Sociology

Sociology

BY

LEOPOLD VON WIESE

EDITED AND ANNOTATED BY

FRANZ H. MUELLER

PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS

NEW YORK

OSKAR PIEST

1941

HAFNER PUBLISHING COMPANY

NEW YORK

PUBLISHED, 1941

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

This book is based on two articles contributed to encyclopaedias and on the text of a lecture. I have asked Dr. Leopold von Wiese, Professor of Political Economy and Sociology at the University of Cologne, to authorize the translation of these articles and their publication in book form for three reasons: first, the need to stimulate anew the discussion regarding the true subject matter of sociology and to prove the possibility of an autonomous system for this science; second, the need for a succinct and lucid presentation of this system for graduate readings in the history of sociological theories; third, the desire to show the possibility of a text which through scrupulous adherence to the sociological viewpoint can be covered in one semester.

The historical and systematic Introduction at the beginning of this booklet is taken from the German Encyclopaedia of Political Economy.[1] The presentation of the "Theory of Social Relations" or "sociology of relationships" (*Bezie-*

[1] *Wörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft,* ed. Ludwig Elster (4th ed.; Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1932), Vol. 3, pp. 379–383.

hungslehre) itself is taken from the German Encyclopaedia of Sociology.[2] The Appendix in which the conception of "the social" is again explained in detail and distinguished from the concept of "the spiritual" and the concept of "the cultural" is identical for the greater part with the text of a lecture which v. Wiese gave in London in March 1937. The lecture appeared in April of the same year in the London *Sociological Review*[3] under the somewhat misleading title, "The Social, Spiritual, and Cultural Elements of the Interhuman Life," a German version of which was published with the title *Sozial, geistig und kulturell* (Leipzig, 1936). Although the problems with which the latter essay deals, especially the category of "the spiritual" in its specific German interpretation, may be somewhat strange in part to the Anglo-Saxon mind, it seemed advisable to add it to this textbook because of the light it throws upon the distinctive character of the sociological approach.

The present book hopes to present the constituent parts and principles of the theory of social relations in a brief yet intelligible manner. All references to other authors which might confuse the student and any departures from the prin-

[2] *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie,* ed. Alfred Vierkandt (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1931), pp. 66–81.

[3] Vol. XXIX, No. 2.

cipal theme have been carefully avoided. The whole system is developed syllogistically from its fundamental concepts. The teacher, however, ought to refer constantly to the American edition of von Wiese's large textbook of the theory of social relations entitled *Systematic Sociology;* On the Basis of the *Beziehunglehre and Gebildelehre* of Leopold von Wiese; Adapted and Amplified by Howard Becker,[4] professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin. Professor Becker makes a special effort to render some of the less familiar categories of von Wiese's system more intelligible to the American reader by frequent reference to, and quotation from American authors whose thoughts and concepts show a certain similarity to those of von Wiese. Professor Becker writes in his Preface: "Whenever possible the American equivalents of German writers referred to in the text or in the footnotes have been substituted or added, and many more who made contributions for which there are no German equivalents are taken into account . . . Again, terminology has been modified in order to evoke German as well as American connotations . . ."[5] Since, in the German original, the principal part of the present little text contains scarcely any references to other

[4] (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1932.)
[5] P. IX.

authors, there was no occasion to make such substitutions. With regard to references to related American sociological theories and to more or less corresponding American terminology, it seemed preferable to suggest that the reader consult Professor Becker's excellent edition, rather than to annotate this text too. This adherence to the original, it is true, will require a special effort on the part of the reader to "live" himself into the different approach of the author. Were it not for the fact that Professor Becker's translation can be used as collateral reference, I would not have attempted to present this text unaltered.

As the text is taken from three different sources, some repetition is inevitable. In an effort to produce a faithful translation, no attempt was made to avoid repetitious matter by deleting it, or by combining the essays, and it is to be hoped that all friends of von Wiese's system will approve of this method.

*

It seems to me that this presentation of the theory of social relations, sometimes called "doctrine of relations," will form an excellent basis for a consideration of the autonomy of sociology as a science. Even those who, like the present writer, do not unqualifiedly subscribe to the au-

thor's epistemology will be impressed by the coherence and thoroughness of the system. The fact that so many of our modern textbooks of sociology are collections of essays on sociologically relevant themes rather than presentations of an actual *system* of sociology is a logical consequence of the uncertainty of many authors about the distinctive character of the sociological viewpoint. Too little account is taken of the specific categories which underlie all genuine sociology, and whenever the basic question of methodology is lost sight of or discarded as a superfluous toying with mere concepts, inconsistency and confusion follow as a matter of course.

*

As nominalism conceded reality only to the particular and considered the universal as a mere figment of the imagination, so v. Wiese seems to take only the separate actions of the individual (*ad alterum*) into consideration. "Society," he says, "as a concept is acceptable only when it is explicitly stated that it is a completely *verbal* concept, a happening, a process [the nominalists would have said a 'nomen']; there is only *sociation*. To be sure, the word 'society' is a convenient abbreviation of everyday speech. . . . The reality which must be substituted for the fictitious sub-

stance 'society' is merely the sum of those occurrences."[6] In as far as v. Wiese denies the "substantiality" of social structures in the philosophical sense we are obliged to follow him. Society cannot exist by itself, it requires men to support its existence, and men alone are substances, i.e. spiritually autonomous persons. But a social structure is something more than the sum of these persons or their acts; it is something more than a fanciful illusion. "The circumstance," v. Wiese concedes, "that they are spiritual and not perceivable by the senses does not yet make them unreal."[7] L. v. Wiese's judgment about "abstract collectivities" in general, that "they are not simple summations of social processes," might be applied to *all* social structures.[8] Even during construction the materials prepared and shaped for a table are called *"parts"* of the table, although the table itself does not yet exist. The table does not come into existence when we have an aggregation of the parts but only when each part is permitted to exercise its proper *function.* Just as these parts can only be "understood" in view of the purpose they will serve in the completed table, so, it seems, interhuman actions receive their specific "social"

[6] v. Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology,* p. 78.

[7] v. Wiese, *Allgemeine Soziologie* (Munich: 1924), I, 22.

[8] v. Wiese, "Soziale Gebilde," *Wörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft,* Vol. III (Jena: 1933), p. 266.

character from the social whole.[9] Although v. Wiese considers this teleological method unscientific and does not agree with the view that social actions are "functions" of supra-individual wholes, he, nevertheless, admits that "social processes presuppose social structures."[10] "We do not live," he once wrote, "in isolated relations; the isolation is merely theoretical, created for scientific convenience."[11] "Social relations," he says in another place, "as the results of social processes are found only within social structures."[12] To give an example: the State cannot exist without citizens, but the citizens can be understood only in their relationship to the State. The citizen is the individual in his public legal relationship to his fellow men within that territorial corporation which we call the State. This is in agreement with v. Wiese's statement: "Social forms result from social processes, just as, on the other hand, social processes presuppose social structures."[13]

*

[9] The whole or, better, its essential and actuating principle from the first is formative and operative within the parts. It would be true "speculation" to assume that groupings of men do *not* result from teleological relations, while thinking in terms of finality seems to be true realism.

[10] v. Wiese, *System der Allgemeinen Soziologie* (2nd ed.; Munich: 1933), p. 509.

[11] v. Wiese in *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie,* X, 548.

[12] Cf. footnote No. 10.

[13] *Ibid.*

Sociology may start out from behavior and human interactions but it should not be forgotten that, as J. Plenge expressed it, the whole is, so to speak, reflected in these processes which are its building material. The principles of causality and finality are not mutually exclusive. We do not abandon empirical knowledge when, with Rudolf Eisler, we adopt the viewpoint that "the principal of finality is, as it were, the inner side of all living causality and the external causal relations presuppose it already."[14] The scientist who subscribes to the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge will insist, of course, that everything which transcends direct sense perception belongs to the realm of metaphysics which he is most likely to consider a mere matter of subjective belief. He may perhaps admit the existence of an order that transcends the empirical and the individual, but he will deny the possibility of *scientifically* abstracting the universal or essence of empirical phenomena in time and space. He starts with the fiction that all is chaos upon which the scientist imposes an order in as much as he describes it and names its facts and data.

I understand the concept of "experience" to be much broader, but I agree with v. Wiese that sociology is an empirical science. To use the language

[14] *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie,* X, 337.

of the Schoolmen: it deals with the *causae secundae,* i.e. with the material conditions which "individuate" the social "forms" (the essences, universals) that are thus transferred from the realm of potential being to the realm of actual existence. In other words, sociology is not directly concerned with metaphysical being and its ends, but with concrete, factual conditions and actualization of being in time and space. With v. Wiese we study the individual attitude and situation as the conditioning factors of social processes. The social process, however, is always a movement of integration or disintegration. Gustav Gundlach says rightly that the "formal object" (subject matter) of sociology consists "in the social process of integration from which social 'structures' result, in other words, in the ascertainment and classification of the proximate causes of these integrating [and disintegrating] processes." [15]

I am unable to close this Preface without expressing my thanks to the Reverend Frederic C. Eckhoff and to Mr. R. A. Kocourek, B.A., M.A., instructor at the College of St. Thomas, for their assistance in the difficult work of translation. I am also indebted to my former colleague, Mr. Clement S. Mihanovich, B.S. in Ed., A.M., Ph.D., instructor in sociology at St. Louis University,

[15] *Gregorianum* (Rome, 1936), XIII, 294.

who discussed the manuscript of the translation with Professor Leopold von Wiese in Cologne and helped prepare it for publication. I am grateful also to the publishers, Gustav Fischer, Jena, and Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, for permission to translate and publish the articles, and to Professor Farquharson of London for allowing me to use the Essay which appeared in the *Sociological Review*. My greatest thanks, however, are due my former teacher, Professor Leopold von Wiese of the University of Cologne, Germany, formerly Carl Schurz professor at the University of Wisconsin (1934–35), visiting lecturer at Harvard University (1935), and honorary member of the American Sociological Society, for his authorization and for his unfailing encouragement during the preparation of the American edition.

To Mrs. Franz Mueller, M.A., Ph.D., who graduated under Professor Leopold von Wiese, credit is due for the preparation of the Index.

FRANZ H. MUELLER

ST. THOMAS COLLEGE
AUGUST, 1940

CONTENTS

PART THREE

APPENDIX: THE SOCIAL DISTINGUISHED FROM THE SPIRITUAL AND THE CULTURAL

Sociology

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

A. SOCIOLOGY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE SCHOOL OF COMTE AND SPENCER

In a retrospective article in the third edition of the *Wörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft* ("Encyclopaedia of Political Economy"), Lexis treated the subject of "Sociology." Twenty years ago he had to enter into a study of that concept of society, a concept now antiquated though still accepted by some German jurists, which in the middle of the last century Mohl, Treitschke, Stein and others used in contradistinction to the concept of the state. They had principally in mind that "civil society" which arose from economic activity and which "could only be thought of as existing *within* the state." The other concept of society, which is far more extensive and includes within itself the state, and which, in contrast to the more juridical and historical idea of society, is really the true sociological concept, was even at that time the principal subject of Lexis' article.

Lexis discovered this concept in the writings of the two great western European sociologists of the

nineteenth century with whom in that period it was always necessary to reckon, Comte and Spencer. He rightly saw in them the true originators of a natural science of sociology. Anyone who follows their example (as Lexis clearly shows) looks for sociological "laws" corresponding as much as possible to physical and biological laws; and wherever feasible tries to establish analogies with the animal organism. Lexis, however, pointed out that in this way hardly any essentially new insights into the interconnections in human society were obtainable. Lexis also took cognizance of the attempts of Tarde to make use of psychological phenomena in explaining social life; but he neglected the studies of F. Tönnies, G. Simmel and E. Durkheim. He himself proposed a number of problems as the immediate task of sociology, in which, however, he went beyond the limits of sociology into the fields of biology, ethnology and statistics.

In general, Lexis gave a correct picture of the status of sociology in the year 1900. Since then research has made considerable progress. The organic viewpoint persists only as a remnant (especially in some works of the Slavic languages, but even in these countries it is considered outmoded). The concept of a sociological law has received an entirely different meaning; many think the idea should be abandoned entirely, and

Spencer has been forgotten so quickly in Europe and America that it does not seem justified. In the meantime, not only have new viewpoints been adopted, new problems proposed and new attempts been made toward the solution of problems, but older sources out of vogue at the end of the nineteenth century, have been revived; e.g., the Romantic School, F. E. Schleiermacher and G. W. Hegel. Today Marx is studied rather as a sociologist than as a social economist. In brief, there is a confusing abundance of profound scholarship available for the study of what we call "society."

There are still further differences between the sociology of the nineteenth century and the same science of recent times. As far as the school of Comte and Spencer is concerned, the older sociology followed closely in the train of the natural sciences in the problems proposed by the latter. In this school and in almost all others, sociology was at the same time a philosophy of history; with Comte and Spencer, positivistic, and in Germany, partially idealistic. Even today many subscribe to this close alliance, even identification, between sociology and the philosophy of history; more frequently, however (especially in America and in the German so-called doctrine of relations) this connection is held to be erroneous and frought

with many dangers to the development of a true science of social life as such. Further, the older science was almost always evolutionary. Its aim was to show the *development* of humanity as a whole and of its principal institutions whereby, as a rule, the idea of a gradual progress was considered a matter of course.

Nowadays the theory of successive development (i.e., the historical approach) is complemented by the study of the co-existing (non-historical or static approach). Especially in America the study of *present-day* social life is considered the more urgent task. Attempts at prophecy have become rare; they are left, without a backward glance, to the philosopher of history like the late Oswald Spengler. When—as is frequently done—the changes in social life are studied, the old discredited word "evolution" is readily replaced by the newer though less distinct "dynamics."

