special feature of the European Renaissance. Asian Renaissance produces fine arts but no new positive science worth mentioning.¹ All the same, no genuine societal differentiations are perceptible as yet. We may then institute the following two equations :

¹ Sarkar: *Hindu Achievements in Exact Science*, London, 1918.

(a) Asia in positive science (c 1600-1750)=
Europe in positive science (c 1400-1600).

(b) Asia in socio-economic life (c 1600-1750)=
Europe in socio-economic life (c 1600-1750).

(4) 1750-1850. Industrial revolution in the West creates a new civilization,—the “modern world.” East and West differ substantially for the first time: Thus,—

Asia (c 1850)=Europe (c 1750).

About 1850 the “East” is behind the “West” by nearly a whole century.

The continuity and uniformity of societal evolution as well as the equations based on them can be illustrated further by reference to the phenomena of Bolshevism in theory and practice. The Manufacturers of Bolshevism have claimed extraordinary things for their patent. And it is primarily because the face value of these claims seems to be accepted by the “outsiders” that they have condemned it in no less extravagant manner. The open repudiation of foreign debts (February, 1918) by the Bolshevik government as well as the “reign of Red terror,” temporary although it was, together with Bolshevik *Comraderie* with the colonies and dependencies including the concession-ridden regions like China, Persia, etc., have perhaps been the most potent sources of Eur-American antipathy to the Soviet regime in Russia.

But so far as theory or ideology is concerned, the fallacy on both sides arises from not recognising the fact that there are two Lenins,—one, the comment-

ator on and modernizer of Marxian metaphysics (*The State and the Revolution*, 1917), and the other, the statesman and patriot, the architect of the "new economic policy" (1922-23). Lenin, the statesman, is sharply to be distinguished from Lenin, the political philosopher.

In the first place, in the field of *Realpolitik*, practical politics, Bolshevism is essentially centralized nationalism and dictatorship or despotism of the few. There cannot be anything new in this patent in the estimation of those who remember the achievements of the "nation-makers" of Europe in the nineteenth century. Bolshevism has accomplished for Russia in the second and third decades of the twentieth century what should have been done for her, as was done for Germany, about a generation or two ago. From this view-point the following equation may sum up the developmental comparison.—

Soviet Russia in politics (1918-27) =

Bismarckian Germany (c 1875-1890.)

In the second place, it should be observed, moreover, that Bolshevism in office, especially since the establishment of the N. E. P. (1923) is economically nothing but the latest form or phase of the "industrial revolution." As such, Bolshevism furnishes the characteristic features of the actual economic legislation and business organization in the advanced countries of the present-day world. The "state-capitalism" (cf, the nationalized trusts and the *Gosplan*) organized under Bolshevism is to all

intents and purposes recognisable in essential particulars as one or other type of contemporary "state-socialism" such as is prevalent in theory and practice, here and there and everywhere. One is easily reminded of Keynes's *End of Laisser Faire*. (1926). The two "categories" differ; but the "contents" of the two categories are virtually identical.

Bolshevism has to a considerable extent hastened the process of evolution, economic, legal and political, in Russia and indirectly also in other countries. But the consummations, associated with the so-called Communistic-sovietic complex, in so far, at any rate, as the positive achievements are concerned, embody really the "next stages" of societal transformation such as might be naturally expected in Eur-America during 1905-1914,—from the trend of developments in technology, pedagogics, public finance as well as constitutional and civil laws. Sovietization, no matter what be the theory underlying it, has but served to bring Russia in line with the progressive nations of Eur-America in economics, politics and culture. It is fundamentally a process in the modernizing of Russia.

The situation would yield the following equation:—Soviet Russia in economic statesmanship and social policy, especially the "N. E. P." and after (1923-1927)=Great Britain, Germany, etc., under post-war economic legislation (1919-1927).

In other words, in economic and social ideals and laws Bolshevik Russia has succeeded in "catching

up" to the vanguards of Western civilization. But in constitutional machinery the forms of popular sovereignty have not as yet reached the Anglo-American standard. German paternalism of the last generation happens still to be the type suitable for the Russian demos. Altogether, however, it is possible for Russia for quite a long time to attain to the German, British, American or French level of civilisation and life's values, *per capita*. In Russia as in India the most serious drag upon progress is the vast number of population. The national wealth and income, the standard of living, the taxable capacity, the general education and technical efficiency of the millions of its inhabitants cannot be lifted within a small compass of time by any Herculean efforts up to the heights such as have been reached among those peoples through the cumulative efforts of generations.

In any case, communism of the Marxian theory, whether economic or political, should appear to be conspicuous by its absence in Soviet Russia, which to-day may best be described as but a constitutional-democratic (albeit dictatorial) State of the Western-European type. One may then ask: wherein lies the revolution? The answer will be as follows. The revolution is to be found chiefly in the attempts of the patriots, the lovers of their people, at "whipping the country into shape" *overnight*. During the last ten years the Russian statesmen have but *sought to accomplish*,—in the course of days, weeks and months,—a great deal of all that

the "western world" has accomplished in a century or so in public and private law.

The chronological survey in this publication will not fail perhaps to furnish some hints as to what may be described as new types of curves, equations and "index numbers" for social science.¹

¹ *Supra*, pp. 9-10, 65-66, 232-235.

APPENDIX

CHITTARANJAN DAS AND YOUNG ASIA ¹

IN the summer of 1925 died Chittaranjan Das in Bengal and Sun Yat-sen in China. Two summers later occurred the death of Zaghlul Pasha in Egypt. When one thinks of these three names together with special reference to the Asian background of to-day one begins to feel that perhaps there is a more profound unity in this string of names than is apparent in the mere unity of three different sections of Young Asia having lost each a heroic statesman in the course of a small span of time.

All the three great men died on the peak of a boom (1923-25) in the Asian curve of political thought and activity. Nay, what is more striking, the contributions of these three leaders to the life's urges and methods of Young Asia exhibit in the main a very marked uniformity that cannot fail to be impressive. The three "cycles" of politics,—the Chinese, the Indian and the Egyptian,—may to-day be regarded as constituting really one single, great cycle, the Asian—so far at any rate as the logical apparatus is concerned. This unity is to be found in the robust objectivity of outlook and the strong doses of stern realism

¹ From "Forward" *Deshabandhu Number*, Calcutta, July, 1928. For orientation to the international and historical background of this comparative character-study, see the chapters on "Leavings of the Great War," "Persia and the Persian Gulf" "Revolutions in China" and "India's Struggle for Swaraj" in *The Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922), the chapters on Turkey, China and Japan in *The Politics of Boundaries* (Calcutta, 1926) and in *Economic Development* (Madras, 1926), and the chapter on China in *Greetings to Young India* (Calcutta, 1927), and for general theoretical affiliations see *The Science of History* (London, 1912)—all by the present author.

with which these agitators and patriots, idealists and dreamers although they were, have enriched the public life of their peoples.

SUN YAT-SEN, ZAGHLUL AND CHITTARANJAN

The differences between the three personalities are indeed obvious to everybody. No less patent are the political and international divergences that mark China off from Bengal and both these regions from Egypt. The fields should appear to be as diverse from the standpoint of external *milieu* as the individuals who were destined to serve them.

In the first place, there cannot exist a greater contrast than that between Sun who virtually "lisped in politics because politics came " and Chittaranjan whose term in active politics was one of the shortest that have been served by any great politician of the world, to be measured by nothing beyond five or six years (1920-25). Zaghlul entered the political field at the ripe age of 65. It was with the Kitchener regime in 1911 that Zaghlul made his *debut*, almost at the moment when Sun's long years of toil and moil among the peasants, soldiers and merchants of China as well as the Chinese emigrants abroad led to the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of the republic in China. Sun was already a veteran and a successful propagandist, indeed, the president of the republic founded as the result of his own patriotic labours when the " grand old man " of Egypt came but to novitiate in politics as a raw freshman. And Chittaranjan had hardly come to a decision as to whether he would plunge headlong into politics at all.

