Modern Indian Culture

A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

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TO
MY DEAR
MAKUN

PREFACE

Modern Indian culture is a unique social phenomenon from every point of view. A few competent books have been written on it, no doubt, but they deal with this aspect or that. The pattern is usually missed, and when it is not, the main thread is identified with nationalism. Besides, the treatment suffers from over or under-statement. But if culture is a whole and a social process, the proper study of its development in modern India should be on sociological lines. A sociological point of view reveals the silent process of social change going on beneath our most prominent behaviour viz., nationalism. Once the nature of that process is understood, the different positive achievements of Indians in the spheres of education, literature, music and other fine arts as well as such negative activities as have enhanced the social distance between those very communities who had co-operatively built up the common traditions of living and thought, fall into their places in the big design that is modern Indian culture. The 'nature' of the Indian society, which is the context of this culture, is neither the nature of the root nor the nature of the flower, neither the actuality of history nor the potentiality of fulfilment. It is an artifice, that of an unreal class-structure, and therefore, unrelated to the seminal principles that one cannot fail to notice in the ope-

ration of the societal life in India until it was turned askew. How this artifice has worked is the story of this volume.

My criticisms, and omissions too, of men of letters and artists are, therefore, strictly impersonal. How can one minimise the importance of the deeds of our great men? But, in relation to what makes, holds and unfolds, like pearls they are, occasioned by the intrusion of a grain of foreign matter between the skin and the shell. A sociologist interested in the process of culture-formation and its dynamics must show up that particle of sand, this spurious middle class, the supreme social incidence of 'economic' Imperialism. He must not desist from pointing out that for ten or a hundred pearls, a million oysters have to be opened and rejected.

My original intention was to bring out a bigger volume with greater details in illustration of my thesis. The paper-shortage called for economy. I then wanted to delete the references altogether. But short references were necessary, said my publisher. So, here they are, only the relevant ones chosen from the books at hand, and given at the end. Others more valuable could certainly be given.

A word more about these references. If there are 'n' sciences, there must be a 'n'+1th science. We have a number of humanistic studies in the social sciences, and the sociologist, who is the 'n'+1th scientist, cannot but depend upon the findings in those 'n' fields. In fact, his pickings are the largest.

At the same time, he must have ears to hear.

So, if I have borrowed much from books and journals, I have had also my personal contacts which gave me numerous chances to look into the process from inside. The writers, artists, musicians, scholars, and the active workers in other spheres, who have inspired me, directly and indirectly, by their talk and guidance are much greater in number than those to whom I have alluded in these pages.

Many students and friends have helped me, both by translation and discussion, in my understanding the spirit of the work that is being done in those Indian languages I do not know.

My thanks are also due to the Editors of the Vishwabharati, The Cultural Heritage of India (Ram Krishna Centenary Volumes), and the Social Welfare where some of the material used in chapters 2 and 6 of this volume first appeared. To my brother, Prof. Bimalaprasad Mukerji, Rev. L. Schiff, and Mr. Chelapati Rao my debt of gratitude is deep. My son, Sreeman Kumar Prasad Mukerji, has given me his time and energy in the preparation of my manuscripts. He has also verified many of my references.

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D. P. MUKERJI

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CHAPTER I

THE MYSTICAL OUTLOOK

There is such a thing as Indian Culture. Non-Indians recognise its existence, and we Indians sense it. Equated with Hindu philosophy at its highest, it means that peculiar relation between the soul and Brahman which is expressed in the phrases '*Soham*' and '*Tattwamasi*.' But a good many things, e.g., the average individual's views about the ordering of society and his own functions his behaviour and distinctive outlook, are missing from this equation. As a social and historical process, however, Indian culture represents certain common traditions that have given rise to a number of general attitudes. The major influences in their shaping have been Buddhism, Islam, and Western commerce and culture. It was through the assimilation and conflict of such varying forces that Indian culture became what it is today, neither Hindu nor Islamic, neither a replica of the Western modes of living and thought nor a purely Asiatic product. Obviously, the contribution of each factor cannot be assessed with any high degree of scientific accuracy. Many people[1] think that the Aryan spirit is the core of our traditions, while others feel that but for Western culture India would have remained primitive. Yet, historically speaking, the indigenous and the incoming forces had welded Indian society into a more or less organic whole, until Western commerce arrived. Even at the end of the eighteenth

century, the Indian social order was, for the most part, equivalent to the discharge of obligations to the family, to the caste and the village panchayats working on the basis of an economic self-sufficiency in the rural units, and in addition, to the guilds and corporations on the basis of trade and commerce between urban areas.[2] With agriculture as the main, and commerce as the specialised vocation, Indian society pursued the smooth tenor of its ways except for the occasional disturbances caused by the need for accommodating new functional groups, e.g., the Arab traders in the western and the southern coasts of India. In Bengal, the retreating Buddhist sects and advancing Islam caused a stiffening of the rules of conduct, e.g., by Raghunandan and Debibar Ghatak, for the upper castes in certain parts only, but no other change was immediately noticeable among the rest. By and large, Indian society was a 'closed' one,[3] if it was not static. Naturally, when it remained so over a long period, it developed, in P. Sorokin's[4] language, the 'ideational' traits of culture with more or less defined views on the nature of needs and ends and the means of their satisfaction, i.e., of social activity, with specific aesthetic, moral, social values and systems, and with certain common notions of Truth, Knowledge, Self, and the Ultimate Reality.[5] In other words, the Hindu, the Buddhist and the Muslim[6] had together evolved a Weltanschaung in which the fact of being was of lasting significance with all that it meant in the way of indifference to the transient and the sensate and of preoccupation with the processes in which self was subordinated to and ultimately dissolved in the Ultimate Reality. Practically, for the

individual, it meant that the proper observance of customs and rituals released him for the control of his inner life. For the society, it connoted a hierarchy in which those values alone were permanent which led to spiritual realisation, those events alone were positive which marked the stages in that march, and those persons alone were leaders whose supreme attainment, if not the only engagement in life, was spiritual culture, bliss and benefit. This world-view is usually called mystical. Before the impact of Western commerce, it was the ruling view in India. After the British rule, the impact of which is of a different order, it pretends to be so. Now Indian society is no longer a closed one, and Indian culture, naturally, is only a pseudo-ideational system. The Mystics' part, which was revolutionary in the stabler periods of Indian history, can hardly be so today. Infiltration alone can be their tactics.[7]

There is a strong opinion that mysticism is a typically Indian product, and that consequently, the Indian view is nothing if not mystical. But students of comparative religion and theology have traced the essential elements in the personal experiences of mystics all over the world and at different times and found them to be similar.[8] Passivity, ineffability and beatitude are common for the Christian, the Sufi, the Indian and the Chinese saint. In the first stage, the mystic is everywhere emptied of his normal thoughts and emotions and begins to feel that he is living a different life. Such a depersonalisation usually brings about the dark-night-of-the-soul state. But it passes, and when other emotions and thoughts fill the void he does not know them or fails to describe them in the older

terms. This is the state of bewilderment, wonder, and passive submission. Once he is thus possessed he speaks of himself as deified. A further stage is reached when the unison is complete, and action is equal to non-action in the sense that both are irrelevant when Becoming is suspended. Certain mystics stop at a particular stage, while those who run the whole gamut are everywhere few in number. The former occasionally descend to the sphere of action and become prophets, while the latter remain models in so far as they sum up in their lives the full course of spiritual evolution. It is difficult to detect the Indian-ness of the mystics' mental make-up and discipline, *pace* the special Indian techniques, though it is easy to hold that their influence on society has been greater here than elsewhere. Nay, it has been even greatet than in China (or in Iran) where the objective situation has not been dissimilar. This fact accounts for the notion that Indian culture is primarily mystical, or religious in the ordinary language, whereas Chinese culture is basically ethical.[9]

It looks otherwise plausible too. Here, banias cheat, communities and political parties fight one another in the name of religion. Examinees begin their answers, clerks and shop-keepers begin their work with an invocation to their favourite deities at the top of their books. A good division at the examination, a rapid promotion in service and a smart deal in the bazaar or the Stock Exchange can all be secured by God's grace administered through a religious preceptor. In a mass observation conducted a few years ago, there were as many as six verbal references to the Godhead by pedestrians in

the course of a twenty minutes' brisk walk along a busy street in an Indian city. The business-quarters yielded nine references in a quarter of an hour. Comparative figures are not available, but the Indian figures seem to be a record. Leaving aside the marital beds and the divine attendance thereupon, it is well known how our public affairs are conducted in a religious spirit. Purely on the population basis, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, Mahatma Gandhi, M. Stalin and President Roosevelt are the most prominent leaders of the world today. Winston Churchill, Hitler, Mussolini and Franco have also vast influence over their countrymen. Of these eight, three, *viz.*, the Marshal, the President, and the Mahatma are devout, and two, Mussolini and Franco, are aware of the political bearings of religion. Stalin and Churchill are non-religious, the former content with tolerating the popular identification of himself with the "little Father," and the latter finding religion unsuited for his type of eloquence and drive.[10] But fairly detailed records are available of the performances of these eight leaders, in their public capacities, but the others do not reveal that religious frame of mind and outlook that we associate with Gandhi. The Marshal regularly reads the Bible, but he is not a Christian Scientist; the Presidential messages are often inflated with prophetic content and soulful prayers, but the President is no Seventh Day Adventist. None waits for divine inspiration and none is admired because of that; none mixes up politics with religion even in his most millennial moments; none betrays the religious urge for perfection, the puritanic fervour for the Absolute, as the Mahatma does. The point about

these personal traits is that they are immediately seized by the Indian (the European and the American too) as *typically* Indian. But it is not Gandhi's influence alone that makes plausible the current notion about Indian politics being fundamentally religious. There are more Swamijis and Maulanas on our political platforms than anywhere else. Communists count many of them as their fellow-travellers. If anything, the incidence of religious emotions among the Muslims is greater. To crown it all, the Government of India and foreign observers alike endorse the notion. When the drive against Communism was first undertaken in India, the main line of propaganda was conducted against its anti-religious and materialistic, and, therefore, anti-Indian spirit. And it went through very well; in fact, it is selling very well today with our Simon-pure nationalists. Outsiders who never came to India, great men from Goethe, Schopenhauer, Max Muller, Germans mostly,[11] Emerson, Whitman and other Americans, have also certified that we are intensely spiritual, that there is more theological subtlety in the lanes of an Indian village than in the campus of a European or an American University.[12] Between the occupied territories of Germany and Japan and the unoccupied areas of the democratic powers we alone remain pre-occupied with matters of the spirit.[13]

Much of this is not tenable. Anthropologists, for example, can point out that many of these traits are primitive, and economists may proclaim that they are the features of a rural economy stabilised for long. Marxists can even say that India is in that stage of the development of her produc-

tive forces where economic conflicts take the shape of fights between gods.[14] Even sensible political scientists may think that we are religious without our willing it. Historians of Indian philosophy may suggest that it was not always so entangled with theology, and quote from the various schools of Hindu materialism, to indicate the positivist context of Hindu culture. Indians must have lived and behaved in this world, and evidences[15] show that certain sections lived pretty well, as civilised individuals. Today, also, they have not ceased to exist as hungry men and women desirous of higher standards in their earthly living. And yet, no social scientist in India has got a chance against the scientists of transcendental knowledge, no non-theological school of metaphysics did have or can have any considerable prestige, no glowing account of Indian Chemistry, medicine,[16] or of Kama-Shastra can disabuse our minds of the idea that life in India always hangs by the Divine Absolute, which are all proofs of our religiosity. Our material conditions, our political subjection, our nationalism conspire in the currency of the story that Indians, by and large, are given to God, that they are addicts to religion, that both the body and the soul of Indian culture are annexed and possessed by the Divinity.[17]

The conclusion is that we may or may not be religious but that there is no doubt of the fact that the religious label has stuck to our culture. Our disgust with the large number of crude ones among religious customs and traditions, our impatience with heavenly intrusions into politics and economics, and our will to create and substi-

tute other traditions should neither blind us to the existence of that label nor to the logical and non-logical reasons why that label has stuck so long. When the Indian progressive youth dismisses religion as an opium, he is not only ignoring social facts but the historical process itself by which these facts have assumed the attached values. In any case, he must know, before he makes history, what materials he is up against. A socialist should also be a student of sociology, which, today in India, is a study of popular errors and beliefs, fictions, myths and legends. The fact of the matter is that in India the mystic tradition did play an important part in society and that its chief exponents were social revolutionaries of their days. The mystics had a great deal to do with the cultural processes, right from the time when the Aryans settled in India. Certain Vedic texts show clearly that the Brahmavadins were from very early times draining the Aryan cult of its positive social substance by the double process of pre-occupying themselves with the search for the Absolute and showing up the hollowness of the Aryan rituals.[18] It is also clear that this class of people found themselves in the company of princes after their career of protests. Their nonconformity did not stand in the way of blessing the Kshatriya order and cursing the lower ones.[19] But their high conduct made ample amends for this isolation from the life of the people. Intellectually, their function was both critical and constructive. There is an extremely healthy freshness in the atmosphere of the Upanishads, a spirit of adventure which paid scant courtesy to caution

and pushed men and women forward on to high endeavours. In the Upanishads there is no counsel to wait or to turn back. 'Forward' was the cry.[20] Obviously, theirs was the pioneer's risk-taking urge. Culture was in the making. But it was soon made. The isolation and the subsequent alliance with the princely order did not enable these mystics to forge further ahead. Our knowledge of the social consequences of the teachings of the Rishis stops at their attempts to introduce the Varnasram Dharma and incorporate the converted tribes into the pyramidal structure, with themselves at the cone, that they had helped in raising. The Brahmavadin Rishis in the forest-asylums do no more serve the cause of sociology than the Government model farms in India do to the science of Indian agriculture, unless we choose to think that non-social conduct is a homage to society. Nobody denies the values of the residents of the forest *asrams* as examples, but examples lose their dynamic values when the social order has been fixed. Whatever is of general social importance in the work of the Rishis in the later stages is summed up in the caste-system, the New Order of the First Millennium before the Birth of Christ. Since then, the caste-system became the datum of Indian society which would be accepted ultimately even by the rebels, the Muslims and the Christians alike.[21] Nobody in India has been able to avoid it, not even in the Universities, which are manned by the rationalists, nor in the governments, which are run by the civilians. The erstwhile dissenters had become respectable, the open society of the Upanishads had been

closed, the gods had lost their efficacy, and the Brahmins came in their stead willing to intercede before them on receipt of adequate reward.

The Buddhist contributions to Indian culture are well known. Probably, they have been over-emphasised by European scholars who found the ethical aspects of Buddhism more congenial to their spirit than the spiritual side of Brahminical culture. Still, what remains is of inestimable value. Sakyamuni developed the doctrines of individual dissent and freedom implicit in the Upanishads. The securing of the holy existence by holy deeds, the ideas of the *rita*[22] and the attainment of *moksha* in this life, of *maitree* and *ahimsa*, are all there. What the Buddha did was to popularise them among the people who had been so long debarred from their knowledge. Sanskrit was not used, nor was initiation by the priest necessary. The result was that the concept of Karma ceased to be esoteric and completely displaced the gods. Once it was done, the Kamya sacrifices for propitiation and achievement of desire disappeared among large sections of the masses. The logical corollary of *maitree* and *ahimsa* was also the stoppage of animal sacrifices. "Be a lamp unto yourself, be a refuge unto yourself" were the last words of the Lord. But the lamp was ultimately extinguished and the refuge turned into caves. The protest against Brahminism petered out and a rigid monachism was established. By the end of the eighth century Buddhism was on the retreat in India. Outside, it continued to act as a leaven. In the meanwhile, however, it had produced first-rate philosophical

works, magnificent literature, painting and architecture—things which thrill us even today. Yet, one cannot get over the fact that Buddhism was finally merged into popular Hinduism so completely that a Bengali Hindu is really a misnomer.[23] Buddhism had offended against life in various ways; it had imposed *nibritti* over *pravritti* and the monastic order over laity, it had insulted the mother and the wife, raised Karma into a non-human agency, and sobered the Aryan Kshattriya's urge for conquest and expansion. The Lord's silence over the nature of the Ultimate Reality and of life after death was ominous. Later on, the drone of 'mani padme hum' would alone fill that void. In short, Buddhism took the mind of man away from the earthly processes of culture. Its humanism became thinner and thinner until the stage was ready for a come-back of the gods. This time, their shapes were monstrous, as a visit in the Gumphas and a study of the Tantrik texts would amply demonstrate. *Maitree* and *ahimsa* lay low for centuries. If we understand culture sociologically, we should not stop with Aswaghosh, the Ajanta or the Sanchi tope; account will also have to be taken of the seeds of decay which Buddhism contained in its outlook on life, its incapacity to produce a social order of higher level, a fact which Spengler rightly understands by nihilism,[24] while it was constantly sapping the foundations of the old. The Buddha had preached his simple gospel for mankind, but it was the urban population that annexed it. The lower classes remained content with the shell of the Hindu symbols, and the upper classes killed the simple doctrines of the

Buddha by logomachy. Finally, they too would lose their habits of discussion in the maze of Tantrik symbolism. How exactly Buddhism spent itself in the land of its birth is not known.[25] One would think that the social process was similar to what happened in China as described by Dr. Hu Shih.[26] The Buddhist celibacy was the opposite of the first three stages of the Varnasram, its mendicancy could succeed only with the princely order and the Sresthis, who in their interests would love to patronise the monks, but it would not appeal to the average house-holder because its asceticism ran counter to human instincts exercied as they were in the family-system. The hair-splitting analysis and the abstruse metaphysics could ill satisfy the urgent, simple, ethical and spiritual needs of the people. Above all, the Buddhist scheme of salvation was anti-social in its skipping over the all-important stage in which the duties towards family and society could be performed. No amount of casuistry in permitting social life would make its eflect normal. The monastic order was no substitute for the social order. From the point of view of social economy again, Buddhism did nothing new. In the Buddhist period of Indian history, caste-corporations, trade and industrial guilds developed.[27] But a close student of history would see more than mere traces of the same in the pre-Buddhist period. The entire corpus of post-vedic Smriti literature is littered with references to artisans and mechanics, syndicates of traders and bankers. Even the commercial class had already come into existence. Money-lenders were also briskly carrying on their

business, so much so that the need was felt for controlling their depredations. Fifteen per cent was the rate above which Manu would interfere.[28] Therefore, all that we find clearly in the Buddhist period was the stepping forward of the functional castes and the middle class of traders and businessmen into the foreground.

In this context of a contrary outlook and lack of originality in the throwing up of a new social order, we find a resurgence of the lower forms of Hinduism in Buddhist garb,[29] a revival of Vaishnavism[30] and of various Brahminical doctrines associated with the Vedanta.[31] A big dose of persecution was no doubt there to supplement the renaissance. Popular Hinduism took over the Lord himself as Siva,[32] the *bodhisattwas* were duly given their niches, the Buddhist Heaven and Hell found their place, and the new monastic orders imitated the discipline and the dress of the monks. Sankara himself was dubbed a Buddhist in disguise. To watch the Brahminical counter-reformation at its best we should read the history of Vijaynagar. There, the great Brahmin commentator, Sayan was also a minister of the Crown, and his brother, Madhava, was ready at hand to support his sophistries. The Buddhist culture that had appealed to the princely order and the townspeople was annihilated by the same set of people. The social distance between the rulers and the ruled, the upper and the lower functional groups, between the princely order and the sons of the soil, remained exactly as it was. It is sometimes alleged that in the Buddhist period, the middle class first emerged through the trade and industrial

guilds. The blunt truth about the social processes of Indian culture is that Islam alone could offer a different outlook and a contrary set of values. Jainism had early become the religion of a peaceful community interested in business and welfare-schemes. Before Gandhi disinterred it, Jainism was leading an apologetic existence as a religion. So Islam alone could give a shock. Its special outlook and traditions have been discussed later. Here we will only mention the fact of their newness. The fullness of the shock had no doubt been taken off by Buddhism. But for the Buddhist cushion, the Hindu society would have been shaken to its roots.

The contact between Buddhism and Islam had taken place outside India, in Iran, Iraq and in Balkh.[33] Out of numerous references, the following should suffice. In Balkh, the Buddhist temple, Navavihara (Nau-bahar), was managed by the Paramukha, the Priest. He was imprisoned and despatched to Khalif Uthman. Probably, he was converted, and when he came back, the son was elected as the Paramukha. Later on, the Turk Buddhist king murdered the family of the chief of Barmak. Only the wife escaped with her child to Kashmir. The child received a scientific education and went back to Balkh where he took charge of the temple. Harun-al-Rashid's prime minister was a Barmak and retained his interest in India. He invited Indian scholars to Bagdad and had a survey made of the Indian religious systems. The tradition of contact with Indian Buddhism continued throughout the Abbasid period. Magians were semi-Buddhists, Ata

Ma'arri, the famous blind poet and one of the most enlightened men that Islamic culture has produced, was a 'veritable Buddhist.' Maulana Ziauddin, following Von Kremer, has discovered many more traces of Buddhist ideologies in Islamic thought.

Nearer home, the contact between Islam and Buddhism was established very early through the twin channels of commerce and politics. The footprints of the Lord on the sacred peak in Ceylon were held by the Arabs to be those of Adam. The Prophet had said, "I smell the sweet breeze of Allah's knowledge blowing from India," and his followers were quick to identify the Indians with the people of the Revealed Book. The Arab traders had spread themselves over Calicut, Malabar, and the Western coast of India. Qasdar, Daibal, Broach, Cambay, Jaudaur, Sopara and Benares had domiciled Arabs as their citizens. The exchange of cultures went so far that one Hindu sect worshipped Ali as an avatar of Shiva. In Sind, the political factor was important. When the Muslims conquered it, the Buddhist rulers were fighting the Brahmins and not having the best of it. The Buddhist princes helped the Muslims to conquer Sind. Buzurg-bin-Shahriyar, who visited the Indian coast in the 9th century, says that the Buddhists "love the Muslims and are extremely well disposed towards them." He alludes to a deputation of two Bikshus to Arabia in Umar's time. One of them came back and told the people of Ceylon how simply the Khalif lived. "That is why they have so much sympathy for the Muslims and are so much friendly with them." Mau-

lana Ziauddin quotes Sulaiman the merchant's saying (851 A.D.), "There does not exist among rulers a prince who likes the Arabs more than Balhara, and his subjects follow his example." It was obvious that the Buddhist Sresthis found easy friends among the Arab traders and the Arab traders found the simple ethics and the humanism of Buddhism, at least Ceylonese Buddhism, more akin to the spirit of Islam. Brahmin cults were too deductive, too other-worldly, too socially exclusive for the Arab taste. Besides, the commercial middle class in the cities were either Buddhists or Jains and never Brahmins. The best example of how Buddhism absorbed the shock of Islam and was itself absorbed in the process comes from Bengal. But that is a different story.

We have drifted away from the mystics in describing the changes in the Weltanschauung. The Muslim saints took up the cue where it was left by the Arab traders. From the eleventh century onward their line is continuous.[34] Here are a few great names with dates. Sheikh Ismail of Lahore (1005 A.D.), Nathar Shah of Trichinopoli (1020), Moinuddin Chisti of Ajmere (1195), Syed Jalaluddin of Sindh (1243), Sheikh Jalaluddin of Bengal (1244), Pir Mahabir of Bijapur (1350), Yusuf of Cutch (1350), Ali Hamdan of Kashmir (1388). From Sindh to Sylhet, Panipat to Gulbarg they spread in ever-widening circles. Moinuddin Chisti was responsible for the Hussaini Brahmins of Ajmere, that peculiar sect who fast equally during Ramdan and Shivaratri, and feast equally in the Id and Ram-navmi, the males of

whom wear Muslim dress while the females put on the vermilion mark. These Mian Thakurs have their counterparts in the Kakas and Samis of Gujerat. The descendants of the latter became a Khoja sect, and some take the Aga Khan as an incarnation of the Hindu triad, Brahma, Vishnu, and Maheswar.

We have at last come to the great medieval mystics, Ramanand, Kabir, Dadu, Nanak, Laldas, Garibdas, Charandas, Leela Debi, Chaitanya, and a host of others with their respective 'panths.' Their spiritual technique as unearthed by Sri Kshitimohan Sen[35] is on all fours with that of the Sufis as given by Dr. Kremer from a Persian MS. or in the Nafais-ul-Funin. The identification of the Sufi Fana with the Nirvana and the Maqamat with the Tantric 'chakras' is well established. We are, however, concerned with the impersonal contributions of the medieval saints, a study of whose teachings reveals most interesting sociological features. Their large number at much about the same period would entitle us to include them in one broad movement which swept across the land. The undoubted enthusiasm which it created among the people would invest the movement with the spirit of a revolution into which even the higher classes were occasionally drawn.[36] And then there was the unbroken series of their continuity which would demonstrate the regulated novelty of their doctrines. But before we proceed to indicate their newness, a sketch of the normal socio-economic background is necessary.

The normal social conditions entailed a hierarchy in which the religious, juridical and econo-

mic functions combined in excellent carpentry. Thus the Brahmins were the preceptors and the supporters of Kings and the Kshatriya chiefs. The latter were a feudal and military class collecting rents from villages and paying parts of them to the overlord who, in addition to the income from the Crown lands, took $\frac{1}{6}$ to $\frac{1}{3}$ of the produce of other lands, sometimes on the average, occasionally, on the gross basis. In the villages dwelt the devout and the self-sufficient, who remained contented except during natural and human visitations. Under the Muslims the same dispensation could continue, if only conversion took place.[37] Jaigirs were well worth the Kalma if Taris was well worth a mass. The Brahmins, who kept the royal and courtly conscience, also kept the conscience of the villagers, with some compensation. They were the steel-frame that kept the structure normal by interpretations, Smritis as they are known. Gradually, however, the social distance between the Crown with his lords and the tenants and tillers of the soil increased. The structure was strained by the end of the Pathan period, and a new system of ideas revolving round equality among the faithful was in the foreground. Conversion was peaceful and paying, compromise was in the air, and the Brahmins sought to make the system yet more elastic than what it had been under the duress of the Buddhist order. The Brahmins further relented and further stiffened; the feudal lords who had kept their jaigirs by conversion had to be tolerated, while humbler individuals were outcasted. Certain political changes took place in the relation

between the centre and the subahs, and the pronounced regional characteristics threatened the all-India frame.[38] The counter-reformation had to come. When it did, it was sponsored by the Kings, the lords and the priests. But the lower castes and the Muslims proved too strong. The Lingayats and the Sikhs were tillers, just as the Jati-Vaishnavas of Bengal are mostly recruited from the Vaishyas and the Sudras, the shopkeepers, journeymen and craftsmen, even today. Lower down, the agriculturists had their own local variations, of Buddhism in Bengal, of pre-Aryan cults and Islam elsewhere. The Kabir, the Dadu, the Laldasi, the Satnamis, the Ram Sevi-panthis would be called Sudras by the Hindu. The majority of the medieval saints in India were Non-Brahmins when they were not non-Hindus, like Kabir, Dadu, Rajjab. The closed ideational society with Brahmins closely co-operating with the nobility and royalty at the top was undergoing a stress that pressed from the bottom. It had to yield before the united front of Islam, Buddhism and popular Hinduism, representing the common interests of the debarred. If India has no record of the prince siding with the people against the overlord or of the overlord taking up the cause of the people against his chief it was mainly because of the absence of a rigid organisation like that of the church among the Brahmins.[39] Being a loose organisation, their influence over the social order was lasting through a series of cautious advances and retreats. Add to it the fact of economic self-sufficiency and placidity, and you get the secret of their continuous hold. The mystics

challenged this shape of things. Perhaps their democratic strength was over-estimated, otherwise why should their doctrines become esoteric and their sects become absorbed into the Hindu fold? But almost every struggle has been thus fought and thus lost with the neglect of the primal urges for change and conflict. So, within the social system of their work, they were active revolutionaries but not dynamic ones. They had to wait for Western commerce and capital for more substantial changes.

In the meanwhile, the mystics performed great deeds: they revolted against idolatry, the tyranny of caste and creed and the mechanics of ritualism, but along the submerged tradition of the dissenting Rishis in the Upanishads. They were opposed—some practised their opposition to the barren asceticism of the Vedantist. They bridged the gulf between the communities, the Hindu and the Muslim, and made them one in faith, love and deeds. Their acts and sayings are the final answer to the communalists and the Imperialists of today. They abolished the purdah among their disciples and recognised women's rights to illumination. The Hindu woman, religiously, is a Sudra and is not entitled to the Gayatri mantram. Exceptions to the rule, e.g., the Brahmavadinis, were there but they should not be understood to mean the ideal state of womanhood inasmuch as the more vital ideals of motherhood and 'grihini,' i.e., housewifery, were always competing. Some even permitted free selection of companions, separation, and widow-remarriage. Temples had no sanctity for them; the heart was the temple, and

its keys were love and intuition. (Note the dialectics of history; the present Harijan movement is immediately directed towards forcing the gates of the temple which the Harijan saints had always despised). Priestcraft was sought to be avoided: it could have no place in a scheme of direct contact, unison, and intuitive comprehension. At the beginning, the head of the sect was selected by spiritual merit and rotation, i.e., irrespective of caste, creed, and sex. Later on, he would often be hereditary. The net result was the destruction of the rigidity of the Brahminical culture and the aridness of its logomachy. The heyday of mysticism marked the beginning of the end of theological scholarship. From many points of view, the mystics' was an anti-intellectual movement. Positively, they released the Indian spirit for a fresh spirit of creative activity in the sphere of emotional disciplines.

Music was the first art to gain from the doctrine of love.[40] The Indian musical system had been divided into the Marga and the Deshi, and it was the latter that got the impetus. Chant became the recognised form of communal worship. A whole community of people religiously perfervid could not be expected to conform to the Shastric standards of accuracy and rules of development. Individually also, when music was the language of the soul in search of the beloved and hungry of direct contact with the Person, any departure from the norm would be natural. Besides, the religious ardour would only make for songs and literary music. So, by the end of the fifteenth century, a conference was called by a Gwalior

prince to set matters right. Since then the pandits and their patrons were kept busy in writing new texts on music. What is known today as classical Hindustani music was evolved from the counter-reformation that the saints and their sects had occasioned. Being a reaction it was deeply indebted to the community-music. Dhamar-Holi, with its beautiful rhythm of swings, regional melodies, combinations between classical ragas and folk-airs, all were incorporated into the classical style and given high status. On the other hand, the folk-style also felt the effects of change. The Abhanga of Maharastra and the Kirtan of Bengal were most affected. Krisna-Kirtan of Chandidas was probably originally sung in the simple Jhumur style, later on, it was highly stylised. By the end of the XVII century, the tide of the Bhakti cult began to turn and saints became *avatars*. The classical became the Darbari, the courtly and the manorial, while the Artha Sangit, i.e., music with meaning, with its insistence on the emotional and poetic value of words, remained *laukik*, i.e., the language of the people and the sects. It is interesting to note that the high and mighty Dhrupad, the rigour of which has driven it today out of public favour, was a *laukik*,[41] regional style of which the words were to be in praise of a god or a king and the execution that of chanting. A pandit from the South[42] listened to the court-musicians of the Badshah and lamented the good old days of music. The music of these centuries had to compromise with the newly aroused devotion. If it ultimately degenerated into hide-bound conventional exer-

cises, with which we are familiar, it only repeated what the caste-system had done to the sects in the social sphere. Only, the history of Hindustani music illustrates better the combination of the Brahmin with the feudal aristocracy. The majority of the well-known scholars in these centuries were either princes or their Brahmin protegés.

The supreme contribution of the medieval mystics to Indian culture was in literature. It will be no exaggeration to say that the enrichment of dialects, some of which like Marhatti, Hindi, Gujerati and Bengali[43] have since acquired the status of literature, was their doing. They had to approach the masses and Sanskrit was the language of the gods alone. A list of the more significant works would cover many pages. Tulsidas' Ramayana, Bhaktamal, Chaitanya-literature, the later Padavalis can compete with the world's best devotional literature. The literary activities were not concerned with original works alone, nor were they collections of mere sayings. Even epics like the Mahabharata and the Ramayana were translated into Bengali. A comparative study of the character of Ram Chandra, Sita, Lakshman in the Sanskrit and the vernacular versions shows the influence of the Bhakti cult in full tide. The Chaitanya literature underwent a momentous change, however. Side by side with the vernacular version, the need was felt to publish Sanskrit works and commentaries. Rup and Sanatan wrote in Sanskrit, Radhamohan Thakur explained the Bengali work, Padamrita Samudra, in Deva-bhasa. This was in consonance

with the gradual conversion of Chaitanya into an Avatar and his final identification with Krishna. His cult had to acquire prestige with the Brahmin and come to terms with his culture.

The same story of a revolutionary outburst and final surrender to orthodoxy is repeated in Painting and Architecture.[44] What can better be described as Rajasthani School, with the Jammu, Kangra, Garhwali and Sikh varieties, is not understandable without initiation in the mysteries of Krishna-Lila. The Rash-Lila series is the most important, and next in aesthetic order comes the Ragmala series.[45] The entire Rajasthan group is a move away from the court-art of the Mughals. The latter had become mechanical in the repetition of its few motifs. It was 'academic, dramatic, objective, and elective.' Prince Danyal even was weary. The Rajasthan school supplied what it lacked, the poetic background. The poetry was lyrical, devotional and erotic by turn. In fine, it reflected the moods which were being forged by the Hindi writers. On the top and in the back of the Ragmala pictures are to be found famous Hindi couplets depicting all the moods of 'nayikas.'[46] This subservience of Rajasthan painting to literature, its connection with music and erotics clearly shows its limitations in 'malerisch' qualities. Nevertheless, in its best days, it did establish a contact with the life of the masses, saturated as it was in the epics and the erotic mysticism of the Krishna Cult.

This contact also became precarious. As in literature the emotion of love was classified into moods and ultimately stereotyped, the relation

between the lovers in the subject-matter of the pictures was also unduly conventionalised. A whole treatise, Rasikapriya, was written by Kesav Das of Bundelkhand (about 1591) to typify the lovers. Dut-Sandhana-rasa (the flavour of love hard to reconcile), Vichitra Bibhram Praudha (an experienced lover stricken), Dutika, Svayam-dutika, Navala-bala, Guna-Garvita (proud), Vipra-labdha (disappointed lover), Khandita (petulant), Abhisandhita, Kalahantarita (separated by quarrel), Virahini, Agata-patika (lover returned), they are all there—neatly arranged, subtly distinguished, and scrupulously followed in literary and pictorial treatments. No wonder that painting became static, sophisticated and aristocratic. The quality itself deteriorated as is evident from a glance at the later specimens of the Kangra school. The Rajasthan painting in course of time shed its freshness, its mass-affiliations, its lively colours and above all, its genuinely human appeal. By the end of the XIX Century it died a natural death.

Architecture, though the earliest of arts, is probably the slowest to move. Yet it did move.[47] In this period, there was considerable architectural activity in Hindu as well as in Muslim principalities. In Bengal, the Vishnupura style was stimulated by the conversion of its low-caste rulers into Chaitanyism. Being strategically situated in the way of Muslim expansion to the South from the Bengal outpost, this principality gained in political importance. Culturally, it came under the influence of Vaishnavism. Extensive building operations in bricks were carried on from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the

eighteenth.[48] (It also became a centre of Hindusthani music. Its neighbourhood is still well known for its Kirtan.) In the North, Brindaban was colonised by Bengali saints and scholars, and it soon became an important seat of Chaitanyism. The famous temple of Jugal Kishore was a work of great beauty. The group of Jaina temples at Sonagarh in Bundelkhand was continued through the XVI and the XVII centuries. The Golden Temple of the Sikhs at Amritsar took its final shape by 1766 after many vicissitudes. The noblest achievement in stone of this period was, however, the civic architecture in Central India, Rajputana and Bundelkhand. The Gwalior (1500), Datia and Orchha (XVII Cen.) Amber (XVII) and Jagnibas (from 1600 to 1740), and Jodhpur (XVII) palaces are unique creations of their kind. The ghats on the Ganges and the Nurbudda are another illustration of the civic art. In the South, the Vijaynagar and Madura styles were the last crop of Hindu Art. The former city under Krisna Deb Raya (1509–'29) and Achyuta Raya reached the height of magnificence. Saiva, Vaisnava and Jaina styles were equally patronised by them. At Madura, Tirmal Nayak (1623–1639) was a great builder. In Tanjore as well, the architectural activity was brisk. The Hindu artists' supreme effort, viz., the Natraja, became very popular at the Chola period. The palaces of the Southern princes were much inferior to those of the North. If, however, one compares the Madura temple with Bhubaneswar or Mukteswar of Orissa or Senagarh or Khajurgaon, the gradual deterioration of the creative spirit is at once detected. Nothing could be more

heavy and choking than the Madura 'gopuram', nothing more mechanically repetitive than its motifs. It is quantity run amuck. Madura alone could illustrate the thesis that the work of the mystics was over. The creative impulse that had been liberated by them had been blocked completely and irrevocably by traditionalism. The Shilpa Shastra had triumphed.

We have come as far as the middle of the XVIII century. The impact of the Muslim rule was no longer an active agency for Indian culture. It could not be so as it was never all-pervasive like economic Imperialism. Numerous were the Muslim traders, chiefly Arab, operating on the High Seas, but with bases in Indian ports. But they belonged to an older age. A new order was dawning. The commercial adventurers had come, and out of their conflict with the remnants of the Mughal rule the British rule emerged. The novelty of this administration requires more than a passing attention. The Muslim rule was a military occupation of the cities mainly. Its influence was felt through marauding exploits, military tributes and fines, revenue-farming, chiefly by Hindu zamindars, and through occasional conversions, seldom en masse. The background of Indian society remained Hindu. Economically, commercial and trading interests were the dominant and potentially progressive groups. In fine, the middle classes were playing their role,[49] though from the point of view of distribution of wealth there were 'giddy heights and dizzy depths.' The village panchayat pursued the smooth duties of rural administration. The caste-system stiffen-

ed itself against conversion and contamination from other sources. Education was fairly well spread, in spite of the destruction of texts in temples and palaces. Villagers as usual were concerned with their land which had not been deprived of its life-giving floods by transport facilities. Peasant proprietorship was the rule, though big zamindaris had been established. The Muslim rulers did not go back to Turkistan or to Afghanistan after serving India for a statutory period. In this context, true acculturisation could take place.[50] The bed of Indian culture remained what it was, only the stream was fuller and richer. The religious outbursts of this period were genuine attempts at synthesis. If they failed, they failed after a long trial, when either the strength of the foreign impact failed or when the Indian society absorbed the new and made it its own. The mystic revolution, in the absence of a fundamental change of the Indian social economy, was bound to be a mirror-revolution. With the British rule the very basis of the Indian social economy has been changed. The indigenous middle class interests in trade and commerce were first supplanted by British agencies and middlemen. Indians were compelled to become land-minded by revenue policies. They were given education, an incidental purpose of which was to create a host of lower-class clerks and officials. The panchayat system was shaken by successive instalments of village self-government. The transport system, inaugurated for the dual purpose of defence and foreign trade, tampered with the physical geography of India.[51] In short, the British rule has

been more intimate than the Muslim rule inasmuch as it has given us an alternative to the native system. The Muslims just reigned, but seldom ruled. They offered us no alternatives, no better way of self-government. The net result of the British rule from the point of view of Indian culture has been the emergence of a spurious middle class—the bhadraloks that do not play any truly historical part in the socio-economic evolution of the country, remain distant from the rest of the people in professional isolation or as rent receivers, and are divorced from the realities of social and economic life. Their loyalties to Indian culture vary from rectitude to reform. Very few of them are social revolutionaries even as the medieval mystics were. The strangeness of their reformism consists in their ideological progressiveness and their practical conformity. Their ignorance of the background of Indian culture is profound. The character of the Hindu revival or of Anglo-Indian culture is conditioned by the unrootedness of this new elite, their increasing social distance from the rest of the community, and the consequent unreality of their position. Their pride in culture is in inverse proportion to its lack of social content.

It has been claimed that the race of mystics is not yet finished. So far as Bengal is concerned, and the rest of India thinks that Bengal is the home of saints, mystics have continued to exist. Until a few years ago each district had at least one. The number is now dwindling, probably because political mysteries are growing and Gresham's Law is operating. Still the mystics exist. An

important point about them is the professional class of their disciples. The educated and the disappointed among the bhadralok swell their ranks. Yet there has been no religious leader of note who has reached the masses, say as Kabir and Dadu did. The Brahma-Samaj, the Arya Samaj, the Prarthana Samaj, all of them catered for the upper classes. The same with Theosophy. Let us take the Brahma Samaj. Without going into details, it may be said that this movement passed through three important stages. Raja Ram Mohan Roy was, of course, the founder. But he was no mystic; his mission was prophetic. (This distinction is a typical product of modern times in India.) He has been credited with the performance of the stupendous task of creating modern India.[52] He had a big mind, large vision, and was more free than his contemporaries from the trammels of tradition. A protestant though he was, he did not want to launch a novel society. Sociologically speaking, his contribution did not consist in helping the older economic order to take the next step in which the forces within the old society would register their evolution. Rather did it consist in giving shape to the circumstances which were created by the blocking of the natural process by British economic pressure. Through his efforts the new middle class acquired self-confidence and a status within the ambit of the foreign rule. In other words, he converted necessity into a virtue. Intellectually, the Rajah was a giant, but he did not notice that the new middle class, even with European education, without prejudices and superstitions, gifted with a

cosmopolitan attitude and blessed with a fair dose of social freedom, could never be a substitute for the genuine middle class that would have arisen on the decay of the feudal system of medieval times; as for example, in the way that it did arise in England from the middle of XVIII century and flower in all the grandeur and limitations of the Victorian age. Today, we are fully conscious of the deficiency of the Victorian period in England. Yet, on the whole, its achievements are superior to those of ours. There was an unconscious realisation of the above fact by the people themselves—Bankim was not compared with his contemporary Dickens, nor were Michael M. S. Dutt, Hem Chandra or Nabin Sen to Tennyson or Browning. They were Scott and Byron and Milton of the previous age. Even Tagore was the Indian Shelley.

Maharshi Devendra Nath then offered the theology of the Brahmo Movement. Inasmuch as it was based upon the Upanishads, the study of which had retired into the background, it was refreshingly orthodox. Neither was the departure from it in the way of rejection or dissent anything else. The whole work of these two leaders was frustrated by the fact that they had no position in the social structure. The Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, which was consolidated after Kesab Chandra Sen's secession, was a reaction of the middle class against the latter's aristocratic connections. The Nababidhan's Kirtan could not bridge the widening gulf. The Sadharan Brahmo Samaj suffered severely when one of its preachers, Vijay Krishna, became a great Vaishnabite. Since

then, the Brahmo movement has been in the process of being absorbed by the Hindu society. While the exclusiveness of the former group has been broken, the range and the mobility of the middle class of the latter have increased. The social meaning of the absorption is the extension of the middle class. From this point of view, the Brahmo movement is typical of similar movements in other provinces.[53]

This, plus the spread of humanism of the atheistic type, the conversion of a few intellectuals into Christianity, and the dawning sense of disillusionment of the professional middle class led to counter-reformation. The Vaishnabite revival, the Theosophical movement, and the recrudescence of reformist Brahminism were different aspects of the counter-reformation. It was, of course, on the ideological plane. The educated were being weaned away from the Indian inheritance, and it was necessary to stop the rot. Naturally, the Hindu reaction carried some of the absurdities of the occasion for the reaction. In this period more claims were made for Hindu philosophy and Hindu customs than even the Rishis dared. Western Science was contemptuously referred to in the lectures in Theosophical Halls. Obviously, the reaction was either tainted by political considerations or by personal disillusionment. The number of retired government officials and professional men in the new ranks of the religious was large, indeed. One distinction is to be made here. The religiosity of this group is not the religious self-complacency of the English bourgeoisie, nor of the Marwari mil-

lionaire who keeps Gurus in the same spirit as he keeps race-horses and mistresses. Its springs are the feeling of deprivation and consequent bitterness. Hence the peculiar abandon, the notorious sentimentality. The difference is as great as that between an American film of the Life of Jesus and an Indian film of the life of any saint.