B. THE PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIOLOGY

1. *Its Relationship to Biology and Psychology*

Formerly the most closely related science was biology, especially speculative biology, founded on the theories of the struggle for existence, survival and natural selection; thus the questions with which Darwinism was concerned were fre-

quently adopted by sociology. This is all different today; only the racial problems still stand in the foreground and these, of course, really belong to bio-sociology rather than to general sociology. Today the connection with the now more scientific biology is, on the contrary, not sufficiently kept in mind, especially in Germany before 1933; instead the connection with psychology has become closer, following in the footsteps of Spencer. This has lately been the cause of considerable confusion, and it has become necessary to clarify the relationship of sociology to this occasionally rather exacting neighbor. The confusion arises from the erroneous idea that everything that treats of the soul or of the mind belongs to psychology; an error comparable to the idea that everything that deals with society is sociology.

2. *Sociological Problems in Other Sciences*

Finally, there has been an increased use of the sociological approach in many other sciences, that is, the incidental reference of the concatenation of their specific questions with social life. There is a great deal of sociology in jurisprudence, history of language and literature, social economics, arts, comparative religion, etc., so that if we were to sum up those sections in other sciences which take society into consideration we would find justifica-

tion for speaking of the "sociologism" of modern science.

The need is therefore very urgent for a clearly defined science of sociology, with its own basic problem and its own methods, distinct from social philosophy, social psychology, social economics, etc., and especially from those sciences whose subject matter is in no way human living-together, but another complex of questions, namely, as in philosophy, the phenomena of the mind or, as in biology, the general phenomena of life or, as in the cultural sciences (sometimes called cultural sociology), the achievements of civilization.

3. *Sociology and Anthropology*

Another cause of confusion today is the identification or mixing up of sociology with philosophical anthropology (ontology of man). Such a science of man as a spiritual being is, of course, very close to sociology; for the intellectuality of man and his social nature are cognate. Sociology, however, has as its subject-matter only the *inter*-human behavior, whereas philosophical anthropology is the science of man including his relations with non-human nature and with the supernatural. Werner Sombart considered such anthropology as the basis of sociology. We, however, consider philosophical anthropology the highest

and ultimate goal of all the separate sciences dealing with man, i.e., the synthesis which we arrive at only by way of sociology and the other special sciences. This is indeed the end that must never be lost sight of. However, the abstractions upon which such a science of philosophical anthropology necessarily depends must be derived from a systematic order of social phenomena provided by sociology. Today many of the problems which belong to philosophical anthropology are left to sociology, and anthropologists of the so-called school of interpretative sciences like Schleiermacher are erroneously called sociologists.

4. *Sociology an Autonomous Science*

Before we can state the concept of sociology we must further distinguish it from the great variety of meanings given it by other authors at the expense of general agreement. Our understanding of the term as that of a special science will make it possible to separate its subject matter from that of other sciences. Then no objection can be made that its subject matter is vague and undefined; such an objection is attributable to a confusion with those all too comprehensive interpretations of the concept of sociology according to which everything that has any relationship to society is called sociology. The objection could be made,

and rightly so, that "society" may be and actually is drawn into every natural and "moral" science. It calls upon physics, biology, history and psychology to apply their methods and systems of thought on this mysterious something which is of great importance for men. It would be wrong to object. Sometimes we see men dealing with the concept "human society" as if everything about it were definitely known for a long time.

The history of a long period, reaching back to the ancient Hindoos and Chinese, shows that very little was accomplished in the aforementioned way, viz., to identify sociology with the totality of the social sciences, and that it is of importance to treat the specifically human "social" with specific methods of thought and research. And in the second way? To deal with the idea "human society" as if it were clearly defined and limited is even more questionable, for then we are constantly deceiving ourselves by taking a word for a concept. Many writers of all periods, when they speak of society, are really dealing with an unknown quantity, an *X*, without being conscious to any degree that within the word there lies hidden so much uncertainty. The lack of a definite method of research, founded upon empirical knowledge and strict methodology with regard to the perceivable nature of "the social," has led to hasty conclusions, allegories, mere fancies, or to a confusion

of this sphere with the so-called objectivized (embodied) spirit or mind or with the content of conscious occurrences in human souls, just as a lack of intellectual knowledge is so often filled by wishful thinking, by setting up objectives of the esthetic or ethical will, or by some so-called *Wesensschau,* "phenomenological envisagement of essentials"[1] [or essential intuition].

Whoever believes that the nature of "the social" is already sufficiently known and that it no longer is a scientific problem, will be inclined to impose upon sociology tasks which can only be undertaken after "the social" has been satisfactorily defined, or he will give sociology tasks that already belong to other sciences and, therefore, would render a special science of sociology unnecessary. As a matter of fact many things are called sociology that ought to be called by other well-accepted names. Because of the very lively and widespread modern idea that all these fields of knowledge depend upon conditions arising out of human society, there has arisen a habit of labeling all these cognate things as sociology.

5. *Confusion of Sociological Problems*

a. With Ethics.—Sociology is often confused with ethics, or, at any rate, there is some kind of extension of sociology from the sphere of knowl-

[1] Howard Becker.

edge of the existing to that of the ought-to-be and of values. This confusion has tragic consequences, for the author of such a mixed system will frequently be unable to resist the urge to give his fellow men prescriptions for their conduct which he should save for ethics proper; he also impatiently connects his observations on the existing facts with the requirements of social reform. When he realizes that theoretic sociology has no place for such things, he calls his system "applied sociology," and thus gives cause for more confusion, since the terms "applied sociology," if we allow it to stand, means something else than social ethics.

b. With Social Psychology.—As we noted above, there is a widespread mingling of sociology with social psychology. All psychology is concerned with processes of the soul (or at least it should be), therefore it is concerned with *inner* experiences, whereas sociology presupposes that there is an external sphere of existence, that there is an interpersonal, not only an intermental, relationship in human life, and that "the social" belongs to the externals of human life and that, therefore, its phenomena must be taken as external facts which do not merely live in our soul. This presupposition might be a metaphysical fiction, but it is and remains the self-understood hypothesis of

all practical life. In order to explain this external sphere of action it is of course often necessary to treat of the psychic occurrences, so that the soul as well as the mind are often mentioned in sociology. It is, however, the *main* sphere of problems and investigations which is the deciding factor in giving each science its proper field; it is immaterial if a science in order to find the answer to its problems must consult all kinds of cognate fields of knowledge. Psychic phenomena belong to the subject matter of sociology as well as to psychology—in the former, in order to explain the interconnection between men; in the latter, to explain the interconnection of psychic occurrences and the inner life of the individuals.

c. With Political Science.—There is also frequent confusion between the disciplines of sociology and political science. Like Dahlmann, v. Holtzendorff, Roscher, Treitschke, Ratzenhofer, etc., in the first three decades of the twentieth century, there are at the present time (1933), e.g., in Germany, capable writers who treat of the science of political life, but who insist on calling their political science sociology. This gives rise to serious misunderstandings and inhibiting controversies. Because of this confusion we hear such statements as these: that sociology arose as the "opposition"-science of the rising bourgeoisie

against the state of the *ancien régime* (C. Brinkmann), or that its subject matter only consists of the ideas of liberty and equality. Here, too, we readily admit that there is concatenation of questions of the second, third and even further removed orders, as in psychology, since political relations and political structures (as state, party, etc.) are social phenomena as well. Sociology also treats of that antagonistic action which we call politics. However, in some respects the subject matter of political science belongs only partly to the empirical sciences and to a great extent it represents a postulating science and is thus much more comprehensive than sociology. In another respect its subject matter, e.g., its treatment of the drive for power, is only a segment of sociology, which indeed includes *every* social action. In order to limit sociology to the sphere of politics, one would have to assert that our interhuman relations are exclusively of a political and, therefore, public character, which is absurd. There is, however, no objection to any author's claim that his work has a sociological character and must be coordinated with sociology, if his analysis of political occurrences leads to general interhuman relationships, as is, at least in part, the case with Ratzenhofer.

d. With Cultural Science and with Social Phi-

losophy.—Reference has already been made to the intermingling of sociology and cultural science. We must distinguish between a science that treats of the bearers of culture and one that treats of the content of culture. Otherwise, we will make the mistake of thinking that we have explained the social interconnection of men when we have described the content of culture, as in language, religion and art, etc., although, as Theodore Abel rightly says, the behavior of men can be explained only by studying social processes and relations.

With this is connected another error, common in Germany and France: that the history of the "objectivized" human mind [i.e., of the spirit having assumed objective actual forms, manifested in cultural facts, as in architecture, sculpture, music, etc.] is at the same time a history of social development. Many historians and philosophers are taking a lively interest in the phenomena of social life as they realize that the origin, manifestation and spread of ideas, convictions and beliefs are strongly dependent on the course of social development. The history and critique of ideologies (unmasking of ideologies) has a close and manifold relationship to sociology; but an identification of the history of the human spirit with sociology, because of the pronounced inclination in Germany of interpreting the *whole*

of humanity according to the history of the human mind, has led to a neglect of the multiplicity of forces which support the connection between men and the painting of an inadequate picture of the social sphere.

e. With an Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences.— From this rejection of the many interminglings with other sciences here specified, it should be clear that sociology must not be made an encyclopaedic synthesis of all the social sciences. According to one view, there is a synthetic sociology in which all the particular social sciences, taking the term in its broadest sense (law, economics, the arts, language, religion, etc.) are considered branches of a sociology which binds them together. Hereby the special sociologies (of economics, law, etc.) are again confused with the totality of the sciences of law, economics, etc. It is quite true that general sociology is the synthesis of the special sociologies of law, economics, etc.; but the sciences of law, economics, religion, etc., contain besides their sociological parts, other parts of extra-sociological character. The sociology of law, e.g., is not the same as the whole science of law; the rules which are derived from the idea of law are conclusions *sui generis,* and they cannot be considered as sociological principles.

Finally, it is clear that the many inclusions of

these special problems of social life in other sciences, which are sometimes erroneously called "sociological" methods, do not constitute a science of sociology, no matter how profitable their studies may be for sociology.

f. The Relationship with Bio-Sociology.—Bio-sociology is the science most closely related to sociology, since it must help to explain the important social structures of family, tribe, people, race. These are not only the results of interhuman existence, but they are phenomena which strike their roots deep into the ground of life as a whole.

C. THE TASK OF SOCIOLOGY AS A SPECIAL SCIENCE WITHIN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Like ourselves, the Dutchman, A. Lysen, sees a clear distinction between that kind of sociology which constitutes the totality of social sciences, and that sociology which wishes to be the science of the social reality itself. The former he designates by the somewhat unfortunate label of "absolute" sociology, the latter as "relative" sociology. We would prefer not to call the former sociology, but merely general social science; the latter alone is sociology.

We must add immediately that sociology does not limit itself to ultimate generalizations, but

also admits a wealth of special problems which are, of course, all systematically connected with the basic problems.

It is not expedient to call this so limited sociology "formal"; there are too many different opinions about the distinction between "form" and "content." This is well illustrated by Sombart's characteristic use of the expressions "form" and "content," which differs from Simmel's usage, as he himself points out.

According to Sombart, Simmel understands "the reciprocal action as the *form* of association, namely that process which we think should be considered as the *content* of all social relations." Indeed there seems to be no reason why the manner and degree of the interconnection between men should be considered as something "formal" or apparent, and the individual purposes which men set for themselves should be considered the "content" or substance.

Now we are able to answer the question about the meaning of the scientific concept of sociology briefly as follows: sociology deals with the social or interhuman processes. General or theoretic sociology seeks to answer three questions which are connected with each other:

(1) How is that phenomenon which we call "the social" to be explained?

(2) What is the effect of "the social" in the human sphere?

(3) In what circumstances does "the social" become active?

In correspondence with these problems, peculiar to it alone, sociology must develop its own methods and with their aid observe and study the social actuality, analyze, compare and systematize it.

The special sociologies, using the same methods and working toward the same ends, seek to answer the same questions in the special provinces of social life (economics, law, religion, languages, arts, political science, etc.).

Underlying this strictly delimited concept of an autonomous science of sociology is the long experience of the history of all science, that a clearly limited and defined statement of the problem must be the foundation, and that a systematic, uniform construction and a correspondence between the subject matter and the methodology must never be lost sight of.

The coining of the word sociology has often been severely criticized as a hybrid form; we think somewhat unjustly. We would like to look on that treasure-house of new words, the old Greek and Latin languages, as a unity. Anyone, however, who does not agree with the hundred-year-old word of

Comte may use the new term formed from the Greek and actually in use today, *koinoniology*. It is very questionable, however, whether the word will ever come into wide usage.

PART TWO

OUTLINES OF THE "THEORY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS"

(Beziehungssoziologie)

A. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF GENERAL OR THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY

General or theoretical sociology has as its subject matter the interhuman or "social." It attempts to find the answer to three weighty and extensive questions:

(1) How is the specifically "social" to be explained?

(2) What does the specifically "social" produce in the human sphere?

(3) In what practical combinations does the specifically "social" become effective?

In a most general way the following answers will suffice for the present (they will be substantiated in the following pages):

(1) The specifically "social" or interhuman consists in an involved and entangled network of relations between men; each social relation is the product of one or more social processes; the human cosmos will find its ultimate explanation in the social processes.

(2) From this interhuman proceeds everything which we call culture in the widest possible meaning of the word.

(3) In actuality the specifically "social" is found to have a very close connection with the bodies and souls of men; without the psycho-physical nature of man, the "social" could not be conceived as the producer of culture because it would be absolutely ineffective.