SUN, A REAL PIONEER

In the second place, Sun may be said to have had hardly any precursor. He is a pioneer strictly so called. Without much historical or sociological apology one can ascribe

the entire anti-Manchu movement or rather constitutional, democratic-republican agitation in modern China to Sun and his contemporaries. The "reforms" initiated or rather contemplated by Kang Yu-wei (C 1898), the revolt of the Chinese Boxers (1900), and the nationalistic-anti-foreign fervent of those years constitute for all practical purposes the very first term in the series of modernism in China's indigenous aspirations and efforts. And Sun's propaganda is not younger than these events. He is a father or maker of Young China in the sense in which neither Chittaranjan nor Zaghlul is a father or maker of Young Bengal or Young Egypt. Sun is verily a Ram Mohan Roy or a Prince Ito, whose work lay however in different fields and is to be credited with different "kinds" of success.

ZAGHLUL SUBSEQUENT TO 1908

But both Zaghlul and Chittaranjan owe a great deal to their predecessors who must have to be traced back at least to the '80's of the last century. The political tradition of the New Egypt commences with the propaganda of the Grant Mufti, an exile in Paris, through the medium of *Le Lien Indissoluble* (The Indissoluble Tie). Zaghlul at any rate is subsequent to the "nationalist" activities of 1908-10. He has had a "history" while Sun had none, except the one that he has created. Chittaranjan likewise is born with a past. Indeed, both the Egyptian and the Indian statesmen are post-war "discoveries" of Young Asia. The very fact that they are post-war manufactures indicates at once their role in world-history and their place in the Asian series.

CHITTARANJAN, A CHILD OF YOUNG BENGAL

Chittaranjan had behind him a full fifteen years' struggle for self-assertion on the part of Young Bengal (1905-1920). The "ideas of 1905" had been associated

in India with the loftiest gospel of self-sacrifice and martyrdom, epoch-making ambitions and world-defying idealism. The subsequent speculations and energisings of Indian patriots both at home and abroad had established a steady and continuously growing tradition of political methods and ideals. A "Greater India" of modern culture and politics had also to a certain extent made its appearance in and through the active and first-hand affiliations of Indian thinkers and politicians with some of the most powerful currents of life and thought in Europe, America, Asia and Africa. A post-war phenomenon as Chittaranjan happens to be, he is necessarily a child of Young Bengal, the *result* of a spiritual evolution.

Sun Yat-sen did not have to size himself up by any standard set by his countrymen. But it has been possible for Sun to set a standard by which the China of to-day and to-morrow may judge its aspirations and achievements. Chittaranjan, on the other hand, when he began (1920-21), had all the time to think of trying to be great enough for the standard already set by Young Bengal during 1905-10. Whether it would be possible for him to set a new standard for India or not was in his consideration but a matter of the history that he was going to create. But in so far as he had to equip himself for the great decision, the fundamental pre-occupation with him consisted in finding out some method by which he could prove to his countrymen and to the world that he was at least as great as those who had gone before.

It would not have been possible for him to hoodwink the people, for the predecessors who had set the standard for Young Bengal were not prehistoric, mythical entities. Many of them were about him, with him, before him and behind him. It is this entourage of young men, active energists, seasoned workers, experienced patriots, practical idealists and self-sacrificing enthusiasts that has "made" Chittaranjan. And Chittaranjan has not only followed the standard: he has

succeeded at the same time in strengthening and perhaps heightening it.

Chittaranjan surrendered himself to the momentum of energies engendered by the cumulative patriotism of Youth in Bengal. And the league of young spirits crowned him their prince. Almost every one of the lieutenants and comrades of Sun Yat-sen is his own creation and handiwork. But almost none of the assistants of Chittaranjan or Zaghlul owed anything direct to their chiefs. Like Zaghlul, Chittaranjan had everybody ready to collaborate with him, nay, guide him and carry his message to fruition. He had but to make his own choice and prepare himself for participation in the great fellowship.

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY IN ASIA

To come to the regions and the peoples. It may indeed be asserted that to-day in the Orient, Western, Southern and Eastern,—the solid foundations of material and moral life are more or less identical. Egypt, the “gift of the Nile,” the Indo-Gangetic plains and the Hwangho-Yangtze Valleys, these “river-mother” regions, howsoever agrarian, rural and feudalistic they may have been in the first half of the nineteenth century like all other countries in the world, have been for the last two generations or so experiencing a transformation in the modes of production and transportation,—and this also exactly in the manner of the pioneering Eur-American regions. One touch of industrialization makes the whole Asian continent kin. Canton, Calcutta, Cairo together with their hinterlands,—all represent the “new economy” and along with it the new “social system.” And the inspirations as well as manifestations of this new system of life are fundamentally uniform with those obtaining in Hamburg, Marseilles, London, New York and Rio de Janeiro. In Asia as in Eur-America the rural communes, the village assemblies, the *panchayats* of *fellaheen* are

being replaced or controlled by larger professional groups and territorial units. The "gilds" of yesterday are giving place to "industrial associations" and "chambers of commerce" on the one hand and "trade unions" and "peasant associations" on the other. The more or less patriarchal joint-family system is tending to become a thing of the past. The individual is coming to his own and along with him the new family of five or six and even the "new woman."

THE NEW EAST IDENTICAL WITH THE NEW WEST

The economic and social revolution that has been going on in Asia in this regime of industrial economy is but repeating the processes already gone through in the West. Asia is perhaps altogether half a century behind the "more advanced sections" of Eur-America. The fully developed character of *Hochkapitalismus* (latter-day capitalism) is therefore not yet patent in the East. But the urban proletariat, the landless labourer, the subordinate position of the handicraftsmen and cottage industries in the social organization, the factory slums, and "modern" poverty, crime as well as degeneracy are already there,—constituting, as they do, a counterpoise to the new aristocracy, the bourgeoisie of wealth and power, and the "higher middle-class" democracy.

In all these things there is hardly anything to choose, except in degree, between the East and the West to-day. But there is one special feature in Asian industrialism. This consists in the dual character of capitalism in Asia. Foreign capital has been playing a very great, because pioneering and historical part in the "opening-ups," "developments," "industrializations" etc., in the different regions of Asia. The role of indigenous capital has up till now been that of a second fiddle or in any case not very prominent. This duality may to a certain extent create complications from the standpoint of political "nationalist" endeavours.

But in spite of the heterogeneous, "dyarchical" elements in the industrial finance as ruling in Asia the other side of the shield, viz., the working class has been expressing itself with strikes and revolts in the self-same manner as in the Western industrialized countries. In other words, the "class war" is being directed against capitalism as such. Labour psychology in the East hardly makes any distinction between "indigenous" and "foreign" employers or employment-capital while pressing its demands.

There are certainly differences between Egypt, India and China in the amount and extent of industrialization achieved up till now. But so far as the social anatomy of the people and the economic basis of politics are concerned the three regions in Asia are to-day to be understood as lying in more or less the same stage of modernism in technique and culture.

THE POLITICS OF YOUNG ASIA

However similar and uniform be the social and economic structure of Young Asia and however identical the motives behind its efforts at reconstruction, one cannot fail to realize that the diplomatic conditions and the international surroundings of Egypt, India and China are fundamentally diverse. The orientations of leaders in these regions to political strategy and tactics must therefore be varied.

CHINA DE JURE SOVEREIGN

There may be "spheres of influence" possessed by foreign powers in China. They may even "pool their interests" once in a while, and of course they have their "concessions" and the "open ports." But still China is as yet neither a colony, nor a protectorate, nor a dependency, nor a mandated territory. She is *de jure* sovereign from the standpoint of external relations, whatever be the exact limits of this sovereignty *de facto*.