Paramhansa Deb himself is a curious exception. He was in the classic line of the mystics. No petulant aversion to Western Materialism, no sophisticated defence on rationalistic grounds, no intellectual pride of heritage ever dictated his spirituality. In him no snobbish attempts at equality with the powerful nations of the West by fictitious claims for religious superiority, no dissent qua dissent, no rehash of Comte, Mill and Hamilton, no loss of breath in trying to keep pace with the progress of the world, but just the undefiled source and the clear vision of an illiterate priest, crude, raw, unmodern and the commonest of the common. He came from the people, he smelt of the earth, and he talked like the peasant, with the shrewdness and directness of homely rustic metaphors. And Paramhansa was a rebel, as Kabir and Rajjab were. He had passed through all types of disciplines, Vaishnaba, Shakta and Vedanta from a male and a female Sannayasin, Islamic, Buddhist and Christian alike. Yet no Brahmin could outcaste him, though some tried. He respected women, in the only way open to Indians, by calling them 'mother' and avoiding them. He would not perform the daily rituals. He would allow non-Brahmins to be initiated.

His toleration was so great that it was misunderstood as an attempt at the final religious synthesis. The old tradition was revived in him.

Yet, and this is the tragedy of the situation, with all the help of the dynamic personality of Swami Vivekananda, Paramhansa Deb's influence has not succeeded in shaking our social foundations. A number of people have been inspired, no doubt, but the masses have not trembled in their sleep. Natural, very natural, indeed, in the light of our thesis, for those who were inspired had nothing to do with the life of the people. They absorbed the shock and converted the release into humanitarianism. Even in that conversion a golden opportunity was lost. Being based upon religion, Swami Vivekananda's love of humanity was certainly more genuine and appropriate than either the positivistic humanism of Comte's disciples or the bourgeois love of humanity that demonstrates itself in charities and such other undertakings which bring knighthoods and Rai Bahadurships. Today, the wonderful institutions under the Ramkrishna-Vivekananda Missions are the object of universal admiration. But they are not informed by the historical sense. In the three volumes of the Indian Cultural Heritage published as the Ramkrishna Centenary Volumes there is no mention of the future of our culture. A sense of the past is only an exercise in memory.

One is not sure when Sri Arabinda and the Mahatma are still living whether the days of the mystics are over or not. But the mystics from our point of view have been important only as makers

of social change. Gandhi has stirred the life of the masses. His work is that of a stimulant. The method, however, is not through genuine mysticism. He believes in God, lives like a saint, has a creed of non-violence and a faith. But the economic and political factors are probably more important in the make-up of his influence than the purely mystic strain. For the masses, his symbolism is more significant than his realities. Sri Arabinda's influence on the people as a whole is not yet apparent.

The present position of mysticism as an agency of social change is a hopeless one. No mystic of today can be so effective as his predecessors. Under the British rule, the Indian society is no longer ideational in the true sense of the term. If it still retains religious ideology it is because of inertia or culture-lag. The reasons why political economic and social movements still owe allegiance to religious ideas are: (1) the peculiar position of the middle class which feels a sense of denial and disillusionment. (As will be apparent, later on, this feeling in its turn is due to the blocking of the natural economical evolution by foreign economic interests). (2) The insufficiency of any other live substitute for the older culture. Our culture today is a mechanical mixture of two incompatible elements. Hence it is not stable. The large number of great men that it has thrown up is more like the series of explosions which an unstable chemical compound makes than the marked stages in the growth of an organism. The Indian mysticism of the 20th century does not percolate through the outer rinds

of the Indian society. Incidentally, as philosophy here is always mixed with theology, genuine philosophical contribution today is rare. An Indian may legitimately feel offended when text-books on the history of Indian Philosophy are advertised and sometimes taken as authentic contributions to philosophy in general and Indian philosophy in particular.

CHAPTER II'

TRADITIONS, RESIDUES, SENTIMENTS, AND CULTURAL UNITY

If Indian culture is there with the outlook that had been religiously conditioned so long, the question that next arises is in regard to the texture of that culture. Is it a mosaic or a motley, a chemical combination or a mechanical mixture of at least two incompatible ingredients? Many people think that the solution of practically all Indian problems depends upon the answer to that question. We are not concerned here with the political demands, except as demonstrations of sociological principles.

About thirty years ago, Prof. Radhakumud Mookerji wrote a book called the 'Fundamental Unity of India.' It created a sensation and was extensively quoted by Indians and non-Indians alike. The importance of his thesis consisted in crystallising what many Indians had begun to feel in reaction against the subtle insinuations and the often overt statements by interested people about India being a congeries of many languages, habits and cultures. Prof. Mookerji emphasised the cultural unity of Hindu India, referred to the notion of a single, undivided Bharat-Varsha in one of the great odes of all times, and pointed out that pilgrimages to the extreme corners of this continent brought its diverse peoples into physical contact in an age when communications were difficult. The use of Sanskrit on

all ceremonial occasions, and their number was legion and hold all pervading, made for cultural homogeneity. These ideas became the stock-in-trade of subsequent intellectuals in India. Then the Communal Award came and the sense of Indian unity was further aroused. In reaction, Prof. Mookerji devoted much time and learning to the solution of the problem of minorities on the model offered by the League of Nations. But the model solution has led to this war and the Professor now recommends cultural autonomy for the minorities in language and religion. Shri Kanayalal Munshi's Akhand Hindustan movement raises the question to the level of politics, though its ideology is more or less similar. The intensity of his arguments comes from the growing strength of the Pakistan movement in the last two years. The defeat of Mr. Rajagopalachari's resolution in the A. I. C. C. has brought the matter to a head and makes it compulsory, even for those who lead a sheltered existence, to analyse further this problem of Indian unity in culture.

Behind the statement that India has a unity is the view of history as a 'record' of events and achievements. The refinement of such a view is known as 'scientific history,' i.e., the application of the scientific view to honestly accumulated and observed data so that no conclusion which the data will not bear may be ventured. Now, nearly all the known facts—nearly, because the writer is not unaware of the incidents of Hindu-Muslim struggle and of mutual atrocities in pre-British India[1]—drive towards the grand total of give and take, assimilation, co-operation, in other

words, of Indian unity. 'Historical' conscience should make a coward of a Muslim League politician if he chooses to assert otherwise.

But history has acquired a different meaning, of late. Not that the scientific approach has been discarded, but science in regard to human and social behaviour has been charged with a new significance. Take Croce's idea of History as an unfolding of the spirit at one end, or Marx's as the play of dialectical materialism, at the other, or if you reject both and accept Toynbee's middle thesis of history as a series of challenges and responses, history becomes a study of dynamic social processes. It is no longer a camera-study of a cross-section withdrawn and immobilised out of life's circulation either by the excitement of the period or by the interests of the historian. Nor is it a cinematic progression of isolated incidents simulating integrated movement for the fleeting hours of academic entertainment. The substance of history today is the organic social life that posits interdependence of parts, and simultaneously, a growth and continuity which assumes that the organism never stays or dies, but changes forms, and ascends or descends into higher or lower stages. The scientific method applicable to such a content, which is a process, cannot, for obvious reasons, be equated either to the laws of mechanics or to the physico-chemical treatment by which causation must not transgress the set sequence of relations and explanation must needs be tautological. Human wills intervene, and they are intractable, excepting in their mass and in their tendencies. Once we come to human actions in their mass tendencies, the content of history

becomes a more total organism comprising different types of environment and of the life of the people in their habits, folkways, customs and occupations, and comprehending the facts and possibilities of development. The analytic process involved in this new method and conception of history eagerly seeks to discover laws or generalisations beneath the mass-tendencies, with a view to remake history. In fine, the problem today for the historian is to take up the continuous social *processes* in Indian history and not to limit himself to the facts of Indian unity. These processes may be studied in strands of traditions or in their cross-sections of 'residues' and 'derivatives'. Another way of putting it is to urge the adoption of the sociological approach. The writer is sure that politicians will profit by it. Indian history is a running concern. The real value of the statement is in the suffix 'ing.' Politicians can use it as a gerund which we know may be constructed as a noun but must be enabled to govern like its verb.

Sociologically speaking,[2] consciousness of kind, which is the psychological base of unity, acquires continuity mainly through social memory, i.e., traditions, a convenient classification of which is into the primary, the secondary and the tertiary, in accordance with degrees of tangibility. The primary group consists of modes of utilisation of natural and mechanical resources, the traditions of social and juridical behaviour that centre in codes of toleration, manners and common law, and the political ones of super-and-subordination, i.e., homage and alliance. Coming into a more intangible world we meet with the

personal, the aesthetic and the religious traditions. Mostly, they are the echoes, or the epi-phenomena[3] of the primary group of which the modes of utilisation, i.e., of livelihood, are the dominant ones. The tertiary traditions are records of conceptual thought and relate to the still more intangible world of theology, metaphysics and the pure sciences. It is obvious that all these types of traditions are not common to all the communities of India. The tempo or the rate of their growth has also not been uniform. When they have met, the rate is fast; when they have pulled in different directions in unequal strength, the tempo has been held up. And yet, the process has not ceased, as the following analysis should show. It is confined to the traditions of the two major communities.

By and large, there are more agreements between the Hindu and the Muslim traditions, as developed in India, in the primary group than in the secondary and the tertiary. Modes of utilisation of Nature's resources, including the general non-exploitation of mechanical power, make the Hindu and the Muslim workers alike. Whatever different shades may exist in the relative customs of cultivation of the Hindu and the Muslim, they are less than those that exist within the Hindu fold itself.[4] The preferences for a particular category of work inside a factory[5] are mainly functional. In regard to traditions of social toleration, the Hindu opinion is that Muslims as a people are fanatics, vide the religious murders and the idea of Saheed, and the Muslim opinion is that the Hindus are intolerant, vide the untouchables. But a sociologist

would venture to submit the thesis that the differences as are betrayed by the caste-system, on the one hand, and the egalitarian habits, on the other, or say, in the allowances given to heretics and the fanatical hatred meted out to the critics, are actually overridden by three sets of social forces. First comes the process of assimilation. Anybody who doubts it should study the manners of the two ruling castes among the Hindus in the U.P., viz., the Kayasthas and the Kashmiri Brahmins who in their dress, food, etiquette, language, even in some of their intimate customs, are as Islamic as any Muslim Leaguer. It is a pleasure to watch a Kashmiri Pandit or a Kayastha clerk correcting a Muslim's Urdu in Lucknow. Then there are the principles of common law and criminal jurisprudence. Their unifying influence has not received their adequate share of recognition. We may add the revenue administration and all that it means in shaping the life of the people in the countryside. Lastly, one would submit the most important feature of social economy in India, viz., the nature of social obligations which form the very base of our conduct, manners, social codes, of all our juridical behaviour, in short, of toleration, in the sociological sense of the term. In India, whatever may be the reason[6] and the processes, the doctrine of responsibility[7] has been more developed than that of rights. Very few of the Hindu and Muslim rights are absolute, they are all limited by conditions that impose the discharge of due responsibilities. By obligations, the social ones are referred to, and of them, the familial are the central. Here all communi-

ties meet. Thus, for example, the 'Karta' of a Hindu joint family has a duty to perform by his relations connected with him by 'spiritual benefit'; and the head of the Muslim family does likewise by his relations, only the circle is smaller, its periphery being determined by marriage restrictions.[8] In India, except probably among the educated upper classes, the head of the family simply cannot afford to permit his relatives to go their own way and earn their livelihood. Other instances will easily occur, e.g., philanthropy or charity, caste or sectarian feeling, even nepotism, in fact, all those traits that prevent us from being civilised individuals. If other countries[9] on the same economic level betray these symptoms of our obliging nature, they do not affect the argument. They only strengthen it.

The third set of primary traditions relates to homage, allegiance and alliance. The word 'ordination'[10] is better, as with the addition of the prefixes 'super,' 'co' and 'sub,' the emotional associations of the word 'homage' can be got rid of. There is next to nothing in the corpus of Hindu political traditions (not merely texts)[11] that lays down a clear rule of behaviour either for or against political homage *as such*. The Hindus have simply obeyed, while their law-givers from Jaimini to Madhavacharya have gone on warning the kings against reckless rule. In Islam, there is, in the Dar-ul-Harab conception, for example; though in the modern Indian version of it the Aligarh movement and the consequential search for employment have proved to be levellers of subtleties and founders of new habits of

homage. The Hindu tradition of 'ordination' is very strong in the social sphere. Alliance between groups has been converted into allegiance, and allegiance into homage. It is shocking but true that there are no living Hindu traditions of alliance between large groups and only those of super-and-subordination exist in the scheme of social hierarchy known as the caste-system. Assimilation there has been, in fact, it is still going on within the elastic boundaries of the caste-system,[12] but the governing principle being one of functional relegation at birth, it has not been able to overcome the additional resistance of the absence of progressive living. Gurubad in the personal sphere of religion is favourable to the 'super' and 'sub' relation, even if we exclude the longer period of Hindu subjection and Hindu feudalism. So the third batch of primary traditions betrays significant diversity.

Recently, however, the rise of the bourgeoisie among both the communities, the general influence of the West, and a wide sense of ineffectiveness seem to be extinguishing the differences. None of these factors has gone beneath the surface. A subject people is all surface; its emotions cannot be deep, nor can influences easily penetrate below the rind and the husk. That is a stern fact and a sociologist can only take it or leave it. Of the three factors making for unity in the midst of diversity in the above section of primary traditions, the widely prevalent sense of frustration is the most intriguing today. It has bred a fondness for homage to exceptional men or leaders. The hold of dictators in the respective political

organisations of the two communities is very much before our eyes. The hold is not similar in the two cases, and the ideas of homage and allegiance are not qualitatively the same.[13] Thus, for example, Gandhi's hold on the Congress is of a semi-religious character and partly divorced from power, whereas Mr. Jinnah's is purely political, *pace* recent adoption of Sherwani and Astrakhan cap at the expense of his immaculate European dress which was the despair of native tailors at Bombay. Thus again, the influence of religious divines upon the politics of the Muslims appears to be dwindling, whereas that of the Swamis upon Hindu politics is increasing. Even in the Congress, which is most certainly a national organisation, ascetics have yet a long course to run. Silk in the Congress pandal is an impossibility, silk on the League platform is the order of the day. Silk or no silk, dictators are building up a common tradition of super-and-subordination in India. Between these two stones of the mill, co-ordination is likely to get crushed.

It is, however, not unlikely that diversity has a chance to lose its edge in the process of a new conflict. In fact, that is the sociological counterpart of the essential nationalist position that the two communities should be equally anti-Imperialist. But there is a catch here. The Hindus bear the burden of a double conflict, the one vis-à-vis the British, the other vis-à-vis the Muslims. The latter, however, have one conflict in view, viz., with the Hindus whom they equate with the Congress. There is yet a third source of conflict for the Hindus, viz., with their own heavy tradi-

tions. The Muslims in India travel light; which explains why their young men can oftener go to the logical extreme. If we leave this, the double conflict divides the energy of the Hindus, whereas the single conflict forges the Muslims into a spearhead for attack. It is not even hinted that there are no nationalist anti-Imperialist elements among the Muslims. They are there, and they are the salt of the earth. The contention is that, for the time being, the suspicion of the organised section of the Muslim community against the Hindus is greater than its mistrust of the political rulers, and that it stands in the way of constructing common primary traditions of alliance and allegiance. Mr. Jinnah would much rather trust Mr. Amery than, say, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya; and so would Mr. Amery. It is all a matter of more or less. So suspicion leads us to the study of social sentiments. But before we do so, the secondary and the tertiary traditions should be analysed.

The degree of tangibility, which is a common sense test, distinguishes the primary traditions from the secondary and the tertiary. Animal communities, again, have none of the latter which, in their turn, are strung together by beliefs and acts of volition of human beings in groups. The secondary traditions can be conveniently divided into the animistic, the aesthetic and the religious. Within the animistic are included the totemistic and magical beliefs and practices by which animate and inanimate objects are invested with certain powers. On a higher level of the same set, one finds beliefs about substance or soul or self, its permanence and impermanence, singu-

larity and plurality, and ultimately, its destiny. The aesthetic traditions start with the assumption and faith in notes, images and words as independent entities acting on behalf of wider invisible powers. Magicians who later on bloom into artists can invoke them by proper treatment in the interests or otherwise of the community or certain sections of it. In the last stage, artists utilise them as modes of personal expression after the necessary identification and annexation. Religious traditions are usually mixed up with the first two. They also proceed from ghosts to gods, ending in one all-kind or all-powerful, but an all-pervading God or spirit. Most of these traditions are vague and, therefore, have ample room for development and adjustment with contrary beliefs. But, and this is the important point, they harden in units or in constellations when conflict has arisen in the primary group, particularly, in the set that revolves round utilisation of resources, i.e., the productive system. The significance of the above is twofold.[14] (1) No conflict in the secondary traditions can be resolved without a reference to the first, and (2) conversely, the conflict in the first takes the form of conflict in the second and in the third. This process is either of attenuation or of reinforcement. History is littered with instances of struggles between prophets and gods corresponding to struggles between principalities, e.g., in Egypt, Judea, China, India, and between classes, e.g., in early Christianity in Rome, and in the Shia-Sunni disputes in Iran. The following quotations from one of the greatest authorities on Mussalman culture, V. V.

Bartold,[15] may be interesting to the Indian reader. "Here, too, the popular masses gave up the religion of Zarathustra and adopted Shiism, the spread of which was connected with the destruction of the feudal system and large-landed properties. The struggle against the Caliphate and orthodox Islam was accompanied by agrarian revolts. As in Europe, the princes sought support among the masses and helped to raise the 'workers on land' against the 'owners of land' who were supposed to be the allies of the Arabs." Not only that, but the later conflict between the two Sunni sects, the Hanifis and the Shafiits, can be traced to the struggle in the primary group. "The greater part of the agricultural population upheld the cause of the Shiits whereas the majority of the townspeople belonged to the Hanifis and the minority to the Shafiits..." who, as we know, still managed to overcome them at Rei. V. V. Bartold who, by the way, is not a Communist[15] thus concludes: "It would seem that under the guise of religion the real fight that was taking place was between the town and the village, between the aristocratic and the democratic elements of the town population." Of course, the connection between competition or struggle in the primary and the secondary groups is statistical, the very nature of the subject matter being group or mass-tendencies. Sometimes, as Marx pointed out in a note on Greek myths,[16] when art is highly developed there is no direct connection with the material basis and the skeleton structure of its organisation. Usually, it is one of correlated variation.[17]

Now, it will be generally conceded that the

corpus of Hindu traditions has a greater number of animistic, totemistic and magical vestiges than the Islamic. This has affected the political and the social traditions more than the economic with the result that the average Hindu's political attitude is very often governed by totems and taboos and his aspirations by magic. The habit of waiting for a miracle to make the tide of events turn in his or India's favour is decidedly more Hindu than Muslim. The Mahatma is, of course, the miracle-man, the magician, the spell-binder, the charmer. There are political families and groups in every province in India which are almost totemistic tribes. In contrast with the magical, the Muslim attitude in politics looks logical, tangible, very nearly of the earth, earthy. The difference in the secondary group of traditions does not easily make for mutual understanding and compromise, even when it does not support the two-nation theory.

The aesthetic group is like unity conferences where communities embrace each other and drown their differences in rivers of tears and goodwill. The Islamic injunctions, as certain Indian Muslims have interpreted them, have not stood in the way of contributions by Muslims to Indian painting[18] and music. The give and take has led to an extraordinary synthesis in Indian art. Whatever certain scholars in Madras and Bombay may say to the contrary, some of our magnificent melodic structures[19] are the gifts of the Muslims just as some first-class portraits are by Muslim painters. The late Nasiruddin Khan's (of Indore) exposition of the Sanskrit slokas in which the spirit of the Ragas is described should have given

the quietus to the communal interpretation of Indian culture. Religious ecstasy among Hindu listeners has been as often aroused by Muslim singers singing Bhajans, Pads, Holi and other varieties of religious music as by those who have a lien on them by virtue of birth and traditions. Unfortunately, our politicians are too busy to care for music and 'things of that kind.' For the Muslim as well as for the Hindu artist, notes and colours have the same potency. One wishes that the same could be said about words as used in literature. Yet the modern experiments in Sanskritic Hindi and Persianised Urdu have not yet succeeded in making new words strike their roots deep into the bowels of the collective Unconscious. This is the opportunity for Hindustani, though its utilisation has not yet been sociologically conducted.

Religious traditions separate the two communities most. Here we are not referring to practices and rituals but mainly to the character of beliefs. The significant heads of differences are enumerated below. The reason for mentioning the Islamic features and leaving the Hindu characteristics to inference springs from the greater facility and the deeper responsibility of the Hindus, on the score of their being the majority, to understand such challenging questions: (1) The substitution of kinship in blood by the community of faith. (2) The emphasis on the prophetic rather than on the mystic, and on the mystic, rather than on the aesthetic. (3) The finality of the institution of prophethood. (4) A more intimate hold of religion upon jurisprudence.[20]

Right from the Medina Charter of Hijrah I, one of the greatest documents in world history, faith in Allah and the Prophet's mission, with the concomitant adherence to the Precepts, has been the basic bond of the Islamic community. The appeal to the deepest instincts of worship no less than to the primitive Semitic beginnings was the earliest cohesive force which was later reinforced by the Semitic belief in being the chosen and the holy "to whom is entrusted the furtherance of good and the repression of evil." Conflict and the need for co-ordination shaped the community as "one hand against all others," "brethren in faith, partners in the sharing of booty, allies against the common foe" who was the non-believer. This idea of the "single hand," of the "compact wall whose bricks support each other" is implicit in every aspect of Islamic law. The connotations of this tradition are very large. One is equality of the faithful among themselves; and another, very relevant to our subject, is the extra-territorial allegiance of the Islamic peoples. Recently, however, a wave of nationalism has swept over them, but Pan-Islam always rides and rules it. Mr. Fazlul Huq's whipping up of local Bengali patriotism has not yet produced any tangible result in minimising the influence of non-Bengali Muslims in local politics, economics and riots. Similarly, Sir Sikandar's understanding of the Punjab problem has only given him the latitude of the Prodigal Son. Against this communitarianism, the Hindus can offer the family or the caste tie, all variants of the blood tie. Hindu and

Muslim nepotism can also be thus distinguished; the weaker allegiance of the Muslims to the concept of Bharat-Mata[21] can also be thus partly explained. The failure of the Khilafat movement in India and its subsequent repercussions should be traced to this source of difference in the religious traditions.

Prophet, mystic, ascetic—they are types in the history of personality. When unitary experience is sufficient unto itself and nothing else is comparable to its joy, it makes the mystic. The prophet redirects the overflowing experience for reshaping social life, and goes to the springs and roots to sprout and fruit. The ascetic, on the other hand, is keen on saving energy to get the most out of the experience of unity.[22] All systems of religion contain and provide for the three personality-types, but due to objective situations, one type becomes dominant in one religion and another type in another. Islamic mysticism is as deep and beautiful, and a Muslim ascetic may be as rigorous, as the Hindu.[23] The two systems have affected each other, as we all know[24]. Yet, the appeal of the mystic-cum-ascetic is to the Hindu and of the prophet is to the Muslim. Proofs galore can be adduced, but one may be selected from the sphere of political attitudes. About the Hindu respect for political leaders, it may be said that its strength often depends inversely upon the length of the loin-cloth, and directly upon the vagueness of its vision and reports of 'Sacrifice' ranging from that of fabulous incomes to the smiling welcome of the inconveniences of prison life. On the other hand, the Mus-

lim respect is based upon more concrete things, e.g., dress and dinner, effectiveness in achieving cohesion, and action. The theoretical subtleties that we find, for example, in the Madras commentaries of non-violence,[25] are inconceivable in Muslim politics. Not even a Bengali lawyer (Muslim) cares to cover the contradictions of Mr. Jinnah. The simple 'reason' is that Mr. Jinnah cannot contradict himself and that his political integrity has been hammered by action which is the prophetic element in him. This does not mean that he does not think; of course, he can. Only, he is more interested in action and reaction, recently, more in the latter than in the former. His prophetic pragmatism has been an invaluable asset to his leadership and the political effectiveness of his community.

In the above paragraph, the words 'prophet' and 'prophetic' have been used as types of personality and experience. But the specificity of Islamic religious belief lies in the 'finality of the institution of prophethood.' On this point, we would rather quote Iqbal from his brilliant lecture on the Spirit of Muslim Culture: "In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition." Now, finality posits the finite, and the Hindu traditions are built on a different notion of time. Hence the usual misunderstanding by the Hindu about the Islamic institution of prophethood as final. But finality need not mean closure at all. On the other hand, it is like the primary requisite which being taken for granted relieves man to direct his energies towards new channels of living and to

cultivate his human resources. The finality of the idea of prophethood, if we are not mistaken, was to a great extent responsible for the glorious burgeoning of inductive reason, historical and geographical knowledge, of that modern scientific spirit, which was more in revolt against the Greek cult of the finite and the proportionate than in consonance with it, that we associate with the Arab civilisation.[26] To the same idea can be traced, partly if not completely, the absence of priesthood and hereditary rights of kings, the frequent appeals to experience and reason in the Islamic texts, the impetus to action and the preoccupations with pragmatic considerations. It has given diverse peoples a cohesion which few things else could give to them in their stage of economic development. If the charge is true that it has reduced critical theological fervour and increased intolerance among the Muslims, then the alleged act is no more and no less culpable than what the doctrine of the infallibility of the Vedas or of the 'Harijan' weekly among certain sections of the Hindus has committed. Besides, the myopia is of recent origin and typically Indian. Which means that the original religious tradition of the Muslim has been overlaid by other traditions and affected by other factors. As it is, this tradition is supposed to pull the two communities apart. The Hindus believe that the Muslims are less critical in their religious matters. The belief is also partly justified on the following ground, which is another feature of Muslim traditions.

The more intimate hold of religion upon

Muslim law and society may not be accepted on considerations of pride by the average Hindu. Nevertheless, it is a fact.[27] Once when a new convert told the Prophet, "Thou art our Prince," the Prophet promptly replied, "The Prince is God, not I." The chief implication of this great dictum consists in the fact that the rule of God is direct and the provider of the principles of super-co-, and subordination which in other communities are to be found in the doctrines of civitas, polis, state or Samaj. The second implication is the avoidance of the mediator, the church, priest-craft and sacraments. Another is the subordination of the rôle of public functionaries to the will of God. Yet a fourth is the spirit of complete surrender, which, in the opinion of some sociologists, is a typically semetic trait. The indivisibility of religion and law sharply separates Islamic jurisprudence from other systems that are based upon norms directly or indirectly approved by the people or derived from the will, reason or moral nature of man. This does not mean that Islamic jurisprudence is less democratic; on the contrary, it is probably more so, because Allah rules in the common interests.[28] Numerous injunctions and safeguards are on record to show that the common interests were not equated to those of the faithful.[29] Religion similarly envelops the economic life of the Muslims, though its stranglehold on usury, hitherto responsible for Muslim indebtedness to Hindu money-lenders and the slow growth of commerce-capital in Islamic countries, is daily becoming weak*. Against the view put here may be urged the con-

tention that the Sharia does not legislate for conscience and allows of a great variety of conduct by circumscribing itself to the observance of injunctions. But it is not a proper division inasmuch as fidelity to the minutiae uses the key to the Hindu and the Muslim spiritual perfection and social prestige in an impartial manner. The more faithful have greater privileges in both traditions.

The tertiary group consists of the conceptual traditions in the spheres of theology, metaphysics and science. Pass as they do through the intellect, such traditions are of the second remove from beliefs and practices. Here, however, a comparison between Hindu and Muslim concepts is unfair to the Indian Muslim. Very little has been known to be the contribution of the Indian Muslim, as such, to the history of conceptual thought, whereas the Hindus have done what they could in India, and seldom anywhere else. If the scope of the subject had permitted it, the conceptual legacy of other Islamic peoples could be taken up. But then it is the relative hold of traditions on the Indian of today that is important. Taking the modern period as our base of speculation, we find that there is complete unity of conceptual traditions in their utter poverty. It pains one to write this, but it is absolutely true that not a single concept, as such, has been thrown up by any modern Indian, be he of the majority or of the minority community, in history, in economics, in political thought or in philosophy, that would compare favourably with anything in the same period in Europe. Yet, one does notice a difference in outlook, in the weltanschauung, and that is as near as

one can get into the rarefied atmosphere of conceptual achievements in India. We select three points as being more interesting than the rest. (1) In politics, the word 'birth-right' distinguishes the Hindu political attitude from the Muslim. Since Lokmanya Tilak coined that ringing phrase, Hindu politicians have been thinking in terms of birth-right. The result is twofold. It has led to the idea that Hindustan's independence is necessary because it is the land of *birth*, and consequently, as *Hindus* have been born in a greater number and over a longer period in that country, they have the *first* lien on it. The shift towards Hindu Mahasabha politics is a matter of drawing the right corollary. The second result belongs more specifically to the region of ideas. Birth-right is much the same thing as the 'natural right' of Roman law. It is different from 'jus gentium,' it is a matter of common sense and intuitive interpretation from certain indisputable facts of human nature and, therefore, it is dependent upon the interpreter's interests. Above all, it is anti-intellectual in being grounded upon the emotions of the dispossessed and the debarred. 'Birth-right' always gives strength to the first national movement of colonial people, but in the later stages of any such struggle, it veers towards Fascism and all that it means. The roots of German and Italian Fascism[30] are to be found in the anti-intellectual, romantic movements of the early nineteenth century which lauded up to the skies the rights of human inheritance, i.e., of birth as such, separable from nurture and acquisition. Rosenberg's Blood and Land are variations of the

idea of birth-right. It is not suggested that the concept of birth-right has given birth to a Fascist movement in this country. Concepts never do. What we feel is that if it is born, its subsequent philosopher will legitimately seek for its progenitors among those who believed in freedom as a birth-right and in nothing else. The seeds of a cheap raciology are in that outlook. The Indian Muslims, barring the nationalist section whose number is large but voice not effective, are not committed to the doctrine of birth-right as the source of political freedom. Unless other conditions intervene, the Indian Muslims cannot develop a theory of race. They may talk loosely about it, but they can only have a theory of peoples, bound by faith, which, we confess, is not much of a guarantee against the possibility of their being Fascists. Persecution-mania may achieve what the concept of natural rights or of race cannot.

(2) The second feature of intellectual outlook is to be found in the conventions of thought. Hindus are perfectionists, and Indian Muslims are not. In other words, the former are absolutists and the latter relativists, in spite of, or as Iqbal would say, just for, the traditions of the 'finality of prophethood.' Watch a Hindu's reactions to the report of a leader's departure from correct conduct, a Muslim officer's greater tact in handling complicated situations, a Hindu politician's concern with consistency, or a Muslim politician's layers of behaviour, and this thesis will not be summarily dismissed. The Hindu mental habits are usually governed by the logic

of either/or, Muslim mental habits are concrete, finite, instrumental, empirical, even positivistic. Which probably explains the Hindu complaint that the Muslims are illogical, even a-logical, pre-logical. But any student of modern logic knows that the rejection of Aristotelian forms does not mean the cessation of thought-processes. We may disbelieve in logic in a strictly logical way, as some positivist logicians[31] have recently asked us to do. From another angle, the difference between the two types of outlook can be held to be derivatives of the Deductive and the Inductive forms of reasoning. But this is over-simplification. For example, the Indian Muslims, if they really owed allegiance to the Arab culture which mid-wifed the inductive intellect in the world, should be completely scientific in their attitudes. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan collected a brilliant band of theologians and men of letters around his movement, Shibli, Hali, Zakaullah, Muhsin-ul-Mulk and Nazir Ahmad. They were all 'naturalists,' i.e., rationalists, with a dose of faith. Unfortunately, too, the only two first-class Muslim scholars in the Faculties of Science in Indian Universities are Mathematicians; and it was only in 1941 that technology was introduced in Aligarh against much opposition. Experimental habit among the Muslims is as yet confined to political activities, where it is known as realism. Besides, Indian political thinking as a whole is compelled to be deductive, which looks like being true to type. The argument runs thus: Non-violence is right, so it must be right at all times, even when existence is at stake. But Muslim political attitude

is coming up fast. It is so imitative in the assertion of its negations. A Muslim politician has of late quoted a Hindu Samhita in favour of Pakistan. A clear case of infection.

(3) That takes us to the traditional notions of Time which, in our opinion, would form the essence of the problem of conceptional traditions. But we would use 'notion' rather than 'concept.' As a concept, time is a derivative of 'function,' which was the contribution of Al-Beruni who extended Newton's formula of interpolation from trigonometrical function to any function. This was a new axis to the world view as Becoming, as opposed to Being.[32] Coupled with it was the very modern view of change enunciated by Ibn Khaldoun[33] in whose history the constant pre-supposition was of time as an objective, creative, evolutionary process of human activity. The Indian Muslim may have nothing to do with this Arab inheritance. Yet he feels that his notion of time is not the cyclic, the recurrent, the repetitive one of the Hindu[34] for whom the alternative is either the mystic extinction of his personal temporal references or a surrender to the broad non-human sweep of the Kalpas and the Yugas.[35] The strength of the cyclic tradition of time over the Hindu mind has been apparent in the Hindu attitude towards this War. Many Hindus feel that it is the end of a Yuga, at least, of the British Empire, so why worry? The Muslim view is different. For him the crisis is the opportunity. In other words, the Hindu suffers time and its cycles, the Muslim bides his time and its chances. The former attitude is deterministic, the latter

is human, opportunistic and historical. A Westerner understands the Muslim and cannot understand the Hindu in this regard.

It may be felt that the concept of non-violence has been omitted from this discussion. But it is a deliberate omission. Non-violence as is commonly understood by the Mahatma's disciples is, in the author's opinion, not strictly a Hindu view, but a Jain one, though through its proved effectiveness as an instrument of political action and the personal, charismatic prestige of Gandhi with the Hindu who, in a fit of absent-mindedness, annexes Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism as colonies within his empire of religion, it behaves like a Hindu concept and an important one at that. At least, the non-Hindus think in that way. Still, it cannot be said to have yet acquired the strength of a tradition. The Hindu Mahasabha does not accept it; even some eminent Congressmen among the Hindus take it with a caveat. On the other hand, the Frontier Gandhi, a Muslim, adopts it, in toto. In any case, it is a Congress conception, and the Congress is neither Hindu nor Muslim. But if this view is incorrect and non-violence is a Hindu idea, then this concept is a bar sinister to the unity of the two communities.

So far the treatment has proceeded along lines of the ready-made and convenient classification of Giddings. The worst of this method is its incapacity to appreciate the dynamics of mutual influence. It leans towards the postulation of separate minds of groups on the basis of differences in tradition, which is just vicious. There is no such thing as a Hindu or a Muslim mind. It

also tends to introduce valuation by the back-door. Thus, for example, the primary need not always be the most potent, at all stages, though it often is. Nor need the tertiary come in the third stage, though it often does. What happens is that the most tangible, the most concrete and the most urgent needs and interests throw up traditions that collect support from other less tangible sources. One example should suffice. Traditions of utilisation derive strength from juristic traditions of property-relations as well as from religious traditions. Usually, they form a close pattern and retain its form so long as the hard core of primary traditions does not undergo a serious change. Even then, during the process, myths and fictions are raised to avert the crisis. Reorientation may continue for a long time if the shocks are mild and the capacity for absorption is great. But be it also noted that revolution itself may build its own traditions. Still the classification adopted is useful in one vital sense. The primary group is primary because of its more intimate hold over the habits of men. If there is a choice between this group and the other two, it is this group that obtains. A change in this group must needs bring about some change in the rest, whereas the converse need not be true. 'Primary' may also be understood in the sense that a root-word bears in relation to its derivatives.

The conclusions of the study of traditions may now be summarised. In the first group there is a more general measure of agreement than in the third. The forms of utilisation and appropriation of natural resources and the in-

accessibility of mechanical power are the same. Cow-sacrifice is not an appropriation of the organic inferior; disagreement on this question is on another level altogether. If we think that "the effective sanction of toleration is vengeance," then the Hindu reaction to antagonistic equals is more passive. But juridical considerations do not allow this sore of disunion to fester. Politically, the fact of subjection is to be entered against the variations in traditions of domination. At the same time, it will have to be admitted that the Muslims are generally less interested in political independence than in their own cohesion. The secondary group shows the greatest amount of active synthesis. There is hardly a single aesthetic tradition which is not the result of joint effort in the course of centuries of contact. Hindu religious practices, more often than we imagine, have been 'contaminated' by Muslim beliefs and rituals, and vice versa. In the sphere of concepts, differences are prominent. But concepts in India are no longer creative. Therefore, the study of Indian culture as a social process involving the strands of traditions reveals that there are disagreements which an organic unity may well cherish in the interests of its own evolution, but which have frightened some genuine patriots among the Hindus into the arms of a static unity, and some Muslims, equally honest in their beliefs, into the arms of a two-nation theory and Pakistan. In short, the 'traditional' grounds for unity today are more passive and negative than creative, and something stronger than the 'logical' interplay of traditions is operating to weaken

them. We will analyse them in the following paragraphs.

If in spite of many common traits and their incessant exchange fissiparous tendencies have been increasing in the Hindu-Muslim relation, it is our duty to enquire into the sources of the power of traditions over the minds of men in order that the process of disunion may be correctly understood. Traditions form the social heritage;[36] therefore, on the analogy of biological utility, they should have a social utility that is implicit in uniform behaviour. Orthodoxy has a survival value, but its appreciation by the orthodox is not always of the same order of intensity. Threats to existence or prospects of conflict or gain enhance it. In normal times, appreciation of survival is only a routine-performance. Men often like to be told of what is to be done and how to behave, particularly, at critical times. Traditions save thought and deliberate action, hence they perform an economic service. They are also safe and sure, and there is always the horror of a new idea and the fear of the unknown. Men will lose even their most precious stakes, say, independence, rather than comprehend the novel and the new. The defence argument is usually on the score of *logical* consistency and the immorality of opportunism. 'Rationalisation' is only a buttress of the habitual; it avoids unpleasant demands and fortifies men in remaining well-set against upsetting elements. Of all the social forces, inertia seems to be the strongest. Habit, ancient suggestion, and ancestral instincts all conspire to make the hold of traditions strong.

It is also obvious that traditions should have an emotional appeal; they must needs be based upon certain instinctive tendencies which, if excited, eliminate competing ideas and energise action, and which, if baulked, lead to neuroses and the search for substitutes. Therefore, the study of the social sentiments and instincts, their relative strength and interplay, is an integral part of the study of Indian culture as a social process. Here also the danger is of sentimental thinking. To avoid it we may use neutral terms, e.g., logical and non-logical conduct, residues and derivatives, coined by Pareto,[37] whose analysis of sentiments is the most scientific of all the sociological treatments of the subject. Unfortunately, he is not well known in our country. Hence a description of his classification is called for.

Pareto's logico-experimental actions are those that adopt appropriate means to ends, both in the opinion of the adopter and the observer. Technical, scientific and economic actions belong to this category. Others are non-logical and fall into various groups; in the first, actions have no reference to end; in the second, they do serve an end even when the performer is not conscious of the connection of means with the end, as in animal behaviour; in the third, there is an appropriateness, but its logic is not apparent to us; and in the fourth, the aim and the result obtained differ. If we pursue these types of behaviours we find a hard core of psychological content in each case distinguished by these features, commonness, invariability, incapability of bearing further explanation, but capability for setting ends. They are

simply there, unintelligible, meaningless, feminine, if you please, the single, unsplit rock of conduct. Residues, as they are called, have been classified into those connected with combination, persistence of aggregates, sex, social units, individual integrity and expression in acts, each with numerous subdivisions. This Byzantine classification need not be fully accepted; in fact, it cannot be, but its essence may be seized, viz., that residues are non-logical and meaningless and yet furnish the drive for action and for the discovery of means. Inasmuch as derivations arise from the urge for some explanation they are attempts to explain actions and do very often suppress their purpose. Psycho-analysis would name this process rationalisation.[38] Derivations relate to affirmations of facts and sentiments, authority, accordance with principles or residues, verbal proofs including symbols, allegories, etc. Usually, public attention is focussed more on derivatives than on residues, e.g., the undivided importance attached to Congress and League resolutions, to statements, messages, comments and explanatory articles.

Combinations may be of similar and dissimilar things, rare and familiar, mysterious and non-mysterious. The act of combining, the desire to combine and belief in the efficacy of combinations make up the list of this type of residues. Persistence of aggregates is a matter of relations with persons, family, space, class, the living and the dead; it also includes relations to abstractions, uniformities, sentiments which are transformed into objective realities, e.g., personification. The

desire for new abstractions also comes in here. The third type is connected with the desire for expression in external acts. Then there are the residues of sociability beginning from particularism, super, sub, and co-ordination, uniformities, desire for approval, and ending in their opposites. The residues of integrity centre in sentiments of opposition to any alteration of the equilibrium and the desire to maintain it at all costs.

Without going into the working of each residue we may say that the combination-residue may act in alliance or opposition to the 'persistence of the aggregate' residue. Both the Hindus and the Muslims, because both are human beings and residues are common to human beings, have a share of each class of residue. But the share is more or less. Usually, the first class is very strong among members of the ruling community, e.g., the British and the Hindus, among the former the Scottish, and among the latter, say, the Vaidyas in Bengal, the Kayasthas in the U.P., or the Brahmins in Madras. The second class of residues is to be found more among the lower ranks of the hierarchy, particularly, if the society is theocratic. These residues are also responsible for conservatism in politics and for such acts of faith as make people ready to kill or to be killed. Their dominance pushes men towards wars of extermination. It seems that the Hindus have a more generous dose of the combination-residues and the Muslims of persistence of the aggregate type. The residues connected with sociability are various. Of them, particularist or sectarian sociability, ordination, asceticism are stronger among the Hindus than

among the Muslims, while those of sacrifice[39] are more potent with the Muslims than with the Hindus.

In regard to sex-residues only a negative statement may be hazarded. The general Hindu opinion seems to be that the Muslims are oversexed. In Pareto's language, it would mean that they have more of sex-residues than the Hindus. But this is not corroborated by facts and analysis. The Hindus, in all groups of their traditions, have greater connection with 'sex' than the Muslims have. But the connection is mostly in the nature of derivations. For example, the rites of birth beginning from conception onwards, Linga-worship, etc., have all the necessary explanation. This may have been due either to the longer social discipline involved in a longer social history, or to the later idea of sex as sin to be worked out through subtler methods. On the other hand, the sex residues among the Muslims have combined less with other sentiments, or undergone less transformation, that is to say, have been less derived, 'rationalised,' and 'sublimated.' This probably[40] accounts for the franker attitude towards sex as a subject and more frequent reference to it in talks among the Muslims. Stories of abduction and rape, which create such horror in the minds of the Hindus, may have less to do with sex-residues than with those of the relation of social classes or of the desire to impose uniformity. Very often they can be fathered on to the decay of rural patterns of living caused by new economic factors.[41] But in the sphere of derivations the difference is certainly noticeable.

In nearly all the different types of derivations, which are "simili-logical explanations of non-logical behaviour," the difference between the two communities is pronounced. This makes one suspect that the modes, at least, the traditions of logic are not quite similar. In the types of derivations related to authority, affirmation, verbal proofs, metaphors, allegories, analogies, myths, legends, etc., the Hindu's brain has been very active, indeed. It is only recently that the Muslims have started on the career of derivations. Mr. Jinnah's dictatorship, the Pakistan resolution, atrocity-stories have all been 'justified' by 'reason.' But Muslim derivation has not yet discovered any absolute reason like 'birth-right.' This may be due to the "inductive intellect of the Muslim" and his relativist attitude. We have yet to see a Muslim half so clever as a Hindu is in discovering scientific reasons for the use of cow-dung or the purity of the Ganges water. But we do not despair. Books on the imperative need of Pakistan have been written and on the two-nation theory are in the offing.

After this sketchy analysis of traditions and sentiments we can be introduced into the sociology of the demand for Pakistan. The first fact that we must notice is that it is as yet '*a demand*', i.e., a derivation or a group of derivations connected with various types of residues, in greater or less degree. In other words, the derivation is affirmative, authoritarian, verbal,[42] and in accordance with certain sentiments, interests, and non-material entities. Of course, it can never be *only*

a derivation; that is impossible by the very nature of the definition by which derivation must needs be of residues. The strongest residues of which this derivation is an 'official version' are (1) those of the persistence of aggregates and (2) of particularist sociability. The residues of expression through acts and religious exaltation, those of integrity in the face of a disturbance of historical equilibrium or order (in which the Muslims were dominant, as in the pre-British days, the memories of which still linger), and others connected with the desire for a substitute integer, real or imaginary, work with the two previous groups of residues in subsidiary alliance. Therefore, the sociology of Pakistan demand is of the order of fiction[43] or myth, that is to say, of the very real sphere of non-logical conduct with a coating of logic. Let us repeat, the word 'non-logical' has no sinister meaning. There are numerous examples in Hindu behaviour which are as non-logical as that. The ideology of Mother India with Bande Mataram as a slogan is one such. In fact, the conflict is between the rival derivations, the one about 37 years old, and the other a kid of two still mewling in the nurse's arms, swaddled in baby-clothes.