There is, therefore, a close relationship between the science of the "social," i.e., sociology, and biology and psychology.

B. SOCIAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

It is false to say that the attempts to establish a theoretical sociology have "always significantly presupposed the concept of the specifically social"; it is true, on the contrary, that the explanation of the "social" is its principal subject matter. It does not presuppose any theory, belief or doctrine with regard to the interhuman. In the beginning it restricts itself to explaining terminologically that the "social" comprises *all* the manifestations and evidences of the *inter*human sphere. We would consider it erroneous to delimit its observations only to certain and not to all manifestations of the interhuman sphere, for instance, to those which are community-forming or to those forces which create the great associations of men. However, it

seems equally contestable to include among its problems for study such manifestations as have to do with the body and soul of the *individual* human being. Very often, it is true, the contributions of physiology, psychology and biology must be made use of in sociology, just as sociology itself offers the results of its investigations to the correlated sciences in the fulfillment of their tasks.

Theoretical sociology, therefore, has but one object proper to itself, one proper subject matter: the "social." We intentionally do not say "society." There is no such substantive that could be called "society." There are only integrated occurrences which therefore have a mere verbal character, namely, influences of men upon men which take place within the human sphere of time and space and which we might call "social" or "interhuman." Because we men by perception have become accustomed to comprehend the world as something objective, and because relations become understandable only by abstract thinking, language first forms the word society, feigning a perceivable object. This abridgment is quite serviceable for many purposes of study and we can very often proceed in speech as if there were such a thing as "society" without falling into error. It is moreover scientifically necessary to inquire why we make use of such a mental fiction. But only

the theory of ideologies and thought construction may enter more profoundly into this matter. A science, however, which wishes to grasp the reality of what happens between men, will not start out from a mental fiction, which, interpreted as a perceivable reality, would immediately lead into error.

In all experience and behavior of human beings there will be found three contributing factors: the body, the soul and the influence of the social sphere. Just as the body and the soul are so closely united that they appear as one in action, so, too, the third element is intimately united to the body and soul elements. There is nothing in human life which does not show an admixture of the social element, i.e., does not display any influence of other men. At the same time, the "social" is also experienced in connection with one's own body and soul.

Thus it is that the demonstration of the existence of an autonomous social sphere in human life is not a simple and self-evident matter for the untrained mind. It is only by the isolating process of thought that the social is separated from its involvement in the psycho-physical being of the individual person; a special science with a methodology of its own is required to abstract the interhuman. This is necessary not only for pure

reasoning or thought, but it is also demanded by the necessities of practical life; mistake upon mistake will be made in every department of public and private life unless the characteristics, forces, limitations and possible relations of the "social" are understood.

We must therefore try to understand that besides the physical sphere of man and the phenomena in the individual human soul, there is another sphere consisting in processes which take place *between* men. Just as these processes depend on actions in the two other spheres, so do these processes also influence the thinking, feeling and willing of the individual person and, though in a lesser degree, exercise some influence on his physical activity. Our immediate task is to isolate the social processes and thereby the social sphere in general.

Let us suppose that this constantly flowing stream of interhuman activity is halted in its course for one moment. We will then see that it is an apparently impenetrable network of lines between men. There is not only a line connecting *A* with *B*, and *B* with *C*, etc., but *C* is directly connected with *A*, and, moreover, *A*, *B* and *C* are enclosed within a circle. Not only is there *one* line connecting *A* with *B*, and not only *one* circle in which both are enclosed, but there are many

connecting lines, some of which are stretched straight and some of which are in loose curves.

These connections between *A* and *B*, and between *A* and *C*, and also between *Y* and Z, and *Y* and *A* are called a *social* relationship and the entire network is called the *social system of relations*. A static analysis of the sphere of the interhuman, will—considering the problem in the most general way—consist in the dismemberment and reconstruction of this system of relations. Outside this network, above and below it, there can be nothing that is social, unless we leave the plane of empirical observation.

Let us however recall our fundamental viewpoint: that the "social" is a chain of occurrences flowing along with time, and, therefore, a dynamic conception of the interhuman will be more adequate; accordingly we will see in processes, i.e. in particular events, the elements of the whole field of occurrences. Our principle concept will be that of the *social process* (or better: the plural, social processes). A social relation will therefore be seen as a result of a social process or processes, like a station or halting place in the vast stream of occurrences; and such a social relation is in turn changed, more or less quickly, by new social processes.

What is a social process? It must be some kind

of occurrence which can be shown as a basic happening in the whole interhuman sphere. Let us now suppose that the whole system of relations is again set in motion and subjected to constant change. It will now become clear to us that the most common form of social occurrence consists in *approaching* (toward each other) and *distancing* (from one another), in a to-and-fro movement. Whatever may be the particular, more or less unique nature of the process which creates the social relation between men, it will always resemble all other social processes in this that it brings men closer together or places a greater distance between them. It is a mistake to suppose that occurrences of superordination and subordination, of domination or of opposition are as universally common as the associative and dissociative processes. There are relations between men which do not create any relationship of subordination; however frequent domination and submission may be, they are not the most universal relations, and opposition is only a variation of dissociation.

There is no relationship between men which does not represent some distance between them, and every mutual occurrence represents some change in the distance between them. From a most general observation of social life it is evident

that it consists of an endless chain of occurrences in which men become more closely united or more widely separated. This interhuman existence, which is the subject matter of sociology, is entirely constituted by acts of binding or loosening, and precisely these acts constitute the *social processes* and can be defined as *occurrences which bring men closer together or place them farther apart.* From the formal point of view, there are always distances.

By thus bringing social processes—according to the static approach: the relations considered as their results—into the front rank and pointing out that all social processes are in the end merely the changing of distances, we may arrive at a comprehensive concept of the whole of social life which will be uniform, strictly systematic and based on deduction. Such a concept of social life will be of the greatest importance in view of the great qualitative differences in the social sphere. This would not be an artificial construction, on the contrary, to proceed from the changing distances between men, means to be aware of and to refer to a reality in life, namely, the ultimate polarity of our existence which constantly wields a deciding influence in daily life. The significance of this proximity or distance existing between fellow men may be seen daily, among the noblest and most simple things, in

work and the conduct of life in general, in caring for life's needs materially and spiritually. Not only in the pair or in the smaller groups does this distance play a decisive role; all the complicated tasks of organization dealing with large numbers of people, constituting the essential problems of such great super-personal collectivities as the state and church, all consist of involved complexes of distances in which the powers of the human soul and body make their influence felt and become important.

Certainly the corporeal, psychical and intellectual powers of the individual are the fundamental sources for all social achievement. The concealed truth of the social sphere is, however, this, that only within it can these powers become fruitful and become forces further active in time and space. The *I* has need of the *You* and together they must become the *We;* this *We* is not infrequently more effective than all the egos in isolation which form the "We." Even the antagonistic tensions between men release forces which are no less fruitful. The psychologist may try to discover to what degree the individual *I* is predisposed to enter upon the *We* and *You* relationship; for us it is sufficient to note the great variation of nearness and distance in the juxtaposition of men. The force of looking for each other is constantly hampered by the force of avoiding each other and

every undertaking in which several men are engaged requires some regulation of the distances between them. In order that a distinct and proper effect may be achieved it is necessary that the degree of proximity or distance between the participants in the undertaking proper to it may be found.

A consideration of the evolution in the course of time [dynamic approach] may show that the same interconnection exists which we found in an analysis of co-existing social life [static approach]. New social processes always attach themselves to the earlier ones. In the establishment of cultures we see an accumulation and an uninterrupted continuity of series of processes. Every interhuman achievement becomes the starting point for new and more complicated social achievements. The fact that today the whole structure of the human cosmos is so extremely involved after such a long history of humanity, should, even more, tell us how necessary it is to study the basis of the whole structure. We dissect the whole into its elements, i.e., into the social processes, and construct it anew.

If we see that the basic processes in the social sphere consist in changing of distances, then the spatial relationships in the material world may serve to a certain extent to illustrate the incorporeal

social interconnections. However, physical distance is not the same as social distance. In some instances physical proximity may be combined with social distance, and vice versa. J. Pieper has rightly pointed out the fact (which we have not lost sight of) that although the distance between two units in the physical realm is the same measured from either one, yet the inner distance (the social distance) from *A* to *B* is not always the same as the distance from *B* to *A*. Between two men there are possibly two distances. This is true only of the "inner distance," as we perceive it when we project our own consciousness into the feeling of *A* for *B* and the feeling of *B* for *A*. A third party standing entirely outside the relation, who for practical or scientific reasons wishes to incorporate a social relation into a system or place it in a frame of reference, will see only *one* distance between *A* and *B* unless he analyzes it. Until he makes such analysis, it will be immaterial whether he measures the distance from *A* or *B*. He becomes aware, for instance, that two friends do not greet each other, or that two lovers feel tenderly toward each other, or that an inferior pays a mark of respect to a superior; he interprets a certain behavior as the expression of a relationship of distance; particularly when this relationship is a standardized one and, therefore, defined, the distance sociologically

(but not socio-psychologically) between *A* and *B* is the same as that from *B* to *A*. According to Pieper: "The true distances of relationship between men are the inner ones and they will become known only after a thorough analysis supported by understanding and experience." This is true from the point of view of psychology, but sociology must consider as "real" what manifests itself in actions. Often it must take mere appearances for truth as long as it wants to give surveys or to develop a frame of reference; only later in its individual analyses can it reach the "reality" of inner relationships.

This systematizing process, which of necessity will be schematic, should never be confused with the methods of analysis. The more we enter into a consideration of the individual fact, the more careful we must be to explain the shades of difference, the particularities, individualities or that which is unique, its "tones and tints." The general survey simplifies and represents its material in a somewhat general way. The decisive point in systematizing is to show the textual connection or, more correctly, to show the similarity or affinity of things rather than to show their differences. That, however, which is uniform and common to all social processes is that ever-present function of distancing men.

It becomes clear, therefore, that for the system as a whole only two distinguishing marks of the social process can be of importance: the *direction* and the *degree* of distance. As to the direction, two are important: the direction "to" and "away from." The degree of distance can be measured to some extent by comparison; we are at least able to distinguish different degrees of association and dissociation. Our attention, in the theoretical sociology of relations, is held exclusively by the rhythm of social processes. As soon as we include in our considerations the determinations of the substance concerned and especially the ends and purposes always present in social processes, we have left the sphere of general sociology and we have entered upon one of the special sociologies such as sociology of economics, of law, or of political sociology. Whether in a particular instance the process of mutual adjustment of two men serves political, economic, or social purposes is entirely insignificant; whether the competition takes place in the sphere of business, the field of sport, or in the realm of literature, is only of indirect interest.

The essential and basic task which the general sociology of relations intends to serve must be expressed clearly. In proposing the problem, directness of purpose and clear distinction are of the utmost importance.

C. SOCIAL STRUCTURES

It is not a mistake to assert that in the social sphere of human life there exists nothing except social processes and their results, relations, which are mostly unstable relations. Our eyes and other corporeal senses, however, perceive only individual men. Sociologically, with regard to individuals, the interesting thing is solely their behavior. This behavior, however, is the result of relations. Our naïve inclination to see only sensibly perceivable, "objective" things even in the spiritual sphere seems to observe and to verify original and permanent qualities and attributes attached to individuals. But even these seemingly firm characteristics can, to a great extent, be reduced to social processes by which the ego of individuals appears only as *one* component alongside the others. However we may measure the degree of influence of the elementary forces attaching the ego to behavior, we will always find in dismembering the social occurrence that it consists only of processes but never of substances existing independently of the individual men.

Opposed to this is the fact that we men have always been accustomed to imagine more or less clearly, the existence of social "substances." To a

great extent we work with the expressions and sometimes with the concepts of the club, alliance, group, crowd, state, church, enterprise, etc. At any rate, most people are convinced that there are states, churches, societies, unions, and pairs. That would indicate that the social sphere consists not only of interhuman relations but also of *social structures,* i.e., in contrast to the mere relations, also of forms and embodiments of a spiritual kind, which we represent to ourselves as immaterial corporations whose cell units are individual men. It is evident that these social structures cannot be perceived by the senses; we cannot point to any place in physical space where they are to be found. In order to form a sensible perception of their nature we make use of symbols, perceptible signs, which represent the structures in the realm of sense. If the social structures do not exist in space, they can only be products of our minds and contents of our thinking and other mental powers. If we attribute to them any reality it cannot be the reality of the perceivable but reality in the sense of an active force affecting and influencing life. Indeed the social structures are highly effective.

Thus we have asserted that they really exist in the social sphere. They exist here along with and in a certain relation to simple social relations. But

for a clear sociological understanding, they must be stripped of their pseudo-substantive character, because the "social" consists only of processes.

We are here confronted with a difficulty. These social structures are, as we have said, only figments of the mind and cannot be sensibly perceived as, e.g., men themselves, and yet no one can be prevented from representing these imaginary structures in a material way or even as persons, as, for instance, artists represent the state or a league in three-dimensional statues. Our common manner of thought, which is dependent upon sense perception, finds it much easier to represent something which is active and has a definite influence on human life as quasi-corporeal, as an organism rather than an involved complexity of occurrences and processes. But sociology cannot be satisfied with allegory, with metaphor and analogy. If the social sphere really consists of occurrences only, then the social structures, at all times construed by the simplifying methods of human thought, must be reducible to social processes.