THE EGYPTIAN ANOMALY

But what is the position of Egypt in international law? Egyptian nationalists and their friends and well-wishers throughout the world may perhaps be hoodwinked to believe that Egypt possesses some sort of sovereignty. The deceptive facts are all on the surface. There is a king who is called "His Majesty" and not merely "His Highness." The diplomatic world at times uses the bombastic expression, "Anglo-Egyptian alliance." Besides, Egypt is said to have been "granted" "independence." But in spite of these terms there is a world of difference between the *de jure* sovereignty as is alleged to exist in Egypt and the *de jure* sovereignty that really belongs to China. One must not ignore the fact that the "independence" and "Anglo-Egyptian alliance" have compelled Egypt to become a member of the "League of Nations" known as the British Empire. The anomaly is patent to all.

None of the wildest dreamers of the world ever believe that the concept sovereignty in any of its millionth dilutions can apply to the people of British India. But the shades of distinction between India, a dependency of Great Britain, and Egypt, a member of the "British League of Nations" are too fine to be objectively grasped even by the astutest lawyers. The manner in which Great Britain has compelled Nahas Pasha last May (1928) to withdraw the Assemblies Bill should leave no doubt in anybody's mind.

INDIA, A CLOSED QUESTION

And yet Egypt and India do differ on the international plane. India is a "closed question," a hermetically sealed entity, in world politics. Everything in India is "an internal problem of the British Empire." But Egypt is only half-way house to being a closed question. India is, besides, geographically isolated from all the great powers of the

world. There is hardly any chance, for the time being, of the Indian question being opened by any rivals of Great Britain and the British Dominions, especially of Australia and South Africa.

FRANCE, A FRIEND OF EGYPT

But there is at least one great power that was, has been and continues to be in any case a Platonic friend to Egypt in all its tribulations. France has not yet forgotten the discomfitures of 1880-82 and the Fashoda incident of 1898. The policy of anti-British pin-pricks administered by her in the "Near East" (i.e., Western Asia including Egypt) has not yet been finally abandoned in spite of the pre-war Anglo-French Entente and the war-time Anglo-French camaraderies. Such words as "Anglo-Egyptian alliance," "Egypt, a member of the British League of Nations," "Great Britain, a protector of foreign interests in Egypt," are like red rags to the horns of France.

Even to-day Monsieur Jung can write as follows in his *L'Islam et l'Asie devant l'Imperialisme*, "Islam and Asia before Imperialism" (Paris 1927):—"It is free to Italy and Greece, allies or satellites of Great Britain, to accept the clause relating to foreign interests in Egypt being under British protection. But France who has been all for Egypt, where she is at home on account of heart, spirit, language, scholarly work,—"*peut-elle souscrire a cet amoindrissement*," can she subscribe to this inferiority and indignity? "*Les Francais proteges de l'Angleterre ! en Egypt ! quelle decheance en Orient !*" "The French people protected wards of England ! In Egypt ! What a fall in the East !" In other words,—to a certain extent, there may be said to exist in France individuals, politicians, groups and organs of public opinion that are prepared even without special Egyptian propaganda and in the interest of their own prestige and influence to prevent the

Egyptian question from degenerating into an exclusive "internal question" of the British Empire.

CHINA'S UTILIZATION OF THE POWERS

Young Egypt has therefore at least a France to champion its cause. The name of France for Young China is legion. It is possible for the Chinese patriots to seek British support to-day, to-morrow Japanese, and the day after to-morrow American, and so on. Germany has been physically removed from China as a result of the world-war. But this compulsory removal has served only to endow Germany with the same mentality in regard to China as France possesses in regard to Egypt. Then there is Soviet Russia who has voluntarily returned the "concessions" to China and has therefore grown all the more into the apparently disinterested friend of the Chinese people. Altogether, the permanent connections of the powers with China's affairs enable the Chinese statesmen to utilize the world-forces in their own interest almost as a matter of daily bread and butter.

ZAGHLUL AGAINST PAN-ISLAM

The political categories that are likely to emerge in such a world, heterogeneous as it is, are bound to reflect the diversity of diplomatic and military conditions in the different areas. There cannot be expected any uniformity in the types of political thinkers and platforms, the tendencies in political agitation, and in the political shibboleths, slogans or platitudes, such as from the nature of the case must form a great part of propaganda in every country, Eastern or Western.

It is not the intention of this paper to dwell at length on any of these items in regard to contemporary Asia or evaluate the ideals and achievements of Sun Yat-sen, Zaghlul or Chittaranjan with reference to the longed-for or desirable goal. We shall attempt to bring into relief certain phases in their

public life in which one can detect unmistakably some of the inner springs of action.

Zaghlul's auto-biographical *Memoir* (in Arabic) is in the possession of his widow. But part of it has been summarized in German in the *Deutsche Rundschau* for January 1928, a leading monthly of Berlin, by an Egyptian friend. In this book we read that in his youth Zaghlul was to a certain extent indifferent in religious matters but that later he began to take interest in his ancestral religion and that throughout the greater part of his life he remained a firm believer in Islam, Zaghlul indeed ascribes the physical and intellectual fitness that marked his old age to the Islamic foundations of his life.

But in spite of this personal faith in Islam and the consciousness of his indebtedness to religious observances Zaghlul takes a vigorous stand against Pan-Islam. The philosophy of Pan-Islam can be archæologically traced back to the extra-national, universalistic traditions of Mohammedanism under the Abbassides, who established the Caliphate at first at Bagdad and later transferred it to Cairo. As a system of life and thought embracing the peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe, Islam lost its "national" i.e., racial, territorial and local character during that period and assumed the proportions of a religious hegemony over the oriental peoples.

"MARCH SEPARATE BUT STRIKE UNITED"

It is this hegemonistic, internationalising, state-killing and world-dominating spirit of a super-racial religion that evokes the tremendous antipathy of Zaghlul's "Egyptian patriotism." He rules the extra-territorial enthusiasm of Pan-Islam out of order in the modern era and establishes his "nationalist" politics of devotion to the fatherland in matters religious and secular. "To-day more than ever," says he, "a strong national framework is the most fundamental necessity for a

modern state." To the Mohammedan peoples of the world he preaches his slogan in the following manner: "March separate but strike united" "*(Getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen)*." This, however, is not to be understood in the military sense, we are told.

Notwithstanding his own faith in religion Zaghul "secularizes" politics and defends his action against the bitter attacks of the religionists. It is not that he loves religion and Islam less but that he loves the common-weal more. The "positive" realities,—the actual race-conflicts and potential economic strikes of the Moslem world, the dynastic or tribal ambitions of the Emirs, and the trend of developments in the larger world of politics and culture, the rivalries of the great powers and so forth, he evaluates more than the words of the Koran and the influence they can possibly exert on the intelligent thoughts and activities of self-conscious individuals and groups.

JAPAN AS MODEL FOR MOSLEM ASIA

Zaghul is fully conscious of the fresh developments in the Islamic world,—the new life that has been on view in Turkey, Arabia, Persia and Afghanistan. But he is not unaware of the cleavages and rifts in the Moslem edifice. "Fanaticism and religious wars," according to him, "may have been good enough methods in medieval times" for hiding or repairing these splits and discords. But "such methods would fail to maintain the unity of the Moslem edifice to-day." The construction of strong states suited to the requirements of modern civilization is what he urges upon the individual Moslem peoples to strive after. And he advises each one of them to have before them Japan as the model.

This nationalism as a secular political ideal of attachment to the land of one's birth, as contrasted with Pan-Islam as a system of unpatriotic, denationalizing and anti-local emotions

can be well appreciated by all modern-minded people. But no doctrine was more unpalatable to the Koranists and Mollahs of Egypt and elsewhere.

Zaghlul's greatness is nowhere more manifest than in the boldness and sincerity of convictions which enabled him to stake his popularity and influence on this very subject of anti-Mollahism. His life was for some long time a war no less against the Mollahs than against the British. Secularization of politics and the weaning away of Young Egypt from the wild goose chase of Pan-Islam, constitute two of his great contributions to the methodology of political life.