Leaving aside residues and derivatives, we may apply the test of traditions to the demand. Here we do not find a single argument on the level of traditional economic differences which would bear scrutiny. Obviously, all over India poverty is common, the lack of opportunities for utilising new resources is common, and consciousness of class-interests among the masses is equally undeveloped and equally waiting to be developed. And

yet, there may be an economic case for the Muslims against the Hindus in India as a whole; we mean the greater number of the owners of the means of production and of the distributors among the Hindus than among the Muslims, and all that it involves. In Bengal the opposition to the Tenancy Act, and in the Punjab to the Sales Tax, chiefly came from the Hindus, dressed up in the usual disguises. But this case is nowhere in the picture of Pakistan. But we do not blame the Muslim Leaguer. The fact of economic exploitation has not yet sunk into the consciousness of the Hindu or the Muslim to rise again either in the form of a belief or a derivation. Even the Congress felt in terms of the 'Muslim' masses, and not in those of masses, as a class, in their contact programme to counteract those very tendencies that have at last culminated in the Pakistan demand. So, it is the political tradition of extra-territorial allegiance based upon community of faith that we have to fall back upon in our analysis of the Pakistan demand. Even here we must not fail to notice that Pakistan, for whatever reasons, may be the disappearance of the Khalifat, is within the limits of Hindustan. As yet, of course, the implications[44] of an alliance with the Muslims on the other side of the Hindu-Kush are there, though in an unofficial manner. But then similar implications of Hindu-Buddhist alliance across the Eastern Himalayas can also be drawn. Religious traditions, though they distinguish the Hindu from the Muslim very largely, as such, have next to nothing positive in the make-up of the demand. What are called 'religious' differences are really

the derivations of 'integrity' grounded on the residue of the persistence of the aggregate. The atrocity-stories published in the Pirpur report were factually controverted by the Congress governments. But that they continued to be believed in, not as facts, but as an overhanging possibility of threat to 'religious traditions' is the vital point, viz., that you cannot kill a fear by a fact, a non-logical derivation by logical arguments or experimental actions. The atrocity-stories were a preliminary move in the ideology of Pakistan. 'We cannot bear any more, so in the interests of peace, let us live apart'—thus ran the logic of sentiments, a logic which Aristotle would not care to look into, but sociologists should, if only because it is the stronger of the two. Most assuredly, considerations of prophethood do not form a perceptible element in the demand for Pakistan. The tradition of the community of faith, as different from birth and concomitant function, is an important differentium, but it has not yet been officially advanced as an argument for Pakistan; if it were, then in Pakistan, the Hindus should have no place, which we know to have been kindly conceded. Still, the community of faith is there in the background, but as a type of 'persistence of aggregates' residues of the 'uniformities' variety. Rather, faith as a social bond comes in only because function is not there to forge a higher and deeper synthesis.

The traditional differences in conceptions have also nothing to do with the demand. In Bengal, an integral part of Pakistan, there is hardly any concept which is specifically Muslim, or which is

so easily distinguishable from its Hindu counterpart that mutual intolerance might justify the suppression or domination of the other to avoid which separation is desirable. We have not yet heard of the Punjabi culture, though there is plenty of culture in the Punjab. That too, we are told by Muslim friends, is not so seriously jeopardised that it must shut itself up in Pakistan. But Pakistan may develop conceptual traditions which may eventually be distinctively Islamic. That will, we are afraid, take some time, because Pakistan will be immediately busy in keeping its body alive before it can take up and work out the great Arab legacy of inductive intellect and historical sense or even the nearer Iranian culture of sweetness and light. The first batch of concepts in Pakistan is likely to be of those of the neighbouring brethren in faith, e.g., the Pathan tribes in the Frontier, or the Afghans on the other side. After all, if Islamic culture is greatly a culture of the Islamic peoples, that of Pakistan must partake of the culture of the peoples resident in that area, even when the 'manifest destiny' of the latter is to be raised to a higher level.

So the demand for Pakistan remains a derivation of only certain traditional and residual differences. Here two important sociological principles should be borne in mind. (1) No residues as such are mutually exclusive. They combine, and the combination, even 'the logical' combination, is a residue. (2) More often than is imagined, the opposition is between a residue, a derivation, and *their absence*. In other words, the study of differences is mainly one of indifference. But

indifference is a mountain of inertia and throws up a huge barrier of resistance to process and continuity, unity and synthesis. And here we come to the crux of the problem. If by the demand of Pakistan, the process of Indian history is resisted and halted, (and that's the apprehended danger in the light of new notions of history, and not that of vivisection which springs only from static and, therefore, conservative ideas of India's history,) then the indifferences that have found shelter under and reinforcement from certain other residues have to be so cultivated that they take to those residues that make for the intensification of that process of larger synthesis. Of all these indifferences, the central are the primary ones connected with traditions of utilisation of natural resources. We do not in the least mean that residues are the causes of facts, nor do we hold that facts are the causes of residues. Sociological reasoning does not proceed on such lines. What we hold is that facts are collected by residues, and residues by facts. As Pareto shrewdly remarks: "Changes occur because new forces come into play to affect either the facts or the residues or both facts and residues—new circumstances occasion changes in modes of life." If we accept this, and there is no reason why Indian politicians should not do so in view of the fact that Pareto was a radical without being a Marxist, then the categorical imperative is consciously to bring into play the new forces, and not to wait for them in prayerful attitude. Once that is done, residues and derivations will change, the latter more quickly than the former. Then also will

differences in religious traditions be less effective, because modes of living have the simplest and the closest association with acts of livelihood and only remote relations with religious traditions. The farther the remove of a tradition from the nucleus of a residue and its pseudo-logical explanations in terms of concepts the less the resistance it offers to changes. The history of the relation between Christian Church and Pagan rites is there for all to see. Nearer home, we have the McNair report on the recent Dacca riots in which the gradual substitution of the religious factors by the economic ones, released by the Bengal Tenancy Act, has been noted in explanation of the psychology of communal ill-feeling in East Bengal.

The most radical solution offered so far of the Pakistan problem has been to bring about the economic changes in the lives of the Muslim masses. But this is not enough, in fact, it only shirks the issue by adding the word 'masses' to the Muslim problem. It may even be called mischievous by the Muslims. In fact, this movement was taken as a challenge and it gave an enormous prestige to the Muslim League before it adopted the atrocities stories. So the proper approach is through the economics of the masses, as a whole class, irrespective of caste or creed. And the spirit of that approach can never be either infiltration or initiation. It can only be that of midwifery. That may mean that communism is the only cure of communalism, which is, of course, a counsel of perfection, i.e., of despair for those who have fear in their souls. But so is Pakistan.

Personally, we do not entertain any hopes about the immediate solution of the problem of cultural unity on these lines even though the Indian communists are allying themselves with Mr. Rajagopalacharl. Indian thinkers and politicians would much rather tolerate a complete vivisection along geographical, religious, cultural lines in the name of resisting disunion than admit the horizontal divisions and work them up into higher levels of agreement. Our leaders mistrust both the communalist and the communist, but they dislike the communist more. It will not be surprising if all communalists, the Government, the Congress and the League should combine "to crush the pest" with Amery & Co. laughing in their sleeve. In the meanwhile, the unity of Modern Indian Culture has to be understood as a continuous social process in which new residues, new combinations of residues will have to be aroused by the development of traditions and modes of living which do not as yet exist or only exist in embryo. This is high creative endeavour which entails the future of all the communities in India, and, therefore, of the continuity and enrichment of Indian Culture.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC PROCESS AND THE 'MIDDLE CLASS'

In the two previous chapters we have been concerned with what is usually recognised as the factor that makes of Indian culture a unity, and what is simultaneously held responsible for driving a wedge through it and making it, at least, two. If one takes only cross-sections of traditions, the unity seems to suffer a little on the score of uniformity and homogeneity. No amount of wishful thinking will get over that fact. At the same time, unity is a concept that is big enough a house to have many mansions. For example, it may be 'historical.' But which history? In the academic history, facts are born free and equal, and detest chains of structural generalisations. The result is that while a thousand cases of Hindu-Muslim collaboration and good feeling scattered over a millennium of our history are trotted out, an equal number of cases of bad feeling may be rescued from a mere ten years' course. Such attempts have been made, but they have failed to convince. So we do not propose to 'give instances.' We would much rather describe the processes of structural changes in the Indian society. They can be understood only in terms of economic history. The processes may at once be summed up thus.

The backbone of Indian society was feudal; it was served by a considerable amount of

commerce-capital; foreign commerce sought to displace the latter; as commerce-capital and feudalism were symbiotic, the former could not be tampered with without upsetting the social equilibrium; a new type of land settlement was thus introduced by the East India Company to achieve equilibrium. Naturally, the class of people who were in charge of the commercial interests, e.g., the bankers, could only have limited duties from now on. On the other hand, the new land settlement created a new class of men who were not necessarily the descendants of the older chiefs, headmen, farmers and assignees. This new body was Hindu as its predecessor in the Muslim period was. But the two forces, released by the impact of foreign capital upon the indigenous commerce-capital and by the incidence of the new landlordism upon what may be called the Indian type of feudalism, did not meet. One of the main functions of the educational system initiated by the East India Company at much about the same period was to make them meet. The sense of frustration that has given rise to a spurious type of mysticism, the fissiparous tendencies in the Indian traditions that have led to the postulation of a two-nation theory, one the Hindu and the other the Muslim, and the extremely poor results in intellectual achievements, with a slow rise in literacy, on the one hand, and unemployment, on the other, are nothing but the after-effects of this incompetent social surgery. Beneath the plaster, we find that either the bones have not granulated, or that they have done so in a way that necessitates a major operation.

Indian feudalism is not on all fours with either the Continental or the English. "Indian feudalism is fiscal and military, but not manorial,"[1] if you exclude certain small estates and jagirs in Rajputana and Central India. In the very ancient times, the basis of land tenure had been the family, rather than the individual.[2] The Crown enjoyed a loose sort of prerogative over the villages. To meet obligations, landlords had soon to be created by adequate grants from the king who was the ultimate and undefined owner of all the land. But the royal demand as well as its satisfaction were confined only to the due discharge of fiscal obligations. The actual cultivators of land were soon turned into tenants. In the Buddhist period, the cultivating landlord was still the ideal and 'hireling' still a term of reproach, but the real picture is of the 'Jataka tale' in which sturdy peasants have left their paternal acres to toil for the royal capitalists. Large holdings were also appearing. It is interesting to observe that some of them were farmed by the Brahmins. There were village commons, with a daily change in pasturage. The Crown, however, retained its right to tax the individual peasant proprietor in the village. Duties on raw produce and special levies on agricultural produce for the state granary during the war and famine were common. There were 'abwabs', and forced labour too. The Crown had monopoly over forest lands and ownerless estates. The monasteries were given large properties. Monks could neither possess nor cultivate, but the 'Samgha' very easily could. The actual working of the monastic system of agriculture is

described by the Chinese Scholar, I-Tsing, who stayed in India from 673 to 685 A.D. "According to the teaching of the Vinaya, when the corn is cultivated by the 'Samgha', the share in the product is to be given to the monastic servants or some other families by whom the actual tilling has been done. Every product should be divided into 6 parts, and 1/6 should be levied by the 'Samgha'. The 'Samgha' has to provide the bulls as well as the land for cultivation. Sometimes the division of the produce should be modified according to the seasons. Most of the monasteries followed the above custom but there are some who are very avaricious and do not divide the produce, but the priests thus give out the work to servants, male and female, and see that the farming is properly done." In other words, the general rule was like what is known as 'Bargadari', with hired labourers or paid servants. The existence of the agriculture proletariat is also indirectly indicated in the Hindu Law Books of this period.

It is clear from the above that the pre-Muslim period of Indian history had already developed landlordism, mainly through grants by kings, with a mass of hirelings or agricultural labourers without land at the bottom. The inter-relations of the three main parties concerned were governed by obligations, which, however, loose, restricted the respective rights. In the Hindu society no gift has been absolute. The obligations to the king came to the payment of taxes and the rendering of occasional military service; and the king could not, and would not, demand more in virtue

of any superior right. Herein lies one source of the basic difference between the continental type of feudalism and the Indian. There the king shared his sovereignty as the first among equal lords or kinsmen.[3] Indian sovereignty was not thus circumscribed; on the other hand, customs and traditions were the *only* checks. Brahmins and Buddhist monks interpreted them and wielded an authority, a close parallel to which is to be found in the Egyptian brand of feudalism. This distinction in the king-landlord relation accounts for the two ways in which extension of the royal authority was checked in the two areas of the globe. English barons, for example, had to take the people with them to resist the king; in India, the chiefs could only start new principalities.[4] That the central authority remained weak before the British period, with the corollary that the intellectual class, Brahmins and others, would always stand against revolt, [5] is thus historically understandable. At the same time, the royal right over land did *not* amount to ownership in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term. Even conquest did not confer ownership. Jaimini and his commentators, Sabara-Swami, Sri Khanda and Madhavacharya, i.e., right down to quite a late period, and all were famous jurists, insist that land is *not* the king's property.[6] How far their almost socialist view, "what is yielded by land as the fruit of labour on the part of all beings must be enjoyed by them as their own property," was actually practised is very doubtful. We have a mass of evidence of exploitation or 'pidan,' as Kautilya puts it. When the main plank of the

king-chief relation was fiscal, the only ones who could escape the payment of taxes were the privileged class of Brahmins, the monasteries and the favourites. If ownership of the Crown was undefined, its demand for money could never flag; if that of the chief was inchoate, extortion would know no bounds except the ability to pay and a conscience, both elastic commodities. Indian landlords have always been tax-collectors right from the Vedic times. Communal ownership[7] related to the village common, which was the grazing land. We surmise, however, that the population of India could not be large[8] and that the area of the common land must have been extensive. If that surmise is correct, then the inference may be drawn that private property existed side by side with, but confined within the limits of, communal ownership. Though there is no parallel to the English enclosure movement, yet encroachments upon the common land must have taken place, but without much lasting effect upon its economy. We had no such woollen industry to necessitate large and enclosed pastures, nor did the easy extension of the chief's authority by mere expansion or conquest mean any change in agriculture. Whatever patriotic historians[9] may say about rural advisory boards, royal solicitude, shastric injunctions, absence of serfdom, etc., the land of India has always been used by the powers that be for taxes, and not in its own interests.

The Muslims only played a variation of the theme.[10] The central administration had to be stronger than what it was. So the *military* connection with the chiefs had to be emphasised.

The rates of *fiscal* dues were also raised a little because wars were more frequent and on a larger scale and the Durbar expenses were higher. The exigencies of the foreign rule demanded three things; (1) confirmation of the hitherto undefined rights of land-ownership of those chiefs who accepted the Muslim rule. They were Hindus. Naturally, Timur invaded India to correct the pro-Hindu sentiments of the Muslim rulers of Hindustan; (2) the creation of a number of assignees who were high officials pledged to give military support, the cost of which was partly paid in nominal salaries but mainly met by the grant of large tracts of land which they could use freely for the purpose of raising revenue. The surplus was considerable. These assignees had a larger proportion of Muslims than the older chiefs had. They, however, left the actual collection to the existing revenue officials, i.e., the hereditary village headmen and accountants, who were Hindus, and also to newly appointed agents who could be and were often Hindus. These gentlemen in their turn would raise their status if they had the requisite ability. (3) The forging of bureaucratic links with the landlords. All were *officials*, either of the central government or of the assignee. The combination of bureaucratic functions with the fiscal and the military makes the jagir system into which the older Indian landlordism developed look very similar to the Russian type of feudalism, known as the boyar system.[11] When the central authority became involved in its own preservation, it was this class of jagirdars, mostly Muslims, in alliance with the older Hindu

chiefs,[12] who revolted and formed practically independent regional governments in the conduct of which the Hindu chiefs had a great share. Meanwhile, they had managed to become hereditary against Hindu injunctions and Muslim intentions. In Bengal, Oudh, Central India, and in the south, we find numerous instances of Hindu-Muslim solidarity. The Hindu and the Muslim assignees, chiefs and the abler farmers had at last formed an *economic class*, viz., the baronial. Under the pressure of the same forces that led to the formation of that class, the Bengal and Oudh governments under the Muslims, particularly, the Pathans, became *national* ones. The connection between Hindu-Muslim solidarity and nationalism was economic, inasmuch as both were the historical expression of the rise of a class. It is a historical fact that the Muslim rule was economically a progressive force inasmuch as it was an advance upon the earlier inchoate forms of economic relations. Equally painful it may be for some to hear that the 'pure' Hindu zamindars, i.e., the older chiefs of this period, played a reactionary role and that the Muslim assignees a revolutionary and national one.[13] From that event can also be traced the history of national literatures and the Bhakti resurgence which synthesised the Hindu and the Muslim cultural traditions. Such is the general picture the main outlines of which could not be changed by Sher Shah's predilection for direct contact with the peasants, nor even by Akbar's attempts to substitute kind by cash in the Crown lands. Full money-economy came in the British period.

The system of farming out in vogue in former times was continued with little alteration even after the introduction of British rule. The tax-gatherers, known as zamindars, were mostly the descendants of the former "Mustagirs," or "Sadrmalguzars," though some, of course, belonged to the old feudal families. It is interesting to observe that in Section 39 of Pitt's Act of 1784—a devout measure to stop the oppression and corruption of the times—ryots, zamindars, taluqdars are placed in the same category in matters of payment of tribute, rents and services. In the Company's Analysis of Laws and Regulations of the said Act, the word 'Ryot' remains. But, subsequently, the word 'Ryot' was changed into Rajah, and the Cambridge History of India followed suit. Even under the permanent settlement, the zamindars did not acquire absolute proprietary right. Cornwallis had no intention to perpetuate a class whose claim was derived from some remote historical right; he was only interested in the present-day source of the right. He introduced stringent sale laws which revolutionised the old order and ruined a large number of the ancient families. The status of the zamindar was often described to indicate its nature of being a conditional office. As late as 1865, long after the introduction of the permanent settlement, the Calcutta High Court in their full bench judgment in a rent case[14] denied the absolute right of the zamindar to the soil.

In the United Provinces, even the pseudo-proprietary right conferred on the Bengal zamindars was not allowed, and permanent settlement

was not introduced although it had been promised by the proclamations of 1802 and 1805. The settlements only introduced a glorified form of farming, and the early settlement reports reveal that settlement was made in most cases with the former "mustagirs" and "mukaddams" who had been erroneously treated as owners. The revenue policy in these provinces was directed against the growth of landlordism of the Bengal type, and governor generals like Lord Hastings and revenue officials like Bird and Thomason, denounced the permanent settlement as a cause of the most grievous oppression. The zamindari, pattidari, and Bhaiyachara tenures were all essentially based on farming principles, and no proprietary rights were created as a result of such tenures beyond a limited interest in the land. As in the past ages, the zamindar's tenure under British settlements partook more of the nature of an *office*, with certain rights and privileges attached to it, than of a proprietary estate in land. But, and this is the important point, the official duties could not be onerous beyond collection of revenues and entertainment. With English officials holding the keys to administration, these duties lost their dignity and the associated authority of more spacious days.

Even the taluqdars, who obtained after the mutiny extravagant privileges to which they themselves had made no pretensions, had originally been contractors for the revenue under the nawab-wazirs, and only a small minority belonged to feudal families of ancient date. The so-called "mushroom" or "impure" taluqdars prepondera-

ted; they had been official favourites before they obtained the right to collect the revenue. The farming system prevailed extensively in Oudh on account of the laxity of the nawabi rule which favoured the growth of "mushroom" taluqdars who were no more than glorified "chakladars." The "amani" system was only rarely tried, and the vicious "ijara" system was generally in force, the farmers collecting the amount of the "theka" and paying into the treasury the stipulated amount. The tenure of the taluqdar was, however, never a fixed one, and it could be changed at the discretion of the ruler. In theory too, therefore, the taluqdari tenure under the nawab-wazirs had been that of a rent collector, and it was political reasons which induced the British Government grown wiser with the cynical wisdom of the mutiny, to abandon the ideas that had inspired the first summary settlement in the time of Dalhousie. The economic significance of the Mutiny, except in Oudh where it was more or less 'a people's war,' consisted in the attempt of the feudal order to keep its privileges intact by resisting any change in the exploitative and any reduction of the administrative functions of the class as such.[15] Even after the general confiscations of 1858, it is legally doubtful how far the taluqdari right over the land is absolute. When Mr. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, the Revenue Minister, in the U.P., casually called the taluqdars "thekadars," or sub-contractors, he had the full support of history.

In the South, the position of the landlord vis-â-vis the Crown, and of the Crown vis-â-vis the cultivator, did not differ from that in the North,

except in local details, during the pre-British period. Thus, for example, there were the usual grants of lands and the imposts, while assessment followed the variety of the crops.[16] In the British period, whatever changes were introduced were practically for the whole of India irrespective of the period of settlement. The sum and substance of these changes was that instead of the old feudal class, almost independently discharging military and administrative obligations in addition to the payment of annual and special tributes to the Crown out of the revenue collected on the strength of hereditary 'sanads,' a new class was created to collect revenue and do what it liked with the land, subject to the judicial control in accordance with the general purpose of the settlement and the subsequent Tenancy laws. In other words, if they duly paid the revenues and otherwise remained good boys and loyal citizens, the zamindars were given the full right to act and live as they liked, which was certainly very much of a living on the huge surplus and the unearned increments. The only two common features, be it noted, between the old and the new class, were (1) that both the classes had some form of connection with the administrative machinery, and (2) both had a Hindu majority in their ranks. And both have since then worked 'mischief.' The socio-economic basis of the Hindu-Muslim conflict had been there, but it became definitely a class-basis conflict since then. One would have welcomed this clarification of issues, if by the other policy in regard to trade and commerce the agrarian proletarisation had not been denied

its fulfilment into the industrial proletariat. More of which anon. But, in the beginning, the British rule certainly envisaged a much closer co-operation with the new class. It also demanded a higher standard of service in regularity and liberal exactions. Mr. Kuppuswamy, in a brilliant series of articles to the 'Hindu' (April, 1938), showed the intentions of the East India Company and of the Government of India towards the performance of the prescribed duties of this class. His position is that the zamindar, legally, as a rent collector, is a public servant, and the same standard of rectitude and responsibility could be demanded of him as of any civil servant. He gives the following arguments :—

1. In the government villages in Madras, called Ayan, by the common law of the country, the state fixes land revenue, collects it through its own staff, and changes it in accordance with what it considers to be necessary in the light of the changed economic conditions. This point, however, does not distinguish the British settlement with either the Muslim or the Hindu under which the Crown also did possess its own lands. But it does not also support the taluqdars' use of 'Sir', or of the Behar zamindars' use of the 'Ba-kasht' land. Mr. Kuppuswamy continues to argue.

2. In zamindari land, the zamindar collects the public land revenue (Raj-bhagam—the share of the Government) in his charge. Justice Reilly in 63 Madras Law Journal says: "There is no doubt that the theory of revenue administration held by the government was that the zamindar in a permanently settled estate had a right to

collect from the ryot the 'Rajbhagam' or the government's share of the produce of the land."

3. In 1864 the Board of Revenue gave this summary of the relative rights of the zamindars and ryots: "In the earliest times of which we have record, the right of the state to a share in the produce of the land was limited and that limit was such as to leave a sufficient margin for the growth of valuable property in the land appertaining with the occupant whose right to retain the possession on payment of the limited share was inviolable and hereditary. The origin of the zamindar's office was comparatively a modern one, and that whatever its origin, zamindars derived their rights from the state which could not confer more than it had posed and exercised. The state asserted and even in later times exercised the power of resumption to exercising its right over the zamindars and thereby altering the terms and conditions of the ryots' tenure. The framers of the Permanent Settlement proposed to relinquish to the zamindars an allowance for their personal benefit out of the average state demand in past years on the zamindari and to fix the zamindar's payment unalterably for ever, leaving to him all the benefits derivable from the extension of cultivation and improvements in the culture of the land but to restrict his demands on the ryot to the rate or share established in the village by the officers appointed for the purpose."

4. The position of the zamindar regarding irrigation works was clearly enunciated by the Privy Council in zamindar of Cavetnagar's case; "The public duty of maintaining existing tents

and of constructing new ones in many places was originally overtaken by the Government of India and upon a settlement of the country in many instances devolved upon zamindar." The right of distribution of water among ryots that was enjoyed by the zamindar was also derived from state. (51 I. C. 899).

It may seem that the mind of the East India Company and of the Government of India was not made up even after the 5th report. But explanation in terms of the fight between the Good Spirit and the Evil Spirit is not sufficient. The conflict between the liberal philosophy of the Victorian bourgeoisie and the older English traditions in regard to India belongs to the realm of apologetics. What really happened was that in the earlier period a buffer class had to be created, and that in the later period, when the British rule was fully established, that class was no longer indispensable. The solicitude of the Government towards the tenants cannot be interpreted as solicitude for agriculture, because by that time the buffer class which could alone improve the land had been more or less completely divested of any responsibility towards it. Of course, there had never been any such investment either under the Muslims or under the Pre-Muslims. But then the chiefs and the assignees and the farmers performed military functions and would govern their own territories without much let or hindrance from the centre. Now the buffer class had no such functions, and those among them who traced their ascent to the old Rajas and Muslim Nawabs, either through fiction or blood, were defunctioned.

Such a class can never be called a feudal class because it did not discharge socially continuous functions; it was only allowed to cherish ownership over land as compensation for discontinuity. Even then the English judges and revenue officials began to put constructions on behalf of the ryots which pinched away many grains of privileges.[17] The only feudal class, as has been noted above, resides in the nooks and corner of Indian states, owing direct allegiance to their chiefs, but indirectly to the overlord, viz., the Crown. Thus we find that the new bones were badly set. No wonder that the body limps and creaks. The defective surgery has caused an out-growth and the consequential sense of pain, inferiority, and frustration.

But the middle class also included another section of the Indian people, namely, those whose trade and commerce were curtailed by the banking interests and by other special measures. Commerce-capital had developed in India in the same way as it did in Europe, subject to the limitations of geography and the state of arts and crafts in the preceding epoch. Among the masses in rural areas, the bare physical needs determined the nature of the major occupation, namely, agriculture, and tradition dictated the rule of thumb methods in the home industries through apprenticeship in families, castes and guilds. But in the town a merchant class arose very early in the day. We find references to their existence in the Vedic, and to their prosperity in the Buddhist literature. They were no small traders or mere shop-keepers. In spite of what may now appear to be their small transport facilities, they surveyed the *total* market

situation in nearly all its aspects.[18] Consumption and distribution, chiefly of fancy goods, were co-ordinated by their personal efforts. They were great travellers and displayed their valuable wares in foreign ports and courts. In every sense, they were merchant adventurers taking risks over unchartered seas on strange land-routes and in strange company, making enormous profits, the proofs of which lay in their conspicuous waste and considerable charities to the monasteries, universities and welfare institutions, no less than in their heavy tributes to the king. So late as the days of Balban, their 'Durshanees' to the roving Emperor were fabulous in extent. Within the specified area of production as well as inside the premises of manual conversions, men and material would be brought together by them. The work of co-ordination was smoothed by the guilds which were usually co-terminous with the castes. Even today, we find their remnants scattered all over India, at Madura, Benares, Behrampur, and Indore. In other words, the commercial functions performed were grounded upon social production, only the terms of the latter being circumscribed. The trader also acted as an intermediary between the village producer and the town dweller. If in the pre-British period the balance between rural and urban economies was better maintained than it is now, it was mainly because of him. One section of his class further developed its activities by financing trade and commerce and by building storage rooms, a counterpart of modern warehouses. Early references to the warehouses are not plenty, but

from the 16th century they abound, particularly, in Western India.

Prior to the advent of the British and other European powers interested in the trade of the East, the indigenous banking system[19] was centralised in particular families. They would finance the military adventures of the kings and nobles, the commercial enterprises of merchant adventurers, as well as town industry with its ramifications in the hinterland. The village banya, of course, was left in peace to look after purely rural needs. The Chettiars of Madras, the Seths of Gujerat and other banking houses are mentioned in old records. The Jagat Seth family stood as a perfect example of the indigenous type of banking. These families would run their business through the *hundi* system, and its effectiveness is manifest in the fact that nearly the whole of Indian trade was run, controlled and organised by them. During the later Muslim period, the family of Jagat Seth had nearly ousted every other. It was even allowed to mint its own coins. The fall of Murshid Kuli Khan's dynasty was brought about by the opposition of this family's financial interest. Likewise, in the province of Bombay, more specially on the coastal towns of Thatta, Broach and Surat, the family banks controlled all Indian trade, and if the briskness of shipping is any criterion, they must have been very rich in the Western Coast. The relation between these banks and foreign trade of India is not very clear. But the relation between these two can be understood by a study of the shipping conditions in those days. Parkinson[20], quoting N. Conti,

states that "the natives of India build some ships larger than ours, capable of containing 2,000 butts and with five sails and as many masts." Parkinson further says: "There can be no question but that ships of this size.....were still to be found there in the seventeenth century." There is no "distinct account how these ships disappeared." From that time the foreign trade of India fell more or less fully into the hands of Arab traders who carried the goods from India to the Persian Gulf and thence in caravans to Alleppo and Dardanelles, wherefrom they were shipped to the Mediterranean countries of Europe. Evidences of actual Indian enterprise in shipping and in carrying goods on ships to other foreign countries are few. Shivaji, in the 17th century maintained a fleet, manned and run by Indian sailors, but its object was piracy of the Moghal cargo-ships. The Moghals also maintained ships manned by Indians, but their purpose does not appear to have been commercial. They, however, carried Mecca pilgrims to and from Jeddah in the Red Sea.

The 17th century was the age of naval enterprise for the European countries, Portugal, Holland, France, England and Spain. Although the combined Spanish and Portuguese fleet had been decisively beaten by the English as early as 1588 A.D., the Portuguese were the first to realise the importance of capturing the Eastern trade. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the French and the English had their respective settlements on the coastal towns of Goa, Calicut, Pondicherry, Surat. They had also their depots and warehouses at inland towns. The advantage that these European

countries had was that they could carry the merchandise via the Cape, while the Arab traders had to employ both ships and caravans in their trade with the East. The caravan route from the ports of the Persian Gulf ran along the courses of the Euphrates and the Tigris. But the two mighty rivers and the long sandy route leading to the ports of Alleppo and Tripoli and to the Dardanelles had to be negotiated. This route was not safe either; the caravans were often looted by organised bands of robbers. The Arabs were thus handicapped in their competition with the Western traders. By the end of the third decade of the 18th century, the competition between the European powers had come to an end, and the English and the French only were in the field. Both the English and the French, however, quickly realised the importance of gaining royal favour. The English had in the 17th century succeeded in getting Firmans from the Emperor and Nishan from his sons.[21] They also maintained good relations with the indigenous bankers from whom in times of emergency they procured loans. One Virjee Vora is reported to have advanced them money at a lower rate of interest and of his own accord[22].

Indigenous banking was primarily a money-lending affair. Usually, the banks were small concerns run by families who thus formed a separate caste. These banks would lend money and also "perform the additional function of a money changer which yielded a good profit." They "played an important part in financing the trade of the country by means of credit instruments. But what is even more striking is the evidence of signal

services they rendered to the State, not only as the officers of the Royal Mints but also by advancing to the Royal Treasury large sums of money in times of national need."[23] The help offered to the State, and in later times, to the Company, placed them in high favour with the government, though society still looked askance. These indigenous bankers also occasionally acted as revenue collectors. "As the land-owners were unable to collect their dues from the cultivators at the frequent intervals as the government instalments fell due, the indigenous bankers agreed to be their sureties and paid the revenue on their behalf, in bills at 15 or 20 days' date."[24] It is also possible that these bankers had a hand in controlling the currency. Coins of dynasties flourishing prior to the Moghul dynasty were current, and since those coins were worn out by constant handling they were not accepted in the market. So these bankers employed sharafs to assess the value of the coin and accept them not on face value but on metal value. "The system of currency and coinage during the Moghul period, with its large number of mints scattered all over the country which issued metallic currency of various classes, also provided the indigenous banker with the important and profitable business of money changing."

The rate of interest charged by these bankers varied from 6% to 500%[25]. Sometimes these bankers would lend money on a higher rate of interest to an individual or to a concern, although either could borrow the sum at a lesser rate of interest from money-lenders with small capital.

The influence of bankers was so great that the smaller money-lenders would not venture to lend the money for fear of being ruined by the ill-will of bankers.

Thus we find these banks functioning as money-lending agencies (*a*) to individuals, (*b*) to private concerns, (*c*) to the state in times of national need, and (*d*) to foreign companies. They would sometimes act as revenue collectors, and control the currency. They were thus inseparably connected with both inland and foreign trade. This last function of the indigenous banks requires explanation. In Moghul times, more particularly in the time of Shah Jahan, a large portion of whose income was derived from trade, the ports of Surat, Broach and Thatta were leased out to individual bidders. They were to impose the export and import duties on the merchandise, and naturally amassed huge fortunes. Sometimes the bidding was so high that the lease owner would become a defaulter. These lease owners, therefore, would fall back upon the indigenous banker for ready cash, and the latter would advance the sum on a very high rate of interest. But the native lease-holders could not have their say in matters of imposing duties on exports and imports on every occasion. Sometimes, as in the case of the English, the traders had direct 'firmans' and 'nishan' in their favour. In the internal trade, the bankers had the final word. They issued demand hundis to the traders, discounted them and remitted money to various other trading centres. Even after the foreign firms got going, they would make advances for short period on the security of goods under their control. They would

also advance money to artisans on the security of their wives' ornaments or on their household belongings. These bankers had also a hand in financing the agriculture. Their agents would lend cash and kind to cultivators holding the standing crop as security.

What happened to those families of bankers and their functions? How is it that their number dwindled until they were either absorbed into the innocuous professions of money-lending and money changing or into the new land-owning class? The process is more clear in Bengal than either in Bombay or Madras. The Northern portion of the modern province of Bombay was, and still remains, the seat of Jains who had always been traders in preference to being cultivators. Jainism stood in the way of tilling and thus hurting the soil, which was none too fertile either. So the bankers who established themselves on the Western coastal towns and played such an important part in the trade of India were not easy to be dislodged. Similarly, in the southern ports of Madras. Bengal, however, was differently situated. We have no evidence to say that the commercial class was ever very strong there; on the other hand, we know that another class, consisting of the Brahmins, the Sramans, and the bureaucrats had been in the ascendant from VIII to XIII century.[26] Nevertheless, the traders were not a minority, nor was their role insignificant. Medieval Bengali literature makes great play of the exploits of the Saodagars.[27] Foreign travellers indicate a high degree of commercial prosperity in the hinterland.[28] The Brahminical supremacy no doubt succeeded in curbing the im-

portance of this class of traders and merchantmen.[29] This continued right up to XVIII century. Still there was plenty of capital in Bengal, and it did not drop from the skies. It flowed from the North-East, Tibet, Assam and beyond.[30] But in the pre-British days, Bengal's imports from the North and the East flowed mostly towards the courts. Calcutta, her most important port, was created by the British. And no sooner was it established than the Agency Houses were started.[31] The banking families in Murshidabad and Patna were more concerned with revenue collection and remittance than with internal trade. This was because of the fact that Bengal was a frontier province, and outside west Bengal the hold of Delhi was so loose that collection had to be left entirely to the local agent. So once the fiscal power was taken off, the Seths' function became attenuated; and once the currency was stabilised, the 'poddars' lost their job. The functional atrophy of this commercial class was further facilitated by a number of factors:[32] (1) The *dastak* system. It was 'a permit, a document authorising the free transit of certain goods and their exemption from customs duties.' First granted by the Mughal Governor of Bengal in 1656 to the East India Company for Rs. 3,000/- a year, it was the object of heart-burning and much protest by the later nawab, Murshid Quli Khan.[33] The Company's servants gave a more liberal interpretation to the already generous transaction and pleaded that the amount was for the whole trade of Bengal, internal and external, and in perpetuity. Emperor Farrukshiyar's new firman (1717) did not improve the situation, but the

E. I. Company acquiesced in the Nawab's interpretation that the amount covered only the sea-borne trade. The internal trade continued to be supervised by the Nawab's officials, and the Company retaliated by shifting their activities from Hugli to Calcutta, under the ramparts of Fort William. In this new city, both the internal and the external trade could be carried on peacefully with the help of native compradors who flocked there. The 'ancient' families of Calcutta were started by these gentlemen. A comparison is possible with the 'aristocrats' of the Shanghai international settlements. Bengali culture of the 19th century takes its cue from the taste of these Calcutta compradors. When they first came into contact with the Company, Indian society had not heard of them. They were neither of the old banking families, nor of the Brahmin caste. Later on, they would buy up land and become zamindars, patronise Sanskrit to please the pandits, learn English and ape their manners to play the Saheb, in other words, be the Bhadralok or the Baboo. In those days, the Baboo had a more pleasant connotation, and the deterioration in its meaning marked the disintegration of this artificial grouping of floating individuals. Today, not only the Deputy Collectors but also lower grade assistants in offices resent the appellation. (2) Agency-houses[34] and the Banks that sprang from their loins formed the second factor. The first took up the financing of the internal trade. The native was shy in his dealings with the captains of the ships. To conquer his shyness a high rate had often to be paid. Foreign trade had not much interest for the native money-lender. So agency-houses were started

by a few enterprising foreigners who in a short course of time concentrated in their hands both the internal and the external business of the land. But then the East India Company was being transformed; it was necessary to stop the currency-muddle; war had to be conducted, peace restored, famine checked. The directorate at home did not look with favour at private attempts to establish banks. So a state-aided bank came into existence at last, and the agency-houses became entrepreneurs, pure and simple. Still the agency-houses could not do without native intermediaries. They were the Mutsaddis, the guarantee-brokers, the warehouse keepers, and so on. With the help of the first batch they consolidated the new middle class. None of them were scions of the Jagat Seth family. But without exception they were all Hindus. They too became landlords; they too were educated. From the factotum of the English nabob to the frustrated Baboo of today is a continuous process. But between the commercial magnate who would venture out to the Indies, to Champa, Bali, Sumatra, and Ceylon, cross the mountains into Burma and China, who would finance the adventures of Kings, and fight them socially, if necessary, who could survive the loot of the Burgees and the durshanee of a couple of crores of tankhas to the Nawab or the Emperor, who would handle hundis with an all-India circulation, between such men, on the one hand, and the progenitors of the Ghoses, Boses, Mitters, the Debs, the Lahas and the Basaks, on the other, there was something more than a chink. It was a chasm in social evolution. The sense of this vacuity overhangs Bengali culture

and accounts for its dissociation with its Indian context. It was sought to be filled up by the debris of a *Hindu* nationalism, ancient glories, and the lumber of Western culture and democracy. Occasionally, better things would be thrown in. But the chasm remained, only the eyes became used to it. Not that it can now be bridged or should be bridged. A sociologist can only note the fact of the break in the Indian social process, and distinguish it from the continuity in the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie in Europe out of its own feudal order.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

The progress of English education[1] is an integral part of the modern Indian social process. By the middle of the 16th Century, the Portuguese had brought the sweets of Western education to the evangelised heathens and their orphans. When the Portuguese power declined, the English and the Danish appeared on the scene. By the first quarter of the 18th Century, the Danish missionaries had started a number of schools in Madras with headquarters at Tranquibar. English was taught in Schwartz' schools. The first missionary school was opened in the city of Bombay in 1718. Calcutta still cherishes the names of Chaplain Bellamy and Rev. Kiernander, and has given a whole street to the memory of the Free School Society. The Court of Directors approved these missionary endeavours to teach English to impress the natives 'with sentiments of esteem and respect for this British nation.' But the directors soon became wise, announced the desire to remain strictly neutral in religious matters, and discountenanced educational enterprises by missionaries. The fact is not well known that Carey, Marshman and Ward, the trio to whom Bengal owes so much, had to confine their activities a few miles away from Calcutta, in the Danish settlement of Serampore, for fear of being packed back to England.

But the missionaries were not the only ones in the field. The Calcutta School Book Society, the Bombay Native School Society, and the Bombay Educational Society under the inspiring leadership of Monstuart Elphinstone, were well started on their career of usefulness in their respective zones. Between the efforts of the Calcutta School Book Society and the Calcutta School Society, Bengal had a number of schools in which English was taught. Capt. Doveton, General Claude Martin, David Hare, each the proud progenitor of well-known institutions, two of which exist even today, gave their all to further the cause of English education. Influential Gentoos like Raja Radhakanta Dev and Raja Ram Mohan Roy helped David Hare to found the 'Vidyalaya,' the nucleus of the Hindu College that later became the Presidency College of Calcutta. The Calcutta Madrasa had been founded in 1751 by Warren Hastings with the laudable object of qualifying 'sons of Mahomedan gentlemen for responsible and lucrative offices in the state.' The Benares Sanskrit College was founded by Jonathan Duncan in 1792. Even earlier, a Bengali had started a private institution to teach English to the boys of the Holy City. At Poona, a college of Hindu learning was started at about the same period.

The East India Company, however, took time to conquer their hesitancy to assume responsibility for the education of the natives. When they did, an annual sum of one lakh rupees was provided out of the revenue to serve the dual purpose of encouraging Oriental learning and the Western Sciences. The clause in the Act of 1813 was, how-

ever, circumscribed by the first education despatch in 1814 which stressed the need of encouraging 'learned natives.' This raised the ire of those 'gentoos' who had already been won over to the side of Western education. The intelligentsia were soon torn between the Anglicists and the Orientalists. The representative of the former was Raja Ram Mohan Roy[2] who believed that the Indian sloth and prejudice could only be cured by the ferment of Western rationalism, while the pillars of the Hindu Society, in reaction to the missionary efforts at conversion, remained Orientalists. Not that the one lakh of rupees was being properly spent to encourage the latter, but their faith was enough.

It would be interesting at this stage to have some idea of the state of educational affairs in the country, in so far as they remained unaffected by the efforts of missionaries, the eccentrics and the officers of the East India Company. We have Sir Thomas Munroe's survey of Madras, the Bombay Government's for Bombay, and Mr. Adams' for Bengal. The Madras figure of student population in the native schools was one out of 67 and the Bombay figure was one out of 133, of the general population. Mr. Adams says that there were one hundred thousand native schools in Bengal imparting education in the three R's. Most certainly, the standard of instruction was not very high, but its lowness was recompensed by its nearness to the soil and all that had sprung from it in the shape of myths and legends. It satisfied the needs of the people, dictated as they were by the rudimentary rural and town economy of the period. All the surveys, however, revealed a disintegrating

process which the collector of Bellary, in the Madras Presidency, ascribed to 'the competition of foreign goods, the movement of troops, and the substitution of European for native rule which, despite a less rigorous enforcement of the revenue had impoverished the country.' Archdeacon Firminger writes that in the England of 1818 for one child who had the opportunity of education three were left entirely ignorant. But contrast is no consolation; we know that the Indian social economy was already being shaken to its roots, and the fruits were becoming diseased and fewer in number. Not even the later solicitude of Lord Hardinge for the revival of the 'maktabs' and 'pathsalas' could undo the mischief that had been done. It had already been too late. The government just went on establishing Sanskrit colleges in Calcutta, Agra. Delhi, and purchasing Oriental classics for public libraries.

