लाल बहादुर शास्त्री प्रशासन अकादमी
Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration
मसूरी
MUSSOORIE

पुस्तकालय
LIBRARY

अवाप्ति संख्या
Accession No. 100841

वर्ग संख्या
Class No. 190

पुस्तक संख्या
Book No. Mal

GL 190
MAL

100841
LBSNAA

NON-ABSOLUTES

NON-ABSOLUTES

BASANTA KUMAR MALLIK

PUBLISHED MCMLVI FOR
THE BASANTA KUMAR MALLIK TRUST BY
VINCENT STUART
LONDON

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1956
FOR THE BASANTA KUMAR MALLIK TRUST
BY VINCENT STUART PUBLISHERS LTD
55 WELBECK STREET, LONDON W1
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

MADE AND PRINTED
IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY ROBERT CUNNINGHAM AND SONS LTD
ALVA
CLACKMANNANSHIRE

CONTENTS

Foreword		vii
Introductory:	CRITICAL SURVEY OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT	1
I	THE PROBLEM OF BEGINNING	58
II	THE FORM AND CONSTITUTION OF THE DISCONTINUOUS UNIVERSE	64
III	RELATED DUALITY	77
IV	THE PRIMAL STAGE OF EXISTENCE	89
V	THE ISSUE OF ILLUSION	96
VI	THE SECOND, OR THE CREATIVE, STAGE OF THE UNIVERSE	110
VII	THE DOCTRINE OF RELATIONSHIP AS WORKED OUT IN STAGES	118
VIII	THE THREE SOCIAL SCHEMES OF HISTORY	139
IX	NOTION OF OPPOSITES	150
X	THE FOURTH STAGE	162
XI	CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL SCHOOL	177
XII	DIRECT EXPERIENCE AND NEGATION	183
XIII	THE ISSUE OF MIND AND MATTER	206
XIV	ORIGIN OF THOUGHT	215
XV	THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE	267
XVI	REVIEW AND CONCLUSION	277
Index		293

FOREWORD

THE lights are getting dim if the span of life allotted to man still runs its course; and it may soon be too dark to find one's way about if the shadows steadily deepen. I have not seen any sign yet that there might be an early break.

What consoles me still is the thought that I have fulfilled my obligation; the outline of the Universe, appearing steadily to me for long decades, has at last taken its place where it should be. What happens now it is for the Gods to decide, not for me. The outline has the proportion of a system which my ancestors would have called '*Jñāna*', and will remain as such till it is time for the Universe to let it go. What prevails then is Reality, which is not '*Jñāna*', and the story will change, if only to relate itself for endless eternal time.

It has given me a chart of life and a fresh horizon in which I can with deep assurance use that chart. It fills me with hope that sooner or later there will be only one horizon left for our species and only one chart to call our own. By that time all the heavens will stand out, like the eternal snow in its blue glory, serene and glistening in the autumnal sun.

The system, or '*Jñāna*', is fresh like dew or a blossom which opens with the first streak of the dawn; it is bare and simple in its outline and will appear to all if only they need it. Others who are still at duty's call may pass it by; like the strange events that range through the night, lying fast asleep, not a whisper of it may touch them.

But soon there will be no call for duties; calls will fade out as a matter of course, and then there will be only one need.

It is difficult not to believe that we are beyond the cross-roads at last. The issue is no longer 'decision', wise or not wise, but a grasp of the 'need' which follows not the call of duty but its fulfilment. We have to fulfil the obligations, and this time by joint effort and the true austerity which alone can keep it alive. If martyrdom may still be our goal, we shall seek it where the clouds meet and glow and not where they break with thunder.

INTRODUCTORY: CRITICAL SURVEY OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT

I

COSMOLOGY, if it has any relevance, is not the Universe or Reality; there has been no claim to eternity about it. Perhaps it was not even conceived before speculation appeared in what I call the 'Universe of process'. Would it not be legitimate then, if I just call it an account of Reality or a statement about it?

It is another issue whether the terms 'account' and 'statement', which must imply thought whatever its status to-day, can be used without apology; but if I do use them—since there is no alternative—Cosmology, even in its ultimate proportion, can have no bearing upon the Continuous, the only other form of the Universe, which in my scheme stands as dual in the specific sense I have given to that term. It is wholly concerned with the Discontinuous Universe, leaving well alone the issue whether there has to be also a separate account of the Continuous Universe. Strangely enough, the Continuous Universe does not admit of being accounted for, so that what I call 'account of Reality' in its full and complete sense has to do with the Discontinuous Universe alone. As my ancestry held that the Ultimate Reality, as they understood it, was beyond knowledge, नेति नेति, *ne'ti, ne'ti*, so I too have the privilege to hold that the Continuous form of the Universe, which is my view of what they called Ultimate Reality, is beyond all knowledge. The evidence, which will be discussed again, is in *The Real and the Negative*.[1]

But can it be urged that I should scrupulously follow the same path as tradition followed in laying down the basis or structure of my Cosmology? Should I have to mean by Cosmos—the notion which forms the very keynote of it—the same thing as my predecessors meant by it? How do the two terms 'Cosmos' and 'Chaos', the mainsprings of all cosmology, stand in my scheme? Do they appear in two Universes or together constitute the range of one and the same Universe? These are important issues.

[1] B. K. Mallik, *The Real and the Negative*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1940.

The fact is that I could not retain the meaning which accrued to the term 'Cosmos' in relation to its direct opposite, the term 'Chaos', in the course of a long tradition. Since my scheme of the Discontinuous Universe provides equally for both chaos and order —I have used the terms 'conflict' and 'harmony' in their place—I could not follow tradition and create two Universes on the basis of these two altogether distinct features of Reality. And for this deviation nothing was so conspicuously responsible as the conception of duality, which appears equally though in quite different forms in my scheme and in that of tradition. I had to deviate from all tradition in my scheme with reference to the nature of duality. I could not, like my predecessors, put an absolute bar between order and truth on one side and confusion and falsehood on the other. In the schemes of my predecessors these pairs belonged to two different Universes. Besides, if duality had to be recognised by them there was no suggestion in their formulation of it that it did or might constitute two distinct phases of Reality which not only never met but which had altogether different objectives to realise. There was not even a hint in tradition that Reality could be Continuous, in the sense I have attached to that term; and if we add to this fact the historical necessity which made tradition define the Infinite as an entity which had no beginning or end, order and chaos, strictly speaking, could not be placed within the compass of the same identical Universe. Cosmology, therefore, in any scheme of tradition had to do with the notion of order in the Universe, which was totally distinct from chaos or from something which, without any rhyme or reason, never ceased to run counter to order.

It does not, however, follow that Cosmology, if it has to deal with the nature or constitution of the Discontinuous Universe, must equally have to deal with its origin, which is obviously quite another consideration. On the contrary, the issue connected with its origin will remain shrouded in mystery until the moment when the Universe will cross over inevitably to the realm of harmony after a long spell of experience within the difficult realm of conflict. The two realms are quite distinct and do not co-exist in my scheme.

There may, however, be schools of thought which may be reluctant to believe that the Universe of the 'many' ever had or

did really need a source for its origin. They may well take that Universe as not only spontaneous in its origin but also indisputably self-sufficient. In fact the atomistic view of Reality discovered the feature of Ultimate Reality in the multiple entities; and after that discovery the schools which did not choose to call the non-multiple by the name of Ultimate Reality, whether we describe them as Ideas or Universals or the Mystical Absolute, had to follow the Atomists of the classical age in their choice of the central theme.

It so happens that the claim to spontaneity on behalf of the multiple Universe is by no means denied in my scheme. If anything it has been more firmly rooted in it than ever before. I hold that the Discontinuous Universe which embodied the multiple was independent and original and therefore necessarily spontaneous. But unfortunately my agreement with the Atomists does not extend any further; I fail altogether to accept their second claim for it, the claim of self-sufficiency. And the reason for this is that self-sufficiency is a notion which may lose all its significance if it is dissociated from the notion of absoluteness. I have to reject it as meaningless. There can be no question that the idea of absoluteness, or substantiality, or totality, or eternity was the one idea which brought out the specific feature of self-sufficiency in all tradition. Every entity which was not self-sufficient was the result of 'creation' or 'emanation' or 'limitation' or 'diminution'. By universal acceptance Reality in its ultimate form was absolute and self-sufficient, whether it was taken to be simple or multiple. But since I have shown that the Absolute Positive or the Infinite of tradition was as totally incapable of existing as the Absolute Negative, I do not see how the multiple Universe which I have called by the name of the Discontinuous, could possibly be self-sufficient. On the contrary, it has to begin and end, although it is meticulously independent and original. Frankly it is not possible that I should either accept or reject any of the cosmologies which the long tradition of our species has handed down to us.

I do not, however, fail to appreciate the fact that the question of origin with reference to the Universe was carefully considered by my predecessors in at least some schools of thought. I am convinced that it had to be considered, since it was by no means a mere academic issue fit only for the speculative mind to appreciate;

even if it rested wholly with such a mind to unravel its mysteries the issue as such remained equally for common sense and for the practical mind. At least life on this planet, if it had to take a strenuous course, could not but set that issue for universal consideration. No mind presumably could escape the anxiety to know where exactly its long trail of discipline would end—if it ever would. And so necessarily the issue of origin had to be faced by all.

It so happened that in the attempts to trace the origin of the Universe the philosophers came to trace it to three distinct conceptions instead of one. Here was a clear, unmistakable division. And as if that were not awkward enough, the conceptions which created that division were found to be in complete disagreement one with another; in fact they lay ultimately in a state of complete confusion. The philosophers in consequence found themselves belonging to three distinct Universes and had to formulate three distinct Cosmologies with distinct theories which were in a state of perpetual opposition about the origin, duration and final ending of their separate Universes. It is quite out of the question, therefore, that I should find any help or support for my position from any of the three historical types. Besides, it is difficult to know whether tradition ever had the chance to be decisive about any of the three Cosmologies.

An account of the nature of the Discontinuous Universe, however, if we can deal with it quite apart from its origin, can be only an account of what in a strictly ultimate sense should be called by the name of the well-known term 'experience'. An account or statement must at least be experienced. It is the only term which to my mind seems to be relevant to it in its proportion as a whole. Indeed, the Discontinuous Universe can be only another name for experience, since the alternative to experience is non-existence—the Absolute Negative is not experience for the simple reason that it cannot exist. Nothing that exists, whatever its form, can escape being at least experience. Even the inorganic atom has to be experience since it will otherwise cease to be existent. The state of non-existence is the state of complete nothingness. And if existence in its turn must shape itself, according to my scheme, in the structures of the Continuous and Discontinuous, it follows that both of these structures have to be scrupulously 'experience', although the issue as to what the nature of experience in the

Continuous state could be might not arise in the Discontinuous realm. This will come for discussion later.

There is, however, a familiar school of thought which seems definitely to deny that all existents must necessarily constitute, or be another name for, experience. In that well-known, persistent view, there can be, and are, existents which need not be supposed either to create experience or to have experience, and where such a view happens to be firmly held, the term 'experience' is associated with awareness, consciousness, knowledge, etc. In other words, this school is convinced that there are in existence non-conscious, non-sensing, non-thinking units or beings sometimes called 'immobile'.

Curiously, it has perhaps never been quite explained where and how the line of demarcation should be drawn between the conscious and the non-conscious; and if the line has to be drawn, what meaning one could possibly give to the alternative of the term 'experience' which it must presuppose. Should it not have been noticed that the meaning of the term 'experience' is derived from its distinction from the non-existent, which is non-experience: so that the non-conscious has to be called experience as well as the conscious, since they are both distinguishable from the non-existent?

It is too early yet to point out where exactly tradition went wrong in its analysis of these terms. We can only note by the way that there has been equally another school of thought in the same tradition which cannot possibly dissociate the existents from at least some association with experience, which according to them is a prerogative of what they call 'mind'. So that if the non-conscious, provided there is such a thing, has to be given a place in existence, that place can lie only within the orbit of mind. It has at least to be 'mental' if not mind, and exist in a state of being which is sensed, or perceived, or thought: existents which fall beyond the range of mind are the Absolute Negative and the Absolute Positive, if I follow my sense of these two terms.

What has to be noted is that the term 'experience' cannot be dropped and there is at least one outstanding reason for this: the statement 'the non-existent has no experience' has a meaning. It follows, therefore, that the existent must have experience. There is no middle term between experience and non-experience. The

suggestion that only some existents have experience would imply that some existents cannot be distinguished from the non-existent.

Incidentally, I may refer also to the dicta which stand to the credit of distinguished metaphysicians: Being is distinguishable from knowing and there is such a thing as 'Being in itself' as distinguished from 'Being for itself'. These are statements which apply to Reality on the categorical level. It has been claimed that 'to be or to exist is not necessarily to know'. The implication is that the Universe, which certainly exists, might have just existed without having any knowledge of its existence. The implication is not correct. To exist, in my scheme, is not to create; it does not mean not to know. To me the Universe either just exists or both exists and creates, i.e. it is non-purposive and purposive. But whether purposive or non-purposive, it is undoubtedly experience and if to know is to have experience, in a specific sense, knowing cannot be distinguished from Being. If a Universe were non-experience it would have to be non-existent as well.

To exist, however, is not necessarily to know, which is a specialised form of experience. But in no case is existence possible unless there is provision for some kind or other of experience—for instance, observing, perceiving or imagining, etc. Thinking or knowing is a special type of experiencing. So that if as a matter of fact there is absence of knowing, that is no evidence for the absence of experiencing.

A being, for instance, may be in a state of sensation—what we shall describe later on as pure experience—or it may be in a state which is called categorical. A thinking being is just as conceivable as one who just revels in sensation or images. Proverbially such beings are supposed even to clash, but both of them are real, existent beings. It would be a mistake if we did not call them equally centres of experience. For ourselves we do not for a moment hesitate even to call the inorganic a centre of experience, precisely because it exists. It is impossible that an entity can exist without automatically being a centre of experience.

It does not, however, follow that the phrase 'to exist' must always mean to have experience. It may just be used to signify the absence of the non-existent. The assertion which all metaphysicians advanced in reply to the sceptic 'Being is' only meant that 'Non-Being is not'. It had nothing to do with the issue of

the definition or characterisation of Being. Proverbially, the schools of thought differed at once as soon as they took up that enquiry.

The view in question—'to be is not to know'—will be reviewed at length as I formulate my theory of knowledge and the chances are that I shall have to reject it completely. I shall also review the dictum of the dialectical school which stands on the distinction between 'Being in itself' and 'Being for itself'. Obviously, not before I have solved the problem of body and mind, or spirit and matter, can I expect to establish with complete evidence my claim that experience is only another name for the existent. Besides, a fresh analysis of both the terms, as categories, follows in my Cosmology.

It may be useful in the meantime if I make two general comments on the two issues, body and mind and spirit and matter. The distinction between spirit and matter, for one thing, on a much deeper analysis of it than any so far known, seems to have arisen for one simple reason—tradition had to create it since the more fundamental distinction between the Infinite and Finite, the basis of all distinction, could not be avoided. That fatal ultimate necessity, even if it had no rational basis, became responsible for all the irrational beliefs of tradition. Presumably all thinkers were aware of this fatality, although nobody had the chance to put some other belief in its place. I shall make a long and elaborate analysis of that other belief. I shall also suggest that body and mind, or spirit and matter, are equally implied by the existent, whatever its form. They are not incompatible nor are they anything but categories.

The other comment is that as I do not follow the familiar path indicated by the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal in tradition —I have departed altogether from tradition—I do not have to deal with the two realms of experience, the Infinite and the Finite. In fact I have to deal with the Discontinuous Universe alone; and since the constituents of this realm have to be modelled on the pattern of absolute equality, the ultimate bases of this pattern, Being and Non-Being, are equally real and frankly non-absolute; they cannot possibly exist in forms such as mind and matter, or conscious and non-conscious, in the senses in which they have so far been understood. They could be either conscious or mind, or

non-conscious or matter if indeed these terms were mutually exclusive or existent entities.

It is another issue whether they can be preserved in any sense whatsoever; they can be, only they cannot be admitted into the realm of existence in any form at the expense of the term 'experience'. They will all have to presuppose this notion wherever they may be. In other words, no entity in the realm of the Discontinuous Universe can be anything but experience, although there could easily also be provision in it for such distinctions as conscious and non-conscious, mind and matter, and body and soul.

Indeed I need not proclaim, as it were, from the house-tops that the issue of body and soul does not arise when as a matter of fact it did arise and is still arising on the whole horizon of human experience. If indeed the disappearance of the issue somehow had already actually taken place, would there be any occasion for the proclamation unless it was for the benefit of those who did proclaim it? Could it not be that at odd moments they might still be dreading the return of it?

All these issues will, however, have the chance of a full review as I go into the analysis of my Cosmology and the theory of knowledge. In the meantime I shall just refer to one other argument—why the Discontinuous Universe, in every phase of it, has to be characterised by experience. And this is a special argument.

This argument derives its origin from the fact that in my theory of Reality the Discontinuous Universe makes room for only two cardinal phenomena as its main and ultimate achievement, Doubt and Certainty; and Certainty in its turn appears in two forms, Negative and Positive. Nothing can happen in the career of its constituents which is not a state of doubt or of certainty in its dual form, or a preliminary preparation for them. This is my peculiar view and I hold it on firm and indisputable grounds. The evidence follows later on as I discuss the creative stage of the Discontinuous Universe.

But could there be doubt and certainty in a Universe if experience, as a phenomenon, were rigidly excluded from it? Could a state of non-experience conceivably stage the complicated phenomena of doubt and certainty? Here again I cannot come to a final decision till the theory of knowledge has been well laid out in all its ramifications. I can only make a general comment in passing.

Does it not seem obvious that a Universe which dramatises in turn doubt and certainty cannot be confidently held to do so unless it at least has experience of that drama? That the enactment of such a drama should take place when the Universe was, as it were, lying stone dead and nothing even remotely sentient survived in it might no doubt suit the primal urge of our protons and electrons as our scientists take them. But can we human beings ever have a communication from such protons and electrons to verify this possibility or can we do without such communication if we must make a statement about them? If, however, some of us still prefer to believe in pure, sheer movement, will it be possible to deny that such beliefs are bound to affect the purity of that which just moves? How could one believe in anything, however remote or abstract, unless somehow it was drawn within the orbit of that belief—which by hypothesis is not exactly a proton? Does not even the scientist claim that the light which the star radiates sooner or later enters his mind?

I am not trying here to 'cash in' on Berkeley, though his point once made was never unmade. What was unmade was his full claim as to what the subject and object were. We have to remember that our great critics do not have to apologise for the criticism they suggest; where they fail marks the close of criticism and the beginning of dogmatism. If, however, I do just suggest that I have a belief in a state which is not experience, the issue no longer arises. Not even a bad drama about it would arise.

What then is the real issue about the distinction between experience and non-experience? Why are we so anxious to hold that a stone just moves, whatever that might mean, while the philosopher watching it deliberately steps out of its path? Is not that movement, too, however deliberate?

The discussion in its full form has to be deferred, since it is in the last analysis an issue of the theory of knowledge, and if still I want to add anything to what I have already said on such an ultimate issue it would be only a review of the modern historical claim which seems indisputably to bear on it. Such a course perhaps may even be necessary and certainly useful since it is sure to help in the full discussion by way of making a preparation for it. The claim I am thinking of is the '*Cogito ergo sum*' of Descartes and the reason why I am introducing it is that it seems at least to

contravene my own position. In any case, there can be no question that it stood primarily for a duality of entities: something which knows and something else which does not know but is known. Here was the source of the whole problem of knowledge.

And I might add incidentally that here was also a clear departure from classical thought on the same issue—the issue of knowledge —whether meant or not. The dictum 'virtue is knowledge', for instance, was perhaps not intended by Socrates to mean that while Socrates knew the universal, the universal in its turn was in a state of being known by that philosopher. I suggest this with great diffidence.

There can be no doubt, however, that the phenomenon of knowledge which suddenly appeared in modern speculation made room for two distinct entities: the mind that knows and the object which is known. The functions which they implied were distinct and specific and could not possibly exist simultaneously in the same entity. Besides, the duality had an undisputed bearing on the constitution of the Universe itself. The whole Universe came to be constituted by the duality of mind that knows and the object that is known—at least in modern European thought. In Cartesian language this claim was put in the form 'thought and extension formed the prime substances of the Universe'. Evidently the term 'extension' was meant by Descartes to take the place of object, if not actually held or claimed to be so in a positive statement. The implication of his theory of substances was that if the subject or the mind necessarily knew, 'extension' did not know but was eminently suited to be known—it was immobile. And if still this Universe was not the whole of Reality, there was God who stood above it as its Creator—it was the only venue in which knowledge displayed its scope since the Cartesian God who created it evidently did not cultivate knowledge in his own domain. He was Omniscient: to know was neither a virtue nor a necessity with God. There was nothing for Him to know since He was Omniscient by the grace of the prophets and priests. The fact is that Descartes' philosophy found the keynote of the Universe without God to be nothing but a drama of knowledge. The theme in it was one of dramatising two simple movements or functions: the function of knowing and the function of being known.

It is a great European drama and will be a theme for close and

sustained review as I go on; in the meantime I may just note that even if it was by no means an ultimate claim, capable of supporting a whole edifice of Reality, it would be foolish to deny its overbearing influence on modern speculation. Whatever enquiry, particularly of the positive scientific turn, there had to be within the realm of the modern age derived its determining agency from the Cartesian division of 'thought' and 'extension'. It is difficult to dispute its influence. And if by any chance the much-too-robust claim of science ever shrivels up under fresh hostile criticism it is not the scientist but the theory of knowledge which he was persuaded to advocate by the modern philosopher which will have to answer for that disaster.

II

But why should the Cartesian account of the Universe which emphasises knowledge as its central feature be incompatible with my theory of the Universe, which, like it, also places experience at the core of the Universe? Do I not mean by experience what Descartes meant by knowledge? In what way did I mean that my position contravened the Cartesian view?

The answer, though simple enough, can only be very briefly referred to at this stage of my enquiry. It is that Descartes and I do not by any chance mean the same thing by 'Universe'—a fact which makes all the difference between our views. Indeed there is only one point of agreement between my account of the Universe and that of Descartes; and that point refers to our mutual claim that the Universe we live in is multiple and not by any means absolute or simple. In other words the Universe is not another name for God, Who is monistic or simple. In Descartes' opinion it is a creation by God; and in mine it is the Discontinuous Universe, which begins and ends entirely on its own. For the rest the two accounts differ absolutely. For instance, they formulate altogether different views about the origin and constitution of multiplicity, which is common ground between Descartes and myself. I agree that the Universe is multiple, but I do not mean the same thing by 'multiplicity'. Equally there is complete disagreement about the nature of knowledge. I agree that there is such a thing as knowledge, but I totally disagree as to what that knowledge is. It is impossible, in my view, that knowledge could be defined in

terms of the naïve duality of the 'subject which knows' and the 'object which is known'. Indeed whatever truth one may still find in such simple statements, they have to be altogether transformed before even a modicum of truth can be extracted from them.

These suggestions, however, will have to wait for their full confirmation till I develop fully the constitution of the Universe. In the meantime I shall consider the only issue which is not only relevant to both the views but is fundamental to them if we follow them in their varied claims; I mean the nature of multiplicity to which I have already referred.

If both Descartes and myself take the Universe to be multiple, the category of multiplicity happens to be interpreted by us in altogether different ways. For one thing, the multiple comes to be classified in the Cartesian scheme under the two substances of 'thought' and 'extension'. No such classification can even conceivably take place in my scheme: in it the multiple remains as unique and independent as possible. Indeed, the notion of 'substance' which plays such a great part in the Cartesian scheme can have nothing to do with my notion of multiplicity. On the contrary, it is the multiple and nothing but the multiple that constitutes, with all its implications, the Ultimate Reality or the Universe which I have named Discontinuous. In no sense does the notion of 'substance' play the part of an ultimate constituent in my scheme. Indeed I shall not exaggerate if I add that the multiple began with that Universe and will end with it in whatever form the Discontinuous Universe is expected to end. It will not be touched by any Reality which is opposed to it as non-individual, whether as mystical entity or as universal. Not even the Absolute, or God, or Law—the final conceptions of history—would stand in the way of the multiple individuals. If 'thought' and 'extension' still must appear in the course of the Universe they will not by any chance classify the multiple but stand instead as states or phases of the multiple. It is impossible that they should exist as independent entities or 'substances', as Descartes called them. And it will make no difference if one produces, in desperation even, evidence as to their divine origin. The stark fact is that the Discontinuous Universe would exclude from its domain even the possibility of divine interference, assuming that there was a God to create a Universe. If 'thought' and 'extension' have still to be

in that Universe they have to be in a form which multiplicity and individuality will most unerringly dictate to them. This, at least, is my account of the Universe and it should serve as legitimate evidence for the fact that there is no agreement between my idea of the multiple and that of Descartes. It follows, therefore, that my position could not but be contravened by the Cartesian.

It is, however, quite another matter why modern European speculation should have propounded, under the direct inspiration of the '*Cogito*', the view of knowledge which (as I have just shown) is contravened by my position. The *raison d'être* of the '*Cogito*' has been already fully discussed in my *Related Multiplicity*.[1] Its origin had to be traced to sheer historical necessity.

But there seems to be no ground for holding that the '*Cogito*' not only implied a mind that knows but also an object that does not know and yet strangely enough is known. Is it possible that '*Cogito*' by itself, even if we take it as a precipitation of doubt, should imply the strange situation in which a mind has to face an object which is not mind but something distinguishable from the mind? Can a thinking individual, as the only indisputable certainty, vouchsafe any other certainty—not to say one which is incompatible with it?

It will be strange to argue that once we have established the certainty of mind we have automatically established the implication of the mind. We have at least to establish the validity of the notion of implication as such before we can argue from the implications of mind. Have we ever done that? And if Descartes, without any such preparation, proceeds to argue from '*Cogito*' that it has 'contents', such as 'ideas', and builds up the ontological argument on the basis of them to establish the whole of creation, he does so at his own risk without any evidence. The moment he leaves '*Cogito*' as a bare existence he plunges back into the vortex of experience which he had already discarded as the realm of doubt.

Could he introduce with legitimacy any other realm with the same certainty simply because to him the realm of '*Cogito*' was certain? All other realms would still necessarily remain steeped in doubt if they ever were so. He had to make a case for them all separately since they were all distinct. Obviously all that Descartes was entitled to was the certainty of '*Cogito*', rightly or wrongly;

[1] B. K. Mallik, *Related Multiplicity*, Hall, Oxford, 1952.

which meant only that '*Cogito*', the presupposition of doubt and uncertainty, was certainty. What indeed he discovered was that somehow the realm of uncertainty could not exist without a background of some certainty, whether he was fully aware of that fact or not. Strictly speaking, it was not even '*Cogito*' that came out as certainty as the background of doubt but something like 'bare being' as we have shown in *Related Multiplicity*. If, unfortunately, Descartes did not see this obvious point, the reason was that he was nowhere near raising the issue of scepticism. The argument that we cannot deny any or all experience without functioning as an individual who alone can negate and deny is perfectly correct. But will it be equally correct to suggest that we do not cease to exist as a negating individual when the stage of confusion arises? Is it not a fact that in a state of mutual negation—the state of contrariety—even the negating individual is bound to disappear? There cannot be any '*Cogito*' left in such a situation, and if somehow scepticism had not arrived on the scene after confusion as a matter of course there would be no history with any record to tell us about '*Cogito ergo sum*' or about the sceptic.

The argument, after this, that the whole situation was God's responsibility and not by any means Cartesian, is quite beside the point. It is bound to fail and that for two clear reasons; the ontological argument, as I have shown in my *Related Multiplicity*, was no evidence for God's responsibility since it was no evidence for God's existence; and even if God had to be assumed as a hypothesis to account for the Universe, human knowledge with reference to the main feature of God's creation, would still have to be accounted for. Could God be supposed to have become man when He created the Universe? That would create impossible complications at once.

Still, if we have to believe in an Omnipotent God there is no reason why we should not credit Him with the capacity for all possible forms of creation except the impossible, which has no form. But could we mortal beings have any idea of the technique of that creation unless our Heavenly Father in His infinite mercy took us into His confidence, either before He actually created the Universe, when we were not there, or just at the moment when creation was coming into being with the human beings just appearing? Assuming, again, that creation and mercy did come

together, such a situation would at least imply at once our co-eternity with God. Would that cohere with our mortality? No doubt we could know the technique of creation after it had been created as God would naturally want His creatures to know every feature of His creation. But even such a chance for us would go by default, since it was ill-suited to a remarkable divine commitment—God had already so willed it that all forms of the Universe after its creation would be overcast by the pall of doubt, except the '*Cogito*'. In fact 'thought' was the only feature of that Universe which was spared that fate if '*Cogito*' is to be trusted. How then could 'extension' which was not 'thought', but opposed to it in the Cartesian scheme, enter our experience after universal doubt? To suggest, again, that God could intervene to release 'extension' from the ubiquitous grip of doubt will not really ease the situation. Such a procedure, even on God's part, may ill become the dignity of the Universe which, it was decreed, must provide for at least one rationalist like René Descartes. Finally, even if the creation theory may for some special reason survive, the 'occasional and frequent intervention of God' in the affairs of His creation might not suit Divine Omnipotence, since it would damage seriously the reputation of God, even as an architect. What then would happen to the Design argument? It would imply further that God, perhaps, was not quite wise in granting free and independent thinking to His creatures known as rationalists. In fact, all this explanation, apart from the innate deficiency of the ontological argument, would not stand even, or cohere with, the claim with which Descartes, as a rationalist, would not easily part.

What then was the ground for the Cartesian claim that the Universe had for its main structure both 'thought' and 'extension' as dual principles? Where did 'extension' come from if the '*Cogito*' was the only certain ground on which Descartes could possibly stand?

It is doubtful if the historian will ever strike any other source of evidence than what Descartes frankly adduced in the ontological argument, and if we have no reason to doubt that Descartes did mean that argument, the Cartesian claim for 'extension' has to be taken as an illusion. If Descartes could not help believing that God created the Universe with 'thought' and 'extension' as the two substances presiding over the fortunes of a vast multiple

universe, he had to do so without any legitimate ground. If the '*Cogito*' stood and gave sufficient support to the claim on behalf of 'thought', 'extension' had no such support and so the Universe had either to be accounted for wholly by 'thought' or not accounted for at all. Even if '*Cogito*' in its turn was not by any means unimpeachable, there was at least some evidence for it. It was capable of giving rise to a great movement which is still not quite dead. And it has to be noted that it was the basis of a new type of humanism in the history of Europe, as I have shown in *Related Multiplicity*. It moved away from the duality of the classical age and seemed to revert to the Parmenidean monism.

Indeed, there is a lot to be said in favour of '*Cogito*'. But the case for 'extension', as it was made by way of the ontological argument, had nothing to be said in its favour. It was not based on evidence, as '*Cogito*' was, nor was it frankly a gift from religious intuition or vision. Its peculiar claim lay in the audacious effort to reach the level of objective Reality from what had only a subjective value and nothing else.

But the issue is not merely whether the Cartesian effort to create the objective world was audacious; there is equally another vital issue, why was it at all made? And the answer to this is that Descartes, without the ontological argument, would have 'stayed put' with his '*Cogito*' as Parmenides did with his Absolute Being. There would have been in consequence no history nor modern European world which history has recorded as an absolute fact. And so it followed necessarily that Descartes had to choose the same way of escape which Plato, Aristotle and others, for instance, chose to get out of the enclosure of the Parmenidean 'Absolute'. He managed to establish the objective world, oblivious of the fact that his method at any rate was certainly not coherent or consistent. And perhaps one could mention, to bring out the extent of the similarity between Descartes and the humanist, that the case for Non-Being which Plato and Democritus made was hardly more arguable than the Cartesian. But then the issue no longer was whether one is entitled to advance any thesis unless it is supported by incontestable evidence, which in Descartes' language meant 'clear' or 'distinct'. After the establishment of '*Cogito*' the issue changed. It soon became one of coming out of the self-enclosed realm of the '*Cogito*', which shut out all light from the

objective world. It was this issue and not the one of escaping from the self-contained experience of the '*Cogito*' by a route which must be above suspicion which precipitated the audacious effort we have referred to. What '*Cogito*' could not produce came as a gift from God, Whose existence was guaranteed not by '*Cogito*' but by the audacious effort to derive from the idea of perfection the Perfect God. The founder of '*Cogito*' who was indisputably the founder of modern rationalism, capitulated to the Christian God and accepted from Him as a gift the fact of 'extension' which by no manner of means could be derived from '*Cogito*'. Here at the very inception of modern thought two diametrically opposed methods were drawn upon to make sure of the reality of two mutually exclusive entities, the thinking individual and its direct opposite, the non-thinking 'extension'. The '*Cogito*', as a result of this achievement, no longer suffered from the agony of solipsism; it soon, as if with a bounding heart, began to exercise its function to know and to experience the objective world in the new shape of 'extension' by compelling it to be known.

The Cartesian success in establishing an objective field with direct divine aid soon created what has been known as the problem of knowledge. The issue arose as to how 'thought' and 'extension' could work together when by definition they excluded one another. The Cartesian claim for implication was completely forgotten—nobody remembered that '*Cogito*' implied 'extension'. In fact the Cartesian argument for implication has not been revived since the problem of knowledge arose.

It is another matter whether this problem had arisen already both in the classical and medieval periods of European history. There are philosophers who may unhesitatingly find an affirmative answer to this question. I have to disagree with them if they do and my reason simply is that the precise distinction between 'thought' and 'extension' which Descartes drew with divine support was not known before the seventeenth century in Europe. There was no relation of opposition, for instance, between the simple and multiple, whether in the Platonic or the Atomist interpretation of the simple and the multiple, or Being and Non-Being. So that if we define the simple and multiple as mind and matter, or 'thought' and 'extension', they will still remain as constituent parts of the same organisation and necessarily co-

operate to bring about either the realisation of mind and 'thought', or atom and 'extension', as the ultimate and eternal Reality. I shall discuss the Leibnitzian view of 'confused perception' and my view of 'confused extension' which bear on this point when I finally review history and the Universe of tradition. In both the schemes however they would necessarily be placed together in a state which would make one of them real and the other unreal; and since this state would not imply opposition it would naturally not create the problem of knowledge. Nobody would, in a Platonic scheme, find it necessary to ask how matter, for instance, could be informed by mind, even as no atomist would have to face a problem in the co-existence of relation and terms. If mind, which was the uniting principle in the shape of relationship in the Atomist's scheme, was unreal, it was expected to disappear altogether in due time, leaving matter, the unique atoms, to reach the level of self-sufficiency. There would be no problem of knowledge in either scheme; and the fact is there was not. And the same could be shown to have happened in the medieval scheme.

If the problem of knowledge, then, did not arise before Descartes with divine consent drew the distinction between 'thought' and 'extension', the main issue to consider now will refer to the ultimate ground of its origin and the exact form that problem took.

It is certainly not by any means difficult to trace the form this problem took in at least the three well-known centres of Western speculation, England, Germany and America, in recent times. Perhaps nothing was achieved in Europe during nearly a century, if we look back from the middle of the twentieth, which can be claimed to rank as high in importance as the long-drawn-out speculation on the problem of knowledge. It almost seems as if Europe has produced nothing else of any importance since Hegel. The strange thing is that it still remains unsolved in spite of the Logical Positivist, and perhaps of his rival in the twentieth century, the Existentialist.