KEMAL PASHA'S SECULARISM

And in this Zaghlul has but acted in the same spirit as another great Moslem statesman of our age, Kemal Pasha of Turkey. It may be mentioned *en passant* that at the moment of writing (June 1928) there comes the news to the effect that under the orders of the National Assembly at Angora prayers and sermons and all services should be conducted in Turkish instead of Arabic. This "Lutheran" item in the policy of reforming and modernising the Moslem religion which Kemal has been following for several years will perhaps serve to drive the last nail into the coffin of Pan-Islam. So far as Turkey is concerned, she is now by law "linguistically" closed to the anti-national and universalistic propaganda of non-Turkish Mollahs.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MAZZINI IN SUN YAT-SEN

From Sun's life-history, rich as it is in international hide-and-seek of all grades and denominations, the type of realism that we wish to single out is of a different character. Sun began his career with Washington and Mazzini on his lips. The first constitution established for the republic of China (1911-12) and the manifesto issued in behalf of the revolution

are worded in a manner that bespeaks his assimilation of the nationalist philosophy coming down from the British, American and French revolutions of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries to the nationalism of Fichte and Mazzini.

But in the meantime tremendous changes have taken place not only in Eur-America, but in China as well. These are mostly to be comprehended by the phrase "industrial revolution."

The world has grown. So Sun must grow too. The philosophies of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei* (Social-Democratic Party), the *Cartel des Gauches* (Left Block) and the British Labour Party have therefore become his own, at least in theory.

LABOUR PHILOSOPHY IN CHINA

In April 1924, a year before his death he enunciates at a conference, says the Italian scholar Mazzoleni in *L'Antagonismo Anglorusso nell' ultimo ventennio* (Anglo-Russian Antagonism during the last Twenty Years (1907-1927), his three principles of government. The first of these principles consists in looking after the *mezzi di sussistenza pubblico* (means of livelihood of the people). This would comprise development of agriculture and textile industry, construction of houses, and building up of communications. According to the second principle the government would promote the "authority of the people." That is, the people is to be educated in the exercise of suffrage, recall and referendum, and so on.

It is doubtful, however, if these "principles" should be described as features of "social democracy" rather than those of "state socialism" as carried out in Germany by Schaeffle and Bismarck. For, Sun is not yet sanguine about the "real constitutional government," which in his judgment is to come in China long after the immediate stage, viz., that of the "rule of force."

SUN DIES A COMMUNIST

But even the "social democracy" of Germany, the "left-wingism" of France and the Labour gospel of Great Britain appear in Sun's realistic imagination to be too moderate, mediæval, and inadequate to the requirements of the new age. He seeks enlightenment from the Bible of Lenin and Trotzky and enters into a treaty with Soviet Russia in May (1924) just a month after the promulgation of "social democracy (?)." He accepts communism and dies a communist (1925).

With a view to the realization of his nationalism he formulates a three-fold policy. And this is embodied in (1) co-operation with Soviet Russia, (2) assimilation of Chinese communists as an integral limb of the nationalist party, and (3) promotion of the working class and peasant movements.

This spiritual transformation, swift and bewildering as it is, has not been a rose-water revolution. The opposition from the capitalists, the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois-minded *intelligentsia* of China is not less keen than that from the Mollahs to the nationalism of Zaghlul. The depth of this opposition can indeed be gauged by the fact that within two years of Sun's death Chiang Kai-shek, the lieutenant on whom his mantle falls, renounces the whole of his Bolshevism and purges the *Kuo Ming-tang* party of its communistic elements. The power that he is alleged to have organized a systematic "white terror" in order to extirpate the adherents of this last phase of Sun's political philosophy, namely, nationalism *plus* communism. The last will and testament of Sun's is to-day being carried from place to place by the Chinese exiles abroad or maintaining its hidden existence in the villages of China.

"EVERY DAY BE A NEW MAN"

It is a singularly curious phenomenon that China, the proverbial land of hidebound conservatism, should have produced a Sun Yat-sen whose one gospel is change and nothing but change. The bed-rock of his realism is to be found in the mentality which enables him to perceive that something new has happened in the world and in the eagerness with which he pounces upon every new idea or ideal that is likely to be fruitful.

Perhaps Sun has fulfilled in his life one of the messages of the great Asian realist of yore, Confucius, who in his *Ta Hsueh* ("Great Learning" or "Higher Education") calls upon the educators to have as their aim the making of "a new and better society." We know, besides, that an old inscription on an Imperial bath has always taught the Chinese as follows:—"Be a new man each day, from day to day be a new man, every day be a new man."

Altogether, Sun Yat-sen is one of the greatest Asians of modern history. Chronologically, the first great man of modern Asia, we must not forget, is Ram Mohan Roy, the second the Meiji Mikado Mutsuhito, the third Saiyyad Jamaluddin of Persia, the fourth Sun himself, and the fifth General Kemal Pasha.

THE REALISM OF CHITTARANJAN

Our Chittaranjan has so often been revered as a *Vaishnava*, appreciated as a *kirtan*-singer, loved as a poet and worshipped as a self-denying idealist that we have forgotten to count that item in his biographical inventory or rather neglected to attach to it the value that it deserves, viz., the item which says that he was a lawyer by profession and that his success in life had lain in the field of legal practice before he came to adopt the political profession. It might, therefore, perhaps

to a certain extent shock the imagination and sympathies of a large number of our compatriots to be told that this mystic-*bhakta*-dreamer-devotee was also a fervent worshipper of the mundane realities and a powerful dialectician in the cause of these earthly commodities.

But it is the hard-headed logic of the legal practitioner, the thoroughly unmetaphysical grasp of things, the positive braininess of the matter-of-fact man of the world, the shrewd sanity and realistic commonsense of the practical businessman that account for 99 per cent. of that character-complex known as Chittaranjan, the sworn enemy of the Government of India Act (1919), as Chittaranjan, the destroyer of the wordy non-co-operation, as Chittaranjan, the founder and organizer of the Swaraj Party.

With the programme of this party or its controversy with the Gandhi-movement, or with the evolution of the different phases in Chittaranjan's own political *psyche*, or with the impact of *Vishva-shakti* (world-forces) and "foreign propaganda" on the Indian nationalism of 1919-25, we are not concerned here. We intend simply to point out one or two features of that realism which constitutes a most significant contribution of Chittaranjan's to the logic of Young India and which makes him as well as his countrymen at once the kith and kin of Zaghul and Sun Yat-sen's countrymen.

All the time that his *bhakti-yoga* was capturing the imagination and inspiring the emotions of his admirers he was but skilfully utilizing the situation, "exploiting" the "psychological moment," so to say, in order to administer doses, strong and large doses, of worldly wisdom to their brains. Self-sacrifice and emotionalism may have indeed created the proper atmosphere of the people's respect for his personality and confidence in his sincerity. But it is the head and not the heart that can furnish daily sustenance to the thoughts and activities of a group, and it is in the head that we have

to seek the foundations of Chittaranjan's programme and party.

THE LOGIC OF FACTS

"Why is the resolution on the 'triple boycott,' as it is called, so sacred," asks Chittaranjan in his first speech at Madras (June 1923), "that no Congressman would venture to touch a word of it? I ask you to look at the circumstances in the country. One fact is better than a hundred texts. Facts are more eloquent than hundreds of resolutions put forward from Congress platforms."

He hammers this fact-philosophy into the very nerves of his audience. "What is the kind of non-co-operation that you are *doing* to-day,—not merely saying." He is injecting into the minds of all around him the logic of "looking around" and discovering the distinction between "saying" and "doing."

The emancipation of the Indian publicists from the thralldom of mere words is the objective he has set before himself. "What is the triple boycott?" He asks again and he answers: "Boycott of law courts? Oh! the law courts are flourishing and flourishing like a green bay tree. * * * I am afraid these wicked things will go on flourishing, in spite of your paper resolutions repeated year after year. Then you say boycott schools and colleges; but the schools and colleges are flourishing! * * * The third of the triple boycott is the boycott of Councils. Lo an' behold, Councils are full to their utmost; so is the Assembly also!"