At first a social process leads to a social relation, whose unstable character is evident in that another process may either replace or change it. In many situations of life, certain social processes increase in continuous repetition. This means that a state of distance between the participating men

has been established, or that a state of affairs has been brought about in which the participating individuals are related to each other by a certain distance which is usually thought of as relatively stable and scarcely subject to change. The uniformity, regularity and standardization of the relations thus formed lend an apparent substantive character to these complexes consisting of interhuman distances. However unstable and fluid social life may be, there is much about it that is regulated and forced into a definite channel. If certain social processes proceed over and over in essentially the same way and lead always to the same or at least similar relations, there arise *social structures* which in a static study must be defined as *a number of social relations so bound together that they are understood as units or substances in daily life.*

Our assertion in the beginning of this section that there really exists nothing but social processes and their products, social relations, is consequently not thereby controverted, since these social structures are nothing more than condensations, or conglobations of relations which in turn can only be derived from social processes.

To state it as simply as possible: the social structure consists of a plurality of social relations. By connecting in itself many and diverse relations,

the social structure as a rule obtains greater power of resistance and is able to subsist for a longer time than a simple relation. Relations of longer duration already have the character of a social structure, e.g., the pair. The fact that new social processes tend as a rule to disturb such a state of durable relations compels man to look for means to stabilize these durable relations through other social processes; and by this they become social structures.

The temporary connection between structure and relation is one of simultaneity, in the sense that (as Plenge said) there is no relation without a structure, and (as we have said above) there is no structure without relations. If we dissolve the social sphere into an endless series of occurrences, as we did above, we must start some place. We select, so to speak, some one thread, to untie the fabric. In other words, we imagine an original or *primal* social process which leads to an original or primal social relation. But very soon some of these relations, grown out of the processes, will combine by new processes to form the original social structure. Afterward within its framework other processes take place, so that for a view which considers the present side-by-side, the connection consists in that every social process takes place within the frame of a pre-existing social structure,

manifesting, however, a tendency to change the old structure and, under certain circumstances create a new one.

The *fundamental concepts* which the sociology of social relations or science of interhuman behavior uses in order to obtain a comprehensive and systematic view of the living-together and cooperation of men are therefore: *social processes, distance, and social structure.* The task of this kind of sociology is divided into two spheres:

(1) The analysis and classification of the social processes.

(2) The analysis of the social structures by reducing them to social processes, and the classification of the social structures.

D. THEORY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS AND GENERAL (THEORETICAL) SOCIOLOGY

The theory of social relations, here sketched in its most general outlines, claims to take in the whole field of theoretical or general sociology. It will find its completion and fulfillment in the special sociologies of the various cultural spheres, and will be further complemented by the other special social sciences and by social philosophy. The question of what name should be given to this whole group of sciences, theory of social rela-

tions and social structures equivalent to general sociology, plus the other special sociologies and the other social sciences and social philosophy, may be left open.

The doubt is often expressed that in thus concerning ourselves with only a part of general sociology, with the elements alone, an important part of the discipline is left untouched. This doubt may take two forms: first, it may be a denial that the method of treating of social relations sketched above is a complete presentation of the theory of social relations; second, it may be a denial that the theory of social relations comprises all of the problems presented in theoretical sociology.

Both criticisms are unfounded. Our refutation of this criticism, however, is not to be taken as a statement that our method of approaching the problems of human social life is the only possible one and that we would never recognize another treatment of general sociology. We merely question whether other methods are equally as productive of results; the decision must be left to the judgment of some future history of science. It is noteworthy and instructive that any other presentation of the basic problems, and any other scientific method will entail a different division and delimitation of the subject matter. In modern

scientific life, criticism has at first often an apparent justification, which immediately vanishes when we recognize that it proceeds, intentionally or unintentionally, from some other basic problem.

The first doubt expressed above: that our intentionally rigid and uniform doctrine of relations, operating with but few fundamental categories does not suffice for the copiousness of social relations, has been, we think, answered above. We hope that we have made it clear that to increase the categories beyond those of direction and degree would endanger the basic idea that all interhuman relations are included as results of processes of binding and loosening and nothing else. To enter more deeply into a study of the purposes of relations and the principal classes of these purposes would lead immediately to the special sociologies whose subject matter is precisely determined by these various types of purposes. Undoubtedly the consideration of these questions of purpose is of great importance; but within general sociology these inquiries will disrupt its unity and inner consistency. It is precisely this which is so impressive: that beneath all these different purposes there is a conformity in the regularity of the rhythm of social processes, evident in *all* spheres of culture. One who does not

distinguish between general and special sociology, who thinks it wise to take up the study of the common-human together with the sociologies of economics, law, religion, art, etc., cannot exclude the consideration of the purposes in his theory of social relations. In our system, that would be a cardinal error. One who attempts a strict consistency, as we do here, exposes himself to the criticism that he is completely losing sight of the great variety and differentiation of life; to reiterate: the consideration of this important matter belongs where there is individualization, that is, in our system, in the analysis of the individual social processes.

In response to the other criticism we may say: it has been said that the theory of social relations presents only the histology, merely the basic social "tissue," and that it needs the complement of a "somatology, the theory of the complex organism of society considered in its general structure" (Plenge). That, however, is only possible where society is considered to be a substance. As soon as we start out with the supposition that society is a spiritual organism, we can follow the example of animal biology and distinguish between anatomy, physiology, histology, etc., in sociology. But since we see only processes and occurrences in the "social," and since we deny the existence of social

organism of any kind, we cannot have a somatology of society. Nevertheless, our theory of relations is even more than a mere histology. In so far as we are able to parallel the terminology of biology or medicine, we may say that it is a physiology.

Do we not, however, omit an important and truly sociological (not socio-philosophical) problem by neglecting a theory of the complex body of society? We do not think so. For the large and largest complex structures, which we call "abstract collectivities" there is just as much space in our system as there is for even the most transient pair-relationship.

Do we not thus deprive ourselves of the possibility of seeing society as a structure or building (as Spencer and Schaeffle did), the delineation of the plan of which should be our task? We say "society" is in no way such a building and may not be represented in this way. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the representation of society as a building is a favorite fiction, a convenient ideology, an economical simplification of thought. We take this fiction into consideration when in our theory of social structures we show man's impetus for spiritual construction at work.

Further, will a theory of social relations do justice to the necessary understanding of social institutions, establishments and groupings from their

functional significance? Is it not necessary to show that every social structure has a task to fulfill, a service to perform, within the framework of some greater whole? Does not the theory of relations reduce the social whole to its atomic components since the theory lays so much stress on the irreducible elements of the social whole and on the social processes? Is there not too much analysis and too little synthesis? And is it not precisely synthesis that is needed in order to show the individual fact in its functional position?

It is a mistake to suppose that the theory of relations, as we have described it, neglects the function for the causality. At each individual social process, we also ask: How much does it contribute to the "sociation" of men? Does it associate or dissociate? It is precisely the integrating or differentiating content that is examined and thus it is given its proper place in the great totality of sociation. This is done especially in the theory of social structures. Constantly we see a group, etc., within the framework of a greater, more complex structure. We do not, of course, interpret this relationship exclusively as if only a smaller and less stable structure "serves" the larger and more stable structure; we also consider that the reverse might be true. Further, we shall show that our task is not only the dismembering, but is to the

same extent the uniting of the dismembered parts into a "whole."

The limitation to the man-man relationship may also appear questionable; it may seem that the subject-object relations (i.e., relations to things) ought also to be included in this theory of relations. We know quite well that, e.g., every people needs a country, every rural family needs a farm, every army needs weapons, every industrial enterprise needs a factory, a store, an office, etc. But if, for the sake of completeness, we included these material or thing-relations in general sociology we would again be led astray from the essential problem into the variegated confusion of technical, esthetic, economic and other problems all of which are sufficiently treated in other social sciences (not in the special sociologies). Sometimes, of course, it may throw more light on inter-human relations if we pay more attention to the thing-relation. Therefore, in the bio-sociological problems of a peoples and in rural sociology, soil will not be lost sight of, nor in the case of an army will the arms be neglected; but at all times this introduction of "objects" must be permitted only in so far as it helps to clarify the inter-relationships of men.

Sometimes there are objections to our delimitation of the scope of general sociology because of

an entirely different conception of the nature of a theoretical science. Some require a consideration of postulates, i.e., of things as they ought to be, or there is a confusion of sociology with politics (especially and frequently with political science). Most frequently no clear line of demarcation is made between sociology and social philosophy, social psychology, or the theory of cultural systems. These demands that we expand our system in the foregoing manner cannot be admitted. The existence of a theoretical sociology seems to us to be justified by the fact that it solves problems which it alone can solve and which cannot be solved by any other science.

E. ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

From the foregoing it follows:

(1) Social processes are the elementary phenomena of social occurrences. They must therefore contain the characteristics of all interhuman phenomena. These common characteristics are the binding and loosening or the combination of binding and loosening in the social sphere.

(2) The distinguishing feature of our theory of social relations consists in that it approaches the phenomena and occurrences in the human world (of the past as well as of the present) from

a uniform and consistent point of view, the purpose of which is to treat of these happenings without any of the ideological interpretations which are so often mingled with the phenomena themselves in the study of the social sphere.

(3) Thus the theory of relations is primarily a theory of the procedure (method) of observing the phenomena of the social sphere in a correct manner. In order to maintain this uniformity and consistency of approach it will be advisable to express the lasting method of analysis in a formula. It is not to be an arithmetical formula, but is to convey the basic idea symbolically in the most simple form. This uniform formula of analysis formula is as follows:

$$P = A \times S$$

It intends to express that the social process (P) is the result of the attitude (A) of the participating human beings and of the prevailing situation (S). We may be dealing with such different phenomena as, e.g., a case of high-class swindling, the foundation of a new party, an abdication, a bankruptcy, a divorce, or some occurrence of daily civil life or of an event of historical importance: there is always some social process connected with it, i.e., an occurrence in which the distance

between men is changed. By it the social network has been altered at one point.

The formula does not signify a multiplication; it is impossible to multiply the attitude by the situation. But the formula may express that a social process is not derived *only* from the attitude, i.e., the outwardly active and outwardly perceivable nature of the persons, nor *only* from the situation in which persons find themselves; it (the formula) expresses the rather definite influence of A on S and of S on A which is decisive. The pure psychologist will easily make the mistake of deriving the occurrence from the attitudes alone, out of the characteristics and attitudes of the persons in question and depreciate the effect of the environment. On the other hand, the environmentalist (as, e.g., Spencer) who explains the spiritual occurrences as processes of adjustments to the situation or environment, which to him is the only basis of reality, often overestimates the importance of the milieu. The sociologist who is not a psychologist and certainly not a mere student of the milieu (environmental theorist), recognizes it as his task to show the interrelation between the soul and the milieu and shows the resulting process, i.e., the social fact.

The sociologist must not allow himself to be taken up with the task of the psychologist, which

consists in showing the inner connection between the occurrences of the conscious and the subconscious self. As far as the attitude of man is concerned the sociologist will be especially interested in a consideration of the connection between the motive and the deed; certainly every investigation of attitudes will entail to a considerable degree a study of motives. Here psychology and sociology touch upon each other, but we see immediately that it is the crossing of two scientific paths, which before and after the crossing run in different directions. The psychologist remains as far as possible within the inner sphere of the soul; he attempts to explain social life by urges, instincts or other elementary forces of the human psyche. Thus he pursues but *one* connection and comes to a one-sidedness, which is indeed necessary for the purpose of isolation in *his* study, but which must always be recognized as a fiction which cannot exhaust reality.

It is certainly true that the "social" is strongly influenced by human motives and that the reasons for our actions are generally very complex phenomena which can again be reduced to more elementary occurrences within the soul. Not only the fact that the social phenomena are influenced by psychic forces, but also that psychic phenomena are influenced by social forces is forgotten or pur-

posely lost sight of in pure psychology. Social processes are preceded by motivations, but these latter are also preceded by social processes. Psychologically, thoughts and emotions may be derived from instincts; but we as sociologists are concerned with the dependence of all emotions and imaginations on the organization of social life; in the same way we are interested in the constructive or destructive influences of these conscious actions on the interhuman sphere. For instance, it may to a certain extent be psychologically correct to trace the relationship between men to *imitation*. It may be shown that even in the small child imitation is very strong, that out of this imitative quality there results a certain conformity in the behavior of men living closely together as, e.g., in the family circle, in a party of players, etc. This agreement prepares the way for cooperation and this cooperation leads to further social binding. But the sociologist remembers that by birth the child belongs to a certain family, a certain class, and a certain people, and that it is by reason of his environment that he can imitate only those limited social facts, which are present in his social environment. The child of a soldier, because he belongs to another circle of social life, will react differently than the child of a businessman.

It follows that this sociological method of ob-

servation does not do away with the psychological method; nor vice versa. They are supplementary, each makes use of the findings of the other science, but neither should displace the other from its field and neglect its own problems. It is the task of sociology to study that part of the psychic sphere which belongs directly to the attitude; on the other hand it is not the task of the sociologist to make an exhaustive study of the relations of men to things. He is not a geographer, political economist, biologist, physician, etc. As he is to examine the mental sphere, so also he is to examine the environment but only to that point which is necessary to explain the social process satisfactorily.

Every social process is the compound result of personal and factual data; it never absorbs the whole personality of a participating human being. We cannot come to know the whole of the individuality of a man by his participation in some interhuman occurrence. Practically, it is true: "By their deeds you shall know them;" but it would be false to assume that a man really bears the total responsibility for the social processes in which he is involved as an acting agent.