But the issue of the ground of origin, provided we take a strict view of it, did not come in for any treatment at all proportionate to its significance. Even the question was not raised why there should have been any such thing as 'problem' as it should have been raised; nor, naturally, was it discussed what exactly were the

conditions which created the problem. It was quietly taken for granted that knowledge, for instance, could not but be a problem; and the reasons given were that since its constituents, 'thought' and 'extension', did not co-operate—as they were incompatibles—it was not to be expected that they would give rise to knowledge. The facts stated were perfectly correct if we go by the Cartesian scheme. But they did not bear any evidence as to why knowledge should be a problem on that account. If 'thought' and 'extension' could constitute knowledge only by co-operation between them the conclusion followed that the issue of knowledge should precipitately drop, if the constituents of it were totally incapacitated from co-operating by being frankly incompatibles. How then was it that knowledge was suddenly called by the name of problem instead of being dropped as an impossibility? Why was it not straightaway discarded as a meaningless issue—a custom not unfamiliar in these strenuous days?

And yet could we possibly avoid taking such a step without presupposing that there was such a thing as 'problem' which, in the nature of things arose necessarily when incompatibles appeared? The presupposition was there, at least, in the procedure adopted, but no evidence for it was given by any analysis of the nature of the problem, with special reference to the source of its origin in incompatibles.

The primary issue, therefore, is to find out first why incompatibles at all arose in the Universe when conceivably they might not have arisen. What indeed was the nature of the Universe which called for incompatibles in its career, and thereby gave the problem a significant place in it? Obviously it was only such a necessity that could give knowledge the feature of a problem, so that knowledge could exist not only as knowledge in its purity but also as 'problem'. We have to define the additional factor which made knowledge a problem and save it, for the moment, from being dropped as an illusion. We have to trace the origin of the incompatibles first.

The enquiry here is obviously categorical and as I start it I have to refer my readers to my view on the relation between the categorical and the concrete. By that view it is not possible to deal with the concrete before we have explored the strictly categorical implications of the Universe. The reasons have been suggested in

Related Multiplicity, and they are remote from any traditional account of thought.

If, however, this very modest claim should sound preposterous to those of my contemporaries for whom it is the 'particular' alone that can claim to be Real—on the sole ground that we are directly and immediately aware of it—it seems we can do nothing about it. There is indeed no alternative if we have to take the empirical creed as the only chance for our salvation in the twentieth century of this Universe.

Still, incidentally, it might well be injudicious to forget that this school of thought might not have chosen to uphold this precarious doctrine if our metaphysicians had not, by some cruel destiny, altogether failed them. There was sufficient cause for alarm when the 'concrete', one of the two outstanding claimants to existence, was left severely alone by the philosophers—I mean as fiction. At least neither the mystic nor the metaphysician found any ground on which it could securely stand. Naturally the conclusion was that one should either revise the mystical and metaphysical views or set up the concrete on its own ground, irrespective of the customary ban on it. The revision unfortunately never took place. To at least some minds, therefore, the 'particular', or 'concrete', which was immediately certain, was bound to appear as the only Reality; and after that soon the claim arose that it was only by an analysis of the 'concrete' that one would find the way to fuller and more complete knowledge. There was nothing unduly audacious or unusual in such a situation.

Unfortunately there was a 'fly in the ointment', to use a popular phrase, whether the empiricist, the protagonist of the argument, was in any sense aware of it or not. Even if it might be perfectly legitimate to claim that there is such a thing as direct and immediate experience of the 'particulars', such experiences by themselves are of no use to any investigation since they are by nature completely self-absorbed. The fact is that they necessarily constitute the virginal state in which the sense of differentiation is conspicuous by its absence. They simply do not admit of being stated or described (see *Related Multiplicity*). And if still we do state or describe them, our statements succeed only in referring to them—and that only after they are completely gone. Indeed, when we state or describe the 'particulars' we are no longer having experiences of

them; we only refer to them as past experiences. And this 'reference', again, can but take the shape of thinking in some form or other—what, however, 'reference' is will be amply discussed later on. It is impossible that the 'particulars' as such can be analysed in themselves, not to speak of being utilised as a basis from which to develop knowledge in its full and complete form. It is only 'thought' which forms the medium for statement or description of the 'particulars'. The case for the 'particulars', in its traditional form, therefore, cannot be made but 'thought' can be reinterpreted and need not be taken in its traditional form. And once that reinterpretation has taken place the 'particulars' are bound to change too, in their significance. I refer my readers to my theory of the categories.

In any case the conclusion follows that the notion of incompatibility, even if it is a category, can be easily known and utilised. In fact we can find out why incompatibility arose in our Universe and what exactly it is by pure categorical enquiry. And I may repeat that this preliminary enquiry is absolutely necessary before the problem of knowledge can be dealt with—a problem which arose for the simple reason that 'thought' and 'extension' were found to be incompatible and mutually exclusive.

This enquiry, the point of which is to trace the origin of the incompatibles, presupposes, however, the notion of the Universe; since it is the Universe that determines what the shape and form of its constituents should be. If anything is ultimate and final in its authority with reference to any issue it must be the Universe: there is nothing else to take its place. It does not, however, follow that I should have to raise at once the issue about the Universe in all its features, and that for two reasons. In the first place such an issue is the subject-matter for my Cosmology, towards which, in this introductory enquiry, I am slowly but steadily tending; and in the second place the issue of incompatibility arises only in a definite phase of the Universe—it is wholly associated with the Universe as it appears when we think of it as a multiple or plural Universe.

The issue before me now is the Multiple Universe; and it so happens that I need not, for my immediate purpose, discuss any other feature of that Universe than its attribute of multiplicity or plurality. Nor is it necessary that I should, in discussing this

feature, draw out its implications at great length—I have done it already in *Related Multiplicity*. It will be enough if I just re-state the position and my account will be concentrated. I am certainly taking it for granted that the case for multiplicity or plurality as I understand it is well-known to my readers—I have had so many occasions to refer to it. I may add, however, that there is nothing in tradition which need contradict my position.

The Universe to which we as human beings belong took, in one of its earliest stages, a shape which gave rise to nothing but problems. This is a historical fact and will be amply testified to as I go on. Its constituents in that phase had, by sheer cosmic necessity, to face two factors—the tension that incompatibles induce and a make-believe that a solution of that tension is possible by a process which can be called only by the name of device. This follows from my view of the Universe and I might just broadly state the salient points which bear directly on the issue we are discussing. This is a very broad account and will be made precise as I develop the analysis of the 'stages' in the full review of my Cosmology.

If the Universe we have just referred to is unmistakably a plural Universe, which exists in its own right and has nothing to do with the Absolute, the Universal or the Divine of tradition, the main issue with regard to it as a matter of course must be one of organisation. And this issue arises for a very simple reason: the entities constituting the world, since they must be dual or plural, are expected to be both distinct from and identical with one another. This peculiar position arises by virtue of the fact that relationship, as an additional factor to multiplicity, must somehow characterise the multiple entities to prevent them from being absolute differents. We have discussed this already in *Related Multiplicity*. While the feature of plurality in the Universe will necessitate the appearance of distinctness, relationship between the constituents will acccount for identicalness. And this perfectly straightforward situation was bound to produce the state of incompatibility, since distinctness and identicalness could not but be incompatible, as history has repeatedly shown. The same entity could not at the same time be different from and identical with any other entity, since distinctness and unity are at this stage of the Universe frankly exclusive of one another. It is indisputable that

they have not been, as yet, in any historical record proved to be compatible. The whole issue will be amply discussed in my Cosmology.

In the meantime I may draw the conclusion that incompatability arises from the very nature of multiplicity or plurality. If we have to take the Universe to be multiple or plural, we have to face incompatibility in it some time or other. Indeed, the only chances which could spare us this grim alternative would have materialised if the abortive claim of Parmenides that the Universe was Absolute and not even dual had succeeded, or, if the attempt to reduce plurality to a status which the theories of emanation and causation so deliberately created for it had not failed.

A plural world which is original and cannot escape the full strain which incompatibility imposes on it is bound, however, to inaugurate the state in which problems must necessarily arise. Since it is sure to be called upon to organise the plural on the basis of incompatibility, the state of problem will inevitably arise since the incompatibles are mutually exclusive. The issue of organisation, broadly speaking, is only another name for the issue of providing for the incompatibles—it has been nothing else so far.

But I do not suggest that the Universe had to face the problem of organisation when it did not exist. That would be a very curious attempt to make. Can the non-existent Universe face any problem? On the other hand if the Universe, while it exists, cannot be an abstraction, one cannot certainly call it by the name of bare plurality as if it were just what that bare category directly implies. At the very least, if it is at all real and exists, it must exist in an organised state. There is no alternative. And if it does not exist, no question can arise about it since there will be no philosopher to ask questions. The moment, therefore, when it had to face problem could not but have marked a moment in its already full-fledged, existent career, whatever its form. The pre-natal stage of the Universe is a chimera; it could never be in a position to ask 'can I or do I exist?'—it has existed for all time. That which does not exist or exists as perfect Reality does absolutely nothing—is 'truly inefficient', as the Buddhists say; and in my view it was not necessary for the Universe to exist once and for ever either as the mystical Absolute or as the God of tradition, since there was no *raison d'être* for such an existence.

Still the question arises—what could be that initial stage in its career which unmistakably gave rise to problem? Could one even conceivably trace it at this distance of time? The answer is simple enough. It refers to the stage of tension which could not but have marked the initial stage. The reasons have already been discussed. If unity and individuality, which had to be mutually exclusive at their first appearance in the Universe, were to be the main factors in the organisation of the Universe, the result could not but make that organisation another name for tension. If two mutually exclusive terms make equal valuation of them inevitable, nothing but tension could come out of their relationship if related they have to be. I may warn my readers, by the way, that this is a very simplified statement about the Universe in which problem arose. It is built on the conception of multiplicity which is only a category. What the actual concrete universe was when the tension arose will soon be formulated. The significance of this simplified statement will then fully appear and its legitimacy be vindicated.

Tension, however, is a grim phenomenon. Whatever the ground of its origin, it must necessarily imply the possibility of a complete collapse of the Universe. It obviously means that the terms that constitute the organisation undergo necessarily mutual neutralisation. It was impossible that one or other of the two terms which must be opposites would or could prevail at the expense of the other. The case of tension is proverbially the case of absolute opposition, and certainly not a case of mere contradiction. The Universe, therefore, had to face as a result of tension the extremely serious prospect of possible extinction.

And this prospect, it seems obvious, was bound to materialise if by any chance a reformulation of the terms which produced the tension was in the nature of things quite out of the question. Indeed there was no other way by which the collapse of the Universe could be avoided than by reformulation of the terms.

The Universe, however, did not collapse, indeed it could not. The reasons are simple:

(*a*) The universe has been in existence eternally and will, therefore, continue to be so for ever and ever;

(*b*) The issue of its collapse was but a possibility which might or might not materialise—the possibility arose from the conceivability of the Negative;

(*c*) The possibility of the collapse of the Universe did not materialise since the Negative was found to be impossible and self-contradictory.

But it is exactly in this strange phenomenon, the possibility of a collapse, that the stage of problem arises. At least human mind, when it falls into a state of problem, has to face the possibility of a collapse. Nothing short of a collapse in some form, as a possible event, can create that state. The two essential features of the state of problem are constituted by the two notions—collapse and its possibility. What it indisputably excludes is certainty, whether in a positive or negative form. No sceptic fell into a mood where he was called upon to face a problem; he had complete assurance that the Absolute Negative existed. Besides, the state of problem is a state of enquiry which presupposes faith and cannot arise in a state of complete uncertainty in which faith does not survive. Yet, strangely, the faith that guides the enquiry does not quite exclude the uncertainty about the fulfilment of the enquiry. There is no certainty in the state of problem that the enquiry will be completed. Problem indeed is a peculiar phenomenon: on the face of it, it seems to imply even a contradiction and yet it is a perfectly consistent phenomenon. It is impossible that we should ever reject the enquiry which the problem suggests: at least the faith in its ultimate fulfilment stands unshaken. But there is constant anxiety lest the enquirer himself may not be able to fulfil it: and it is a fact of experience that many enquiries do not survive to see fulfilment and even the enquiries that do succeed turn out sooner or later to be illusory. In fact there has been no fulfilment of any enquiry which stood the test of time. The strangest thing in history is that faith in enquiry never disappeared except when the Universe in a small or large way plunged into confusion. It is still vigorously continuing.

What, then, is the explanation of this apparent contradiction? Why should we keep on the enquiry in spite of its repeated failures? And if it has to be kept up out of a regard for the faith in its objective, why not wait with fortitude and calm till the faith, as it were, has chosen to fulfil itself and in its own time?

The answer is simple. At least the human mind if it wants the fulfilment of the enquiry also wants that it should be fulfilled by the human mind as distinguished from the non-human or by some

particular type of individuals or groups of them. And it is this dual interest that has been responsible for both certainty and uncertainty affecting equally the state of problem. There is no real contradiction in such a state, and perhaps it follows directly from the heart of the Universe if we ever go deep into it. The problem stands as an epitome of at least some stage of the Universe, as we shall soon see.

This strange analysis of the origin of problem however correct may or may not be acceptable to my contemporaries. Some of them at least may even be dubious about the verification of the past in which the problem first arose. The question is bound to be raised whether that remote and legendary past can be verified in the way our geologists, for instance, verify the past of the earth on which we live.

The answer is by no means easy to give, but perhaps the main reason for this unfortunate situation is that between my contemporaries and myself there seems to be no common ground on the basis of which we could easily interchange ideas and views. The whole of my work will bear evidence to that. Evidently my contemporaries uphold tradition and assess the significance of a position in the light of what tradition recorded as truth. There is a bar, in consequence, between them and myself; since I do not uphold tradition but find it to be altogether indefinite and uncertain. There is, for instance, not a single issue on which tradition has not held three distinct views which clashed with one another. If one has to discover from tradition what, for instance, such notions as 'problem', 'fact' and 'history' meant, the discovery will lead necessarily to three types of theory which neutralised themselves many a time in the course of history—yet this is by no means a strange comment to make.

It may, however, well be that at least some of my contemporaries are no longer in possession of their original faith and orthodox tenacity and may even be looking for a fresh formulation. It is even permissible to assume that the issue of verification is not to them what it still is to the scientist or the philosopher of the mid-twentieth century. They may not even ask me to verify the 'tension' at the inception of our Universe in the way in which the geologist verifies the prehistoric age of the earth. They may, on the contrary, be dubious about the validity of any such verifica-

tion which we have so far trusted. We seem to be steadily receding from the modern age which in its latest phase even denies judgment.

It does not, however, follow that we should drop the issue of verification altogether. On the contrary, at least the ultimate notions of fact and history would still persist as valid notions in our scheme. It may be worth while, therefore, if I incidentally state just broadly my views about them, hoping that they will make at least some impression on those who have a need for the reformulation of these conceptions. Their *raison d'être* will appear as the enquiry deepens.

I shall define 'fact' first. Broadly speaking, the notion of fact implies four other notions:

(1) it implies the notion of individuality; nothing which cannot be described as individual can possibly be entitled to be called fact. I am using the term 'individuality' as it appears by way of contrast in the milieu of the universal and mystical;
(2) that which is fact must begin and end: for instance, the Infinite Absolute or God of tradition or Primal Energy cannot be fact since they all imply 'no beginning and no end';
(3) that which does not conceive an ideal or realise it should not be called fact: for instance, the indeterminate is not fact since it implies opposite ideals and cannot function;
(4) finally, fact must be what should be called experience: for instance, the Absolute Negative, which is not experience since it is impossible, cannot be fact.

After this broad definition of fact it should not be difficult to formulate what history is or should be, since it is nothing but an account of facts. And this means that history is only an account of the Universe, which in its turn is constituted by nothing but fact: and if the outstanding feature of facts is that they are verifiable, history cannot take account of anything which is not open to verification.

This account of fact and history is not, however, intended to be final or exhaustive but it gives me sufficient ground to conclude that the state of tension did actually appear in the career of the Universe as positive, solid fact. And if my claim that it is open to verification is yet to be justified it will form the subject matter of

analysis later on. Meanwhile, if I have discarded traditional metaphysic it will be unfair if I am expected to preserve any traditional science. If it has been necessary for me to replace the conceptions of 'fact' and 'history', which are familiar in tradition, it is not possible that I shall preserve the method of scientific analysis which followed from that conception. In fact, nothing that my contemporaries are still cherishing can have any relevance to my position. It is rather a peculiar one but I have to adopt it for the sake of truth.

The account that I have just completed with reference to the origin of the two notions 'incompatibility' and 'problem' is obviously my own, and before I draw the final conclusion it might be useful if I discussed briefly the records handed down to us bearing on the same issue. I take it that they were at least familiar issues in some form or other in all tradition.

The records I shall have to refer to, if I keep to European history, must at least be Greek, as the Greek records provide perhaps the only trustworthy original account of strict speculation in that history. There are scholars who hold that the Judaic records, the only other records with any independent and original claim, did not emphasise speculation so much as stress 'way of life'—call it Ethics or Ritual or Dietary. In any case one has to deal with the Greek records as they fully demonstrate how the problem arose in dealing with the nature of the Universe and what happened in consequence to the whole organisation of the Universe in the Western world.

I have dealt with the history of Greek thought in *Related Multiplicity*. I shall now offer against that background a little more elaborate analysis of the origin of 'problem' in Greek thought, and compare the Greek account with my own account on the same issue which I propose to call by the name of a twentieth-century view. Both accounts deal with the ground of the origin of problem.

It is necessary, however, that an account of the metaphysical enquiry which the classical thinkers and myself had to make to solve the sceptical issue should be stated as a preliminary issue. That enquiry was needed to establish the evidence for the Universe —there was no universe outstanding in human experience as a consistent pattern—and this preliminary is necessary for one simple reason. Both the classical and twentieth-century views about the

origin of problem appeared in the course of that ultimate metaphysical investigation. The enquiry led directly to that development. The immediate issue, therefore, is in what ways the two enquiries agreed and differed.

As regards agreement between them neither of the enquiries started, as Descartes' enquiry started, with nothing but a keen historic plea for the phenomenon known as '*Cogito*'. Instead there was genuine scepticism preceding both these enquiries; and what that really meant has been amply stated in my *Related Multiplicity*. The second point of agreement to note refers to the procedure followed—neither enquiry was ever under the depressing influence of the twentieth-century plea: 'thought at its best is the creation of the human mind in the shape of language and liable to be discarded as soon as the purpose behind that creation is fulfilled.'

The similarities did not, however, extend any further. In fact, my own analysis of the categories and their precise place in human experience—the central feature of both the enquiries—turned out to be remote in their significance from what the classical giants indisputably achieved. If neither enquiry stopped with '*Cogito*', which was not a category, mine certainly did not come to the same conclusion as to Being and Non-Being, the two ultimate categories, as the classical did. We have to note that both the classical and the twentieth-century view, unlike the Cartesian, had to raise the issue of both Being and Nothing, which cannot possibly be confused with '*Cogito*' which is neither Being nor Non-Being.

I should, however, relate the classical procedure a little more elaborately before I compare it with the procedure of the twentieth century view.

It is well known that the classical mind did not deny the Positive Absolute though it rejected explicitly the Negative Absolute. And if still a sharp division arose between Parmenides and the rest of the Greek thinkers, the ground for this was that the latter could not be content with the Positive Absolute alone as Parmenides frankly was: on the contrary, they felt it absolutely necessary to re-introduce the Negative—not, certainly, in its Absolute form—as an additional factor in the constitution of Reality. The immediate result was that Ultimate Reality appeared in their scheme frankly as the duality of the Positive and Negative,

or of Being and Non-Being. The strictly monistic claim fell into abeyance; and what happened in consequence to the Absolute Positive is another issue. Logically it was Parmenides who remained scrupulously correct while both Plato and Democritus fell from the austere logical level precipitately. I mean that the Absolute Positive could not possibly survive with the Non-Absolute Negative by its side, though Plato and Democritus persistently held that it could. The Absolute, as absolute, could not possibly tolerate anything, not even a speck of dust, to use a figure, to cloud its horizon, if we insist on its absoluteness with strict Parmenidean accuracy. And it made no difference if Non-Being came to be reduced to the level of Unreality.

I shall discuss this point at great length when I come to review the Greek speculation in the light of my Cosmology. I shall then suggest that the Greeks who opposed Parmenides had to re-define the Absolute Positive, not just to take over the Parmenidean form of it. Nothing else was possible. They had to posit what has been known as Individuality or the Pluralistic Absolute in direct opposition to the monistic Absolute of Parmenides. Logically the monistic Absolute could not make room for the changeful multiple. Parmenides was absolutely correct in discarding them, as he was a strict monist. If, however, both the Absolute Positive and the changeful multiple had to be equally recognised, the way out was to combine them and this meant at once the creation of the pluralistic Absolute—the series of changes with no beginning and no end, if we are precise and strict. The claim that Reality was both Being and Non-Being which stands to the credit of the humanist, therefore, was a misnomer. The real position was that while Parmenides stood for the monistic Absolute, the humanist espoused the cause of the pluralistic Absolute, or the principle of individuality as distinguished from unity. Unfortunately the two Absolutes were very often hidden under the well-known distinction between Permanence and Change, or Being and Becoming —notions which are by no means adequate.

It was not noticed that Becoming, by itself, could not guarantee its own existence: it had to be, as it were, encased in the framework of the Infinite—a Cosmic necessity.

What exactly I mean by the 'framework of the Infinite', however, will call for analysis as I go on. Meanwhile I may suggest

that the Infinite, whatever it may be, cannot be unstable or liable to change perpetually without any chance of being complete and perfect. That which is not total and complete is uncertain and therefore unreal.

And it may be added, by the way, that Hegel's attempt to present Becoming as a synthesis of Being and Non-Being was no more valid than Kant's attempt to combine the multiple sensibilities by the categories. The point to note is that the evidence in both cases was exactly of the same type as the humanist in classical days utilised on behalf of the 'changeful multiple'—sheer empirical experience. Both Kant and Hegel, like the humanist, had to stand on a reference to facts of experience for evidence—as if what is frankly incompatible to thought could be easily compatible if only common sense had chosen to vindicate it in the garb of sensation or image. If we cannot conceive of a synthesis of opposites (which can only produce tension and confusion) could we, as if by a miracle, come across such a synthesis as a matter of empirical observation? We could if we are prepared to accept illusion as fact. One can actually see the snake in the rope, as my ancestry held, provided the conditions are ripe. The conclusion is that there was no choice outside the monistic or pluralistic Absolute. If Parmenides had to be questioned the alternative was to fall back upon the pluralistic Infinite, which was in its turn equally questionable.

A question of great historical importance may, however, be raised—did humanism frankly hold the pluralistic Absolute? Could we interpret the dichotomy of the Real and Unreal, Being and Non-Being, as only another name for the pluralistic Absolute? How indeed could we account for the vast distinction between Platonism and Atomism if the pluralistic Absolute was the one theme of the humanistic school?

A full answer to these questions cannot be discussed at this stage of the enquiry. What can be pointed out is that humanism historically appeared in two different stages: as an initial conflict with Parmenides; and as a complete organisation which took the shape of another conflict—this one between Platonism and Atomism. Only humanism was involved in the first and neither Platonism nor Atomism and its conflict lay wholly with Parmenides. In the second stage there was no sign of either Parmenides or the

humanist; there was only downright conflict between Platonism and Atomism. In fact, the Platonist and the Atomist monopolised the scene at this stage. And the reason why this happened was that a fresh issue arose in the career of humanism after its conflict with Parmenides had come to an end; the issue of organisation. The humanist was called upon to build up the concrete Universe which the conception of the pluralistic Absolute implied. The Universe, which was eternal, made this 'building up' necessary. Perhaps its origin can be easily traced.

III

The original clash in Greek history, as in all classical tradition, appeared between the sceptic, who stood for the Negative, and those who not only challenged the sceptic successfully but made a case for the Positive. Perhaps there was no Parmenides or humanist at this stage, as they were absent in the humanistic organisation. Being, or the Positive, stood as the common belief of all the Greek thinkers who took part in dispelling the sceptical claim. But as the notion of Being indicated the Absolute as the only form of the Universe in its concrete pattern, the way was paved for the appearance of the conflict between Parmenides and the humanist. Soon the Absolute was interpreted in two different ways. Parmenides was convinced that the Absolute was monistic and excluded everything else. The others, who came to be known as humanists, were equally convinced that the Absolute by itself could not account for the 'changeful many' which, like the Absolute, had to be recognised. Reality, therefore, was not only the Absolute, or Being; but was also Non-Being. In other words, the Absolute was interpreted in two opposite ways: the monistic and the pluralistic.

The phrase 'Being and Non-Being' which one meets with frequently is only another name for the pluralistic Absolute, as I have taken pains to argue. The 'changeful many' cannot be just added on to the monistic Absolute. If, still, they have to be incorporated into the Absolute, the Absolute will have to be pluralistic, which certainly makes room for the 'changeful many'. (It is immaterial if this cardinal point in the controversy between Parmenides and the humanist was not either noticed or worked out.)

According to the records, the school of Parmenides after this

went out of the picture and the issue that monopolised Greek thought ever afterwards was the issue of organisation. The 'changeful many' had to be organised—a need which would not have arisen if by any chance Parmenides had succeeded in establishing his monistic Absolute which excluded the 'changeful many'. But once this need arose as a matter of course, it was evident that it was the pluralistic Absolute that could serve as the ideal of that organisation. There were two points which the notion of 'changeful many' implied:

(1) they had to be organised since they could not exist as absolute differents;
(2) if they had to be organised, the organised life of changes could not take place outside the Absolute within which they had to be incorporated.

And what else could the Absolute mean unless it was the pluralistic Absolute which alone could serve as the objective or ideal of the humanistic organisation. After all it was individuality, and not unity, which was the goal or ideal of the humanist. (This, by the way, is my own suggestion as to the place of individuality in the Greek scheme, and I venture to make it on logical grounds alone, which to me are final.)

Perhaps I may also add that no school of humanism ever held that the 'changeful multiple', their specific contribution, was the only Reality. Indeed the Absolute was never off the humanistic horizon, although it was not clear whether the Absolute the humanist held to was quite distinct from the Parmenidean concept of it. It may even be argued that the humanist at times might have believed that he was not contradicting Parmenides but, as it were, making up for his deficiency.

But even the records will not contradict the claim that the Absolute which was actually worked for by the humanistic organisation was not monistic, but frankly pluralistic. It was either the One, or Idea, or Form, of Plato and Aristotle or the self-sufficient and perfect atoms of the Atomist. But how did all this happen? We have to refer to the actual history of the humanistic organisation for a reply, at the cost of some repetition.

The 'changeful many' as they came to be organised were found to imply the unique and identical as equally essential for their

existence. This is an old issue. Organisation was impossible unless one or other of the two implications was taken as Real at the expense of the other. The organisation had to provide for both, whatever the method. And the 'changeful many' had to be organised since otherwise they would be reduced to absolute differents. This meant that there was bound to be more than one organisation for the 'changeful multiple' and not simply one. Here is the origin of Platonism which took the 'changeful many' as Unreal and also of Atomism which took them to be Real. The consequence was that Platonism had to interpret the Absolute as 'one', or 'idea', or 'form', while Atomism had to describe it as the self-sufficient or perfect 'many'. In both cases, it was individuality that was emphasised, or the pluralistic Absolute. There was no alternative. There was no sign of the Mystical Unity.

Could we not argue, after this, that the assumption that the humanist preserved the Parmenidean Absolute was quite wrong? And is it not evident that there was no other way to realise the pluralistic Absolute than that of Platonism and Atomism, which frankly held the two conceptions of individuality respectively as the ideals for their separate organisations?

But the questions incidentally may still be raised whether Reality could be Infinite in any sense whatsoever, or whether it could be Finite in addition to its being Infinite, though as a matter of choice. There is no logical answer so far. All that can be held with certainty is that human experience—as a matter of historical fact—has conceived of Being and Becoming just as much as it has conceived of Infinite and Finite. And if these conceptions could not be permanently held, it only follows that Reality remained to be known. There is no special virtue in calling it by the name of Infinite or Finite.

If still the non-Parmenidean Greek persisted in introducing the 'changeful multiple' by the side of the Absolute Positive, no doubt he did so on purely empirical grounds. This has to be specially noted though we have referred to it more than once. There was absolutely no logical evidence for the 'changeful multiple' —that phrase was not a category. The procedure was quite arbitrary.

Curiously, it was still open to Plato and Democritus to introduce the Negative into their scheme even though they, along with

Parmenides, had discarded the Absolute Negative. There was a definite way to do so. But the 'changeful multiple' was not the medium through which the Negative could be re-introduced. An altogether fresh logic had to be found, capable of restoring the Negative without either bringing it back in its Absolute form or questioning the claim against absolute scepticism. And this could have been done in a way which the whole of my philosophy has made abundantly clear. The fact is that there was still *another* Negative fully surviving—even after the Absolute type of it was, with universal consent, given a decent burial: and this Negative could have been legitimately put by the side of the Positive, provided the humanist was prepared to discard the Absolute Positive as well as make a clean break with Parmenides. The cost to him obviously was prohibitive. If it guaranteed consistency and originality, it also meant a fatal variation of his traditional creed. And so the question does not even arise why it was not chosen; since the fact is that it was not chosen. And will it be uncalled for if I add that it is the 'fact', in the last analysis, which stands as the real 'backbone' of the universe? It will be a cry in the wilderness to wish it otherwise, since the Universe, or the fact, makes no distinction between the rational and irrational, or truth and illusion.

What happened in the end in Greek thought is well-known, however; the Universe which the non-Parmenidean Greek built up was conceived in the form of a duality of the Absolute Positive and a Negative which was not on a par with it, but strictly 'Unreal'. Suddenly a new distinction was sprung upon the speculative world. In fact it was the humanist who was mainly responsible for the creation of the momentous dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal; it followed necessarily from his conception of duality. There was no trace or sign of it in Parmenides. And what this distinction meant in history for good or evil ought to be familiar and vivid. Perhaps there is no evidence that the Greek ever fully understood what was meant by the Positive and the Negative, not to say by the Absolute. Nor did any classical enquiry, for the matter of that, anywhere else yield any more fruitful result.

This outline of Greek investigation, though still in its preliminary stage, has given rise to some major issues which bear directly on the main theme of my enquiry—the origin of problem. It might

be advisable, therefore, to discuss these issues before I go any further.

Obviously the best method of discussing them would be to raise some leading questions. They are familiar enough, as will appear from the following account:

(*a*) In what stage of the categorical speculation of the humanists did the notion of Non-Being appear? Did they introduce Non-Being directly after they had broken away from the Parmenidean position?

(*b*) If, instead of Non-Being, it was the 'multiple' that was introduced in opposition to the insistent claim of Parmenides that it was the Absolute Positive and nothing else that was Real, did it not follow that the Absolute Positive would in that stage be automatically interpreted as the 'simple' since there was no third entity between the 'simple' and the 'multiple'? The duality in Greek thought, therefore, arrived necessarily in the garb of the 'simple' and the 'multiple' rather than as Being and Non-Being in its first formulation.

(*c*) If the nature of evidence on behalf of the 'changeful multiple'—it was presumably empirical and not logical—made no difference to the Greek claim that the 'multiple' had as much right to existence as the 'simple' (which presumably had logical evidence) did it not follow again that a difference of view was bound to arise as to the metaphysical stature of the 'simple' and the 'multiple'? In any case, the issue at this stage did not appear to be that of Being and Non-Being but that of 'simple' and 'multiple'.

If, still, the position of the humanist appears in the records in the form of 'Being and Non-Being', we do not really get an accurate account of that form unless we interpret Being and Non-Being as 'simple' and 'multiple'. The fact is that Non-Being came into the picture only after the 'multiple' was introduced as a challenge to Parmenides. Besides, there was no fresh interpretation of Non-Being, as far as I can see. The Negative remained, still, as the Absolute Negative—though as a Cosmic outcast. But once the 'multiple' was firmly established, though on purely empirical grounds, the Negative suddenly reappeared; although not in its Absolute form. In fact the second Negative was never

accounted for, but only utilised. The real issue was discussed in terms of 'simple' and 'multiple'. These two terms completely overshadowed Being and Non-Being: the enquiry ceased to be carried on in ultimate categorical terms. What this meant we shall soon find out. It was certainly no longer a categorical enquiry.

The point to note, however, is that sharp internal differences, even between the Platonist and the Atomist—the two schools of humanism—soon broke out, and the reason was that the simple and multiple proved to be mutually exclusive. Indeed, it seemed that there was nothing to choose between them.

This state of mutual exclusiveness, however, did not arise on the scene so long as the notion of the Absolute Positive occupied the whole of the Greek horizon. There was complete agreement among all the Greek thinkers during the period when they challenged the sceptic successfully with the stand for the Absolute Positive. But the moment the 'multiple' arose, on purely empirical grounds, and stood as a challenge to the Parmenidean claim to the totality of the Absolute Positive, the whole notion of the Positive had to be reshaped—and that in the form of the 'simple'. And then it was bound to appear that the Positive and Negative were mutually exclusive, which meant that they had to be re-interpretated if an impasse or tension between them in any case had to be avoided. After this the distinction between the Real and the Unreal could not be long in arriving. It did arrive.

The Greek thinkers travelled a long way, however, from the Absolute Positive on which, at the inception of Greek thought, they had all stood firm; and if Being and Non-Being were still preserved it was more as a matter of courtesy than of logic. The Absolute Being of Parmenides did not survive except as a view; indeed, it disappeared, like the Absolute Negative, from the whole of Greek civilisation, for all practical purposes.

A very serious question arises, however, as to why the humanist preserved the 'simple', of Parmenides, when it was clear that it excluded the 'multiple'. Why did he not stand for the 'multiple' alone, in the same way as Parmenides stood for the 'simple'? Besides, the 'multiple' as 'multiple' could not be a challenge to the 'simple', of Parmenides, which was the Absolute Positive. As we have already seen, the clash between Parmenides and the humanist was only another name for the clash between two different inter-

pretations of the Absolute Positive—the monistic known as unity; and the pluralistic, known as individuality. What then is the explanation of the strange fact that humanism arose on the basis not only of a dualism of Being and Non-Being but on a dichotomy of Being and Non-Being? To plead for the 'multiple' on the ground of empirical experience is to establish the Unreal by the side of the Real by a completely irrational procedure. There is absolutely no chance of 'by-passing' the Parmenidean claim if the Absolute is a foregone conclusion. Either the Absolute has to be re-defined—and that in a way by which a place could be found for both the 'simple' and the 'multiple'—or a confession of failure to account for the 'multiple' has to be made.

The investigation in Greek thought was carried on, however, entirely in terms of the 'changeless simple' and the 'changeful multiple'. As if by a stroke of destiny, Greek thought remained completely oblivious of the real drama in the Universe; and soon humanism, as I have already said, developed an internal clash between the two notions of the 'changeless simple' and the 'changeful multiple'. It is familiar history that the two schools of Platonism and Atomism arose with two distinct organisations:

(1) the one built on the 'changeless simple' as the Real while the 'multiple' was Unreal to it;
(2) the other took the 'changeless simple' (relationship) as Unreal while the 'changeful multiple' was Real.

Incidentally, logic and intuition came into clash in classical history right at the inception of the categorical investigation.

The clash between the Platonist and the Atomist, however, was not the only serious clash that affected the classical investigation in the early dawn of the robust classical age. That which took place between the humanist and Parmenides—an equally historic one—was a clash on the same scale and proportion. (I have already referred to it.) If, however, the 'simple' and 'multiple' did not form the constituents of this clash, what did form it was perhaps a more profound distinction—the distinction between unity and individuality. The claim which Parmenides held that there was nothing else but the Absolute Positive was challenged by the claim that Reality was both Being and Non-Being. And if this did not mean that the humanists openly disputed the Absolute

Positive altogether, they certainly were not prepared to accept its absoluteness in the exact sense which Parmenides persistently emphasised. In other words, while they were definitely opposed to the claim that Reality of Being was unity, the alternative to them necessarily was to espouse individuality—a category which was implied as a matter of course by the duality of the 'simple' and the 'multiple'. If they differed among themselves as to the status of the 'simple' and the 'multiple' as metaphysical entities, they agreed fully in their opposition to the Parmenidean claim to unity as distinguished from individuality. As a matter of historical fact, the clash between the Greeks and the Hindus arose exactly on the same issue of unity and that clash is still on the stage of history. How strange it is that Parmenides could find a permanent place not in Greece but in India, a more ancient land than Greece.