The imperviousness of verbalists and wordy philosophers to the actual happenings at their feet and in their neighbourhood is finally carried home in the banter that follows. "But we fools would not enter these Councils," he goes on, mercilessly exposing the unreality of the situation, but say, 'Oh yes! we have practised the triple boycott. Don't you know

the triple boycott ? ' We expand our breasts and we are satisfied, lie down and sleep."

We have here neither the poet nor the singer, nor the *Vaishnava* nor the *bhakta* nay, not even the patriot, but a brain speaking to the brains.

THE LAWYER'S ART

The *pucca* lawyer is at work. You have given him a brief and he is out to crush his opponent. He has prepared his case diligently and is determined to win. His is not the straw that the drowning man will seek to catch at, namely, the *argumentum ad hominem*. You notice that he is not indulging in vague patriotic sentiments. No, he is operating a powerful dynamo in order to generate continuous streams of the cold logic of realities such as may play upon the nervous system of the jury and the judge, the opposition and the audience and bewilder them all into one mass of open and haphazard retreat.

Let us now see Chittaranjan working his battery upon another *idola* of the day. " You talk of civil disobedience, but if you start civil disobedience now it will be dead before it is born. You ask me why ? I say you cannot *manufacture* civil disobedience."

It is not the esoteric, transcendental vision of the prophet that is Chittaranjan's source of inspiration here. He knows that it is the word that killeth. It is therefore the word that he would kill. The prevailing logic is too well known to him.

You may *think*," he argues with the opponent, " We have boycotted the Councils *on paper*, and therefore we shall not go to the Councils." If this is the kind of logic that satisfies metaphysicians, well, he would but treat them with the following joke : " Similarly let us say at any rate : Civil disobedience, civil disobedience, civil disobedience,—to keep up the enthusiasm of the people." The audience has sense enough to laugh at this point, and half the victory is won.

Then comes another dose of reality. "Civil disobedience has been postponed," says he, "from the end of April to the end of June. I do not demur because I know it that at the end of June it will again be postponed to December. And in December, if the orthodox view continues to prevail, it will again be adjourned to March and again three months later, and so on."

NOT THE REALISM OF COWARDS

There is a type of realism that is too cowardly to gaze into the future or rise above the ephemeral and the local. It is mightily happy with the here and the now and dare not tread the grounds of creative discontent. In that realism, "Whatever is is good."

But Chittaranjan militant, the role that we see at Madras, is the furthest removed from this type of unrisking, unprogressive, self-contented positivism. The logic that fears to ransack the possibilities of the living present is not in his grain.

CHITTARANJAN MILITANT

In the present instance, however, the problem of non-cooperation *vs.* council-entry, civil disobedience *vs.* passive submission, freedom or Swaraj *vs.* subjection is not the real question at issue. Chittaranjan visualizes the situation in the clearest manner and wants us all to visualize it as clearly as possible. We are not encountering here the problem of extremism *vs.* moderatism, of patriotism *vs.* cowardice.

He wants us only to open our eyes and see. His realism consists in grasping the exact facts of the times. It is not that he loves non-co-operation, civil disobedience, extremism, freedom, patriotism, etc, less than anybody in India. But he would not care even to discuss those questions. Because, he knows that all those questions are for the time being irrelevant.

The only relevant point is to note that neither non-co-operation nor civil disobedience nor any of the other extremist-patriotic items of nationalism is to be found in the life around him. You have no right to call certain things non-co-operation, civil disobedience, etc. which are by no means to be described as such. It is the realism of rising above mere "words, words, words" and being alive to the solid happenings in the world of action that characterizes Chittaranjan in his crusade against the "scholastic" logic of Gandhian non-co-operation.

MADRAS vs. GAYA-FARIDPUR

It is at Madras (1923) that we find Chittaranjan at his highest. There it is that the very pulse of the virile, vigorous, manlike, defiant, dare-devil machinery of the Bengali fighter is vibrating with the self-consciousness of one that is born to smash the world to pieces. The Chittaranjan who was to be lionized in 1924 and sanctified at the funeral procession in 1925 in a manner that had not fallen to the lot of any mortal on earth, the Chittaranjan that was destined for the first time in modern Indian history to destroy once for all the prestige of the established government by inflicting defeat upon defeat at the time when Gandhi was only talking, however courageously no doubt, of the present administration as being but Satanic, the Chittaranjan that was to capture the Corporation of Calcutta for his Young Bengal and annihilate the mystery of that citadel of foreign domination,—all these Chittaranjan came into existence in the unsentimental, prosaic, and dry-as-dust, but powerful and combative, as well as clean-cut, factual, realistic and brutally sincere, nay, heartless messages with which he greeted the people of Madras at the first interview.

By the side of the Madras speeches or rather the first speech at Madras, Chittaranjan's presidential address at the National Congress at Gaya (1922) is bloodless and insipid. He does

nòt there rise much above the conventional level of Congress presidents who, as is the custom, must say something on everything because "the country expects a lead from them." Chittaranjan also talks of many things, not only of constitutional struggles, but of labour, "recent" political theories in the Western world, Asian federation, and what not,—not forgetting of course to advertise his own patent of *Vaishnava Lila*.

But one feels that he is not yet in his element. You are compelling him to say things in which his life has not been much interested. You are perhaps asking him to add this paragraph here and that paragraph there. And he is sweet enough to please you as well as the rest of his gang. This eclectic hotch-potch of political edibles, some of which perhaps he has not even cared to digest, shows only that he has not yet discovered himself.

If at Gaya (December 1922) Chittaranjan was not yet born, at Faridpur (March 1925) he was already dead. The situation is strange. In the meantime he had fulfilled his mission and satisfied his pledge. He had "pointed out to the Congress the path that would lead it from victory to victory and triumph to triumph." He had inflicted defeats upon the Government and proved to the world that "dyarchy" was impossible. He was now the hero of numberless battle-fields. Chittaranjan was triumphant. And yet at Faridpur his speech registers the nadir of depression in the political curve of Bengal.

We need not proceed to discuss the situation and attempt discovering the etiology of this transformation. It is only necessary to note, in order to get a clear idea of his personality, that Chittaranjan militant is a man, a giant, a devil-incarnate, a sight for the gods. But Chittaranjan triumphant is a pigmy. He belongs to the type of fighters, and as a fighter in the battle-field he is one of the most

successful. Don't pry into his other moods, unless you are "really" interested in the "whole" man or wish to be convinced still once more that we are all "human, all-too human."

MORE A FIGHTER THAN A PHILOSOPHER

Chittaranjan did not perhaps possess the weakness of believing that he was born to say words that would endure. He is not an architect of wordy structures. It would be school-boyish to go to him for a philosophical analysis of the political or speculative dissertation on the nationalistic problems of his country. In the political field, it should appear to-day, he had only one mission,—and that was to defeat the Government of India Act. We should not be incorrect if we were to establish his type by saying that he is neither a Mazzini nor a Garibaldi but that he is a Cavour. One must not press the analogy too far, however. You can only do him injustice by trying to enumerate his contributions to thought. That way his *forte* does not lie.

Democracy, popular sovereignty, socialism, communism,—all these categories are shadowy in his psychology. They really remain to be precisely defined and carried forward by his successors.

It need be noted in this connection that the major section or rather the main block of Indian nationalists is behind the rest of the advancing world in these the basic problems of neo-nationalism.' Chittaranjan is not much ahead of the traditional Indian patriots, although in some of his statements one may read the invasion of new ideas. He may address trade-unions but perhaps he does not understand or even care to go deep into what he says.

Asia has grown along with the world. Sun Yat-sen has accordingly grown from point to point. But in Chittaranjan here is hardly any growth because, in reality, in active

politics he is only a point,—a vital impulse of two years (1923-24). One does not know exactly how he would have behaved in the scavengers' strike as well as the mill and railway strikes of to-day (1928).