The two despatches of 1829 and '30 betrayed the beginnings of a new attitude of the Company towards the education of natives. The first merely contained the wish that their education should be such as to qualify them for higher stations in the civil government. Be it noted that by this time civil government was well established and business in the commercial House and Banking concerns was flourishing without competition. The 1830 despatch uttered the theory of filtration. In the words of the despatch: "The system of education by a thorough study of the English language could be placed within the reach of a very small portion of the Indian population but the intelligent Indians who had been thus educated might as teachers in

Schools or Colleges or as translators and writers of useful books contribute on an eminent degree to the more general extension among their countrymen of those accomplishments which they themselves had gained and might communicate in some degree to the native literature and to the minds of the native community that improved spirit which it is hoped that they themselves will have imbued from the influence of European ideas and sentiments." Well might the natives say: 'Thy will be done in less than fifty years'. The long sentence quoted above offers the educational key to our culture. It contains the essence of class-education as opposed to mass-education. Mayhew writes that the Government which so far back originated the theory and backed it in practice "must be held to deserve a beating." His comment deserves quotation in full. "For, by so doing, it encouraged the separation of mass from class, town from country, western from eastern modes of thought and life, to which India, left to herself, has always been too prone. It established the idea that education is a luxury, an investment perhaps also for the thrifty, but an investment in which privileged classes will receive most assistance from the state. It also obscured the truth that the education of the people of India means nothing if it does not mean the development of the cultural instincts and the raising of the material level of all classes of those peoples."[3] Now, Mayhew is the honest British democrat who, believing in education, is ashamed of the class-bias of the despatch of 1830. He is, of course, aware of the dangers if India were left to herself. But he makes the document bear an excess of responsibility. If by 1830

the country had been impoverished, the foreign civil government had been consolidated, cottage industries had decayed, zamindaries had been created to collect rent, and the old merchant middle class had disintegrated under the pressure of English business-interests, then there was no alternative left for statesmanship but to create a black-coated salariat to support foreign rule and foreign trade. The filtration theory was only a reflection of the objective situation. If it reeked more openly of class-prejudice than any address of the Rugby Arnold, or of a Mandarin in China, or of an Indian publicist lamenting over the problem of unemployment consequent upon a lower standard of examinations, it was mostly because of the consciousness of the fact that the class in this case was an artificial one. The governing authority knew that a substitute class had to be raised and groomed by a highly selective process of breeding. England and China had a middle class; the E. I. Company suffered from the double burden of creating one and educating it. And then, we too were willing. Why also blame poor Thomas Babington Macaulay, who only carried out, in better English, the same infiltration tactics among the willing ones? Said he, "We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern, a class of persons Indian in blood and colour but English in tastes, in opinions, morals and intellect." To this class was consecrated the task of refining the vernaculars and enriching them with scientific terms borrowed from the West. The first part of the task has since been duly fulfilled—even the tallest among the Anti-Imperialists profess

English reactions, and the most radical among the Anti-Imperialist writers are only refining 'vernacular' crudities into English syntax and attitudes, either in the light of T. S. Eliot minus his Anglo-Catholicism, his Royalism and his traditionalism, or of D. H. Lawrence minus his insight into Nature and life. Of course, for Philosophy, the authorities felt that vernacular was enough, though Sir S. Radhakrishnan has not yet obliged them by writing in his own tongue or in Hindi or in Sanskrit. Thus, modern Indian culture, in one sense, has been a consummation of Macaulay's dreams. The second part has only been recently undertaken. But most of the science teachers' reactions are still English. They have a feeling that for Science, English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese languages are more fitted than any Indian language. These gentlemen may or may not be scientists, but they certainly are no philologists.

We will not go into the details of the controversy between Raja Ram Mohan and his opponents in the matter of education. He was a great man, perhaps the greatest Indian of XIX Century. But, sociologically, his contributions must needs be put in the proper historical perspective. As noted before, the series of legislation known as Permanent Settlement had begun its work in creating a leisured class not hostile to the culture of their creators. Clerks and subordinate civil servants with some knowledge of the English language were in demand. In 1837 Persian as court-language was abolished and English slowly substituted. Lord Hardinge solemnly resolved in 1844 that 'in every possible case a preference shall

be given in the selection of candidates for public employment' to those educated in the English schools. Once the passport to power and prestige was duly drafted and signed, Raja Ram Mohan could only help the general issues to crystallise on other planes.[4] By the middle of the 19th Century the die was cast. English education spread rapidly in Bengal, Bombay and Madras. In 1852, the three presidencies showed 9,893 pupils receiving English education out of a school-going population of 25,372.

Once more. Both English education and 'land-mindedness' were imparted *after* the liquidation of indigenous trade and commerce and the cottage industries. It was the newly created gentry living on land or on the new commerce who took to English education. Those who suffered from the disappearance of cottage-industries found the English education in the cities too expensive and the pathsalas and maktabs dying of neglect. Those who made money by acting as agents of foreign commercial concerns became landlords in their turn, settled in the city and fathered the Calcutta Baboo culture, the sampler of Bengali culture up till the end of XIX Century. The new landsettlement and the frustration of commerce-capital went together to form the social incentive of English education on the part of the Indian. Bengal illustrates this thesis better than any other province in Northern India. No wonder that the Government were duly impressed by the avidity of the Bengalis for English education. The needs of the civil government were an additional feature.

If in Bombay an average Arts graduate who is

not a Parsee knows Sanskrit fairly well and has no hankering for jobs as we find in Bengal, it is not solely due to the Poona Brahmins, the efforts of the Bombay Education Society, the great advocacy of Elphinstone on behalf of Oriental learning, on the one hand, nor can it be traced to the lesser intimacy of the province with the central administration, on the other. In his famous minute, Elphinstone had written that "it would be surely a preposterous way of adding to the intellectual treasures of a nation to begin by the destruction of its indigenous literature; I cannot but think that the future attainments of the natives will be increased in extent as well as in variety by being, as it were, engrafted on their previous knowledge and imbued with their own original and peculiar character." These noble words cut no ice, except among a group of ardent nationalists. Even after Mr. Paranjpye's report, the Bombay University has not done as much for the vernaculars of the Presidency as the Calcutta University has done for Bengali and other Indian languages. The special reasons are these; the peculiar system of land-tenure in Bombay offered the facilities which were ably nursed by the strong merchant class among the Parsees and Gujeratis to provide a greater outlet for the youthful talents in the shape of business careers than the training in English schools for government jobs of the lower cadre could ever do. In Bombay, the hold of foreign 'Houses' upon the native-traders was less, and could be resisted and supplanted by the strong merchant communities of Bhatias and Parsees. The Maharastrians had no such class, how-

ever. Industrial capital soon developed among the Parsees and the Bhatias, in fact sooner than anywhere else in India. It fortified the commerce—capital better, and allowed Indian finance—capital to emerge for the first time in India. So men and women of Bombay took to English education in a way very different from the Bengali. The resulting differences in culture are material.

Once the Universities were started in the three Presidencies, belief in English education became almost blind. Manners followed education. But the excess generated a reaction. Michael Madhusudan was a case in point. He wrote English, spoke English, dreamed in English. But he gave up English verses to produce magnificent poetry in his mother tongue. Between 1850 and 1885 a noticeable change was occurring in the attitude of the new middle class. The Baboo was cutting his teeth. The spread of English education was only making the educated despair of being treated as equals of their masters in offices. The report of the Indian Education Commission of 1882 gives the following figures of higher education, as imparted by the Calcutta University: 1495 First Arts, 548 B.A., and 112 M.A.'s came out between 1857 and 1871. In the next ten years, the corresponding figures were 2,666, 1,037, and 284. The best of the graduates got government jobs, but the majority were not sure. Besides, the superior Imperial Services were not open to them. The discontent led to the agitation for throwing them open.[5] Petitions and memorandums were submitted by various bodies, with the British Indian Association at their head. Magazines and platforms

were vigorously utilised. At last three Indian Civilians came in. One of them, the late Surendra Nath Banerjee, had to leave the service soon, and became the father of Indian Nationalism. He was ably assisted by the famous barrister M. Ghosh who had failed in the I. C. S., and Lal Mohan who had failed to get returned to Parliament. Before Bankim Chandra wrote his Ananda Math, which contains the Bande Mataram, he had quarrelled with his immediate superior, Mr. Buckland. Similarly, Dinabandhu Mitra, the author of Neel Darpan, "The Mirror of the Indigo," for the publication of which the Rev. Mr. Long was sent to prison, was a Postal Superintendent. The tradition of the patriot-literary magistrate in Bengal is old;[6] it is still going strong. Bengali literature owes a great deal to the disgruntled Babu. The fact of the matter about him was this; he was meant to be a clerk with the possession of a fair smattering of the English language, a good handwriting, and loyal manners, but he started reading John Stuart Mill, Burke, Milton, Paine, Godwin, Comte, Kant, Hegel, and the rest of them. This was clearly not in the bargain. Macaulay intoned in 1853 that the Indian public's mind would outgrow the system it had fostered, demand better government, even European institutions. He was not sure whether such a day would come. "But never will I attempt to avert or retard it. Whenever it comes it will be the proudest day in English history." The demand did not take long to come, but its satisfaction was a different story. In the meanwhile, Macaulay triumphed, and Indians showed their 'scholarship' in English in their fulminations against English

prejudices in India. Really, the standard of expression in the weekly and monthly periodicals of those days was so literary that by its side the style of our best authors in English looks journalese. So far so good, but the new class was also really behaving like Oliver Twist.

In this period, Indians suddenly became conscious of their past. Rajah Rajendra Lala Mitter, Sir Ram Krishna Bhandarkar, Indraji and others followed in the footsteps of Wilkins, Jones, Du Perron, Colebrooke, Wilson, Max Muller, Prinsep and Cunningham. The rationalist Bankim took to the Bhagwat Geeta, and wrote on Lord Krishna in the spirit of Renan on Christ. Articles appeared on the military prowess of the ancient Hindus, their medicine, astronomy and philosophy. The certificates of Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Emerson were shown with pride. India was great when Great Britain was steeped in Cimmerian darkness and Europe was a jungle. Of course, none cared about the *social* history of the Indian people in those days. There is not one indication anywhere of the barest recognition of the *social*[7] forces that had destroyed the glorious period. Either it was the work of Providence or the fault of the Muslims! At this time, an old Purana was unearthed in which Queen Victoria's name occurred, her rule blessed, and the Indo-British connection stated as the will of Providence.* The spirit behind research and the limitations of its scope were set by middle class romanticism, even when the method was learned beyond cavil. The new literati were in search of moral support. A parallel phenomenon was the birth and growth of the Historical School in Germany in

reaction to Napoleon's regime. But the analogy need not be ridden to death. For one, the Prussians had the Junker caste, and for another, a genuine bourgeoisie was rising there on the ashes of the feudal order. The results were naturally different: there the Prussian State, here the Indian National Congress.

A deeper reaction than that of the Babus and the scholars came in the wake of a religious revival. It was more than a reaction, it was almost a revulsion. Elsewhere we have dealt with this subject and shown its nationalistic affiliations. Here we can only note the educational aspects of the question. Bhudeb Mukhopadhya, Raj Narayan Bose, Kali Prasanna Sinha, Maharaja Radhakanta, Rajah Kamal Krishna, Raja Kali Krishna, the Burdwan, the Natore and the Dinajpore Raj families, and various others among the old and the new rich, became patrons of the Oriental learning and manners. They dressed themselves like Indians, supported a large number of dependants, and were surrounded by Pandits. All of them, barring Raj Narayan who was not rich, endowed Sanskrit Pathsalas, and made Pandits read or edit Sanskrit texts and translate them into Bengali for popularising them. The late Bhoodeb Chandra wrote on the Hindoo social system, the first sociological treatise on Indian Society written by an Indian; and Raj Narayan, the beef-eater[8] of earlier days, lectured on the "superiority of Hindooism over all other forms of Faith", under the auspices of the National Society. Raj Narayan inspired Naba Gopal Mitra in founding the Hindu Mela and a national paper, but could not make him favour a democratic form of govern-

ment. The 'National Naba-Gopal' thought that India was destined to be religious and that dictatorial rule was most suited to India.[9] Bhoodeb, the first Indian Inspector of Schools, did not care much for representative government and the like, and remained an orthodox gentleman of some charm. Another well-known writer of this school, Akshay Chandra Sircar, went so far as to say (1874) that Islam was the real difficulty in the national unity of India and that India was not a nation.[10] Bankim Chandra, the first graduate, was an extraordinary man, and not simply a first class man of letters; he was a genuine radical. It was he who advocated the use of the Bengali, who realised the plight of the masses, and pleaded for equality (in an essay subsequently withdrawn),[11] saw through the pretensions of the new bourgeoisie, and wanted democratic forms of government; and yet in his scheme of things the Muslims did not come in. Whatever the Hindu defenders of Bankim may say, his novels do not show many traces of affection for the Muslims. He and Akshay Chandra lived on the opposite banks of the Ganges; they were poles apart in most things; yet they met on the common ground of an anti-Islamic attitude. Similarly, Sisir Kumar Ghosh, the elder of the Patrika Ghoses, was a good democrat, in parts. His writings are worth studying even today. There is hardly anything in the Congress ideology today, right from passive resistance, economic nationalism, the role of the panchayats, down to anti-imperialism, which cannot be found there.[12] And yet, he too. Here are two excerpts.[13] "The operatives in our mills are not slaves; or in other words, they are at perfect liberty to serve in the mills or give up their

employment and seek a livelihood elsewhere." Sisir Kumar had also written on the miserable condition of the people of Jessore and advocated tariffs to foster Indian industries. On education: "The real point at issue is not whether the education of the lower classes is desirable or not, there is but one opinion on this point, but whether it is desirable to extend lower education at the expense of the higher." Sisir Kumar had previously pleaded for the rapid, even compulsory, extension of the vernacular and its inclusion as a medium of instruction. He had even wanted vocational training for the commonalty. He did not notice these contradictions; he probably resolved them by his Vaishnavism, as Bankim did through the use of the Sannyasin in his novels. If the radicals were middle class in their moorings, and completely indifferent, if not hostile, to the Muslims and to the masses, it was difficult for others to realise that they too were sons of the soil, equal to the Hindus in their common subjection and impartial poverty. Such radicalism could be boiled down to the protection of Hinduism, the equation of India to the land of the Hindoos, that of the Hindoos with the middle classes who would not remain clerks and Deputy Collectors in the Subordinate Services but would go up higher and higher until they reached the ante-rooms of the Belvedere. This legacy of Hindoo resurgence and middle-class domination became the mortmain of the Congress. It was invested in Nationalism; and the interest is Pakistan. The mischief started in Bengal, and has lasted longest in Bengal.

But the Muslims soon realised that English

education was leading the Hindoos to power and being rationalised into a doctrine of Hindu nationalism. The Muslim leaders reached the above conclusion first in Bengal, because English education, English domination over culture, English stranglehold over the economic life of the people, English creation of Hindoo zamindars came first in that province. The Calcutta Madrassa had been established by Warren Hastings for creating clerks and officers. When Lord Bentinck recruited the majority of judges from the Muslims, the Hindus complained against his partiality in the pages of a newspaper.[14] But it was clear that the Muslims were not taking full advantage of the English classes and the Anglo-Persian department of the Madrassa that had been opened soon after English became the official language. Only four Muslims in all became Junior Scholars between 1826 and 1851.[15] In 1852, Lord Ellenborough in his evidence before the House of Commons wanted two chambers of Legislature for India, the one for the Hindoos and the other for the Muslims. Halliday thought that the real objection to the representation of Indians in a Legislative body was that the Hindoos and the Muslims were so divided. Amery & Co. are so unoriginal. On the other hand, Peary Mitter reasoned against separate representation; the Hindu Mahasabha could not better his arguments. So, naturally, in 1853, when stipends to Muslim scholars in the Madrassa were being abolished, there was a mammoth meeting in Calcutta. Be it said to the credit of the organisers of the meeting that the objection it lodged was not directed against favouritism towards the Hindus, but towards attempts at

the religious conversion of the natives, Hindus and Muslims alike, through the encouragement of English education. As yet, religious fervour counted. But by 1856, it yielded place to the forces with which we are familiar today. In that year, the Mahomedan Association and the National Mahomedan Association, and in 1863, the Mahomedan Literary Society were founded, all in Calcutta, by the English scholars among the Muslims. Abdul Lateef, the first Muslim Junior Scholar, in a paper on Muslim education in Bengal read in Calcutta in 1868, said: "Mahomedan education can never cease to have a strongly marked feature of political interest, which will force itself on the notice of all who desire to make the enlightenment of the Indian races the handmaid of loyalty and devotion to the British power. I beg you to bear in mind that it is no longer open to debate whether respectable Mahomedans are willing to have their children imbued with the principles of a sound, healthy education." Mr. Abdul Lateef wanted a separate College for the Muslims. Sir Sayyid Ahmad's Aligarh College established in 1872 was the concrete realisation of Mr. Lateef's dreams. Once it got going, the Aligarh movement became co-terminous with the history of English education among Muslims in India. Haji Mahommad Mohsin's heavily endowed trust for Muslim students came into operation the next year. It was clear that Muslim education in English was at last on its legs. Justice Mahmood,[16] the son of Sir Sayyid collected these comparative figures: College going Muslims in 1881-82—Bengal 106, Madras 30, N. W. P. 29, the Punjab 13, Oudh 7, Bombay 7:

High School Muslim population—Bengal 3,831, Madras 117, Bombay 118, the Punjab 91. In the period between 1858-1893, Calcutta University Muslim graduates numbered 290, Bombay 30, Madras 29, the Punjab 102, and Allahabad 102. The year 1881-82 is an important year in the history of Muslim education. The National Mahomedan Association of Calcutta submitted a memorial to Lord Ripon in which the circumstances leading to the decay of the Muslim position were mentioned, and a demand was made for a new policy of the government in regard to Muslim education. The newness consisted in separate educational facilities. The Central Government was only too willing to oblige. It referred the Muslims to the result of examinations as qualification for higher jobs, but mentioned the High Courts, Local Governments and local officers who could "redress the inequality," obviously without regard to intellectual merit. The subordinate officers were accordingly impressed upon to do their best. But it seems that the Muslim leaders knew that nothing would be achieved. In 1883, Mr. M. Yusuf was compelled to claim 'separate representation' for his community in local self-government, on two grounds: (1) education can only be acquired by practice, (2) "When there is party spirit and angry feeling between the two classes of people, it is necessary to reserve power for the representation of the minority." But Mr. Yusuf would remain content with reservation of seats for any minority by religion. He was, however, a democrat compared to such worthies as Kristo Das Pal and Maharaja Tagore who opposed the introduction of local self-government. He even wanted

votes for women.[17] This queer mixture of democracy with reserved representation continued to be the feature of Muslim attitude in every sphere of demand, until Mr. Jinnah prescribed Pakistan as the panacea.

From 1885 onwards the progress of education in English became rapid. Two events with deep social significance took place about this time: (1) The Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act. By this the loopholes in the Act of 1859, which had given occupancy rights to tenants who had cultivated the same land continuously for 12 years, were closed, and the tenant, to enjoy occupancy rights as under the previous Act, could cultivate any land in the same village for 12 years. The result was the legal recognition of what had been happening for some time past—viz., the growth of a class intermediate between the actual tillers of the soil and the Zamindar, in other words, the Kulaks of Bengal. They soon developed a thirst for education and pressed for services, after sub-letting their land in turn to the lower tenants. The importance of the Act consisted in the breach of the first line of defence of the newly privileged and in the greater ease of circulation than before. Since then there has been no turning back on English education, until Tagore and Sir Asutosh Mookerji revolutionised the whole outlook of education in India.

(2) On the 28th December, 1885, the first sitting of the Indian National Congress took place in Bombay under the presidency of Mr. W. C. Bonnerji, the famous barrister of Calcutta. The first voice heard in that hall, which was that of a Sanskrit College, was Mr. Hume's. Four objects

of the Congress were defined by the President: Promotion of personal contacts between 'the more earnest workers' in India's cause throughout the Empire; eradication of race, creed and provincial prejudices to consolidate the development of national sentiment that had begun under Lord Ripon; the recording after full discussion of the opinions of 'the educated classes' on some important social questions; and the determination of political action by 'native politicians' in the next year. Nine resolutions were passed. The first wanted a Royal Commission on Indian Administration, and the second the abolition of the India Council. (Sir Stafford Cripps was pleasantly surprised when he was told of the demand in 1942. Mr. Amery was, of course, quietly filling up its vacancies when Cripps' mission was being proposed). The third demanded elected members in existing councils and the creation of three new bodies, the fourth proposed simultaneous examination for the I. C. S., the fifth and sixth criticised military expenditure, the seventh protested against the annexation of Upper Burma, the eighth ordered the despatch of the Congress resolution to different political associations for further discussion, and the ninth fixed the next venue in Calcutta. Before Tilak, no material change was effected in the main attitude of the Congress demands as embodied in the above resolutions. The social composition of the Congress remained upper middle class, and naturally all the demands were couched in the cultured language of highly educated people, distinguished as lawyers and steeped in the constitutional laws and practices of England. The infiltration theory in education was working in

driblet,[18] but with a vengeance. With the introduction of the Tilak School, the general composition became middle-middle class, of course, in the same specious sense of the term. The composition underwent a further change after 1919 when Gandhiji took up the reins and broadened the basis of the organisation to include the lower middle class. The middle-middle class took to responsive Co-operation, or Swarajist tactics as it was newly baptised, but without breaking with the Congress. This withdrawal of the intelligentsia from the sphere of political agitation into that of sulking co-operation created a vacuum between the classes which all institutions abhor. In the meanwhile, Commerce-Capital had received a tremendous impetus during the War, and one branch got a chance of evolving into Industrial Capital and throwing up at last a genuine middle class. The new bourgeoisie felt baulked by the British competition. It swung over to the side of the new Congress. The second agency for filling the vacuum was the old Hindu nationalism in a new garb. Now that the Khilafat movement had failed, revulsion flowed back to the Hindu Mela ideology. Tilak too had a share in it, but he died prematurely. The educated Congressmen or nationalists of any other persuasion would not openly declare with 'national' Naba Gopal, that Islam was the chief barrier to India's nationalism, but they would speak in another language, *e.g.*, dangers of vivisection, menace to the Fundamental Cultural Unity of India, and so on. The capitalists in the Congress rank were all Hindus, very religiously minded. Twaney's thesis was proved to the hilt,[19] but Weber's could not be,[20] in

the absence of any 'rational' ethics. The devotion of the capitalists to the Mahatma could ill square with rationalism. The result is that today, with the incursion of the lower middle class and of the merchant and the industrial capitalists, a premium has been given to definite anti-intellectual tendencies in our political thinking. It seems that the old trickle of culture that the infiltration theory of English education had released has dried up, and that some supreme act of self-immolation before a God unknown is necessary to make a fresh spring of life flow. From now on, nothing but Basic Education paying the utmost regard to the objective social situation would do. The masses must come to their possession; the work of Tagore and Sir Asutosh should be carried out to its logical conclusion.

It is really astonishing that the Supreme Poet of India should also be a great pedagogue, one of her very greatest.[21] As early as 1890, Tagore had violently reacted against the abstraction of the prevalent system of education and compared the Indian educated with a man on crutches, worse off than the unlettered savage who at least knew the use of his arms. The poet had never taken kindly to the discipline of the schools and had played truant all along. So when in 1901 he settled in his father's estate at Shanti-Niketan he got his life's chance to give effect to the various ideas that he had been maturing. His idea was to 'catch them young.' Children in contact with nature and in co-operation with their own group would learn to feel and do rightly. Self-reliance and hardihood would be the meed of their initiative. They would learn through their mother tongue and thus think correctly and

concretely. There would be no bar to self-expression. Once feeling and curiosity were trained, the boys would study nature, in the pucca Western manner. The third phase of the rhythm would be awareness of India, her past, through researches, her present; through living links with the economic life of the people, and her future, as a chief contributor to the progress of humanity and its unity which the Indian youth should almost religiously seize. The Poet's pedagogy was not poetic, nor was it a throw-back to the forests; it was very rigorous, very modern, and very comprehensive. He would be satisfied with nothing less than the education of the whole man. He was a great believer in the Gestalt-Psychology, and would often practise it in his classes with the children. Being fundamentally a musician he would make the beats of life suit its rhythms. Such a programme could hardly be realised in full in a subject country, but more has been accomplished in Shanti-Niketan in the way of a genuine national renaissance than in any other educational institution in India.

And yet, Shanti-Niketan has not brought about a socially revolutionary change in the country. To the regret of the Poet, it was falling into line with other official universities. Nobody was disappointed that it was not producing civilians, say, like the Allahabad University, but the country expected that it would at least produce their victims. Shanti-Niketan, in solitary grandeur, stood out of the political movement.[22] Then again, many people felt that it was just a poet's experiment, his Leela, and nothing more. Sri-Niketan, with its rural reconstruction programme, the ring of Co-operative

Societies, the Melas, the folk-songs and plays, looked like an effort, and an effort from the top at that, a tour de force. Somehow, people felt that it did not strike roots, though rootedness was the very aim of the Poet's endeavour. Shanti-Niketan was grounded on the initial assumption that individual will and capacity could outstrip the material context. Its neglect in the life-time of the Poet,[23] the patronising and meaningless solicitude towards it after his demise, the stupendous indifference towards its ideals and their occasional misconstruction, are no doubt so many pointer-readings of our low standards of values. True also that neglect, pity, indifference are a homage which the spurious pay to the authentic. Still the fact remains to be explained why the spurious are at all congregated in India which cannot afford them. There is nothing wrong with Shanti-Niketan, only it is not held by the frame, not seized by the immediate context. And it is the immediate that is the dramatic, be it even the manufacture of an ounce of salt out of a ton of sea-water.

There was another valuable experiment, the National Council of Education in Bengal, in the first decade of this century. Starting as a protest against the Bengal Partition, a band of patriots and scholars wanted to start a University on which Curzon's fiats and Risley's circulars would not be binding. Aurobinda Ghosh was its Principal, and his staff was brilliant. Gradually, however, the educational ardour was displaced by extremist political fervour; the arts department was closed, the teachers went away in search of better pay, and the technological section developed into the Technological College

at Jadavpur. It is a fine institution, but the original inspiration seems to have languished.

But modern Indian education in India is co-terminous with Sir Asutosh Mookerjee. For a full quarter of a century he ruled the intellectual life of Bengal and the destiny of her youth. His influence was felt throughout the land. He was the un-official Vice-Chancellor of every Indian University. He was more than a pedagogue. We do not think that he had any cut and dried educational theory. But he summed up all our educational ideals, raised our intellectual dignity, and enhanced our self-confidence to pursue knowledge in all its branches and hold our own against the best in the world. Not that we have produced very many of the best, but even those rare few whom we have, drew their inspiration from his encouragement. His assistance was not confined to the Bengalis alone. For some years, out of seven University Professors at Calcutta not one was a Bengali. Under him the Calcutta University became the University of Asia. Professors in other centres of learning in India would receive their communications from European and American Universities addressed C/o The Calcutta University. All this is well known and has been duly praised, perhaps over-praised. But what has been ignored is the fact that by his educational work he touched our society basically and affected our culture vitally. He is alleged to have lowered the standard of all examinations, from the Matriculation onwards, and thus created the problem of unemployment. On the credit side, he definitely spread the love of research, raised the status, not simply of Bengali,

but of Pushtu even, and introduced Bengali in the University curriculum as a subject of serious study and in the schools as a medium of instruction. What is the social significance of his deeds and misdeeds ?

The first series of actions resulted in a very large increase in the school and college-going population. Roundabout 1918-20, the proportion of scholars seeking to profit by college education under the auspices of the Calcutta University to the total number of school students was the highest in the whole world. Naturally, their number, and it was on the increase, frightened the vested interests who spared no pains to declare them unfit. Journalists, provincial governments, employers, and members of the liberal professions, lawyers, doctors, bemoaned and condemned the lowering of the ancient standard. The critics probably did not know that about the same period, at least in three independent countries elsewhere, Great Britain, France, and the U. S. A., the same lament was being voiced in reports on their educational progress. They brushed aside in a superior manner the consideration that the reduction in the general level, if any, might as well be the cumulative consequence of 60 years' teaching through a foreign medium. They completely ignored the fact that this large quantity was throwing up a scholar or two of high quality who would raise the status of India before the world. But entrenched privilege never fumbles for reason to hide its own fears. The fact of the matter was this: Young men from social groups which had no previous trade or traffic with education were now gambling with it.

These groups were 'outsiders'. Peasants were stinting themselves to send their young folk to schools and colleges. This social phenomenon was interpreted as the naïve love of degrees among the unfit who were being mollycoddled by Sir Asutosh. In reality, it only meant the bankruptcy of the entire social economy that had been foisted upon the country. The system of land-ownership, divested as it was of any interest in the land apart from battening upon its surplus or differentials, was reaching its crisis with dwindling rent-receipts and the waxing number of the landless. The cultural consequence was the breach in the barrier of educational costs and privileges. Not even the plucked B. A. would like to go back to his slum-relations in the villages to feel out of tune there, now that his hopes had been lifted, his horizon enlarged by his stay in Calcutta, by incessant talks in tea-shops, and even by the dull lectures on Political Theories in the class room. In case he went back, he would eventually sink, be swallowed up in the family, land intrigues and village-gossip, but he would lose respect for those who had monopolised the fruits of the earth. The Deputy Magistrate would no longer fascinate him, nor would the Zamindar and the Police Sub-Inspector hold any terror for him. Above all, he would want to marry the girl of his choice, though he would end by marrying the choice of his parents. In the meanwhile, he would pour out his soul in verse and music. This demolition of barriers between the middle-middle and the lower middle classes, and the opening out a small breach for the tenant classes to come up through education was no small change for

a hermetically sealed society. Sir Asutosh effected it and created the conditions for the resulting sense of maladjustment. The sphere of elite had suddenly enlarged, and with it the possibility of a still quicker mobility.

Another important sociological consequence of Sir Asutosh's 'lack of discrimination' has been the turning away of the minds of our scholars from safe and fat berths to the acceptance of a life of risks and uncertainties. The social gain is immeasurable, and compensates for all personal inconveniences. So long as the support was sure and prospects secure, the only virtue demanded of the incumbents was conformity to rules of service. Among the large number of Government officers in the educational services, or of teachers in private colleges, a microscopic minority were interested in equipping themselves further with advanced knowledge. Scientific research among the P. E. S. was nil, with two or three exceptions. The reason was not so much the absence of a research-atmosphere, as the absence of a need for research in well-coigned seats of advantage. To put it bluntly, there was no economic incentive to research, and no incentive can be half so effective with teachers as preferment. Seniority and recruitment from Great Britain had made it all un-necessary. On the other hand, in the last twenty-five years, among the new entrants to services in Universities, and even in private colleges, a greater proportion of research-scholars is noticeable. Whether the quality of teaching has improved or not is an entirely different matter. Given the usual wirepulling and other influences, a great premium has

been put since Sir Asutosh's regime upon some achievement as qualification for the holding of educational posts. If Sir Asutosh had merely lowered the initial barrier, he could have been blamed for throwing the unworthy into the hands of wolves that were baying at the door. But along with the opening out of the arena of competition, he intensified its quality, and along with intensification, he showed to the intrinsically worthy that the release of the tension could be reduced by their own scholarly efforts. In fact, what Tilak is held to have done in politics Sir Asutosh did for education. Both proved that mendicancy by a large number of people was not a business proposition. Both dragged host of men into their movement. Both gave a chance to quantity to throw up quality and thus be transformed by it.

We have previously coupled Sir Asutosh's name with Tagore's. The way that was paved by the former has made possible the latter's influence to spread far and wide. But for those 'worthless graduates' the recent tendencies of our literature would have been inconceivable. It is well known that Tagore has raised the level of competence and made it impossible for any literary endeavour to fall below a certain minimum. The very large number of minor artists who are filling up the pages of numerous magazines and publishing books of all kinds and types are mostly recruited from the graduates belonging to the lower middle class. So Sir Asutosh's achievement in the matter of circulation of the literary elite is clearly marked.

Other finer arts have also been invaded by the graduates. Formerly, painting and music were

the preserve of the ne'er-do-well. Boys who could not get promotion from one class to another would be shunted off to an art-school. Musicians came from those for whom all hopes had been abandoned by their guardians. The situation has changed for the better; artists are no longer pariahs, illiteracy and plastic or musical abilities do no more go together in the public mind of today. The active revival of music, as demonstrated by the number of college students among its votaries and by the effort to create new forms, is certainly a sign of change. Even in matters relating to business, particularly in Insurance, the influx of educated people has led to an unprecedented expansion and a consequent heightening of standard. (Advertisements of Insurance Companies are the mainstay of many literary journals in Bengal). If the snobbishness of the older types of graduates had not been thus broken by the new educational policy, all this would have been impossible. It is also a statistical conclusion that the craze of Bengali students for taking English degrees in humanistic studies perceptibly diminished in Sir Asutosh's regime, and the number of those desirous of availing themselves of opportunities for scientific research and technical studies offered by English, and particularly American and German Universities, did show an upward tendency.

Along with the above, nobody coming to the Calcutta University from the Continent, America or England dared ape Western manners. This nationalism in manners in other provinces is partly due to the recent political movement of Mahatma Gandhi. In Bengal, it is older and can be traced

to the earlier Swadeshi movement of Bengal. But Sir Asutosh' and Tagore's examples were better than any precept. Behind the examples was the economic fact that the middle class young men, even of the lower stratum, now could and did go to foreign Universities, and when they came back they could ill afford to live in any style above their own. Bengal's case is typical of India; only the time-lag is a sore.

What are the cultural consequences of the progress of English education among Muslims? The effects are similar, because the main outlines of the context are Indian, and, therefore, common. Yet, a few differences may be noted and their nature analysed. The Muslim students in the Punjab and the U. P. are still recruited from the upper middle class on account of the high costs of education. Stipends and scholarships have not yet opened the flood-gates. True that an Aligarh boy does no longer stand out by virtue of his office, manners and dress, but his standard is any day higher than that of his counterpart in Dacca, which city is commonly held to be the centre of a Muslim region. In the Western province of Pakistan, a Muslim student, say, of the Government College at Lahore, can only be beaten by his Sikh class fellow in the quality of his dress and his out-of-pocket expenses. In the Lucknow and the Allahabad Universities only the Momin Muslim students are avowedly poor. Agra has not yet developed a tradition of scholarly expenses. This middle-middle class Muslim student community must have jobs, in the search for which they come into conflict with the Hindu students. Muslim young men who come from very well-to-do classes or the poorer sections become atheists, radicals,

rationalists, materialists and Communists, almost to a man. They soon throw off their lumber, and skip over social stages with the ease of a swallow. Whatever is happening to modern Urdu literature is at their instance. Probably, it is unfair to them even to suggest that these Muslim young men hold the key to the future culture of India. They have to be 'Muslim' in compliance with G/O A to Z, and as a concession to their birth and to the prejudice of their Hindu friends who shall find the Muslim in them. The truth is that they are the freaks of to-day, and the probability is that they will be the normals of tomorrow.

In Bengal, the picture of Muslim education is different. There the number of Muslim students in schools and colleges has been the largest and the solicitude of the government and the educational authorities has been the greatest. Special institutions, special stipends, special qualifications were amply provided. Much of this treatment was due to the fact that the Muslim formed the majority community, and part of it to the fact that the new school and college-going population came from the middle tenant classes who were mostly Muslim. A survey[24] of the economic condition of the Dacca University students showed the utter poverty of the Muslim boys. When they went out of the College or the University, they became job-hunters. The Government could satisfy some, but not all. The Hindus and the brethren in faith from other provinces stood in the way. Communalism and Provincialism developed fast. Attempts were made to introduce Urdu, but they did not meet with success. The Urdu spoken

by the average Bengali Muslim is not even a slang. So far, only in three cultured Muslim families of Bengal Urdu is spoken at home. But there the ladies are imported from outside Bengal, and boys sent to Aligarh or to the Doon School. Nothing is known of any solid contribution by the Bengali Muslim to Urdu literature, except the effort to introduce Urdu words into Bengali texts by semi-literate Maulavis.[25] An eminent Bengali politician had once replied to a criticism of his incorrect English grammar, "It is deliberate, Sir. When I cannot murder an Englishman, I can only murder his language." But this effort, though not yet given up, has been laughed out of court by the Muslim writers in Bengali who are as fond of the language of Bankim and Tagore as anybody else is in Bengal. Naturally, when a Muslim writes about his community, certain words used at home come in. But they need not be misfits, just as the account of their life and habits, when it is not a repetition of the life and habits of the Hindu petty bourgeoisie, should only enrich. Unfortunately, very few novels, stories and poems by Muslim writers in Bengal have struck a new path, as one would have expected. Which only proves that Muslim education in recent years is of the same sociological order of importance as Hindu education was in 1885. The Muslim society in Bengal, after getting rid of the incubus of the higher classes of the Murshidabad, Patna, Mysore, and the Lucknow variety, is now entangled in the conflict between the middle-middle and the lower middle classes. A conjecture may, however, be hazarded that the circulation will be quicker here than among the

Hindoos. The number of farm-labourers in Bengal[26] is increasing fast, and the Muslim society stands to suffer most from it. The last Tenancy legislation has broken the fall, no doubt, but its full import cannot yet be realised. Only its connection with the recent wide-spread riots in East Bengal, so long described as outbursts of religious frenzy, has been officially recognised by the McNair report. So, Muslim education in Bengal at least is going the way of all flesh in India. It is speeding up the circulation, but within the generic limits of the spurious class, called the Indian middle class. In other words, the speed is not yet enough to break the barriers of artificial interests. Compare the so-called Islamic songs by Bengali Muslim writers with those in the film-life of a Hindu saint; only Brindaban is substituted by a Muslim holy place. It is the same attitude, the same reeking sentimentality, the same unreality, as only a frustrated class can exude.

It would seem that I have excluded Aligarh. But Aligarh pedagogy is of the same sociological order as of any other University *plus* the sports, the *achkan* and the cap.

Hyderabad is a different story. It is Indian India, with a feudal aristocracy of jagirdars living in little islands of their own, with the masses, mostly Hindus, lapping the shores. Within these aits, the communal differences do not exist, and a cultural synthesis of some sort has already been achieved. When the Osmania University was started with Urdu as the medium of instruction even in the higher courses of Science, objection was raised by the Hindus that the attempt was non-social, nay

anti-social. Yet, whatever scholarship and research is to be found among the Muslims mostly comes from the Osmania. The writer has had it from one of the very few first-rate Indians in Mathematical Physics that the students of that University, with the help of their Urdu text-books, show as much grasp of the subject as any other group of Indian students who have a wider range of books in English, French and German to draw upon. The same holds true of other branches of learning. Most of these graduates are being absorbed in the State services which have been expanding rapidly of late. Unemployment is not yet a problem in Hyderabad. Sociologically, only a bureaucracy is being formed today. Being an Urdu-knowing caste with no roots in the life of the people, its cultural future is uncertain. At best, that culture can have the rare beauty of an excrescence.

Outside these main currents stand the numerous resolutions of Muslim Educational Conferences asking the Government and the Nawabs to protect and foster Muslim language and culture. Their significance is not educational, but political. They only prove that the Muslim community is becoming self-conscious. The special features of Muslim education are being treated in the theological schools,[28] by the Maulanas, most of whom, in contrast with the Hindu Pandits, at least in the U. P., are nationalists to the marrow of their bones, 'Congress-minded' in the official language.

The final social result of a hundred years of English education may now be indicated. The lower middle class is everywhere on the increase, but only up to a point. It is not a geometrical point, but a

demographic boundary, broad and shifting. But the limit is determined, on one side, by the economic interests of the upper group which the earlier educational policy had partly served. But bigger social forces have at last enlarged that original set and increased the social mobility of the middle class. When that has happened it is found that English education strengthens the last barrier between that expanding spurious class and the masses.[27]

CHAPTER V

LITERATURE AND CLASS-EXPRESSION

So far we have been describing the objective situation in the context of which modern Indian Culture developed. Its essential resulting feature is the feeling of historical frustration which the original stock of middle class that could most profit by contacts with the West now felt in its bones. The substitutes offered by the East India Company, and subsequently by the British Government, were land ownership and facilities for education in English. The facts that the first remained unconnected with agricultural productivity and the second with the main stream of Indian cultural traditions amply show that the alternatives were not socially sufficient. We know too well that the zamindars became parasites on land and the graduates job-hunters. But in course of time their numbers, through sub-tenures and the extension of schools, increased, and quickened the social mobility. But since then nothing has happened to their structure vis à vis the people. The Indian middle class is still a spurious class and has no roots in the soil, however desperately it may try to strike them. Its inner bastions have fallen, but the no-man's land outside remains. The sense of impotence inside and fear of the people on the other side haunt its precarious existence and overhang its achievements in literature and fine arts. One could also mention in illustration the slow growth of science and tech-

nology. Literary efforts are our immediate concern in this section, and science has not yet entered into Indian Culture. The subject is vast, and we can only suggest the very broad outlines.

All the provincial languages which are creating a literature of their own today first came into prominence in the medieval period in the wake of the mystic disturbance described in the first chapter. That movement was mainly of the Bhakti cult and primarily protestant in spirit. So our provincial literatures started with the double legacy of religious emotionalism and doctrinal dissent in the name of Love, Intuition and Man. It is to be noted that those provinces *e.g.*, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, which enjoyed these legacies more than others, were the first to take English literature with its inner soft core and rough husks of individuality unto their bosom. The historical truth is that the humanism and non-conformity that we find in modern Indian literature are not solely the gifts of the West. English literature only reduced the size of the letters in Love and Man, and reinforced the sentimentality. The former was a gain, but the latter is a definite loss. Gain it was, because the little man had been swallowed in the triumphant assertion of Chandidas that Man was the supreme Truth, but only some gain, because in the absence of more concrete forms of equality the spiritual side of the Vaishnava conception of Humanity was extremely valuable[1]. A definite loss it has been in numerous ways; e.g., an unbalanced development of poetry at the expense of prose and criticism, the enlargement of the centres of weakness in the heart of Indian sentiments, (the sort of thing one finds in the description of

Nellie's death in the Old Curiosity Shop, only multiplied and repeated ad nauseam), and a morbid puritanism which made Bankim Chandra forbear from describing how his hero kissed his wife[2] and prompted him to wash the sin of a woman who had left her husband's house for a night by the purificatory ablution of a Sannyasin's blessings.[3] Modern Indian literature thus invested its legacy in British securities.

The spirit of non-conformity in Indian literature is as old as the Vedas. Even in the Brahmanas it raises its head, if not for long. It is there all over the earlier Pali and Jain literature. In the medieval period we have noticed its flowering at the green hands of the mystics. The Mangal-Kavyas of Bengal are very interesting in this way. They are paeans of gods and goddesses,[4] mostly of the earlier local variety, against whom the heroes and heroines revolt, but to whom they finally succumb. The hero in a number of cases is a merchant-prince[5] who can never escape the wrath of the god or the goddess he has offended. The merchants seemed to have adopted either a new religion, or a liberal, disrespectful and non-believing attitude towards the old.[6] And the older deities are cruel, very much so when they are women, as in the story of Behula and the Serpent-goddess. It also seems that sects were competing between themselves to enlist the support of the mercantile community or the Sresthis. Subsequent history does not record a synthesis or a hegemony, though later Vaishnavism captured the business-ethics, fairly completely. The folk-literature proper, usually a cycle of local legends, has less to do with gods

than with human beings in their daily love and living.[7] Occasionally, politics intervene, and we get glimpses of the doings of royal courts. Otherwise, local squabbles in which the hero and the heroine belong to opposite camps, even to forbidden castes and communities, are the main preoccupations. These tales are so fresh and light by the side of the classics in their heavy armour, so heterodox in their ruling attitudes, and so deliciously secular within the larger and remoter ambit of the divine! Yet it should never be forgotten that all this freshness disappeared. Hindi literature, one of the most secular of the Indian languages, succumbed to an Alexandrine complexity of types of sentiments, of heroes and heroines.[8] Rhetoric displaced poetry, until a Hindi poem became only a string of conceits.[9] Some excellent verses were no doubt being still produced, but their prosody is all that can be admired today. Its shackles still hang heavy upon the modern Hindi poets who are forced to suit their sentiments to the prescribed types of *chhanda* and *rasa*. The fondness with which modern Hindi poets cling to the well-worn categories and force their beloved into the prescribed types of 'nayikas' is pathetic. Modern Bengali poets thank their stars that they are the parvenues of the 19th Century. The Urdu poets with their Persian typology are less favourably placed. Their charter of freedom is very recent.

Sentimentalising of all manner is one of the chief characteristics of modern Indian literature. In religion it is an anodyne, in politics it is patriotism, in economics it is Utopia-mongering, in poetry it is lyricism with a dash of the moral and the spiritual.