I have already just referred to the distinction between the two categories of the Absolute Positive: the monistic and pluralistic. I may add that the terms 'unity' and 'individuality' may also be used for them. The real difference between Parmenides and the humanist—and for the matter of that between the Hindu mystic and the Greek humanist—was on the ground of unity and individuality. Both sides held firmly to the Absolute Positive, but disagreed as to what it meant or how it should be defined.

If, however, the records do not make these points adequately clear, there is enough evidence in the actual clash between them to testify to the fact that the clash rested on the basis of the Absolute, and on nothing else. Both sides competed with each other only on the issue of the nature of Reality and on no other question—as if there were no Universe at the moment existing for the absence of an agreement about its nature between them!

It is another issue why the clash between the mystic and the humanist was never solved. By the records, we get nothing more than the bare information that they alternately rose and fell, with a variation at times in their career in the shape of confusion. Nor is it anywhere discussed why there appeared, as a matter of course, two distinct clashes: one external, i.e. between the mystic and the humanist, and another internal, i.e. between the two schools of both humanism and of mysticism.

The complete solution of all these primary issues will be evident as I develop my Cosmology. It will be possible to show how the

whole of what we call the Universe, or history—with its three distinct schemes about Reality—arose, and where it stands today. We shall have a fresh scheme of the Universe in which the scheme of what we call history will form just a stage.

But how does this account of classical thought with reference to the leading question compare with the account which I have suggested in my scheme? If both the accounts fully agreed in being truly metaphysical, where indeed did they come to differ? I shall now relate the differences after stating my own position.

Unlike both the schools of classical thought we definitely did not stay with the Absolute Positive. Indeed, the Absolute, both in its Positive and Negative forms, disappeared from my scheme. What appeared in the place of these forms was a completely fresh account of Being and Non-Being, which *Related Multiplicity* went into with an elaborate analysis. Being and Non-Being became non-Absolute and stood out on a level of perfect equality: and so the Continuous and Discontinuous turned out in the end to be the main subject-matter of my enquiry. These are terms with which my readers must be already familiar.

Incidentally, this view of the Universe, which I have called the twentieth-century view, came, as a matter of history, at almost the tail-end of the efforts of man to be in direct communion with the spirit of the Universe. It is inconceivable that even my great ancestors could conceive of it, exactly as it is impossible that we can ever expect to grasp truth in exactly their way. And if, still, the Buddha or Socrates ever came to be re-interpreted by us, the re-interpretation did not fall due before we had fully benefited by what they had taught and lived for. This interpretation, be it noted, is not assimilation—it is a fresh discovery. The truth is that no step in the long process of history could have been skipped, by virtue of its sheer originality: nor could one of them postpone its departure from the venue of existence and leave the rest of the steps waiting in deep suspense for ever.

But once our species reached the stage of twentieth-century review, it was no longer either possible or necessary that one should still repeat the classical or modern analysis exactly as they were. Instead, it fell due that one should carry on the whole of the metaphysical enquiry in an altogether new way with categories alone—such as Being and Non-Being, or the Positive and the

Negative. This way was not the way of the classical thinker, as the records amply show. So, as the twentieth-century enquiry proceeded under these new auspices, the Absolute was found to be altogether meaningless, with two immediate results: first the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal as the means of solving the incompatibilities could no longer be held; and second, with the inevitable disappearance of the Absolute, Being and Non-Being —as Non-Absolute—stood out on the plane of perfect equality, so that the Universe could not but exist in the form of the Continuous and the Discontinuous, an existence which was never even dreamt of in any tradition.

The claims are unusual, and it will certainly add to their lucidity if I go into a more detailed review of the different stages of the enquiry that led to the formulation of these claims.

The enquiry did not stop in its initial analysis of the ultimate categories—Being and Non-Being—at the stage where the classical enquiry indisputably did. It continued its course totally unhampered till the whole structure of Reality was built up with nothing but Being and Non-Being as its categorical basis. In both *The Real and the Negative* and *Related Multiplicity* a full account of this further analysis will be found. I never had to descend to the level of notions such as 'multiple' and 'simple', or 'individuality' and 'unity', to collect either logical evidence or necessary material for the ultimate structure of the Universe. Mine was a strictly logical process; it had no alignment with empirical hypothesis in any shape or form, not to say with art or science—indeed, if I avoided the whole issue of incompatibility and assured myself of the ways and means by which it could be legitimately resolved, I could do so by a stroke of sheer good fortune.

It should however be quite easy to see, after this, how different the two procedures are. They had to be different, and these differences outweighed the agreements by a long margin. And I may close this comparison by a fresh reference to two simple facts which came out of that comparison.

In the first place it was obvious from my scheme why the classical mind, by the eternal economy of the Universe, was bound to fall into the illusion of the dichotomy—that of the Real and the Unreal. The humanists could not possibly avoid the conclusion that the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal was the only way

to solve the impasse between the 'simple' and 'multiple', or 'unity' and 'multiplicity'. The moment they had, as if by cosmic compulsion, to stop with the incomplete analysis of Being and Non-Being they could not but rely on empirical evidence or refuse to move even an inch from a half-formed logical analysis—they were fated to be waylaid by the tragedy of history. Indeed, there was no help for all this, however grim, since the Universe had in its scheme a provision as much for illusion as for truth. There is nothing, from the angle of the Universe, to choose between the Negative and the Positive. It was cosmic necessity that the claim to validity should be evenly distributed between illusion and truth.

Secondly, it was equally obvious from my scheme that the two sets of categories which created the impasse, once they appeared on the scene, never disappeared. They did not turn out to be impossible like the Indeterminate or the Absolute. They continued to function as Real and Unreal ever since the issue of incompatibility was arbitrarily dropped. And what this procedure—against all evidence—meant I shall soon be able to discuss.

I can now, however, draw the main conclusion. There is sufficient evidence why problems arose in the classical age and in the exact way they did. They arose in two forms: that of solving the impasse between 'unity' and 'individuality', and that of solving the impasse between the 'simple' and the 'multiple', or the 'changeless' and the 'changeful'.

Curiously, however, we do not come across any reference to the impasse between 'unity' and 'individuality' in the records on Parmenides. We are just told that Parmenides did not consider 'individuality' at all, as if he could not help the assurance that he was himself the Absolute. Yet all records testify to the fact that there was a division of opinion between him and the humanist—he had to face the humanist in spite of his being the Absolute; and if such a division, in the nature of things, could not possibly arise unless they held two positive opinions in opposition to one another it was not possible that Parmenides should be totally unaware of the claim that opposed him.

Once this awareness is granted, we have to admit that it was bound to be followed by one of two things: either by a complete denial by him of the opposite claim on the ground of sheer impossibility or by a frank recognition of it as the direct opposite

claim. There was no third alternative. And what exactly happened? Parmenides, as a matter of fact, could not avoid the second alternative—humanism never disappeared like the Absolute Negative once it arose—and so, as it were by the same nemesis, either both Parmenidean 'unity' and humanistic 'individuality' would have to drop out like the Absolute Negative, or a split would surely arise between them on the ground that they could not both be equally real. It was the second possibility that was realised in Greek history.

This issue, though hardly raised in Greek thought, was fully worked out in the Hindu scheme; in which what is known as the third category took charge of individuality. It was considered to be neither Being nor Non-Being. Either Parmenides was a Hindu mystic—in which case his record is not to be traced to any Greek source—or somehow his real position had been worked out in the Hindu scheme. It is another matter why he did not himself work it out.

In any case I have to record the two momentous facts of history: a state of impasse invariably preceded the decision to solve the problem to which it gave rise by the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal; and a dual situation arose in all the classical schemes which had to be judged in the same arbitrary fashion—I have already discussed the metaphysical grounds.

There is just one more simple comment to make before I close this review of classical thought. That comment is that the classical procedure, though arbitrary and groundless, achieved at least one supreme result: it prevented the collapse of the Universe, which was imminent. This was obviously a distinct contribution. But strangely enough, by the same cosmic provision, it also became the perennial source of any and every problem in European history our species has been heir to. Indeed it is the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal, the specific discovery of the classical age, that has been responsible for the perpetual conflicts of all history. Apparently the safety of the Universe was bought at the expense of its instability—as the Buddhists would say if they were to make a comment. And if by any chance this instability tends to be exclusive it will lead to the same result which collapse of the Universe would imply. There is only one alternative left that can save the situation; and that must be the discovery of Truth, which

alone can replace the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal. In no other way could the equal validity of 'unity' and 'individuality' be established.

If there is incontestable evidence that the problems did arise in the classical age of Europe it did not follow that they should also equally have infected the twentieth-century view. On the contrary, if the Universe, by cosmic necessity, had to make room for the problems in its course it was equally necessary that it should provide for their solution. As the Buddha said, 'if there is a disease, there is bound to be its cure'. In our language nothing can possibly happen in this Universe which could not, by its very nature, end: and it so happens that the twentieth-century view managed just to avoid infection as it arrived after the problems had already arisen, and necessarily implied their solution.

And it is a fact that the twentieth-century view has formulated a scheme of Reality in which the equal validity of both 'unity' and 'individuality' has been proved and established. It is no longer necessary that the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal should have to be considered.

But this claim about the twentieth-century view, however indisputable, has to wait for its complete verification till I have discovered the presence of the problem in the whole of European thought. So far, I have reviewed the classical history of Europe. I have to make equally a full review of modern European speculation to illustrate the presence of the problems in the full range of European history. It will be time then to discuss the solution offered by the twentieth-century view.

The question is: how did the modern speculation in Europe stand to the classical? Did modern European thought choose to travel exactly by the same route as the classical, and come, like it, precisely to the same conclusion? Did it actually face the problem in the shape of incompatibility and find itself in consequence compelled to deal with it by the same device—the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal? Finally, did the two distinctions of the 'simple' and the 'multiple', 'unity' and 'individuality', also waylay it on its course and force modern thought to recognise that the problem of organisation rose straight out of them?

To answer this question we have to note as a preliminary that modern European thought, in its strictly philosophic activity, did

not start as the classical so obviously did. My readers are familiar with the evidences I have suggested with regard to that claim, but I shall briefly re-state them. The ultimate categories, while they initially started the classical enquiry never once came into the picture in any stage of the modern philosophical enquiry. If the classical mind definitely began its positive construction with Being the modern mind started with '*Cogito*'—which certainly was not even a category. '*Cogito*' was the first incontestable certainty of the modern mind, whilst it was Being, one of the two ultimate categories, that provided the initial certainty for the classical mind.

Obviously, it was this primary difference between them that was to decide finally whether the modern mind would have to face a problem at all; and, if it was pre-ordained that it should, also what form or shape it would take. If a thinking individual forms the starting-point of an enquiry, that enquiry is sure to have to face at least 'individuality' and 'thinking'—its two undisputed progeny. And the main issue then will be whether this progeny will sooner or later stand out as incompatibles in the same way as did the 'simple' and the 'multiple', or 'unity' and 'individuality', of classical thought.

It is familiar history that the establishment of '*Cogito*' was followed immediately by the discovery that the individual mind was a 'container' with a dual content—'ideas' and 'sensations'. The terms are obviously non-technical. It is equally well known that Descartes derived his account of the Universe from an analysis of the 'idea of perfection', which, again, was not a category. This analysis is known as the ontological argument. It gave Descartes the Perfect God who in His turn created the Universe for Descartes with two 'substances' which he called by the names of 'consciousness' and 'extension'.

Like all creation, again, whether of divine origin or spontaneous or independent growth, the Cartesian theory had to pass through even acute criticism, at the hands of critics of great merit; and it seems that I in my turn may not be able to take those criticisms as altogether unjustified. In fact, to me, the Cartesian mode of analysis and the results derived from it after all introduced only a fresh device. If it was by no means a repetition of the classical scheme it was nevertheless a device, though of a different pattern from the classical. It will be possible for me as I come to formulate my

theory of knowledge to show that the doctrine of 'substance' and 'attributes', as well as the attempt to describe 'mind' in terms of such popular notions as 'container and contents' had no basis in either logic or fact. But I do not propose to discuss all these issues at the moment: I shall raise just one: did Descartes either explicitly or by implication presuppose the two classical distinctions of the 'simple' and the 'multiple', and 'unity' and 'individuality'? Or, to put the same question in a negative form, did the Cartesian speculation avoid the issue of problem altogether after it had to its complete satisfaction established the '*Cogito*'? (Incidentally, it would have made no difference to the ultimate result even if there was no occasion for Descartes to choose terms which are synonymous with 'simple' and 'multiple', or 'unity' and 'individuality': the issue would have arisen in any case if only the Cartesian terms, however different, created the same situation as did the 'simple' and the 'multiple'.)

This fact can easily be verified if we analyse the Cartesian theory of creation—in any case we must know Descartes' Universe to find out if the problem did or did not arise in it. It is well known that the Universe which God created had only two 'substances' as its constituents—'consciousness' and 'extension'. Equally, since this duality resulted from the divine mode of creation, it followed that God had to stand aloof from them, at least after the creation. It is impossible that God could be identified with His creation at any time, whatever divine powers might mean. As creator or cause, He must stand totally separate from the effect; and if, further, the effect His creation formed was a duality He had no alternative but to stand as Unity.

By the elementary law of identity, a cause has to have oneness in its integrity, and this primary condition which attached to all existence is not expected to lapse even if we have to deal with divinity. Indeed, if we must somehow accept God as the cause and creator of the Universe, we have to draw a line between the identity of God and that of the Universe. It is inconceivable that God and His creation should between them constitute one and the self-same entity, or produce something which is neither God nor His creation. And if creation in its turn had to be duality, there could be no alternative for God but to stand aloof and form Unity. In any case, it is too late in the day to discard such notions

as 'unity' and 'duality' as meaningless nonsense. I have discussed that subsidiary issue in *Related Multiplicity*, and proved that the latest school of thought on that subject is literally 'on a wild-goose chase'.

Similarly, if the two substances, 'consciousness' and 'extension', are associated with multiple modes or instances, they have to be called 'simple' since they cannot be identified with the 'multiple' modes, and it would be useless at this hour to attempt to discard either of these terms. There is no third term between the 'simple' and the 'multiple' and both of them are as conceivable as any ever suggested. The terms 'simple' and 'multiple', however, may not convey as much meaning as substance and modes do; exactly as the term 'God' may certainly mean much more than Unity or something quite different from it. But whatever this possible increase in the proportion of their significance may imply, they need not be supposed to contradict the claims which arise from their categorical significance—and categorical significance they cannot possibly forgo if they are to be taken as at all intelligible. They will have to abide by the conditions laid down by their categorical features. The evidences are in my *Related Multiplicity*, which I do not think need be scared by the Positivist's tale. God, in other words, cannot behave like Unity, for the same reason (*vide* the Law of Contradiction). The possibilities that may still be open to God by virtue of being God will have to wait for their fruition inside the boundary of His proverbial Unity.

May we not argue, then, that the distinctions of the 'simple' and the 'multiple', or 'unity' and 'individuality', did arise in the Cartesian scheme though they were neither noticed nor referred to. There was no alternative. If God created the Universe, in which the duality of 'consciousness' and 'extension' came into existence, God could not possibly cease to be Unity under any circumstances —not certainly as a result of that creation. Descartes, at any rate, kept Him at a safe distance from the Universe. For exactly similar reasons, if the two substances, 'consciousness' and 'extension', had multiple modes and instances attached to them under divine injunction, they could not cease to be 'simple' any more than the 'multiple' would cease to be 'multiple' by being attached to the 'substance'.

In any case the issue would immediately arise, could God—as

Unity—create a Universe of duality, or could the 'simples' have the 'multiple' as their modes or instances?

In classical thought, in all its ramifications, Unity and duality were found to be incompatible with one another. The Unity, therefore, was kept at a safe distance from duality. Parmenides simply had to refuse to move from his position with regard to the Absolute Positive, which was frankly Unity. Equally was the humanist adamant in holding that Ultimate Reality was the duality of Being and Non-Being, which is another name for 'individuality' The two positions never met.

Similarly, since Being and Non-Being, or the 'simple' and the 'multiple', were found to be mutually exclusive, they could not both be preserved on equal terms. That was frankly fatal to any organisation of Being and Non-Being.

And what this vividly meant is that Reality could not be both 'unity' and 'duality', or 'simple' and 'multiple', at the same time or on equal terms. If Reality is the Absolute Positive, it cannot be dual, but must remain as Absolute. Obviously, Reality would disappear into non-existence if it were made to put on both the Absoluteness of Unity and the individuality which results from the combination of Being and Non-Being. And the same would happen to Reality if it were compelled, in its dual state, to be both 'simple' and 'multiple', and that on equal terms.

The two pairs of distinctions were basically accepted as mutually exclusive.

Could Descartes, then, escape the perfectly enigmatic situation if he had to recognise that the distinctions were legitimately applicable to terms like 'God' and 'substance'? Could he possibly deny the distinctions if he was a rationalist? The questions had to be raised. Could God, again, who had to be regarded as Unity, escape the incompatibility of Unity and duality if He had to be both Unity and duality? Could He, finally, at all create—not to speak of creating a Universe in which duality appeared in a state of opposition as 'consciousness' and 'extension'?

It is obviously inconceivable that 'consciousness' as 'substance' would hold the 'multiple' as in any way attached to it if it had to be 'simple'. And how, in any case, would a Universe arise if the constituents have to be opposites? Would not that at once precipitate tension between them?

These are all legitimate questions which are bound to arise provided we do not reject with some impatience as meaningless all notions and terms except 'sensations', 'images' and a few more which we as mortals have to use for our daily existence, with or without any evidence. And I am raising these questions on the simple ground that at least Descartes had not the chance, by his sheer remoteness from the twentieth-century Positivist, of rejecting all thought. He was a rationalist who, under extreme pressure, almost recanted his adherence to the opposite faith at a certain stage of his speculation. That faith had nothing to do with Logical Positivism.

But what, really, is the answer which the Cartesian scholar has to give to these questions? Could he prove that there was a God whose existence depended entirely on Descartes' ontological argument? And if we waive all criticism of that argument and accept the Divine Presence, could such a God, who had to be Unity, create a Universe which is bound to be something different from that Unity? If creation, again, is taken for granted to save the divine credit for Omnipotence, could such a God cope with a Universe in which the 'opposites' did not for a single moment cease to prevail?

I do not know if there are any answers to these questions. In any case it is quite out of place at this late hour to repeat the three arguments—God's Omnipotence, Occasionalism, and 'parallel lines'—to rehabilitate the Cartesian theory of creation. They might be of value if an opposition to Descartes from the rival schools of thought had to be met. No defence need be sacrosanct. In the constant conflicts of history between opposing schools the value of an argument lay not so much in establishing the purity of its logic as in making a theory prevail. My interest, however unusual, lies in judging the truth-value of a scheme, since I feel confident that I have somehow reached a standard by which I can judge.

The main issue that I have been discussing refers to the presence of problem in modern European thought. The point for us is really to find out in what precise way the problem appeared in modern European history, and whether it was actually raised by Descartes. I have not the slightest doubt that the problem had not only to be there but was still there, lying totally unsolved. And now after this long analysis it becomes absolutely clear that

Descartes' God and 'substances', however different in appearance from the classical categories, were exposed to the same difficulties as the classical categories themselves were. They could not be bypassed under any circumstances.

But could, again, the immediate successors of Descartes—for instance, Spinoza and Leibnitz—escape the presence of the problem if Descartes did not? If the Cartesian theory of creation which had no categorical origin had to submit to the rigour of the categorical demand, could the doctrines of 'substance' and 'attributes' and monadic hierarchy in any way escape that rigour?

It seems to be obvious to ask—could Spinoza's 'substance', which was defined as self-sufficient, escape the status of Unity which the God of Descartes did not? And what would his 'attributes' be unless they constituted at least the 'multiple' or the 'many'? Even if we did concede to the 'substance' of Spinoza self-sufficiency—as all tradition has done and I do not—could self-sufficiency possibly claim the right of escaping the obligations of being Unity? And once we grant to the 'attributes' the feature of not being Unity, but its direct opposite, 'multiplicity', could we still think that they would cohere with Unity? These are legitimate issues which are only being repeated.

The same issue would arise with the monadic world which provides for 'individuality' as well as Unity in the hierarchy of monads. As Descartes' God, in spite of His Omnipotence, had to submit to the exigencies of the categorical world, Spinoza's 'substance' and Leibnitz's 'highest monad' would have also to share the same predicament, and for exactly the same reason. No claim on their behalf on the score of Omnipotence, which the new terms 'god', 'substance' and 'monad' imply, would establish an immunity for them from the enigma of problem rising straight out of incompatibility. One cannot escape the categories, whatever their disguises.

Some other claim has to be found for the 'god', 'substance' and 'monad' if we want to guarantee that immunity. A 'god', or 'substance', or 'monad' would make good their Omnipotence, Self-Sufficiency and Perfection only if by some cosmic preparation the inherent incompatibilities of such categories as 'unity' and 'individuality' or the 'simple' and the 'multiple' have been already removed. Not till that transformation has taken place in the struc-

ture of the categories would Omnipotence, Self-Sufficiency and Perfection by themselves be of any value, except as possibilities.

And we may add that nothing of what we have meant by them since the beginning of history would survive, the moment that transformation had taken place. This is a far-reaching comment to make but it is long overdue.

Perhaps it was only a make-believe, however inevitable, that one could solve the problem inherent in the heart of the categories by a mere change of name of the categories. And here in all likelihood was the real evidence why the school which made thought the creation of language arose; it could not have arisen in a vacuum. And once it had arisen, its claim to recognition might have remained unaffected if it had not, in a sudden mood, prophetically suggested that thought could not be re-interpreted, or if the stigma that came to be attached to thought on the score of being artificial or unverifiable was fixed and permanent. Perhaps the prophecy itself was meant inadvertently to be an instance in which thought was unavoidably absent from their scheme! And certainly their credit did not improve when they failed to note the inherent deficiency of their own positive standpoint. That was the second time, perhaps, that thought became moderately conspicuous by its absence in their scheme! Indeed, if criticism had not a prehistoric right of existence, and make-believe had not formed a legitimate part in the career of all schools of thought, the new school of the twentieth century would have found it extremely hard and strenuous work to make any impression on its contemporaries.

It is not necessary, however, that I should explore the whole field of modern European history to illustrate my thesis with reference to the significance of problem. That is an issue for the historian; my duty particularly is to find out if terms such as 'god', 'substance' and 'monad', which are not synonyms for 'unity' and 'individuality', or 'simple' and 'multiple', indicate the presence of the problem exactly as the others do. And this duty I had to undertake by reason of a simple historical fact: the presumption arose that the issue of problem in human history had automatically disappeared since the arrival of these terms to replace the categories. As if what the ultimate categories of the classical school failed to achieve was instantly achieved by the terms known in

their guise as 'ideas'. It was altogether forgotten that the foundation of the Universe rested entirely on the categories—provided we still had any respect for evidence. If the categories had ever completely failed to supply evidence against the sceptical claim there would remain only one prospect for the Universe in its concrete fullness—that was to float serenely in limitless confusion for ever. How would this benefit the Logical Positivist? No 'god', or 'substance' or 'monad' would or could be there to rescue that Universe from such catastrophe! Should my contemporary Positivist still deny the categories?

IV

A review which now falls due of the empirical school on the same issue may, however, be introduced by a preliminary analysis of its origin and sudden historic prominence. The first thing to note, obviously, refers to the question: what is the background and basis of that school? And the answer is that it is exactly the same as that which its rival school, the rationalist, implies—the '*Cogito*'—although there seems to be no direct reference to it in the archives of this school. It need not, however, be supposed that one could find at least some trace of the categorical enquiry in the effort of this school to get at absolute certainty. All that stands to its credit is only a mild critical enquiry, which serves as a prelude to the formulation of its creed—and, what is truly unfortunate, this critical enquiry, however responsible, was not robust enough to reach the sceptical level. It would be difficult to hold that the Baconian reference to the 'Idols' should be taken as the model of sceptical enquiry—it did not even reach the high-water mark of Cartesian criticism. It has to be admitted, therefore, that the empiricist, in this inaugural stage, put down his main creed as a result of the Cartesian analysis of the contents of the '*Cogito*'. The thesis that 'sensation' is the Ultimate Reality could not be derived from any other source, especially as '*Cogito*' ruled out every other source and stood there as the only instance of truth. And certainly there is no evidence that the '*Cogito*' was denied in this school, even by inadvertence. On the contrary neither of the two main implications of '*Cogito*', the 'individual' and 'consciousness', did ever form the subject-matter of serious dispute in the empirical scheme. What was disputed was the

validity of Idea, one of the two obvious contents of '*Cogito*'. It is indeed inconceivable how any empiricist could deny that 'sensation' implied both 'consciousness' and 'individuality'. Perhaps not till later experiments such as Behaviourism excluded 'consciousness' arbitrarily, almost as a matter of whim, and put 'movement' in its place, was there even a suggestion that 'sensation' could do without 'consciousness'. At least 'consciousness' and 'individuality' were considered to be essential to 'sensation', as it was introduced by Bacon. Even the phrase 'direct and immediate certainty', the holy command of the school, need not be supposed to cut into the central claim of the '*Cogito*' in the empirical school.

If '*Cogito*', therefore, had to be taken as the basis of empiricism, it follows that whatever contents it presumably had should have been given by the empiricist exactly the same status with reference to validity. 'Ideas' should have been admitted to recognition in the same way as 'sensation' was, since their position, as contents of the '*Cogito*', was in no way inferior to that of 'sensation'.

One cannot deny the supreme importance of the '*Cogito*' in the empirical scheme and it might be worth-while if I deal with it at much greater length. The question arises: how was it that the '*Cogito*', which was the sole instance of indubitable certainty, should in a strange way provide also for a typical case of uncertainty in the very core of its identity? Could it maintain its indubitable certainty and at the same time hold in its identity contents which were partly certain and partly uncertain? How, again, did duality, which was undeniably the main source of incompatibility, find a place in the absolute integrity of '*Cogito*'? Does not this very natural question sound like the time-worn issue: could the Infinite, with any justification, give rise to the Finite? or the Real to the Unreal? or the 'simple' to the 'multiple'? The fact is that the arguments which have piled up in the course of centuries to ease the situation could never meet the initial difficulties. It has not even been cleared up how duality, the source of all incompatibility, could enter the heart of any integrity which must necessarily be certain and unique. Still, though all these issues are by no means either fresh or original perhaps they will bear repetition: indeed, it may do us good in many ways to remind ourselves that we have not in the course of from three to six thousand years ever succeeded in establishing the case for either 'sensation' or 'idea',

or proved the claim of 'immediate perception' to certainty, or that of thought to necessity. And if there is no further direct yield from such repetition as to the real relationship between fact and thought, it may at least be taken as a necessary preliminary to any fresh discovery. As the mystic insists on concentration as the only technique for what he calls 'insight' so the philosopher may insist on repetition, which looks very much like it. But what I am trying to suggest is that if the review itself does not lead directly to any solution, it may make us in due time see some feature in the '*Cogito*' which may be essential for the real solution. What I mean is, that, after such reviews in the twentieth century, the contents of '*Cogito*' may suddenly appear as indeed nothing but fresh instances of the 'simple' and 'multiple' of classical history. We may even be able to see—what our predecessors did not see—that '*Cogito*', even though it could not be confused with a category, was by no means immune from the agony of holding a problem in its core, as the categories did. Its contents, at any rate, must have been actually exposed to this agony, since by their duality they stood necessarily liable to incompatibility. It will never do for us to forget that it is duality or multiplicity which is, in the last analysis, the source of all problem. If we have to take the '*Cogito*' as the bearer or container of dual contents, we must be prepared for the consequences which duality is bound to precipitate. Indeed the issue, strictly speaking, is not merely whether Descartes started from the level of concrete experience rather than from the categorical level; the issue also is whether by that change of procedure he kept clear of the range of duality and multiplicity. And yet such an escape itself, even if it were actually reached by a miracle, could by no means be an advantage to Descartes, since the alternative to duality was solipsism, which meant nothing short of the silence of death. The fact is that '*Cogito*' not only missed the chance of arriving at Absolute Truth since it was not an ultimate category; it shared also with the categorical investigation of history the necessity of facing the enigma of incompatibility.

What happened, therefore, was that discrimination between 'idea' and 'sensation' had to be made, not on the historic grounds advanced for centuries but for one simple reason—that they appeared to be incompatible with one another. They turned out, for all practical purposes, to be 'simple' and 'multiple', or 'unity'

and 'individuality' of the classical tradition, though well disguised or completely hidden. The problem, therefore, was bound to arise —the problem of solving the incompatibles in the shape of 'sensation' and 'idea'. And it did. Could they be provided for on equal terms, as they had to be? And as the problem, once it had arisen, was not solved by a fresh interpretation of 'sensation' and 'idea', the alternative was either to repeat the classical procedure or to look for a diversion. The modern mind was much too ambitious not to look for a diversion: it refused to repeat the classical dichotomy of the Real and Unreal.

I have already mentioned that the movement inaugurated in the seventeenth century was towards Parmenidean monism or Unity; it chose to build on either the 'idea' or 'sensation', and not on them both equally. Obviously, here was a clear departure from the duality of humanism, since the emphasis was laid either on 'idea' or on 'sensation', to the detriment of the one or the other and therefore to both in the long run. And this strategic move, astutely conceived, prevented at least the persistence of the problem for the time being; in a monistic situation the problem cannot arise due to the clear absence of the source from which alone incompatibles could spring. It is a historical fact that Parmenides never had to face the problem of the incompatibles: he chose the eternal silence of the Absolute—and perhaps is still there, if we judge by the records! But neither the rationalist nor the empiricist could possibly preserve the monistic calm for long. They had to return to the life of the 'multiple', though in the attenuated form either of 'ideas' or 'sensations'. They were much too modern to stay long on the sombre height of monism, which was bound to petrify into the frozen horizon of Mystical Unity. Soon they descended, in the language of figure, to the lower levels where the 'multiple' prevailed to be recuperated by the balmy air of the expanding plains. And once there, they were soon exposed to the inevitable incompatibilities which the 'multiple' constantly bred. They are still, it seems, in that firm grip, gasping.

I may now close this long analysis of the origin of problem with the final comment that problem appeared in both the classical and modern thought of Europe in exactly the same form, in spite of the fact that the structures of thought in the two ages widely differed.

The issue as to whether the twentieth-century scheme is equally exposed to the emergence of problem may now be raised. I have already said that it is not so exposed, since it arrived after human history had already had a full taste of problem. Problems are not eternal phenomena—if the Universe, as a matter of course, has to make provision for them, it is equally under obligation to supply them with solutions. That is possibly the reason why the twentieth-century view has succeeded in removing the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal by a fresh interpretation of the two pairs of terms; 'unity' and 'individuality', the 'simple' and the 'multiple'. Here is an augury for a new stage in the Universe which will wholly replace the period of conflict by the period of harmony.

The issue that arises now is the issue of the specific problem known as the problem of knowledge. This problem, as we have seen, arose in modern European thought after Descartes had formulated his '*Cogito*' as the only basis of certainty, and it took this simple form—how could 'mind' and something else which is not 'mind' but is opposed to it as its contrary co-operate with one another and produce knowledge? If co-operation between 'thought' and 'extension' is essential to the origin of knowledge, could 'thought' and 'extension', which are contraries or incompatibles, in any sense of the term co-operate?

Though obviously simple in its outline, the problem still remains unsolved. There have been even moments when it was on the point of being dropped. Perhaps for the last half-century it has been honestly held that it should be given a burial. It may sound strange but solution of problems by this method of downright negation has almost been the order of the day in the twentieth century. Even the whole realm of thought has been robustly negated in this fashion, with the confident expectation that the problems inherent in it would automatically disappear. The problems persisted, however, in spite of such downright violence. In the end, neither method—the one of simply by-passing it or the other of trying to solve it by accepting it as problem—made any difference to its prospects. It continued to exist. Indeed one cannot help comparing, in the language of figure, these methods and their temporary results to the long-tailed birds which, during the course of a well-arranged shoot, fall dead in the copses, to the delight of all, but fly out again to everyone's utter surprise.

If the problem persists, it follows that it has to be reopened and discussed; and it seems legitimate to hope that one may not only trace its origin but find for it a truly adequate solution. At any rate, I may fairly claim to have a completely fresh technique of approach, and this may succeed in resolving the problem where all other approaches have failed. This approach, however, is relevant only to what I have described as the Discontinuous Universe, which forms part of a completely new scheme of Reality. It is necessary, therefore, that I should postpone reviewing the problem of knowledge from this new angle till I have laid, at least broadly, the structure of the Universe. Here begins, strictly, an account of my Cosmology. I shall now open the theme of the Universe.

CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM OF BEGINNING

THE Universe whose lay-out is my immediate and chief concern is the Discontinuous Universe and not the Continuous which both precedes and succeeds the Discontinuous—a cosmic necessity which marks the main, ultimate features of the relationship between the two. This feature has been already amply discussed in *The Real and the Negative* and in *Related Multiplicity* and needs no fresh review. Nor is it necessary that I should repeat the logical account of the origin of the two Universes: the main arguments of that account—which derives from the two ultimate categories, Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being—are familiar by now. The Continuous forms the Reality which Being and Non-Being in their two separate, unrelated states embody: while the Discontinuous is only another name for the Reality which Being and Non-Being in their strictly related state constitute. Between them they form the triadic pattern of Reality which I have described as the Continuous, the Discontinuous and the Continuous in my main position. To my knowledge, no history or tradition referred to such a scheme.

I may perhaps repeat that the Discontinuous is altogether free from any direct complicity with the Universes which fall beyond the region which begins and ends—I mean those realms which have no beginning but an end, or begin but have no end. The Discontinuous stands by itself, totally independent and original though definitely implied by the other two.

This, obviously, is a very broad outline and will naturally increase in proportion as my analysis steadily progresses. By its clear urgency, however, the question of 'beginning', with reference to the Discontinuous Universe, calls for immediate analysis.

It may sound strange but the fact is that the problem of 'beginning', like most other problems of ultimate proportion, still remains in all philosophic speculation unsolved and rather obscure. Here is, to all appearance, an obvious instance of what may justly be called by the name of universal failure, if we go closely into the

records of human thought. And if in such an extremely precarious situation there may still be some prospect of relief, it must lie in what many in the twentieth century would describe as pure chance. The age is in no mood to cultivate thought with any respect and may ere long incline towards the abyss of cynicism faster than one expects. Curiously enough, I still value thought and so feel quite assured that the scheme of Reality I have formulated may point the way to the deep-seated grounds of what I have described as universal failure.

A review of this historic anomaly obviously falls outside the range of this enquiry. Since my main philosophic position is in no way bound up with that anomaly I have no obligation to undertake its review till I come to the issue of the reinterpretation of history. What instead falls due is a fresh statement, if possible, of the problem of 'beginning'—and that wholly in the light of my own scheme of Reality. The difficulties inevitably connected with this issue, one may presume, must have already been exhaustively analysed.

The notion of 'beginning', as I see it, implies at least two other distinct notions:

(*a*) the notion of some entity which must begin and, therefore, cannot be eternal—at least in the sense of existing without a beginning by its own right;
(*b*) the notion of at least another type of entity which does not in the nature of things begin and therefore must be eternally existing, though it is bound to come to an end.