POVERTY AND POLITICAL FREEDOM

But on these questions, fundamentally economic in their character, as they are, and having bearings, as they do, of *dal-bhat* (bread and butter) on political problems as well as on genuine freedom and democracy, a superficial philosopher or propagandist is likely to be led astray by sentimentalities, whether sincere or hypocritical. The recent report (1928) on Indian labour conditions for which Mr. Purcell, a Labour Imperialist and a neo-colonialist of Great Britain, posing as he does as the friend of India's hungry millions, is responsible, is an instance in point.

As an account of contemporary India's destitution, dirt and disease nothing can be more objective and faithful than Purcell's report published in the *Daily Herald* (London). The only regret is that he has not analysed the situation deep enough to indicate actually or roughly which way the chief remedy lies. His tirade against capitalists, both Indian and foreign, can be well understood. But he should only have pointed out that the ugly and dehumanizing conditions of labour in mills, mines, factories and workshops, not only in his own country but in all the advanced countries of Europe and America have been removed, and this only recently, not so much by purely economic methods as by politics, political agitation, nay, revolts and direct actions.

Industrialised India—although the industries have not advanced far enough—presents no peculiar social condition for which some specifically Indian or Oriental panacea is needed. Mr. Purcell knows quite well what the methods are by which the heartlessness and absence of sympathy of the employer

classes can be combated. He has only to refer to the century-old legislation by which factory-owners, capitalists and employer classes generally have been deprived of their inherited right to exploit the dumb millions. It is, besides, so late as 1875 in England and 1884 in France that the working classes have been able to wring from unwilling hands what may be described as their charter of independence, consisting in the right to organise strikes and carry on class-war with their exploiters. Certainly, these pieces of legislation have come through political propaganda, constitutional struggle and attempts to command the parliaments according to the voice of the submerged masses.

CAPTURING LEGISLATURES

The most important tactics in this class warfare which have compelled the employer-classes in Eur-America to understand the limits of their autocracy have consisted in the successful efforts by which the legislatures have been captured by the representatives of the working classes. The transformation of the laws of property, and other civil laws by which the poorer classes have been enabled partially to communalise the inheritance of landed estates and other wealth as well as enjoy the right to administer to ascertain extent the workshops, factories, etc., have also been accomplished not by the so-called economic methods but by ways and means that are 100 per cent. political. Politics have indeed been the most spiritual force in the movements that have led the industry to be democratised and earnings of labour placed on a humane level. It is the political machinery, command over the state, influence over the courts of justice nay, power over actual administration—that have enabled the working and cultivating classes of England and other countries to enjoy the little sunshine, the few “ultra-violet rays,” that they can to-day in the twentieth century.

Mr. Purcell knows all these facts about Eur-America, and

certainly he has not made an unduly damaging and disagreeable statement when he has described the actual condition of hovels, child labour and mortality in our country. But he glibly talks of managing the present situation in the following manner: "All the politics, constitutional issues fade into insignificance beside this terrible economic problem." He says further that "the trouble in India is the stomach trouble, basically, primarily." An Indian visitor in contemporary England, nay, contemporary America, might perhaps make the same statement because the most elementary student of social statistics knows that even in those wealthy countries of the world some 30 per cent. of the people are living below the poverty-line.

POLITICAL MEDICINE *vs.* ECONOMIC PURGATIVE

One might therefore ask Mr. Purcell to say to his own countrymen, as well as to his cousins on the other side of the Atlantic: "Ye English people! you Americans, you have only one trouble and that is the stomach trouble. Away with your party politics! away with your Republicans *vs.* Democrats! do away with your labour platform! All politics, all constitutional issues fade into insignificance besides the stomach trouble. All that you need is but an economic purgative."

But Mr. Purcell cannot afford to be so intellectually dishonest in regard to his own countrymen and in regard to European and American societies. He knows that for even economic diseases there is a political medicine. Indeed, in England, France, Germany, America and Russia it is political doctors that are ministering to the economic maladies. He himself is agitating for reform, legal reforms, political reforms, because he knows that without influencing the machinery of law it is not possible for him in many instances to extricate the hundreds and thousands of the unemployed from the poverty slough. As a British politician and as a Western

social thinker he would fail in his duty if he were not bringing home to his countrymen the importance of the state as a machine for the economic remaking of the people.

India will have hardly anything to object to in Mr. Purcell's graphic account of her economic situation. But it is too late in the day for India to be bamboozled by thoughtless counsels and doctorings. If Mr. Purcell is not prepared to be honest in regard to the methods by which the economic troubles of India may in the main be remedied, India is in a position to psycho-analyse the mentality of Mr. Purcell and his comrades and point out exactly what they and their predecessors have done in order to remove the evils of industrialism on the one hand and extend its blessings to millions of people on the other.

There is nothing unnatural if India is determined to capture the state and make it subservient to the demands of India's health and wealth. For, the cure for "stomach troubles" is not all economic. It has to be sought no less in strong doses of political freedom,—command over the law, the constitution, and the public finance.

One can therefore easily sympathise with the general political philosophy of Chittaranjan and his comrades—who have chosen not to be shunted off from the main track of national welfare by subscribing to a monistic and one-sided economism.

THE HINDU-MOSLEM PACT

Nothing reveals Chittaranjan more realistic, objective and matter-of-fact and at the same time more far-seeing, patriotic, nay, democratic than the much-condemned religio-political measure, the Hindu-Moslem Pact (December 1923) with which his newly-established Swaraj Party virtually commenced its career. It startled not only the majority of his coreligionists, the Hindus, of course, quite disgustingly, but,

agreeably enough, even a very large section of the Mussalmans as well.

The situation is parallel to that in Egypt. There we have seen Zaghlul Pasha, the Moslem, aye, an orthodox Moslem, heartily condemning Pan-Islam in the interest of politics, of "national" development and of adaptation to the contemporary world-forces. In Bengal we have a Hindu initiating a policy, on paper no doubt for the present, which is apparently anti-Hindu but positively and pronouncedly pro-Moslem. And the warm opposition which greets Zaghlul from the Moslem camp, especially from the Mollahs, is but repeated on the Indian theatre in the intense antipathy which Chittaranjan has to encounter from the side of Hindu orthodoxy or rather the "traditional" patriots of the Hindu community.

Be it noted that the strength and courage of Zaghlul and Chittaranjan in regard to their respective problems as well as the stake of popularity and influence involved in the issues raised thereby render them both redoubtable and worthy colleagues of that other great Asian of the day, Sun Yat-sen, who by entering into an open alliance with Soviet Russia and categorically accepting the Chinese communists as an arm of his *Kuo Ming-tang* (Nationalist Party) has dared risk his position and prestige in the affections of certain elements in Young China. Communism or Bolshevism, however unpopular it be to the budding capitalists of China, furnishes, as we have seen above, the *Leitmotif* or dominant note in the awan-song of this father of Chinese nationalism and democracy. The Bengali Chittaranjan's aggressively pro-Moslem politics embody the same realism of Young Asia which is bold enough to declare against Pan-Islam in Moslem countries like Egypt and Turkey, and to incur the hatred of the landed interests, captains of industry and merchant-princes in China.

NEW FORCES IN INDIAN POPULATION

What is a pact ? A pact is a contract. It involves a bargain, a higgling, a give-and-take and a compromise. It is an embodiment of the equality, factual or potential, of at least two forces, whether in individuals or in groups.

☐ To deny the existence of such forces or to ignore the equality, *in posse* if not *in esse*, of these forces in the social and economic structure of India to-day is to admit one's positive blindness and to declare that one needs the curative services of a medical expert. But to admit these realities in the forces around you can but automatically lead you, if you are a living organism and intend to live on and flourish by "responding" to the "stimuli" of the world (to adapt a phrase from our scientist Jagadish Chunder Bose) is but to go forward; invite and meet those forces, study their terms and assimilate the laws of their own being in order that by "understanding" them you may learn how best to serve the interests of your own metabolism, your own vital expansion.