Economics is mentioned[10] because very recently the heroes are all going back to the land and starting 'asrams' for the uplift of the masses. As in religion, so in other spheres; one part of this cloying sweetness comes from the Indian mystics, and another from the English literature of the Victorian period. The Vaishnava padavalis, Tulsidas' Ramayana, Bhaktamal, the vernacular translations of the epics, no doubt, are also great secular literature of which any country may be proud. At the same time, one cannot deny the existence of a very pronounced strain of the erotic emotion in the first, of emotional abandonment in the second, and a spirit of masochism in the third. Of all types of gush, the erotic is the most sickening; the artistic value of complete surrender cannot always keep pace with its spiritual significance; and masochism is so effeminate. To see Rama Chandra, the conqueror of the mighty Ravana, weeping over Seeta's disappearance or Lakshman's collapse may act as purges, but it palls. When Michael Madhusudan wanted to correct the tearfulness of Ram Chandra, he was condemned by the Pandits as unorthodox, satanic, diabolical. He too could not run away from the legacy, in spite of the fact that his models were Virgil and Milton. Later writers had only Scott, Byron, and Shelley. On the English side, we know it for certain that almost every vernacular literature that is of some importance today started with the translations of the English romantics in prose and verse. In China also, a similar procedure was adopted, but the result was different. The old humanist traditions of China were too powerful to be swamped.

Yet a subtler causation worked to implement and modify the Indian inheritance. It was offered by the mental climate of the class previously described. Contrast this class with the bourgeoisie of England or of the U. S. A., set off the Boston Brahmins in the flowering days of New England against the Poona Brahmins and the Bengali Babu, and you know the difference between Dickens, Hawthorne and the Indian novelist.[11] India did not have a genuine middle class; she was forced to have a substitute group; she felt baulked in every way; she did not have any interest in the soil excepting in what it could yield in the way of surplus and unearned increment. She was not economics-conscious, she only cherished her glories. The greater the feeling of deprivation, the greater the sentimentality. The Muslim memories of the recent past were stronger; the Muslims had less of the new class in their ranks; so their sentiment was mainly that of restoration.[12] In whichever linguistic area the new Bhadralok class sprang up, the new literature developed, and wherever it developed, it was reeking with emotions. Bengali emotionalism is a product of the Permanent Settlement and the Calcutta University. Gujerati sentimentality is less, because in Gujerat the native commercial class could not be liquidated so completely as in Bengal. If the entrepreneurs must have their exercise of the heart, the specious ones should have their orgies. Any drama, any Indian film, mythological or social, is a waste of tears in an expanse of shame. And it is not shame for the original sin, it is the shame of frustration, pure and

simple. Our literature is a perpetual nostalgia for the might have been. Even the so-called realism is romanticism reversed. An intelligent writer on modern Hindi Literature[13] has the following classification of its schools of poetry, vaisnavism, mysticism, nationalism, pessimism, and experiments in verse, and divides the Drama into the Romantic, and the Realistic. The examples of realism which he gives are streets away from the real stuff.

Another manner in which the frustration was sought to be worked out was through the historical novel and drama. We have already referred to the growth of the historical sense by the middle of XIX Century. Towards its close, Indians were fulfilling their wishes and seeking compensation through a literary resuscitation of their past. Rajput and Maharastra history was handy, the heroes had the right stature, and their enemies being Muslim sovereigns could satisfy the anti-Muslim sentiments and simultaneously avoid the laws of sedition against the established form of government. The national song 'Bande Mataram' was sung by a band of Hindu sannyasin rebels against the Muslim oppressors of the Motherland. Romesh Chandra Dutt is better known in Bengal for his novels of Maharastra's awakening[14] and decay than for his economic history. The dramas were yet more nationalistic. Occasionally, they were disguised in the mythological garb.[15] But usually, they had Muslim princes and princesses as their heroes and heroines. The lives of Sirajuddowla, Chand Bibi, and Razia Sultana were good meat. Occasionally, the heroes of

local fights furnished excellent materials for patriotism. Kanhayia Lal Munshi's historical novels, the trilogy on Patan, played an important part in the literary and political renaissance in Gujerat. Barring the works of Jaya Shankar Prasad and of a couple of others who are not very significant writers, the whole corpus of modern Hindi historical drama may be said to be a re-hash of D. L. Roy's experiments in that field. There is an idea current among critics in Hindi literature that D. L. Roy was a great artist with a highly developed sense of tragedy, history and drama. In the last scene of a Hindi drama on Ranee Durgabati, the widowed queen, after successfully resisting all blandishments and machinations, ascends to Heaven in all her glory. The Indian stage must have any number of royal dresses, saintly beards and angelic wings among its properties.

In the meanwhile, political intransigence was growing, and some people felt that they could do without the disguise of history. All of them were not literary men, the most well known being politicians. An interesting feature of modern Indian prose is its close connection with political journalism. The Kesari, the Andhra Patrika and the Navajiban may be rightly held to be the progenitors of modern prose in Maharastra, Andhra and Gujerat. Both Tilak and Gandhi are first-rate essayists in their languages. On the other hand, political essays in Bengali, if we leave Bipin Chandra Pal's and Tagore's aside, are not of that crystal quality. The reasons may be the greater rigour of the application of the laws of sedition, which made equivocation of the Ramsay MacDonald type a

virtue, and the greater fascination for a particular English style among the nationalists in Bengal. Whatever they are, it is to be noted that the first important orientation in Indian politics is contemporaneous with the growth of political prose in Bengal, Maharastra, Andhra and Gujerat. In Bengal, excellent prison-literature was the first abiding result.[16] Otherwise, the philosophy of nationalism adumbrated by Aurobinda Ghose in English became a plea for terrorism in exciting Bengali. In Maharastra, however, some of the best examples of historical research were not in English. As one great scholar said: "We have so long read English to know ourselves. Let them pick up our language now if they want to write about us." A sentiment none too liberal, but it made for good prose, clear, simple and direct.

The all-embracing sentimentality stood in the way of wit, humour and satire, only one form succeeding, that which enabled the writer to express his dissatisfaction without much offence to the state or the society. Our comedies are often crude and vulgar; when they are not, they are dismissed as too subtle, too intellectual, vide the fate of Tagore's comedies. Akbar's Urdu pieces, Bankim's Kamalakanta, D. L. Roy's comic songs are classics of their kind; but their softness could be better explained in terms of the authors' holding government jobs than by any innate gentleness of Indian nature. Of course, the Sanskrit and Persian classics are deficient in humour, but modern India could provide ample materials, at least for bitterness. What we find instead is a mild, amiable, reformist, didactic humour. The braver spirits, when they

were not puritans and fanatics, could ventilate their wit against *social* abuses with impunity. G. Appa Rao's Kanya Sulkam written in the Vizag dialect of Telugu is one of the cases in point. Otherwise, wit, irony and humour lose themselves in righteous indignation. India has not yet produced a Voltaire, though she is supposed to be on the brink of a revolution. A phrase that stabs, an article that kills, a book that demolishes—these are not Indian phenomena. They posit freedom and faith in reason, which are non-Indian commodities.

However much one might revolt against the sweetness of the vernacular literatures, their reformist zeal has always to be counted in their favour. Through prose, poetry and drama, the call went out for removing the injustices in the social system. The position of widows, particularly, the young ones, the conflict between the daughter-in-law and her new relatives, the problem of dowries, all came in under the fire of criticism. It was the family maladjustments which formed the main object of assault. Gradually, the attack developed on other fronts, chiefly, the caste-system and the Brahminical rule. The idea of romantic marriage based on the right of the individual to select the right partner soon became popular. What the various reformist movements were trying to do received impetus from the band of progressive writers that included women. Cases like these occurred: a father solemnly promised before the audience during the third act of a social drama that he would not charge the legitimate bridegroom price for his son who was a young Deputy Collector; a mother-in-law, after she had read a novel in which the young

heroine committed suicide, allowed her son to take his wife away with him to his place of employment; a young man offered himself as the groom for an ugly and blind heiress; young progressives of a village joined a delightful conspiracy to spoil an old man's third marriage; students with copies of literary magazines in their hands fell in love with either their second cousins or with the first fellow-girls they met at the gate of the college or in the bus. Till, say, 1910, the initiative for implementing literary action by conduct mainly rested with the males. Soon, the women took it up. But being essentially modest, our Indian girls only confined themselves to suicide, or life-long maidenhood, nursing or teaching. If compelled, they would practise the ideal of modern Indian womanhood in which the body belongs to the husband and his relations and children while the soul remains in elective affinity to the once beloved. Elopements prompted by literature were very, very rare. Usually, the influence of literature on women was manifest in their desire to separate from the joint family and have a respectable friend near by. Sarat Chandra Chatterji's portrayal of the woman in revolt did more for the emancipation of the Indian female than any Social Reform League ever did. More of him anon.

The reformist zeal in literature had certain limitations, however. The lower castes were more or less outside the pale of observation; and the social inequality was not further analysed into its essentials. In the main body of modern reformist literature in the Bengali language, only three references to the material base of social injustices occur.

Two are in the two lesser known essays of Bankim Chandra on the peasants and on the concept of equality, and the third is in Dinabandhu Mittra's Neel Darpan, in which the dramatist holds up a mirror to the exploitation of the indigo-planters. Even then, in the first two cases, the tone is not strident, and in the third, the attention of the reader is rivetted upon the Englishman's assault upon chastity rather than upon his economic exploitation, though the author's intention could be otherwise interpreted. The writers were government servants, and the shade of John Stuart Mill hid the Indian scene from Owen and Marx. The entire socialist literature of England and France in XIX Century had been completely missed by our men of letters. It was in the thirties of this century that it was seized, though seized loosely.

The second good thing about the tradition of sentiments was the love of nature that it generated. Unfortunately, after Kalidas, nature had been almost quashed by spiritual urgencies. She led an apologetic existence in the folk-songs and the folklore. In Kabir and Dadu, nature is a store-house of examples for the love of God, and of precepts for the conduct of man. With the medieval Hindi poets nature is a source of pathetic fallacies. But by the middle of the 19th century, descriptions of the physical environment begin to appear. At first, the environment is unusual, and often non-Indian. Soon, however, local colour prevails. One wonders how far this recognition of the countryside was the gift of English culture or of land-mindedness, the upsurge of a new sense of patriotism that turned the attention of the intellectuals

from the cities to the villages or just the admission of incompetence to understand the implications of an urban culture. The first explanation would be plausible in view of the supreme quality of English culture, its feeling for topography which stands out in English novels, stories, poems, paintings, and in English behaviour, even in India. But Shelley, Byron, Tennyson, the poets who affected the Indian poets most, had less of that feeling than other more typical, if minor, English poets. Sir Walter Scott's physical atmosphere of the Border, or Wordsworth's of the Lake District, had no counterpart in Bengal or Gujerat, and only some resemblance to that of the Western Ghats. There are no references to the Norwich school, for the matter of that, to any school of English landscape. So, the genuine English feeling was probably not directly communicated. On the other hand, it sometimes affected adversely. If the Koel and the cuckoo, the lotus and the jasmine were old, the nightingale and the hawthorn had to be introduced, no matter if they were not Indian. Two consequences flowed from it: (*a*) Nature's beauty became spiritual; (*b*) the description of Nature became un-natural, except in the hands of eccentrics and women. Nightingale=a bird, the eglantine=a flowering plant; this was the type of knowledge an Indian acquired in his school-days. 'Nature' in poetry thus became unreal and abstract, metaphysical, and all too human. Therefore, the other explanation of the new interest in nature is probably more adequate. The Indian middle classes were compelled to live in the cities, either as government servants or as absentee landlords; they did not

belong to that atmosphere; they disliked it; and romanticised the country-side in reaction. Still it was a gain that Nature had been detected, even if she could not yet be discovered. The moon, the river, the cloud, the broad sweep of the plains, the homeliness of thatched cottages and the majesty of the village banyan-tree began to hover over the literary scene in a way that had not been allowed by the schematising rhetorician of earlier days.

One more result of emotionalism and we may pass on to the more pleasant prospects of Indian literature. Neither in Sanskrit nor in Pali is there any trace of priggishness in matters of sex. The Indo-Persian bi-sexual freedom is well known. Everywhere, the man-woman relation is healthy. Gods and goddesses, princes and courtesans, princesses and their lovers obey the dictates of nature without fear of offence against a superior moral law. Certain divine creatures behaved worse than human beings and were tolerated in Heaven. Their love is seldom unreal. Sentimentality comes in for the first time in the Vaishnava padabali literature[17], when the bed is asked to hold and behold the play of spirit. Tantrik literature was saved by the severely practical but esoteric results of the physical union, and by the cult of the mother. But then its influence was much less than that of the Vaishnava verses. For one, it did not produce good poetry, and for another, its reading was confined to the upper castes who looked down upon the lower class Vaishnava sects[18] and their popular literature.[19] The social distance between the Tantrik and the Vaishnava sects was marked indeed.[20] The Victorian mood found a happy hunting ground

among the former. It was not exactly the puritanism of the John Knox type, but the prudery of the Victorian that invaded Indian literature through the activities of the reformists. Where the Brahmos, Victorian Virtue's own middlemen had any say, as in Bengal, blight fell on the natural, the so-called gross instincts and reduced men and women to straw and putty. No Bengali writer of eminence in the nineteenth century had any tactile sense. Decency had killed it. The pre-occupation with sex that one finds in more recent Indian literature[21] often makes it pornographic, but it is a legitimate reaction against the sheer hypocrisy of the older generation.

Tagore's name has been scrupulously avoided in the preceding description of the main outlines of Indian achievements in letters. It looks like understanding Soviet Russia without Lenin. But the reasons for not including him in my orbit so far are manifold. He has created the Indian literature of today, but he stands above the criticisms which its study yields. He is too big, and for many strenuous days earnest students will seek to interpret him. His creations cover almost every imaginable aspect of culture. What Maxim Gorki felt about Tolstoy after his death is felt by every Indian who has cared to know his contributions. The debt of gratitude weighs heavily on the self-respect of those who were born within the fifty years of his rule. Those who are now critical are only dismayed, overawed by his overwhelming greatness. He has made it difficult for us to be original. The new impulses in Andhra, Gujerat, Maharastra and Hindi poetry have emanated from him—in greater or less degree—this is admitted

by the writers themselves. In Bengal, there is nothing in the way of culture, what to talk of literature, that does not come from him or through him. He seems to have anticipated everybody, including those who write about the poor and the dispossessed.

That such a supreme genius should be thrown up by a subject people is a puzzle to the sociologist. He may be dismissed as a disease or a freak. But one who knew him or studied him well will not treat him thus. The social analysis given thus far does not fit him, this is an honest confession. Marxist interpretations of the fact of his greatness have been offered, but they are pathetically inadequate. Yet, he had his secret, apart from the personal one of being a genius. The secret was the Upanishad[22] and the appropriation of its doctrines for the world-view. Tagore proves the vitality of Indian culture, its capacity to give and take and build itself anew. The joy of living in tune with the Infinite, the dignity of the human soul, the sweep of creative unity, the assertion of the spirit against the bond of letter—these Upanishadic ideas enabled him to take in the Universe in a few giant-strides. It is wrong to explain him in terms of the East-West relation. Tagore is Indian all through, and being truly so, he absorbs the West easily. There was a time when he was called the Indian Shelley. Happily, those days are departed. We have not yet comprehended his greatness, but at least we know him to be one of the finest products of Indian culture. His specific contributions to *Indian* literature are the following:—

(*a*) Lyric poetry. His own lyricism at its full

is different from that of the English romantics, of the Sanskrit classics, and of the Vaishnava poets. Its quality is not that of 'wonder',[23] but of unison or oneness; it does not impose private feeling upon natural objects, nor does it dance attendance upon a particular doctrine of love.[24] At the same time, it looks very much like the well-known varieties. Reading him through translations, one is tempted to call him mystic, vague, dreamy, sentimental, wishy-washy. In the original, his lyric gifts concern the concrete.[25] Unfortunately, it is the soulfulness of his more reputed poetry that has affected the younger generation of Indian writers. The reason seems to be that they have not had his grounding in the spirit of the Upanishads, for the matter of that, in any basic traditional trait without which lyricism is a flight into the cloudland. For the true lyric feeling one must needs be steeped in the traditional values; for conveying it one must be a person, i.e., an individual bold enough to re-orient the inherited values and work them out through concrete experience. Tagore's imitators have had no traffic with Indian culture, they are too unrelated to the Indian world to have any genuine feeling of experience. Yet the net result has been an increase in delicacy, in the enlargement of the number of moods, and in quickened facility in turning out good verse. Much of this poetry is easy virtue, but in India where all activities are clogged, ease is a virtue in itself. In Bengal, it is almost impossible to write bad verse. Elsewhere, indifferent imitators of Tagore's verses recite their masterpieces in public meetings.

(*b*) His world-view or internationalism.

There was a time when this was equated by patriotic Indians to a weak-kneed trucking with the West, if not to something worse.[26] But his last-minute condemnation of British Imperialism is supposed to have made amends for his earlier weakness. What is not yet clear to most of us is that he was the first Indian to see the connection between mechanical civilisation, greed and nationalism.[27] In other words, he was the first anti-Fascist of this country, though he did not reach there through Marxism. The fact that well-known and elderly Indian writers have chosen to remain merely Indian i.e., anti-British, may be advanced against the thesis that Tagore has made our writers world-conscious. This argument wants scrutiny. Two world-views are possible today, the materialist's and the humanist's. Tagore's is the latter's. At one end of the humanist axis is the individual, at the other is the Universe, while the axis itself is the continuous culture of a country. We owe it to candour to say that in the hands of the middle class, Indian literature is nationalistic. But a chasm exists between the national and the nationalistic, nearly as big as between the socialistic approach of MacDonald and Snowden and the socialist endeavours of the Soviet. The non-co-operation and the two civil disobedience movements could not bridge it. They have produced excellent political prose writers in Gujerat,[28] and a literary man of eminence who writes in English, Pandit Jawaharlal. The rest is a haberdashery of the same old patriotic nostalgia whipped into racial hatred. Still there is nature as it is and there is the nature in fulfilment; and there are tones and overtones. The fulfilment of Indian literature is

in the overtone of universalism. That is Tagore. If the universalism in our modern literature is a bit thin, it is the doing of the escapist class that is working out Tagore. Without his roots, without any fresh chance in the objective situation for a creative spurt, that class can only plant cactuses from the wasteland of Europe's thirties and call itself the new Gardener in the place of Tagore.

A few words that were written in May, 1939[29] on Tagore's universalism as expressed in his literary writings will not be out of place in this connection of tenuousness: "The charge that Tagore ran away from politics when it became a serious business may be said to reflect the growth of Indian political consciousness, from its stage of mendicancy to that of vain assertion with its refuge in the myths of the past, thence to a clearer vision of national responsibilities of self-help, and ultimately, to the realisation of the historical fact that India is linked up in urgent bonds with the rest of the world that, incidentally, is not England. What appears to be growing out of a movement for an individual is really the political development of the nation. Tagore once admired Japan when she stood for what was best in Asiatic culture, its values of beauty and discipline;[30] he has now condemned Japan when her proclaimed Asianism is a plea for imperialist exploitation.[31] Beneath these changes, his pattern of values remains stable as will be evident from his earlier interpretation of Chinese culture and his proclamation of its unity with the Indian.

"Let there be no mistake in appraising Tagore's emphasis on culture. It is bound up with political

independence in every case. Only, his idea of independence is not negative. Not being based on opposition it draws its strength primarily from indigenous potentialities, and secondarily from contacts with, or diffusion from, the outside world where human beings, instead of waiting on the transcendental, strain to live better by their own efforts and with the assistance of science. The only criticism that can be laid against this concept of culture is that it does not pay sufficient heed to economic forces. Tagore has not been a student of economic history and his (concept of) culture has been the loser to that extent. Yet he is personally alive to the economic problems of the world. His letters from Russia have a new ring of truth. But it has been lost in the dulcet notes of his poems. But that is the tragedy of the economic life of India and Bengal. In the meanwhile, let us be content with his confession that he was wrong when he justified accumulation of property by the natural law which relegates the shadow beneath the light of the lamp.[32]

"Tagore's views on history are admirably summed up in an article called 'Kalantar' or Crisis... ...If we compare it with what he had written regarding ancient Indian Civilisation[33] we notice the dynamics of his views. In the latter he spoke of the forests and the saints living thereinin intentional inexistence. In the former (The Crisis) he refers to the quality of medieval Indian Civilisation as affected by the Muslim conquest and differentiates it from that of the modern period in which contact with British rule has shaken our rural community life to its foundation by the exertion of pervasive pres-

sure. But he refers (also) to the fruits of science and technology and envisages a state of Indian culture when it will have shed its obscurantist accretions. Above all, history is at last interpreted in terms of crisis as opposed to providential evolution. No doubt this is different from his earlier notions of development which partook of a Crocean unfolding of the Divine Spirit.[34] Since then he has not written on history, and the young Indian looks elsewhere for the thread that knits India with China, Abyssinia and Spain."

That was on Tagore's seventy-eighth birthday. On his eightieth birthday he spoke of what British Imperialism had done to India. Before that he had once more refused to shake the bloody hands of Japan, and replied in the language of a Hebrew prophet to Miss Rathbone's insulting appeal to India. These almost made Tagore into a popular hero, and partly accounted for India's great grief at his death. But in our hatred of the British rule we forgot his substance. We only chose to remember his diatribes against foreign rule, against the mechanical civilisation, against materialism, we only watered down his universalism, quoted his utterances on behalf of the down-trodden, the tillers of the soil, and thus circumscribed his humanist universalism to inflate his nationalism. We simply ignored his call of self-help, his affirmation of the principle that society was at the root of the state, his assertion that without an overhaul of the social system political independence was not worth having.[35] In spite of these convenient lapses of memory, Tagore's culture has entered into our marrow. It has made every Indian writer pine for a world-view. Jawa-

harlal is transforming the vision into sight. Only, he will not write in any Indian language. If today there is no young progressive writer who is not an anti-Fascist, it is because of the fact that Tagore had preceded him to construct the frame of his outlook. No. 115 in the posthumous English publication, "Poems", is an overtone of the cultural attitude of progressive Indian literature.

What Tagore stands for in Bengali literature does not come within the scope of this volume. Nor is it possible to measure to the full his influence on the forms of modern poetry in India, Hindi, Urdu, Gujerati, Marathi, Canarese, and Telugu. The two points mentioned above, his lyricism and universalism, have not been consciously imbibed either. Nor are they exhaustive. His rejection of asceticism, his concept of joy, and what is known as his mysticism, for example, could be added. The school of Hindi Chhayabad is a pale imitation of Tagore. But they are not his specific contributions. All these and many more are implicit in Indian traditions; they are in the Upanishads, in the medieval poets, in the teachings of Buddhist, Jain and Muslim saints. Tagore is the synthesis of Indian Culture. He repeats in his biography the course of Indian history.

Most certainly, it could not be the full course. He himself had suggested many by-paths. When Tagore was alive the impulses that he had released were forging new shapes. Many a writer, even in Bengal and of his entourage, was trying to create novel forms. This post-Tagore movement has been wrongly described by people who should have known better as a move away from Tagore.

Nothing like it happened in Bengal. In other provinces, probably, a reaction set in.* But its value can be judged from the fact that his influence there had seldom been a conscious process. If the action was by hearsay the reaction could not but be senseless. Reaction in the England of Chamberlain, the Germany of Hitler, and the Italy of Mussolini can be easily understood. Tagore was just at the opposite pole of these gentlemen. In India, the anti-Rabindranath attitude one notices occasionally is usually grounded on plain ignorance. The charge against his lyrical forms, his idealism, his mysticism, and his world-view cannot stand. He is the father of many forms, his novels and stories are real, his spirituality concrete, and his internationalism never rejects India. Yet, there is something in that protest which he was the very first to appreciate. Professors of literature have not seized it, however, when they call it the realistic phase that must needs follow the romantic period in accordance with the dictates of Saintsbury, Gosse and Cazamian. On the other hand, worshippers of Tagore deny the usefulness of critical dissent. But life does not wait for such men's understanding. And it is life that has moved the young writers to look ahead. These are often the minor ones who fill the pages of magazines with stories, issue slim volumes of verses, and otherwise behave like artists. They belong to coteries within which they are admired, and outside, condemned as highbrows. Very seldom are they original. Yet, in their entirety and in their aspirations they reveal an unmistakable urge.

From Tagore to Iqbal it is an easy jump, if one

goes by reputation. Certain common features also class them together, e.g., nationalism of an early stage passing on to a wider vision, pre-occupation with the problems of self and the non-separation of poetry from philosophy, the stress on personality in the judgment of art, religion and ethics, a dignified attitude towards death, (note the last words of both), and a critical approach towards Western contacts, to name a few only. Yet, the differences should be patent to all but the congenitally blind. Iqbal is essentially an Islamic poet, and his interests, after the salad days, are purely non-Indian. "Although I am born in India, the light of my eye is from the sacred dust of Bukhara, Kabul and Tabriz." (Piam-i-Mashriq). His humanism is weak, in spite of his deep sympathy for the peasant and the labourer. "Run away from the democratic form, be a slave to a Wise One, for even the brain of two hundred asses, does not produce the thought of a man" (Piam-i-Mashriq). Such lines show his lack of confidence in men and women. His wise one was also a strong and a successful man, like Mussolini, on whom he wrote an ode. His symbol was the eagle. But, as Prof. Nicholson observes, "The affinities with Neitzsche and Bergson need not be emphasised. It is less clear, however, why Iqbal identifies his ideal society with Mohammad's conception of Islam, or why membership of that society should be a privilege reserved for Moslems. Here the religious enthusiast seems to have knocked out the philosopher—a result which is logically wrong but poetically right". We are here neither concerned with logic nor with poetry, except through sociology. From this point of view

Iqbal's contribution to Modern Indian Culture is mainly indirect, because (1) much of his poetry is classical Persian, which is not easily understood by most of his co-religionists, (2) its broad and deep appeal is primarily to the Islamic peoples, as such. His direct contributions are his Urdu poems, and the few political pieces that culminated in the demand for Pakistan. In the first, he is more in the tradition of Ghalib than of Hali, though for a time Akbar's pithy style attracted him. His political speeches in the Punjab Assembly and the famous one at Allahabad in 1930 are, however, not contradictory. Read together, their maker can hardly be accused of the charge that he believed that Indian Culture was two. On the contrary, in asking the Muslims of India to understand the spirit of Islam, he was aiming, like Sir Sayyid Ahmad, at strengthening the base of Modern Indian Culture. The aim, being more than merely literary, could not be immediately realised. Thus it is that Iqbal's influence on Indian literature has been much less than that on Muslim politicians. Even his critical attitude towards Capitalism, which was prompted by his solicitude for the Muslim tenants against Hindu landlords and money-lenders, has failed to impress as a contribution to Indian economic thought. One wonders if Josh and Jullunduri, Faiz and Mejaz are the direct consequences of Iqbal, the poet. They are *in* the current of Indian literature, much as Hali was, though with a richer deliberation, if with less poetry.

Tagore and Iqbal were the universalists of modern Indian literature on the double strength of traditions and new contacts. Both realised

that culture in India could survive only by re-orientation and re-valuation. Another group of literary men developed a second attitude, not contrary to the previous one, in fact, a tributary to it, but certainly different in emphasis. This group felt that the international outlook was good in its way, but not quite so good for all times. For example, it was taken to be premature for a dependent and a poor country like India as she was, though not for what she would like to be once her nature was fulfilled. Their logic of creation was not that of either/or, but the logic of *the meanwhile, of one step at a time and one purpose for one stage*. Their 'nature' was not that of the lotus, but of the seed, the mud and the stalk, *without* which, they argued, the lotus was a paper one. They underlined the time-factor very heavily. In other words, they were the relativists of culture, with a historian's point of view and/or a realistic approach towards life as it has been and is actually being lived. This outlook could not be the same as that of the all-timers.

We shall take only three writers out of a long list that could be prepared. They are the *representative* writers, when Tagore and Iqbal are the *symbolic*, and the minor artists are the *typical and significant*. Kanaiya Lal Munshi, Prem Chand and Sarat Chandra Chatterji probably did not know each other's language intimately; they did not have the same status in life; their family-influences were dissimilar. Munshi, besides being a first-rate man of letters, is a brilliant lawyer, a well-known politician and an administrator of proved worth. The other two were of a retiring disposition, and did not bear the 'tika' of talent on their brow. Their

styles are not the same; Munshi's crisp and brittle, which appears even through translations; Chatterji's fluid and graceful; and Prem Chand's unassuming, to the point of non-existence, particularly in his later works. Their humour too; Munshi in his social skits and dramas is light and exuberant, Chatterji is sarcastic and ironical, and Prem Chand is grim. Munshi is intensely interested in history, the history of Gujerat, the history of India, the history of literature; Sarat Chandra's hobbies did not include it. Yet, they are bound by one common feature; they all take their stand upon Indian facts as they are, and once firmly planted there, they look out and can afford to feel idealistic. Munshi's forays into the ancient history of Patan and Pataliputra are not masterly retreats into pre-arranged positions; they are defences in depth. In a manner of speaking, they are an exercise in tenses. His past, present, and future are put in scene, over scene, as in a Tintoretto. And then think of his socio-political novels and dramas.

Munshi's works cover a wide field, social and semi-political novels, historical romances, mythological and social dramas, stories, essays, a couple of biographies, a standard history of Gujerat and its literature, and an autobiography. He is known to the writer through English and Hindi renderings only. But his first work strikes the key-note of his subsequent achievements. The hero of *Verani Basulata*, Jagat, is in love with Tanmani But the course does not run smooth, and he becomes a disciple of Anantanand, a Hindu Swami, who had started a *mandal* or a society at Ratanagad to invi-

gorate the dying nation with the living historical ideals of India. The Swami dies by *pranayam* in prison before he could be executed. The similarity of motif with Bankim Chandra's *Anand Math* is striking. But, probably, Munshi is at his best in his famous triology on the Chalukyas of Gujerat, the Patanani Prabhuta Gujaratano Natha and Rajadhiraja. The characters are men and women of royal proportions, warriors and statesmen, princes and ladies. Munjala is one of the rare portraits of a statesman by an Indian novelist. Prithviballav deals with the Dhara King, Munja. It is probably the most popular of his novels. He has also another on Kautilya to his credit. In his mythological dramas, the biography of Narsing Mehta, and the study of Gujerat, he shows the same historical sense as ever. But this history is not archaeology. At the same time, Munshi's history is not 'economic,' either. After reading his novels one feels like saying with Croce that all history is contemporary history.

Prem Chand was not a scholar like Munshi; nor was Chatterji. In their cases the relativist outlook was concentrated in an intense vision of the local and the immediate. Prem Chand was also interested in history. He wrote the drama 'Karbala,' with a political motive. For obvious reasons it could not be played, and even if it could be, the forty-three scenes would have taken at least six hours. And then we have his numerous stories in which the glamorous deeds of India and acts of Hindu-Muslim unity are depicted. The nine novels and the remaining six volumes of stories deal with nearly all aspects of contemporary Indian

life. Prem Chand's forte is the lower middle class and the peasants in the villages. Read his two volumes of Mansarovara and his last novel, Godan, or that gem, Kafan, and you will see that he knew his men and women and their milieu. It is not suggested that his characters are all round. He himself admits in his introduction to the last collection of his stories, and elsewhere, that he is more interested in psychology. But that does not create character. Prem Chand uses dialogues but they are not dramatic. Here Munshi and Chatterji score over him, the former by his training as a dramatist, and the other, probably, by his innate gift. But Prem Chand's strength is in showing the pattern of living as it is actually lived and as it has evolved. Therein lies his real art. He puts characters in their setting; none stand out, but the milieu is seething with life. Compared to this achievement, his social idealism is sentimentality. Why should it be so? Why is it that this almost socialist writer fails, exactly as Sarat Chandra fails in his Pather Dabi, to carry us with him along the very broad values of socialism? How is it that we are moved to the depths of our being by one stray remark of a blind beggar, and simply reject the mass of sermons about humanity and all the rest of it? The answer is simple. Prem Chand took his stand on the specific qualities of a *particular* configuration. Only when he was firmly planted there was it that he could strike for the larger issues. But he could not connect his configuration with the wider pattern. His thought-content was inadequate for his talents. The same with Sarat Chandra. Realism also posits a knowledge of the larger and the more

material processes. Munshi, in spite of his scholarship in history, suffers from this deficiency and fights shy of materialism, which accounts for his over-emphasis on the racial factor, his mystique of Indian Culture. This qualified realism reveals the impulse behind the historicism of these three men. It is obvious that their concept of history is not what we read about at the college and the school. Its sense of the present and the relative is the genuine stuff. It means the specific, the particular, the concrete and the immediate. But it fails to focus the general.

The resemblance between Sarat Chandra and Prem Chand's social ideologies is so close that long ago it should have struck any observer of comparative Indian literature. They share a few attitudes in common. The first is a deep sympathy for the unfortunate, the oppressed and the dispossessed. It extends to the women of the town, the vagabonds and the wastrels, those who live on the fringe of decent living and chalk out a substitute code of manners, a code that may be frowned upon by the more fortunately situated but is none the less one in which the spirit moves. These residents in the outskirts of civilised life have dignity of the human soul; they are fresh in contrast with the decadent middle class; they are full against the hollow men, the stuffed men. Above all, they are rooted in the soil, they belong to the earth, to which the cattle belong. The second attitude is one of social criticism towards the existing order of things. It is best illustrated in their revolt against the injustices towards women. Thus it is that both Prem Chand and Sarat Chandra are immensely popular with the

educated women of today. Sarat Chandra's women characters are certainly his best, if you exclude the ne'er-do-wells. They are of the same type, but they are fighters, they have pluck, they are not the *lalita-labanga-lata* of Joydeva, or the swooning type of women you find in the canvases of some Indian painters. Still they remain women, tender in sentiments though tough in tongue. Munshi's women characters are also strong and firmly drawn. Their examples are reported to have caused family rebellion.

These two attitudes, working with others, have made up the immense social significance of Prem Chand, Munshi, and Sarat Chandra. When we remember the number of people who speak Hindi, Bengali and Gujerati, the three of the biggest language groups in India, we can easily gauge their influence and their representative character. The subject matter that called for this outlook has led people to label Prem Chand and Sarat Chandra, particularly, as realists. Well, they are realists in a way, if one puts them in the earlier contexts of Hindi and Bengali literatures. But if realism means anything more, say, a scientific temper, as Zola pointed out many years ago, or a sense of history, as Lenin suggested, then Prem Chand and Sarat Chandra Chatterji are not realists. Nor is Munshi, in spite of his claim that he portrays characters as they are. Nowhere do we find the same grip over the objective reality and its subjective counterpart as Gorki had or as Malraux possesses. Of course, a vision is always necessary, as both Gorki and Malraux do betray. But it should be clearly seized, otherwise it remains just

the dreamy gaze of the Blessed Damozel, with big vacant eyes seeing nothing, a pose. And here, one must notice one vital point of difference between Prem Chand and Sarat Chandra. Prem Chand was getting more and more progressive in his social views while Sarat Chandra's last works were becoming apologies for traditions. Probably, that also can be accounted for by the relative strength of the middle classes in the two provinces. What is the future of Munshi, the brilliant litterateur ?

Very significant things are happening to Urdu literature. The Urdu poet has had probably a heavier deadweight of set imageries but a lesser one of typical emotions and responses than his Hindi counterpart. In any case, he has had less to carry of metaphysical lumber. Like the Muslim young man, the Urdu poet may, if he chooses, travel lightly, which gives him a greater chance to think of the world to come. Sociologists may detect in this outlook (1) a lesser quantity of vested interest, (2) the two Islamic traditions of millennial promise and social equality in faith, and (3) a greater dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs in family, in society, in economics and politics. The Hindu who writes in Urdu has had a deeper understanding of Islamic culture than the Hindu who only writes in his vernacular. The understanding first came through contacts with the court, and accounts for the courtly polish of his poetry. The real point about modern Urdu literature is its faith and optimism, often a Marxist one at that. Two poems on the Red Flag, one by Mejaz and another by a Bengali Hindu, Subhas Mukerji, show the difference that resides in

the unity. The former lacks the concreteness of the latter, though both convey hope. It is characteristic of Urdu poetry that even a revolutionary poem, say, one on the railway engine, should be sung in a supine melody suited to Kadar Pia or Dagh's compositions. Urdu literature is still deficient in novels. For the matter of that, Muslim novelists in Bengal (all write in Bengali) are also less significant than the Muslim poets, Qazi Nazrul Islam, Humayun Kabir, Jasimuddin, and others. The reason seems to be that Muslim family life is more deficient in variety and drama than the Hindu family life, dreadfully monotonous as it is. Ahmad Ali's Twilight in Delhi, though written in English, is a bold departure, and therefore, a notable exception. But short stories and essays are coming up in Urdu. The *Angre* blazed a trail when it was burnt in the bazaar by the Maulavis. Since then a number of good stories have appeared. Though most are modelled on Prem Chand, none seem to have reached his standard of achievement. Their technique is usually that of reportage showing a weak grip on the subject which is either picaresquely or anecdotally conceived. Modern Urdu literature, on the whole, is exciting. Provided it gets rid of its Iranian complex[36] and comes closer to the language of the people, its technical future is assured. The same could not be said for modern Hindi literature. It is already prosody-perfect, and with its closer affiliations to Sanskrit and medieval Hindi it is less likely to shed its inheritance and come to terms with either the Theti-boli or basic Hindustani. Efforts are no doubt being made in many directions, in the im-

portation of a social vision, in the cult of regional Hindi, (Meerut and Berar particularly), through prose-poems, verse-libre, etc. But one who has attended a number of both Kavi Sammelans and Mushairas cannot have failed to notice the difference in the quality of response of the audience to the recitation of modern verses. Be that as it may, both the Hindi and the Urdu poet want to travel beyond their four corners, look at the world, collect ideas, and come back to change and construct anew. The two kindred points they want to be true to are Russia and the home. Very few of them can be called major writers from any considerable standard, but few also are in England. Even Prem Chand, who was an artist of high merit, is not uniformly first-rate, though exception must always be made to his short stories which can hold their own against the best that other countries can offer. His novels seem to fall apart, much as Sarat Chandra Chatterji's did. Prem Chand's social imagination was expanding in his latter days while Sarat Chandra was definitely contracting. Yet Prem Chand's influence on society and on young writers has been less than that of Chatterji. Probably, the reason is the greater disintegration of Chatterji's society and a brisker literary exercise in his language and province.

Thus we see that modern Indian literature is characterised by an increased emphasis on social content. The scope of the subject for novels, stories and poems has been considerably enlarged. It is now miles away from mere social reform. Mostly, the situations relate to conflict, and their treatment is sociological. Various problems

are discussed, of sexual maladjustment between the husband and the wife, between the individual with his new values of personal welfare and the society with its ancient code of static morality, between the educated youth with his romantic notions and the stern realities of life incarnated in his wife.[37] The urban encroachment upon the social economy of village life has also formed the subject matter of some significant stories and novels.[38] The fall of the landed gentry[39], the rise of the petty bourgeoisie, the life of the unfortunate men and women in the cities and of peasants in the village have also crept in very recently, while class consciousness has also been indicated. In a word, social conflict is the modern literary theme. But the way in which it is sought to be resolved is interesting. In a large number of cases, the hero or the heroine submits to the social code, though with a heavy heart. The heaviness is supposed to be the mark of tragedy, while, in reality, the ultimate submission is the more tragic of the two. When the hero or the heroine continues to revolt, he or she builds a Utopia or joins an 'ashram.' This misplaced seriousness has made all our minor artists incorrigibly didactic, including the realists among them. The explanation of the spirit of the revolt lies in the increased social mobility among the middle classes just as much as that of its fizzling out consists in the gulf that still separates the lower middle class from the masses. It is the historically conscious among the former who are interested in creating 'proletarian literature.'

Another symptom of change is offered by travel-diaries and sketches and the large number of free

translations from modern European novels. The former are outspoken essays, describing the vigorous qualities of Western life, chiefly its freedom of manners, equality of sex, and social legislation. The best sketches are usually by women,[40] when they are not, they betray a feminine quality of observation.[41] Tagore's later travel-diaries remind us of Keyserling's. In translations, the choice differs from province to province, but the writers of short stories generally commandeered are Maupassant, Tchechov, Poe and Lawrence. Both the selection and the cross-section are typical. The erotic interest of the first and the last, the gentle melancholy in the life of the shabby gentility portrayed by the second, and the strange horror of the third enable the Indian readers, mostly women, to enjoy the pleasure of compensation and recognition. They cool the jaded nerves of the bored. Novels cover a much wider field. They are mostly of the annual Nobel Laureates in literature. Scandinavian and Russian novelists are the favourites among the literate today as Scott and Dickens were fifty years ago among the intellectuals. In poetry, Bengali magazines revel in Ezra Pound, Lawrence, Eliot, Auden, Spender, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Yeats, Macneice, and many more. The English poets of the twenties and the thirties have been most exploited. Scientific books have also been rendered into the vernacular. Children's literature has often been bodily lifted. Sex literature is rampant. Interprovincial translation is also going on, often with complete disregard of the laws of copyright. This large mass of derivative literature betrays the secret desires of our society to get rid of its nume-

rous complexes, by facing them elsewhere. If we could resolve them here and now, and by our own social efforts, our literature would have been naturalistic. But the class to which the progressive writers belong is incapable of doing so, either by the force of circumstances over which they have little control, or by the want of intellectual equipment, i.e., of a knowledge of the social processes involved in the formation of complexes. In other countries, this valuable sense of social conflict is a source of tremendous energy that can be harnessed to artistic expression. Here it remains on the level of emotional discontent. When artists fail to utilise the forces of disruption, the extension of the scope of literature remains a burden, and artists protect themselves in little Tobruks of their own, behind the defences of doctrines. Consequently, Indian criticism today is either Pateresque and Wildeish, or cheaply Marxist. Our increased social content has not been followed up by a growing thought-content. A knowledge of the social processes through which Indian society is changing, of the historical reasons for its integration and disintegration is the supreme literary need. (It is *not* the culture of classical objectivity[42] that is wanted.) Otherwise, discontent, experiments, quantity of output, enlargement of the scope, all remain as symptoms of the crisis, but not as indicators of the future course of our literature. Only a thus enriched sense of values can exploit the sense of facts, or objectivity, as it is known.

Other consequences of the derivative literature are also mixed blessings. Stilted style has been made fashionable; readers have been split into

coteries with special interests and sophisticated attitudes of the high-browed, on the one hand, and the vague wish-fulfilments of the low-browed, on the other. There has been little serious endeavour to interpret Indian life in the light of comparative values. There is no parallel in India to the Catholic poems and novels of France. There is no such thing as even a purely Hindu or a purely Muslim novel. It is either Anglo-Hindi or Anglo-Islamic. When otherwise, a Muslim hero elopes with a Hindu widow, or a Hindu graduate sighs his life out for a Muslim girl who has just discarded the purdah and does not know what to do with her freedom and looks like joining a cinema company or a leftist club.

Poems are naturally more remote from social contact than novels and stories are. The content has to be ground finer in poetry. In the recent past the tradition was to keep poetry safe from problems. Many of Tagore's statements show how jealous he was of the poetic isolation.[43] This does not mean that his poems avoided issues. Only, they did not wear them on the surface. But the sum-total of his teachings points towards the detachment of poetry from what is known as 'problems.'[44] Problems, and specially social ones, however, refused to be kept out.[45] When they were allowed entry, they pressed for formal and mental changes. Experiments in verse occurred in plenty, but the new attitudes were comparatively few. In the absence of that 'extra fact' they remained poetic gestures. Instead of optimism we thus get pessimism. If it is still optimism, it is for the new social order. Revolt is still cribbed in sex. It

is Freud and Marx in uneasy alliance, with Freud as the dominant partner. On close analysis, the poetic note of despair and frustration yields the same result, misfit of the individual with the class that is doomed.[46] The poems of the humble and the lowly, of the rebel and the wastrel,[47] are either songs in praise of departure from the social norm or expressions of pious wishes with the sure knowledge that they cannot be fulfilled. They are usually loud, full of sound and fury. The very loudness is a confession of fear. Canister-cries seldom make revolution. The amorphous desire to rebel is not the revolutionary temper to create. Here too, the sense of social direction is lacking, and constructive efforts that will forge ahead of Tagore have not yet been planned. The romantic nostalgia of the ruralist, the isolation of the purist, the self-pity of the individualist, for whom the pity is in the poetry, the Whitmanly holloaing to rouse the 'oppressed, the suppressed, the repressed and the depressed', are creating a literature of wish-fulfilment and escape. The general idea is to solve the conflicts by flight or by shutting one's eyes to them. Telescope on the eye defunct is expected to abolish the enemy around. All this makes our uptodate literature symptomatic, but not highly significant. It promises well, it has not yet achieved much. The Indian middle classes were meant at best to be scholars in English; they produced at least three Indian literatures, which was not in the bargain. Today, they have been instigated by their own social pressure to look beyond their class; if their vision is blurred, they still deserve credit. No similar body in the world ever suffered from more stringent limi-

tations, not even the Chinese compradors in the 'settlement' ports.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIOLOGY OF MODERN INDIAN MUSIC

Hindustani classical music* is about three hundred years old. Like modern Indian literature, it is indebted to those who combined the various culture-compulsions of the Middle Ages. To attribute its rise to this community or that is unsociological. That the cultural synthesis in music took place when the rulers were Muslims does not make it any more Islamic than the Hindu names of singers, composers, scholars and patrons would make it Hindu. *It is just Indian.* Certain scholars strongly urge that at least the base of Indian music was Hindu. But then the pre-Muslim scale, or the vertebral structure, that which survives in Madras and Mysore, is Kanakangi, which is equivalent to the Northern Indian Kafi, whereas that of Hindustani classical music as we know it is of the Bilawal scale. How it was changed can only be guesswork, but that it has so changed our audile habits that the finest vocalist from Tamil land is the object of ridicule in Lucknow is a fact observed. He is alleged to sing out of tune, though his airs sound so familiar. The second historical fact about our classical music is that it was never above incorporating the *folk*, the *regional*, even *non-Indian* types. Dhrupad, which is reputed to have been sung before Akbar and which is so high-browed that nobody now listens to it, was in a sense the Agra-Gwalior style, just as Holi-Dhamar belonged to Muttra.