Evidently these two implications form, as it were, the crux of the whole issue of beginning, and the question which immediately arises is, is there any evidence in history that a case for these two types of entities, one which does not begin but ends and the other which both begins and ends, has ever been made? Does any system of thought give an account of the 'eternal' in the sense that it does not begin but ends, and therefore can legitimately precede the entity which begins and ends? Do we come across in any recorded scheme of thought the claim for the existence of an entity which does not begin but must end? The answer to both questions is in the negative. There is no sign in any tradition either of an entity which has no beginning but ends, or of one which begins and also

has to end (in the sense in which we take the two notions of beginning and ending). Besides, if such entities have to be, in the nature of things, independent of one another and completely original, there could naturally be no occasion in tradition even to conceive of them. What had to be conceived of, instead, and also firmly believed in was the stature of an entity which if it had no beginning equally never ended—what is generally known as the Infinite and Absolute. And it made no difference if such an Absolute was described universally either in a monistic or in a pluralistic way. The fact is that the Mystical Unity whether आत्मन् *Ātman* or निर्वाण *Nirvāṇa*, and the humanistic individuality, whether 'simple' or 'multiple', and finally the dualistic 'community', whether Earth or Heaven, were all claimed to be without a beginning or end.

Equally that which was supposed to begin and was not eternal in the hierarchic school was the result of creation or emanation or diminution of the eternal. It was not Real but Unreal and therefore neither independent nor original. There was no place in this scheme for the entity or event which really began or could begin if we look for consistency.

And exactly the same conclusion has to be drawn with regard to the beginning of an event in the equalitarian school where a case for 'beginning' was so ostentatiously made. It is familiar history that the Real was claimed by this school to be not only unique but also particular; this claim again was held as a matter of creed or perhaps as just simple, naïve faith. But there seems to be no evidence that the unique or particular of this school was, or could be, a fact and not indeed an illusion; there was just a pious conviction that it was fact. And so the unique which existed in this school existed only as an illusion which the school took to be truth.

Somehow it was not fully realised that unless there was a provision for the real antecedent to the 'unique particular', which was by its nature changeful, the 'particular' could not possibly come into existence. The condition follows from the definition of the 'particular' which was changeful. Obviously there would be a vacuum or void preceding it in the absence of that antecedent. And no vacuum, since it was another name for the Absolute Negative, would allow the existent to enter its realm, not to speak of the unique and independent. And if it is contended that the

school was fully aware of the need for an antecedent, and did provide for it, the fact is that what was provided was not even a pseudo-antecedent. It was not seen that an antecedent could not function as such unless it was completely free from the precarious necessity of having an antecedent in its turn. The critic very soon pointed out that the theory of constant change which is the philosophic faith of this school provided only the panorama of infinite regress—there could be no chance left after that to trace the real antecedent. Indeed, unless one could suggest a conception of Reality which did not need a beginning for its origin and yet had full capacity for ending its career it was impossible that an antecedent to an event which began could be found. There was no other way to provide for an antecedent to an event, nor, for the matter of that, to account for the phenomenon of beginning.

No school of thought, therefore, can with any legitimacy be credited with a theory of 'beginning' which was dependable. If the Absolute of tradition, for instance, neither began nor ended, it was obviously incapable of accounting for 'beginning'—it was after all total and complete existence and made the 'beginning' of events and entities impossible. And it made no difference what form the Absolute of tradition might or did take; whether the Absolute appeared in a monistic shape as Changeless Unity or in the pluralistic form as 'changeful individuality', it had to be total and complete. In either case, totality and completeness had to characterise it since there was no other way to provide for certainty in its career, the *sine qua non* of existence. It is still perhaps easy to see that the monistic form, with its stand for the Changeless Unity, could have no difficulty in reaching totality and completeness: and if it is not in the same way obvious how a series of changes could also appear as total and complete, the alternatives were two; the pluralistic Absolute had either to abandon its claim to absoluteness for total certainty or boldly to rear that claim on the plea that there was such a thing as a positive framework of infinite changes which was comprehensive and capacious. It could not possibly preserve its claim to absoluteness without totality in some form, as the only means of escaping uncertainty. In an ever changing Infinite, which has no beginning or end, there can be no root for existence.

There was indeed no alternative to totality, though one could

as a matter of choice discriminate between monistic and pluralistic totality: and the fact that all history testified to is that neither of the two devices 'delivered the goods', to talk in popular language; they lived and died as devices. The case for 'beginning', therefore, could not be made if it had to depend on the conception of the Absolute, whatever its form. And as the Absolute was the only conceivable Reality in tradition, the case for 'beginning' was never made; it remained to be made.

But does my position provide for the existence of the entity or of the event which begins? Do I suggest, by any chance, an account of the antecedent which could be trusted to meet the necessary implications of the notion of 'beginning'?

The answer is in the affirmative. The simple reason is that what I have described as the first Continuous—that which does not begin but ends—easily provides for the antecedent and makes it possible for the Discontinuous Universe to begin.

Evidently, there was no vacuum anywhere eternally existing, since Non-Being, a name given by me to the first Continuous, was without a beginning. The possibility of that which begins and needs an antecedent, therefore, was guaranteed by the eternal presence of Non-Being. Nor could any fresh difficulty arise to neutralise that possibility. The fulfilment was bound to take place since there could be no attempt on the part of the first Continuous to stand in the way of that possibility by eternal endurance. It had to come to an end: there was no alternative, though that necessity did not by any chance mark any deficiency in it—there can be no provision for any deficiency in the Universe except as illusion.

We may therefore safely conclude by repeating:

(1) the first Continuous makes the vacuum or the void impossible, as it existed without a beginning. The Discontinuous could not have begun if the vacuum had been there without a beginning.

(2) the first Continuous, again, since it is not the Infinite of tradition which neither begins nor ends, ends after it has existed without a beginning. The Discontinuous, therefore, begins as the first Continuous disappears.

Here is the true conception of 'antecedent', and it avoids the

two well-known devices of tradition to characterise it, the 'unconditioned' of Aristotle and the nightmare of 'infinite regress'. We need no longer introduce the 'unconditioned' in despair, as if it could arrest the even flow of 'infinite regress'; nor need we let the constant changes pursue the course of an endless, uncertain Infinite to safeguard the simple, forlorn event.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FORM AND CONSTITUTION OF THE DISCONTINUOUS UNIVERSE

If there is sufficient ground to conclude that there is nothing to invalidate the notion of 'beginning', the issue that now arises refers to the form and constitution of the Universe that begins and ends. I have to formulate what can roughly be described as its organisation, its unique and specific structure by which alone it can be distinguished. Obviously the Universe, as it is concrete Reality which begins and ends, must have a structure—and it may be added that no organisation which is to embody the Universe can exist and function without a purpose in some phase of it or other. If the Universe has to exist it has not only to cherish a purpose but also to realise it. To exist is not necessarily the same thing as to create.

But how shall I discover what the organisation or the purpose of the Universe is or can be? I have no datum to go upon except the categorical, and the only category that I can utilise is the 'category of both beginning and ending'. I am assured that the Discontinuous Universe begins and ends: but I know nothing more about it except that it must be preceded by a Universe which did not begin but ends and equally must be succeeded by another which begins but never ends. This certainly means that they do not co-exist and must be independent of one another, but can I from such meagre data, however ultimate, form any idea about the organisations of the two Continuous Universes and the Discontinuous Universe? It does not seem that I can.

But may I not, it may be argued, form at least some idea by a close comparison of the Continuous and Discontinuous Universes assuming that there is some similarity between them? Even if it may be a fact that the two Universes must, in the nature of things, be essentially different from one another, could not similarities between them (whatever they may be) make us somewhat the wiser with reference to the shape and form of their organisations? With-

out doubt both of them are equally distinguishable from the Absolute, whether Positive or Negative. The Absolute is only conceivable, while the Continuous and Discontinuous are not only conceivable but they definitely exist as concrete Universes: and they exist in a manner which makes Time, in its Cosmic sense, the prime factor in their constitution. May not these similarities between the Continuous and Discontinuous have at least some bearing on the differences which indisputably testify to their independence and uniqueness? The answer is in the negative: similarities, in my view, are not what the Platonic 'universals' took them to be. Indeed, in my scheme, the whole question of relationship between agreement and difference stands on a plane which keeps clear of all traditional formulations. I shall deal with this issue later.

There is, indeed, no alternative to falling back upon the basal datum, the category of 'cosmic time' as the only medium for discovering the constitution of the Universe. If the Discontinuous must begin and end, that basal fact alone should indicate the way by which the form of its constitution should and might be traced.

The indication is that we shall have to go back to the two ultimate categories, Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, since it is these two ultimate categories that determine in a special sense all basal notions of cosmic proportion. If it was inevitable that the Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being had to exist as both related and non-related, at least three conceptions of Time were bound to arise. This meant that there had to be three distinct Universes with beginnings and endings distributed in three different formations. The categories therefore are:

(*a*) no beginning but ending,
(*b*) beginning and also ending,
(*c*) beginning but no ending.

(The fourth view—no beginning and no ending, the traditional Infinite or Absolute—is found in my scheme to be impossible though perfectly conceivable.)

But what can the duality of Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, as the main constituents of the Universe, possibly indicate as to the structure of the Discontinuous Universe which has to begin and end? Does it, for instance, mean that the Universe can

only be dual and not, by any chance, even multiple or plural?

This is the first significant question to raise with regard to the structure of the Universe. If we cannot take the Discontinuous Universe as Absolute—the constituents are dual—are we obliged to take it as only dual?

The answer is in the negative. If the Discontinuous Universe has to have both Being and Non-Being instead of only Being or Non-Being, it is bound to have a third feature which we must describe as relationship. (One somehow is reminded of the Chinese philosopher who suddenly said to his pupil: 'If there is a bay horse and a dun cow, there must be a third thing!') The absence of relationship, whatever it might mean, would mean at least the 'state of absolute differents', which in my view is pseudo-negative—it leads to the state of solipsism straight away, and then to the Absolute Negative, which is the terminus of solipsism. (I do not know if the Chinese philosopher implies all these serious consequences.) The Discontinuous Universe, though the entities which constitute it must be dual, has to make room, therefore, in its constitution for something more than bare duality, since relationship has to play an important part in it. Even if there cannot be more than two types of entities, these entities have to appear in a form which will provide for relationship and therefore something which cannot be covered by simple duality.

What is it, then, that relationship as such contributes towards the constitution of the Discontinuous Universe? If, again, relationship is not and cannot be a third entity, what could it be? It cannot be a third entity, since the Positive and the Negative between them exhaust the possibilities of the types of entities or existents. What then could relationship be?

The answer to this question implies a preliminary analysis of the term 'existence', the next ultimate term after Being and Non-Being. If the term 'existence' has not only to be distinguished from the terms 'Being' and 'Non-Being' but also to be considered as a penultimate category, it is obvious that it should not be identified with Being and Non-Being. An analysis of this category, therefore, may indicate the way to the interpretation of 'relationship', which is a synonym neither of 'existence' nor of Being or Non-Being. Obviously it cannot be another name for 'Being' since it cannot in that case be associated with Non-Being as well, nor

for Non-Being, for a similar reason. It is a third category which follows Being and Non-Being. What then is it?

As a matter of strict logical analysis there appear to be three distinct notions as presuppositions of the term 'existence': 'identity', 'objective' and 'function'. Here is undoubtedly a specific condition laid down for a claim to existence on the part of the Universe, or of any constituent of it, which is not implied even by the Laws of Thought. The Universe, with its constituents, Being and Non-Being, though categorically certain, will fail to reach the world of existence if it is not possible that Being and Non-Being could in any sense possess specific identities, objectives and suitable functions to realise them. The issue of existence is not merely whether the Universe has an identity of its own; the issue also is whether the constituents of the Universe have the chance, not only of existing with identities but also of having objectives and functions to realise them. Obviously there can be no question about their identities unless we repudiate the Law of Identity; and there are equally valid reasons which account for their strictly purposive character which I shall presently discuss.

Strangely, however, these qualifications appear separately in separate stages of the Universe, as I shall, with full evidence, show later on. Such separate appearance, though strange, is perfectly possible and wholly consistent, since the question whether the Universe could be absolutely one whole instead of a Universe of Stages, simultaneous or successive, does not arise in my scheme. My Universe is frankly and necessarily a Universe of Stages—an issue of ultimate importance which I shall presently discuss. But I may add here that the Stages which constitute the Discontinuous Universe are strictly dual; the Stage of existence, pure and simple, and the Stage which embodies creation.

It is the Stage of existence, by the way, which we shall call by the name of Primal Stage, which perhaps bears pre-eminently the qualification of its identity. And it so happens that there cannot be any sign in it of the two other qualifications, Objective and Function. These appear normally in the Second Stage, in which the cardinal phenomena of purpose and its realisation are strictly embodied. (Evidence follows.)

What, however, these two Stages are and what exactly is implied by the separate existence of the three qualifications is a

subject for later analysis, but I may repeat that if the Universe, with its constituents Being and Non-Being, has to exist with all the three qualifications, Identity, Objective and Function, to exist at all, it does not follow that it must be qualified by them all at once and altogether or not at all. On the contrary, it may—and will—exist in different Stages in which it will be qualified separately by them. I have already referred to the Primal Stage in which the Universe just exists; I shall add that the Primal Stage will be followed by another Stage in which the same constituents, Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, will profess a common purpose and function to realise it.

The issue of existence if we do not go any further, therefore, implies three conditions:

(1) we have to establish Being by disproving Absolute Non-Being—the classical tradition of human history worked out this conclusion with universal consent.
(2) we have to establish the Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being by disproving the Absolute Being—this is my own specific suggestion: no tradition reached this conclusion. I have drawn it already in *Related Multiplicity*.
(3) we have to establish the validity of the three notions of 'identity', 'objective' and 'function'. This is also my own position.

And it is only after we have fully attested these three specific conditions that we could be sure that the dual Non-Absolute, that of Being and Non-Being, was perfectly capable of existing provided there was no fresh difficulty standing in its way. The above three notions in any case have to be established as cardinal implications of the notion of 'existence'. To exist, the Universe must be capable of possessing identity, objective and function to realise it. It cannot miss any one of them; nor, strictly, could it begin its career with any but the notion of identity.

But even these cardinal implications of existence need not exhaust the conditions of concrete existence. The Universe could still remain as only a categorical certainty, which by itself would be sufficient only to neutralise the still outstanding sceptical claim. There is at least another condition which Being and Non-Being have to satisfy before they can be trusted to inaugurate the Primal

Stage of the Discontinuous Universe—indeed we shall not be quite out of the wood of speculation with reference to concrete existence until we have solved the issue of relationship which I have already raised. The Universe, in other words, cannot reach concrete maturity till we have seen how the Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being exist as related duality.

All this speculation, by the way, need not be taken to mean that I am claiming actually to build up the Universe or to be the real architect of it: it only means that I am trying to prove its claim to existence. That, indeed—and nothing else—happens to be my special function with reference to the Universe: to prove its existence. Could it possibly be anything else? And it is by no means strange that such a function should not only presuppose an existent Universe but also a state of doubt with regard to its existence, with a sceptical claim following it. The fact is that, even if we human beings did not create either the Universe or ourselves, we are fully free to doubt its existence and then raise it out of that doubt. There is sufficient evidence, therefore, for what is known as the 'conceit' of the 'mere creature' of God—as if he was the real architect of the universe. Strangely such a conceit has been inevitable in the Cosmic scheme.

A case for 'related duality' has, however, already been made—duality by itself cannot possibly constitute the concrete Universe. A state of 'absolute differents', which alone is possible to duality, is of no avail if we want to establish the concrete Universe. It leads necessarily to the crisis of non-existence which the notion of 'absolute differents' implies. If the Universe has to survive the crisis, it has to develop the features which 'related duality' implies. And as these mean both 'identity' and 'uniqueness', Being and Non-Being in addition to their other features have to exist as both unique and identical with one another—the obvious implication of relationship.

The conclusion is therefore that the existence of Being and Non-Being in their concrete fullness means that Being and Non-Being must be capable of existing with identical and unique natures, objectives and functions if they are to exist at all. Altogether they must presuppose five distinct notions: 'identity', 'objective', 'function', 'uniqueness', 'identicalness'. It does not, however, follow that the five notions as presuppositions must

actually constitute Being and Non-Being—a fundamental issue which will be amply discussed later on. In the meantime I may point out that, since they are categories and not concrete entities —the function of categories is not to constitute but to lay down the evidentiary basis of the concrete Universe—their logical and metaphysical validity is only an evidence that there is nothing to stand in the way of the Universe as a concrete reality. And this is exactly what is meant by metaphysical speculation, the point of which is to develop complete and sufficient evidence for the possibility of the concrete Universe; it does so by building up a categorical structure which disproves for good the sceptical claim: 'Nothing is.'

If, however, the Universe has to be related duality, it follows at once that it must at least be a multiple Universe—the first indication about its structure—which is neither absolute nor dual. Even if the constituents of the Universe still have to remain dual, i.e. Being and Non-Being—no third entity being conceivable—that pre-condition need make no difference to its indisputable claim to be multiple. The issue, therefore, is what precisely is the meaning of the term 'multiple' or what exactly has a Universe to be if in no circumstances can it be absolute or dual? How shall we define the term 'multiple' as distinguished from the terms 'simple' or 'dual'?

The terms 'many' and 'plurality' may easily, in the light of all tradition, be confused with synonyms of 'multiple'; but the fact is that they are not synonyms. They do not, however, contradict the notion of the 'multiple', but normally presuppose it.

The strict interpretation of the term 'multiple', however, will have to follow and not precede the laying down of at least an outline of the Stage of the Universe which we have referred to as the Primal Stage. Since this Stage is, as it were, the corner-stone of the structure of the whole Universe, it is necessary to initiate all enquiry about that structure with an analysis of what should constitute its most outstanding feature. That feature is that the Stage as it comes into existence makes room for two simultaneous states of both Being and Non-Being.

(1) one in which the Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being exist in a state of identicalness;

(2) another in which Being and Non-Being exist in a state of distinctness.

The claim is extremely unusual and requires an elaborate analysis: but if for the sake of argument we take it for granted, it has to be admitted at once that the Primal Stage cannot be described as either 'simple' or 'dual' in its structure. In fact the term 'multiple' will appear to be the only term relevant to it, because Being and Non-Being are bound to exist in three distinct forms in the Primal Stage: two distinct and one identical. It is obvious that if Being and Non-Being must exist, if at all, as unique in two forms and also as non-unique and non-distinct in only one form, the forms altogether have to be three. (This will be fully evidenced as we go on.) And this means that the term 'multiple' must at least indicate the numerical proportion of three (here is a clear indication of mathematical truth) a number which must dictate the shape of the unit in the organisation of the Discontinuous Universe. In other words, the unit must be a group of three distinct existents —not one, or two, or even more than three. Can we, then, help calling it multiple? I need hardly mention the historic reference to this number in all tradition.

It will be stupid, however, even to imply that there is nothing unusual in such a claim. Indeed, it will not be a surprise to us if the contemporary philosophic mind finds it to be meaningless nonsense.

For ourselves, only a most searching analysis assured us that it was nothing short of a blessing to be able to stage the primal state of the universe on such a firm basis. It has proved to be as it were the corner-stone of the whole cosmology, as our readers will soon find out.

A question of supreme importance arises at once, however: can Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, if they have to stand related, be supposed to exist in two separate states and yet preserve their identities, if the Laws of Thought have to be in any case upheld? How can Being and Non-Being be both distinct from and identical with one another if they must be credited with one and the same identity? Is not that exactly what the Laws of Identity and Contradiction strictly prohibit? What does 'identity', after all, mean if not what the clear formulation of the Law of Identity obviously upholds?

The answer to this question is that Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being do not by any chance violate the Law of Identity, since

their separate states do not between them form one single state. The Law of Identity applies only to single states. If it is actually applied to separate states, it would have to be applied separately —it should be applied to the state of distinctness as well as to the state of identicalness by two separate acts, as it were. One will have to find out if the state of distinctness is consistent, or self-contradictory, exactly as it has to be proved or disproved that the state of identicalness is consistent.

We are called upon here to deal with two separate existents of the same Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being. So the issue does not arise whether Being and Non-Being do actually violate the Law of Identity by being distinct and identical at the same time, simply because they are not expected to be identical and distinct in one single state.

The same issue may be repeated, though in a different form: can Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being possibly be in separate states or must they not, in the nature of things, necessarily be in one simple state? It may even be argued that an entity, whatever it may be, if it is to exist at all must necessarily exist in one integral state—and never in more than one. In other words, the enquiry will imply that identity must necessarily take the simple form of the 'monistic', or 'absolute', state, since it is only in that state that totality is presupposed. And after that neither of the two notions—the simple categorical duality of Being and Non-Being or the related duality of Being and Non-Being—will escape the rigour of the monistic absolute. In fact nothing short of a very curious situation will arise: on the one hand, Being and Non-Being will need related duality, if they exist at all and do not remain in the limbo of the Negative; on the other hand the Law of Identity will make the possibility of dual states, the necessary implication of related duality, impossible. The prospects of the Universe, at that rate, would at once stand gravely imperilled.

The issue is naturally a very serious one, since it would imply nothing short of the collapse of the universe: but what, exactly, is implied by the condition that existence must mean 'monistic existence'? Why should an entity, such as Being or Non-Being, have to exist in only one simple state all at once and in as comprehensive a state as possible if it is to exist at all? The form which is

not in any sense comprehensive is evidently partial and therefore cannot be called a form since it is not real.

But do the Laws of Thought lay down any injunction with reference to the nature of Identity as such? Obviously both the Laws imply identity as a *sine qua non* of existence, which means also that it is only the Absolute Negative, or anything which is frankly impossible, that can claim immunity from that supreme condition. But it does not seem as if there is any other condition laid down about identity: there is at least no condition that it has to be monistic, or dual, or plural—indeed there is no legislation emanating from the Laws of Thought with reference to either the form or even the necessity of existence. If, indeed, by any chance the Absolute Negative had prevailed rather than Being—it is for the Cosmic to decide such issues and not the Laws of Thought—even that would not be a violation of the Laws of Thought. Undoubtedly, the conditions laid down by the Laws of Thought are provisional. The Laws of Thought apply if and when the entity is actually there existent. It is not their job (to use homely language) to bring the Positive and the Negative into actual existence. The question of existence is not a question for the Laws of Thought to resolve—on the contrary, they presuppose a truly existent Universe, even for their own validity. The entities go into abeyance or come into existence as a matter of strict spontaneity. And it is only when they appear fully in existence that they at all become subject to the Laws—when the issues of proof or evidence arise.

Where, then, did the condition that the existent must be monistic, or absolute, come from? Could we trace its source?

Here, indeed, to localise the origin of the condition we have to go straight to the central core of the main tradition of our species. In the universal hypothesis of human tradition—that Reality is a duality of the Real and the Unreal—will the origin of this condition be found. In as much as the belief in the Absolute arose as the core of Reality, the notion of 'identity' in its ultimate sense came to be inextricably bound up with monistic integrity; which placed all other identities in the shape of dependent entities—as, for instance, 'copies' or 'limitations' or 'illusions' or 'fictions'—by its side, that is to say not as real identities, but as ones that were 'subsidised', so to speak. There was no Reality in tradition except

the monistic unity or the pluralistic individuality; and they were both illusory.

This is not the place, however, to discuss this very large issue; only when I come to review the Laws of Thought again in my account of Logic will it be time for me to complete this discussion. In the meantime what is possible is just to suggest that, as I personally have no obligation to accept the universal hypothesis, the Absolute—in fact I have discarded the notion completely—I have no reason whatever to believe that the notion of 'identity' must in any sense imply absoluteness. It simply is not true—in the light of my own position—that Being and Non-Being, if they are to exist at all, must exist altogether and all at once, that is to say in the shape of absolute totality. If we have to preserve both Being and Non-Being on equal terms, we have for obvious reasons also to reject 'totality', since that can only mean either the Parmenidean or the Protagorean 'Absolute', which preserved only one form of Reality—unity or individuality—at the expense of the other. The term 'Reality' in my scheme, in its ultimate proportion, means three successive States of existence—the triadic pattern. It does not mean 'one whole', or 'totality', or an 'infinite series of changes without a beginning or end', since these are all to me meaningless conceptions. And as I turn to the plane of Reality which I have called by the name of the Discontinuous Universe, I find naturally that Being and Non-Being, the two constituents of that Universe, have to appear in two separate states of existence simultaneously. That is the only form in which Reality, whether in its ultimate or proximate form, could exist—there is no alternative. The monistic conception has been found to be impossible, even though perfectly conceivable. Besides, as we have already seen, the two separate states of Being and Non-Being could not possibly imply a violation of the Laws of Thought, since neither state, as it stands, implies a self-contradiction. Such a situation would have arisen only if both of them had made room for distinctness and identicalness in their identities at the same time. That is the only conclusion one can consistently draw from the Laws of Thought.

Perhaps I might add, in passing, that it was not only the monistic Absolute that suffered, in the language of figure, from a plethora of totality: the same predicament surrounded the other equally-noted 'Absolute', the pluralistic, as well. The changes that

occurred to them had to be complete and total, since otherwise the absoluteness of their position would at once fatally deteriorate. From a horizon of uncertainty the chances of totality indisputably disappear. So the make-believe must have arisen sometime or other that the changes were, so to speak, enclosed in the 'stable framework of infinite regress'. And if all these safeguards, insidiously hinted, practically made the changes immobile, that was only a foregone conclusion. Perhaps it was missed altogether that 'infinite regress' did not safeguard the changes, since they never had a chance of taking root in the fateful quicksands of constant regress, as the Buddhists held. Neither of the two Absolutes, therefore, had a moment's chance to survive with a sane and clean record; and if, still, they had somehow made history even vibrant, the reason is that nobody, so far, has had anything but the illusory as a standby in any situation.

Besides, the notion of 'time' itself, as it appears in the formulation of the Laws of Thought, brings out clearly the true meaning of the condition that is laid down by it for existence, if we analyse it closely. It implies that A or B, for instance, may be, say, cold or hot, if these features do not have to appear at the same time—which means that there can be no such bar to these features if they appear at different times. Here is no fixed monistic conception of either 'existence' or 'time'; neither 'time' nor 'identity' is in any sense suffered to have only one type or form of existence; which is the monopoly of the Absolute, if we take the Laws of Thought seriously.

The claim that identity must, therefore, mean either a monistic Absolute or a pluralistic Infinity falls to the ground. And if the conception of the Absolute has to be given up, there is no possible alternative to putting the Non-Absolute in its place: and once the Non-Absolute stands out as the only valid form of existence, its identity can only be dual. This duality will appear in two separate states—one in which the two Non-Absolutes will stand related, and another in which they will stand as unrelated—therefore in two different forms. The Continuous, the Discontinuous, and the Continuous will constitute the two separate states.

It is another issue why the schemes of philosophic thought conceived the notion of the Absolute in direct contradiction of the Laws of Thought, an issue which has been amply discussed in

both *The Real and the Negative* and *Related Multiplicity*. I can only repeat that the theory of separate states for Being and Non-Being stands on legitimate grounds: it is the only form of existence which they can possibly assume and I shall proceed to discuss other questions that arise out of this most unusual conclusion.

CHAPTER THREE

RELATED DUALITY

The next question that arises refers to the significance of the two conceptions of identicalness and distinctness. What, indeed, do they really mean, if it is necessary to define primal existence in terms of these two states? What, again, are the positive features of the two states in which Being and Non-Being must exist as identical and distinct, if they exist at all?

Apparently the state of distinctness, in some sense familiar to us in history, has at least to be distinguished from the state which derives from the notion of 'absolute differents'. On no account should we assimilate the state of distinctness into the state implied by the notion of 'absolute differents'; the latter neither does nor can exist. Its only conceivable basis, sheer possibility, never turned out to be an actual fact. It lived and died as a possibility.

Nor should we confuse the state of identicalness with, say, the state of unity, which is believed to mark the realisation of what we call 'common purpose', or the state which the Platonic 'universal' or Idea is claimed to embody. The state of identicalness is not another name for the state of unity, or universality, whatever they may be.

These, however, as mere negative statements, can serve only as a precaution against possible oversight in analysis. They cannot aspire to be adequate. Indeed, not before I developed the positive meaning of the two terms could I be sure about the precise significance of the two states—we have to define them.

But perhaps even the issue of definition may not be altogether unfamiliar, provided we take into consideration only one of the two states—distinctness.

It is inconceivable that the notion of 'distinctness' could imply anything else but the notion of 'uniqueness'. Indisputably it is this notion which marks the positive feature of the constituent entities in a state of distinctness, if we go by tradition. In some sense or other, each of the dual terms has necessarily to be unique if between them they must constitute duality. The monistic Reality

for instance, cannot be unique since it is not in any sense dual. Uniqueness is the special trait of the dual, or the multiple, or the plural, as distinguished from the simple or the Absolute. But could we gather the same clear evidence about identicalness? Does it even follow that Being and Non-Being have to be in a state of identicalness simply because they are related?

There are, at least, some ultimate issues which have to be considered before an answer can be found, and as a preliminary to this enquiry I have to revert to the analysis of 'related duality', the basic principle of this philosophy. If my conclusion about the two separate states of Being and Non-Being is drawn wholly on the ground of 'related duality', conceivably it is only a deeper analysis of that duality that could yield us their positive features. There cannot be, in any case, any other ultimate source which we might conveniently approach.

A question already familiar to us may, however, be repeated as a preliminary even to this analysis: why are distinctness and identicalness needed at all for the concrete existence of Being and Non-Being? Could they not have existed as just Being and Non-Being, by virtue merely of their categorical certainty?

They could not: the duality of Being and Non-Being was found capable of producing nothing but the state of 'absolute differents', which was frankly an impossibility. It was impossible for them to exist by virtue alone of their duality. The duality necessarily had to be supplemented by relationship before existence could be guaranteed to them. This is an old argument: but one cannot repeat too often that it rested wholly with 'related duality' to determine the prospects of a concrete Universe.

But what light does 'related duality' throw on the positive features of identicalness? If it is a perfectly conceivable notion, does it follow that it must guarantee concrete existence in the form of identicalness?

Perhaps it would considerably help our enquiry into the significance of related duality apropos of a concrete Universe if I introduced here a broad review of the two well-known terms, 'duality' and 'relationship'. Such a review is essential since they seem to be almost in a state of confused speculation.

If we turn to the classical period of human thought, Reality, except in one single instance, was defined universally in terms of

duality, and its special feature was described by the phrase 'dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal'. Reality meant the Absolute or Perfect Reality side by side with the relative and imperfect. The Hindu and the humanist frankly held this view; and as I, at any rate, suggested, the Judaic and its two well-known offshoots—Christianity and Islam—fully agreed with them, though the dichotomy did not appear in the same form in the Judaic view as in the other two. All this is familiar as I have formulated the triple organisation of human history often enough.

If I add to the classical contribution on duality two other equally clear instances of it, familiar as the contribution of the dialectical school, I shall perhaps help the enquiry: one was formulated in Buddhism, whether by the Buddha himself or by some school of Buddhism, and the other was introduced into modern European speculation by Hegel. In the case of Buddhism the two ultimate notions, Permanence and Change, between which the dialectic lay, formed a duality since they were frankly opposites: they could not be confused with the 'simple' or the 'monistic' entity. In the case of Hegel, equally, the Being which arose from the act of 'positing' by the Absolute Spirit formed a duality with Non-Being which arose from another act by the same spirit known as 'negating'. This is Hegel's account of the origin of what we call the Universe. There was a moment, therefore, in the opinion of Hegel, when the dialectic between Being and Non-Being was fully operative and naturally the complete sway of duality followed in at least the world of change.

It seems, however, that none of these three types of duality can be taken as a truly consistent account of duality. The reason is simple. If duality has to imply two conditions—two terms, and not one, as well as reality and equality of both the terms—none of the three instances of duality which have appeared in the history of thought can be taken as genuine instances of duality. The classical claim evidently fails to meet the conditions, since one of the terms is Unreal by definition; and no better case could be made for either the Buddhistic or Hegelian types. Being and Non-Being of the Hegelian type, since they were not spontaneous in their origin, could not be real, and it made no difference if they began to oppose one another the moment they were started on the course of existence by the Absolute Spirit: and exactly the same difficulty

can be raised against the Buddhistic type since 'permanence' and 'change', the two terms of the dialectic, not only were illusory and unstable but implied the background of the void, which is either fiction or the Negative. Indeed the whole of philosophic tradition, Eastern and Western, suffered from innate deficiency whether it was dialectical or not. It could not by any chance establish Reality: it was really one long continuous process of missing it under the pressure of illusion.

Could I not, then, argue that a case for duality or dualism was not made in tradition though the terms were known and clearly formulated? And have I any better evidence to offer for the notion of relationship—I mean, whether a case was made for it in tradition?

Perhaps the issue of relationship is much more difficult to disentangle in tradition. At any rate, its philosophic importance was by no means a matter of universal agreement. If we analyse the history of classical humanism in its Atomic mood, we can trace only the well-known popular meaning of relationship in it. The Atomists who sponsored it had to introduce it as a matter of clear necessity. The unique atoms were bound to be reduced to the state of 'absolute differents', if, somehow, they missed altogether the chance of meeting one another through some 'points of contact'. The entity which could bring about the meeting could naturally be only relationship, a term which the Atomists had to admit into the organisation of the atoms: it was the 'simple' which with the plural atoms constituted the dichotomy in the Atomistic school. Related atoms, therefore, were to them a necessity: if the atoms had to remain unique and independent, they equally had to stand united by relationship. Relationship meant here 'point of contact'—like, for instance, a bridge which connects the two banks of a river. We are dealing here with the core of empirical thinking.

Perhaps one could equally trace another meaning of relationship which need not be classified as popular in the Platonic school of humanism. There, in that school, one might suppose relationship to mean a common meeting-ground which served the multiple as their goal and objective, by no means comparable to a bridge. If, for instance, the multiple had no such meeting-ground to serve as a common goal of aspiration, they might by their sheer

multiplicity have been caught in the net of infinite regress, even though they were not moving individuals. Relationship, therefore, could definitely mean here only 'oneness' or 'unity', and no point of contact. The bridge, certainly, was no longer in evidence.

Neither of these two senses of relationship, it seems obvious, can by any chance be substantiated. The notion of uniqueness, for instance, forbids any such contact as the idea of the meeting-point suggests: it does not go with uniqueness—in fact it is opposed to it. Besides, there is no evidence that relationship—as a third entity which connects—could exist without being unique in itself: and if, still, it is supposed actually to exist it is bound to be exposed to the same awkward position as the other two which it was called upon to connect. The notion of 'infinite regress', which made all such attempts at bringing unique entities together foolhardy, was known to the critics of relationship in all ages and climes. Recently the English philosopher, Bradley, in Oxford, repeated it in his attempt to establish some version of Hegelian speculation in the British Isles where Empiricism ruled tenaciously. And before him, David Hume, in Scotland, was much too honest and realistic as a philosopher to permit relationship to have anything to do with the unique sensation, or any logical significance. There was almost a touch of *volte-face* when, after disowning relationship as an entity, Hume suddenly—as if led by destiny—deposited it in the arms of what he called 'habit', which was evidently not a sensation, but might perhaps aspire even to be esoteric. The critics may hold after this that it was such an unrealistic procedure on the part of an Empiricist like Hume—the recognition of 'habit' which was not a sensation, as it was not a particular—that stimulated the twentieth-century American speculation to build altogether on 'habit'. They called it, however, by the name of Life; and the edifice they built on it (which they called philosophy) was the model of Pragmatism which a hostile critic called 'mechanised truth' or 'American philosophy'. What other consequences followed from this well-known, fatal slip of Hume it is for the historian who deals with social phenomena to say.

If we now turn to the Platonic meaning, it appears at once to be more erudite than popular, if not quite esoteric. The point that it emphasises refers to the notion of 'identity', or 'oneness', with now and then almost a mystical flavour. Unlike the notion 'point

of contact' which implied the existence of the dual unique, it stands frankly for the monistic state. Relationship, in this scheme, does not relate but rather assimilates or absorbs the multiple. Here is a fulfilment of aspiration or the realisation of a common objective devoutly desired by the devotee: the 'many', or the 'multiple', disappear and never have the chance of being connected, becoming instead 'relationship' in its esoteric purity.