Those realities in the Indian world of forces were seen by Chittaranjan's eyes without the least haziness. And his eyes counselled him to the existence of a virtual equality between the old forces and the new forces, so far at any rate as the urge for self-assertion is concerned. The higgling mood, the contract-mentally, the pact-philosophy of Chittaranjan's is a remarkable index to this realism.

Where is the man in contemporary India who has eyes and yet does not see that the agriculturists, the peasants, the *ryots* already constitute a force, and a force getting organized into groups ? What about the workingmen in mines, factories, plantations, railways and elsewhere ? Do they not constitute a new socio-economic force, a new group-reality ? Are not, again, the Namasudras, the non-Brahmans, the Pariahs and other depressed classes becoming self-conscious

enough to be evaluated as new forces in the make-up of the Indian population ?

No matter whether all these sections of the population be "backward" and "minorities" or the reverse, the only potent fact that counts to the political eye is that they are already developed or getting developed into forces, groups parties, demand-pressing entities. It is but such a reality, —backward or advanced, minority or majority is not the important point,—that the Moslem forces represent in India to-day.

As soon as there emerges a force, the living organism will have to understand it, assimilate it and enter into a pact, with it. Young India already needs legion of pacts, a peasant-pact, a labour-pact, a pariah-pact, a Namasudra-pact, a Non-Brahman-pact and last but not least, a Moslem-pact as well. This is dictated by the interests of the minimum of existence for the Indian people.

It is the unclouded vision of the healthy realist that enabled Chittaranjan to visualize the swift rearrangement that is taking place in the demographic structure of his fatherland. Therein is to be sought the policy of a revolutionary sacrifice of the alleged Hindu interests while conferring eye to eye with the Moslems. He has but asked Young India to "strengthen its household," so to say, by submitting to and making use of the new forces wherever new forces are visible or in formation on the horizon. If you are not careful and wise enough to utilize them they are going to be exploited by "others." This is the pragmatic logic of *vishva-shakti* (world-forces) in *Real politik*. Choose the way you will. *Yenstam tena gamyatam !*

CHITTARANJAN'S MATERIALISM

But it is clear that the "loaves and fishes" constitute the chief terms in the Hindu-Moslem Pact. The cow-music items

form really but a sop to the mass-prejudice and superstition on both sides.

A certain proportion of membership on the Bengal Legislative Council and on the Local Bodies is assured to the Moslems. And further, they are assured also of a certain percentage of the Government posts. The Hindu-Moslem Pact is frankly a document of open-eyed materialism. And sturdy materialism is an honest contribution of Chittaranjan to Bengal politics.

No pact without "loaves and fishes," the economic interest, the cash-nexus,—except perhaps it be a pact with somebody for entering the Kingdom of God. But even there you have to furnish the *daksina* for the priest, the *sinni* for the Mollah, and the "mass" for the Father. The Holy of Holies understands quite well the reality of "bread and wine."

If you intend to be friendly to the peasants or if you wish the peasants to "strengthen your household," you will have to discover the points at which the shoe pinches the peasants. It is their demands that you have to understand and try to satisfy. A great portion of their reality is furnished by land-tenure, rent-law, inheritance, partition, fragmentation, indebtedness, credit-facility, marketing and so forth. They may want constitutional liberty, *Swaraj*, freedom and what not. But they want many other things as well.

The labour-reality likewise comprises shorter hours, better conditions of work, housing, minimum wage, "social assurance," "a hand in the management" and so on. By all means the peasants and working men appreciate the spirituality of political freedom and self-assertion in and through *swaraj*. But they are also alive to the "loaves and fishes" first, second and always.

This certainly is brazen materialism. If materialism stinks in your nostrils you are at liberty to choose your 100 per cent. spiritualitarianism wherever you can get that commodity.

The world is wide enough for all of us. But then you will have to sacrifice your usefulness as a member of the political society.

A distribution of "loaves and fishes" there must ever be in politics. The question is to find out the ratios, co-efficients, proportions, index-numbers. Ultimately it comes down to statistics, political calculus, and a number of arithmetical operations on the magnitudes indicating the professions, groups of earnings, standard of living, etc.

For the present, let us note that the possibility of class-conflict is certainly active in every such calculation. But the chief thing to observe is that economic considerations may not at all be waived in any of the major problems of Indian politics.

Chittaranjan is supremely materialistic enough to announce to Young India if not philosophically, at least factually that the Hindu-Moslem question is fundamentally a "loaves and fishes" question. The Mussalmans want chances to greater wealth and opportunities for higher social position. There is no spirituality possible without "loaves and fishes," and there is no spirituality possible without social position.

CLASS-SACRIFICES AND TRANSFERENCES OF POWER

The sections that surrender the possibility of a certain part of the "loaves and fishes," *e.g.*, the landowners, the industrial capitalists, the employers and so forth, may believe that they are being asked to undergo tremendous sacrifice. It is easy for them to feel that they are paying too high a price for solidarity, industrial peace, political stability, "strengthening of the household," etc. It is part of their mentality, possessors of vested interests as they are, to consider every surrender as extraordinary self-sacrifice.

But from the other side, the demands amount but to the minimum of conditions for bare existence as animals, as social

beings, as mental and moral agents. The "beneficiaries" are not likely to understand, of course, that there is self-sacrifice anywhere in these surrenders.

But to deny that there is any sacrifice involved on the Hindu side would be practising blindness to the reality. It is not without sacrifice and opposition of certain interests that education has been rendered compulsory, universal and free in England and other countries. It is not without sacrifice on the part of certain classes that factory legislation, and developmental labour-laws as well as land-reforms have been enacted in Eur-America. It is not without sacrifice on the part of the Shoguns and Samurai that the Meiji era was inaugurated in Japan. The sacrifices involved in Bolshevik Russia belong in the long run to the same category of surrenders although perhaps on unprecedented scales.

In all these cases the sacrifices are the sacrifices of one class in the interest of another class. Orthodox British economists would call them, so far as purely material interests are involved, "transferences from the rich to the poor." The "rationing" of "essential commodities to the better-to-do classes" is the well-recognized custom in Great Britain which covers every sort of legislation commencing with the "poor law," embracing the "death duties" and coming down to the "feeding of the school children." Such "socialism" is found to be quite consistent with "liberal economics," says the Italian theorist Rignano in *Di un socialismo in accordo colla dottrina economica liberale* " (Of a socialism in accord with the liberal economic doctrine).

German *Sozial-politische Gesetz-gebung* (Socio-political legislation) has no theoretical scruples on this score. In France all these transferences and class-sacrifices, as one understands from the jurist Charmont, are simply illustrations of some of *les transformations du droit civil* (transformations in civil law) that have been going on for the last two generations or

so. And that is why Patouillet in his *Codes de la Russie Sovietique* considers the civil code and family code of Soviet Russia to be but continuations of the codes already prevailing in Eur-America.

These transferences and class-sacrifices have been taking place in the advanced countries more or less under the normal processes of law-making. French "solidarist" thought like that of Bougle considers such acts of self-sacrifice on the part of the possessors to be, like the "social assurances," but the discharge of "social debts" (cf. the "triple debt" in Hindu societal thinking) according to the ideas of "quasi-contract" in the interest of the "disinherited." Those peoples that are too backward or too obstinate to introduce these legal reforms have to submit to the surgery of a revolution. A great part of Bolshevism is essentially nothing but "modern Western civilization" enforced by patriots and humanitarians in a mediævally stagnant country at the point of the bayonet. This is how a country is "whipped into shape."

It is but such sacrifices to which the Hindu-Moslem Pact calls upon Young Bengal's go-aheads to harness their moral enthusiasm and social adventure. If there is any material sacrifice, actual or potential, in the situation created by this measure Chittaranjan has a whole host of legislation and evolution as well as political philosophy in his favour.

PROPORTIONAL AND UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

The economic and social situation with the Moslems in Bengal is not indeed as bad as might be suspected from the above discussion bearing, as it does, chiefly on the urban labour and rural poverty questions. But all the same, the Hindu-Moslem Pact raises some very fundamental issues in connection with the redistribution of material and moral power among the different classes of the Bengali people.