Parenthetically: Can we not see here that the whole theory and practice of judging and managing men, in pedagogy, politics, criminology, etc.,

will be given a new viewpoint by this theory of social relations? In judging a criminal we should be equally far away from the purely individualistic valuing of the crime, which places the whole responsibility for the crime on the criminal and traces it back to his qualities, and equally removed from the rather pointed "social" view which likes to be known as "sociological" (we would call it pseudo-sociological), and which makes the political order, the state, the classes, or some other social structure entirely responsible for the crime. Here, too, we see that the sociologist should neither be an individualist nor a universalist; he must think along the lines of the science of social relations, explaining every occurrence in the social sphere as a social process, in which men of a certain attitude become involved in particular situations.

Never, as we said before, do we come to know the whole of man in the social process nor do we understand the situation completely by referring to him alone, for we learn this only through human manifestations and statements; we see it (the situation), therefore, only through the medium of our own manner of thinking and feeling and through the medium of other men who take part in the process.

It would be a mistake to say that we look upon men as *complete* beings who are unchangeable by

social processes, so that the sphere of the individual remains untouched by the processes, and the social sphere alone is constantly subject to change. Rather both spheres are subject to change. One trait of man's character will be strengthened by the situation active in the social process, still another will be suppressed. Thus an element in the social structure, to which this particular man belongs, is changed and indirectly the structure is also changed. Some social processes, e.g., riots, attempted murders, seduction, elections, generally have even a direct effect on the inner organization of the social structure. We thus arrive at the proposition or thesis: Men (as social beings) *and* social structures (as groupings of men) *come into being* only through the social processes which string together continuously.

The two factors "attitude" (A) and "situation" (S) are further to be analyzed. A is the product of the more or less innate peculiarity of man, "individuality" (I), and his past "experience" (E). The attitude is formed by the past (especially childhood and youth) as well as by inherited qualities. The formula would be:

$$A = I \times E$$

In the situation there are also two elements, the factual data, i.e., the non-human environment

(*C*) and the attitude of other men participating in the particular social process (*AS*). Therefore:

$$S = C \times AS$$

The analysis of the individual social process according to this uniform and consistent method will lead to a characterization of a given concrete occurrence under an abbreviating, typifying designation, either as adjustment, competition, boycott, exploitation, etc.

F. THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

Our second task is to place the individual social process in the framework of all social processes. In the extensive panorama of the phenomena of association and dissociation, the individual occurrence or process must be given a place proper to itself; only in this way can we review the social sphere as a whole and make the necessary comparative study. In the systematics of the social processes we first distinguish between the *fundamental processes* of association (*A-processes*) and dissociation (*B-processes*). These are in turn divided into *principal processes,* made up of a series of subprocesses which combine in "ideal types" [methodological or heuristic standards] all the *individual processes* established casuistically by an analysis based on the aforementioned formulas.

In addition to the fundamental processes of association (*A*-processes) and dissociation (*B*-processes), a third category must be mentioned, the mixed processes (*M*-processes) which in one respect have an associative effect and in the other a dissociative effect.

The principal processes within the *A*-processes are arranged according to the degree of approach, and those under the *B*-processes according to the degree of retreat. We distinguish:

Aa : Advance	*Ba* : Competition
Ab : Adjustment	*Bb* : Opposition
Ac : Accordance	*Bc* : Conflict
Ad : Amalgamation	

All interhuman relations are products of social processes but not all social processes lead to relations. Such processes which do not necessarily lead to relations, and in most instances remain transient meetings, are called *contacts*. We consider them releasers of interactions, phenomena of comparatively short duration, which in contrast to the occurrences of advancing do not contain the explicit intention of association on the part of one of the participants (or both). We distinguish between primary and secondary contacts; the first are face-to-face or immediate contacts, i.e., contacts mediated directly by the senses, the latter are

distant contacts. There are also voluntary and involuntary contacts and above all, sympathetic and categorical contacts.

In the contacts the two possibilities of association and dissociation are hidden. If we trace the path of association (*A*-processes) we will find the following series of steps in an ideally complete ("ideal-typical") movement:

(1) Preliminary stages: Isolation, estrangement, separation, enmity
(2) Transition: Contact
(3) Steps preceding association:
    a — Toleration
    b — Compromise
(4) Principal processes graded from *Aa* to *Ad* (*see* above)
    a — Advance
    b — Adjustment
    c — Accordance
    d — Amalgamation

By advance, we understand the preparatory steps to coming together; by adjustment, association through simultaneous and mutual recognition of differences; by accordance, the attempts to overcome differences; and by amalgamation, the establishment of some association which is conceived as a new state or condition.

It is impossible to enumerate here all the sub-

processes under each principal process as they are distinguished by language. As an example we give here the *subprocesses of advance,* intentionally in alphabetical order:

accepting
acclaiming
accompanying
acknowledging
adoring
adulating
alluring
amusing
applauding
assenting
becoming familiar
being spokesman for
cheering
comforting
condescending
confiding in
consulting
dedicating
enticing
giving and receiving (Simmel)
instilling confidence by personal example
interpellating
making oneself easy of approach
obtaining patrons
pardoning
petitioning
referring to another as a means of entrée
requesting
rewarding
searching out
seconding
thanking
through coeducation
through compliment
through gallantry
toasting

For a strictly formalistic showing of the contrasting *B*-processes we should also have four de-

grees of separation or dissociation, for which language, however, has not coined such clear terms, as in the *A*-processes. We might give the corresponding grades as follows:

Ba : loosening (the community)
Bb : contrasting oneself
Bc : separating oneself
Bd : attaining total isolation

It appears to us, however, that this differentiation of dissociation is only superficial. We prefer to distinguish three steps which it is true are also qualitatively different, but which in final simplification are only different degrees of dissociation: competition, opposition and conflict. Thus we arrive at a deeper understanding of dissociative human activity. In competition there are still many elements of the "*with*-one-another" and especially of the mere "side-by-side" mingled with the inimical principle so that in the individual instance there may be a relatively small predominance of the "*against*-one-another." In opposition there are pronounced resistances which are, however, partially or totally latent or disguised. Conflict contains a pronounced "against-one-another": consisting in combat, violence, accusation, in antagonistic striving of many kinds, all of which have the tendency of inflicting harm on another.

Until now we have considered under the *A-*, *B-* and *M-* processes such interhuman occurrences which do not necessarily presuppose the presence of social structures. We call these processes of the first order. *Social processes of the second order* include occurrences between individual men when the existence of such a social structure (or even more than one structure) must be logically included and finally processes between social structures themselves. (Social processes are indeed not only processes between men but also between structures.)

From what we have said above it should be clear that here, too, we distinguish between associative (integrating) and dissociative (differentiating) processes. Leaving aside a more detailed description of the system, we point out only that there are the following principal processes of dissociation: arising from inequalities, domination and submission, gradation and social stratification, selection, individuation, separation and estrangement. These occurrences of dissociation become destructive processes in exploitation, favoritism and bribery, formalism and ossification, commercialization and radicalization, and perversion. The integrating processes are, on the other hand: equalization, ordination (coordination, subordination and superordination), socialization.

Institutionalization, professionalization, and liberation are occurrences which become processes of transforming-constructing.

These principal processes again include numerous subprocesses.

Only a complete view of the fundamental, principal and subprocesses, as we have given it in the "table of human relations,"[1] will make clear the purpose, completeness and strict systematics of the theory. There, an articulated system, i.e., a congruously subdivided arrangement showing all the typical interhuman processes, is given, in order to have a complete and unitary view of the whole of social life. As, on the one hand, each interhuman occurrence must be analyzed like any other, even though it may belong to some remote part of the social globe, so on the other hand every occurrence must be given its proper place in the social whole. Thus it will be possible to compare the social processes. It will also become clear how much probability there is that a certain occurrence will be able to influence social life in this or that direction. By referring every social process (even the most insignificant) to the general occurrence of positive or negative sociation, underlying it, the

[1] L. v. Wiese-H. Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (New York, 1932), pp. 717–730.

social process is conceived not only causally but also functionally.

G. SOCIAL "STATUS" (CONDITIONS)

Although our scientific attention has been turned largely to the social processes, we do not lose sight of the network of relations which is created and changed by them. In our dynamic theory of relations we have also tried to systematize the products of social processes, the relations, in so far as it was necessary for our system. Thus we distinguished between genuine and spurious, open and disguised relations.

All social processes when they repeat themselves have the tendency to create not only relations but also more general and more lasting *interhuman* states or *conditions,* which, certainly, are soon disturbed by new social processes. But in a static study we must be concerned precisely with these, for we have seen in them, the great stations, so to speak, on the road to our goal. The *A*-processes have a tendency to conditions of *socialization* and *union* on the one hand and to *dependence* on the other; the *B*-processes have a tendency to *loneliness, isolation* and *separation* on the one hand and to *self-consciousness* and *independence* on the other.

H. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERHUMAN DISTANCES IN THE THEORY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES

We must now briefly sketch the social structures in this essay; but we do not wish to give the impression that this second part of our system is of lesser importance. In the following the leading thought already sketched must be kept in mind.

(1) Every kind of collectivity, in as much as it presents a purely social structure and not one which is at the same time a creation of nature to be analyzed with biological methods, is reached by means of our system (from the pair to the state and the cultural circle). The bio-sociological structures (especially humanity, race, people, tribe and family) go beyond the horizon of our study. They require a method of treatment which combines the biological with the sociological viewpoint; they are, therefore, the subject matter of a science which is a combination of biology and sociology.

(2) Even though we recognize the existence of a "theory of social structures" alongside the theory of social relations (in the narrower sense), because of the complexity of the respective phenomenon we cannot permit the introduction of new basic categories into the total system; these

categories must derive from the principles of the theory of relations in the narrower sense of the word. Social processes and distances must continue to be the basic concepts. Also, in this theory of social structures we see the great advantage of our system in this vast field, a consistent whole which extends from the externally simple union of two persons to the great social collectivities or bodies. Without doubt there must be many gradations in it. There is a distance between the corporate body (e.g., the state, etc.) and the individual social process, as great as that between a massive mountain of chalk and the tiny crustaceous animal whose shell is part of the great rock.

When we designate the social processes as the elements of even the most complicated, and apparently solid structures, and say that every commonwealth is nothing more than an involved regulation of distance-relations we are actually separating the "reality" of these structures from the vast mass of ideologies which covers them. It was the work of thousands of years, the mental effort of many generations, to produce, substantiate and actualize ideas of state, church, nation, league, family, profession, class, economy, art, and science as institutions, etc. The social structures are the most patient objects because they are unable to resist these claims by opposing them with

the moles (weight) of the conditions of the physical existence as man does; with man the vital laws of spiritual and corporeal life have often caused the ideologists' desire for experimentation to become fruitless.

Our task of understanding the social structures as they really are, namely, regulations of distance, apart from any ideology, is made very difficult by the fact that every ideology which men have tried to actualize or have succeeded in actualizing, has changed the distances between men and groups of men, and has thus become a factor which cannot be overlooked in our theory of social structures. When speaking of the necessity of separating and isolating the social structures from the ideologies which cover them, we merely wish to say that we must beware of confusing those ideologies or mental products with the social structures themselves, e.g., to consider the theories and ideas of Plato, Hegel or Rudolf Smend regarding the state as the state itself. In other words, we do not wish to add still another theory to those already existing in literature or in the constitutions of states, we wish merely to take account of these ideologies in as much as they, as factors of social processes, have had an effect in history on changing the relations between men. Our attention is always di-

rected only to the actual interconnections between men.

Social structures are differentiated, therefore, only by the various ways in which men and groups of men within these structures are connected with each other, or separated from each other. Here again the distancing is the deciding circumstance, except that in the structures the tendency is toward greater duration than is generally the case in simple relations.

We have here a twofold distance:

(1) The distance existing between men and, in the larger structures, the distance between groups of men.

(2) The distance which is thought to exist between the structure itself and the individual man. We shall soon see that this second kind of distance will afford us the basis for distinguishing between different types of structures.

I. ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES

As in the theory of social relations in the narrower sense, so here too in the theory of social structures our task will be twofold:

(1) The analysis of the individual structure.

(2) Placing the individual structure in its proper place in the system of all social structures.

We take up the analysis by revealing the specific social processes which characterize the individual type of social structure. We also dissolve the structures mostly conceived as substances, into the moving and the flowing course of actions. In a crowd, in an uproar (mob), a particular family, a choral society, a political party, a trust, a commune, in the Evangelical church, in the Roman Empire, in all these we look for those social processes which are especially frequent and which therefore have a strong influence on the life of the structure.

We formulated the principal problems of the theory of social structures in our General Sociology: "Which social processes are so prominent in the structure that they give it its social character? To what degree can these processes be explained as association and dissociation? For what reasons does the social structure give *these* social processes more room? What symbols and standards correspond to these processes and consequently to the social nature of the structure itself? What is the relationship of this structure to other structures? By what processes are relations formed between them? We are further concerned with the complexity of the structure and thus also with its relationship to the elements, which are conceived

as its component parts: Is this structure a combination of other simpler structures? Or is it a mere structure of relations, i.e., a structure resulting from an accumulation of often repeated interhuman relations? What possibilities of activity will men find in this social structure? What parts of their inner being or of their physical make-up will be activated or neglected? What situations are frequently afforded them by the structure?"[1]

Keeping in mind our basic principles, we must be governed in dividing the structures into categories by the following:

(1) The principle of division will be the distance.

(2) We may not distinguish according to the purpose of the structures (as, e.g., in law or economics).

We distinguish the following:

(1) Crowds
(2) Groups
(3) Abstract collectivities

Sometimes social structures are simply called groups, but this designation is opposed by the usage of languages, since states and churches cannot well be called "groups." Moreover, it is necessary to make a distinction between those social

[1] Cf. L. v. Wiese-H. Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (New York, 1932), p. 417.

structures which we call groups and the large collectivities. The frequent confusion between pluralities which we call groups and crowds is especially to be avoided.