The case for relationship even if it is made in the Platonic style, is hardly, therefore, any more arguable than the Atomist's case. If the notion of the 'point of contact' is forbidden by the notion of uniqueness, the notion of the 'simple', or 'oneness', is equally forbidden by the 'multiple', whether changeful and moving or somehow set in a non-moving class.

If, therefore, we go by the records of tradition, we have certainly got the terms duality and relationship duly noted, but no consistent interpretation of them. We cannot build up a scheme of Reality in terms of related duality if we have nothing but the resources of history to fall back upon.

Both duality and relationship therefore have to be reinterpreted before 'related duality', which presupposed the Reality of both, can be utilised as a primal basis of the Universe. In any case, we could not possibly attach a meaning to this phrase if its obvious constituents all equally fail to be significant; and it would never do to take 'related duality' as nothing but a mere aggregation of duality and relationship. We have to find out exactly what the two terms 'duality' and 'relationship' mean before we can form any conception of related duality.

I have already discussed the notion of 'duality'. It implies in my scheme two distinct conditions:

(1) There have to be dual entities, and not merely one and certainly not more than two, before the conception of duality would apply;
(2) The entities in question must be perfectly equal to each other and indisputably real.

The interpretation is obviously unusual and did not arise in tradition. It could not, since the basic hypothesis agreed to by all tradition about the nature of Ultimate Reality was the Absolute. The issue of duality and even that of multiplicity was still amply

discussed, but such analyses of duality and multiplicity depended for their validity on the Absolute. They were not real in their own right and therefore the phenomenon of duality, as such, could not arise. The unreal is neither simple nor is it dual or multiple. It is just unreal: though it is not actually 'nothing', or totally inconceivable like the Absolute Negative.

The Absolute, however, does not in any sense complicate my position since the actual Reality in my scheme is not the Absolute, but the dual Non-Absolute. There is no question of introducing duality as an implication of the Absolute—a duality which could by no means claim originality and independence of the Absolute. On the contrary, it is the Absolute which is replaced by the dual Non-Absolute, with the result that Reality stands out as dual, and not as 'simple' or 'multiple'. I am in a position, then, to lay down the two distinct conditions as a definition of duality.

Perhaps it will be equally possible to define relationship, which is my next issue, if I keep to the conception of Ultimate Reality as strictly dualistic, and not either 'monistic' or 'pluralistic' as all classical thought held. This means that I shall have to refer back for the moment to the constitution of the Universe as I see it.

It is a familiar claim that if Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, as the only constituents of the Universe, form duality, they also form the Universe in two distinct formations: one in which they exist as monistic entities in a state of unrelatedness, and another in which they stand as related.

In other words, the constituents that form the Universe are two, and not one or more than two. Here is the primary meaning of the term duality: it just expresses the fact that the constituents are numerically dual. And since the Universe, as it comes into existence, has to appear in two states, related and unrelated—we can conceive of both of them equally—the dual constituents, Being and Non-Being, have to appear both in a monistic form and in a dualistic state. Here is another meaning of the term duality. It just refers to the fact that the Universe is a related one.

It is only in this formation of the Universe as Related Universe that the notion of relationship comes directly into play. The Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being exist here as strictly related—a state which is totally opposed to the monistic. And the obvious point to note, as a preliminary, is that relationship has significance

only in the milieu of the duality of Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being. There would be no such thing as relationship if the constituents of Reality were not, or could not be, dual. As a matter of course, they exist either together or not at all: on no account could they exist by themselves in complete separation from one another. If in fact both duality and relationship are relevant notions they are absolutely essential to one another: and it is with them that the issue whether the concrete Universe should be constituted or not rests. Most emphatically, if the Universe exists, it has to be dual and related. Indeed the most appropriate and adequate phrase with reference to it must be 'related duality'. If anything exists as Universe it must be related duality; there can be no such thing as duality or relationship existing to form a Universe on their own. Their metaphysical validity, which is indisputable, serves only as presupposition to the Universe of Related Duality—a unique phenomenon which has not the slightest resemblance to such notions of tradition as 'aggregate', or 'class', or 'group', or 'community'. It is just a Universe of Related Duality. Tradition had no occasion to conceive of it.

If, now, I call the Discontinuous Universe by the name of a 'dualistic Universe', it might only imply that Being and Non-Being—as dual entities—are enough to constitute the Universe by themselves: but there could not be a Universe if it had to be the handiwork of just Being and Non-Being as dual entities. It would equally be completely inaccurate to describe the Universe as just 'related', since relationship—like duality—is only a category and cannot by itself constitute a Universe which must have dual constituents. It is one thing for relationship, as an existing entity, to relate, quite another just to be itself, as bare relationship, with nothing to relate. It is on such a rock as 'bare relationship' that all rationalism and idealism disintegrated into nothingness. The function of 'relationship by itself' indisputably has no concrete significance: it is valid only as a category.

There can therefore be no Universe which can be called by the name of 'relationship', nor one which is a Universe of 'bare duality' there can only be a Universe of related duality. That, at any rate, is my position.

A difficulty may in all probability be raised. If the Universe cannot be founded either on duality or on relationship alone, do

Being and Non-Being, then, as dual entities, automatically combine and build up the Universe I have called by the name of Related Duality? If Being and Non-Being, as entities, have to be distinguished from 'relationship'—which is not an entity and must on no account be identified with them—could 'related duality', which could result only from a combination of them, be even a consistent and possible formation? How could there be such a formation if duality and relationship have to be kept strictly separate, since Being and Non-Being cannot be dual and related at the same time?

The views formulated may be admitted at once—Being and Non-Being cannot be distinct and dual and also related at the same time. Therefore either they have to be in two separate states simultaneously existing; or there can be no such thing as related duality—indeed we should have to do without a Universe altogether.

But if the Universe in any case has to be, whatever else may not be—unless we prefer to remain sceptics for ever and ever—it must necessarily provide in its scheme for two simultaneously existing states in which Being and Non-Being have to stand out as respectively distinct and related, in separate forms. This, as my readers know, is my own specific solution of the problem of duality and relationship which remains unsolved in tradition. But if, at this late hour, even a restatement of my main position, which I have fully argued, does not appear to satisfy my critics, I may at least repeat some of the arguments I have already advocated in support of that position. I shall also have to raise one or two more issues in the expectation that an answer to them will not only confirm my claim but meet the difficulties that have been raised. These issues are:

(*a*) Is not the idea of the two states, the main plank of my position, conceivable? Could one argue that it is contradictory or inconceivable? Did tradition ever record the formulation of the two states or suggest grounds to reject it?

If the answers are in the negative, could one argue against this new position on the basis of a hypothesis which has nothing but tradition to support it? It is permissible to suggest that no argument is relevant to a new position if it

stands for its *raison d'être* on an old hypothesis which has been completely superseded by the hypothesis of the new position. Such a procedure is frankly self-contradictory.

(*b*) Assuming that the idea of the two states has to be accepted as a conceivable position, an enquiry could still legitimately be made as to the precise manner in which the nature of duality and relationship would stand defined in this new setting. Could we conceive of different interpretations of duality and relationship from those with which we are familiar in tradition?

The first set of questions has already been answered, as our readers know. That answer has given full evidence that Being and Non-Being naturally not only can, but must, exist in two states if they exist at all. This dual state makes room for both duality and relationship without creating even a semblance of contradiction.

The answer to the second question is that duality, here, will mean just 'distinctness'—as distinguished from 'absolute differents'—while relationship will mean 'identicalness', as distinguished from unity, or oneness. In other words, Being and Non-Being will appear as distinct from one another in one state; and will exist in a state of identicalness in the other state. It might be of great help to the enquiry if we analyse these two terms in the perspective of history.

The first thing to note is that if the two notions, duality (or absolute differents) and unity (or absolute sameness) do not imply actual existence– the reasons are obvious—both distinctness and identicalness, when introduced instead do imply actual existence, for they are not only conceivable but actual existents. Entities which are distinct are unique; while entities which are in a state of identicalness have the feature which is known in history as being 'at one with others'. Besides, one could easily illustrate the historical importance of these two features by reference to the mystical organisation known as the Group society, or to the humanistic organisation known as the Individualistic society. At least these two types of organisation form the scheme for two-thirds of the societies known in history.

The second point to note is that these two states form the only conceivable state of existence, since any other form is either in-

complete or partial, if not self-contradictory as we have shown by our long review of the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal. They will therefore exist either in both the states—since this is the only conceivable form of existence—or not at all. There is no room for choice, especially when we are dealing with ultimate situations. If by any chance the Universe were to miss any conceivable form of existence, it would lose existence, and nothing short of that, since there is no via media between the Universe in its complete fulness and the Absolute Negative. If the Negative has to be challenged—as it has to be—it must be by the Complete and Perfect Universe. The idea has been well known in tradition, though the notion of completeness could not be worked out with universal consent.

Relationship and distinctness, therefore, must imply one another and must exist in two separate and simultaneous states. The question of contradiction between them cannot arise. What arises is the only form of existence in which they can exist.

I may, however, repeat that the difficulty about the two sets of terms—'duality' and 'distinctness', and 'relationship' and 'identity'—arose in tradition for one simple reason. It was found impossible to suppose that the same entities could be both distinct and identical at the same time. To all tradition the two notions frankly stood out as incompatibles. Devices, therefore, were the only conceivable mode by which they could be provided for, and so the whole theory of the dichotomy of the Real and Unreal had to be devised. The conception of the Absolute which the term 'Real' meant took the lead after that, and plunged the whole of history into one vast morass of effete speculation. This unbearable situation would have eternally persisted if the Absolute had not been discovered in time to be a misnomer. There is no occasion, therefore, any longer to raise difficulties on the score of incompatibility, when the issue ceases to be that of the Absolute and of its progeny, the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal. Once the Absolute is lost to the four winds of heaven there is no difficulty left in providing for the incompatibles in two separate states, where they become perfectly compatible with one another. Immediately the nature and form of identity changes; it ceases to be monistic totality and admits of dualistic, and even of pluralistic, formation, all equally simultaneous and real. Being and Non-Being,

the prime movers of the cosmic movement, can therefore easily avoid the shackles of dichotomy and appear as both 'distinct' and 'non-distinct' simultaneously, although in two separate states; and what is more, they have full freedom in their separate states to achieve results which are original and independent. And all this becomes possible for one simple fact—the Universe, in its Primal Stage, established with scrupulous care the two states of distinctness and identicalness.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PRIMAL STAGE OF EXISTENCE

I HOPE I have by now made a case for the positive features of the two notions 'identicalness' and 'distinctness' and perhaps also for the main structure of the Discontinuous Universe in terms of related duality. The question I have now to discuss refers to the *necessity* for the Primal Stage—a momentous issue. What do I imply when I say that the Universe 'just came into existence' in this Stage? What, indeed, is 'just to exist'?

The issue, momentous as it is, need not be unusual and complicated. Indeed, on any view, the existence of the Primal Stage may just be taken to mean that the Universe has to exist as a necessary preliminary to anything else that may also exist or happen in its course. There has to be such a thing as an existent Universe before anything conceivable can happen or function, since nothing can function or exist in a vacuum. The whole conception of Infinity arose in tradition to meet such a necessity. To function, again, is at least to conceive an objective and to realise it after it has been conceived: there must be an existing Universe to make these two functions possible. Function necessarily presupposes the existent Universe. Besides, as a conceivable state in itself, the Primal Stage has an inherent claim to exist by its own right unless it is neutralised as a possibility.

The claim I have just made for the Primal Stage is obvious, and its validity frankly stands on simple and ultimate grounds. It may be profitable, therefore, if I supplement these by other grounds—which may or may not be equally simple and ultimate.

At least two other grounds may be easily suggested which seem to bear the same logical significance. One of them follows or derives from the nature of existence itself: which is certainly the most significant evidence. If it is necessary to distinguish the nature of existence from that of creation, the Universe has to provide for both existence and creation—two quite distinct identities. If to exist is not necessarily to create, the Universe has to make provision for both the Stages—there must be a Stage in the

universe which can be legitimately called the Stage of existence, exactly as there should be a Stage which should be called only by the name of 'creation'. In the first Stage there will be no sign or trace of creation, while in the second Stage the issue will be one of creation directly and of existence by implication. These two Stages must necessarily be distinct and should on no account be confused with each other.

It may, however, be argued that the notion of existence, in history, has been distinguished from that of non-existence but perhaps not from creation. At any rate the ultimate Laws of Thought proverbially dealt with the two categories of Being and Non-Being, or existence and non-existence. The question of creation did not enter into this scheme. Either an entity exists, or it does not exist. All questions of proof and evidence have, from immemorial times, stood on this absolutely axiomatic distinction.

The 'attempt to distinguish', as a phenomenon or function, however, not only implies two distinct terms but also the necessity for them both to be positive. Existence, in consequence, cannot be distinguished from non-existence, since the latter is by no chance a positive entity—the negative whether in its absolute sense or in its relative sense of simple absence is conspicuously non-positive. If, still, such a distinction was made, there was an explanation for that distinction, which is that there was such a thing as the 'possibility of the Negative'. Non-existence was a perfectly conceivable category. One could, therefore, think of both existence and non-existence—and also distinguish them in the realms of pure thought.

It is, however, another matter whether this distinction has any bearing upon the realm of concrete existence where the issue arises. In fact it has not, since, if it has to be accommodated in the concrete realm, the terms to be distinguished have to be both concrete and positive. Evidently only one of the terms is positive.

If, however, the notion of existence has in any case to be distinguished, we have to find a notion from which to distinguish it; the term which is relevant and appropriate must necessarily be 'creation'. There is no other term conceivable. Is this not sufficient evidence for the claim that the Universe must have a Primal Stage, separate from the creative stage which follows it?

There may easily be yet some other grounds for the existence of the Primal Stage:

(*a*) If the Discontinuous Universe had to begin, presumably it was the 'primal stage', and not the 'creative' which follows it, that could most suitably serve the Universe to stage that beginning. Incidentally, the issue of beginning, in my scheme, did not arise before the Discontinuous Universe had fallen due. The First Continuous had not to begin but only to end: it was eternally there without a beginning. It was the Discontinuous Universe, therefore, which had to stage its beginning and this necessarily meant that it was bound to have a Primal Stage. It was altogether a different question whether the Universe had to have other stages—as a matter of fact it had. But they could have nothing to do with the issue of beginning since they were bound to follow the Primal Stage with specific objectives.

(*b*) The next ground for the existence of the Primal Stage, though not exactly on the same logical level as the one I have just discussed, derives from the fact that it just neutralises the possibility of the Absolute Negative. This neutralisation had a specific value all its own, which the Universe could not possibly go without—at any rate its absence would have meant the presence of the Absolute Negative. Even if the Primal Stage is not a stage in which Purpose appears, the Negative certainly stands neutralised in it without a Purpose. Its contribution to the Universe from the ultimate point of view is of the same significance as that of any other stage. The Universe cannot do without it—this form of specific and ultimate neutralisation of the Negative.

(*c*) There is still another specific contribution which the Primal Stage makes to the Universe: it meets the sceptical challenge 'Nothing is', which by a Cosmic necessity was bound to arise in the Universe. It is eminently suited to do that, as if the Universe introduced the Primal Stage in anticipation of the claim of the Absolute Negative. It is indeed another name for the category of Being which all classical analysis opposed to the sceptic as a challenge to the Negative. If, still, there is a distinction between the Primal Stage and

> Being it is due to the fact that, while Being is just a category, the Primal Stage was a concrete existent. The purpose that is served by them, however, is the same, and it is one which had to be served. If the Universe had to be complete and perfect, scepticism was bound to be unavoidable.

It would be foolish to argue after all this that the state of sheer existence is comparable to the Absolute of tradition. No doubt the Absolute could not be creative, since it is total and complete and so may be described as 'existence' pure and simple, or as Being in its pure or sheer absoluteness. It has been at times so described in tradition. But unfortunately it lacks the elementary capacity of existing, since it is logically impossible, as is the Negative. The Absolute of tradition is therefore neither existence nor creation —it is nothing.

The conclusion is that there is enough evidence for the Primal Stage of the Discontinuous Universe. If it guaranteed the beginning of the Universe, it equally made possible the whole of what I shall call by the name of 'creative stages'—indeed it was only after that primal appearance of the Universe that any experiment, not excluding that of illusion could possibly be made.

The question may, however, be raised (we have already referred to it) whether it was not possible that the Universe could have begun, in the shape of either truth or illusion, and cut out the stage of sheer existence altogether. If the Universe had to appear as illusion or as truth—we shall soon discuss the point at great length—could not the Primal Stage of it serve both the purposes at the same time—that of existence as well as that of illusion and truth? Would not that have served at least cosmic economy, if nothing else?

The full answer to the question will have to wait till I have formulated the precise meanings of illusion and truth: in the meantime, I may just suggest that since illusion will only exist as a possibility (the evidence for this follows) it was evidently incapable of existing before the Universe began, and so obviously it could not bring about the existence of the Universe. As a possibility, it is indeed the one form of Reality whose existence consists wholly in an effort to develop its own identity—a view which it is a privilege to suggest. We have to note that there are two clear

types of the existent: one which is actual, with an identity of its own, and another which is but an effort to realise its identity and is therefore a possibility. What is more, while the 'actual' fulfils its objective, the 'possible' fails to do so—and ends, necessarily, in confusion. This is certainly a very different view from what Aristotle formulated in his conception of 'potentiality' if my reading of Aristotle is correct.

Could illusion, then—which must at best be a possibility—begin the Discontinuous Universe after the first Continuous had definitely come to an end? If it has no identity which is present but only one which is prospective, could it possibly serve to inaugurate such a Reality as the Universe? Could an identity yet to be born achieve any result? Obviously, all its effort must be exhausted in materialising its own identity, assuming that there will be provision for such an effort as a matter of course. How then, could it undertake to begin the Universe—a beginning which implies an altogether different effort from the one it fortunately had? Even the effort which the 'possible' has to make to realise its own identity cannot exist before the Universe is actually there to provide for that existence. Could it then replace the Negative and establish the Universe unless there was already a chance for it to do so in an existing Universe? How could there be such a chance if the Universe were not already there? It seems almost useless to raise or discuss such an issue.

But it cannot be repeated too often that 'possibility' is a peculiar type of the existent: it is certainly not 'nothing' and yet it is without an identity. The Law of Identity does not apply to it, exactly as it does not apply to the Absolute Negative: and yet it is not 'nothing' but perfectly conceivable. But as an effort which exists, it must have its own identity, which must mean that existence of effort is only another name for a specific type of existence of Being and Non-Being. And it can be legitimately argued that Being and Non-Being assume this type of existence when they appear in the purposive state. In other words, it is Being and Non-Being that become possible; and this change in the career of Being and Non-Being could take place since they were already existent. Indeed if the 'possible' had to be, it could be impersonated only by Being and Non-Being. There would be no such thing as the 'possible' if Being and Non-Being were not, or could not be, already there.

It is only when the Negative has been excluded by Being and Non-Being in the Primal Stage that the chances for the 'possible' fall due. Proverbially, in a vacuum nothing exists—not, certainly, the 'possible', and it is only for Being and Non-Being to fill the vacuum by the feat of sheer existence, to use a figure. The conclusion follows that the 'possible' cannot by any chance begin the Universe.

Illusion, therefore, to repeat, cannot by any chance serve the purpose of staging the beginning of the Discontinuous Universe: and if illusion cannot do so, the same inability will equally attach to truth, which can only follow illusion, and not precede it. And both of them are bound to presuppose the Primal Stage of existence, which is neither illusion nor truth since it is not purposive.

Incidentally, it was a mistake in tradition to define truth as ultimate and make illusion follow it as the 'third category'.[1] This mistake was made in the period of history which was the handiwork of illusion, and it could not be avoided since the primal belief in tradition took the shape of the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal. It was the Absolute of tradition that was responsible for the misinterpretation of illusion and truth. It was altogether missed that there was no Absolute except as illusion; nor was it understood that illusion preceded truth, even as both of them presupposed the Primal Stage of the Universe.

The analysis with reference to the notion of the Primal Stage of existence may now be closed. I hope I have given sufficient evidence to establish its *raison d'être*. I shall just add that the Primal Stage established three things:

(1) the reality of both Being and Non-Being, as Non-Absolute;
(2) the existence of the state of identicalness;
(3) the existence of the state of distinctness.

A very remarkable conclusion follows:

We are no longer called upon to deal with the two Non-Absolutes as mere ideas of human experience which have only evidentiary value but as actual, objective Beings which exist in a concrete society of their own. Indisputably this means a profound change. We have to accept the fact that in addition to the societies of beings which history has so far recorded there has been at least

[1] This is the Hindu conception of illusion, see *Introductory Critical Survey of European Thought*, p. 43.

one more Society in concrete existence, though quite outside our limited horizon. It is evident that the main function of this Society is to preserve the bare existence of the Universe. Its sole trust and care is to ensure scrupulously that the Negative, in its absolute form, may be perpetually excluded, so that the very basis and foundation of the Universe may remain solid and unshaken. Could one conceive of any function, cosmic or human, of any greater breadth and wisdom?

It is, however, another issue what this Society of the two Non-Absolutes actually is, and how, exactly, they neutralise the Absolute Negative.

It is impossible for us in the Third Stage of the Universe, the realm of the 'possibles'—I shall soon explain the origin and nature of this Stage—to have any direct contact with this Society. We are strictly confined in regard to it to a categorical experience which has only an evidentiary value. We know absolutely nothing else about it. We cannot, naturally, call it by any such name as esoteric, or mystical, or just unverifiable. These terms imply the traditional hypothesis of the Absolute. But we do not suggest that direct contact between us and this Society is by nature impossible. On the contrary, there is nothing unverifiable or mystical in the Discontinuous Universe. As we come out of the realm of the 'possibles', which we are bound to do, we shall be in a direct line of contact with it.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ISSUE OF ILLUSION

I SHALL proceed now to raise another central issue—an issue which has been known as the 'issue of illusion'. How could the stage of illusion with its dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal appear in a Universe which was already committed to the equal reality of Being and Non-Being? If Being and Non-Being had absolute validity in what I have described as the Primal Stage of the Universe, could there be some other Stage in the same Universe in which Being and Non-Being were frankly Unreal?

This difficulty certainly will not diminish if we have to recognise illusion as an outstanding fact, and not drop it as mere phantasy of human experience (as some schools are inclined to do). No record of history failed to give a vivid account of it—a record which has to be accepted by us as almost an obligation since we do not either make history or unmake it after it has been made; at the best we only interpret it and often we may even doubt its very existence. And after this it is simple logic to recognise what may be called the creed of illusion—the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal—as a historical fact.

Perhaps my procedure in discussing the issue of illusion immediately after I have established the Primal Stage might easily appear to be a little premature. I could have waited till at least the creative stage was well under way and the place of illusion safely located in what I shall describe as the Third Stage of the Universe. If an objection is raised I have nothing to say in reply, but I am confident that this procedure will do more good than harm. At any rate, once I got inside the core of both the notions 'possibility' and 'illusion'—a very unusual fortune for the enquiry—the procedure became not only feasible but in a sense necessary in view of the extraordinary significance my ancestry, at least, attached to the issue of illusion.

To recognise illusion as existent fact, however, is not necessarily to accept the ground of its origin, the nature of its function and the method of dealing with it hitherto known. I may, indeed, have

to hold an altogether different view with regard to any of these issues from what has so far been held: and what is certain is that I shall not be repeating the interpretation which the view of my ancestors has attached to the term 'illusion', perhaps the most robust yet known. There will be no trace of the third category in my scheme except as subject-matter for fresh interpretation. Instead I shall place illusion in what I shall describe as the Third Stage of the Universe—the realm of the 'possible', with its claim to existence confirmed.

What, then, is the solution of the issue of illusion? How can we reconcile the two apparently incompatible propositions:

(*a*) Being and Non-Being as non-absolute are both equally real;
(*b*) Being is real while Non-Being is unreal and neither of them is non-absolute?

Can it be held that the same Universe may in some phase embody the equal Reality of both Being and Non-Being while in some other phase it may hold them as Real and Unreal? Here is a distinct problem.

This problem, still, it may be argued by the optimist, need have no special historical significance. If the basis of all history rested on the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal, need we take any serious notice of incompatibility, however oppressive it may be as fact? If the Universe could actually exist as both Real and Unreal at the same time, could it be an obligation on our part to make it compatible and consistent? Did we create the Universe? Could we be in any sense responsible for it? If fiction, illusion and evil could find a place in the same Universe by the side of truth, on what ground should incompatibility be excluded from it? After all, incompatibility must at least have an equal right—with fiction, illusion and evil—to appear in the Universe, if there is nothing to choose between it and them. Could we not, then, follow the time-honoured course of history and accept them all as inevitable? Is there any alternative?

We could certainly follow tradition provided we were prepared for the grim consequences—periodic, unmitigated confusion for ever and ever. After all, optimism is an irrelevant interlude in human experience and history, at this late hour, is not exactly a guide to the solution of problems or to the fulfilment of objectives.

Its only contribution, one may safely presume, has lain with scrupulous consistency in either creating problems or ruthlessly bringing about frustration of ends—a grim discipline, to use the mildest term conceivable.

What, then, is our explanation of the place of illusion in the Universe? How do we account for Being and Non-Being, the two ultimate entities, appearing in the same Universe as equally Real and also as Real and Unreal?

Whatever the explanation may be, the core of it will lie in the proof that the two propositions do not, as a matter of fact, contradict one another, even though they are frankly incompatible. It will have to be shown that Being and Non-Being may with perfect consistency exist in two spheres of the Universe; in one as both Real, in the other as one Real and the other Unreal.

Evidently no account of the Universe so far known will make it easy for us to find this explanation. Neither the monistic nor the pluralistic Universe could possibly make room for Being and Non-Being in two types of existence which are frankly incompatible—at any rate the outstanding scheme in all tradition which I have called 'device' will testify to its impossibility.

The prospect of an explanation, therefore, must rest on one possibility only, whether or not the scheme of the Universe which I myself have been propounding can suggest that explanation. If, for instance, the Universe is by no means describable as a monistic 'whole', or as a 'series of changeful entities or beings which have no beginning or end', may it not be that it is bound to hold a feature in it which can quite consistently provide for what appears to be frank incompatibles?

The fact is that it does make this provision. And that provision has its origin in the supreme fact that the Universe is a Universe of Stages—a Universe which appears in its ultimate proportion in the shape of a triadic pattern, the Continuous, the Discontinuous and the Continuous. One cannot possibly confuse the Universe, as a pattern of Stages, with the Universe as portrayed in any tradition.

The issue as to why I call the Universe a 'pattern of Stages', and what Stages really mean in their relation to one another, and many other issues allied to these will come in for close analysis as I go on. In the meantime I may just mention that the explanation we

are seeking with reference to the issue of illusion will follow directly from the conception of the Universe as a pattern of Stages. I shall therefore proceed to discuss the Stages.

What I have called the Primal Stage of the Universe—the one in which the Discontinuous Universe began—has already been discussed, and the Stage which comes directly after the Primal has been broadly referred to and described by the term 'creative'. It is that Stage and the others in close succession to it which now call for careful analysis; I shall gradually complete my account of them all. The analysis will involve a discussion of three distinct issues:

(*a*) the nature of the Creative Stage;
(*b*) the ground of its origin;
(*c*) the way in which the two outstanding phenomena of illusion and truth arose.

This discussion raises at once a preliminary issue—why should the Universe be at all a Universe of Stages? Even if the Universe cannot be (the evidence is familiar by now) a monistic whole or a 'series of changes with no beginning or end', does it follow that it has to be a Universe of Stages? Is there no other alternative?

The answers to these questions are in the negative. It is simply not conceivable that the Universe of Stages—the Continuous, the Discontinuous and the Continuous, the sole pattern of Reality in my scheme—could be replaced by any other pattern. Perhaps I may give some of the obvious reasons for such an assurance.

The pattern of the Universe in my scheme is not built on what is known as hypothesis, which the scientist follows as almost the main lever of his investigations in the modern age (there is no rock of certainty on which hypothesis stands if we turn to the scientist in his pure, immaculate mood); nor is the pattern anywhere dependent for support on what the mathematician aims at, a formula—something which can be varied *ad infinitum* and which leads to the prospects of a 'choice' which is certain to end in nothing, since the formulae for obvious reasons are all equally unavailing. The pattern I have described is built instead on a fresh conception of the categories, which is completely original; and an alternative to them is inconceivable. What indeed strictly forms the ground-plan of this pattern is nothing but the Laws of Thought

closely reinterpreted and then applied to the fresh cardinal experiences which did not pre-suppose any premises which ever were known. Nor is there any axiom to support that plan, and it does not certainly rest for its validity on verification, which is but a slender reed. And so no question can arise about its bona fides, provided we do not fail in our comprehension of it. Either it is seen at once or not seen at all.

If questions still arise with regard to its validity—as in history events at random arise—that anomaly can only serve as an evidence that a logical necessity, whatever its authority, need not necessarily meet with the immediate approval or acceptance of the whole community to which it is presented; there would still remain in the community the possibility of either a failure to comprehend it or even the strange fact of questioning it. It is another issue why mere possibilities should stand in the way of Truth which is attested by pure logical necessity. But they may and do; and those who will follow me till I have completed my account of the Universe will be given the assurance that even such possibilities have a meaning which Truth, if taken in its real proportion, will not dispute.

One must be prepared to accept, in the light of my scheme, that a proposition which is logically certain may not only be missed altogether but even honestly believed to be self-contradictory. Such comments will not stand as judgments on the pattern but only as evidences of failure to grasp the true significance of the pattern: and such failure, in its turn, could easily be traced to the technique utilised for apprehension—a technique necessarily shaped in the light of the deposit of faiths and beliefs which the pattern in question deliberately cast aside. Even this clear demonstration may fail to weigh with those who have missed the pattern as a matter of history. Here, indeed, we reach an issue which is Cosmic in its proportion, and not merely one of logic. We have to wait with respect for the community which may fail to see the pattern, and live in the meantime by the greater logic of what one calls cosmic obligation.

This method of waiting, again, should suit us particularly as being more appropriate and balanced than wanton expatiation on the consequences of the life of illusion. It will indeed be gratuitous to suggest a diagnosis of the failure on the part of the community

(on the ground that they are steeped in illusion) if truly illusion will as a matter of course soon give place to Truth.

But one might record, by the way, as just a review of history, the fact that when we do plunge into the depth of illusions which by their immense originality simulate the appearance of truth, we enter directly into the ultimate stage of the conflict of history.

And it is exactly at such moments that thought is liable to be challenged as useless and artificial; in fact, a vacuum is bound to be created by the absence of thought. Soon this vacuum would be filled in by a code of conduct or a mode of living, modelled it may even be on a stern ascetic ritual. It will be held with great vigour that the capacity to see truth is only another name for behaving in a particular way or acting under strict, specific regulations. What it would rigorously exclude is control by thought.

But is it really necessary that one should incapacitate thought in the interests of action? Doubtless, the life of action and that of emotion which support thought have the supreme credit of forming the basis of existence: but do they, if we assess their value in its true proportion, really contravene thought? In any case, the function of the Laws of Thought proverbially was not by any means to negate action or emotion, any more than it was to cultivate them with any special exactitude. If there had been no life in this Universe, in any form, there would be no sign of the Laws of Thought or any occasion for applying them. That is a simple truism. But the Laws of Thought certainly do insist that, if one has to live to see Truth, one also has to submit the experiences of that life to the test which the Laws of Thought inexorably lay down. The life of action, whatever the conditions in which it appears, does not by itself guarantee the success of its end. The values and the standards which guide action, with all their austerities, may fail to guide action just as much as they may succeed. They have to depend upon the test or criterion of Truth, and it is only when the test has been satisfied that their credit is assured. The point of the Laws of Thought is to discriminate between what is contradictory, and therefore impossible, and what is consistent and indisputable. We have to note that the Universe we live in is built not by God alone but also by the medicine-man and the magician just as by the metaphysician. It is a Universe which is either falling into doubt or creating evidence to remove it.

It is frequently claimed that truth can be seen provided a specific mode of living has been lived; there is no reason to question it. The Mystical Unity, for instance, cannot be felt or understood unless the whole course of ascetic life, with its moral and intellectual commands, has been accepted and rigidly followed. No mystic ever forgot to emphasise this truth while the commands were being formulated. But it is altogether a different thing to suggest that the sheer ascetic mode of living, unaided by logic or thought, is sure to guarantee the vision of truth, if we know its proper significance. At least the discipline and the experiences which followed from the austerities had to be purified by calm and regulated thought, the only medium of supplying evidence. There is such a thing as austerity which the Evil God, as a matter of Cosmic choice, controls, as well as that which is tested on the anvil of thought, or, shall we say, by the Good God. The austerity of the code of commands itself is no test of its validity or truth. It is one thing to formulate a code or mode of life, a different thing to guarantee its validity. The formulation raises only a possibility but not by any means a certainty. Quite another code has to be formulated for that.

And one may at least suggest that history has not been a record of the success of any code, nor of anything which is truth. It is definitely a record of alternate rise and fall—and that only of claims to truth and not of Truth—which led to all-round confusion in the end. If there is any proof in history which has stood firm, it is the fact that history is nothing but a frank record of illusion, though perhaps for the good of the Universe.

I feel perfectly justified in offering my thesis of the pattern of Stages as categorical certainty without an alternative to it. It is indisputable Truth though it is too early yet to discuss the code of life which preceded its orientation.

If the Universe, then, has to be accepted as a Universe of Stages, the question still arises: why was the Primal Stage followed by the Creative? If there has to be a Second Stage, does it follow that it must be Creative?

The reason is that the Primal Stage did not bring out the obvious duality or distinguishability of the two Non-Absolutes—Being and Non-Being, which was as essential to them as their need for

existence which it frankly provided for. There had to be, in consequence, a Second Stage in addition to the Primal, one quite distinct and separate from it. It is in this Stage that the duality and distinguishability of the two Non-Absolutes stand out, by contrast with their bare existence in the Primal Stage. The two features cannot be confused though they must be strictly related to one another.

But could we perhaps suggest some fresh logical reason for the necessity of the Second Stage by drawing a conclusion from the very nature of the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being? If the answer is in the affirmative, it implies for certain that we should draw such a conclusion on the basis of an altogether fresh enquiry.

We have to ask whether any entity or constituent of the Discontinuous Universe could conceivably be inactive: if the Discontinuous Universe has to begin and end, does it not follow at once that there is no alternative to its being active, that it has to exclude inactivity from its range altogether? At least the Discontinuous Universe cannot be confused with the 'static' or 'complete', the Infinite or Absolute of tradition; so that the term 'inactive' cannot possibly apply to it. And certainly it will be useless to equate it with the Absolute Negative, which is frankly inactive. If the term 'static', still, in the unsteady speculation of the human species has been identified with the 'activity of thought', or with the Absolute which stands out in all rigid schemes as 'complete' and 'perfect', we need have no special concern for that unholy usage.

We cannot revive the Absolute after having discarded it altogether as meaningless and impossible. And so far as the 'inactivity of thought' goes, it is frankly irresponsible thinking; for in the first place it stands on the basis of Positivist logic, and in the second place it is fatal to any logic or any enquiry to reduce thought to nonsense. We simply cannot afford to destroy the source of all evidence.

If Being and Non-Being which alone, therefore, can constitute the Discontinuous Universe must necessarily be active entities, the Discontinuous Universe constituted by them has to be active through and through if only to distinguish itself from the non-active Absolute, or the Absolute Negative.