The project looks childish but is profoundly revolutionary

for two reasons. First, because the situation as it exists to-day finds the Moslems in no enviable position in the official and semi-official organizations. And secondly, because it seeks almost overnight (although, no doubt, it is stated, "when the foundation of self-government is secured," whatever it may mean), to raise them to the level at which they ought to stand more or less according to the strength of their number in the population of Bengal. In other words, the alleged "unfit" are to be lifted to the level of the fit,—and at the cost of the fit.

On the face of it, nothing could be more astounding and absurd. But this is exactly what the architects of Soviet Russia have sought to accomplish for their own people. They have not chosen to wait until the "processes of nature" would raise the submerged masses up to the level of the "upper ten thousands," the "natural leaders" of to-day. They are consciously attempting to direct the course of evolution in the shortest possible time along the lines of democracy and national efficiency such as have already been to a great extent worked out in Western Europe and America. The "proportional" and "populational" policies involved in the Hindu-Moslem Pact are, unconsciously perhaps, but indications of the same democratic goal towards which mankind has been moving in the progressive world.

Not only with the Moslem but with the other, new social forces as well Indian statesmen have to deal in a purposive, goal-ful, constructive manner. The combined Indian phalanx is to be strengthened. The basis of its recruits has to be expanded in all directions of the population-mass. The working moral force of India is likewise to be democratized. The teeming millions, no matter whether Hindu or non-Hindu, Pariah or non-Pariah, Moslem or non-Moslem, are to be enabled to exhibit their hydra-headed individuality and self-assertiveness.

If you are to treat with all the numerous groups in the

community in such a manner you have to begin by satisfying the Moslem, Namasudra, Non-Brahman and Pariah urges for a higher economic life and a more elevated social rank. There is no beating about the bush. The material basis of individuality, manhood, and self-assertion must be recognized.

As for the proportion of 55 per cent. or 35 per cent. and as for the details regarding this particular post or that type of service you will have to confer *tete a tete very often* in your life. There is no last word in any pact.

But the Hindu-Moslem Pact forces upon the attention of Young India, although in a rather crude and unphilosophical manner, the problem of modern democracy. It dimly suggests that the entire people, "fit" or "unfit" by the conventional standard, is to be allowed the right to participate in and control the government of the country. And this is a great acquisition in the realm of thought.

If "poverty" has ceased to be a bar to representation in the constitutional law of advanced countries it must cease to be a bar to representation in India also. Further, "illiteracy" also is no longer to be regarded as a bar to the exercise of political rights. In other words, the two vestiges of mediævalism, namely, "property qualification" as well as "literacy test" must be simultaneously abolished in India.

Indian statesmen will have to get ready for the "universal suffrage" in no equivocal manner. The "rights of the illiterate" as well as the "rights of the poor" are to constitute the two-fold slogan of Young India in the coming constitutional struggle. This is the ultimate meaning of the naive and almost thoughtless employment of "unweighted" arithmetic in the distribution of seats and posts according to the Hindu-Moslem Pact.

EVOLUTION OF REALISM IN INDIAN POLITICS

Realism is a chief feature in the political life of Chittaranjan. And this is perhaps his most characteristic gift to Young India.

Indian politics from 1885 to 1905 was the politics of dilettantes, successful lawyers who used to see the country within the four walls of their own rooms in the Bar libraries, prosperous businessmen and the new industrial bourgeoisie of all sorts. Surendra Nath Banerji was perhaps the most active of that crowd on the Bengal side and is responsible for some splendid spade-work.

Then came those days (1905-10) never to be recalled without a madness, the days of unparalleled enthusiasm and actions of self-denial, the epoch which ushered Young Bengal into being. Politics was lifted up for the first time into patriotism, a cult of self-abnegation, a religion, the thing that was virtually unknown except to a select few in the epoch of dilettantes. In 1905 began the age of whole-timers in national service and the spiritualized abandon of self and all to the altar of the motherland. That Young Bengal of patriotism and self-sacrifice is the creation of Bipin Chandra Pal and Aurobindo Ghosh, especially of the former. In 1919-21 Gandhi could not contribute a single new item to the spirituality or religion of patriotism already engendered in the ideas of 1905. That is why Gandhism fell virtually flat upon the energists of Young Bengal, except to a certain extent upon those who happened to be some fifteen years too backward.

THE SWARAJ PARTY

It was left for Chittaranjan to initiate the third epoch (1923), the epoch of realism. Young Bengal did not need any lectures on the virtues of self-sacrifice or the platitudes of martyrdom. The metaphysics of the soul being realized in the service of

the Mother was already at least fifteen years old in Bengali consciousness and practice.

If you are competent enough to bring the spiritual fervour of Bengal's patriotism up or down to the dirt and dust of technical, professional, work-a-day politics you will be appraised as somebody, as *bap ka beta*. This is what the idealism of the Bipin-Aurobindo complex failed to achieve. That complex simply manufactured nationalistic steam but did not know how to engineer the steam into a workable machine.

This machine is the contribution of Chittaranjan. In his self-sacrifice, emotionalism, *bhakti-yoga* he was contributing nothing extraordinary or unknown to the mentality of young Bengal. It is good that he began in the orthodox fashion associated with the "ideas of 1905." But what then? What is he going to do? He makes a vow and gives an undertaking. "I am fighting," says he, "for the victory of the Congress. I am pointing out to the Congress the path which will lead it from victory to victory and triumph to triumph."

It is not enough to say so. It may be tall talk. "But how are you going to accomplish it? What is your method? And is that method objective enough to be grasped by every body?" "Yes," he might have replied, "I have my machine. Here it is."

Up till now Young India was talking of ideals and practising self-sacrifice. At last came the engineer, the machine-man,—a Bengali, a *Vaishnava*, a poet, a singer,—who visualized a machine and presented the people with it. The machine-age was initiated. And the Swaraj Party came into being.

"PROFESSIONAL" vs. "DILETTANTIST"
AND "PATRIOTIC" POLITICS

In 1923 politics in India entered upon the third phase,—the professional as contrasted with the "dilettantist" and

"patriotic" phases. It is without reference to the programmes and policies that this classification and chronology are being attempted. Our object is simply to indicate the general methods of political life.

For, after all, these three phases constitute really one phase from the standpoint of the actual "contents" of political thought. "Substantially," the nationalism of Chittaranjan is identical not only with that of Bipin-Aurobindo but even with that of Surendranath. But in so far as Chittaranjan talks of serving the submerged 97 per cent. of the population, takes a continuous interest in the Trade Union movement and introduces free primary education in Calcutta under the auspices of the Corporation, he may be regarded as speaking a new language, the alphabet of which was unknown to his predecessors. He is, thus considered, not only the last of an old series but possibly the first of a new, representing a somewhat genuine transition to a novel political ideology.

Leaving this aspect, the material or contentual aspect, of political programmes from our present consideration we find that, so far as the "formal" side, the methodology or paraphernalia of public life is concerned, the age of well-groomed parlour-politicians and holiday statesmen is gone in any case. Gone equally is the age of simple *bhakti-yoga* as well as of merely self-sacrificing and "devoted" patriotic workers. No matter what be the programme and policy, the age of party managers, party-clubs, political professionals, technical politicians, pact-jobbers, dealers in compromise, give-and-take practitioners, *Real politiker*,—well and good, if they are also "patriotic," self-sacrificing and devoted into the bargain,—has come.

Politics is a dirty job, and political life is essentially a party affair. If you wish to serve your country in and through politics, you must be expert in handling dirt of all sorts and expert likewise in the making and remaking of parties. Thi

is the most solid chip of realism to which Chittaranjan has treated his beloved Young Bengal. And as for renunciation, idealism and self-sacrifice, "remember," says his spirit from the heavens, "that this realistic philosophy of dirt and dust comes from *me*, Chittaranjan ! "

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