Bengal gave *bangali*, Sindh *sindhu*, Surat *surat*, Gujerat *gujarati*, Bihar *behari*, Multan *multani*, Jaunpur *jaunpuri todi*, the hills *pahari*, just as Yemen gave *eman* and Turkey *turask todi*. And all these raginis are Sastric. Not only the ragas, but the rhythms as well e.g., *Holi-Dhamar* of Muttra and *Punjabi 'Theka'* of the Punjab. This process of adaptation continued right up to the end of the eighteenth century, though in diminishing strength. A third fact is that our music has always served two masters, religion and the court. Dhrupad is defined in the texts as songs in praise of gods *and* kings. Gradually, the kings prevailed, and the gods were sung in the *deshi* fashion. By the eighteenth century, when it became a courtly affair, music gained in sweetness and subtlety, but it lost its pristine simple vigour. Eventually, it became vocal gymnastics, until the romantics in the provincial durbars started protesting. One such protest was Thumri, which probably originated but was certainly developed in Lucknow. That protest also petered out into grossly sensual and mechanically repetitive expositions. Indian feudalism had by then completely isolated itself from the life of the people. The music that it patronised was living on its inertia. Such features are nothing special to Indian music. They are mentioned because many people in India think that our *ragas* and *raginis* emanated from the gods, that they have no history except the story of degeneration since the days of the Rishis and the great masters of old.

One feature, however, is peculiar to the growth of Indian music. It makes no distinction

between composition and execution. Not that some of the Dhrupad, Bhajan or Kirtan songs cannot hold their own against the best European plain songs and hymns, but of composers in the European sense, i.e., as a class of artists whose function is not execution, we have had none. The specialties of our system, its nuances and nature of improvisation, were not favourable to notation that could divide the labour. Oral tradition was the rule here, as in all other branches of knowledge, which the Indian had understood more as experience than objects of learning. A general feudal structure in which crafts were not differentiated beyond the point at which the craftsmen formed a caste, and not high up at that, was also responsible for this combined functioning. The immediate reason was that because both poetry and music served religion and royalty, any outpouring of devotion and loyalty would be good enough so long as the desirable sentiments were there. And so far as the patron-kings' and saints' appetites were concerned, it was but natural that the sentiments should know of no artistic limits. The full-throated way in which 'welcome-poems' are sung today before the District Magistrate shows how much more difficult then it was to save music from poetry or poetry from music when the heart and the stomach of the devout were both fuller. Despotism, benevolent or malevolent, mixes up arts and crafts; only when it is weakened either by internal stress or by external pressure that it splits them up. The courts of Mahummad Shah and of princes in the South that flourished after the Mughal Empire had become ramshackle, have given us whatever 'com-

posers' we have in Kheyal. Even then, Sadarang's Kheyals have to be sung in the Gwalior style to be appreciated. Thyagaraja's Kirtans are the only great compositions preceding Tagore's pieces.

Till the eighties of the last century, Hindustani music was leading a sheltered existence in the courts of princes, big and small. We are told that our noblemen cared for music, patronised musicians, and tolerated their airs. Experts belonging to well-known musical families, *gharanas*, were carrying on their traditions with some zeal and considerable ability. In spite of local and stylistic differences, a certain norm was conserved. It was respected, but it was not sacrosanct. For example, *Basant*, with and without *pancham*, was equally dear. Certain compendiums and commentaries had appeared, but their importance was preservative. The masters were rigid disciplinarians, as any group would be in a closed atmosphere. The South was a little better placed. Madras pandits would ascribe it to the unbroken continuity of Hindu musical traditions in the South. But if Urdu, which is reputedly a Northern Indian product, came to its own through the Muslim principalities in the South, and when we know that Dakshini pandits were invited by Muslim darbars in the North to set matters right, we cannot fully accept the explanation. The North and the South had never been completely divided. Yet the admission has to be made that what was being done to Indian music by the Muslims in the North during the Pathan and the Mughal period was not being done in the Karnatic. The old tradition there was probably left to repair and renew itself. And its resources were not negligible. For

aught we know, the Bhakti cult came earlier and was more pervasive there than in the North. It had created a richer devotional literature, invaded metaphysics more effectively, and influenced other cults, e.g., the Shaiva, more deeply. On the other hand, the submission to orthodoxy was fuller. It will be, however, inaccurate to assert that the submission at any stage was a surrender. Thyagaraja, for example, was not a Yes-man in music, just as Veena Sheshanna often played the truant. In the Maharashtra country, there was no such valuable tradition to keep or correct. Consequently, no opposition was offered there to the introduction of the Hindustani style of the Gwalior variety. The diffusion of the Gwalior culture-traits in music is a very interesting study. From Man Thanwar of the fifteenth to Haddu Khan and his family of the nineteenth, it has been almost a procession of conquests. Karnat alone resisted it, and Bengal found it rather trying. Maharastra musicians today occupy the front rank among the vocalists in the North; yet, seventy-five years ago, Maharas ra belonged musically to Madras.

The eighties were a turning point. The princes gave place to the zamindars and merchant-princes. The zamindars absented themselves from their estates and flocked to the cities, the seats of Government, business and pleasure. Merchant-princes, in their turn, were becoming land-minded and buying up estates but they preferred to remain urban. Both felt it their duty to be patrons of Indian culture. Little courts were formed, and the musicians poured into the cities from the decaying durbars. There was hardly a musician

of note who in that period did not come to the then Imperial city of Calcutta to try his fortune. Bengal got a taste of classical Hindustani music from that date. The earlier connections were faint ones, and the Vishnupur style, of which Bengal is proud, was Bengali. It bore the same relation to the Gwalior style as Krittivas' Ramayan does to the original. After the death of Wajid Ali Shah, who is alleged to have taken 108 musicians, along with a thousand beasts for his menagerie, and who brilliantly played the toy-king at Metiabruz, a suburb of Calcutta, Maharaja Sri Saurindra M. Tagore, began seriously to collect musicians and stimulate theoretical interest in music by writing compendiums. His own titles in music ran into a dozen lines, and his name is still revered by the older generation. In this patronage he was followed by his fellow zamindars all over Bengal. Be it noted that forms other than the classical also received their kind regards. Some of these forms were positively vulgar. Later on, the Sangeet Samaj was established under the joint auspices of the zamindars and the professional classes. The functions were confined to monthly soirees, occasional staging of plays, frequent feasts, and daily displays of wealth. In short, the Samaj was concerned with entertainment in which waste was more conspicuous than art. Once, a member who had taken the part of a Sadhu in a play positively refused to part with his costly rings, and appeared on the stage fully decked. When the Sangeet Samaj collapsed by its sagging weight, a number of smaller clubs and schools of music grew. About this time the Jnanottejak Mandali was formed in Bombay. Its purpose was more serious than simple

entertainment. If the Sangeet Samaj of Cornwallis Street, Calcutta, is only a name in Bengal, the latter is responsible for at least three colleges of classical music in India and two dozen books. Pandit Vishnu Narayan Bhatkhande was a member of that *mandali,* and founded his pedagogics on his lectures there. Elsewhere, e.g., at Patna, Gaya, Bhagalpur and other cities of note in Bihar, the local gentry fostered the revival of interest and exchanged musicians with Bengal. The anti-Bengal feeling was not yet acute. In Madras, at least, in the city and in the Tamil land, musical activity continued, with a slight shift in taste towards Hari Katha among the new elite. The Pandits went on interpreting the Srutis and produced many subtle, if somewhat meaningless, commentaries. The position in the U. P. was peculiar. This province has the largest number of cities in India of which the majority have had historical importance. So the natural expectation is that they should have given the lead to the renaissance. Nothing like it happened. Benares had a distinctive style that was preserved by a caste, Allahabad had none of its own, Agra exported musicians to the Indian states and retained none for itself, Lucknow became interested in the dance school of the famous brothers, Kalka-Binda, Cawnpore was a parvenu, and Meerut was a cantonment. Only one area, Rohilkhand, with the Rampur State as its nucleus, remained musical. The Nawab of Rampur had the finest collection of musicians, vocalists and instrumentalists, and an excellent library of music. Saharanpur became the home of Sarod. But the Nawab would not allow his great love to radiate. No

musician who had entered this court was allowed to leave it. The reasons for this phenomenon of the U. P.'s failure to lead in music in spite of the possession of a large number of good musicians were entirely social. Here were the taluqdars of Oudh and the zamindars of Agra. None, barring a few in Benares, were permanently settled landlords. The thirty years' revision made them more dependent upon the Government than their counterparts in Bengal had to be. English education came a bit late, and in a half-hearted manner. The new aristocracy found it more paying to please English officials than to learn English and exploit the culture that it brought. (Naturally, English recruits to the Civil Service would usually give the U. P. their first preference for postings.) Between this class and the absence of a new professional class, music, like other fine arts, wilted. Not that the 'barons' were puritans, but they only wanted to keep the domestic atmosphere undefiled. Dancing girls would certainly be invited on every festive occasion in the Hindu and Muslim households, but the gentlemen would not learn, and the ladies would never be allowed to learn music. The gentry knew the musicians instead, and became indifferent to their music. In the eighties, even much later, the dancing girls of Lucknow would give 'lessons' in manners. The musicians proper retorted by keeping a jealous guard over their trade secrets. Their race was disappearing by disuse. By the thirties of this century, when the middle class suddenly awoke to culture, they had to import musicians from Maharastra to teach music to their sons and daughters. The writer remembers three

objections to the proposal of incorporating into the Lucknow University the flourishing Marris College of Hindustani Music in Lucknow: (1) It will drag down the academic level. (2) Indian music is not worthy of study, because it is not a Science. (3) It will lower the social prestige of teachers and students alike, because music is associated in Lucknow, with bad women. Of course, the resolution was withdrawn. It happened in the U. P. about fifteen years ago, elsewhere, it could happen thirty years ago. Since then the Marris College, renamed the Bhatkhande University, has become the premier institution in Northern India with about 800 boys and girls, all belonging to respectable middle class families. Students from Ceylon also are to be found there. The dancing classes are crowded with girls, some of whom of 'high' families can give points to the professionals in poses and movements of the eyes, arms and hips. The Government has neglected this institution by reducing the grant and appointing a Committee. Probably it suspects that the taluqdars and the middle classes have gone off their head after a staid career over these long years of loyalty.

The Punjab in the last quarter of the nineteenth century had three well-established styles of music, Kheyal of the Muslim gharanas, the Shabd, and the Tappa. The first specialised in quick *tans* and *palta* and, unlike the Agra-Gwalior style, leaned more towards the Tappa than towards Dhrupad. 'Shabda' is the devotional music of the Sikh. Its voice-production, dignity and movement make it akin to the Dhrupad. By the side of the Shabd, if

sung in the old fashion, the *garanhati* Kirtan, which is the high-browed type of Bengal's devotional songs, sounds a bit thin. Tappa is a peculiar product of the Punjab, and is supposed to be derived from the camel-driver's songs. It, however, leaped across a thousand miles and founded a tradition in Bengal. The two hops were Lucknow in the U. P. and Gaya in Bihar. When the Punjab became rich, thanks to the river colonies and the Government contracts, musical style was displaced by the sartorial.

The previous survey excludes folk-music. It had to wait until Tagore took it up. In the interval, it just managed to keep the villagers merry in their seasonal and family festivities and devout in their spiritual moments. On the other side, the Indian States had their retinue of women musicians, mainly, as symbols of their ancient prestige. Only when a prince would be born, a princess married, a brother-prince or an English lord would visit the court that the patrons would trot out their protegees. The rest was silence.

After the eighties, the composition of the elite in Bengal, Bombay and Madras underwent a change. The middle-middle class, consisting of the degree-holders, government servants, lawyers, teachers, doctors, engineers, and the like, became numerically stronger and more articulate. They had two main attitudes—one, to ascend the scale and end in Rai Bahadurship, failing which, to feel *nationalistically*, and the other, to challenge the supremacy of Western culture by singing the ancient glories of India. The first became associated with the puritanic neglect of music, of other arts too, and the

second brought about the revivalist movement. In Bengal, the puritanic fervour was stronger than the revivalist, and in Bombay, it was the converse, for purely economic reasons. This new stratum in Bengali society became deaf to music and plugged the ears of those who would cultivate it. In our younger days, ignorance and disrespect of music had received almost an official validity. Only the ne'er-do-wells could learn it, and the worth of the culture was as usual estimated by the social worth of its exponent. The musicians as a class were pariahs, and music was taboo in nearly all families except those who, like the Tagores and the Chowdhuries, were rich and large enough to be sufficient unto themselves. In East Bengal, however, zamindars' sons could be musicians. But then, they were zamindars, and not the middle-middle class. The members of this latter class in East Bengal, when they became urbanised, sublimated their horror of sex into a hatred of music and the stage. They had not even Aurangzeb's justification of religious injunctions; on the contrary, their god was Joy. The community-prayers of this 'flower' of new Bengal were almost funereal. There was no classical music among Muslim families in that province, but *deshi* music was indulged in while the Maulavi was away.

In Maharastra and Madras, music was not forbidden. Veena in Karnatak and Kheyal in Maharastra were considered parts of a liberal education. Earlier than in Bengal, music had penetrated into the interior of the southern household. Thus, for example, in the south, even before 1920, a good voice or a fondness for songs did not bar a

respectable girl's marriage-prospects. In Bengal, it did. The standard of amateur competence in Madras and Maharastra was not negligible either. It was, and is still, not the custom there for parents to parade their infant prodigies. Today, a Bengali who has some regard for music simply cannot overstay in his married friend's house. He shall have music, and dance too, if the friend is blessed with a daughter who can lisp and toddle.

The release in Bengal was effected by a combination of two sets of factors. A number of graduates were being poured out of the University. They were in excess of the government and the mercantile demand for clerks. But the numerical increase compelled the graduates to take to something else than submitting applications. Now that the exclusiveness of the upper middle class was broken, the social circulation was brisker. The Bengali unemployed Babu began to look out for himself. Doors of commercial undertakings had been shut by the Scotch and the Marwari in the name of the graduate's worthlessness and his sense of false prestige; capital was not available, who would trust the poor? So the Bengali graduate took to literature and music, to insurance and the films, in a chronological sequence of despair. Sir Asutosh had made the Bhadralok stand upon his legs. If the legs were weak, it was none of his doing. In Bombay, the Parsee, the Gujerati, and the Maharastra youth did not have to fully face the unemployment problem. He could still desist from being a clerk. Naturally, his regard for whatever traditions the earlier middle class had maintained or created could be preserved. It is not suggested that the Poona

Brahmins did not feel frustrated. But their feeling was more political than economic, because the memories of former independence were not so extinct as in Bengal. The old forts still standing on the bleak hills would not allow them to subside. The Gujerati case was different. The Bhatia could not be suppressed. He flung his commerce all over the east. Besides, he had his Bhajans and Garbas, in the performance of which the ladies were always prominent. The commerce-capital of Gujerat was the only shutter left open in the closed room of India. The Parsee had little time for such frivolities.

The second factor that opened the flood-gates of music in Bengal appears to be human. A band of brilliant composers started the spate of songs. Ram Prasad, Nidhu Babu, and others including a Father Anthony and a Maharajah, had written a few good pieces. But once Tagore came, a new opening in the history of Indian music was made. He was followed by D. L. Roy, Rajani Kant Sen, and Atul Prasad Sen (of Lucknow). Before we take up Tagore, the greatest of them all, we may mention the common features of their works. All of them were rebels, and their heterodoxy consisted in a fine combination of the ignorance of the subtler rules of grammar with a more or less sure comprehension of the architecture of the *raga*. They mixed airs, Indian and foreign, classical and romantic. They paid due heed to the beauty of words. They differed, however, in the degree of the mixture and in the evocative value of their poetry. With Tagore, the mixture became an individual product and the poetry ineffably beauti-

ful. He alone followed the logic of the revolt. Yet all these composers had a common social context, which is revealed in their 'national' songs. They could not stand the political subjection, and wanted India to be free. What they did through their music to the national movement cannot be discussed in this volume. D. L. Roy's comic songs, which in virtue of their comicality alone are worthy to be ranked by the side of the verses of Barham and Belloc, Hood and Herbert, had a strident note of social criticism against the hypocrisy of the middle class. He had another instrument in his armoury, drama. Rajani Kanta's comedy was cruder. A. P. Sen was wrapped up in love-songs when he was not composing the patriotic verses. A subtler relation between the composition and the social context is exposed in the undertone of longing in all their love-songs which are often so cloyingly sweet, so pure, so puritanically cautious, so mixed up with spirituality, in fact, so typically Bhadralok. But it should be said at once that the context does not fully hold Tagore. He steps out of it, looks behind and beyond, and marches on, like an Apollo. His best love-songs can be sung by none but the brave. They are the least known.

No apology is needed for dwelling on Tagore's compositions at some length. His genius is essentially musical; he is known in the '*ghat* and *bat*' by his songs; the illiterate sing him, three-year-old children lisp in his numbers; and he knew, he desired that he be known through them. "My poetry may or may not die, but my songs never." That is true as far as it is possible for anything to be true in this world. If India knew his songs as

much as Bengal does, she would have stopped breathing as Bengal did, at least ceased wondering why Bengal was dead, on that August noon of 1941.

Tagore's own development as a composer largely followed the needs of the growth of Indian musical forms. This is as it should be. A great man cannot but repeat in himself all the vital stages of life and culture. He pushes some ahead and releases the energies confined in others, but he exploits them all. There are at least four milestones in the history of his composition. In the first, he was following the behests of practice and writing poems to well-known melodic patterns. Conformity was the rule. Even then, the earlier pieces had two elements of novelty. They gave little scope to *tans* and *kartabs*. Much of this restriction was due to the Dhrupadic structure of the songs, to the richness of their poetry, and to the peculiar deficiency of the language, as he found it then, in the matter of vowels, the preponderance of consonants, and the abrupt endings of words. Besides, the songs would often describe the dramatic features of the story-element, e.g., the songs of Valmiki-Prativa and Mayar Khela. Hindustani music also possesses elements of surprise in the permutation and combination of notes, in *tan*, *murchhana*, *chhutt*, *gamak*, etc. Among these, the first, viz., *tans*, are almost excluded in Dhrupad. So the others alone can be used, and they were used. But, and this is the touch of Tagore, when these existing dramatic conventions were not sufficient, Tagore was not averse to the adaptation of European airs for his purpose. It was of course more than mere pas-

sive adaptation, it was an authentic act of creation. Pluck out the words of the songs in Mayar Khela, so foreign when first heard, spread out the air, and you get the skeleton of the Indian 'raga,' often in a different key. Yet, taking all the songs that he wrote before, say, 1900, the general feature was an elastic orthodoxy rather than a controlled heterodoxy. In fact, the musicians and the 'cultured' audience had not yet cursed Tagore with bell, book and candle; his Brahmo Sangeets were quite popular with the Ustads.

Gradually, however, Tagore's heresy was peeping out. He was blending airs, mixing up castes! From its early days, the Indian musical system has been classified into *jatis*, *ragas* and *raginis*. The essence of the scheme is the fixation of the genus and the species according to structures. In the *thats*, as the genus may be called, the bare essentials are indicated in a sequence of notes, and any aberration in the development is almost a religious offence. At the same time, however, latitude has always been given to the possibility of admixture in the execution of characteristic phrases of two or three cognate ragas or species within the same *that* or genus. This was at once a concession to the physical limitations of the voice and the inner impulsion to cross artificial barriers, and a recognition of emotive affinities. In *Darbari Kanada* and *Bahar*, for example, the difference in *that* is transcended by a fundamental similitude that comes out in *tans*. The various texts (Shastras) came to terms with the realities of the situation and recognised these alliances with trans-frontier ragas. Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

practising artists had been preparing all kinds of mixtures of species. Some like *Jhinjitkhambaj* became very popular, a number of them, like *gaud-sarang*, *nat-kedar*, *puriya-dhyansri* were taken unto the bosom of the elite, while others like *Bhairon-bahar*, *Eman-Bilwal* remained to prove the unique virtuosity of certain families. There are few species in Hindustani music which are anthropologically pure, though the Ustads are always swearing by purity. Tagore demolished this myth of 'purity' by the very principle of the growth and the very practice of the art of music. Objectively, that principle had remained long in the dark and at last become radio-active. In this way, at least twenty new species or *Raginis* were sponsored by him. Their survival value has since then been tested.

The third period marks the consummation of Tagore's experiments. The choice before him was clear: either he would remain content with what he had achieved in the way of new combinations of melodies, wait for time to antiquate the opposition to his novelties and allow him to be classed in future with the master-composers, like Tansen or Thaygaraja, or he would push on to the creation of further forms driven by the urge of fresher impulses. A genuine revolutionary that he was, he could not but take the next step forward, even if it were further away from the ambit of the classicist's approval. The drives came from 'folk-songs,' as they were called, but which were sophisticated in their way. Hindustani music was always conscious of their separate existence, and had called them 'Deshi' or 'Artha-sangit'. In other words, they were laden with literary values. They were like the native

states where Indians are Indians as they would like to be known by non-Indians. Their stress was on words, and their reference was to devotion and its accessories, love and its aphrodisiacs, and life with its crude and slightly medieval realities. Music as such was a subordinate factor there; only means to ends. In short, the Deshi style had both a popular and a collective appeal in its meaning-side. But it had certain other qualities which the *Marga* or the Durbari style did not possess. Springing from that great protestant movement of the Middle Ages, the Deshi songs partook of the directness of individual approach to the Divine, rejected the help of intermediaries. Therefore, their spirit was congenial not only to Tagore's spirit of dissent but also to his philosophy of life. As a *raga* in the *Marga* style was a generic structure of notes and thus generally disregardful of the individual emotions that a song could convey, its protest in the Deshi style would naturally take the line of particularising the generalities of classical modes through words that conveyed specific meaning. Two results ensued from this, First: instead of the prolonged development of a *Raga*, as in *alap* or in *asthayee*, its infinite variety was expressed in different compositions, each conforming to the urge of its mood and all doing justice to the pronounced differences with other *Ragas*. Thus, for example, instead of *Bhairabi* being spread on one plane and over one stretch of a long period, its multiplicity of forms in improvisations would be specified in a dozen *songs* in the same *Bhairabi*, but differing between themselves in moods and nuances and communicating these distinctions through appropriate

meanings in words and whatever minor changes in notes they would compel. The second result was the birth of the art of composition as such. No writer of songs in the nineteenth century Bengal, where the contrary could be expected, duly considered the musical value of words or the verbal appropriateness of musical feeling. The heaviest *ragas* had light bodies and the lightest *ragas* had armours of medieval knights. No wonder that the lady of music remained in the ogre's castle. Tagore let off the delicate detenu from internment. His *Todi* and *Malhar* clothed dignified sentiments, and his light songs got their *Khambaj* and *Pilu*. The Bengali language offered difficulties, no doubt, but they were surmounted easily by the wizard who had in more than one sense created that language itself. Here came the importance of the Deshi melodic patterns. They demanded simplicity and directness, individual and specific moods, and an upsurge of feeling. Tagore provided them with all that they wanted. If in the meanwhile they took him away from familiar paths, he could quote music's own history that impels worn-out forms to seek life from the soil or be damned otherwise. Was not Dhrupad as we know it the regional style of Agra and Gwalior? Was not '*Deshi*' itself a classical *Raga*?

In the last phase, Tagore's musical genius discovered new dimensions. Throughout his long career, he had been throwing up musical dramas in which first the members of his family and, later on, the gifted members of the Shanti-Niketan were rendering him every assistance. From the time that the Falguni was staged, Calcutta began to look forward every year to the Shanti-Niketan festivals

in which dignified acting, beautiful dresses, artistic scenes were harmonised by lovely music. India also had her share in the enjoyment of the glory of this mosaic. Here too Tagore's development was striking. What might be called the preponderance of music was controlled by dance and drama into perfect proportions. The organic integrity of Chitrangada could hardly be split into component parts. It was something more than an opera as is usually understood here; the subtlety of its sentiments and the extreme refinement of its lyrics would in any case raise it to a higher level. Within the limitations of Indian music, the drama was fully conveyed. Dance and dresses contributed to the totality of its musical effect. Indian music at last corresponded, as far as it could, to the subtleties of individual feeling.

One word of caution: Tagore was no mere writer of songs, as many would wrongly believe. Excepting the very early period, he seldom wrote a poem to be set to music at leisure. Poems and their musical forms came to him *complete*, at one and the same moment. This was possible because he was an executant himself, and of no mean order. The process of fusion was further facilitated by the fact that his poetry had met with similar problems and solved them; it had unleashed similar energies in literature; and his music and poetry were both prompted by a common urge to freedom. A composer's final test is the aptness of the fit between form and content. Separately, the musical pattern should have as high a distinction as the poetical. That is to say, each is valuable *per se*. No appraisement of the place of Tagore's compositions in the

history of Indian music need take away anything from their individual achievements either as poetry or as musical pattern. Here one can only point out the exquisite workmanship of the latter in the context of the whole composition.

It has been said that Tagore, the composer, could only be a Bengali. The traditions of Artha-Sangeet were there no doubt e.g., the Dohas, the Vaishnava padavalis, the Tantrik songs, the Baul, the Bhatia, and so on. Tagore once said that in Bengal nothing could be mechanically repeated. We do not propose to analyse his views in detail; all that we can say with certainty is that in so far as it was a generalisation of his own musical forms the statement was correct. The fact of Bengal being a frontier province had made it a refuge, and enabled the competent among the refugees to conduct a few experiments in music. That Delhi was far away was one of the reasons why the Darbari style of music could not get a foothold in Bengal. We know only of a couple of the *Saniyas* in Bengal. The decay of Delhi made Oudh the centre of its weakened culture, but only transformed Bengal into the hub of the economic life of the eastern half of Northern India that included Assam, Tibet, North Burma and parts of southern China. With the true sight given to commerce, the East India Company selected Calcutta as the eastern headwaters of the flow. Broach, Surat and Bombay settlements tapped Aryavarta, while Madras, Salem, Coconada, Calicut, etc., irrigated the region below the Vindhyas. These facts of historical and commercial geography are of vital importance in the understanding of the qualitative difference in

the hold of Indian traditions upon the respective zones, and consequently, upon the centres and diffusion of Indian music. Maharastra had little commerce and much politics. It stuck to the older Sanskritic traditions with greater tenacity than Bengal could. Maharastra renaissance never could cut the umbilical cord. The Servants of India, the strong anti-Muslim feeling, the Education Society, the Women's University, the Kesari, the politicians from Gokhale to Tilak with their responsive co-operation, the reformers from Ranade to Karve and Thakkar, are all conjugations of Sanskrit roots and verbs. This is the heart of their realism, the broad base of traditions. One cannot think of C. R. Das pouring over the pages of Panini in the Alipore Jail, one knows of his great love for Kirtan. On the other hand, one has heard of Tilak writing the Geeta Rahasya, a stupendous work of Sanskrit scholarship, inside the jail and coming out a sceptic and a lover of classical songs. Thus, if one cannot fully explain Tagore by the fact of his birth in Bengal, which, unfortunately, most of his Bengali admirers do by way of compensation, the difference between his attitude towards music and that of Bhatkhande can be partly understood in terms of the difference in the hold of earlier traditions upon the two regions of India, Bengal and Maharastra. Family atmosphere also counted in this divergence in outlook. Tagore came from an upper class family. His grandfather was a magnate in finance, ran through a huge fortune, is reported to have presented two hundred shawls to the ladies in a Paris reception to the Empress of France. Tagore's father rescued the

struggling family from the huge debt, and he also saved the Upanishads from the excrescences while retaining the Vedic rituals. He became a landlord and a man of great spiritual vision. Tagore pushed his father's reformism further, was the first of the family to give up the sacred thread, the first to allow marriage with a non-Brahmin, the first to dispense with the *sila* from ceremonies. His interpretation of the Upanishads was not the same as his father's. It was primarily a poet's, while his father's was that of a seer. The Tagore family was outcaste. It was also as big as a tribe, and could be self-sufficient. This island fortress of the Tagores was not a floating one, it was an observation post, a base of operations which, if it was outside the territorial waters, was under the protection of the shore-batteries. But protection only in times of emergency, vide his Message of the Forest, his nationalism, his lectures in the Shanti-Niketan series, his renunciation of knighthood, his final condemnation of Imperialism; otherwise, the culture he would like to build was open to all the storms and stresses of wind and waters, to folk-strains and European airs. Bhatkhande, on the other hand, came from a Brahmin Marhatta middle class family and knew Sanskrit like a pundit. His work could be mainly one of resuscitation, systematisation and scholarship. The writer was one of those who brought the two together, and vividly remembers the impression that they created upon each other and upon those present. The one a rebel, the other a reformist, a Lenin meeting a Kautsky. The one a creator, the other a re-constructor, a Sun Yat Sen talking to Chiang Kai-shek.

The one pouring out his message in unpremeditated ease, the other listening humbly, reverently, cautiously. Technically, they were like the Two Singers in Turgenieff's tale. The writer's own impression was that while Tagore had not taken a degree in Sanskrit, Bhatkhande had not joined any Faculty of Imagination. Tagore came back and said that he had met a Brahmin, a Deb-Sharman; Bhatkhande was overwhelmed, touched his big forehead with folded hands, and said that he had had a vision of a prophet.

V.N. Bhatkhande was born in 1860, graduated in law in 1887 and built up a fair practice in the Bombay High Court. His wife and child died soon after. He left the profession in 1910 to devote himself entirely to his life's work In the meanwhile, he had received a sound training in all varieties of classical Hindustani music from Wazir Khan (Rampur), Raoji Boa Belvalkar, the famous Dhrupadiya, and Mohammad Ali, the well-known Kheyalia of Jaipur. He learnt *Sitar* from Ballav Das, the disciple of the famous Jivanji Maharaj. A strong feeling of nationalism, the confusion in the variety of styles, and an urgent desire to bring the riches of *gharanas* to the ears of the public urged him to undertake an all-India tour. He met princes and *ustads*, scholars and loafers, learnt Bengali to read Kristo Dhan Banerji's masterly treatise, the Geeta-Sutra-Sar (1885), collected thousands of songs and a large number of manuscripts on the way. Many are the stories of opposition of the *ustads* to this outsider LL.B.'s assault upon their professional secrets, and of his lawyer's feints, inveiglements, cajolery to disarm them. To the last

days of his life he remained a suspect to the *ustads*. Some expressed open contempt for his works, while others observed an armed 'neutrality.' Yet they ultimately succumbed to what they called his humility but to what was in reality the pressure of social change. With the princely patrons out, the musicians felt themselves like lost children. When they found that the outsider had reduced the period of training from a life-time to six years, their economic security was gone. But they soon realised that the same enemy had created a substitute audience, and felt grateful.

Bhatkhande was an active member of the *Jnanottejak Mandali* of Bombay, where he would organise soirees and deliver lectures on music. Subsequently, regular instruction in music was given by him to the members who felt interested. On one such occasion the then Maharaja Scindhia met him incognito. Bhatkhande was soon invited to organise a music school at Gwalior. It became the Madhoji School. He was requested to become its Principal. But the shrewd Brahmin refused the offer. The scions of the old *gharanas* were appointed teachers on his recommendation, and began to teach their pupils, but according to his system. The Gaekwad was also duly impressed. The first All-India Music Conference was held at Baroda in 1916. Here a battle-royal was waged between Bhatkhande and his opponents who held that his classification had done injustice to the Srutis, the secret of our melodic system. The victory of Bhatkhande was complete. After that a number of All-India Conferences were held, in one of the Lucknow sessions of which, a resolution was

moved to establish a College of Music. The Marris College of Hindustani Music was the consequence. In this work, Bhatkhande received great help from the then minister of Education, Rai Rajeshwar Bali, his cousin Rai Umanath Bali, and the late Raja Nawab Ali. The Baroda State School had been started earlier. In these three institutions at least 2,000 boys and girls are daily receiving instruction in the foundations of Hindustani Music. The Calcutta University has also adopted his system. But its scientific rigour has been watered down to suit the soul of Bengal. Otherwise, it is his pedagogics that is regnant in Northern India.

Bhatkhande was more than a missionary of the art of music. There have been few scholars like him. Only Shastri and Abraham of Madras, Kristodhan Banerji and Sir S. M. Tagore of Bengal belonged to his class. Of them again, Kristodhan Banerji alone had his common sense and share of the modern temper; even then, Banerji had not travelled. Others expounded the Srutis and wrote redactions. The list of Bhatkhande's books is as formidable as their quality is high. *Srimal-lakshya Sangit* in Sanskrit, *Sangit-Paddhati* in four volumes, the *Kramik* series in five for the five years' course he contemplated, the *Gita Malika* in twenty-two parts, the *Lakshana-Geeta-Sangraha* in which he showed his abilities as a composer of merit, and the *Abhinaba-Rag-Manjari*, are his major works. He edited Pundarik Vittal's treatises, Venkata-mukhi's *Chaturdandi-prakasika*, Hriday Narayan's *Hirday-Kantuk* and *Hriday-Prakasa*, Lochan's *Rag-Tarangini* and Srinivas's *Rag-tatta-bibodh*. Commentaries on *Sangeet-Darpan* and the Swaradhyaya chapter of

the *Ratnakar* were also published by him. They were all in Mahratti, Hindi or in Sanskrit. Only three essays were in English, those masterly surveys of the system of music of Northern India from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. As if that was not enough, he would take classes and conduct examinations so long as he was physically able. On the Kalyan *that* alone, he once gave in Lucknow ten lectures of more than an hour each. He was one of the greatest Indologists that the writer knows of. A few words on his system are necessary.

After he had collected about three thousand pieces from the members of well-known families, he reduced the airs into twelve unities of structure or *thats*. This was a departure from the usual classification into six *ragas* and thirty-six *raginis*. His construction is scientific for the following reasons, (apart from that of the solution of the hell of a confusion which six faithful and devoted *raginis* would cause to their single husband of a *raga*); (1) it is empirical in being based on (*a*) the agreed elements in the actual execution of the *ragas* and *raginis* by experts, and (*b*) only those *raginis* which are usually demonstrated by them, not more than sixty in number, out of their pretentious repertoire of hundreds and the permutational possibilities of thousands; (2) it starts from the Bilawal scale in which all notes are pure, and passes on to *thats* with one, two, three and four Vikrit notes in gradations of complexity and difficulty in mastering; (3) it gives a rational explanation of the usual assignation of *ragas* and *raginis* to fixed periods of day and night by breaking up the full scale on the back of the *madhyam*, thus divulging the correspon-

dence between the morning and the evening melodies in the lower and the upper half of the *that*, respectively. This is the essence of Bhatkhande's theory of Sandhi-rag-prakas. How one scale shades off into another is a corollary to the above. Further, (4) it has a notation that can be learnt by the tyro. Tagore's notation is simpler, but its simplicity is mainly with reference to the subject matter. Bhatkhande's notation enables one to easily catch the nuances, the twists and the shifts in weight, without which Indian music is a verbal exercise. In the words of the songs in the Lakshya-Sangit series are disclosed the essential features of the *raga-rupa*, its ruling notes, and peculiarities of ascent and descent, its key-phrases, and the governing spirit. Only some of the compositions attain to poetry, but they are all clever. Nobody would put Bhatkhande, the poet by the side of even a second-class poet of Bengal or Gujerat. His strong point was that he knew the demands of music upon words, while our literary artists seem to be ignorant of them even when they quote Pater. (Hard consonants and compounds for *mirh* and soft vowels for *gamak* are their common sins). Each such effort of Bhatkhande served the interests of the new elite, if they choose to care. Today, classical music has ceased to be a closed preserve for the feudal order and the upper classes, and anybody with some Hindi and a little Marathi for the *Kramik* series and the *Paddhati* can acquire a workable knowledge of the important *ragas* in our system. If he cannot become a musician he can at least debunk the high and the mighty. From Bhatkhande also flowed a quantity of musical scholarship, e.g., H. L. Roy's

Problems of Hindustani Music (English) and R. L. Roy's Raga-nirnaya (Bengali). Sri Krisen Ratanjankar, Karnad, P. B. Joshi have written papers of a high standard, and they are all his pupils. Unfortunately, the schools that have worked under his inspiration have not produced students, barring a few, who can transmute their knowledge into acts of joy.

It has been held that between Tagore's and Bhatkhande's individual pressures the closed elite-group of *ustads* has been broken. But individual achievements, great as they are, would not have been sufficient if the set-pattern of the princely-patron—courtly-ustad—courtier-audience had not been considerably loosened by the middle class who formed the Indo-British substitute. At long last, we have begun to find classical music inside the pure domestic environment and respectable young men and women taking up music as a profession. Though Bhatkhande himself was more than a revivalist, his influence has been in that direction. Even in Bengal where Tagore rules, young composers find Bhatkhande's work handy, and put Bengali words upon his notations and cross them with Tagore's music, *Kirtan*, *Bhatial* and A. P. Sen's *Thumri*. The result can be well guessed. Which compels one to make an uncharitable but a true comment that while Bhatkhande's gross influence has been towards disciplined advance in taste for the classics, and no creation please, Tagore's has been towards confusion in the name of artistic execution. Yet, Tagore, who ran away from every form of artificial restriction that a foreign culture had devised, imposed upon himself the most rigo-

rous and obstinate *tapasya* of his own throughout the long sixty years of his creative period, a rigour that was only of the Rishis of old. That the *tapasya* in him has been missed in Bengal is due to that province's social context. That the adventure which is the impulse behind the continuity of Indian culture has not been seized in Bhatkhande's mandated territories is similarly traceable to the slower rate of mobility of the middle class there. Tagore shot into the soil to resuscitate the dying Bhishma, Bhatkhande uttered *mantrams* by his bedside. Tagore knew the social strength of art, Bhatkhande was conscious of the persistence of traditions in art. Yet their influences have met. The ignorance of the average executant of the new music betrayed in his talks on art and *rasa* is as unbearable as the learned conservatism and the poverty of the power of communication among the students of music colleges. Both types of musicians have unlimited vanity, of the parvenu and of the impotent. But those among the public who are disinterestedly interested in the cause of music as a social agency have gained. Their number is not, cannot be large so long as the social structure is what it is. These two great men seem to have a long wait before them. Their immediate impact is appreciable, but it is nothing to what it can be.

Vishnu Digambar was a great singer and an excellent teacher. His disciples are all over Northern India and Bombay, and some of them are genuine artists. His Gandharva Vidyalaya has its headquarters in Bombay, but his school is really peripatetic. It is not strange that Vishnu Digambar's

popularity with the public should have rested on his Bhajan and his almost religious personality on the platform. He had a sound training, a grand voice, dignity, and dramatic qualities. Yet his social significance is that of a carrier.

In Madras, we do not know of any such personality who can be a symbol of musical renaissance. The race of creative giants seems to have been exhausted. What we find instead are things, like musical commentaries, chairs in music, text-books, new editions of old texts, and a quarterly of high academic quality. The clear-cut difference between the high and the low in music persists, though the fissure in tastes is not as deep as it was elsewhere in India some time ago. Standards of appreciation are much higher in the South than in the North. Successful men in Madras, however, evince the usual predilections towards devotional music. The net result is a loosening, but not a falling into parts of the traditional taste. Whatever Madras has touched recently has been reduced to high class journalism, just as the Bengali touch has inflated everything into high falutin, a humid, turgid, tropical eloquence. Madras is many, but the tragic unities are seldom broken. Bengal is one but hers is the looseness of the stream of consciousness.

Instrumental music has been less susceptible to change than the vocal. Itj ust disappeared before the harmonium, the authentic bastard of Indo-European culture. Until recently, wedding presents to the bride had to include an 'organ', as it was called. But it had the supreme merit of serving the social purpose in music, viz., tickling without

training and catering without cost to the bourgeois listeners. Bhatkhande's schools and the All-India-Radio, in one of its lucid intervals have almost banished it. Today it is used in accompaniment by fond parents of infant prodigies and by devoted lovers of professional women-musicians. We are witnessing a revival of Indian instruments, like *Sarod* and *Surbahar* in the North, and *Veena* and the flute in the South. The thunder of *Pakhwaj* is silenced with the death of Dhrupad. Orchestration remains a problem. The All-India-Radio and film companies are trying to solve it. Both have failed, the one lost in the vague desire to do something, and the other, in the maze of imitations of Los Angelic 'background'. Monstrosities like *marubihag* with a dash of the jazz and a shriek of the violin when the heroine is becoming a *sannyasini* in one of her many fits of unrequited love are the stock-in-trade of modern Indian orchestration.

To summarise the state of musical affairs in India: Dhrupad is gone and has taken the *Pakhwaj* with it. The feudal laziness of its *alap* is unsuited to our vexed ears. But dignity has gone too. Kheyal lives in four important styles, the Kirana of Bombay, represented by Abdul Karim and his pupils, the Agra style of Fyaz Khan, the Punjabee style of Ghulam Ali, the Gwalior style of Raja Bhaiya and Shanker Pandit. Benares has the largest number of second class, i.e., highly competent singers and instrumentalists (*Sanai* of Bismilla) in Northern India. Thumri has no great exponent today, though it is the base of public taste in Lucknow, the city of music. Everywhere Kheyal is seeking alliance with Thumri. Bihar follows the U. P., though

Bhagalpur and Gaya have local pride. Bengal wants to create, but it is creating absurdities and vulgarising Tagore. The recent attention to the folk-styles bears the seeds of promise, but seeds in that tub cannot sprout. The Rag-Pradhan, only Narad knows what it means, is already a bundle of mannerisms. Bengali music, while it is good enough for the new bourgeoisie in other provinces, is insufferable for its sweetness, its protoplasmic invertebrateness. Art can no more be raised above its context than you can lift yourself by your ears.

Three important social agencies have lately been working upon Indian music: gramophones, films and the Radio. The writer does not belong to the category of those who condemn their music without hearing it. They have often produced good music, rescued and unearthed many a dying musician. Who knew before the Bombay station was started that every township in that province could still produce at least one musician who would be the despair of the local incomparable elsewhere? Who knew before the Lucknow or the Trichinopoly station was started that Benares and Trichinopoly still led? Through the Radio, comparative judgment has been facilitated and musical interest aroused; children have begun to sing and old ladies hum in the lunch hour in which film-music or recorded music is provided. It is very often vulgar; and only occasionally, 'pucca gana' is conceded. But vulgarity is so human, in the sense of being socially typical and symbolic, and you cannot ask the ladies not to switch off when the Khan Saheb is on the air. If Zohra Bai records are not reprinted, old classics

of literature also are not re-published. For mental health our women need a mid-day nap with soft music and soft novels, no less urgently than evening-dreams in the cinema-hall, just as our men-folk will have their furtive pleasures to keep going as human beings. Indian society consists of families which are little ententes of petty bourgeois interests. The males and the females may lead a dog's life otherwise, but don't they look sweet to each other when they listen to the film-music, sung, recorded, transmitted? The Radio, the gramophone, and the film companies have brought peace to the house. But it is the peace of petty bourgeois fantasy, the sort of thing which Charlie Chaplin portrayed in Modern Times with love and irony.