But that necessity does not mean that it has to be just active, and that in only one definite sense. Incidentally there cannot be different senses in which, for instance, the notion of existence can be, or has to be, taken: either an entity exists or it does not exist —the idea that there can be different forms of existence for different entities is meaningless. At that rate we shall never know what it is to exist. The phrase 'forms of existence' is a misnomer, and so also is the phrase 'degrees of truth'. They can be distinguished only from what has been known as 'matter and content' of thought—an idea which does not raise the issue of existence as such. Could it be equally held that an entity has to be either active or not?

The answer is in the negative. If the Discontinuous Universe has to begin and end—and in both cases in a thoroughly active manner—surely the activity which is responsible for its beginning cannot be identified with the activity which necessarily brings it to an end? In other words, activity must be ultimately dual in its nature. There have to be at least two distinct forms of activity—one to whose credit the beginning of the Universe will lie and the other which will have in consequence as its achievement the ending of the Universe. Neither of them could possibly be defined just by the term 'activity'. Besides, while one in the normal course will precede the other, the other will naturally follow it. They cannot in any case be confused and must remain strictly independent of one another.

If, still, both the processes of beginning and ending must also be called active, such a necessity will arise only when we have to distinguish them from the non-active, or the Absolute Negative. That is certainly one way of dealing with them, but it is necessarily different from the way in which we distinguish the two activities themselves in so far as they bring about the two distinct events, the processes of beginning and ending.

Here is a clear case of duality so far as activity is concerned, and that is exactly the reason why they strictly imply one another. Neither of them could come into existence if the existence of both of them had not been eternally provided for. It is simple logic that neither beginning nor ending has any meaning if we try to conceive of them as altogether separate and completely unrelated; and yet this relationship, however necessary, could not stand in the

way of their uniqueness or independence. It will not draw them into the net of causality whether in the sense of ground and consequence or just antecedent and consequent.

Could I not, then, describe the two types of activity by the two familiar names of Purpose and Realisation? Is there any other way to describe them unless too much importance is attached to the theory which describes the two forms of activity in terms of what we generally call 'time'. That is only a convenient diversion—we are simply debarred from utilising any association of activity with time. (I hold an altogether different conception of time.) We have to describe the two instances of activities in terms of the two notions of Purpose and Realisation.

And this description will give us the chance, long overdue, of defining the two terms, Purpose and Realisation, in a strictly logical sense. Here is at any rate a logical account of them, an account which should bring to a close the long career during which they floated about in the speculation of our philosophers like aimless wanderers on the tumultuous seas. We can confidently hold after this that if we have to be active, we must be so at one moment in conceiving an objective and at another in realising it. There is no third way of being active except when we reach an impasse as a result of absolute failure to realise the objective: except in the case when Being and Non-Being are just active in the Primal Stage; we have to be active in both ways except in those two states. And so, incidentally, the dream of the scientist, whose ambition was to manufacture a Universe with nothing but constant changes, whether simultaneous or successive, was really a dream. The attempt to negate the primal claim of 'end' or 'objective' to condition changes and to give the changes a *raison d'être* on their own account, could not succeed; it went against the grain of the Universe, which must begin and end. Such a Universe must imply a 'purpose' which does not change as well as a 'function' which does change, so that the purpose could be realised.

It may not be at all inappropriate if we add, by the way, that entities which change in a uniform way do not have to be under the direction of any agency or law, which must exist, if at all, quite outside the entities. There is, and can be, no such law; which is a scientific hypothesis for which no scientist, by God's grace, ever succeeded in giving evidence. The entities doubtless

change, but these changes cannot be accounted for unless we keep in mind that those very entities exist in another state in which they conceive an end or objective which makes the changes inevitable. Agency, here, can have no other meaning.

Being and Non-Being, therefore, not only have to be active entities, as they exist, but must exert their activities in two altogether different modes—conceiving objectives and realising them. And so, as a direct consequence, a fresh Stage falls due—a Stage in which this dual activity will find room for its steady operation. It cannot be confused with the Primal Stage, from which it is bound to stand apart and in which Being and Non-Being are just active exactly as they are existent. In both cases they exclude the non-existent and the non-active Negative. Perhaps we should add that the phrase 'Beginning and Ending' has two meanings: when we say that the Discontinuous Universe begins and ends, we mean that it is preceded and succeeded by the Continuous Universe. When we say that Being and Non-Being begin and end we mean that they are active in two senses, i.e. they conceive and realise.

May this not be taken as pure logical evidence for the Second Stage? Could we not argue now that the Universe must have at least another Stage, to provide for the specific form of distinguishability for the two Non-Absolutes?

And if this is clear logic for the origin of the Second Stage, it is well suited to bring about the distinguishability of Being and Non-Being: and these two achievements supply the broad answer to the question which called for all the preliminary issues.

It would be profitable, however, to elaborate this answer by a further enquiry as to whether the two Stages are bound to be related, in spite of the fact that they have to be strictly independent of one another and perfectly original.

It seems obvious that since the basic form of the Second Stage will have to be directly associated with that of the First, relationship must be implied in some sense or other. Even if the two stages have to be different by virtue of the specific forms of their activities, each of them will equally have to share the two states which existence, as such, implies—'identicalness' and 'distinctness'. It will be necessary, for instance, for the Second Stage to exist before it can function at all. And if to exist is to exist in the

two states of identicalness and distinctness—there is no alternative to it—the Second Stage will have at least to presuppose these two states, if not actually to embody them. It will be perfectly correct to say that the Primal Stage made existence possible for any conceivable entity or state. Indeed the issue of existence, as such, was solved by the Primal Stage, once and for ever. Here is the evidence of direct association of the Second Stage with the First.

But the question still remains, how would the Second Stage actually appear? If the Second Stage does not, as it were, have to repeat the virginal form of existence—the two bare states of identicalness and distinctness—is it not possible that it may appear with an identity from which one may not be able to trace them? It cannot. In the first place, the Creative Stage itself has to have two separate states on its own account since it will represent two distinct modes of existence:

(*a*) the mode in which the phenomenon known as purpose will appear;
(*b*) the mode in which the realisation of that purpose will take place.

In the second place these two states themselves—purpose and realisation—would, for a special reason, have constantly to presuppose the presence of the states of identicalness and distinctness. It is inconceivable that the state of purpose could come into existence unless the state of identicalness was actually there to sponsor it. The notion of 'purpose', since it implies commonness, the direct opposite of the distinct and unique, necessarily presupposes the state of identicalness. If the Universe, for instance, could exist without a provision in it for the state of identicalness, that Universe would have no chance of developing the common purpose. And for exactly similar reasons, the purpose would miss its realisation altogether if there was no state of distinctness in the Universe from which alone the purpose could be worked out. If, however, the fact is that the Universe did exist in both the states, it must be supposed that it had already made provision not only for the existence of any and every entity provided they were conceivable but also for such special entities as common purpose and its realisation. One may therefore safely trace the pre-existence of the two states, identicalness and distinctness, from the presence

of the common purpose and its realisation in the Second state, the state of distinctness.

We have so far had evidence for the necessity of the Second Stage and at least some idea about the nature of relationship which connects the two Stages, the Primal and the Creative, without interfering with their uniqueness and independence. We have also had evidence for the duality and distinguishability of the two ultimate constituents of Reality—Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being. These are central issues and it might be profitable if we go over them once again, if only to summarise our conclusions.

Evidently the Primal Stage could not provide for the distinguishability of the two Non-Absolutes. It provided only for their concrete existence and nothing else. If they existed, still, in two separate states—which in a sense were distinguishable in so far as they were not identical—that sense was only an evidence for their concrete existence. It did not bring out their feature of distinguishability. It was altogether a mark of concrete existence. It meant nothing else but the fact that they were existent and not mere categories or absolute differents. The issue whether they were distinguishable and not merely existent could not arise at this stage since it was only consolidating their existence. The point is that a state of distinctness is not just another name for a state which provides for distinguishability. The latter implies an additional factor—that of conceiving an objective and realising it.

We may also note that the issue of duality is not merely the bare negative issue of excluding the simple. It must be something more. If it does exclude the simple—in my scheme it is the only Reality and has no alignment with the 'Absolute' of tradition—it also introduces the state of identicalness. If Reality, for instance, has to exist in the shape of two Non-Absolutes and not one Absolute, the two Non-Absolutes in their turn have to exist in two states and not one: one will bring out their distinctness while the other will embody their identicalness.

This conception of duality as it appears in the Primal Stage is altogether different from any that I know of: and the same comment applies to my idea of distinguishability—the idea which presupposes the two independent states of purpose and realisation as I put them.

I may close this short summary with just one more reference to

the Primal Stage, the corner-stone of the Universe. It can do no harm, but only good, if I just repeat that the issue of Primal Stage is one of *existence* and bare activity and absolutely nothing else. No other issue is relevant to this Stage. If it is evident that Being and Non-Being were both non-distinct and distinct in it, it is equally evident that the two states just connoted concrete existence and bare activity; which means that Being and Non-Being were no longer mere categorical entities. The case for *distinguishability* remained to be made; and it could not be made before Being and Non-Being appeared in two other fresh states, in which they respectively conceived a common purpose and functioned adequately to realise it—the two forms of activity I have already mentioned. Here is a full answer to the claim that Being and Non-Being must not only exist but must exist in a way which will bring out their distinguishability. It is in the stage of purpose and realisation that Being and Non-Being reach their ultimate nature of duality and distinguishability. The two notions 'distinctiveness' and 'distinguishability' are by no means synonyms.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SECOND, OR THE CREATIVE, STAGE OF THE UNIVERSE

I AM in a position now to raise the issue of the form and constitution of the Second Stage of the Universe. The immediate question is, what happens to the two Non-Absolutes as they appear in the new Stage conceiving the Common Purpose and putting forth effort to realise it?

I may note at once that the notion of 'common purpose' means nothing but the presence or existence of the common purpose in the state of being conceived. This state again means exclusively the outstanding fact of a society of individuals formulating or conceiving it. It is an actual existent state—I mean, the formulation. The whole of its identity is exhausted in this formulation. It does not have to wait for the materialisation of its identity in the future, as do possibilities. It is complete in itself as a formulation, exactly as the individuals who formulate the common purpose have no other form of existence than the act of conceiving or formulating. Indisputably the presence or existence of the common purpose is a unique and original phenomenon. If it has a meaning it is the result of analysis and adds nothing to its identity.

To begin the Creative epoch the Universe, by its ultimate economy comes to possess a common purpose which it did not possess in the Primal Stage. There can be no question about the supreme significance of the Creative epoch; and I may add that on no account could the common purpose be confused with what is called the 'concrete Absolute' in our long tradition. There is nothing 'mystical', or 'personal', or 'ideal' about it—on the contrary, it begins and ends as an *actual entity* with the strict implication that it must be fully realised by some other society.

This is obviously a very broad account of the society which begins the Second or the Creative Stage, and will have to be amplified by elaborate analysis. I may, however, mention at once that the main issue about this Society centres round two essential points:

(*a*) The nature of the common purpose and its realisation, with special reference to the activities they imply;
(*b*) The relationship between the two activities.

These two points will not yield to interpretation unless we keep in mind the basal fact that the Second Stage is the Creative Stage *par excellence* of the Universe. We have to note that Creation consists of two distinct achievements; conception of the common purpose and its realisation in the shape of frustration and fulfilment. If the constituents of the Second Stage are bound to be the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being, in two different states, its constitution can only mean two distinct activities on their part: they will conceive the common purpose in one state and realise that purpose in another—with specific relationship between the two states.

What, however, is most noteworthy about the constitution is that it can appear only in the shape of a society, or organisation, of individuals, as I have already mentioned. The Non-Absolutes which constitute it exist as concrete individuals and not as mere categories conceived by human mind. And if the question is raised —it may well be raised—whether it was not possible that they could have existed as categories, the answer may not be so simple as the question certainly seems to be. It requires close analysis.

Obviously the Universe which is slowly shaping itself in this work, as an answer to the sceptical claim, is not exactly the Universe which arose after the First Continuous duly went out of existence. This Universe could not exist in the First Continuous, nor could it arise in any Stage later than the Second—indeed, it may well seem absurd that I have to refer to the difference between the Universe, which arose in its own time, and the account of it which this work is trying to formulate by way of removing the 'Universe' of the sceptic. But the question that has been raised cannot be answered otherwise.

The fact is that the Universe, which came into existence in its own time, was by no means a categorical Universe—it was not only complete but a fully concrete Universe. Exactly the Universe which this work is recording is a Universe of categories; it is nothing but a system of categories which constitute thought and are referred to by thought. There is all the difference between the

two Universes—a fact which it is impossible to question. Here is, at least, an evidence that the Non-Absolutes, as they change from Stage to Stage, may at least in some Stage exist in the shape of thought and nothing but thought.

And yet there is also evidence that the Universe of categories directly presupposed the concrete Universe which came into existence after the First Continuous had closed its round. In fact, it was definitely implied by that concrete Universe (which we have called the Discontinuous) that scepticism was bound to arise as it entered into its Third Stage and plunged into primeval darkness in a certain phase of it. It was ordained that periodic confusion and darkness would prevail in that Stage; and it was not possible that this darkness should recede till the light which came from the categories in the Third Stage dispelled it. It was this light which rejuvenated the whole Universe in the Third Stage and made it a Universe of categories. The constituents of the Third Stage of the Universe had to exist in the shape of thought if only to get out of the primeval gloom of the sceptical belief which marked the Third Stage periodically: and it was only after this interlude of categorical experience that the constituents of the Universe were expected to get back their concrete fullness again.

This is a full answer to the question whether the constituents of the Universe could at all exist as categorical experience.

And if we still may question the claim that the stage of categorical experience was, in the nature of things, preceded by primeval darkness, there is the whole history of human experience to verify it. Could we normally deny it? Not even the Divinity of history could spare its creatures the torment of the anguish of soul which the image of the primeval darkness necessarily created for them. The Universe periodically became one vast sea of confusion and doubt. And every time such a panorama appeared, it was for the metaphysician to rebuild the Universe with the supreme technique of evidence. It was by no means a meaningless task but essential. (It is another question whether the metaphysician earned divinity as a result of this achievement!) But God certainly was not called upon to create the Universe with the technique of evidence, since the sceptic was not co-eternal with God, if we have to believe in Divine creation. Most certainly the Universe, the marrow and bone of which was category, was not the Universe

of God's creation—it could not be. God was not a metaphysician. Both the Universes—the Universe of God and that of man—were there as it were to preserve the prestige of Divinity and the credit of man. There is complete evidence for both Universes: one of category and one of eternity.

If, therefore, the constitution of the Second Stage, which has no direct connection with that of the Third Stage, has to be taken as a society of individuals rather than as a society of categories, it follows that it should be what we call a verifiable phenomenon. It should be possible for us to have direct contact with it—something which we cannot have with the mystical or non-temporal Reality of tradition, however we might desire it.

It so happens, however, that we do not have any such contact with it and can only expect to have it in some distant future. This, however, creates no logical difficulty that may neutralise the possibility; on the contrary, one may even find sufficient explanation for postponement—I shall soon discuss that reason as I go on.

But there can be no doubt that this society of individuals is a society by itself. In fact it is a dual society in which the individuals function and exist separately. In one they conceive the common purpose while in the other they realise it. The two functions are specific, original and independent of one another.

For instance, the individuals who conceive the common purpose could not do so unless they belonged to a state of identicalness. The point to notice is that, unless the individuals were at one with one another in a state of identicalness, they would be incapable of the act of conceiving. The term 'conception' implies two things indisputably—the presence of a common purpose as distinguished from the unique, and the presence of individuals who are at one with one another. Conceptions of the common purpose cannot take place unless both conditions are present.

This, at least, is my interpretation of the notion of 'conception'; and I can argue, equally, about 'realisation', which it necessarily implies. Realisation has no meaning in a Universe which is without a common purpose, even as common purpose has no chance of appearing in a Universe if it is incapable of providing for its realisation. They imply one another. In other words, if it was the Creative Stage of the Universe—and not the Primal—that was responsible for both the common purpose and its realisation, that

Stage was, in the nature of things, bound to provide for both or for neither of them.

And I may add that no tradition ever succeeded in either defining them or providing for their existence at the same time. Neither my ancestry nor any other had any chance to provide for the 'common purpose' and necessarily missed the opportunity to find out what 'realisation' truly meant and what form it could take.

The next point to refer to will be the nature of relationship between the two states of purpose and realisation. They are independent of one another and perfectly original. Nor could they, naturally, in any way interact, or interpenetrate, or determine one another. In the nature of things, they keep to their own orbits and act respectively to conceive the common purpose and realise it in two distinct forms. I have to add that it was not at all accurate in tradition to describe the state of 'common purpose' as a state of possibility which was supposed to become actual only in its realisation. Both the states, on the contrary—that of conception and that of realisation—were actual states and had specific achievements to their credit. If still they had to stand related we can only call their relationship by the name of 'implication', which means that either both or neither of them existed and functioned. They could not appear in any other form of relationship.

The issues, therefore, that arise now will refer to the following:

(1) What exactly is the common purpose of the Universe as it is conceived? Who and what are the individuals responsible for it? What exactly is the nature of the society they form? If it is a society in which the Non-Absolutes have to be in a state of identicalness, how is the society actually constituted?

(2) What is the form of the other society which has for its main objective the realisation of the Purpose? How do the Non-Absolutes appear in it?

These are issues of supreme importance and it may not be at all possible to answer them before, as we shall see later, we have reached the Fifth Stage of the Universe. They have to be postponed. In the meantime, I shall make a review once again of my main achievement so far. The theories which make up the achievement are not only fresh and unfamiliar but even subtle and intri-

cate. We have travelled a long way since we began the analysis of the Discontinuous Universe. The summary will help us to see the bearing of our achievement on what the issues above imply.

It is by no means easy to hold together in one's mind as a definite picture a system of thought if it happens to be not only unusual and fresh but frankly suggests a replacement of all that went before. The first thing I shall record is the nature of my ultimate claim about the Universe, which demarcates it completely from any claim recorded in history. The claim is that it is a triadic Universe in the shape of the Continuous, Discontinuous and Continuous; and the basis of this strange form appears in the ultimate fact that the constituents of the Universe are dual—non-absolute Being and non-absolute Non-Being—and not the Absolute, whether monistic or pluralistic. The triadic form arose since the two constituents admitted of two types of existence, related and non-related—the non-related in its turn having also two forms. What I may add to this account is the negative statement that the Universe is neither monistic nor pluralistic; since it is not the Absolute whether in the shape of unity or in that of individuality. It is a Universe of Stages and certainly it is not dualistic in the sense in which that term has been understood in all tradition—in the shape of the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal.

This triadic form, again, has resolved all the metaphysical antinomies of tradition such as the Absolute and the Relative, the Infinite and the Finite, the Permanent and the Changeful. And it might be useful if I discuss this claim in relation to the one that has been universally held on these issues—such a discussion will not fall due until I come to review history.

The basic significance of the triadic form, however, rises above the level of any criticism, especially if the hypothesis of this criticism is drawn exclusively from the archives of history. Should it not escape criticism altogether since there is no other hypothesis?

The second fact of ultimate importance that I shall record is that the Discontinuous Universe, with which alone we are here concerned, began as 'related duality'—the constituent of its Primal Stage. Here is a Universe of bare existence and activity as distinguished from the one which is Creative.

If the triadic pattern of the Universe is the solvent of all logical and metaphysical problems, 'related duality', the Primal Stage of

existence, is the resolution of all concrete problems. I go into this question of resolution at great length in my account of the Fourth Stage. For the moment, we shall just state that it solves the basic difficulty of organisation which the existence of duality and plurality necessarily implied. Indeed no scientist or mathematician, after this, need have the awkward necessity of improvising devices to provide for the ultimate incompatibles of unity and individuality: and the same immunity may be guaranteed in due time to the artist, the statesman and the priest. The issue, if it is not one of criticism, must be one of discovery, especially of the technique of its application to all spheres of experience. I need not add that there is no hypothesis in history which can rise up to its criticism.

As I have put the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being, as the ultimate constituents of Reality—the triadic pattern derives from them—I have to put equally 'related duality' as the one single principle which will account for all forms of existence and specify the nature of their final achievement. If I may anticipate, the issue in the end will take two forms:

(*a*) one of resolving the conflicts of history, which will be the main constituents of the Third Stage of the Universe, soon to be discussed;
(*b*) one of fulfilling the central purpose of the Universe, which will begin with the Fourth Stage and be completed in the Fifth. This will bring about the resolution.

Obviously this is not the place to discuss in any sense the panoramic change which the Universe will undergo as a result of this achievement. Indeed the occasion for it will not fall due before we have completed our career in the Universe and reached a stage of existence which is beyond our calculation at the moment.

The next point to note is that the Discontinuous Universe has to its credit only two stages of existence:

(1) one of bare existence and activity, a phenomenon which for ever excludes the persistent claim of the Absolute Negative to exist in the place of the Positive;
(2) one of creative existence and activity, a phenomenon which introduces the purpose and its realisation. It fulfils the need for the forms of existence in the Discontinuous Universe.

Between the two stages they complete the whole epoch of beginning and ending. Reality afterwards enters into the realm of the Second Continuous, which will keep it eternally fresh in the full enjoyment of the supreme value of never-endingness.

The next point to note refers to the notion of relationship, which forms, indisputably, the central feature in the constitution of the Discontinuous Universe. It is this feature, again, which distinguishes the Discontinuous Universe from the two Continuous Universes, which exist in a non-related, monistic form. If the Discontinuous Universe begins and ends, the reason is that it is a related Universe on its own. Its character as related, however, is not an evidence that it somehow is dependent on the Absolute and therefore must be finite, incomplete and imperfect. There is no Absolute in existence in my scheme, and the Continuous which has replaced it either ends or begins, even as it does not begin or end. The traditional notion of 'no beginning and no end' has been dropped by me altogether. The related Universe is therefore just as independent as the non-related. If it begins and ends, neither its beginning nor its ending is a sign of any deficiency in it, any more than 'no beginning and an end' or 'a beginning and no end' is a mark of efficiency in the Continuous. These are unique features and have a right to form the Universe of the triadic pattern: and if, still, justification is called for, it may be claimed that the Absolute Negative is completely ruled out by it. Between them the two Continuous and the Discontinuous Universes provide for endlessness and totality of existence. One can affirm with perfect legitimacy that the Universe as we see it never was—or could be —absent, nor did it fail to provide for permanence, or change, or any conceivable form of existence.

If the related Universe, then, is just as essential and real as the Continuous, it only means that the two Non-Absolutes, between which the relationship must appear, have to exist with as many forms of relationship between them as possible. This is perhaps the most essential argument for what I have described as the theory of Stages. The Universe cannot have all the relationships at once and altogether, nor could it be any other medium than Stages which could accommodate relationship in all its varied forms.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE DOCTRINE OF RELATIONSHIP AS WORKED OUT IN STAGES

So far I have discussed two Stages—the one with which the Universe began, the Stage of Existence, and the other which introduced Creation. I shall discuss now the three phases which will complete the Creative Stage—this means that the Creative Stage will include altogether four phases.

As a preliminary to this discussion I shall emphasise the fact that both the Stages and phases will have their own type of relationship and this necessity will follow from the nature of the organisation which the two Non-Absolutes will form in every one of them. For instance, the two Non-Absolutes in the Primal Stage will have for their organisation just two states: the state of identicalness and the state of distinctness. The total achievement of this organisation, as I have so often repeated, is the bare existence and activity of the Universe. The issue of relationship here appears in its primary or virginal form: it is another name for the non-distinct as distinguished from the distinct. No other stage of the Universe actually provides for this ultimate form of the notion of 'relationship'—they all presuppose it. And the peculiarity of this ultimate form is that the non-distinct and the distinct co-exist in the same organisation. And once relationship is accommodated in this primary sense in the Universe of Existence, the issue for all forms of existence is solved. No longer is it necessary to raise the primary issue of relationship in any organisation which follows the Primal Stage—they all have full benefit from the achievement in the Primal Stage.

If, however, the issue of relationship as a matter of course arose again, its meaning changed; it was not the same as it happened to be in the Primal Stage. The term which held the new meaning was 'simultaneity'. Entities which were considered to be related in other stages coexisted and underwent changes simultaneously. Perhaps nothing else was implied by relationship but

simultaneous changes; at least, no trace or sign of identicalness, or the non-distinct, was detected in this new form of relationship. It was the notion of 'law' that somehow came to be tied up with this change in at least the realm of empiricism—with or without any reason.

It is another issue why nobody in tradition asked what is meant by co-existence. If entities exist, as they well may, surely it does not follow that they must, therefore, necessarily co-exist, nor is it ever obligatory for the empiricist to believe that co-existence must imply simultaneous changes. There is no 'must' in the empirical school. Finally, these changes, even if they had to be simultaneous for non-empirical reasons need not have been supposed to imply 'law', which is something quite distinct from the changes and has no logical tie with them. And after this to introduce the direct and immediate fact of observation as evidence is not to improve the situation, but perhaps to be disproportionate and even to lose balance.

My suggestion is that the second sense of relationship, 'simultaneity', was guaranteed by the first. If entities can exist, they can exist in any form conceivable. The main issue is one of existence, since it implies a provision for two incompatible factors—unity and individuality. And once that issue is solved by Related Duality which makes room for both the non-distinct and the distinct, the issue of simultaneity, instead of being a problem is bound to be a necessary implication. The distinct entities have to co-exist and change simultaneously if their main function is to realise the common objective of the organisation they belong to. There is no other alternative. And after this, the notion of 'simultaneity', might quite appropriately be called by the name of 'relationship', for the simple reason that it follows from the primary sense of that term. One cannot, at least, call the distinct entities unrelated, since they are not absolute differents; and if by calling them related one gets into complications, for reasons already known, there is the Primal Stage of Related Duality to remove that complication. Why not, then, call simultaneity by the name of relationship? Besides, one could find a special reason: the simultaneous entities may be, and actually are, differently constituted. The opposites and the harmonious are equally simultaneous: is a function, then, not indicated?

But this is no defence of the empirical usage of this term. The empiricists had no conception of relationship in its primary sense and had no reason whatever to introduce the term 'relationship' on the basis of simultaneity. No doubt they observed the simultaneous, but they had no evidence for it—perhaps one could question this observation as an instance of pure illusion. At any rate, the arch-empiricist totally denied that human experience ever truly recorded anything but the 'absolute differents'. How we claim authority and even wisdom for ourselves even while we profess complete ignorance and put all the blame on our Heavenly Father since He created us with what we call 'habits'!

If the Primal Stage of the Universe is the only Stage in which the Non-Absolutes appeared with relationship in its ultimate sense, all the other Stages which formed the Creative part of the Universe could have only the derivative form of relationship. The Second Stage, for instance, had the two Non-Absolutes in two distinct forms: they conceived the common purpose in a state of perfect agreement, as they were in a state of identicalness. Here is a clear case of relationship which cannot be confused with relationship in the state of distinctness; which is a relationship of opposites. And in both cases the term 'relationship' means simultaneous changes in the two Non-Absolutes.

As I go on developing the Creative Stage I shall have the chance to note the specific differences between the types of relationship which the phases of the Creative Stage are bound to introduce. Altogether there will be one primary or ultimate and four derivative forms.

Perhaps an account of 'relationship' in the Universe will not be complete without a similar account of the two Non-Absolute terms between which relationship appears, and the point which needs fresh analysis refers to the peculiar situation in which Being and Non-Being, or the Positive and the Negative, stand in my scheme. Several comments deserve to be made:

(1) Being and Non-Being not only are equal in value and validity but go through every form of relationship. They frustrate each other just as much as they complement each other. The Universe, in consequence, stands as 'tension', or 'chaos', or 'confusion', even as it appears as 'certainty', 'perfect unity' and 'complete harmony'.

(2) Being and Non-Being begin existence in a form in which one cannot choose between their identicalness and distinctness. Here they neither clash nor harmonise but just exist, as if they are without a value or meaning.

(3) They never fail to function as both positive and negative. For instance, when the Universe is in the state of conflict it is indisputably in a negative state—it will be odd if the state of confusion which follows from conflict is considered to be a positive state; it cannot be taken as a state in which something is posited, or affirmed, or constructed. Equally, where the Universe is frankly in harmony, one cannot call that state negative. On the contrary, it is a state which is pre-eminently one of affirmation and construction.

(4) Strangely, however, even when the Universe seems to be the handiwork of the Negative, it is necessarily the handiwork of both the Positive and the Negative. The Positive and the Negative never fall apart but work together. And this happens for two reasons.

In the first place, if both the Positive and the Negative are equal in value and validity, existence for them can take only the form of Related Duality. In no other form can they exist. And this momentous fact means that the Positive and the Negative stand ultimately as both distinct and non-distinct. This primal condition of existence, again, admits of relationship in any form. Even opposition, or tension, or conflict—with its result confusion—is not debarred by it. The Positive and the Negative are not the Positive and the Negative of tradition and therefore do not put on the feature of absolutism. They are non-absolute and exist as Related Duality. In that capacity, while they never lose their related duality they take on all forms of existence whether destructive or constructive.

In the second place, if they are dual, they form Related Duality. And it is this basal fact which made the appearance of the incompatibles—the 'uncertain' as well as 'evil' and 'illusion'—possible, though all of them in the end proved to be nothing but episodes.

The next question to discuss is the issue of individuality, which is just as fundamental an issue as that of relationship. If the two Non-Absolutes accommodate, as it were, all forms of relationship between them in different stages of their existence, they also equally form the basal type of every kind of individual. There can be no individual which can stand in existence for a moment if it is not directly an instance of either the one or other of the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being. Indeed, the Universe cannot have any constituents unless they embody strictly some instance or other of the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being. Whether, for instance, the individual is a stone or a Spirit, it will have to appear in the direct line which began in the Primal Stage of the Universe with the two Non-Absolutes as its constituents. In other words, the term 'individuality' will mean two things:

(*a*) uniqueness and independence which imply concreteness;
(*b*) an existence in a series which began its career in the Primal Stage of the Universe—a series which had the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being, as its original links on terms of perfect equality.

Here is a new notion—the notion of 'series': and it implies the same principle or validity as what we have called 'Stages' do. As the Continuous, Discontinuous and Continuous form three main divisions of the Universe, so the individuals form a series in the middle division of it. Both conceptions, the divisions of the Universe and the series of individuals, while they successfully preserve the uniqueness of each division and individual also keep them from falling apart and disappearing into the state of 'absolute differents'. The divisions and individuals therefore stand strictly related, in the sense that no division or individual could have come into existence or be real if by any chance it was not possible that all the other divisions and individuals should do exactly the same with their specific uniquenesses. The nature of Reality guaranteed to its constituents only the life of divisions or series. We may take the Universe either in the shape of 'Stage' as distinguished from 'whole', or as a 'series of individuals' if we consider it from the point of view of its constituents. And this falls due for only one reason: the Absolute which made 'total identity' for any conceivable entity inevitable, in all tradition, is meaningless in my

scheme. The absence of the Absolute introduces the two Non-Absolutes at once—with the corollary that they must form a series; which is nothing but existence of the same entity in more than one form, either simultaneously or successively.

I shall now go back to the issue of the constitution of the Second Stage. I have discussed at some length the Society of Beings whose chief function is to *conceive* the common purpose. I shall proceed now to discuss the nature of the society whose sole object is to *realise* it—and that in two distinct forms, 'frustration' and 'fulfilment'. The issue is, what is realisation?

Obviously, this issue has a special significance for us since the whole of what we human beings call by the name of history or, at times, the Universe, derives wholly from this cosmic fact of realisation. It is a momentous issue.

It seems necessary, therefore, as a preliminary to my analysis of the main feature of realisation to re-state a few points with reference to the ultimate nature of Being and Non-Being as concrete existent entities. In other words, I must briefly state my main position again before I proceed any further on some of the essential notions I have so far discussed. They are as follows:

(1) Being and Non-Being in my scheme are Non-Absolute and by no means Absolute or total in the sense in which that term has been taken in all tradition; perhaps the only sense conceivable in the Third Stage. All the classical schools agreed on the main issue of the Absolute as such in spite of their deep disagreements as to its interpretation.

(2) Being and Non-Being, again, as Non-Absolute are equally Real, and certainly not Real and Unreal as all tradition took them to be, except the school of Parmenides which believed only in Absolute Being. He was the only protagonist of Logic as distinguished from 'common sense', which is called empirical experience.

(3) Being and Non-Being as equally Real appear in a dual state, the state of identicalness and that of distinctness, and it is only in the state of distinctness that realisation falls due. The state of identicalness is the state of conceiving the common purpose. (This is entirely my own position and was not suggested in any tradition.)

(4) Realisation has to appear in two forms by virtue of the fact that the agents and entities which will bring it about are the Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, or the Positive and the Negative. Since both are equally Real and at the same time easily distinguishable, realisation must partake of forms which will preserve the specific character of both and not obliterate either one of them in the interest of the other, or both of them, if possible, by introducing a factor which is neither the one nor the other. (This is, again, relevant to my scheme of Reality alone and was not even dreamt of by any tradition.)

The issue of realisation is therefore by no means simple: and yet, before I develop its main theme, I have to refer to what may be called an unusual complication in its career. I have to suggest that the Cosmic was bound to stage a sudden catastrophic change as a prelude to realisation.

That catastrophic change is Tension, a phenomenon to which I have already referred in discussing the structure of the Universe in terms of 'related multiplicity' (vide *Related Multiplicity*). The hypothesis I chose to account for it—related multiplicity—was perfectly correct but its logical basis was by no means ultimate enough. Tension derives its origin from the fact that the state of distinctness in the Creative Stage, which is the only state responsible for realisation, was constituted by two opposites on perfectly equal terms. The two non-absolutes, Being and Non-Being did not appear as merely distinct (as in the Primal Stage of existence) but also as clean opposites.

Obviously there was no alternative to Tension: and the reason was that Being and Non-Being, as Positive and Negative—and equally Non-Absolute and valid—could produce neither frustration nor fulfilment of the common purpose—the two outstanding forms of realisation. Tension obviously does not represent the fruition of either Being or Non-Being. It is nothing but complete neutralisation of both; one cannot call it by the name of Non-Being, which means the state of destruction and frustration; nor by that of Being, which implies the state of construction and of fulfilment.

But can it even conceivably be argued that if Tension cannot be

mistaken for the realisation of the common purpose, it has to be taken as nothing but its neutralisation?—as if Tension were the only form which realisation could take? Need it be the only chance the common purpose of the Universe could possibly have for its realisation? The answers are in the negative. Tension, as a Cosmic phenomenon, had a perfect right to intervene in the Cosmic process when the phase of realisation fell due, as it was indisputably conceivable: it might at least serve as a prelude, or more precisely, it might only hold realisation in abeyance, and not in any sense neutralise its chances. The case for realisation was guaranteed for all eternity if Being and Non-Being were the only ultimate constituents of reality. What therefore fell due after Tension was nothing if not the necessity of a fresh effort for realisation, and not a collapse of the common purpose—or of the Universe, for the matter of that.

But what could be the logical significance of neutralisation to which the opposites are reduced? Or what does the notion of opposites truly mean?

It may sound strange to my contemporaries but the 'opposites', whose presence occurs only in the state of distinctness in the Second Stage, do not inaugurate what we are used to calling by the name of conflict or clash. Between entities which are evenly constituted, whether in validity or value, conflict is inconceivable since its main form—contradiction—implies inequality. It is only between unequals that the possibility of conflict can, and does, appear. The stronger contradicts, destroys, suppresses or assimilates the weaker. It is commonly said that the 'subject knows while the object is known'; or the 'Mystical Unity absorbs the individuals'; or 'God exalts the creatures from the vale of tears, the Earth, to Heaven, the abode of peace and love'; or the 'good destroys the evil'; 'the real eliminates the unreal'. Here is room for activity which breaks the spirit of resistance.