We would prefer to distinguish structures according to the greater, lesser, and least proximity existing between men in the structure, but social structures are generally too complex to be distinguished by the degree of one distance. Therefore, we differentiate not according to the distance between individuals in the structure but according to the distance as it is conceived as existing between the structure itself and the individuals.

In the *crowds* we conceive the active processes in such a manner that the relations of the individuals who have been knotted together in the crowd exercise a direct influence on the activity of the crowd. Crowds are very much like the empirical individual in his characteristics. The structures of the second degree, the *groups,* are more beyond the reach of the varying play of individual disposition since they possess an *organization* which prescribes the activity of the individual. The structures of the highest degree of socialization, the *abstract collectivities,* are considered to be supra-personal, and thus removed as far as possible from the empiric individual man. They are thought of and experienced as bearers

of lasting values which are not dependent upon the lifetime of the individuals.

In the *crowd* concept we distinguish between *concrete* and *abstract* crowds. By the first we understand a flexibly connected interhuman structure, formed out of a mass of men for a short time into a uniform chain of collective actions, when the situation releases corresponding emotional influences which more or less dominate all participants. By an abstract crowd we understand an unorganized human structure, of some duration, founded upon very obscure concepts in the minds of an indefinite plurality of men with regard to their supposed companionship of fate or experience. We call these two forms of structures, crowds, because in both the number of partners is indefinite and both are interconnections of emotional, unorganized character, and because they are in an interchangeable relationship to each other by reason of which the existence of one type of structure is dependent on the other.

The analysis of the concrete crowd or mass corresponds entirely to that of the social processes. Examples of the abstract crowd are: the common masses of the people, polite society and the public. First, we observe the companionship of fate and experience that they display; second, the barrier to the activity of the reason or mind among and

upon men that they form; third, that the masses are fit human material to serve the purposes of persons with qualities of leadership; fourth, their peculiarity in being a social residuum after the process of selection (Geiger); and last, that they may become a reserve for the renewal of social life.

Groups are social structures of such comparative duration and such relative uniformity that the men who are united in them are considered as belonging together. Their characteristics are:

(1) Relative duration and relative continuity.

(2) Especially, organization on the basis of division of function.

(3) Perceptions of the group by the members.

(4) Development of traditions and customs if the group continues to exist for a long period of time.

(5) Interrelations with other structures.

We distinguish:

(1) Pairs or dyads.

(2) Three-member groups or triads.

(3) Medium-sized groups, which are further distinguished as: (a) regulated; (b) optional; and (c) a mixture of both.

(4) The larger groups.

There is much to be said about group emotions, especially about the different kinds of so-called

"affects," i.e., emotions determining one's conduct, such as *differential* and *central* affects (Arnold Zweig). Whenever we use the expressions: group affect, group spirit, group ethics, etc., we are using an abridged form of speech; a group can neither have sentiment nor mind; what we mean are the affects and methods of thought (mentalities) of men in as far as they act as members of the group.

An important concept for the understanding of large groups is the concept of *"group standard."* If we wish to comprehend such a large group we must always try to secure an idea of the particular standard which applies to it; without such a standard an optional group cannot assert itself. Every member of the group will strive to form himself inwardly and outwardly according to this standard; and it is always partially or totally the personification of the purpose and aim of the group.

In analyzing the groups we ask especially the following questions:

(1) What "principal desires" (W. I. Thomas) of the individuals are satisfied in the group? to what extent? in what combinations?

(2) What is the standard of the group? and

(3) How are the group emotions or "affects" manifested?

In the *abstract collectivities* we distinguish be-

tween those of the first and second order. These latter have a functional or service relationship to the former. If we eliminate the abstract collectivities which are bio-social and consider among those of the first degree only those which are purely social, we can enumerate the following:

(1) State
(2) Church
(3) Station (estate)
(4) Class
(5) Economic order (industry)
(6) The abstract collectivities of mental life, i.e., (a) arts, and (b) the sciences

It is impossible to give even a rough sketch of the task which the theory of relations assumes in examining the large collectivities and the institutions and agencies linked with them. These structures are certainly not mere accumulations of social processes, but come into existence as the products of simpler structures, which in turn were the products of social processes. In spite of this we must still keep in mind our basic principle that we are dealing with distance regulations between men when we analyze these greater "commonwealths" or structures. We also further develop Durkheim's concept of *social force* and attempt to show that these structures, although they are nothing more than the products of men's

minds, are nevertheless the greatest forces in human life. Above all we must show how the ideas which support the collectivities arise and to which functions and necessities they correspond. In every such social corporation we recognize three force-complexes:

(1) The objectification of the striving for union.

(2) Technico-factual purposefulness.

(3) The residues of human passions, lust for power and vital instincts.

Let us suppose that we are to analyze a certain state (country) according to the theory of relations; at first we will study its symbols and its standards. We will next attempt to observe the attitude of men and groups of men within the state sphere (as distinct from their behavior in the free public and private sphere) and determine the nature of the social processes here frequently active. The result must be a peculiar kind and form according to which men will cooperate and react upon each other. We will come to know the nature of the state in the light of the prevalent social distances. The more we focus our attention on the significance of interhuman distances in numerous studies of all possible structures, the more will we understand that they are in fact the truly essential part of "the social." The influence

of man upon man produces that which is called society and community, but the manner and degree of the influence depend entirely on the distances in which men stand to each other. Whether I observe an everyday occurrence in business or social life, or whether I study the Germanic-Roman cultural circle, the social element will always be proximity or distance of the vital and spiritual forces of human beings.

J. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

We hold that the importance of the theory of social relations consists principally in that it affords a consistent view of the whole of humanity, in which the social forces are isolated from the interconnections and relationships within the world of things, from the relations of things to man and from purely individual forces; so that we may clearly understand the activity of the *social* sphere according to its various kinds, degrees, possibilities and limits of activity. This is of the greatest importance in practical life although it is by no means sufficiently appreciated today. The insight into and treatment of human character dominate all public and private life. Here not only (and not primarily) the deeper strata of the individual soul are of interest—the things into

which the psychologist tries to penetrate—but also and principally the interpersonal (interhuman) attitude.

There is no field of human activity in which greater results (in every respect—not only in increased technological efficiency) cannot be achieved if one makes use of the appropriate art of arrangement and handling of men. The theory of social relations wishes to present an empirically corroborated theory for the technology and ethics of human intercourse. This applied science will then have merely to draw comparatively simple conclusions from our analyses and systematics of actual life, thus representing and comprising knowledge of human nature and a corresponding science of organization, of personnel relations and administration.

Wherever there is organization, we are dealing with regulations which receive their peculiar form or stamp not only from the things that are used but also, and not least of all, from the personal, i.e., interhuman relations with which we are exclusively concerned. Let us consider the example of the organization of an army: certain arrangements, regulations, and groupings are such because of the specialization of weapons or arms to be used. To some extent the artillery must be differently organized than the infantry because in one we have cannons and in the other, rifles;

mounted troops cannot be organized in the same way as infantry. In this respect the theory and system of organization finds its basis in the technics. But besides these thing-relations in the groups and units of the army, there are also connections between *men* which are characterized especially by super- and sub-ordination. Aside from all *technical* differentiation, it is the intention in an army to change a large number of men of different characters and abilities into a military unit, so that this great mass of men can be handled to a certain degree as a social body. This organization is non-technical; it is sociological, which means that it is a matter of the science of human relations. Today, however, the error is still prevalent, especially in practical life, that the method of organizing the powers and forces of men can be derived only from the material relationships, i.e., the interrelation of *things* or the relation of men to things. The theory of social relations attempts to show the particular requirements arising from the man-man relationship.

In this sense, the theory of social relations or science of interhuman behavior finds an application in all fields of human activity, but, of course, it does not attempt to explain the various spheres *in toto*. It offers an explanation of the personal-human side of the phenomena. The other half is technics. We are not unmindful of the fact that

in practice the two fields are not so easily distinguishable as in theory, where, contrary to the prevalent superficial opinion, it is really possible. It is necessary, first of all, to see clearly how the human, subjective relationships are distinct from objective-purposeful relationships and how psychical phenomena are distinct from the social activity of relations. But should we not expect that every industrial executive and manager in the economic world, every teacher, officer and corporal and sergeant in the army and every administrative officer or judge will be able to separate the human sphere from the sphere of things with exactitude? There is still much to be accomplished in this respect.

As opposed to an exclusively ethical explanation of the manner of dealing with men, our method of observation has this advantage (although it by no means neglects the ethical forces in the attitude): it does not start out with any preconceived opinions of "ought," or "ought not," but it simply observes, compares, generalizes and then concludes: *this* is what *we* may expect, *these* will be the consequences according to all human probability if such a thing is done or omitted.

A growing habit of thinking along the lines of the theory of social relations, and the use of its manner of viewing will bring about important

changes in public and private life which will have nothing in common with the outmoded, one-sided, antithetical and unsociological concepts of individualism, liberalism, socialism, communism, and universalism. The least we may expect from this scientific view of social relations is a much more differentiated, graduated, more human, non-ideological and non-dogmatic knowledge. We constantly experience how different, richer and brighter the social world appears to those who have trained themselves to this manner of sociological observation. They are immune to catchwords and the customary primitive, political judgments.

The theory of social relations, as general sociology, will find an application everywhere we find the common-human, i.e., in the science of education, criminology, police administration, in military science, in politics, the arts, social activity and in every kind of organization. Because of its affinity with the theory of organization it is obviously of great usefulness in the special fields of social practice, especially in industry and administration.

The manner in which the departments of special sociology are to be treated according to the theory of relation cannot be considered in this booklet.

PART THREE

APPENDIX

THE SOCIAL DISTINGUISHED FROM THE SPIRITUAL AND THE CULTURAL

A. THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE "SOCIAL" WITH THE SPIRITUAL[1] AND THE "CULTURAL"

The definition of the task of sociology as a science may be stated in one quite simple and short phrase, namely: The revelation of the social elements in human life. "Revelation" here implies, firstly, to set forth the many basic forces that through their interplay produce the manifestations of *the social;* and secondly, to indicate the associated effects of *the social.* "Human life" includes both the life of individual men and the life of collectivities of men.

But what are the "social elements"? This cardinal question, "What is *the social?*" is the essential and specific problem of sociology consid-

[1] It is a difficult question whether the German words *Geist* and *geistig,* used in the same sense as Sombart and other modern sociologists regard them, are better translated by *spirit* and *spiritual* or *mind* and *mental* or *intellect* and *intellectual.* This can be decided only if the half-mystical and more or less metaphysical meaning combined with their use is duly considered. Then we see that the words *intellect* and *intellectual* are inadequate, also, though in a lesser degree, *mind* and *mental;* therefore *spirit* and *spiritual* were preferred.

ered as a systematic science. By that problem sociology is distinguished from all other sciences, which for their part set themselves other cardinal questions. If everyone concerned in sociological studies accepted these limitations, while comprehending to the full the scope and abundance of the tasks involved in the interpretation of the social, we should be much nearer the completion of a work whose theoretical importance and practical utility cannot be too highly valued. One might think that this cannot be so difficult a task and might indeed already have been undertaken. But the reverse is the case. Evil spirits, whose vocation is to stir up mental confusion, seem to cast a spell. The purpose of making the social intelligible is too often altered to other purposes. In the consciousness of scholars the social seems to assume another shape with the greatest ease, and this shape they pursue without knowing they have gone astray.

First of all, then, it is necessary to say quite simply what the term "social" means—and particularly what it does *not* mean. Another word having the same sense is "interhuman." What is implied in the significant preposition "inter"? Hence arise these questions: firstly, what comes out of the coherence of men, with its relations of association and dissociation? And secondly, how

does this positive and negative coherence come about?[1]

To understand what follows it is indispensable that the mind should be kept free from all the accessory conceptions so often implied by the term "social," and particularly to avoid the narrow, ethical meaning of the term. "Social" is simply interhuman in all its aspects, thought of as a fact, not as a norm; a sociological category freed from every implication of value and applicable to both the smallest and largest coherences.

It is most important that we should avoid making the social equivalent to certain other categories. This demand that we ought to make of ourselves is most exacting, yet it is the most frequently and completely ignored. Even where such equivalences are not suggested in the first instance, the inclination later appears to derive the social from other categories and thus to deprive it of its independence and special character. Sociology is then reduced to a mere appendage of that science from which the social is derived.

The deepest degradation of the social takes place when its position as a basic force in human life is considered to be a mere fiction or a simpli-

[1] [This editor suggests that the term "relationship" might better convey the author's meaning than the word "coherence" used in the translation of his essay published in the London *Sociological Review*.]

fying assumption which evaporates as soon as we try to seize it. Then the interhuman element disappears in favor of other forces, e.g., in favor of individual human forces. Then it is asserted: "All that is of importance in human life, e.g., that which we call culture, rises not from the interhuman sphere but directly from human souls and bodies." The interhuman sphere which in truth is not visible or otherwise perceivable, is said not to exist: the only reality is the individual human bodies. Sociology therefore disappears in favor of anthropology.

The student, however, who has not the will or power to deny the structure and processes of the interhuman sphere often shows, as we have said, the inclination to change the interhuman into a special manifestation of human coherence. We may here disregard explanations belonging to the sphere of the natural sciences, such as attempts to give purely physical and chemical interpretations. We are, however, concerned with:

(1) The equivalence[1] of social and vital events (sociology then becomes a branch of biology).

(2) The confusion of the social with that which developed historically (sociology then becomes systematized history).

[1] [In the opinion of this editor, the word "identification" might better convey the author's meaning.]