Still these three agencies are not innocents. The film and the gramophone companies are capitalist concerns. Under the pressure of strong financial groups they tend to oust new efforts. And they camouflage their profit motives by referring to public taste. The public taste being what it is, there is no sense in making it worse. It is rank hypocrisy to appeal to demand only when the supply alone is ready to exploit the demand-supply equation. One finds it difficult *not* to think of hundreds of subjects that may answer the unformulated demand. These subjects may not be as insistent as the love-motive or the snob-urge, but in their totality they may be. A socialised film or gramophone industry has achieved wonders elsewhere. The All-India Radio is another affair. It has no profit-motive behind it. What is there is, however, pretty bad, neglect of the Government, lack of vision and interest in culture in the controlling authority. The truth is that the author-

ities are not interested in India and her culture, beyond a certain point. They have no burning faith in her future. Nationalisation is their primitive terror. The Government have been using the A. I. R. for war-propaganda, but the department is not yet permanent, enjoys no liberty of opinion, and has to remain oblivious of the needs of Indian society. The approach is administrative in its negative caution, political in its avoidance of politics that count, and unimaginative in spite of its brilliant staff. In short, it is non-cultural and non-social. With that outlook, the zoning of music was only natural. Regional culture is a fact, but Indian culture is both a fact and a value. In fact, it is the supreme value, which is ill served by occasional exchanges of artists from one area to another. Briefly, the A. I. R. has not been allowed to grow to whatever stature it could attain even in these limited conditions. About three years ago, a survey in musical taste was undertaken by the A. I. R., but nobody knows what has happened to it. Probably it was one of the first casualties of the War in India.

This brief and hurried resume has shown two tendencies in our music, the revivalist and the creative. They are the result of the impact of economic forces upon our traditions. But the economic forces did not come from the soil, nor were the traditions living and kicking. So society became middle-class, mistaking the oxygen of the apparatus for fresh air. It has become lower middle class at last. This disintegration of the Indo British elite has made both the tendencies abortive. Creative music has become a literary re-hash, and revivalist music is the talk of the horse-

dealer who has eaten off the hind-legs of a donkey and wants to pass it as a thorough-bred. The revolutionary potencies of both have lost themselves in the sands of the social distance that separates the middle class from the rest of the people.

CHAPTER VII

REVIVAL OF FINE ARTS

It is not the intention of the writer to discuss the fundamentals of Indian art. More competent men have done this job with scholarship and insight. Indian writers, and a few Europeans also, have introduced a fair dose of enthusiasm into their appraisement. Usually, two claims are made on behalf of Indian art: (1) Its view-point is so distinct from that of every other style in the world that one might describe the position as Indian Art *versus* the rest.[1] The argument is on the score of a complete severance from realistic delineation. If one goes by the pure theory of Indian aesthetics which takes its cue from the Aitareya Brahmana VI, 27,[2] then the creative process dictated by the texts is pitched in such high key that it appears to be unique. On the other hand, examples of Indian art at their aesthetic best, are not above conveying forms less than the angelic, and in the manner appropriate to them. Even the earlier Ajanta contains pieces which could be called concessions to the 'humanity' of the world around their makers.[3] The little monkey alone could disprove the angels, and many will be on the side of the monkey, in art, at least. Then, again, this claim to be angelically unique must needs exclude one or two styles, particularly, the Mughal portraits, birds and beasts. Indian art is not a purely Hindu concern, and its history is a composite affair. (2) Though the view-point is not peculiar to

India, it alone is worthy of the Indian awakened to his heritage. The arguments range from the power and economy of traditions to the superiority of spiritual values. But Dr. A. K. Coomarswamy has established the similarity between the Indian and the Chinese discipline and vision,[4] and sought a close parallel in the doctrines of a medieval European mystic, Meister Eckhart.[5] In regard to our duty towards the view-point there is unanimity among scholars and lovers.[6] Their position is somewhat like this; we have been a spiritual race, a resurgent India can abdicate her spirituality at her peril. Indian art is a store of spiritual values, so let us keep it safe. It is not very clear from the scholarly writings how the store has been actually preserved and the accounts of stock kept. Only a vague feeling of traditional continuity is conveyed, excepting by a writer like Dr. Abanindra N. Tagore[7] who shows the connection between the older forms and the living ones of folk-art, such as *alpana*, (*rangoli*—Gujerat, *Kolam*—South, *Jhunti*—Orissa) or by a seer like Sri Aurobinda who bases the whole process on the concrete level of national discipline. The fact of the matter is that we are *not* conscious today of the earlier traditions, myths, legends, and symbols. *We*, of course, are the middle class Indians of today among whom an ignorance of the stories from the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, what to speak of the meaning of the lotus-motif or of a *mudra*, is a part of culture. But outside our rank, people in the villages are still responsive. Every year hundreds and thousands of earthen images are made in Bengal for community-worship to last only the auspicious days, and each such image is made according to

traditions. Usually, the bigger ones have their auras painted with divine figures, each true to type. Aesthetically, they are not satisfying, but they demonstrate the living nature of the Indian view of art among the potters and priests, if not with the elite.[8] Similarly, in Cochin and Travancore and Malabar, i.e., Kerala, dances and dramas are performed on almost every occasion in the villages by the *Chakkyaras* and the *Nambudris*, castes for the purpose, and the illiterate peasant-audiences are so well aware of the legends, even when they come through Sanskrit dramatists like Kalidas and Bhasa, that only the very complicated *mudras* and poses are missed by them.[9] So if traditional culture is not the attribute of the new middle class, but is still related to the life of the people, then the move away from Western non-Christian, representational art[10] to some form of the ideational Hindu type was one in the desirable social direction. How far the move was prompted by book-knowledge is debatable. Ronaldshay reports that the Tagore brothers had not heard of the Shastras when they started the movement.[11] Dr. A. N. Tagore has said that his eyes were opened by a volume of Mughal miniatures. Probably, the urge lay somewhere between discontent and intuition. Which was not enough, as we know from what has happened to that movement in these thirty-five years.

Then there are the rebels who lodge a few complaints against Indian art and its outlook. In their opinion, it is weak, monotonous, lyrical, metaphysical, and unsuited to this industrial age. Besides these rebels whose cerebrations have not yet

risen to the level of a systematic exposition, we have a few artists who practise on the Western style and appreciate the Indian. Their catholicity also awaits the formulation of general principles.

From these three attitudes we may deduce the following social facts; (1) that, by and large appreciation is less today than what it was,[12] (2) that it is still greater in the country-side today than in the urban areas, (3) that the middle classes in the cities are blind, and that (4) the revolt starts from the latter group. On these bases, new movements in the Fine Arts have to be judged. Movement includes creation *and* appreciation, production *and* sale. In other words, it is a social process.

Though we are not concerned with the history of the Government Schools of Art, in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Lahore and Lucknow or of the various museums in the cities, we may notice that the Government of India, generally, have been stirred into assisting them by the exhibitions in London, right from the Great International Exhibition of 1851,[13] to the Empire Exhibition of 1935. Sir George Lloyd, who, according to one version, was to Indian painting in Bombay what Curzon was to Indian archaeology, had a similar inspiration. The decorations of the India House in London and of the Viceroy's House and other buildings in Delhi are in the same line of patronage under official and European direction. Before Mukul De (Calcutta), Debi Prasad Roy Chowdhury (Madras), Samar Gupta (Lahore), and Asit K. Haldar (Lucknow), there was no Indian principal in any of the Government Schools. It is not suggested that modern Indian Fine Arts need not be grateful to the European

heads. Calcutta had Havell and Percy Brown, Bombay had its Griffiths. These three gentlemen contributed to the revival in their own ways, the first by a deep understanding of the nature of Indian art and his courage to invite an outsider, Dr. A. N. Tagore, to work as Vice-Principal with full liberty of action, the second by his keenness and sympathy, and the third by bringing the Ajanta within the knowledge of his students who would often camp near the caves to copy the murals. But they are only three out of a long list of British officials who did all they could to spoil their students' taste. Modelling from life, sketching from life, copying the living masters of old, Leighton, Alma Tadema, Poynter, and Marcus Stone, Watts jostling with Raphael and Murrillo on the walls, the Principal hobnobbing with the Governor and Rajahs and Maharajas, ex-students serving as drawing masters on thirty rupees per month and practising homoeopathy to supplement their income—this was the picture of the Schools of Arts' activities. The curriculum was drawn in such a way that the arts were separated from the crafts, with the obvious intention of attracting young men of respectable families for the latter and driving the artisans' sons into the former. In Bombay for example, the Reay School of Crafts was separated early. Stipends varied accordingly. The administrative direction was weak and confused. If the head of the institution was a strong man, he could have his way in doing nothing for art and everything in management. Besides, the Governments did not know whether an art school really belonged to the Industries or to the Education Department. They put it under the charge of both. Even today, a

similar situation obtains in certain provinces with the result that the Principal's work is mainly concerned with getting round the officers of both the departments tugging at each other over the appointment of a chaprasi on twelve rupees a month. Nothing happened to the crafts either, no new design worth speaking of, and no revival. Art-museums, as such, hardly existed. The whole thing had to wait before the middle class citizens took it up themselves. The Bombay Art Society was no doubt formed in 1888, but it really began to function from 1910. An art society was started by G. N. Tagore in Calcutta in 1907, with Lord Kitchener as the president. It came to be well known as the Indian Society of Oriental Art. Out of its thirty members, only five were Indians. The Europeans had been intrigued by the samples of Indian art at the Delhi Durbar. The first exhibition was soon organised, and it became a sensation. It contained pictures by the two Tagores, Nanda Lal Bose, S. N. Ganguly, Asit Kumar Haldar and Venkatappa. Subsequent exhibitions attracted crowds from the High Court and Clive Street. The Government gave a grant of Rs. 10,000 - and the Rupam, in its days the best art-journal in Asia, was started. The society got a habitation and opened classes. Its patrons and workers were cosmopolitan, though the inspiring genius was that of the two Tagores. The intellectual aspect was in charge of O. C. Ganguly and Woodroffe, to name two only, while Coomarswamy expounded its doctrines from outside.[14] A 'national' movement had at last appeared. Gradually, it spread over India (minus Bombay), and Ceylon.

One erroneous assumption in regard to it should be removed before we proceed to discuss its social bearings. It was *not* the Bengali school of painting that was born in Calcutta. The artists included other provincials; the sympathisers and patrons were Englishmen, Germans, Japanese, Indian princes; the subject matter was Hindu and Buddhist myths and legends, figures from the early history of India, Mughal kings and queens; the technique was not Bengali, as no Bengali technique was existent apart from that of the *patuas* and the potters, in fact, it was eclectic, pastiche, if you did not like it; even the pigments and the brushes had to be imported from outside. The only Bengali touch, *per se*, came in the Chaitanya cycle (K. N. Majumdar, particularly), in the landscapes that were few in number, and barring those of Gaganendra Nath were not much to be proud of, and in a certain delicate 'lyrical' feeling which was so Bengali. The grounds for the latter opinion were the bodies of women. It is not known how exactly they were identified as Bengali. For aught we can see, Gujerati and Malabari women look very much like their Bengali sisters. In many cases the women belonged to the primitive people, failing whom, to the princely order. The dress and the ornaments of princesses were Indian, and not typical of the Bengal of those days. In fact, none of the spectators had seen the women of Ajanta, Bagh and Sigirryiah, and all felt the urge of recognition. They thus put the women of the new pictures into the Bengali household. Besides, women in India are associated with delicacy, and Bengal with lyricism, devotion and mysticism. The circle of argument was

complete. And yet, there was something in that feeling, only it had nothing to do with art. To put it bluntly, non-Bengalis hated their own middle class sentimentality when they saw its exhibition in line and colour, and transferred their hatred elsewhere where it fitted. By and large, the impression that was conveyed by the array of pictures with the same motifs year in and year out was that vitality was lacking in the conception of the movement, that technically, it was convention without social conviction, and that though its direction was not towards the caves, it could only be into the ivory tower, unless a miracle happened. The 1908 movement which started in Bengal 'opened the eyes of India', as Haldar puts it, but the eyes were leaden.

The Bombay revival[15] came in the twenties. The Prince of Wales' visit, the decoration of the Durbar hall in the Government House, and Sir George Lloyd's sympathy were the immediate urges; they were subsequently supplemented by the need for decorating Delhi and putting up a good show for Bombay in the Empire exhibitions. The grand result is the Indian room in which the walls and the ceiling are decorated in the 'traditional' manner. Whatever may be the merit of the pictures of the Zodiac or of Agriculture, Industry, Sculpture etc., it is undeniable that Griffith's ideas have been partly realised. The Bombay revival is chiefly mural. The Ganesh procession could not have been painted by one who did not owe allegiance to the Ajanta.[1]

Only a culture-enthusiast would discover a renaissance in Bihar and the Punjab, though Patna

and Lahore have two of the finest museums in India. The Patna *Kalam* is dead, and no new *Kalam* has sprung up. Yet there are more patrons of the Fine Arts in Patna, among the lawyers particularly, than anywhere in Northern India, barring Benares. Chughtai ruled the Punjab before Amrita Sher Gil's return to India. Her premature death makes us feel prophetic. In the U. P. we have the Kala Bhawan at Benares, and the Government Art School at Lucknow. The function of the first is that of a store-house of masterpieces, while that of the latter was once of a radiating centre. So long as Rai Rajeswar Bali was the minister of Education, the Lucknow school received a good deal of support in money and publicity, and the teachers could teach. Since then, it has wilted under inattention. In Madras, the situation has improved in recent years. Devi Prasad Chowdhury has put new life into his school, and the work of his pupils shows vigour. The Andhra impulse seems to be exhausted, however. Kerala specialises in dance revival under the guidance of the poet Vallathol. Dr. Cousins has arranged the Art Gallery in the Travancore state. Hyderabad is generous in preservation; and so is Jaipur which has a School of Art to its additional credit.

It is not a pleasant prospect. The Renaissance is practically over, as the appointment of professors of Fine Arts here and there definitely proves. And yet, there is plenty of talent everywhere and appreciation is not yet defunct in the country-side; the number of buyers of pictures has certainly increased, and the output is more. Dr. Coomarswamy writes:[17] "It may be said without fear of contradiction that

our present poverty, quantitative and qualitative, in works of art, in competent artists, and effective connoisseurship is unique in the history of the world....." He calls the latest exploits, 'tawdry', 'meritricious.' He is not, however, equally clear about the reasons of this decadence. He seems to suggest that our ignorance of Indian symbols and traditions and our acquired falsely foreign taste are responsible. But he is otherwise emphatic: "Now the economic factor is practically without bearing on the issue." It is public taste, of the rich and the poor alike, which is Dr. Coomarswamy's villain of the piece. But why should the public taste be what it is? It was not like this before, as he himself has stated elsewhere. The explanation is neither with the public, which should not be equated with the people, nor with taste, which is not just the snob's itch. It is economic, socio-economic, preferably, as the following argument will tend to show.

The contents of the pictures are chiefly mythological. One feels after visiting the shows that gods and goddesses of the Puranas have taken a holiday from Heaven and come outing there. Divinities are chosen by individual temperament, the tender ones being usually preferred to the tough. Thus Siva is seldom the destroyer, but the devoted husband who is incidentally a Yogi, and Krishna is in his elements after giving up the reins. Then the Pauranic kings come, followed by the Buddha, Asoka, Chaitanya and other saints. Characters from literary works like Shakuntala, Meghduta, the Jatakas, Ramayana, Mahabharata, Omar Khayyam are equally popular. The incidents in their lives are usually the human ones,

seldom tragic or comic, but invariably melodramatic. Though the gods and the kings are human, actual men and women seldom come in the picture. Portraiture is not fashionable, and for human figure the artists go to the primitive and the villager, the beggar and the vagabond, i.e., anywhere except to the members of their own class. Landscape is rare. These are the common features of the subject matter of modern Indian painting.

The pieces are mythological, *not* symbolical, *nor* allegorical, except in Bombay. "A symbolical expression is one that is held to be the best possible formula by which allusion may be made to a relatively unknown 'thing,' which referent, however, is nevertheless recognised or postulated as 'existing.'"[18] The use of symbols posits a personal conviction about the referent *and* a social agreement. A cross on the road has the latter, for the motorists, but not the former. Similarly, the rock is Mr. T. S. Eliot's personal conviction, but it has no basis of common agreement among Indian readers. In such cases, the symbol is only a sign. Modern Indian paintings are signatures, from this point of view. Nor are the Bombay murals in any way better. They are supposed to be allegories, but neither in the Christian nor in the Indian way. They are not 'images of the mind of god,' as St. Thomas would have it, nor are they the bodily shapes formed of Maya which the highest Lord may, when He pleases, assume in order to gratify his devout worshippers, as Sankaracharya *put it once for all. The Bombay murals are only* pictorial vehicles of desirable qualities, sermons in paint. Abstract these qualities are, because they

have been abstracted from the social referent, and didactic the treatment is by the very need of covering the lack of conviction by assertion. Such being the case, when the sign is taken for the symbol and allegory ceases to be an integral part of the collective unconscious, in other words, when the social acceptance of the referent and the terms of reference is absent, we can only afford to be sentimental and press for a reference to another reality, e.g., naturalistic representation, personification etc..[19] Now it is obvious that both for conviction and agreement, a certain homogeneity of social structure is essential. Symbols and allegories must be conveyed to be seized. Unless the provider and the provided have a common context of living, they cannot have the necessary attitude of '*sraddha*.' So it is not the deficiency of *sraddha* which is the primary reason for our lack of taste, as Dr. Coomarswamy would have it. It is this presence of two types of living, one with some private conviction and no agreement, and the other having no conviction and a conventional agreement just strong enough to resist an encroachment upon its peace, which should rightly account for our poverty in appreciation and creation.

We know that the character of mythology is basically organic inasmuch as it partakes of the collective life in the social struggle with nature. In its earliest forms it is non-dogmatic, and non-religious too. But it is soon annexed by the religious leaders and priests in the interests of law and order. Thus, while *advaitajnan* is for the initiate and the advanced, the Pauranic legends are good enough for the rest. This division reflects the division of society into two

parts, one that may afford to make the most of faith, and other that lives by it as a substitute mode. Still, the context is not torn, and give and take continues, so long as no new modes of living occasioned by new processes of material production, i.e., fresh conquests of nature and their utilisation, do not intervene. All that may happen, if the same mode of living is prolonged, is the thinning out of the social relationships. Occasionally, a rebirth of mythology takes place in the wake of a religious revival or counter-reformation. This is referred to by some art-historians as 'ups and downs' or cycles.[20] It only means that the belief in the immutability of that social order which subordinated mythology to religion dies hard, and that its holders will do anything to preserve their hold. But the resurgence of mythology in modern Indian culture has a few additional features. We have noted how the middle classes are not the genuine ones, how they are divorced from the traditions of land-utilisation and confined to revenue-collection, and how the sense of social frustration haunts them. Such men must search for substitute—situations of gods and goddesses behaving like men and women, and of men and women cast in the heroic mould. If the substitution is too close, then mythology becomes an allegory, too simple for the C. I. D. even. So an extra dose of compensation is there in this recrudescence of mythology. It is not the authentic stuff, because the social classification of today is not an emergent of the social classification of old.

The first corollary to the above is that the gods and goddesses and the heroes and heroines of the

new mythology should be a little more human, have a little more of character, should speak to us more or less in our language. Thus it is that Krishna, Radha, Siva, Parbati, the more reputed of the pantheon, Buddha and Asoka, are all too—too-human, sensual, in another manner of speaking. If the swan is to be a real one, then Saraswati cannot remain a goddess; she will be a college girl, demure but pretty, capable of a mischief or two but she will not do it; if the Buddha is in his penance, the ribs must come out; and if Krishna is playing with his flute or robbing the milkmaids of their dress, well then, Krishna should pour melting music and behave as boldly as the Indian Penal Code will permit. Technically, it involves a pseudo-realism in the name of the human. Humanity of this type is the creeping paralysis of modern Indian art.

The fluctuations of paysage and portraiture in the history of art have been described and analysed[21] in great detail. Paysage or landscape is really a modern invention. In the early periods, the function of nature was purely decorative, in the medieval period, ideogrammatic or ideational. The sentiment which visually considers Nature arises by the eighteenth century. Nature at last has become external. With the appearance of the sky *as such* real landscape begins. Such is the general outline given by Laprade.[22] P. Sorokin, however, distinguishes two types of paysage, the ideational and the visual, and accepts the above conclusions only in regard to the visual type. Actual correlations between the pattern of social economy and the emergence of visual paysage cannot be established, but generally speaking, the opinion may be hazarded

that only under conditions which are created by the new relations between man and nature that the latter in virtue of its own right can force its attention upon the former. When Nature was the bestower of gifts and of curses, its elementality had to be recognised as super-human. The corresponding treatment was what was proper to a powerful outsider who had come to stay, the sort of thing one found in the villages when a British soldier passed. But some kind of understanding was soon established; living was becoming less precarious, the chunk of stability out of the mass of instability was getting bigger, for years crisis would not come, and fear gave place to social sentiments worthy of the tribal life. The art of this period was becoming ideational, until we come to settled agrarian economy. It was the feeling of stability, generated by a long period of social ordering after unsettled living, and by the actual economy in energy in getting a living out of agriculture as contrasted with pasturing and hunting, which was the background of the ideational art. There was then no question of fresh conquests of nature apart from slight improvements in agricultural technique. The question arises in all its intensity and becomes *persistent* when the social pattern of living is apprehended by a large number of people to be unstable and the need is felt for a greater economy. Science or conquest of Nature is *not* the primary urge. Change in the social structure is. Once that urge is felt, ideational art with ideational paysage cannot stay. This happened in Europe in the eighteenth century, with the usual lag between one country and another occasioned by the different tempos in industrialisation. The

contempt of the masters of the Renaissance for landscape is as well known as that of the Impressionists' pre-occupation with it from the second half of the nineteenth century. The ups and downs are only minor movements, incidents of local crises, that come within this larger development.[23]

Both the proportionate scarcity of landscapes and their steadily increasing ratio in modern Indian painting can be understood in the light of the above consideration. We have not yet passed from agricultural economy to industrial economy, but we are passing. The hang-overs of ideational landscape with its daub of blue and gold for the sky, a highly stylised tree or two for the forest, a rock for a hill, a dark slate-coloured mass for clouds, a crane for the rains, a spray of flowers for spring, are still there, no doubt, but the suggestiveness has disappeared. Man, city, sentiment, naturalism have come instead. If the landscape is rural, there must be a village-woman in all her patent crudeness, with a load on her back and skirt tucked up. If it is of the city, the look is directed beyond it towards the outlying village. And the seasons display all their wealth in the pictures, with holding nothing, like the new rich. The middle-class nostalgia is all over our landscapes, few as they are. Their increase connotes the invasion of visual art.

Portraiture is rarer than landscape. Its rise elsewhere is associated with the periods of aggressive individuality and of 'character'-formation in the sense used by Smiles in his Self-Help i.e., to say, of one against odds. The Moghul portraits which are usually admired are of vigorous noblemen, able warriors and of chieftains who came up when

the Empire started declining, i.e., after Akbar and Jehangir. The Rajput portraits are ideational. In the nineteenth century, some good portraits were drawn by unknown artists for the founders of new families. These ancestors rose from nowhere and became rich first through their contacts with the foreign concerns and then by landownership. But by the third quarter, the descendants of these gentlemen had lost their individuality, and photographs were sufficient for their flabby complacencies. The portraiture that we find occasionally in the Exhibitions is of the twentieth century great men. Portraits of princes are seldom drawn, and of the 'types' seldom sold. When the middle class standard has smudged all 'character' out, photographs can easily do the work of oil.

The argument from the point of view of content is further advanced by three other facts which are closely connected with the socio-economic background; (*a*) the separation of Crafts from Fine Arts, (*b*) the display of names of artists, and (*c*) the poetic names given to the pictures. Throughout the medieval period, in Europe and in Asia, arts and crafts were an integral process. Christian, Hindu and Chinese texts are very clear on this point. Schoolmen would divide human efforts into the sphere of Action and Making.[24] Prudence was for the former, and Art was for the latter. Within the sphere of Making, the only consideration was that of making well. Craftsmen in their guilds were 'artists', and 'artists' had their shops manned by members of the guilds. The two functions separated with the decay of guilds and the rise of new patrons. Guilds decayed and new patrons flourished when the feu-

dal order was being displaced by the industrial. In India, the guilds and monasteries do not exist, and the patrons are those who can afford to feel superior with a few paintings in their drawing rooms otherwise filled with cheap upholstery. Similarly, nearly all art, religious and secular, was once anonymous.[25] The Durbar painting of the Mughals bore names, but not the Rajasthani, the Basoli, the Sikh or the Kangra, much less to speak of the Ajanta and the Bagh. Chinese and Japanese paintings would no doubt be signed, but then the signatures were a vital part of the picture itself. The calligraphic ideogram balanced the pictorial ideogram.[26] Signature, here and now, is at once a token of the confusion between symbol and sign and an index to the social confusion in which guilds have lost their function without being supplanted by a fresh economic organisation. It also indicates the effort of the artist as an individual to escape by proclaiming his little status and self as loudly as he can. Such a self is not personality. The talk about individuality is very often due to a sense of inferiority that is closely allied to social frustration.

From names in paintings to the nomenclature of paintings is an easy step. So far as we know, the *Ragini*-pictures were the first large body of paintings to have couplets attached to them.[27] The habit caught on when illuminated manuscripts were fashionable. But it was confined to the art of illustration. In Bengal, the practice was facilitated by the existence of Tagore's poems in which both the pictorial and the dramatic elements (of a certain type) could be easily found. These poems depicted

the most fugitive moods, and in plenty. Besides, the poet Tagore was a relation of related with the artists, the Tagore brothers. The latter have often acknowledged their indebtedness to the former. So the poetic material was ready at hand, and the rest was a memory for apt quotation. The writer remembers how Dr. A. N. Tagore would fix a name to a picture before the exhibition was opened. He would do it with a chuckle, arguing that otherwise it would not sell. In other words, he knew the 'lyric' nature of the demand. The middle class want pleasant sentiments in pictures *and* poems, at one and the same time, and let them have them for thirty rupees! The demand for sentiments in pictures sprang from the same source as the demand for sentiments in literature and music, viz., the will to forget the original denial and the consequent discontent.[28] When the demand was met, a farewell was given to the ideational art. From now on, modern Indian painting would tend more and more towards representation and humanity. But it would still not be fully visual and sensate. For that Indian society would have to wait. In the meanwhile, it is neither fish, flesh nor good red herring, just as the class is from which the artists come. It is all of a piece. Dr. Coomarswamy's neglect of the socio-economic factor in the explanation of an all-round poverty in the present production and appreciation of the Fine Arts is hardly worthy of their wisest scholar in the East.

Jamini Roy's and Rabindranath's paintings are to be put in the above perspective. Roy's register a dissatisfaction with pastiche and a thirst towards the ideational. The first is interpreted as his

mannerism and the second as love of the primitive and the archaic.[29] Both interpretations are wrong. Jamini Roy is only in search of the values before they were deflected. So he goes back to folk-art. It is not a backward movement in time, but a plunge into purer values. Probably, it is not proper to call his art folk-art either. It is art of the *pre*-visual stage, before physical eyes displaced the *gnan-netra*. In this search he gets the primitive no less than the Christian and the Vaishnava values of art. Those who dismiss him as an imitator of Kalighat *pat* style cannot explain his series of Christ and the Vaishnav, his magnificent Peasant, and his numerous dolls. His inner vision has not yet seized the spacious, or the oceanic but it has struck upon the fundamental of art, as Indians have understood it so far in the way.[30]

Tagore, on the other hand, is visual. His is an extension of Impressionism,[31] in one sense, viz., in what followed it by way of reaction. Impressionism was the blind alley of realism and artists turned back to break up the spectrum of vision. This was done in a number of technical ways, and also by a re-orientation of the sight. The last led the artists to the primitives. But essentially, it was a drive, a search for the wholeness that is in innocence. Tagore is in this line of seekers. Therefore, Tagore's visualness is that of a child. Give a pencil to a child, and the pencil only 'aids in the birth of a line of which he knew nothing, and which was waiting to be born. This line was not foreseen by the mind. On the contrary, in the infinite number of possible figures, all that the mind could do was to recognise the particular one which was striving to appear in

that particular space, and which was so to speak, already completely traced and only needed to be made visible.' This penetrating statement of M. Bidou is an elaboration of Tagore's own estimate that his paintings were 'salvage-work' of the fittest and the most rhythmical out of the 'perpetual activity of natural selection in lines' in the universe of forms. Obviously, such a sight is insight, not into the 'meaning,' but into the play of the rhythm which is meaningless, *a-symbolical*, yet *ideational*, as much as Blake's insight is. Tagore, however, did more than produce the inter-linear pen-play and 'automatic writing' on the margin. He did draw and paint figures of men and beasts that have no counterpart in this earth. Their equals in strength and terror roamed about in the distant ages before men were civilised and animals domesticated. They are in strange contrast to his reputed lyric delicacy. Probably, they came from the unplumbed depths where myths lurk and passions crouch. It is a terrible experience, that of looking at his last pictures. One looks straight into the eyes of the denizens of the dark. Yes, it is the look and the gait that strike first, and last. Tagore's art is visual, in the best reference of the term. No formula can explain, no context hold his genius. He contains both.

In this hasty sketch we have excluded the aesthetic and the technical aspects. The sociology of the movement has been our sole concern. That the movement has a value is undeniable. It has opened some eyes, and given a certain social status to the artist. Thirty years ago, only the ne'er-do-well would be packed off to the art-school and they

would be content with school-masters' jobs. We now hear of studios, medals, good posts, parties in their honour, and even a volume on their works. A few schools have their teachers in painting and modelling.[32] Women have begun to attend classes in the Fine Arts. But all this is symptomatic and strictly in consonance with the artificial social structure. But what about the movement? Today, its intellectual content is weak, therefore, any conscious elaboration is non-existent; and its objective correlate is limited and confused, therefore, its vision is closed and blurred. Its vitality cannot surpass that of the pattern of living from which it must needs draw.

A separate chapter on modern Indian architecture would have been desirable, if it were possible. A bare mention of its salient features should suffice. Before the nineteenth century the Indo-European architecture was based upon the models with which the various Western traders were familiar in their home-ports in Southern Europe. It was but natural that the factories and warehouses, and later on, the residences, tombs and churches in the new commercial centres should conform to their European prototypes. When the factors spread themselves out in the country-side, they built fortresses to secure safety for their wealth, and garden-houses to fit in with their prestige and their very much enlarged conveniences in a country with an execrable climate but cheap living. Many of the Indo-European buildings which date from the eighteenth century have their ground-plan mainly fixed by two economic considerations, viz., (*a*) safety for goods and cash in deep vaults, strong

rooms and cellars which could also protect the women and the children if they cared to live in India, and (*b*) the luxurious standard of living of the nawabs[33] with their nautch-parties and gorgeous dinners that necessitated large halls, high ceilings and polished floors, loggias and anterooms. The servants, who were very large in number, lived in the out-houses. The weather was responsible for the balconies, the large windows and the lattices, and prestige for the portico, while privacy for the begums demanded a private courtyard in the Indian style. The convents were constructed on principles, which were as those of the Catholic countries from which many of the traders came. It is also interesting to observe how the nationality of the Western trader determined the type of architecture that he built in India. Thus, for example, we have the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Danish, the French and the English styles in chronological sequence. Of these, the Portuguese influence penetrated deep. Quite a number of terms for our domestic architecture in daily use today, particularly in Bengal,[34] are Portuguese in their origins. There are, however, few samples of Indo-Portuguese style in civic architecture. The best example of the religious type is the church at Bandel in Bengal. The Indo-French architecture has a number of large buildings to its credit, e.g., the Constantia at Lucknow and the Martinere School in Calcutta. The first was designed on the Regency model by General Claude Martin, the famous French adventurer and arms manufacturer of Oudh. It is named the Palladian style by Mr. Percy Brown.

Its immense proportions and fantastic taste were just the thing for the nawabs of Lucknow to imitate. Decadence called unto decadence. The 'germs of a very beautiful composition' that Fergusson detected in the Constantia are overlaid by the crowding of pediments, capitals, arcades and statuary. The Anglo-Indian architecture in its ordering of space and simple dignity was, however, more satisfying. It had no counter-part in any indigenous English style, but it was a genuine adaptation to the climatic needs of India. Some of these buildings are huge strongly-built mansions that have lasted the rigours of the Bengal climate. A few planters' quarters survive and they are big enough to hold the entire administrative machinery of a district. Technically, the nineteenth century bears witness to the skill of the Indian mason only in brick-work and stucco.[35]

So far as large scale operations in this century are concerned, e.g., the Victoria Memorial, the Delhi and Hyderabad buildings, an attempt at getting at the Indian 'traditions' is noticeable. Usually, it stops at imitation or electicism. Domes, minarets and *sikhars* lie cheek by jowl in Anglo-Hindu-Saracenic camaraderie. The princely palaces can afford to be purely Hindu or purely Muslim, unless, of course, an English architect has to be paid to please the powers or the princely whims. But the private buildings of the princes can still be beautiful. No civic architecture in the Indo-British period has the solidity of a medieval palace or a *chhatri* in Central India. And yet, the chief architect of Delhi reported only the other day that Indian craftsmen were still living and could be trusted. Religious

architecture is openly imitative, and of the worst models. Domestic architecture in the cities and the hill stations shows some departure. Its character is purely negative, in the abolition of the purdah and the courtyard. Positively, recent domestic architecture is a corollary to female emancipation. Its contribution to domestic bliss is not as well known as its importance for social gatherings. That is another reason why modern designs are feminine. The real reason, however, is bourgeois fantasy. Flats are a modern phenomenon for India. In Calcutta, they are used chiefly by the lower middle class Indians; in Bombay, they are used also by the well-to-do who insist on privacy. Otherwise, they all mean the break-up of Indian family life by the pressure of economic forces operating through women's quarrels.[36] If we take the group of Bombay clerks with an income varying from Rs. 80 to 160/- a month,[37] we will not be far from the truth in saying that the rent absorbs anything between 20 to 25% of the income. In other cities the proportion is between 15 to 20%. The lower middle class can only have poor flats inside the city on Rs. 15/-. If they live in the suburbs, only a little more accommodation and open air is available, but the cost of transport pushes up the proportion to the city-level. Certain municipalities, improvement trusts and employers have undertaken to build houses for their menial staff, but the rents in every case are higher than those of the shanties and 'chawls' built by private parties. Back-to-back tenements with a dirty lane into which the refuse of both sides is conveniently thrown form the rule. The railway colonies are always better. Upper grade employees

have better houses than what they could otherwise engage, while the officers' quarters are very roomy and well-appointed. But none would annex medals in an architectural show. Almost every city of note has a development scheme, and in a few the planning is as scientific as private interests and Corporation-susceptibility will allow. Private companies have also taken it up, but their areas are known as 'Mortgage Streets' in view of the financial arrangements. The middle-middle classes, of the Rs. 200-500/- group are the main patrons. A common design is not possible here because of the private 'artistic' tastes of the owner-occupier. Now that communal riots are fairly popular, there is a tendency for the communistie to segregate in their own 'safe' localities with the result that domes and Buddhist topes need not be harmonised. In the Hindu quarters, Buddhist railings (Sanchi) support Anglo-Indian verandahs. Here design is not separated from the science of building, and the contractor is himself the architect. Only the very well-to-do classes can have a designer. But then the designer usually has his own ideas from the garden-cities in Europe or America, while the owner and his wife have their own from the domestic architecture number of the Studio. Improvement Trusts and Municipalities cannot enforce anything but a common ground-plan. Ships with decks and portholes, in the coastal cities, temples in the inland ones are the usual models for the well-to-do. Like modern furniture, modern domestic architecture does not belong to India. Architects are not to be blamed for this, it is the homelessness of the class that will live in houses. From home

to house—that is the social trend which determines the formlessness of domestic architecture. A few palaces and private railway stations, a department of architecture in the Bombay School, a few classes in design here and there, representations to the Government for employing more architects, and even strongly-backed appeals to the public to start a school of Indian architecture, do not make a movement. Of all the arts, architecture is the most social and yet the least progressive in India.

The dance-revival in the last few years reminds one of the early days of modern Indian painting. Public enthusiasm is marked when a dance-troupe visits a town. More articles are being written and more talk indulged on dancing than before. In the upper class households, there is always some performer, just as there is at least one detenu in every Bengali Hindu family. Respectable parents today are not above attending dance-shows in the company of their young ones. The movement was started in Shanti-Niketan, taken up by Vallathol in Kerala, and developed by Uday Shankar. It has been further enriched by the discovery of regional styles, e.g., Manipuri, Tanjore, Kathakali, etc.. The Kathak style has been the standard of the U. P., with Bhand and Nautanki as auxiliaries. Garba in Gujerat has no parallel elsewhere in its respectability and its almost universal hold. The Chow dance of Orissa has recently come to the fore. India has had an opportunity of witnessing the Pwe of Burma and the Bali *nrittya*. Anna Pavlova and Ruth St. Denis also visited India a few years ago. Today we have a number of competent artistes, men and women, who tour India and outside.

Among them one could mention at random Gopinath, Ram Gopal, Leela Sokhi (Menaka) and Mrs. Arundale, as typical of their own genre. G. S. Datta's Bratachari movement combines dance with rural reconstruction and social service. Its art-nucleus is the 'martial' folk-dance of Bengal. Nothing surprising in that for those who know the history of the formation of 'martial classes' in the British period.

A few words are necessary for making the requisite distinction. The Shanti-Niketan dance is operatic, and it is Tagore's dramas, with and without words, that hold the dance. The songs are also Tagore's songs. Naturally, the special quality of Tagore's genius, lyricism, pervades the entire performance. Each gesture is a mood, each stance a feeling, each posture a sentiment, and the movement is a liquid sentence. Vigour of the epic or the tragic type is not present, but a quiet nervous strength is very much there. At first, the individual dance was prominent, and the dancer's duty was to interpret, that is to say, translate the song-theme by bodily movements which were usually confined to the hands. Later on, Tagore was not the man to sit idle, the individual was subordinated to the main theme, and other limbs woke up. Still the songs, so independently beautiful they were, dominated, and thus impeded the growth of dance as an independent feature. This too was eventually controlled, until at last the Chitrangada became a perfect piece. The production-side also was considerably improved. In the group-dances, the pictorial element was beautifully joined with the musical. The general criticism against the Shanti-Niketan dance is that it

is deficient in foot-work. But the criticism is based on a double ignorance—of the place of 'footwork' in Indian dancing, and of Tagore's conception of dancing. 'Footwork' is prominent only in the Kathak style, it is controlled in the Bharatya Natya school, in the Kathakali and in most folk-dances. Footwork is very often a repetition of the '*bols*' of the *tabla*, and by itself conveys no meaning of the theme. It is a display of virtuosity more than a communication of the spirit, which is better achieved by the eyes, the brows, the neck, the trunk, the hands, and the *mudras*. Tagore's conception was rhythm, and *not* the mechanical division and subdivision, permutation and combination of beats or *matras*. The *laya*, the larger rhythm that encompasses the beats, had to be observed, and it was generally observed. Besides, the body beautiful must not be exhibited, but only the idea and the sentiment. Such a spirit is basically Indian, but it is not purely traditional. In the Shastras,[38] the human body has to conform to the angelic norm. In place of the angels Tagore gave his angelic songs to conform to. Therefore, the criticism on the score of footwork is unsound. It only betrays a prejudice for the sensual and the mechanical. What may be urged instead is the comparative hesitancy in exploiting other limbs, e.g., eyes and neck. Fingers are skilfully used, but the too frequent swings of the arms cover them. Occasionally, one detects looseness in the main structure. The idea is that the theme should hold it firm. But when the theme is subtle and complicated, it is a tall order for the performers. A little more of simplicity could assure the homogeneity of

the pattern. Now that new Tagore dramas will not be available, one wonders what will happen to the talented performers that Shanti-Niketan has produced. But many years will pass before the Shanti-Niketan repertoire is exhausted. Shanti-Niketan's contribution to song-dances is permanent.

Uday Shankar's Culture Centre in Almora U.P., is the second radiating centre, while Vallathol's Kala Bhaban is the third. The Almora school is cosmopolitan, while the Kala Bhaban is mainly Indian. Both, however, are dominantly South Indian in the sense that the Kathakali which is one of Uday Shankar's bases is also one of Vallathol's brilliant experiments. Both consider that the Hindu dance, which is to be found in the South in some purity, is more worthy of attention than the degraded Bai-nautch of the North. Uday Shankar, however, is not above lifting a form or two from the Kathak style, but that style is not his strong point. The West has influenced him a great deal, particularly on the production side, while Vallathol is indigenous, with the Vidwan and the drone in the simplest of rural settings. Vallathol does not stress the background, but for Uday Shankar, it is essential, musically and pictorially, though it is seldom allowed to dominate. In fact, music is not always woven into the texture of his dance-pattern, while it is always done in the Shanti-Niketan school. His orchestra is merely a prelude and a support. This deficiency on the side of music does not touch the effectiveness of the Kerala style.

What music cannot provide, sculpture does. Uday Shankar's ally is sculpture, as that of the Kathak is music, and of Shanti-Niketan the united

front of songs and pictures. To enjoy Uday Shankar's dance a morning dip into any volume of plates on Indian statuary is helpful. His fingers are poised in the traditional style, the eyes dart and the neck rolls in the approved manner, the body moves from one position to another as the drama dictates, but the pose is the thing in Uday Shankar. He begins with it, pauses in it, and ends in it. There is always that axis round which the system moves. It is the trunk from which the gestures shoot out like branches, keeping the organic connection intact. Even when his arms quiver and roll, and what a rolling! the impulse seems to come from an imaginary still, central, prototypical structure of which the body is merely the physical form. The spirit of Indian dance, viz., imitation of the divine image, is in every pose of Uday Shankar. The image is sometimes almost physically divine as we know it through stones and bronze, but it is certainly not all, too, human, which is his strength and his Indian-ness. But for the alliance with sculpture, the *sattvik* quality of dynamic equilibrium in Uday's performances would not have been possible.

Uday Shankar's latest ballets mark a progress in his idea of dance. He is no longer content with mere mythology, and he proposes to reach out to the problems of the day. So far two ballets have been shown, the Rhythm of Life, and the Machine. As ideas, both are weak, almost sentimental. As achievements, the parts do not hang together. But the individual and the group-performances are excellent. Uday Shankar seems to be a liberal social reformer in his outlook on life. He must open a school right in the heart of Cawnpore.

Almora is far, far away, where gods dwell undisturbed by the whir of the machine and the curses of the unemployed. Uday Shankar can embody the new. He has come down from mythology to allegory, will he step down further to create symbols? Let him have his divine forms, but the gods also change shapes while retaining their godhead.

India is full of folk-dances. Strictly speaking, the Manipuri, the Vaishnava, the Chow or the Koota are *not* folk-dances. They are highly stylised ones, with elaborate rules and intricate rhythms. The *tal* in the kirtan and the Manipuri styles is a variation of the *pancham-sowari*, which is often the despair of accomplished players in the cities. But the *gajan* (Bengal), *Kajri* (U. P. and Bihar), *Ahir* (U. P.), and the *lathi* dances are folk-dances. It is not generally known that martial dances with sticks, swords and strings are popular throughout India. Their common features are the group formation, the participation of all present in the dance, i.e., the absence of the division between the performer and the spectator, the rotation of the central rôle, vigorous movements, circular and forward and backward, lively music with simple beats, and the festive nature. Nearly all primitive tribes are dance-mad. It is not difficult to trace the Bharatiya mudra of a peacock, an elephant, a horse, or a deer or a lion to the unsophisticated mimetic gestures of primitive peoples.

The future of the dance-movement depends upon those folk styles. G. S. Datta had popularised one—the Rai-Benshe. Haren Ghosh, who has done for this movement as much as anybody else in India, has popularised the Manipuri and the

Chow-Seraikhela, in particular. There is hardly any school that he has not sponsored, but his chief merit lies in his bringing these folk-dances out of their retirement into the notice of the middle classes.

The present status of dancing is that of Indian Music and Painting thirty years ago. The incubus of mythology is there, and social obloquy is disappearing. The appeal is yet confined to the middle classes who will much rather have ogling women to entertain them than merciful divinities to bless them. Sentimentality is creeping in, and production is gaining importance. Indian dancing is still dependent for its growth and execution upon individuals. If it is also weak and thin, it is a further proof of the fact that 'infiltration' can seldom strike the deeper veins of society.