If conflict, then, is not possible between opposites which must be equal, the opposites cannot be conceived as active centres which can mutually resist one another. What is possible to clean opposites is a passive process in which the experience of steady mutual disappearance takes place—a completely negative state. What, however, this exactly means cannot be traced to any recorded experience of history, since the clean opposites never

appeared in the Third Stage of possibilities. Its whole career was spent in the Second, which is still outside the ken of history. No doubt it implied both a common purpose and the impossibility of being succeeded by a vacuum: but, as wholly a state of passive experience, it was excluded from achieving anything positive to help in the realisation of the common purpose. Its only contribution lay in removing itself from the Second Stage, since it was nothing but a hindrance to the realisation of the common purpose. Perhaps as a negative state it heralded the approach of frustration, grim and forbidding in its maximum enormity.

The best way to bring out its true character, however, is to compare it with the state of conflict, which, as I have just said, appears in the Third Stage between the Real and the Unreal. Here is the undisputed sphere of the dichotomy of history. In this sphere conflict unmistakably appears between two incompatibles —the belief in unity and the belief in individuality. And what is specially noteworthy, is that if these two beliefs stand out in a state of opposition they do so without a common background. Here is a case of opposition which is of a different type from the opposition which creates Tension. It takes three forms in succession—two of contradiction and one of contrariety—and necessarily all the forms are active centres of resistance. In the two stages of contradiction, as a result of mutual resistance, unity and individuality alternately rise and fall. It is in the stage of contrariety, the final stage, that the beliefs stand as incompatibles, with evidences between which there is nothing to choose. This is indisputably the stage of confusion and doubt. Some people still call it mutual resistance, though there is no evidence on the strength of which alone resistance could follow. It is, however, a prelude to mutual disappearance, unless evidence arises in the shape of scepticism to prevent it—as invariably happens. The interlude of scepticism, while it brings back evidence, does not last, since it soon loses that evidence in self-contradiction. After this the faith in Reality reappears, with fresh evidence.

How then does Tension compare with the state of conflict? Or more precisely, how does 'confusion'—a state in which no evidence appears on behalf of Reality—compare with Tension in the Second Stage, a situation in which the faith never disappears? If the common purpose persists in the stage in which Tension

appears, and if no belief survives in 'confusion'—there is no background to a conflict which ends in confusion—could we identify the state of Tension with the state of confusion? If the opposites go down equally, with nothing but a sense of mutual disappearance, could they be identified with the incompatibles or contrarieties which disappear into confusion and doubt? Would, for instance, the sceptic at all intervene in the career of Tension? Could he possibly do so if the common purpose never is questioned by Tension?

Perhaps one may further argue that Tension as an experience which did not imply conflict or contradiction, did not make room for the issue of value. If, doubtless, it was still a negative stage, it was obviously without any implication of value which 'conflict' necessarily implied. It is another question what it is; there is no record of history which bears witness to it. In any case it will be a mistake to attach positive value to the Negative, whatever its form, exactly as we cannot identify the clean opposites with the incompatibles, or 'confusion' with Tension.

This is a broad analysis of the extremely strange phenomenon of Tension, or opposites. Perhaps we shall grasp its significance more adequately as we come to discuss the Dialectic. In the meantime it may be affirmed that what falls due after Tension is nothing but the necessity of a fresh effort for realisation, and not the collapse of the common purpose (or the Universe, for the matter of that). It is indeed inconceivable that Tension, which stood so perilously close to nothingness, should form the final stage of the Discontinuous Universe. That Universe could not come to an end in a completely negative state. Instead, there had to be changes in the forms of Being and Non-Being—changes which alone could guarantee the realisation of the common purpose since that realisation of the common purpose is a Cosmic necessity. As the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being, as opposites, disappeared, other forms were bound to step into their places. The issue therefore is, what could be those changes? This is a fundamental issue.

I am entering now into what in a very real sense is the most significant stage of my thesis. At least two distinct enquiries are indicated if we want to trace the changes—a review of historical records and a specific form of logical analysis. The review of history will give us the types of the changes in actual operation

while the logical account will formulate the conditions which determined their origin and form.

The changes will be found to be literally colossal, perhaps nothing short of a Cosmic revolution. It is here that the two enigmas of human experience, illusion and inequality, entered the course of the Universe. The issues that arose from those changes are, therefore, difficult and profound.

Let us, however, postpone for the moment the historical review and turn exclusively to the logical enquiry, and that for two reasons:

(1) A logical enquiry must precede, and not follow, the historical review, since all historical records imply a logical framework as their presupposition.
(2) My enquiry is primarily logical and only indirectly historical. My main point is to establish the logical structure, which alone supplies the primary evidence for Reality. All other evidences depend for their validity and orientation on the main structure of the categories.

The question therefore is, could we conceive the positive structure of the changes whose sole object is to replace the two primal features of the non-absolute Being and Non-Being—non-absoluteness and equality—by their opposites? The answer fortunately is in the affirmative.

Prima facie, it seems certain that there is only one possibility as to the shape these changes could take. Being and Non-Being, if they have to be relieved of their non-absoluteness and equality and yet remain in existence, must, as it were, be exalted to the position of the Absolute if that is possible. Between them the Absolute and the Non-Absolute exhaust all conceivable forms of existence. If it has to be that Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being must change radically, there is no alternative for them but to become the Absolute in some sense or other, whatever that might mean.

But the question arises: could they be Absolute, if they had to be so, in identically the same sense and form when they are frankly dual, and opposites? If, obviously, they cannot, the Universe has to choose between ending precipitately with the Second Stage or making provision for a dual Absolute. And the fact is that it did

make that provision, as a matter of historical fact, in the shape of 'unity' and 'individuality', the two well-known forms of the Absolute. Being and Non-Being, therefore, could both easily be Absolute since there is room for them to be either 'unity' or 'individuality'.

But difficulties still may arise. If, for instance, the Third Stage of the Universe has to be the venue for achieving frustration, could this be brought about by the two Absolutes, which are opposed to one another? It could not, since the result of the opposition of the two Absolutes will repeat 'Tension' and will not bring about frustration. What, then, is the alternative?

It is to treat the two Absolutes as both real and unreal; there is no other alternative, and the fact is that it was this plan, exactly, that was cosmically inaugurated in the Third Stage, to guarantee frustration. Strictly speaking, the plan should be called the 'dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal'—we have referred to this notion already. Indeed, what we call history, or the Universe as we know it, is nothing but an off-shoot of this dichotomy.

But a number of questions, all equally important, arise at once and these have to be discussed as a preliminary. First, was the distinction between the Absolute and what I have called the Non-Absolute ever known in tradition? The answer is in the negative. The Absolute was certainly known if anything was known—in fact it was indisputably taken to be the only Reality, though in two different and exactly opposite senses. Strangely, however, there was something else also recognised in all tradition, existing by the side of the Absolute, known as the Unreal. And this Unreal, in its turn also, was interpreted differently by the different schools. There were three different schools. In fact, the interpretations, on both the counts, not only differed from one another but positively clashed as opposites.

All these are facts of history, but there was no sign whatsoever of the Non-Absolute in any tradition. It was conspicuous by its absence in the whole range of history. Obviously, the Non-Absolute cannot be confused with the Unreal, which certainly was there in every school—in fact the Unreal has no *locus standi* in my scheme, any more than the Absolute which, in tradition, was called by the name of the Real. I have two Non-Absolutes in their places; and both of them are equally Real. The question, therefore,

whether the Non-Absolute can become the Absolute may be altogether meaningless to my contemporaries, who still cherish tradition either as dogmatists or critics.

What is the point, one may argue, of asking the question whether the Non-Absolute can become the Absolute if and when the Non-Absolute is the only Reality? Evidently the Absolute is not the Reality in my scheme, and the Unreal of tradition is frankly not real. Is there any sense, then, in asking whether the Real, which is the Non-Absolute in my scheme, can become the Absolute which is *non est*—though tradition could not quite escape such a predicament? And it makes no difference if the Absolute of tradition appears in more than one form: the Absolute Negative, or the Absolute Positive, either as unity or individuality.

Obviously, if the Absolute itself is open to contradiction, whether directly or indirectly, one cannot discriminate between its different interpretations to any purpose or effect. One has to reject them all as altogether useless and irrelevant.

They might conceivably be of value if by any chance one could utilise the Absolute, by some fresh interpretation of it—and one which will not bring it into direct clash with the dominant claim of the Non-Absolute.

But can we conceive of any such interpretation? Will not the gloom of a collapse of the universe spread over its horizon again as it did after Tension?

The situation, to my mind, may, still, not be so desperate. In fact it does seem that there is a definite way out of the difficulty raised; and that way is indicated by the notion of 'possibility'. If the term 'Absolute', in spite of its varied interpretations, cannot be utilised to give the Non-Absolute a chance of undergoing a necessary change, the phrase 'possibility of the Absolute' need not precipitate any such predicament. The point is that the Absolute becomes completely innocuous the moment it is reduced to a possibility; and the conception 'possibility of the Absolute' is certainly conceivable. As possibility it cannot come into clash with the Non-Absolute, since it has no identity and exists as only an effort. As 'effort' again, it implies the existence of Being and Non-Being. In fact 'possibility' as effort is soon involved in the sole occupation of materialising its own identity. That is the meaning of 'possibility', which is in direct contrast with actuality; my

readers are familiar with my theory. In any case, there is no occasion to change the Non-Absolute into the Absolute which is *non est* and impossible.

I can, therefore, without any hesitation constitute the Third Stage of the Universe with the 'possibility of the Absolute' and inaugurate it as a realm of the Possible. The question which then arises will refer to the constitution of that realm.

And here, as a preliminary, I should note that the statements I shall make about the Third Stage will refer only to the presuppositions of that stage and not to its actual history. They will deal only with the conditions which are both essential to its existence and determine rigidly what may be described as the categorical form of its constitution. I shall leave well alone the issue of how exactly this Stage came into existence and what the organisations were which embodied that achievement. Nor shall I touch the question of the objectives which those organisations were bound to profess, with or without reason—or their actual realisation, if any. These are historical issues and will naturally call for analysis after I have completed my categorical and logical enquiries about the Third Stage. The reason why I am separating the two accounts of the Third Stage will soon be clear.

If the constituent of the Third Stage has to be the 'possibility of the Absolute' rather than the Absolute, that constituent has to appear in a dual form—the 'possibility of unity' and the 'possibility of individuality'. I may repeat the reasons: if there are two types of the Absolute, both types will have to serve to form the constitution. There is nothing to choose between the two types and since the two Non-Absolutes in the Second Stage are not only dual, but opposites, they cannot be served by one and the same type of Absolute. The reasons are obvious—the two types of the Absolute are 'unity' and 'individuality', and the two Non-Absolutes will as a matter of course change into them.

The next question that arises will refer to the constitution which the dual constituents are bound to form; and here the conditions that will determine them are two:

(1) The two basal features of non-absolute Being and Non-Being—equality and opposition—which have to be strictly provided for in their forms as possibilities.

(2) The outstanding necessity for these possibilities to bring about the frustration of the 'common purpose' which was formulated in the Second Stage of the Universe.

These conditions, it is obvious, will determine the proportions which the organisation of the two possibilities is bound to assume. And so in it the well-known 'dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal' will play the central role, though not in any sense which is strictly traditional. What I mean is that the two possibilities of 'unity' and 'individuality'—the two types of the Absolute—will necessarily appear in alternation as real and unreal. While, for instance, the 'possibility of unity' will stand out as real, it will have the 'possibility of individuality' as its unreal, which must be under its domination, so to speak. Exactly the opposite form will fall due when 'individuality' will stand out as real and 'unity' as unreal. This is the true significance of the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal: here is the broad categorical structure of the organisation.

And after the two possibilities have completed their dual state of Reality and Unreality, they will enter into a third form in which they will face each other as contraries. This is the final stage in the career of the realm of possibility, in which frustration will be fully worked out.

I have the privilege of suggesting this dichotomy as the basic categorical form of the organisation of the Third Stage. I shall find that the dichotomy will take three distinct types as I come to refer to the well-known historical account: these have been already referred to more than once as the mystical, humanistic and dualistic organisations. The issue of relationship which is bound to arise between them will therefore be one of conflict or of opposition. The organisations will pass through two states of contradiction alternately and end up as contraries—to whose credit the frustration of the common purpose will directly lie. But in no part of their career will the 'common purpose' appear as the direct background of these conflicts, though it is only the conflicts which will bring about its frustration.

It is too early yet to discuss the historical issue, especially as I am absorbed in a categorical analysis. I can only make the comment that this strange arrangement for frustration was cosmically

appointed as undoubtedly the chief function of the Third Stage. In any case, the position I am formulating is frankly unusual and it may be profitable if I discuss again at least a few more essential points arising out of it.

(*a*) As the Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being change into possibilities of the two types of the Absolute, there will be no trace of them in the Third Stage or any Stage which will follow. There will be only the possibility of unity and the possibility of individuality. Here in the Third Stage begins a transformation of the original constituents of the Universe: we shall see how it affects the other Stages which will follow.

It is another issue whether the possibility of unity and the possibility of individuality as concrete entities also embodied an experience that they were mere possibilities: in the nature of things they would not—as we shall see later, they could only be centres of experience which represented the complete assurance that the Absolute itself, whether as unity or individuality, was actually there. This experience or assurance, again, constituted what has been known as 'illusion' in our history, one of two enigmas already referred to.

(*b*) The two terms 'real' and 'unreal', well known in tradition, will appear in the Third Stage but they will not be synonymous with unity and individuality, the two conflicting forms of the Absolute hitherto known in history. On the contrary, both unity and individuality will alternately exist as real and unreal. When, for instance, unity is real, individuality will stand to it as unreal and *vice versa*. They will form actually the main goal or objective of the universe—this means that the universe in the Third Stage will have competing ideals in a state of conflict.

The Real and the Unreal as defined in this categorical analysis will be quite different from what they have been taken to be in all tradition. The term 'real' will not mean the Absolute either of Parmenides or of the Humanist; nor will the term 'unreal' mean the Non-Absolute in the sense of the 'simple' of the Atomist or the 'changeful many' of the Platonist whether in its mystical or dualist sense. Since there is no Absolute, as a matter of fact, the

terms 'real' and 'unreal' have no chance of deriving their significance from it.

Indeed the Real and the Unreal have to imply an altogether different meaning remote from any traditional view, as I have just pointed out, and the new meaning is: the Real is that which dominates in a conflict, while the Unreal is that which submits to that domination. The term 'domination' means contradiction. If the possibility of unity, for instance, is defined as real, it only means that it actually dominates or contradicts the possibility of individuality. And since nothing is eternal in the Discontinuous Universe, but must begin and end, the domination can be only for a time—with the necessary consequence that it will be followed by its opposite phase, that of submitting to suppression. The possibility of unity then will pass into a state in which it will be dominated in its turn by the possibility of individuality.

I may repeat that all this follows in the light of my interpretation of the Third Stage. Nobody—unless it were the absolute sceptic—ever suspected that the Universe we belong to has never been the Absolute or that the Real is not the Absolute.

It is interesting, however, to note by the way that the traditional account of these two notions, unity and individuality, duly recorded two definitely opposing claims about their reality or unreality. One school claimed that unity was the real while the other equally claimed that it was individuality that was the real. So it follows that in one sense both of them have actually been claimed to be real and unreal. Besides, the total result of the conflict between the schools was necessarily confusion; all this will be fully discussed when I review history.

In the meantime it is necessary that I should make a few more comments on the Real and the Absolute. While I deny altogether that the notion 'real' could possibly mean the Absolute, the whole of tradition defined the 'real' in terms of the Absolute. Here is the outstanding difference between my position and all others. The Real and the Unreal, to me, mark only a stage in the career of unity and individuality respectively. Neither term stands for anything else. Both unity and individuality have had to be alternately real and unreal, so that there has had to be two 'reals' and two 'unreals' in a state of conflict in the Third Stage. There has been nothing to choose between them from the point of view of

validity or value. They have been destined to win and lose equally in their conflict with each other, and neither of them has been expected to survive in the end. And all this is perfectly conceivable since the Third Stage is a realm of possibilities which was intended cosmically to bring about the frustration of the common purpose. I may add that unity and individuality in their turn are nothing else but the Real and the Unreal, as mentioned above.

But since all these strange and most unusual claims presuppose the Non-Absolute rather than the Absolute as the ultimate form of Reality, it may be interesting to record that the Absolute—in spite of all that discredit, as it were, heaped on its head—has not been altogether out of the picture. At least a shade of it has appeared in the Third Stage of the Universe. It has existed at least as possibility, the chief outstanding constituent of that Stage. Non-absolute Being and Non-Being have had to change completely into the two forms of the Absolute—unity and individuality in the shape of possibilities. It was a Cosmic necessity and therefore was bound to materialise as historical fact. If, however, even such an achievement did not make the Absolute the presiding genius of the Universe, as all tradition held that it was—there was no sign of the Absolute before the realm of the possible arose—it was the Absolute in its garb of possibility and not the Non-Absolute in its actual state that had the sole credit of having materialised the frustration of the common purpose, one of the two cardinal values of the Universe. And this achievement on the part of the Absolute was possible since its existence as a possibility created the universal assurance that the Absolute actually existed —the Universe was really safe and sound. This assurance, in somewhat non-technical language, prevailed in the whole atmosphere of the Third Stage; it filled the body of the stone and the blade of green grass no more and no less than it overwhelmed the human spirit or any other being in the outlying regions of the earth. What the Universe would have missed if this assurance about the Absolute had not arisen is another matter. Indeed we need not be in a hurry to drop illusion as a senseless enigma: nothing else could have brought about the frustration of the common purpose, so vitally essential to the Universe. Far better was it to have the assurance about the Absolute when there was only a possibility of it than to miss the values the Universe could, in its graceful and

abounding bounty, guarantee to us by virtue of that assurance.

There is just one more point which I may discuss before I proceed to relate my categorical analysis of the Third Stage to the actual historical formation of that Stage. That point refers to the issue of the two notions—'neutralisation' which is associated with Tension, and 'confusion' which derives from conflict. This requires an elaborate analysis.

I had occasion however already to mention that the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being in the state of distinctness in the Second Stage underwent neutralisation, since Tension marked the inevitable consequence of the state in which they stood as opposites. I have also referred to the all-encompassing conflict between the possibilities of unity and individuality in the Third Stage, the result of which was not neutralisation but confusion. Here is reference to actual historical records whether wholly known by us or not. It may seem, however, as if non-absolute Being and Non-Being in the Second Stage stood as opposites in the state of distinctness in exactly the same way as the possibilities of unity and individuality did in the Third Stage. The question therefore arises—do they form two different types of the opposite?

The answer is that they do. It is obvious that the state of opposition which gives rise to neutralisation cannot mean active effort on the part of the opposed entities and terms. The explanation for this is simple. Since the opposites are evenly balanced from all points of view, the initiative for action on their part is foreclosed, and so the prospects of active effort simply cease to exist. What remains possible is complete and spontaneous neutralisation. If a result has to take place—the state of opposites is not a state of non-existence—it cannot but mean an experience which would be immediate, mutual extinction. This is a peculiar situation: we can note three points in it—first, Tension is a preliminary to the active stage of conflict, second, there is no survival of opposed terms, third, there is no possibility of the collapse of the Universe.

On the other hand, the state of opposition—in the Third Stage in which conflict rules—is pre-eminently a state of active effort on the part of the opposing terms to realise an objective. They not only put forth effort but do so in two distinct stages: one in which they alternately rise and fall (this is technically called the stage of contradiction), the other, the stage of contrariety, which

necessarily ends in confusion. The strength of resistance here is evenly balanced; the inevitable consequence of which is complete disappearance of the opposing terms with no prospect of revival. But this disappearance takes place as a result of active effort or mutual resistance in the two stages of contradiction—here is a strange form of activity!

Incidentally, the term 'dialectic' is exactly appropriate for this stage of conflict and not for the one of Tension. The reason is that the opposites which the dialectic implies must involve the opposing terms in a state of active effort and mutual resistance. No dialectician need demur at this claim. Only, somehow, no dialectician ever saw that there were two types of opposites—that which leads to neutralisation, with no active effort preceding it, and that which is marked wholly by active effort. If by any chance the dialecticians had seen it, they would not, for instance, have accepted the Hegelian form of it as the only true form.

Besides it is another noteworthy fact that Hegel did not mention the state of *contradiction* between Being and Non-Being—the necessary preliminary to the stage of *contrariety*. Nor did he see that neither Being nor Non-Being could exist by itself, even though they had the privilege of being created separately by the Absolute Spirit. Indeed, none but the Absolute Spirit could claim the privilege of enjoying monistic existence; the reason being that it really was the Parmenidean Absolute, which never existed —as the rest of Greek thought so energetically testified.

And after this the attempt to produce a synthesis out of the dialectic was bound to fail; to its credit would lie only a performance in which nothing could possibly happen except that difficulties would multiply. This performance may be evangelical in form according to the mood of the times or its close parallel in the scientific sphere which is loud and explosive.

But certainly the dialectic by its ruthless procedure put an end to the misery of conflict which even the 'Eightfold Path' perhaps failed to do. It drained away all existing sources of energy and made the whole of human experience amenable to the persistent dread of the Negative. No illusion, the staple of conflict, could survive after that and therefore no life of any description. The result was the Void, a very close parallel to what one school of Buddhism suggested. Was it then ever a fact of history?

This analysis of the notions of opposition and the dialectic will later be referred to again with reference to Hegel and the Existentialists.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE THREE SOCIAL SCHEMES OF HISTORY

THE categorical account of the Third Stage may for the moment be closed and it may be useful for a time to turn to the historical records, with reference especially to the well-known schemes of history which I have referred to as mystical, humanistic and dualistic. The object will be to find out what points of similarity, if any, there might be between my scheme, which is categorical, and that of tradition, which is historical. It will certainly help to assess the true significance of my scheme.

Evidently, tradition altogether missed the conception of the Non-Absolute—and, naturally, with it the entire claim on behalf of the triadic form of Reality, the Continuous, Discontinuous and Continuous. Neither of the two Continuous Universes was anywhere on its horizon, and if the Discontinuous Universe was not altogether unknown to it, what was actually known was just a garbled version of what I call the Third Stage—the supreme realm of the possible or the realm of *māyā* in my ancestral vocabulary. Neither the First nor the Second Stage came into the picture at all, if I know history; and the Stage which followed the Third (as I shall soon show) could not, in the nature of things, have any place in the three opposing conceptions of the Absolute. The evidence for all this will appear later on as I develop my account of the Third and Fourth Stages.

All this may sound very unusual to the Hindu or the Greek or the Jew, not to speak of the Christian or the Mohammedan who trace their descent to Judaic thought: but it has to be recorded in the twentieth century, when—by all the evidences I know of—the long age of illusion in the Universe seems to be definitely on the wane.

Since, however, it is only the Third Stage of the Universe that is known to tradition, I have to find out just what that sense is in as precise a form as possible.

Obviously, all the three schemes which exhaust the total achievement of our race were definitely built on one single

hypothesis—the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal. The Real, according to these schemes, did not exist by itself. It was definitely supposed to be associated with something else which was described as 'unreal', though in three different senses. (There was one exception, if we go by the records of Greek history, which however does not appear to me to be either consistent or significant: my readers are familiar with my comment on Parmenides.)

Perhaps it is here in this fundamental hypothesis of all classical thought—the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal—that at least some agreement between the traditional schemes and my own can be found. I have shown already what the dichotomy is and why it arose in the Universe as a matter of Cosmic necessity—there can be no question that I hold this theory as the only basic interpretation of the Third Stage of the Universe. This has already been discussed: and the whole of traditional thought would become meaningless verbiage if we took the hypothesis of the Real and the Unreal from under its feet. Here is what appears to be deep similarity between tradition and my scheme.

It is another question whether my theory about the origin of the dichotomy as professed in tradition has been duly considered by the twentieth century schools of thought after I had formulated it in *Related Multiplicity*. It may not have been; but no theory, as far as I know, was ever suggested by either the classical thinkers who introduced the dichotomy or by their advocates who have flourished in the long ages that followed. Any comparison, therefore, between my claim about dichotomy and that of tradition will have to be made, not on grounds of theory but strictly on the basis of facts which are familiar and easily acceptable.

There is at least one fact which stands indisputable in the schemes of all tradition—the conception of the realm of Reality in which the hypothesis of the dichotomy forms, as I have just suggested, the basic principle. It is another name for the Universe that was, or is, or could be, according to all tradition. And if it is a Universe which cannot be called only 'real' or only 'unreal', that raises no difficulty. The fact is that, according to tradition, the Real would have to exist in some sort of relationship with the Unreal—it may even be as a matter of choice, as my ancestors held. This has been the traditional view.

And however hard tradition might have sought to relieve this

direct strain upon the Real—the Real was the Absolute—no metaphysician could convince the human race that the strain did not imply a limitation. The difficulty became so oppressive in course of time that in at least one school of theology, rather late in its appearance, the strain was deliberately transferred to the shoulders of the cosmic figure known as the Son of God—as if to keep the Godhead at any cost unstrained and unlimited. Perhaps such a figure was a cosmic necessity, not only to testify to God's proximity to His creatures, but to give, as it were, scientific or legal evidence that God, through a trustworthy Agent, got the burdens of their sins fairly borne. The claim of what we call 'law' after this naturally became meaningless, exactly as the need of the creatures for any sense of dignity was irretrievably lost. This device, however, was not the only one known in history.

It is not at all possible for me to accept the realm of reality in terms of the dichotomy as if it were only another name for Reality. If it is a positive realm, without even a semblance of the Negative, it is only the realm of the 'possible', the supreme seat of illusion.

The Universe cannot be identified with this realm, since the Universe had to provide for the 'actual' as well. Besides, it is the 'actual' that provides for the 'possible' and not the other way about. The realm of the 'possible' is only a stage which presupposes the eternally actual Universe.

The distinction between my view of the realm of Reality and that of tradition is therefore conspicuous, although both accept the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal as the basic principle of the Third Stage. The disparity arises for one simple reason: I take the dichotomy as relevant only to the Third Stage while my contemporaries not only take the Third Stage as another name for the Universe but are still subject to the illusions which the Third Stage—as the realm of 'possibility'—is bound to produce. We therefore view dichotomy from altogether different standpoints.

It is not, however, only the principle of dichotomy which happens to form a point of similarity between my position and that of my contemporaries with reference to the Third Stage. Both positions, as a matter of fact, hold that conflict is an outstanding feature of that Stage. To me, at any rate, even the *bona fides* of the Third Stage would stand questioned if the phenomenon of conflict and its inevitable consequence, complete frustration of purpose,

had not marked the career of this Stage. Conflict indisputably is planted in the heart of the Third Stage as its dominant and essential feature, and no tradition would deny this truth. But here, again, the categorical and historical views on conflict in the Third Stage completely differ in their valuation of conflict. The difference can be traced, in the last analysis, to the ultimate factors of Reality—Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being. If, indeed, we have to admit both the Positive and the Negative in the ultimate constitution of Reality, we have to admit both positive and negative values. Could we, then, avoid taking frustration as the negative value and fulfilment as the positive?

Nothing is more apparent than the fact that the agreement between my position and the historical account of the Third Stage is completely outweighed by the difference. If there is agreement that there are three fundamental constituents of the Third Stage —dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal; conflict as the prevailing relationship between the three organisations of the Third Stage; and the basic principle of 'possibility', or illusion, which alone can account for conflict—there is radical divergence about their interpretation and cosmic significance.

The immediate issue therefore is: why should this divergence arise at all? If it cannot be just an arbitrary event which yields to no analysis, what could be the historical grounds?

The main reason is that the approach made by me and by my contemporaries to the issue of the Third Stage is altogether different: we view it from different angles, which means literally that our standpoints do not coincide—as if we do not belong to the same sphere of existence. At any rate there is evidence that I am not subject to the illusion that the Absolute is, in the same way as are all my contemporaries: and what this marked difference implies with reference to my view of the Third Stage it is not necessary precisely to define. It is enough to add that if I am, inevitably, in the Third Stage, I am also not of it. My main job with regard to the Third Stage is to deal with the problems of life as they appear, especially in my relationship with, my contemporaries. Most of the time I live in direct contact with my fellow-men: it will not be an exaggeration to say that I should drop down dead if I suddenly lost this contact altogether, but it is equally true that what I cannot help regarding as the very core of my life draws me

away from all my fellow-men. I live to solve problems which do not even appear on the horizon of my contemporaries and I have a sense of security and of peace which has never yet entered into the confident mood of my contemporaries. Even when I find myself in conflict or in controversy with them, sooner or later I deal with it in a way which arises out of my own position and owes nothing to tradition—it is almost impossible not to hold that I have somehow strayed into a different stage of the Universe, perhaps its latest contribution.

The issues I have raised refer to the origin of the Third Stage: it was my lot to feel that it had an origin which still remained unexplored, that not a soul or a thing within its vast ambit had any idea or sense of it. Not even the gods of the Third Stage could be trusted to give an account of it, since they, too, as sheer 'possibilities', were debarred from raising the issue and, like their creatures, were immersed in illusion and could cultivate nothing else. Throughout the length and breadth of the Third Stage the assurance prevailed that the Absolute stood as its sole ground or creator, when the fact is that it was not an eternal truth but complete illusion. Could assurance, the gift of pure illusion, make room even for curiosity? If man could still ask what was the nature of the Third Stage, the query would only mean: which of the gods could really account for this Eternal Universe? The result would be only a controversy about divinities, not an enquiry into the origin of the Universe. Nobody ever looked outside the Third Stage altogether to another horizon, to make sure whether it really was the Eternal Universe: there was a limit to speculation and to practice, which limit was strictly drawn either by the Divine Absolute or by the void. At least the absolute sceptic and the Buddha planted these somewhere on the outskirts of the Dome of the Universe—renowned as the *Stupas*, by the Buddhist artists.

But as I was led by chance to raise the issue of origin, even the vast intricate tangles of the Third Stage could not altogether hold me. Soon a vista spread wide before my eyes and a whole panorama stood out which indicated the origin of the Third Stage and its rightful place in the Universe. It was an overwhelming experience. What it all meant and how the panorama would, in the fullness of time, be drawn by the master-artist it is for the future

to unravel. I could only stand speechless by the radiance which the first virginal attempt to measure its vastness revealed.

The vivid features of that form have already been stated:

(*a*) The Third Stage is a stage of the 'possibles'—it made no room for the 'actuals'. The Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, the only conceivable 'actuals' in the ultimate core of the Universe had no place in it. Their place has been taken by the 'possibility of unity' and the 'possibility of individuality'.

(*b*) It is a Stage which has been generated cosmically for the sole purpose of realising the frustration of the common purpose which the Second Stage formulated in the state of identicalness.

(*c*) There was no place in the Third Stage for the Absolute; it was a Universe wholly for the possibilities known as 'unity' and 'individuality'.

(*d*) The two possibilities formed the bases of three organisations between which perpetual conflict appeared, till it ended in confusion, the only appropriate form of frustration.

This is for the present sufficient as a record to show how the Third Stage appeared to me after I was led to raise the issue of its origin, and it is only right that I should add that if my contemporaries, like my predecessors in all ages, missed it, there was only one explanation. They all honestly believed that the Absolute was not a possibility but a fact. Not for a moment did any school of thought or practice cease to hold the assurance that the Absolute was the 'ground' or creator or ideal. It never dawned on them that the Third Stage, their home and habitat, stood on the bottomless vacuum of illusion. If some were bold enough to call the earth the abode of illusion they studiously kept the home of truth in heaven. It was not realised that both earth and heaven belonged to the same Universe, which was a Universe steeped in illusion. There was nothing to choose between earth and heaven since they both had their origin in pure possibility.

And this oversight about the true nature of the Third Stage was bound to arise, since it was a stage in which only the 'possibles' existed and the 'possibilities' prevailed. Heaven, the abode of God and the Mystical Eminence which is remote from both earth and

heaven were all equally 'possibilities'. There was no authority or energy, however powerful or benign which could for a moment claim to be anything but a 'possibility'. So it was inevitable that the whole atmosphere of the Third Stage had to be at the mercy of sheer oversight or illusion. Indisputably it is the nature of possibility not to know its own identity. And if still the state of effort it implied had to embody at least some experience—every entity must be an experience—the alternative was to believe firmly that the Absolute was, when it was only a possibility. Here is the real origin of माया *māyā* which so far has ruled the stone and spirit with equal justice and mercy.

If differences arise between my view and that of my contemporaries they arise for that one simple fact. They still stand as 'possibilities' of 'unity' and 'individuality' whilst I am not, in at least some sense, any longer in the Third Stage standing as a mere 'possibility'. It is another question why it should be so, but it is so. Only it casts no reflection on my contemporaries or on myself: there is nothing to choose between the state of 'possibility' and 'actuality'. Here, however, is a point which will call for elaborate analysis when I reach the stage of reviewing the different spheres of experience.

The historical account of the Third Stage, as distinguished from the categorical, therefore, stands self-complete and perhaps self-absorbed, like the high lights on its horizon eternally looking inwards and not really sure what to do with themselves. Yet the Third Stage could not quite get rid of the drama of perpetual movement which reduced it periodically to a mere outline of vacancy, filled perhaps with dreams or with an anguish to re-enter the stream of time.

The categorical picture that I have drawn could not, even as a phantasy, enter into this region. No historical horizon could hold it since it was saturated with the Absolute. It was the only realm where illusion had a monopoly of all existence.

Technically, if the Absolute could exist only as a 'possibility', it was bound to exist as just an assurance that it was truly the Absolute. It would be naturally oblivious of the fact that it had no right to an identity except to the one of a 'possibility'. The fact is that the Third Stage was only another name for the assurance of the Absolute. And if this sounds baffling it is the very notion of

'possibility' that would account for it. I may repeat that the 'possibility of the Absolute' which is another name for the Third Stage cannot be aware of its own identity, that it is a 'possibility'. Identity could not exist when the 'possibility' came into existence as just an effort to produce that identity.

But I do not mean that the Third Stage actually began with both the categorical and the historical phases. Indeed it could begin only as a historical Universe—which proceeded straightaway to bring about the frustration of the common purpose. And it was not before this urgent cosmic need was realised in practice that the categorical interpretation of it fell due. If, indeed, it has been possible for me to suggest that interpretation it does not indicate anything of any special significance in my claim; all that can be said is that I must somehow have already tasted frustration in a way that made the interpretation inevitable. A break was bound to take place in consequence between me and my contemporaries. At least I was entitled to map out the whole scheme of the Universe, leaving the remaining issue of completing the frustration of the common purpose to my contemporaries. Here is simply a piece of history, which reflects neither credit nor discredit on either side.

But the fact is that the categorical experience followed the partial winding up of the historical process and was by no means contemporaneous with the historical: and once that happened, the mid-twentieth century could not but mark a stage in the Universe when the categorical and historical should both be existent, as distinct societies with two altogether different objectives to realise. While the historical would be steadily finishing the round of conflicts by open or veiled warfare on behalf of the two competing Absolutes, the categorical would be confidently building up the structure of evidence as if to recreate the Universe. If they are independent of one another they are nevertheless bound by the relation of implication and certainly do not come into conflict.

But the question may be raised at once: how is it that the categorical and the historical Universes do not clash, even though the categorical is expected to replace the historical? If the categorical represents Truth and the historical is an embodiment of illusion, could they possibly help clashing with one another?

The issue here is primarily one of conflict; and the first thing

to note about conflict is that the terms or entities that create conflict must belong to the same realm—absolute differents do not clash. This really means that the terms must both agree and disagree. The agreement will be with reference to a common purpose while the disagreement will appear on the issue of realising the purpose: there will be two opposite ways of realisation. This is a fundamental issue which deserves to be specially noted.