(3) The equivalence of the social with certain phenomena of the psychic life (sociology then becomes social psychology or physio-psychology).

(4) The equivalence of the social with the spiritual (whereby a distinction is made between mind and spirit and, as a rule, manifestations of an objective world spirit, whose existence becomes a necessary metaphysical supposition, and is taken for granted).

(5) The equivalence of the social with the cultural (sociology then becomes the science of culture).

Two other equivalences must be mentioned to complete the list:

(6) The equivalence of sociology and political theory; in other words, everything social is political.

(7) The equivalence of sociology and ethics (sociology then becomes not a science of that which is, but of that which ought to be).

We must regard these confusions as the greatest hindrances to the development of our science because they lead away from the right road, into a foreign region. Unless scholars have a clear idea of this danger they may, sooner or later, fall under the attraction of the well-beaten and centuries-old paths of the elder sciences.

We must deny the identity of sociology with

any one of the neighboring disciplines above enumerated, while admitting the existence of correlations and parallelism. There may sometimes seem to be only a fine borderline, but the decisive point is that the central and essential questions are different. In this paper we are concerned with the problem so far as it is involved in the relation between the social and the spiritual or cultural.

To bring out the point, we may imagine two scholars discussing the problems of sociology, and frequently using the term "social," and seeming at first to give it the same sense, while later some uncertainty arises. Finally A asks B: "What exactly do you mean by 'social'?" B replies: "I mean the relation between men that is peculiar to them. This relation is not merely the physical relation existing in the inorganic world, nor is it merely the physico-psychic relation existing in the realm of plants and animals. It is a spiritual relation. Men are held together corporeally, psychically, and, in so far as they are human beings, also spiritually. We might even say they are combined artificially, not naturally."[1]

This answer is an example of the narrowing of

[1] This reply is a quotation of a passage in Werner Sombart's Academy paper: *Soziologie: Was sie ist und was sie sein sollte.* (*Sociology—What it is and what it ought to be.*) (Berlin, 1936, Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften in commission by Walter de Gruyter and Co.)

the field of interhuman coherence. Social coherence is made identical with spiritual coherence. The questioner A, who thinks differently, may respond: "I refuse to identify the social with the spiritual. They are different aspects of human life: some spiritual elements are found in the social, but many more non-spiritual elements. Not seldom spiritual and social are discordant: the social hinders the spirit and the spirit avoids the closely integrated thought of interhuman life. Perhaps what man has in common with animals is a closer social coherence rather than spirit."

Speaker A would here be setting out the view advocated in this paper. That view, however, does not deny the influence of the *Weltgeist* in human society throughout its history. We do not deny the significance of mental and cultural elements and supersede them by a materialistic interpretation of history. The degree to which social institutions are intellectualized is a valuable study for the philosopher or cultural historian. It is clear to us, however, that to attempt to dissolve the social completely into spiritual or cultural elements is fatal. It is fatal in theory, because it leaves the special character of the social unexplained, and it is fatal practically because political or private actions based upon such a confusion of thought must increase suffering in the world.

B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPIRITUAL ELEMENTS IN COMPARISON WITH THE SOCIAL ELEMENTS

The identification of the social with the spiritual may have two different meanings, according to whether or not a distinction is made between spirit and soul. In the first case spiritual coherence is non-psychic. In the second case spirit is looked on as equivalent to the subjective activity of thinking. Here the social is interpreted psychologically, and a preponderant or even exclusive part in bringing about interhuman coherence is attributed to the intellect. However, in the first case an objective spirit is supposed to exist, and here again there are two possibilities.

(1) The expressions of spirit, and therefore the relations in which men are spiritually related, may be given the widest extension imaginable. Compare Sombart's saying: "It extends from the Boxers' Club to the Academy, from the family to the State, from the warehouse to the religious brotherhood; in short, it encircles the whole being of men."

(2) You may see the manifestations of spirit only in the most abstract and highest social structures, particularly in the State, as Hegel did.

The contrast between the two principal con-

notations of the spiritual has nothing to do with sociological theory. It belongs to the field of anthropology, or to that of philosophy and psychology, and touches also that of metaphysical doctrine. (To enter into these questions would divert us from our theme and is, indeed, unnecessary, because we consider both the implied doctrines false.) Let us, however, glance at the implications of both. Take first the idea that the social is the immediate result of human thinking in such a manner that analysis of the intellectual faculty also reveals the principal phenomena of the interhuman. The idea might be summed up by changing Descartes' famous sentence, *Cogito ergo sum* ("I think therefore I am") into the sentence, "Social coherence is the result of process of thinking." Even if we admit for the sake of argument that human coherence is a purely psychic phenomenon and derived from psychic processes, it would still be a mistake to give special prominence to the connective power of thinking. Sentiments, instincts, and passions form positive and negative elements of socialization which are not less strong —are, indeed, much stronger—than thinking. (This, if nothing else, may be learned from Pareto.) Groups with *conscious* aims and plans and forms of intercourse dependent upon common interests certainly play a great part in mod-

ern life. But, using Tönnies' terms, the *Gesellschaften* ("associations" or "societies") thus created are found side by side with *Gemeinschaften* ("communities"). Even if this rather controversial antithesis between social structures is not accepted there can be no doubt that the whole inner life, down to the purely animal sensations and the simplest instincts and up to the deepest religious emotions and most artistic ecstasies, influences interhuman coherence. The significance of ideas and ideologies for social life must by no means be neglected, but these factors themselves are never mere products of thinking but results of the whole psychic life. They are even less under the control of strict thinking than is generally supposed. Herein they are, like conceptions and thought-systems, useful for tasks other than social ones.

To the spirit, interpreted as the intellect, therefore, we may not attribute exclusive importance. But what of the psychic life, considered as completely unified? Here we face the much-discussed question of the relations between psychology and sociology about which during the last decades errors have been piling up. It may suffice to say that the term social embraces all forces or factors causing approach or avoidance between men: therefore not only psychic or physical human powers are covered by it. The social is quite a

special blend, embodying not only psychic or physical human elements, but also non-human elements in connection with the human. Even the most penetrating study of human psychic life does not afford sufficient insight into the phenomena of social space. The cross section drawn by the psychologist through the complexes of human life is not the same as that of the sociologist. The first, indeed, also collects observations of external events, but only to gain from them knowledge of the *inner* life. He is interested in external events *only* in so far as material may be extracted therefrom to answer the question: What is the soul?

For the sociologist the question is just the opposite. His proper field of study is the realm of *occurrences between men.* Social facts are not events in the inward life of souls. Social facts come to pass in social space. This is, indeed, not the same as physical space, but like that it is a field of facts, i.e., thoughts of conscious and unconscious actions projected into the physical world. Sentiments or thoughts that do not become deeds have no place in the specifically real world of the social. It is true that psychic forces are the chief causative factors in the interhuman life; they are, however, not social itself but only one of its elements. This can be demonstrated most clearly by a comparison of this psychic inner phenomenon with the social

external worlds. If there were a total and pure dependence of the interhuman upon the psychic, the social processes would follow a course corresponding to the preceding images in the soul. That, however—to take only one point—does not and cannot happen, because in each interhuman process several men take a part, and each of these persons has formed his own image different from that of the others of the expected events.

Simple social happenings, e.g., a conference, a trial, a confession, may be analyzed to show how that which actually happens (i.e., which can be controlled by a third observing person) is a different thing from that which precedes and accompanies it in the souls of the persons concerned. You become aware of the great differences between the soul-images and the actual happenings. To verify this actual existence of interhuman coherence and effective change in it is the task of the sociologist. He is the third person observing changes in the social sphere, and not wishing to answer the question, "What is the soul?" but "What happens in the relationship of man to man?" His realm consists in his conception of social space as an objectively given reality, an *Ausser-Ich* ("outside of self"), and in his not confusing this kind of reality with the mere psychic inner reality.

C. THE "INTERHUMAN" AND THE "PSYCHIC"

In all countries there are writers who believe that they are expounding sociology by analyzing and comparing those powers of the soul (especially sentiments) which are concerned with the coherence of men. Such are, for instance, the sentiments and striving associated with domination, submissiveness, obedience, sympathy, etc. Many others try to build up a system of motives, and, in the better examples, they look for the active manifestations of such motives. But even so, they certainly do not reach the field of events. They are taking only the first, though important and necessary, steps on one of the roads leading into the field of social facts. We do not advise the closing of this entrance from the soul to the field of action, but urge that from the first it should be realized how all these impulses leading from the psychic to the social suffer manifold fragmentation, extinction, strengthening, and change by influences from the external world.

In practice, a dissolution of sociology into psychology must be followed by mistakes of lasting effect. We should then study and influence the souls of men, in the belief that thereby we could know and control happenings in social space.

In education, in politics, in the army, in economic organization, and the like, one cannot reach the end without psychology, but one cannot reach it with psychology alone. That which must interest the theoretical investigator is of no interest to the practitioner: only that which is carried over from the psychic sphere into the social sphere is important to him. To know and to influence this space of the interhuman world with all its psychic and non-psychic contents and its mixture of both—that is the point.

D. NOO-SOCIOLOGY

We now turn to that interpretation of the spiritual which is said to have nothing in common with psychology. Here the spiritual is not a subjective force inherent in the inner life of men, but a divine power transcending human experience and manifesting itself as the *Weltgeist* in the history of mankind, using the social structures as vessels for its manifestations. According to this interpretation, our task would be to discover this objective spiritual power in the collectivities of men. That would be the purpose of sociology.

To deny that the social is one and the same as the spiritual may not mean to deny God. It means to doubt that God's will and ways can be

recognized in the social order created by men in such a manner that we must make the science of society equivalent to the knowledge of divinity. Even if we believe that the hand of the world spirit can be perceived everywhere in the social history of mankind, we can only dare to say that either "God's will is always manifesting itself anew in spite of man's incapacity and errors," or "Sometimes an effort by men to find a place for superhuman powers within their social order may be recognized." All this is a subject of social philosophy or of religious ethics, but has nothing to do with a realistic sociology, having reference to everyday life and resting upon sensual observations. Further, we encounter this kind of spirit only when we meditate about the highest and most abstract collectivities. States, churches, cultural unions, etc., sometimes strive for spiritualization. Looked at realistically, however, they are without exception only forms of socialization, the contents of which may be infinitely different. Extending from plainly primitive and instinctively built structures to ideal orders, they can develop towards the *Weltgeist* or they can go away from it.

A conception of social structure under which the coherence existing under such structures is of spiritual origin cannot be defended unless we give the word *spiritual* a quite empty sense. However

we may interpret the word *spiritual,* there are always deficiencies and distortions if we equalize it with *social.*

In this statement a contradiction of Sombart's Noo-Sociology is involved. His thesis, "All society is spirit and all spirit is society," has its origin in Comte's social philosophy. It is false. We may imagine what fatal consequences would follow from it if practices were regulated by it, by such a rule as: "Every phenomenon in the realm of human society is determined by spirit." On earth the striving soul of some individuals is and remains the only home of spiritual forces. Society is not capable of absorbing much from them.

However, a more or less optimistic or pessimistic view of society and spirit is not the point. (Sombart and Pareto are the greatest contrasts I know in this respect.) More remarkable is this conclusion: that alone is good sociology where the conceptions social, spiritual, and cultural—to add here this third element, cultural, which is closely allied to spiritual—are separated from each other. If we make the social equivalent to the other two forms, only a totally wrong image of the interhuman sphere can result. And if practical and, for example, political principles are based upon this doctrine, suffering in the world must greatly increase in consequence of this fundamental lack of truth.

To play dangerously with the word *spirit* in an obscure half-mystical manner is, I regret to say, a German peculiarity. It is done in order to emphasize an opposition to the idea of comprehending social life from the standpoint of natural science. These altogether spiritualistic people find it unbearable to study the natural facts in the interhuman sphere, however attractive and important. They are very busy "extirpating the last traces of naturalistic thinking." They do not, however, extinguish these traces, but only the last traces of clarity in their own thinking.

E. CULTURE AND SOCIAL "SPACE"

To make "social" and "cultural" equivalent is an international defect that may be found today in America as frequently as in Europe. In particular the sociological school of the Evolutionists shows a tendency to change its studies of the growth of social structures into a statement of the achievements of these structures. They would like to demonstrate progress as clearly discernible in the results of human productivity. It is especially where a demand for valuation is dominant that history or the science of culture arises without difficulty out of sociology. Then culture and civilization appear as the important subjects, both envisaged correctly enough as results of interhu-

man life. Society is thought of as giving rise to culture, and therefore they think the study of society becomes the study of culture.

A sublime and attractive task, but there is much lack of clearness here, for conceptions as to what should be included under culture, and what not, differ widely. If by culture you understand, as we do, all refinements of natural existence, and you study the coherence of such refinements with the group-life of men, this is one of the most fascinating tasks that the scholar can undertake. But just because of this the sociologist ought to offer resistance to the implied replacement of his proper task by another.

What is the difference? The science of culture deals with the products of social life. Sociology, on the contrary, does not study products but producers. It does not teach how men as individuals or in groups have subjugated the world of things, but how they behave or have behaved to one another. Some conclusions may certainly be reached from the man-*thing* relationship, and therefore very often cultural achievements and their history may be included as material or evidence. But for the sociologist this indirect significance of mere things does not elevate them to be the principal object of study.

Here, again, the danger does not lie in the con-

sideration of a non-sociological subject, but in the consequent neglect of the other task and the attempt to perform that by misrepresenting the science of culture as sociology. The consequence is that the special theme of sociology becomes forgotten and excluded. This alone is what we protest against.