CHAPTER VIII

THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM

The preceding chapters do not pretend to be a comprehensive account of Modern Indian culture. Literary and aesthetic criticism was also precluded from the treatment of arts and letters. Only a sociological survey of the present position was the objective. The past came in for its pull, for the continuity or the discontinuity of its context. In the pursuit of that objective, a very important strand in the web of social causation came out, viz., the birth, growth and decline of an artificial elite-group, called the *bhadralok*, within these one hundred and fifty years. Its particular culture is usually identified with Indian culture. But, certainly, the *bidagdha-jana*, the *nagarak*, the courtier or the *grahastha* of other days is a genus distinct from the *bhadralok* of today. While the former had a measure of peace and balance in his attitudes and conduct, the latter is driven by discontent. That peace was not of the graveyard just as the present discontent is not divine. The middle-class soul, which is alleged to be the originator and the repository of culture, is stricken by a malaise, a malady. It is simultaneously preyed upon by a feeling of guilt and a feeling of denial. It knows that it does not belong to India, and must cover its shame in the loudness of the arriviste's assertion or by a cloying compla-

cency. The middle class has also seen the closing of its career, and must find the enemy. One section of it found the enemy inside and turned to reform and rationalism, giving up many a value in the process; another sought the enemy outside, became anti-British, and anti-Muslim or anti-Hindu by communal conviction, sacrificing the priceless heritage of social adaptation. Unfortunately, few realised the nature of the malady in terms of the social forces that had been released by the juncture of new situations like the destruction of indigenous merchant-capital and of the rural pattern, the novel land-settlement, and the socially useless policy of education by 'infiltration.' It is not easy for anybody belonging to a free country to know how that Great Denial has worked havoc with the various attempts at renaissance. Freedom of opinion and fruits of modern science India has no doubt enjoyed in some measure; but it has been a freedom to quote authors who were writing under the pressure of their own culture and deducing eternal law from it, and science is unrelated to her own specific needs. It is no wonder that the Indian man of science seldom displays the scientific temper in regard to life outside the laboratory. We also know of the politician who is radical only in politics. Such a disintegration is not conducive to renaissance. In short, India could not fully utilise whatever opportunities she received, because they were not the substance of her need. A much deeper layer of consciousness than the memory for purple patches is involved in the burgeoning of a peoples' spirit; a broader vision than what the dreaming spires of Oxford inspire or a seat in the Delhi Secretariat provides is required

for seizing the requisites for rejuvenating Indian culture. A couple of Nobel Laureates, half a dozen Fellows of the Royal Society and a few more Knights from the academic circle are not sufficient. In fact, they do not make up Indian culture. India has three hundred and eighty millions of people, her civilisation is at least three thousand years old, and her culture cannot be exhausted by producing out of the middle class only a hundred remarkable men and women in a hundred years. In a sense, India's great men of the recent past have distributed the burden on Indian Culture, they have not lifted the deadweight.

For special reasons, the frustration in politics has not been discussed in this volume. Its importance in the field of culture is great. The politics and the culture of a subject country cannot be separated from each other. But more competent men have described India's political disillusionment. People outside India have come to sense it even through the triple quarantine of censorship, counter-propaganda and indifference. About what the peoples of India are feeling about it, the less said the better. But one relevant point has to be made. The political frustration is shifting towards hatred—a poisonous constituent of culture anywhere, more so of Indian culture as it was and likely to be in the near future. In the economic sphere, the opinion may be hazarded that no amount of fillip given by this war to Indian capital can make up for the heightened feeling of disappointment at the failure of Indian commerce-capital to be fully converted into industrial capital or reduce the resentment at the inability of the partially industrialised capital

to take the next step forward in the production of heavier goods. Culturally, this new phenomenon is more dangerous than the earlier one, because the emotional reactions are greater and wider now than before. Similarly with labour. More men and women than before have been engaged in industries, their wages have also increased; but the phenomenal rise in prices of foodstuffs and other essential commodities used by the labourers and their dependants has eaten up the increase in their income, and the class-consciousness among them is definitely on the increase. The condition of certain sections of agricultural producers, if anything, is worse. True that strikes have declined in number in these years, but this peace is specious. Industrial unrest is always covered in the period of greater employment and rising wages. But underneath flows the dark current of dissatisfaction. It does not take a prophet to predict that when it comes up on the surface, as come it will after the war, it will extinguish many a wishful thought of happy collaboration between capital and labour. Industrial labourers are not likely to forget that during the War some of their representative organisations were not recognised, and that they got allowances and bonuses instead of a rise in the scale of wages. Logically, they should not long defer the understanding that in spite of their temporary prosperity their share in the increased national income was less than that of their employers. But then the Indian capitalists will not find it difficult to prove that their dividends were taken away by the Excess Profits Tax. Memories of the confusion in prices and scarcity in food will be too handy act as

effective resonators of the resentment. The lower 'middle-classes', who have been hit the hardest, will also contribute their quota. Unemployment will also stalk the closed factories and offices. And then, capital and labour will be friends with the *bhadralok* against the common foe, bound by non-economic ties of hatred. Those who naïvely believe in the advent of a new order for India the day after Soviet Russia beats Nazi Germany, and those who hope for a sensible scheme for post-War reconstruction sponsored by the ruling classes in Great Britain and India for the Indian people are co-tenants of a particular paradise. Therefore, for some time to come, the sense of historical denial, which has been at the back of modern Indian culture so long, is going to become a Living Presence and dictate all fresh cultural efforts. Which means that India, free or otherwise, has to reckon with the potentialities of Fascism at no distant date. If on the top of it, the Atlantic civilisation goes in for 'technocracy' or 'managerial democracy,' as it is very likely to do, then the conditions-precedent to Fascism in India will be considerably strengthened by pressure, by imitation or in reaction, or by all combined.

In a way, the above prospect should not frighten any Indian interested in the future of the higher activities of his brain. This land has passed through many vicissitudes and rationalised them into devious schools of pessimism. If a prophet who has a cross between an Indian anchorite in a cave and the Preacher of the Ecclesiastes were the only possibility or if the historian of Indian culture could say in 1942: "Our revels now are ended:

these our actors. As I foretold you, were all spirits, and are melted into air, into thin air; And, like the baseless fabric of this vision, the cloudclapped towers, the gorgeous places, The solemn temples, the great globe itself, Yea all which it inherit, shall dissolve; and, like this insubstantial pageant faded, leave not a rack behind;" or if again, the eyes of so many young men and women had no speculation, then India would have turned on her side and slept for another century the sleep of the vexed. In India, time is reckoned by the visits of the spirit and the appearance of Avatars, as it is counted by the primitives in terms of the visitations of Nature and the rhythm of seasons. So, one might argue that India could still possess her soul in patience. But whose soul? Hatred lurks in the purlieus of the soul of the middle class. That soul is ready to inject poison, a poison brewed by the long-drawn alchemy of denial. It will not give India any peace, because it is contrary to her spirit.

India in the three millenniums of her civilisation has never produced hymns of hate. From the Prithvi-sukta in the Atharva Veda to the Bande Mataram of Bankim Chandra Indians have offered paeans of praise to the Mother Earth. The *Hindusthan Hamara* of Iqbal and the *Jana gana mana* of Tagore conjure visions of humanity. True that in this spaciousness India was not oblivious of her own place. But she never strove for recognition. Subsequently, however, it began to be felt that this continent was like a microcosm which had been set the task of creating a unity out of diverse peoples and creeds and the varying tempos of their culture. This unity, on further analysis, was found to be

antithetical to the totalitarian type. One could call it plural or organic according to taste, but its essence was at once concrete in its emphasis on conduct and universal in its intimate connection with the Divine. Above all, its expression was a goodish measure of toleration: goodish, but not the full measure, in view of the age-long contempt towards the outcaste and the Yavana. At the same time, this intolerance seldom created stasis or various stresses which have destroyed other societies of repute. So we see the reasoning of the claim that India has a message for the world in the fact of her survival and unity amidst crumbling cultures.

That sense had been nurtured by earnest patriots in the first flush of nationalism. But the nature of nationalism soon dictated its nurture. The groundwork of the new national feeling had been a search by the Indian middle class of equality in government employment. Blessed by the larger policy, the urge for equality was co-terminous with Hindu resurgence. When the educated and the land-owning sections of the Hindu community behaved like the biological sport of a wayward bull that came out of the cattle-breeder's eugenic experiments to produce a docile cow that would not kick at the milk pail, the Muslim interests which had been suppressed or ignored since the beginning of the nineteenth century had to be attended to. Numbers of applicants were growing in the meanwhile. New avenues of employment were also not within the range of possibility. These faggots were collected to form the '*fascio*' of Indian nationalism; only the axe and the fire were wanting: Mazzini and Garibaldi were in every leader's lips;

though the intellectual allegiance was to Cavour. The heart, however, cried for Bismarck's type of nationalism. Bengal and Maharastra produced the fire and the axe in the bomb. This mixture of anarchist philosophy and action with patriotic sentiments was the feature of Indian nationalism in the first decade of this century. If the anarchist programme of action has been dropped, the anarchist philosophy has remained to sabotage all thinking on collectivist or socialist lines. The patriotism of a spurious middle class among a subject people could not go further. Then Tagore came. He found that Mother India, like the Wild Ass' Skin in Balzac's great fable, was shrinking at every fulfilment of material wish. Tagore re-asserted the international outlook of Indian culture, reformulated India's message and reiterated her demand of independence. The utter need of self-help and co-operation in the re-vitalisation of Indian villages was stated with his usual fervour. For the time, terrorism lost its appeal with the middle-class intellectual. But Tagore's apotheosis of the individual looked like an extension of the earlier anarchism. Those who were influenced by him never realised that his individualism was rooted in the personalism of the Upanishads. The vast indifference of the Indian intellectual to the abiding traditions of India was a big vacuum which no love of Western thought or parliamentary life could fill. Gandhi's unerring instinct noticed the danger, as also the way of combating it. He propounded that 'ahimsa' was the quintessence of Indian culture. If historical judgment went against his theory, his own impeccable life supported it. One is not sure how far his

philosophy of non-violence has gone deep into the mind of the Indian people, but one cannot doubt the high quality of the function of that philosophy in striking for the deepest base of Indian culture viz., the traditions of social adaptation. Gandhi stands for the permanent values of civilisation, just as Tagore and all the Indian sages before him have always done. In those common values the 'person' in indissoluble connection with the Divine has been the fixed centre. With Jawaharlal, the divine connection has been substituted by the social. His society is that of the world collectively marching towards better living. Jawahar Lal's influence is the first sign of the collectivist India in modern Indian culture. Here too, naturally, there is no trace of hatred. To repeat: India has never hated or excluded in the long course of her history, and yet, she is learning today to hate and exclude. This is against the teachings of all the Indian sages we know of, ancient and modern, though this may be natural in the pattern of India's all-round disillusionment and frustration, in the context of her emotionalism, and in the foreground of the modern middle-class culture. But what is natural need not be historically just. History and Nature do not form a pair.

So the immediate problem of Indian culture is how to eschew the hatred. The answer is:—Comprehend the spirit of Indian traditions and orient that spirit in the light of the collective life of the people. It can be done. But it will never be done by amiable talk of the East and the West swooning into each other's arms in mystic affinity or soulful ebullience. Nor will it be achieved by praising the vir-

tues of the British Commonwealth of Nations and pointing out the profit in India's deciding to remain in it. Much can be effected by the new creative spurt that is likely to occur if after the victory of the United Nations India gets a chance of linking herself with China and Soviet Russia. But it is only a possibility. India has so long been at the mercy of outside forces, transcendental once, world-political now. It is time that she should set about opening her own energy of which she still has an ample store. A store, however, is not a hoarding place, and energy is not a jewel from the cellar. India's energy is in her social composition. In these hundred years, a counterfeit class has been uttered. It once performed certain functions. Now it has none. Its mobility has increased but it has not burst its bonds. The social distance between the group of middle classes and the masses is wide, and getting wider with every creation of new interests which are meant to act as sops to frustration. It will still increase after the War, for aught one knows. So the middle class will have to realise, here and now, that its old role in history is over, and that its new role is with others whom it has so long unwillingly ignored. Only then will India profit by the post-War phenomena. Otherwise, Indian culture will come to naught and be swamped by the tide of Fascism. Already the symptoms and the conditions are there If anybody denies their existence let him look into the recent history of Bengal, that rendezvous of the middle-class' destiny.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

[1] *e.g.*, K. M. Munshi—*Akhand Hindusthan.*

[2] Moreland—*India at the death of Akbar.*

[3] H. Bergson—*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.*

[4] P. Sorokin—*Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. I.*

[5] Ibid.

[6] Radhakrishnan and H. Datta stop at the Hindu; Mrs. R. Davis, among others, stops at the Hindu-Buddhist, but Dr. Qanungo's *Life of Dara Shikoh* and Kshiti M. Sastri's *Dadu* and *Kabir* include the Muslim contribution.

[7] cf. the position of the Church in Catholic Europe; L. Sturzo—*Politics and Morality: Church and the State.*

[8] Roger Bastide—*The Mystical Life.* Mukerjee—*Theory and Art of Mysticism.*

[9] Hu Shih—*The Chinese Renaissance.*

[10] Mr. Churchill too has had his visions, in his adult days in South Africa. They related to himself. Now, they are about the British Empire. But none are of the religious type, unless it is held that the Empire is a sort of Secular Church and he a cardinal thereof.

[11] Neitzsche and Bismarck, both thought that if they had the power they would make the Indians read Sanskrit only and keep them religious. They condemned the British for teaching them English and Science.

[12] Sister Nivedita, to name one only, in her *Web of Indian life.*

[13] Shree Aurobinda is excluded, *vide* his letter to Sir S. Cripps.

[14] Footnote to Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in which Greek myth is discussed; Marx's

letter to Engels, 2nd June, 1853. Engels to C. Schmidt, Oct. 27, 1890.

[15] Vatsyayan's *Kama Sutra.*

[16] P. C. Roy—*History of Hindu Chemistry*; *Introduction*—B. N. Seal.

[17] Ronaldshay—*The Heart of Aryavarta.*

[18] Tagore's series of lectures known as *Santi-niketan.*

[19] B. N. Datta—*The origin and development of the Indian social process*, series of articles in the *Parichay*—Calcutta.

[20] *"Uttishthata Jagrata" "Charaibeti."*

[21] cf. Blunt—*The Caste System in Northern India*, Ketkar, O'Malley and N. Dattas' works on the same.

[22] A. S. Altekar on the *Contributions of Buddhism to Hindu Culture* quoted in the *Social Welfare*, June 4, 1942.

[23] B. K. Sarkar—*Gambhira.*

[24] Spengler—*The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, p. 352.

[25] Vallie Poussin—*Buddhism*, in the *Legacy of India.*

[26] *Chinese Renaissance*, pp. 85 ff.

[27] R. C. Majumdar—*Corporate Life in Ancient India.*

[28] R. K. Mookerji—*Hindu Civilisation.*

[29] Poussin—*Ibid.*

[30] H. C. Roy Chowdhury—*Early History of the Vaishnava Sect.*

[31] Poussin—*Ibid.*

[32] B. K. Sirkar—*Gambhira.*

[33] Maulana Ziauddin of the Vishwabharati—*The Development of Cultural Relations between Hindus and Muslims. Cal. Rev., April and May*, 1935. Maulana's researches in this field are very valuable.

[34] M. L. Chowdhury's Lecture at the Calcutta Muslim Institute on *The Influence of Islam on Indian Culture.*

[35] Every article, lecture, and treatise of Kshiti Mohan Shastri (Vishwabharati) is indispensable for this period. And what has appeared is only a drop compared to his

knowledge. I am deeply indebted to him.

[36] *Chaitanya Charitamrit.* Biman Mazoomdar's researches into Chaitanya literature are very valuable.

[37] B. N. Datta—*Origin and Development—Ibid.*

[38] Ishwari Prasad's *Medieval India.*

[39] Shelvankar gives a different interpretation in his brilliant, banned book, *The Problem of India.*

[40] V. N. Bhatkhandeji's papers on *Hindustani Music* in the XVI, XVII and XVIII centuries. P. B. Joshi's in the Allahabad University Journal, O. C. Ganguly's *Ragas and Raginis,* and articles in *The Sangeet* (Lucknow).

[41] *Ain-i-Akbari.*

[42] Pundarik Vithal.

[43] R. C. Shukla—*Hindi Sahitya ka Itihas*; K. M. Munshi—*Gujrat and its Literature*; D. C. Sen—*History of Bengali Language and Literature.*

[44] A. K. Coormarswamy—*History of Indian and Indonesian Art.*

[45] N. C. Mehta—*Studies in Indian Painting.*

[46] O. C. Ganguli—*Ragas and Raginis.*

[47] E. B. Havell—*Ancient and Medieval Architecture of India*; O. C. Ganguly—*Indian Architecture,* G. D. Sirkar—*Mandirer Katha (in Bengali).*

[48] Articles by various authors in the *Modern Review* and the *Rupam.*

[49] Bernier's *Travels.*

[50] Tagore—'*Kalantar*' or the Crisis of the Age, the most brilliant interpretation of Indian history written so far, not yet translated.

[51] Marx and Engels on India (Socialist Book Club, Allahabad).

[52] Amal Home—*Raja Ram Mohan Roy* (Centenary Celebrations).

[53] Shib Nath Shastri's *History of the Brahmo Samaj,* Bepin Chandra Pal's articles.

CHAPTER II

[1] Abdul Odud in his lectures on the Hindu-Muslim question at the Viswa-Bharati gives a number of instances. Tipu Sultan's mass-conversions (Wilks' History) are, however, to be counterbalanced by his gifts to the Sringeri Math.

[2] I have followed Giddings' "*The Principles of Sociology*" from now on. His later work, e.g., *Historical and Descriptive Sociology* showed an advance on his earlier views. I have combined both the works.

[3] Giddings does not use it, but he means it.

[4] Blunt—*Caste System in N. India.* S. S. Nehru—*Caste and Credit.* Brahmins cannot use ploughs and do not grow certain fruits. Briggs—*Chamars* shows the rigour of their internal prohibitions.

[5] Muslims for weaving.

[6] Probably, the undifferentiated agricultural economy.

[7] R. K. Mukerji's *Comparative Economics*, Vol. II.

[8] Mathai—*Village Government in British India.*

[9] Chinese nepotism and graft have been traced to a keen sense of family by competent observers like Smith and Snow.

[10] Small and E. A. Ross use it.

[11] Anjaria in *Political Obligation in the Hindu State* holds a slightly different view. The only classic instance is of Ram Das and Shivaji. One swallow does not make summer.

[12] *Gait's Census Report*, India, 1911 and Blunt (U.P.) 1911, where the dynamics of the caste system have been illustrated.

[13] The writer's articles in the *Tribeni* and *Social Welfare* on *Dictatorship.*

[14] The writer leaves Giddings here.

[15] *Mussalman Culture*—Calcutta University. Otherwise, Professor Suhrawardy, the translator, would not have touched him.

[16] *Critique of Political Economy.*

[17] Marxists would call it variation from the mean.

[18] Coomarswamy does not fail to note the differences in the handling of Razm-nama and Rasikapriya. (*History of India* and *Indonesian Art*.) N. C. Mehta stresses the combined efforts in painting.

[19] Darbari Kanada and Mian-ki-Todi, among the heavy, Sarfarda, Zila, among the lighter, to name four only. Mr. Karnada, however, believed that the Darbari was only the Sudha-Kanada of old. Madrasi pandits identify the Mian-ki-Todi with a Shastric *raga*. Sitar and Tabla are known to be Amir Khusru's inventions.

[20] I have drawn extensively, among others, from the following books:—(1) Iqbal—*Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (the 5th chapter, The spirit of Muslim Culture, is masterly). (2) H. Lammens' *Islam*. (3) V. V. Bartold—*Mussalman Culture*. (4) *The Legacy of Islam*—Edited by Arnold. (5) Levy—*Int. to the Sociology of Islam*. 2 Vols. and (6) Hell—*Arabic Civilisation*.

[21] Pirpur report. Ceremonial singing of *Bande Mataram* was one of the atrocities. The respective roles of the mother and the father-cults among the Hindus and the Muslims should be further studied. The father 'should' belong to the pastoral Semitic or Hebraic peoples. Mother-cult is very strong in Bengal where Tantrikism has a firm hold. Mother-cult in India seems to be pre-Aryan.

[22] Iqbal—*Ibid.*

[23] Nicholson—*Personality in Sufism*.

[24] Qanungo's *Dara Shikoh*.

[25] Rajagopalachariar before 1942 and Satyamurti early this year (1942).

[26] Hell—*Ibid.*

[27] Lammens—*Ibid.*

[28] Levi—*Ibid*, and de Santillana on Islamic law and Society in the *Legacy of Islam*.

[29] Even political safeguards were provided *e.g.*, Babar's testament; *Religious policy of the Moghul Emperors*—Sri Ram Sharma, *Calcutta Review*, January 1935.

*Darling brilliantly pointed it out in his Presidential

Address to the All-India Economic Conference, Lucknow Session.

[30] *The Roots of National Socialism*—Rohan D'Butler.

[31] Ayer—*Language, Truth and Logic.*

[32] Iqbal, *Ibid.*

[33] Bogardus—*A History of Social Thought*; Enan—*Ibn Khaldoun.*

[34] The idea of Hindu time implicit in the doctrine of Karma is not mechanical, philosophically, but, sociologically, it is.

[35] cf. W. Lewis—*Time and the Western Man.*

[36] M. Ginsberg—*Psychology of Society.*

[37] V. Pareto—*The Mind and Society* (Four Vols.). Borkenau's Pareto in Modern Sociologists series is balanced and critical. Aldous Huxley's article is still the best introduction.

[38] Mannheim in *Ideology and Utopia* goes deep into this question, but in his own way.

[39] e.g., the doctrine of Shaheed, and the tradition pattern of Amir *or* Fakir.

[40] The purdah and circumcision may have much to do with it.

[41] This is on the basis of reported figures of abduction. Where self-sufficiency and panchayets are gone and a landless class is on the increase, such cases abound. In East Bengal, Muslims are forming a greater proportion among the Kulaks than before.

[42] Loud, though not yet literary.

[43] Vaihinger—*Philosophy of As If.*

[44] Only one statement is clear enough, so far.

CHAPTER III

[1] Shelvankar—*The Problem of India.*

[2] U. N. Ghosal, Jayaswal, Samaddar, N. C. Banerjee, and P. N. Banerjee have all made valuable contributions to the subject. Besides using their standard works, I have found Dr. Radha Kumud Mukerjee's *Hindoo Civilisation* invaluable. His latest, *Indian Land System*, published by the Land Revenue Commission of the Bengal Government, is a classic of its kind.

[3] Commons—*Legal Foundations of Capitalism.* Max Weber—*General Economic History.*

[4] Shelvankar—*Ibid.*

[5] B. N. Datta—*On the history of the Indian social processes.* 15 articles have appeared so far in the *Parichaya* (Calcutta). He writes with a slight anti-Brahminical bias.

[6] R. K. Mukerji—*Indian Land System*, gives the quotations.

[7] No reference to communal ownership as such is in the *Vedas.* Which does not mean that it could not be there. It may as well suggest that it was so universal a rule that only departures from it could be noted. More positive evidences have to come forth before Morgan and Engels' scheme can be made to fit in with early Indian conditions. We can only recommend Engels' *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (West and Torr's translation) and Morgan's *Ancient Society* to our Indologists.

[8] I disagree with Dr. Radha Kumud Mukerjee in this regard.

[9] All Indian historians are patriots, usually passive, so no names.

[10] I have followed (*a*) Ishwari Prasad's *Medieval India*, (*b*) Sharma's *Mughal Rule in India* and (*c*) Khosla's *Mughal Kingship.*

[11] Mavor—*An Economic History of Russia.*

[12] cf. The Bar-bhuiyas of Bengal (Swatantra Bangla—R. R. Chanda, 3rd March, 1942, the *Anand Bazar Patrika*). The story is similar in Oudh. (Ashirbadi Lal—*The First Two Kings of Oudh*).

[13] B. N. Datta—*Ibid.*

[14] Known as the Great Rent Case.

[15] This view runs counter to the bourgeois-patriotic view of the Mutiny held by Har Dayal and others. But facts speak otherwise. I am glad to find that B. N. Datta agrees with me (*Parichaya*).

[16] R. K. Mukerjee—*Indian Land System.*

[17] The memo. of the Bengal Landholders' Association to the Floud Commission is pathetically correct in its contention that the Government by its tenancy legislation had taken away by the left hand what it had given by the right in the way of Permanent Settlement.

[18] cf. Gras—*An Introduction to Economic History.* His and Pirenne's account of the relation between town-economy and rural economy is very revealing.

[19] L. C. Jain's *Indigenous Banking in India* is still the best book on the subject. H. C. Sinha's *Early European Banking in India* deals in a masterly way with Bengal.

[20] Parkinson—*Trade in the Eastern Seas* (1793-1813).

[21] D. Pant—*The Commercial Policy of the Mughals.* Dr. Radha Kamal Mukerji has tackled a large number of hitherto unknown data in his articles on *The Economic History of India*, 1600-1800, in the *Journal of the U. P. Historical Society*, Vol. XIV, Part II, 1942.

[22] Foster—*The English Factories in India.*

[23] Jain—*Ibid.*

[24] Jain—*Ibid.*

[25] *Central Banking Inquiry* Report.

[26] Dr. Nihar Roy in the *Sahitya Parishat Patrika*, 1942. Calcutta.

[27] Dasgupta—*Aspects of Bengali Society.*

[28] Ibn Batuta.

[29] cf. the relegation of the gold-merchants to a lower status.

[30] Moreland—*India at the death of Akbar*, and J. C. Sinha —*Ibid.*

[31] H. C. Sinha—*Ibid.*

[32] See J. C. Sinha's comprehensive account—*Ibid.* For this period, the latest authoritative works are (1) K. K. Datta —*Alivardi and His Times* and (2) N. L. Chatterji's *Mir Qasim.*

[33] A number of articles have appeared on this subject on the basis of my own, of course, without reference.

[34] H. C. Sinha—*Ibid.*

CHAPTER IV

[1] In this chapter apart from *Selections from Educational Records* (Govt. of India), (*a*) Howell's *Education in British India* (1872). (*b*) *Report of the Calcutta University Commission.* (*c*) Arthur Mayhew—*The Education of India.* (*d*) F. F. Monk —*Educational Policy in India.* (*e*) B. Majumdar—*History of Political Thought* (from Rammohan to Dayananda, 1821-24), Vol. I, Bengal. (*f*) Sayed Mahmood's *History of English Education in India,* and (*g*) Raja Ram Mohan Roy's English Works have been most useful. (*h*) Brajen Banerji's *Sambad Patre Sekater Katha* is every scholar's quarry. (*i*) P. C. Sinha —*The Problems of Education in Bengal* is a handy volume. But the two authors to whom I am particularly indebted are Professor Anath N. Bose, whose articles on *Hundred Years of Western Education in India* (*Calcutta Review,* 1923) are the blue-print of the early part of this chapter, and Prof. Majumdar, who has collected most valuable information on the political aspects of this period.

[2] Amal-Home—*Rajah Ram Mohan Roy* (Centenary Celebrations).

[3] What follows is not suggested by Prof. Bose.

[4] Here none of the biographers of the Raja will probably agree; some admirers will violently differ. But it cannot be helped.

[5] R. P. Masani—*Dadabhai Naoroji.*

[6] The house of a Bengali Civilian writer, posted in Bombay, was once searched by the Police for alleged implications with terrorist activities. From R. C. Dutt to the civilians of

1941 this literary stream has flowed. In one issue of a Bengali monthly as many as four civilians' articles poems, stories, and one instalment of a novel were published. In Bengal, seven young civilians have published at least one book, one of whom a dozen, and another three, in their language. Madras knows of two Civilian authors in English. A peculiar custom is growing in Bengal, that of District Magistrates waiting on the major litterateurs, and even standing up before the minor ones! Elsewhere, men of letters wait and wait in the anterooms of Deputy Commissioners. The Bengal case has not yet been reported to the higher authorities. Or has it been ?

[7] Not even B. Majumdar and B. Banerji, the two best modern scholars on the period, whom I have followed closely from now on. The former's emphasis is on politics, the latter's on the arrangement of reports.

*Sir S. Ahmad and his group of theologians also sought to prove that friendly relations with the British were Islamic.

[8] His autobiography.

[9] B. Majumdar—*Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Samyabad.*

[12] Old files of the *Patrika* and *Memoirs of Sisir Ghose* (edited by P. Dutt). Also, *Speeches and Writings of Babu Moti-Lal Ghose*—edited by Satya Gopal Datta and Bros.

[13] Quoted by B. Majumdar, *Ibid.*

[14] *Samachar Darpan*, March 17, 1832.

[15] This and the following facts are to be found in B. Mazumdar, *Ibid.*

[16] *History of English Education in India.*

[17] Thus far B. Majumdar.

[18] Mayhew's term.

[19] R. H. Tawney—*Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.*

[20] Weber—*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.*

[21] Various articles have appeared on Tagore's educational reforms and ideas, of which K. R. Kripalani's *On the Poet as*

Educationist is the best; *Vishwabharati Quarterly*, Birthday Number—1941.

[22] So people felt, not quite truly, though. The Abode of Peace has given a number of students to the national cause, and one Congress Minister.

[23] The regard of Mahatmaji for Tagore has saved Shantiniketan, but has not succeeded in removing the general suspicion about Shantiniketan's non-national (because *international*) motives. Mahadev Desai's report of Gandhiji's replies to queries in connection with the Andrews' memorial is interesting.

[24] Undertaken by Prof. J. C. Sinha.

[25] Consult Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee, the eminent philologist, in registered cover. His researches cannot be published.

[26] Census Report, 1931, Bengal; though the heading of the schedule is not the same as of previous ones.

[27] The Deoband School leads. Its principal has been arrested recently under the Defence of India Rules.

[28] I make no apology for referring largely to Bengal. That is the home of the Babu, the *bhadralog*, and the unemployed B. A. The U. P. is not mentioned because of my personal knowledge over twenty years.

[29] It has been calculated that by the Resumption proceedings of the thirties of XIX cen., in Bengal about £3,00,000 (3 lakhs) a year was lost to indigenous education by the invalidation and resumption of grants of lands which from times immemorial had been the accustomed way of patronage and subsidy of education by Indians of all ranks. Pandits and Maulwis yielded place to Englishmen and Indian scholars in English—vide Mehta and Patawardhan's Communal Triangle in India, p. 87.

CHAPTER V

[1] Bepin Chandra Pal—*Bengal Vaishnavism*: D. C. Sen—*Vaishnava Literature of Medieval Bengal*: S. K. De—*Theology and*

Philosophy of Bengal Vaishnavism in *Indian Culture*, Oct. 1935.

[2] *Debi Chaudharani.*

[3] *Krishna Kantar Will.*

[4] Mansa and Chandi.

[5] Chand-Sadagar, for example.

[6] R. N. Ghosh in the *Anand Bazar Patrika.*

[7] Mymensing—*Giti-kavya.*

[8] Syam Sundar Das' and Ram Chandra Shukla's volumes on the history of Hindi language and literature.

[9] O. C. Ganguly—*Love Poems in Hindi.*

[10] V. S. Khandekar's *Doan Dhruva* for Konkan, and Manik Banerji's *Boatman of the Padma* for the deltaic Bengal. Jiban May Roy's *The mind of Man is very typical.*

[11] Van Wyek Brooks—*The Flowering of New England.*

[12] Emperor Bahadur Shah's poems, kindly translated for me by Mr. Ahmad Ali.

[13] I. N. Madan—*Modern Hindi Literature.*

[14] Apte dealt with the same subject in *Usha Kal*, cf. R. C. Dutta's *Jiban-Prabhat.*

[15] Khadilkar—*Keechak-badh*, but the Government saw through it and stopped its performance.

[16] Upen Banerji's *Experiences of the Andaman* easily occupies the first place.

[17] Certain passages in Jayadeva also are obscene.

[18] The jati-Vaishnavas are supposed to have no morality, because of the ease in the selection of partners, and divorce.

[19] 'Good enough for the poor shopkeeper', as a Brahmin said.

[20] The two sects were more or less on par with the two classes.

[21] When it is not just juvenile delinquency. The Freudian rebels of the Kallol group have become respectable with age.

[22] Those who knew his spiritual life would at once agree, Kshitimohan Sen and Mrs. P. C. Mahalanobis, for example. Also S. K. Maitra in the *Vishwabharati* (80th) Birthday number, and Prof. S. N. Das Gupta in his study of Tagore.

[23] Herford—*Age of Wordsworth.*

[24] Sachin Sen has clearly pointed it out in his study of Tagore.

[25] Nihar Ranjan Roy—*Introduction to Rabindra Literature* (Bengali).

[26] Amar Roy's *Rabiana* and pages of C. R. Das', (Deshbandhu) *Narayan.*

[27] *Nationalism*, 1917. (Lectures in Japan and the U.S.A.).

[28] Gandhiji, Desai and Munshi.

[29] *Viswabharati*, May 1939.

[30] *Diary of Travel to Japan*, 1919, *vide* also his violent denunciation of Nationalism (lectures in Japan and the U.S.A.) of 1917.

[31] His letter to Yone Noguchi.

[32] B. N. Ganguli on Tagore's conception of property in the *Parichay.*

[33] *The Message of the Forest*—a lecture.

[34] *Creative Unity.*

[35] *Swadeshi Samaj.*

* Sumitranandan Pant is alleged to have got rid of his influence, probably because of the fact that it was once more than an influence. His later poems have considerably gained thereby. Surya Kanta Tripathi (Nirala), on the other hand, found release in Tagore, and is certainly a radical force in Hindi literature. He is not ashamed of Tagore's influence. In a meeting of the U.P. Progressive Writers two only protested against Tagore being called a progressive. If by progress is meant Marxism and *only* Marxism, Tagore was not progressive. His extraordinary sensibility and deep humanism made him understand the *ideals* and the *general* point of view of Marxist writers. But he was not a radical through dia-

lectic materialism. A brilliant estimate is that of Amit Sen in the *Parichay* (Tagore Memorial number).

[36] Even Faiz (Lahore) and Ali Sardar Jafri (Lucknow) have to explain their Persian allusions to the average citizen of Lucknow. Which does not mean that the progressive Urdu poets are obscure. It only suggests that they want to express new ideas which Urdu does not bear, but which only English, with its rich vocabulary, and Arabic and Persian, with their greater variety of abstract nouns and concrete image-raising adjectives, can with satisfaction. English they are not afraid of using, but they would much rather be allusive in Persian in the interest of their ideas, though at the cost of reduced evocative values. This canalised effort is not communalism, but it is revolutionary, inasmuch as digging up the roots involves contact with the soil and its aeration, lopping off the dead branches and the pruning of the new. A similar process is to be noted in the poetry of Sudhindra N. Datta. Going to the roots is a fundamental, and, therefore, a revolutionary effort, even though it need not mean revolution.

[37] Khandekar's *Doan Dhruva* (Mahratti), P.N. Srivastava's *Vida*, Nirala's *Apsara*, the novel *Budhua ki Beti* by B. S. Ugra, L. N. Misra's drama *Mukta ka Rahasya* are typical of Hindi. Prem Chand's stories and novels are, of course, there.

[38] Sailajananda, Premen Mitra, Manish Ghatak, particularly, have produced the *Bustee* literature.

[39] Tara Shanker's *Kalindi* (Bengali), and various stories.

[40] Leelavati Munshi's, for example.

[41] Suniti K. Chatterji (the philologist) on Java and Bali.

[42] J. C. Ghosh in the *Legacy of India*, an otherwise penetrating essay.

[43] *e.g.*, Tagore's *Inaugural Address* at the Prabasi Bengali Sahitya Sammelan (Calcutta) and the letter written to Buddha Deb Bose, published after the Poet's death in the *Kavita*.

[44] *Palataka* and *Punascha* are full of such poems.

[45] Subhas Mukerji's *Padatik*, for example.

[46] Samar Sen's *Nana Katha.*

[47] Premen Mitra's *Bandir Bandana.*

N.B. The standard texts on Bengali, Hindi, Urdu, Gujerati, and Marhatta literature have been consulted for this chapter. I have derived great benefit from discussions with men of letters, many of whom have kindly translated and explained their writings to me.

CHAPTER VI

* Besides the more well-known ones among the Sanskrit treatises, the following modern books have been used for this chapter. 1. Ayyar—*Thiagaraja.* 2. Sir S. M. Tagore's Works. 3. V. N. Bhatkhandeji's Works (Hindi) and his articles on the history of Hindustani Music in the XVI, XVII and XVIII centuries (Eng.). His lectures, above all. 4. F. Strangways—*Music of Hindustan,* 5. Clements—*Introduction to the Study of Indian Music.* 6. Popley—*Music of India.* 7. *South Indian Music Series*—P. Sambamoorthy. 8. *The Samgraha-Cuda-Mani* of Govinda and *Bahullara-Melakarta of* Venkata-Kavi, Edited by S.S. Shastri. 9. Kristo Dhan Banerji's *Geeta-Sutra Sar* (with explanatory notes by H. Banerji). 10. O. C. Ganguli's *Ragas and Raginis.* 11. H.L. Roy—*Problems of Hindustani Music.* 12. R.L. Roy—*Rag Nirnaya.* 13. D. K. Roy's Bengali writings have been very helpful. 14. Kumar Birendra Kishore's articles are full of facts patiently collected. On Tagore's music his own letters are still the best. More important than these sources have been my personal contacts with musicians and scholars, among whom Rajah Nawab Ali and Principal Ratanjankar must be first mentioned. I do not propose to give detailed references, they will burden the book. I have, of course, drawn upon my own books and articles on different aspects of this subject.

CHAPTER VII

[1] Jamini Roy—*Kabita* (Tagore number, Asarh 1348 Bengali year).

[2] "It is in imitation of the angelic works of art that any work of art is accomplished here; for example, a clay elephant, a brazen object, a garment, a gold object, and mule chariot are works of art. A work of art, indeed, is accomplished in him who comprehends this. For these (angelic) works of Art are an integration of the Self; and by them the sacrificer likewise integrates himself in the mode of rhythm." Integration means *samskar, or katharsis.*

[3] W. E. G. Solomon—*Mural Painting* (The Ajanta Caves) in *The Bombay Revival of Indian Art.*

[4] A. K. Coomarswamy—*The Transformation of Nature in Art* (The Theory of Art in Asia, and in notes on pp. 175-76, and 186-189.)

[5] *Ibid.* Ch. 11, P. Sorokin—*Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. 1, Ch. 9.

[6] Havell, O. C. Ganguly, N. C. Mehta and others.

[7] Nandlal Bose has shown, on the other hand, that the traditional, *are* the real, in his marvellous sketches for students. Sri Aurobindo's National Value of Art combines the traditional values with those of national needs, which must ascend from the level of the purely aesthetic to the spiritual. He alone is aware of the dynamics of the process, and not content with interpretation. His dynamics of art-history will not be accepted by other historians of art. Ajit Ghose in his articles on Kalighat *pat* performs a service similar to Dr. Tagore and N. L. Bose by showing the continuity of the *pat* with figures in the illuminated manuscript.

[8] Some of the 'ugliest' traditional ikons are highly evocative while the modernised versions of the beautiful ones are positively repulsive to anybody with the slightest knowledge of symbols. Many of the idols of Durga in the Sarbajaneen pujahs in Calcutta are realistically done, and

attract the entire *bhadralok* community of the city. For sheer unrootedness, nothing to beat this crowd.

[9] *Sanskrit drama in Kerala*—Rajendra Shanker (Four Arts 1936-37).

[10] Coomarswamy—*Ibid.* J. Maritain—*Art and Scholasticism*, is a neo-Thomist interpretation. P. Gardiner—*The Principles of Christian Art.* H. Pierce and R. Taylor—*Byzantine Art and Archaeology*, and *East Christian Art*; they destroy the claim of uniqueness which Dr. Mulk Raj Anand makes in *The Hindu View of Art*—pp. 37-48.

[11] *The Heart of Aryavarta* may be a case of the Tagore humour.

[12] *Vide Malavika-agnimitram*, II. 1, *Uttara-ram charita*, 1.39, *Mrchchhakatika*, III, 2-5. A. K. C. describes how Hem Chandra in *Trisastisalaka purusacaritra* classifies the effect of painting on various types of spectators—(*Reactions to art in India –ibid.* 105). Also in *Sakuntala* (VI, 13-14).

[13] Sir Jamshetjee Jeejeebhoy's donation of a lakh of rupees was the foundation of the Bombay School of Art in 1854. The correspondence between the dates of deep Government solicitude for Indian art and of Indian political movements is also interesting. The terrorist movement in Bengal (1908-1909) and Government grant of Rs. 10,000 for O.A.S. in 1910, and the non-co-operation movement 1920-21, and the Bombay grant of Rs. 5,000 in 1922; which proves that the terrorist movement was considered twice as dangerous.

[14] A. K. Haldar –*Art and Tradition* (Twenty-five Years of contemporary Indian Painting) gives a running account. He gives a tree of three generations of Tagore's disciples. A further treatment has no scope here.

[15] *The Bombay Revival of Indian Art* (published with the permission of the Government of Bombay).

[16] Bombay also has the *Gujrat Kala Prabartak Mandal.* Its activities are not known. What is known is that Rawal and Kanu Desai have not yet succeeded in making Ahmedabad a seat of Indian painting, in spite of the Tagore collection being there.

[17] *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. III—The Part of

Art in Indian Life, pp. 510-13 should be read by everybody interested in the future of our culture.

[18] Coomarswamy—*Trans. of Nature in Art.* He follows Jung.

[19] If we take the sign for a symbol, we shall be sentimentalising our notion of blue eyes, and if we take the symbol for a sign, we are reducing 'thought' to 'recognition'.—A. K. C. "*Paroksha*", *Ibid.*

[20] P. Sorokin discusses these theories threadbare by statistical analysis. Unfortunately, his data are not Indian. Yet they do not seem to take away anything valuable from his criticisms. *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. I (Fluctuations in Forms of Art).

[21] P. Sorokin—*Ibid.*

[22] Quoted by P. S.

[23] *The Background of Art*—D. Talbot Rice, a little classic.

[24] J. Maritain—*Art and Scholasticism.*

[25] Eric Gill—*Art.*

[26] Yone Noguchi—*Hiroshige.*

[27] O. C. Ganguly's *Ragas and Raginis*, Vol. II.

[28] This point could be further developed by a closer study of the reasons for the earlier development of literature in our modern culture, its correspondence with that of painting in the intermediate stage, and its final triumph over other forms of fine arts in the last. In the earlier patterns, of our culture, the process is similar but not identical.

[29] A. K. Haldar in the *Alaka* on Jamini Roy's paintings.

[30] I am indebted to Prof. Suhrawardy and Mr. S. N. Datta in my appreciation of Jamini Roy's paintings.

[31] Jamini Roy—*Kabita.* Tagore appreciated this article. It is a pity that Indian painters are either silent about Tagore's paintings or talk loosely about them to cover their discomfiture. The best introduction to Tagore's paintings is (1) his own notes and explanations (2) M. Bidou's article (in the Paris press) quoted in *The Rupam* April-July—Oct. 1930 and in the *Viswabharati* Birthday

number, 1941, and (3) A. K. Coomarswamy's in *The Rupam, Ibid.*

[32] Interesting work is being done in art-pedagogics in the Doon School by Mr. Khastagir.

[33] Spear—*The Nabobs.*

[34] S. K. Chatterji—*Origin and Development of the Bengali Language*; he has also written a separate paper on the influence of the Portuguese language upon the dialects.

[35] 'The civic architecture of India in the XIX century', Percy Brown, *Calcutta Municipal Gazette*, 16th Anniversary November 1940.

[36] *U.P. Census Report*, 1921.

[37] Prof. Ghurye—*Salary and other Conditions of Work of Clerks in Bombay City*—Journal of the University of Bombay, Vol. IX, part 4, 1941—rent-proportion is not given.

[38] Bharat's *Natya-shastra* is the main classic. M. Ghosh's edition of *Abhinaya Darpana, Bharata Tandava Lakshanam*—C. V. N. Nayadu, A. K. Coomarswamy's *Dance of Shiva and Mirror of Gestures* are the four indispensable books. A number of articles by Rajendra Shankar, Asoka Shastri, Haren Ghosh, R. B. Poduval, Uday Shankar and Miss M. McMarthy have appeared in various journals. Ragini Devi's *Nrittanjali* and P. Banerji's *Dance of India* can also be consulted. The last book is weak on the critical side, however.