Perhaps it may be objected that our definition of culture is too wide and too materialistic—that culture is not only, or not at all, civilization or the domination of things, but just refinement of relationships between men. Culture may appear as social culture, and thereby two different conceptions may become possible: first, you may make cultural the equivalent of spiritual—then, all that has been opposed to the thesis: "Society is spirit and spirit is society," may also be opposed to the statement: "Society is culture and culture is society." A new idol is erected, no longer called spirit but culture. Or again you may try to approach sociology by interesting yourself in the interhuman life, but choosing from it arbitrarily some things which you value so much that you regard and investigate only these. You therefore put aside other matters that are perhaps mean and unrefined but still are important parts of the social reality. Again, therefore, the image of society arising from such a conception is untrue. The

sociologist is never free to choose according to a preconceived state of values. His inevitable omissions arise from the necessities of a working economy, and not from ideas of value such as culture implies.

Further, a doctrine of culture which judges values according to the strength of the sympathy between men or to similar social ideas is social ethics. It belongs to the science of that which ought to be. Finally, a doctrine of culture seeking the dismembering of the course of historical evolution into cultural phases, or the total culture of the earth into spatial regions, is history (philosophy of history or cultural geography or geopolitics).

F. WHAT IS THE "SOCIAL"?

Now we come back to our main question. What are the interhuman elements if they are not identical with the psychic, the spiritual, and the cultural ones? What is the subject of sociology? True, it does not deal with the study of the human body, nor with the study of the human soul, nor with the human spirit. It does deal with the influences of men and collectivities of men on one another. Its great theme is man as *socius*. The observation that men, being *socii,* form groups or withdraw

from existing groupings is its most important fact. In studying the living together of men we have to consider all forces engendering coherence or avoidance between men; while, on the other hand, we have to meditate upon nothing else but just upon those forces and their effects.

There is no other way of studying the social elements than to observe the main types of occurrences in the interhuman life and to ascertain by analysis the causative forces at work, with the result that psychic, bodily and spiritual elements are seen to be related in varied mixtures with extra-human natural elements, and also personal with group elements, old with new, organized with unorganized, material with ideal, and so on. Since his youth the writer has striven to perform this task by developing a systematic theory of the social processes and social structures of men. There are, however, authors of the abovementioned schools who assert that such an object of study does not exist. Sombart at least has said so in a paper read before the Prussian Academy of Sciences. There he rejects six trends in sociology and among them our sociology of relationships. He raises objections to calling this sociology formal, in which I quite agree. But I put this aside as insignificant. Then Sombart continues: "But more important is the absolute objection that on closer inspec-

tion the object of formal sociology does not exist at all. Such an isolation of a distinct part from a complex phenomenon as is brought about through an isolating abstraction is, in my opinion, entirely inadmissible in the realm of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. One cannot here isolate relationships as one may, e.g., in the fact of movement from bodies and make them the object of a particular science. One cannot do this, because every phenomenon in the realm of human society is spiritually determined and consequently defined by quality. Every correlation derives its character and consequently its shape only from a spiritual relationship without which it is a natural, not a social, fact. There is no honor, no jealousy, which is not embedded in a distinct spiritual atmosphere. No group, no crowd, about which it would be possible to make general statements of a sociological nature. To grasp an occurrence sociologically it must always be asked: In which collectivity—of familial, political, religious, purposeful, type, and so on—is it happening? But a collectivity is always determined by its spiritual contacts. Obviously in formal sociology we have to do with the last remnant of natural science thinking. Whoever considers this as unsuitable for comprehending human society will, therefore, be obliged to regard formal sociology as an unsuccessful attempt, although it may have been worked out with great intellectual power."

G. THE CONCEPTUAL ABSTRACTION OF THE "SOCIAL"

But we now come to the important question: "Is there a possibility of isolating the interhuman from the total complex of experienced human reality?" We must first clear up another point. What is it that sociology must consider in an isolated form, and how far does that isolation reach? It is true that a study of the social as a part of the human field cannot be undertaken except through isolating abstraction. This applies also in the study of the spiritual or the cultural. There, too, no other way exists. For each systematic science the thesis that its object does not exist in a distinct and separate way must be admitted. In other words, that the cross section isolated for scientific purposes and dissociated from the whole cannot be experienced. On the other hand, the totality of practical experiences cannot be taken as the object of one science. In contrast to the systematic sciences, indeed, history tries to register concrete experiences. As soon, however, as it begins to explain these, even history has to simplify things by omissions and so to approach to the isolating method of the systematized disciplines such as sociology.

All concrete experiences are disordered, piles of numberless ingredients, not accessible to logically ordered investigation unless we begin by inquir-

ing whether they contain this or that element in them. Further, we have to demonstrate similar elements in other experiences and to establish an intelligible coherence between these distinct ingredients of numerous experiences. We may never assume that we can grasp rationally in this way the totalities of concrete experience.

The social does exist in human life just as much and as little as the spiritual, psychic, or cultural. When we draw the image of reality in the scientific style, omissions are always to be found. Without abstraction life cannot be explained. Only by abstraction can we verify this or that systematically. The main point is that we constantly put forward to reality only one distinct, clearly defined question. We do not mingle this question with other questions, and we try to extract from an abundance of suitable objects all that is required to get our answer. The same objects may also be investigated by another science, but then other matters are in question. There is no science that can pretend alone and in its own right to explain reality throughout. Each science always explains only something taken out of reality.

In sociology we try to set forth those elements of human life which can only be reduced to coherence between men. When this point is fully realized we can further show that the difficulties

of such an abstraction are not greater or less than those which arise when we isolate any other homogeneous complex of elements. We have to analyze occurrences of human life in which more than one person is taking part, and in doing so to ask what in their process is to be reduced to the influence of one man on the other, or of the individual on the collectivity, and so on. In the professional terms of science we have to analyze and systematize the social processes as such.

If we consider, as Sombart does, a single social process (for instance, an occurrence of jealousy or crowding) in respect of its actual coherence—of its "embeddedness in a distinct spiritual atmosphere"—we are perceiving it historically, not sociologically. The sociological question is, on the other hand, what speciality of positive or negative coherence is given in an occurrence, and how can this speciality be fitted into a more general type of association or dissociation.

H. THE ADVANTAGES OF A SEPARATE STUDY OF THE "SOCIAL"

With the question whether the isolation of the interhuman is possible is closely linked the other question as to the fertility of this method. Can we, starting from our point of view, reach essentials,

or do we get nothing but a superficially ordered "catalogue of social phenomena," nothing but senseless classifications and external coherences?

In reply it is difficult not to adopt the pathetic style of the psalmist and declaim poetically how the fate of one man is bound up with that of other men. We cannot believe that in this epoch which has been named "the social age" people should be unable to realize that the demonstration of the approach and the avoidance of men is the most dramatic, most alive, and most exciting object set before any scientist. Sophocles, Aristophanes, Shakespeare, and Goethe stand godfathers to such a science.

It is true that the process of ordering into main categories only puts the facts in order, but everyone who knows the dangers of confusion and the lack of clearness in our field ought to see how necessary is this first "superficial" task. Simple explanatory, apparently superficial, categories must form the secure framework of the system. These must not worry readers or hearers by having the appearance of enigmas in thinking.

However, the categories are not the most essential factors: they are unavoidable working tools. There may be readers who think that we do not gain much when, for example, we observe the soldiers in an army practicing partly processes of

approach, partly processes of avoidance, partly mixed processes.[1] More essential, indeed, is the insight (which can be attained by investigating the play of changing coherences) that the social sphere, in which we act on other men and are acted on by them, may be considerably different from the internally experienced world. Equally essential is the insight that of the desires, apprehensions, and strivings of men only a part is realized, and that part, indeed, in a manner different from that anticipated. And, further, that only in definite situations which the individual alone cannot produce do such realizations occur; in short, that the social world is another world from the individual sphere. Not merely to suppose and to understand in Sombart's sense, but to reveal the laws to be inferred from such deviations—that is an essential and rational task. To reduce this special kind of facts to dismembered spiritual entities does not bring us one step further.

It is an impressive task to plunge into the depths of this interhuman distance. Is it possible that one really cannot see that it is an object that "exists"?

[1] Cf. Wilhelm Andreae, *"Gegenstand und Verfahren der Gesellschaftslehre," Zeitschrift f. d. gesamte Staatswissenschaft,* Vol. XCVI, No. 3.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. A bibliography of books by Leopold von Wiese in the German language is to be found in his *Sociology: Its History and Main Problems.* This pamphlet also contains a biography of the author.

II. Books and articles by von Wiese in the English language:

Sociology: Its History and Main Problems. Hanover, N.H.

Systematic Sociology, On the Basis of the *Beziehungslehre and Gebildelehre,* Adapted and Amplified by Howard Becker. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1932.

"Sociology and Suffering," *International Journal of Ethics,* XLIV, No. 2 (January, 1934), 222–35.

"The Social, Spiritual, and Cultural Elements of the Interhuman Life," *Sociological Review* (London), XXIX (April, 1937), 136–53.

"Systematic Sociology as the Science of Human Behavior," *Sociology and Social Research,* tr. by Howard Becker, XV (1930), 103–15.

"Tribute to the Memory of Victor Bramford," *Sociological Review* (London), XXIII (October, 1931), 197–98.

"Current Sociology II: Germany," *Sociological Review* (London), XIX (1927), 21–25.

"The Idea of Religion," *Calcutta Review* (The University of Calcutta, India, October, 1937), pp. 65–66.

"Social Theory and Social Practice," *American Sociological Society Publications,* XXIX, No. 3 (August, 1935), 49–59. (Papers; Human Problems of Social Planning, Presented at the 29th Annual Meeting in Chicago, 1934.)

III. Reviews of von Wiese's books in American periodicals:

Einführung in die Sozialpolitik. 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1921. Reviewed by Albion W. Small, *American Journal of Sociology,* XXVII, 394–95.

Allgemeine Soziologie als Lehre von den Beziehungen und Beziehungsgebilden der Menschen. Part I. *Die Beziehungslehre.* 1st ed., Munich, 1924. Reviewed by Albion W. Small, *American Journal of Sociology,* XXXI, 87–89.

Soziologie, Geschichte und Hauptprobleme. Berlin, 1926. *American Journal of Sociology,* XXXII, 516. (Translations of this booklet: *Sociology: Its History and Main Problems* and *Systematic Sociology,* pp. 659–713.)

Das Dorf als soziales Gebilde, Beiträge zur Beziehungslehre. Vol. I. Munich, 1928. Reviewed by Howard Becker, *American Journal of Sociology,* XXXIV, 549–550.

Allgemeine Soziologie als Lehre von den Beziehungen und Beziehungsgebilden der Menschen. Part

II. *Gebildelehre.* 1st ed. Munich, 1929. Reviewed by Floyd N. House, *American Journal of Sociology,* XXXIV, 921–22.

Verhandlungen des Siebenten Deutschen Soziologentages. Ed. by Leopold von Wiese. Tübingen, 1922. Reviewed by Floyd N. House, *American Journal of Sociology,* XXXVII, 477–78.

Systematic Sociology by Leopold von Wiese-Howard Becker. New York, 1932. Reviewed by G. P. Murdock, *The American Anthropologist,* XXXIV, No. 4, 703–05.

IV. Leopold von Wiese's theory presented and commented:

Abel, Theodore. *Systematic Sociology in Germany.* A Critical Analysis of Some Attempts to Establish Sociology as an Independent Science. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, No. 310. New York, 1929.

Becker, H., and Barnes, H. *Social Thought from Lore to Science.* Boston, 1938. II, 915–918.

Bogardus, E. S. *The Development of Social Thought.* New York, 1940. Pp. 472–74.

Brinkmann, Carl. "The Present Situation of German Sociology," *American Sociological Society Publications,* XXI (Chicago, 1927), 47–56.

Editorial Staff. "War and Reorientation," *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. I. New York, 1937.

Ellwood, C. A. "Sociology in Europe," *Sociology and Social Research,* XII, No. 3 (January–February, 1929), 203–10.

Ginsburg, Morris. "Recent Tendencies in Sociology," *Economica,* XIII, No. 39 (London, February, 1933), 22–39.

House, Floyd N. *The Development of Sociology.* New York, 1936. Pp. 390–392.

Lasker, B. "Systematic Sociology in Germany," *Sociology and Social Research,* XIV, No. 1 (September–October, 1929), 35–38.

Lundberg, George A. Foundations of Sociology. New York, 1939. Pp. 36, 87, 102, 111, 132, 248, 261, 267, 280, 281, 348, 371, 374.

MacIver, R. M. "Sociology," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* XIV, 244b.

Mihanovich, Clemens S. *The Subject Matter of Sociology.* A Critical Study on the Distinctive Character of the Sociological Viewpoint with Special Reference to Dr. Leopold von Wiese's Theory. (Diss. St. Louis University), St. Louis, 1939. *Cf.* Dr. Mihanovich's article in *Social Science,* XV, No. 4, 395–401.

Oppenheimer, F. "Tendencies in Recent German Sociology," *Sociological Review,* XXIV, No. 3 (London, October, 1932), 258–60.

Sorokin, Pitirim. *Contemporary Sociological Theories.* New York, 1928. Pp. 493–95, 507–11.

Wirth, L. "Modern German Conceptions of Sociology," *The American Journal of Sociology,* XXXII, No. 3 (November, 1926), 461–70.

Young, Pauline V. "Contemporary German Sociology," *Sociology and Social Research,* XVI, No. 4 (March–April, 1932), 355–66.

INDEXES OF PERSONS AND SUBJECTS

INDEX OF PERSONS

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

A

D

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

R

S

T

U

V

W