Entities or terms which do not stand in relationship neither agree nor disagree. They are completely unrelated and therefore must be absolute differents. I have discussed the question of existence as such and made it clear that entities must conceivably exist either as absolute differents or as related. In the one case existence will be another name for non-existence, in the other it can only mean the dual state of identicalness and distinctness. I have also shown that we never deal with the realm of existence as such. That realm represents the Primal Stage of the Discontinuous Universe. The realm that we deal with is the Creative Universe, in which entities have to exist in two simultaneous states; one in which they conceive a common purpose and another in which they try to realise it. Conflict cannot appear in the first state but appears only in the second.

Can conflict appear, then, between the categorical and the historical Universes if they belong to different realms, with specific purposes and proportionate methods of realising them? If the realms are as distant and remote from one another as 'possibility' and 'actuality' could make them, does the question of common purpose and the issue of conflict, which must imply a common purpose arise between them? If the categorical is bound to replace the historical, this only means that, since the normal ending of all conflict is confusion, it is sure to be followed by the categorical. There cannot be vacuum following it. No conflict, again, could be arrested or modified by any agency or law. If the entities which clash are contradictories or contraries, nothing can stand between them. They will have their fruition as they deserve. Either they are or are not: they cannot be both there and not there. But if the conflict is there, resolution of it has no meaning—what has meaning is the disappearance of conflict. The categorical which follows the disappearance of conflict, therefore, has nothing to do with the conflict.

This ought to be enough to give some idea of the difference between the two accounts, categorical and historical, of the Third Stage—the difference is outstanding. It will appear even more vividly as I proceed to lay down the basis of the Fourth Stage which will replace the Third, as our categorical account implies.

If the categorical account is an evidence that the Third Stage was, cosmically speaking, a Stage judiciously intended to bring about the frustration of the common purpose, it also proves that frustration has already actually taken place. The *raison d'être* of the Third Stage, the illusion that the Absolute is, no longer stands upright and as authoritative. In at least a tiny corner of the Universe it is already known that if the Absolute ever was there, it was there only as a possibility. It was this knowledge which created the Fourth Stage, the one which was bound to be free from the illusion that the Absolute eternally is. It is now a question of time how long it will take the whole of the Third Stage to recede completely into the void, making room for the steady advance of the Fourth. Perhaps the main issue is only to visualise the process which will mark the steady retreat and advance respectively of the two Stages. If the sudden appearance of the Fourth Stage, in the shape of the categorical account of the Third, was an evidence that the Third no longer held a monopoly of the Universe, the change once begun will gradually complete itself. Once illusion, the vital force of the Third Stage, is replaced by Truth, its proportion, whatever the volume, will have to be steadily diminished by the proportion of Truth. The Universe therefore will from now be a venue for a dual process—steady retreat on the part of illusion and steady advance on the part of Truth.

It is this drama of dual process, the replacement of illusion by Truth, which from now on will absorb my attention. Since it is a fact that I am in the heart of this drama and must enact it, whatever the consequences, I cannot take it except as an obligation set by the Universe.

It will be legitimate, therefore, if I begin with a preliminary analysis of the grim achievement of illusion—the conflict (the staple of which is opposition or more precisely opposites) which most classical minds, beginning possibly with the Buddha, called by the name Dialectic. This introduction to the drama may serve

it as a fitting prelude as it will embody the ripest consideration of the human mind. Here is indeed the direct descent from the guiding principle of the Third Stage, the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal.

CHAPTER NINE

NOTION OF OPPOSITES

It will be appropriate if I choose for this short review the singularly modern type of the notion of opposites known as Hegelian and its apparent offshoot Existentialism, as interpreted by the French philosopher and dramatist Sartre.

A preliminary remark is necessary, however, with reference to the procedure I shall follow. It is not meant to be a critical review which simply either accepts or rejects the position under review. In fact, all that could be said by way of exposing the inconsistencies or of delineating the achievements of the notion of opposites has been already said. There is no point in my repeating the historic comments or just bringing out some fresh implications of those comments. And the reason why I propose to follow such an unusual procedure is that I am strongly inclined to look at Hegel's great contribution to thought from a standpoint which may not be at all traditional. As it happens, I do not belong to any of the three schools of thought familiar in history, and naturally I can only find out in the light of my own position what Hegel might have meant to say, a surmise which still remains unexplored. If I point out also some inconsistencies in addition, they will be fresh and could not have been foreseen. I may repeat that both my interpretation and my criticism of Hegel will be derived from my own position.

It will not be necessary for me, however, to refer to the Hegelian claim about the Absolute; nor shall I make any comment on the Hegelian implication that a reality like the Absolute or even a finite concept may or does hold within itself a tacit contradiction of the Law of Identity—the state of self-contradiction. I do not mean that Hegel made the claim himself but his position amounted to nothing short of it. The only occasion in tradition when such a liberty was conventionally allowed arose in the lone moment of mystical experience which immemorially stood out as a claim in spite of the protest of the rationalist or the empiricist. It is open to anybody to classify Hegel with the mystic or to claim for him the

credit of being the last and most astute rationalist in the Western world: but no dialectic appeared except as a taboo in the realm of the mystic, wherever it might be traced. Hegel cannot have both the dialectic and the mystical to draw upon for his credit at the same time unless, once again, one raises the plea for his defence that the Law of Identity does not count. But any discussion or controversy which has reached the stage where a choice cannot be made between sense and nonsense generally has passed its zenith of usefulness. Either the mystic or the rationalist involved in it soon finds himself to be an outcast, or perhaps under the direct protection of the State. It is impossible to make sense of a statement in which the Absolute is claimed to be both positive and negative, or capable of positing and negating itself. What is possible is that it may be accepted under duress—after all, the State on Earth is still paramount and perhaps the Church too.

The issue is not, however, whether we can deny the functions of positing and of negating as conceivable facts; we certainly cannot. Still, if we do make such an attempt it will not sound less irrelevant than to deny that reality in any form of existence was entitled to be positive or negative. The main issue is whether any entity which has an identity of its own can be positive and negative at the same time, or can consistently posit and negate itself with the self-same identity. The answer is simple if we believe in the Absolute as the only type of reality.

It would however be senseless to forget that a philosopher of Hegel's capacity could fall into a speculative oblivion and miss that answer. If, still, by the records it seems that he could not be supposed to have escaped that predicament there must be an explanation for this. At any rate, if an authority like Gautama the Buddha could be called in to diagnose the case, he would have prescribed for the European oblivion as he did for the whole of the human species, 'if there is a disease then there must be a cure for it'. In any case, such oblivion stands out as a universal feature of the race in some form or other. And the diagnosis is that our race, since it had to believe firmly in the Absolute with or without reason, was liable to 'infection'—a name given by our medical authorities to any disease in the twentieth century. There has been no record in which the Absolute has been successfully replaced by a more consistent or comprehensive conception. The

alternative left under the circumstances was to build up edifices as devices, so that the acute agony of scepticism could be relieved for the moment, at least till the sceptic came back to the fray to plunge the race into the sea of agony again. Hegel's was the latest Western device partly modelled upon the patterns already known. It would be unfair to Hegel to suggest that he was not aware of the insistent claim of Parmenides that the Absolute was immaculate, total and perfect. Not even a philosopher's capacity to measure its dimension and inner economy could for a moment be allowed to function in the presence of its primal dignity. My ancestors denied only the possibility of knowledge about it. It was only Parmenides who would not allow even a negative statement to be made. But as luck would have it he had to make a statement to deny anybody's right to do so.

Is it necessary to suggest that Hegel had no idea either of Parmenides or of Hindu thought? Why, then, did the records imply that the Absolute—according to him—was directly responsible for the Non-Being of the humanist and for the third category of the Hindu? Why did Hegel interfere with the eternal calm and quietude of the absolute realm? Why make the Absolute just an active principle behind the realm in which conflict arose in a dialectical form and never ceased till to-day, in spite of the periodic halts in its career in the shape of what he called synthesis—something which meant, really, a cessation of the old and worn-out conflict in the interest of the more virile ones that were to follow? As a rationalist who had no use for Personal God or Mystical Unity, he could not dispose of logic or the Laws of Thought as the mystic could or the dualist did when it suited his purpose—how could he, if he was determined to pursue his dialectic? Why then did he make the Absolute wholly responsible for a drama, the theme and enactment of which had till Hegel's time been the sole achievement of the God who is Evil or the weak and imbecile creature whom God created?

Perhaps there was at least an explanation for such a profound discomfiture of reason and of the Laws of Thought; it would be wise if I just turn to what that explanation could be.

I do not believe that inconsistencies and self-contradictions take place as if they were inescapable discrepancies which neither the spirit nor the order of the Universe could quite get rid of. If the

Universe is the only reality it must at least be a sane one. It must be all-inclusive and perfectly consistent. Neither the Evil God nor the Unreal, whether it was frankly the irrational or just fluent phantasy, had anything to do with its creation. It has been steadily there without a beginning unhesitatingly. The inconsistencies and self-contradictions, therefore must have had a meaning and should be accounted for. What has been called the Evil God, or the Unreal, was really not the Evil or Unreal even as illusion or oblivion had their own logic.

What then is the explanation of the Hegelian insistence on the dialectic? Why did Hegel orient it from the very heart of the Absolute? The issue is whether the Absolute or the dialectic was his main concern.

To my mind, it was the dialectic and not the Absolute that was responsible for his speculation in such a grand manner. What Hegel, like numerous other philosophers—the Buddha was the pioneer—could not but take as the only indisputable experience of the human race was the fact of conflict and the grim consequences that followed from it in at least the history of his species. Are we not still in the throes of it? And perhaps he was not at all convinced that the factors or agents which stood as verifiable entities could be in any sense held responsible for such an enigmatic cosmic drama. If we do really want an explanation it will have to be traced to the very fountain-head of all reality—the Cosmic Providence. With what propriety indeed should we hold responsible those who are frankly mere creatures and ruthlessly limited, for such a distressing feature of the Universe—conflict in all shades and forms, no less diabolic than enigmatic? Should not the whole responsibility be instead directly on the head of the Absolute, who is in perpetual enjoyment of His Omnipotence? It would be more appropriate, Hegel might have thought, to trace the root of conflict to cosmic creation and involve the Absolute Himself in it, than to leave it at the door of the relative and finite, which could not even account for their own existence. Here was a direct challenge to the Personal God. If there could be no Evil God by the side of the Absolute, nor any 'will' which was 'free' in the sense that it could either avoid conflict or fall into it—which was but a phantasy deliberately concocted by a ruling Church—why repeat the well-worn method of keeping the

Absolute out of it all? If we have to believe in the Absolute at the cost of all reason and logic, let that be the final stage of our ignominy in our definitely unreal career. And if by that means at least some limit could be set to our innate deficiency there need be no fresh grievance arising from that. Instead, the satisfaction ought to prevail that God and man do equally share the burden if the burden has to be borne. Could the question of alternative arise again?

And yet this grand theme of complicating the issue of the irrational by drawing divinity into its fold was already dramatised in human history. That drama led inevitably to a desperate human enactment—perhaps wantonly cruel and non-divine. Could the spirit of revenge go any further? It was Hegel's specific suggestion, as we see it, that the attempt should be made in a truly classical style, and not be built on such evidence as what we call 'facts' or 'phantasies' are expected to verify. That way, if not quite madness, was at least inconclusive. Even to-day, in the mid-twentieth century, the Christian claim is challenged by the simple, naïve plea—perfectly honest—that there was no evidence either for revelation or crucifixion. Did anybody ever prove a fact except to those who were already heavily conditioned to accept that proof? It is only the premisses which the human mind is called upon to trust—the gift of intuition. At any rate there is no escape from the necessity of the conclusions which are implied by the premisses intuited—phenomena which never appeared on the empirical horizon. If the idea of perfection, for instance, has to be accepted as a gift of intuition, soon the Perfect God is bound to appear; or to take another illustration, if the conception of 'whole' is a well-grounded intuition, the 'parts' will claim assent to their existence as a matter of compulsion. Hegel's attempt, therefore, was overdue if the cardinal features of history—constant conflict and its grim consequences—had to be traced to the ultimate Reality and not be left to the tender mercies of fact or phantasy: it earned in any case the credit of having completed the painful argument of history. If the Absolute had to be accepted as the ultimate premiss, let history be proved to be nothing but the direct responsibility of the Absolute. It was a challenge to Parmenides, not in the tame classical way which introduced Non-Being by the back door—I mean empirical evidence—but by a more direct, downright method of

foisting the origin of that Non-Being on the head of the Absolute itself. The result in the end, however, as if by cosmic justice, proved to be the same. If the Absolute of Parmenides did not survive in the strange dualism of Being and Non-Being, the dialectic of Hegel only introduced the epic of tragedy with not a speck of mercy in it as we see it enacted in the mid-twentieth century. The Absolute to-day is in the adamant grip of what we call the inorganic, if the human species is still alive and with any pretence of thinking left in it.

But the fact remains that Hegel's concern was the dialectic; he meant to relieve conflict of the stigma attached to it by all tradition by an effort to prove that it was a cosmic necessity without an alternative. For myself, I do appreciate the method and herein lies his momentous achievement.

There was, however, a 'fly in the ointment', as is said in homely language: Hegel failed completely to discover a premiss which could guarantee the fulfilment of his method. The Absolute certainly was not that premiss, nor did it improve its prospects by the astute Hegelian attachment of the notion of Spirit to its cosmic proportion. Perhaps the inspiration for such an attachment might have come straight from the *Cogito*. Did it not then forebode the Evil, at once? Could the Absolute be taken out of the Parmenidean fold even for an experiment once it was—to use a figure—under lock and key with Parmenides?

And if after this analysis of the main motif of the Hegelian dialectic, we turn to the dicta or corollaries derived from the hypothesis about the Absolute Spirit, we need not be afraid of being waylaid by any serious complication. For instance, the dictum that 'every concept does hold within itself its own opposite' seems on the face of it to be nothing but an extension of the primal hypothesis. If the Absolute Spirit can as a matter of choice both posit and negate, why not the 'concept', too—though it is not the Absolute but only an emanation from it, if we are precise. If the Absolute, again, can be safely credited with an inner movement to produce the relative, the changeful or the limited, could there be any surprise if the concept in its turn is found to harbour within itself its own opposite? Once identity has been split into opposites, it is immaterial whether we have to face the consequences of it on the strictly Absolute level or equally also in the

relative, the protégé of the Absolute. It may sound strange but the fact is that a review of Hegelian thought has no meaning since the claim of Hegel is a direct violation of the Laws of Thought: one can only collect the varied instances in which this violation was perpetrated. The issue is certainly not one of thought or logic: the Hegelian enquiry cannot be taken as an enquiry into Truth—it was only a stupendous challenge to the Absolute. Nor is it one of building up a scheme of reality on mystical data which deny logic and deny the evidence which reason cannot do without.

And yet the sole purpose of Hegel as I see it was to deal with the central issue of human existence, to build up a categorical scheme which would leave no chance to the poor creatures to question the enigmas of life. Did it not look like an astute attempt to hypnotise the Absolute as the magicians did? All authoritarian schemes fall victim to this technique in the end.

Still the purpose of Hegel was noble even though the result was disastrous. Does not the categorical structure of Hegel look almost like the Leviathan—or, in other words, like the European modern state Germanic or Parliamentary, or the Church in its halcyon days? If reports are authentic, the dialectic of Hegel came even to be worshipped like the Absolute. It was much too massive in its concentration of the categories to be appreciated with anything but awe, and did it not, after Kant, make the most forbidding challenge to the modern age of science as if to outdo his predecessors? Indeed it cannot be refuted unless one exposes its primary hypothesis, the Absolute Spirit—and that not by a counter-hypothesis which is equally vulnerable, but with the aid of truth itself. Unfortunately this has not been done; what has been done instead is to deny the Absolute outright and put in its place the phenomenon called 'sensation' or the method of proof called by the name of 'verification'. Nobody has yet suggested what the terms 'Absolute' and 'dialectic' truly mean in the scheme in which the 'opposites' play. Instead, what variation has so far been wantonly put on the head of the dialectic sounds as if Hegel gave birth to it in the nineteenth century so that the twentieth might either turn it into a rhapsody or make of it the basis of an epic fight on the plane of sheer economics. How could one otherwise account for the claim, in the twentieth century, that the whole issue of reality is nothing but a movement from the state which

'Being in itself' implies to a state in which 'Being for itself' appears? It is seriously held that the Absolute Spirit, by the pressure of undue strain on it on account of the absence of any consciousness in its pure state, took a leap into mid-air where it at once became conscious. But once this fateful leap was taken which evolved consciousness the Spirit could not retain it and get back to its primary state at the same time. It could not carry it home as the wasp does the bee after the paralysing sting. The whole adventure precipitated a fruitless struggle. Here, according to Sartre, was the origin of a nostalgia in the heart of creation and the chief explanation of the perpetual struggle in history.

But did Hegel by his promise of a final synthesis mean this miserably poor prospect for his species. And if he did not, why did his followers choose to deny that synthesis for the sake of sheer phantasy, which still moves human emotion so deeply? It is difficult not to be amazed at the pathetic effort of man in the twentieth century to solve the enigmas of life by pure phantasy.

It is another issue whether the Absolute Spirit could be confused with the non-conscious, immobile entities of history. Could even the Absolute, as a matter of choice, ever undergo a process which looks very much like suicide? And what is the evidence for the state which has been described as 'Being in itself'? Do we find it unless we descend to the plane of the most elementary experience of the human mind, the state of pure sensation? But 'Being in itself' on the level of ultimate reality can only mean self-absorption, with totality as its ground. It is necessarily non-referent—there is nothing to refer to. Could self-absorption on the absolute level, then, be taken as a mark of deficiency rather than as the only evidence for perfection and completeness? Should one even suggest with any sense of propriety that there was, fatally, a lack of consciousness in it? It is difficult to understand why the distinction between 'Being in itself' and 'Being for itself' was utilised to give an account of the genesis of creation. Obviously these conceptions have no categorical value and therefore are utterly inapplicable to any form of ultimate reality. It seems that since the '*Cogito*' appeared in the seventeenth century, by way of a violent challenge to the classical spirit, there has been no limit to the mad hunt for the ultimate scent of reality in terms of conceptions which have no categorical value whatsoever. It has not

yet dawned on the intellectuals of the modern age that the whole realm of the concrete, which stretches right up to the region of pure number and extension, was at the mercy of internecine conflict. The contribution of this part of the Universe was not truth, but illusion: and if, periodically, it seemed to flourish with a sudden flush of certainty, even that interlude in the midst of ever-increasing confusion came as a gift from the world of thought. My contemporaries who are seeking a way out with a prejudice against thought are only delaying the appearance of Truth. Perhaps they cannot help it—but what is the point?

I shall now give an account of what I hold to be the true meaning of opposition, and how exactly the dialectic is bound up with it.

The issue that I shall raise at once is whether the state of opposites can appear as a matter of choice on the part of any entity or being however paramount. If at least two terms or entities must be implied by the notion of opposites could either of them be supposed to create that state? On the other hand, if two terms are frankly opposed to one another, could they avoid co-existing, or existing unopposed, at the same time or at different times? Again, can the terms that oppose one another be on different levels of reality, one of them being real and the other unreal? Finally, can opposition lead to any positive result, i.e. is there such a thing as its resolution?

These are all not only relevant but fundamental issues; one cannot possibly resolve the problem of opposition without an adequate answer to every one of them, I shall, therefore, proceed to discuss them in the light of my main position about reality.

As a preliminary the first thing to note is that we are not called upon to discuss the issue of opposition in any Universe other than the Discontinuous. If to discuss or to enquire or to investigate is in some sense or other to know, the Universe which I have called Continuous falls outside the range of any discussion or investigation. We cannot know the Continuous since knowledge, in my view, implies a direct contact between two entities which must belong to the same realm. What this contact means is just the issue of knowledge. But as, evidently, the Continuous and the Discontinuous do not form the same realm, we who belong to the Discontinuous are naturally not expected to know the Continuous.

The issue of opposition therefore is the issue of the Discontinuous Universe, as a matter of course. What constitutes the Continuous or what happens in it or how the Discontinuous stands to it is not an issue we can deal with. I can just suggest that we can refer to it in the categorical way—that is testifying to its reality and not in any sense describing its concrete form or shape. My ancestors made a comment about the mystical unity which has some resemblance to my view of the Continuous: but the Continuous cannot be identified with the mystical unity of my ancestry.

Whatever 'opposition' as such may be, it has to abide scrupulously by the rigid conditions laid down by 'related duality', the ultimate form of existence in the Discontinuous Universe. The monistic conception familiar in tradition has nothing to do with it. The Discontinuous is not a monistic Universe, nor is it dualistic in the sense tradition took it to be: it is a Universe which I have called by the name of 'related duality'. The Absolute of history is completely out of the picture, here and elsewhere.

At least one very significant conclusion follows at once. 'Opposition' cannot be the result of creation. Since there was no Absolute Being—like, for instance, Descartes' God, or the Idea of Plato or the आत्मन् *Ātman* of my ancestry—there was naturally no Being or Principle which could create it, assuming that creation as an act was still possible. Besides, in a Universe where the ultimate constituents are dual and Non-Absolute and in a state of perfect equality, opposition, if it is a real state, must be a spontaneous state and not presuppose creative activity. Equally there must in that Universe be a state of harmony, which is as conceivable as opposition. And what is specially noteworthy is that a Universe of related duality will have to make room not only for opposition and harmony as spontaneous states but also for a state which cannot be called by either name. There is the stage of primal existence in which Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being appear in two states which simply imply one another. In fact, the state of implication is the predominant feature of the Universe, which appears in three stages: Continuous, Discontinuous and Continuous.

The two hypotheses for the origin of opposition, choice and creation, therefore fall to the ground. Since God, however powerful, did not exist and since no such things as 'emanation from

Mystical Unity' or 'diminution of Idea' have any meaning, we have to replace this hypothesis by the theory of spontaneity.

The answer to the third question—whether the terms opposed to one another must co-exist—is after this easily answered. The argument is fully discussed in *The Real and the Negative* in which the point is made that A and Not-A if they are opposites have to co-exist. Non-existent A and Not-A cannot co-exist, nor can successive A and Not-A, for similar reasons. To oppose is at least to co-exist. This claim was made in the course of my interpretation of the Laws of Thought. I proved by this analysis that the Positive and the Negative, if they exclude one another—A cannot be A and Not-A at the same time (Law of Contradiction)—also had to co-exist since they were opposites.

But could all this have been even implied by Hegel in his claim for the co-existence of the two functions of 'positing' and 'negating' in the Absolute? I wonder. In any case Hegel altogether spoiled his case by placing co-existence in a third entity outside the Positive and the Negative which he called by the name of Absolute Spirit.

The answer to the third question is that the terms that oppose one another must co-exist, which means that they cannot possibly oppose one another and yet exist in different forms which makes co-existence impossible. And obviously they cannot exist as opposed and unopposed at the same time.

The fourth question, whether they could belong to different grades of reality is equally easy to answer.

If the terms have to be equal in the Universe of 'related duality' they cannot in any circumstances be real and unreal respectively. The only occasion when the terms do alternately appear as real and unreal arises when they belong to the realm of the 'possibles'. Even here they have to be alternately both real and unreal. This form of reality or of unreality does not create any gradation, since the Real and the Unreal here are both possibilities. Even in a world of illusion which possibilities imply, the principle of equality prevails: and as it is the only world in which opposition appears there is nothing to hamper it from the introduction of any occasion for strict inequality.

Finally, the answer to the question whether opposition leads to any positive result is definitely in the negative. Opposition, which

forms the last stage of conflict, is another name for confusion and uncertainty. The question of resolution of opposition has no meaning. Opposition is an end in itself. Its only function is to create frustration which is one of the two central needs of the Discontinuous Universe—frustration and fulfilment. The issue of synthesis which Hegel formulated cannot arise in my scheme.

CHAPTER TEN

THE FOURTH STAGE

We are now at the very threshold of the Fourth Stage, a Stage which will unerringly bring to a close the long drawn-out phase of continuous frustration. The age of faith and expectation will then begin, and before long, the glow of the Fifth, the age of fulfilment, will be on the horizon.

As a Stage by itself, the Fourth will intervene between the Third, the Stage of possibilities, and the Fifth in which the 'actuals' will gradually appear in their robust, complete fulness. It will pre-eminently stand as a negative Stage since its main objective is to replace the age of confusion by the age of certainty. If the Third Stage reduced the whole of history to a sceptical moment and sought finally to install the negative in place of the Positive, the Fourth Stage will efface that moment permanently and fill the atmosphere with assurance, as a prelude to the fulfilment of the aim of the Universe. Technically, it will bring to the sceptic the answer to his long-standing charge that the Universe suffered from a lack of evidence and therefore deserved to be *non est*. And this answer will naturally mean a retreat of history, along with the sceptic, and a filling-in of the vacuum that the sceptic created to the detriment of all pre-existing claims. The drama that will enact this replacement will end not in a fight but in the fulfilment of the universal desire for evidence, which not even the sceptic ever truly discarded. The Universe even at this stage never once truly was a vacuum: there was a corner in it in which at least the dogmatism of the sceptic survived. Perhaps history preserved that dogmatism, as it must have seemed neither proper nor judicious to leave its wide dominion at the mercy of the sceptic's hard-sought vacuum.

But how is the vacuum to be displaced? What is it that brings about the replacement of history? If the sceptic has to retreat in the face of the evidence which the Fourth Stage introduces, what is exactly meant by that retreat?

These are profound issues, and the answer to them is that the

Universe begins again exactly in the proportion the evidence permits. Here is what may be called the metaphysical stage of the Universe, the stage of 'thought' in its pure unadulterated form. By no means does it repeat the Universe which existed with a beginning or that which existed without a beginning. No Creator, if there was one, could be called upon to give evidence for his creation, since there was no sceptic co-eternally existing to ask for it. But as by all the records the need of evidence appeared, the Universe had to be, as it were, re-created for the satisfaction of the sceptic. Here is a drama of dual performance, that which introduces scepticism with its grim foreboding and that which suddenly gives it a quietus, so that the actual and concrete may come back to life again. History called it by the name of tragedy, as it was bound to do. It was a different issue with the Spirit of the Universe; that Spirit never allowed a single blade of grass to grow unless it had sufficient nourishment in it to feed the Universe.

What, then, is the evidence which will replace history and fill in the vacuum? At least three major statements have to be made as a preliminary to a full account of that evidence. And, in any case, this drama of building up the evidence should not be hurried in its enactment but gradually evolved.

The statements refer to

(*a*) the structure of Ultimate Reality as it was laid down by the constitution of the Fourth Stage;
(*b*) the structure of what can be called proximate reality emanating from the same constitution;
(*c*) the constituents of the Fourth Stage, with their identities and the relationship between them. This statement will define the form of what I shall call the organisation of the Fourth Stage.

These are comprehensive statements and will cover to the minutest detail every conceivable issue, whatever its proportion. And they will altogether embody original and fresh accounts of this Universe—a fact which may easily create embarrassment to my contemporaries.

It might not be unwise therefore if I just say a word or two about myself to avoid any such complication. To talk about a new Stage in the Universe, whose main objective is to replace

history in which we were born and grew up, may easily sound stupid, if not conceited lunacy. And, if, as a result of such talk, I find myself in a state of existence which cannot be called even by the mild name of 'detachment', which my ancestry so fondly and robustly cherished, I may really be in need of sympathy. But this quite unusual behaviour, I mean my talk, will not be of my seeking. If we never had control over our origin, is it inconceivable that we should likewise have no control over such a feat as establishing a Stage of the Universe? My consolation is that this feat, if it is one, might have stood to the credit of any man, since its origin in any career was bound to be spontaneous and sudden. Nothing in my career had anything to do with its origin directly. I am solemnly prepared to abjure any credit on my own account.

The statement, however, about the structure of Reality needs a preliminary discussion of the ultimate principles which both determine the Fourth Stage and demarcate it from the Third. And I might add that it is too early yet to discuss the fully-matured constitution of the Fourth Stage: not till it has earned a definite achievement to its credit could it with any legitimacy form a subject-matter for serious consideration. Even if one could already count upon at least some *bona fide* experiments to live up to the principles of the Fourth Stage, they cannot be robust enough yet to bear any serious analysis.

The principles underlying the structure of the Fourth Stage as its sole determinants are three. I shall state them once again.

(*a*) Reality is a triadic pattern and not by any means the Absolute of tradition. In my view the triadic pattern is the ultimate metaphysical position, the final evidence for everything which is not impossible. Any claim or conception which will not cohere with it is another name for the impossible or the illusory.

It is, however, only the ultimate issues, necessarily categorical, which are relevant to this principle. Its main contribution therefore lies in resolving the antinomies of history such as Being and Non-Being, Infinite and Finite, Permanence and Change, Absolute and Relative, Unity and Individuality, Eternal and Temporal and their immediate implications such as unity and individuality, mind and matter, space and time, etc.

(*b*) Reality is related duality. This is the second principle which is presupposed by the middle Universe of the triadic pattern. The two other Universes are not subject to this principle, as the issue of experience—except in a categorical form—does not arise with them. We do not come into direct contact with them—relationship does not play any part in their career. So the principle of related duality has no application to them. The main function of this principle is to establish the Discontinuous Universe and determine the ground plan of all organisation. It is the only principle which could provide for the simultaneous existence of unity and individuality—the ultimate presupposition of all related existence.

(*c*) Reality is duality and neither individuality nor unity, not to say community. Its constituents are not only dual but also non-absolute. They are non-absolute Being and Non-Being, or the Positive and the Negative. Finally, these two non-absolutes are equal and not greater or smaller either simultaneously or by alternation in their relationship to one another. If, for instance, they clash as opposites or harmonise as complementaries, they never lose their level of perfect equality. This is the most significant feature in their career.

These are broadly the three ultimate principles, and the next issue is to compare these three ultimate principles of my scheme with the parallel basic principle or principles of the Third Stage. It is only after I have made this comparison that I shall be in a position to discuss the organisations which the two Stages, the Third and the Fourth, embody.

What, then, is the ultimate principle which is presupposed by the Third Stage as it is recorded historically?

That principle may be defined by the well-known phrase—dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal. The term 'real' was defined by the term 'absolute', and so the term 'unreal' was another name for the 'relative'.

At least two points have to be noted if we go into the implications of this strange notion of duality:

(*a*) In dealing with the Real or the Universe it was found in the classical epoch of human civilisation that the Absolute

could not stand by itself except for a brief moment in Parmenides, if we trust Greek records. It had to reckon with the Unreal, though not on equal terms. At least 'Time' had to be recognised by the 'eternity', an additional existence which did not claim to be total, complete or perfect. Duality, therefore, meant a curious phenomenon—a phase in the career of the eternal reality, which was bound to pass into nothingness.

(*b*) The other point is that the moment the notion of deficiency, incompleteness, finitude, etc., entered into the scheme of reality the notion of equality disappeared. The Real and the eternal could not be equal to the Unreal, nor did it constitute duality with the unreal. Both the notions of duality and equality had necessarily to be dropped. If, however, these were sacrificed on the altar of eternity—totality and absoluteness—what happened as a result of it all was only a strain on the human mind: that at least is certain. Two opposite conceptions of eternity and totality monopolised the whole field of speculation. Soon, what actually happened to distinguish their career was nothing but doubt and confusion. Reality was almost reduced to nothingness—at least, the sceptic triumphantly appeared for a time.

The main principle of the Third Stage, the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal, therefore, could not be taken as only another name for the Real. The dichotomy only stages—almost as a mark to its prestige and credit—an era of conflict in the name of the Real and the Unreal and finds itself in the end steadily disappearing with the smoke which that conflict provides. Indeed the Third Stage of the Universe, by the records of history, was nothing if not perpetual conflict between two claims about the Real, though both sides in it had alternate opportunities as if to sustain their energy with periodic assurances of victory and triumph. This alternate rise and fall, however, led in the end to what may be called the coma of doubt and confusion since conflict in its last stage passes into the stage of contrariety. Could one ever measure the agony of this last stage?

I have suggested already a theory of the origin of this preordained conflict of the Third Stage, and I have also claimed that

it led to an achievement which was essential and invaluable: but in spite of that the difference between the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal, the ground principle of the Third Stage, and the triadic pattern of Reality which I hold stands indisputable. Only it will be a mistake to forget that it was the triadic pattern that was, in the ultimate analysis, responsible for the dichotomy. The dichotomy was the only means by which the common purpose of the Universe which started off the creative stage could be duly frustrated.

The comparison between the two principles—the triadic pattern and the dichotomy—may now be closed and the comment may be repeated that, while duality and equality could not directly evolve in the Third State, they formed explicitly the essential feature of every other stage of the Discontinuous Universe.

What, then, would be the organisation of the Fourth Stage, or the nature of its constituents, and how would they stand to one another? Is there a strictly logical way of tracing the answer to these questions?

Whatever the full and complete answer may be, one thing at least is clear enough: the organisation of the Fourth Stage must presuppose definite changes in the constituents of the Third—exactly as the organisation of the Third had meant changes in the constituents of the Second. We have seen already that the actual Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being of the state of distinctness in the Second Stage had to undergo changes, so that they could become the possibilities of unity and individuality of the Third. Changes of exactly the same radical type have to take place in the possibilities of unity and individuality, so that they could take their places as constituents of the Fourth. And what is equally essential, these changes have to introduce an altogether new type of entity which cannot be confused with the actual Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being of the Second Stage; nor can they, obviously, mean only a repetition of the 'possibility of unity' and 'possibility of individuality'. The Universe has no room either for reversion or repetition. If the change from the Third Stage to the Fourth was due, it implied necessarily originality and independence. Besides, since its constituents had to be unique, it followed that their objective had to be unique, too, and completely different from what the constituents in the Third Stage had either cherished or

worked out. In fact the whole organisation of the Fourth Stage could not but be an altogether new phenomenon in the Universe, by the time it had reached its culminating point.

What then must be the changes the 'possibilities' of the Third Stage have to undergo to serve as the constituents of the Fourth? If they could neither revert to the Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, from which they had in a sense sprung, nor continue exactly as they were, what alternatives were left? Could they be just bare 'possibilities' or transform themselves directly into the garb of actual unity and individuality?

The answer is in the negative. 'Possibilities' as such have no existence in fact, however conceivable they may be. There can be only the two possibilities of the Absolute. Even then, these 'possibilities' would exist, as a matter of course, only as efforts to realise their identities. Besides, the existence of a 'possibility', which is but an effort, implies the primal existence of related duality—the two states of Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being. I have discussed all this. There can be no question of the existence of possibility *qua* possibility.

Equally, unity and individuality cannot exist as actual, since the Absolute (which the actual forms of their existence will mean) is impossible; we are dealing with their historical sense only. And certainly the problem of the changes needed in the 'possibility of unity' and the 'possibility of individuality' cannot be solved by simply splitting the combination of the two terms—possibility and unity or possibility and individuality. That will be creating two more stark impossibilities.

The conclusion is that the Fourth Stage cannot be a stage of mere possibilities; nor could it be constituted by the Absolute in its actual form. And it is impossible that the two 'possibilities' can just transform themselves into their original forms, the Non-Absolutes of the Second Stage. What then is the alternative?

There is an alternative, but I should review some personal history before making any attempt to formulate it—which may be taken as a part of the historical evidence.

I now know for certain that the Third Stage is a realm of possibilities—a fact which was not known to me before 1938. I now know also for certain that the two Absolutes, unity and individuality, cannot exist as actuals but only as mere possibilities. This

also I did not know before 1938. After the extraordinary change in my view of Reality—the realisation that the Third Stage was not the whole Universe nor anything but a possibility—naturally I had to draw a line between myself who had this experience and my contemporaries, who to this day scrupulously hold that the Universe is not only a Universe which exists as an actual fact but is, as it were, commanded by the presence of the Absolute. I cannot hold that the Absolute was or ever could be actual. It was only a 'possibility' which never materialised.

But what exactly is the bearing of this, my personal experience, on the whole issue of changes that must take place in the constituents of the Third Stage as a prelude to the origin of the Fourth? The answer is clear. If I myself was a constituent of the Third Stage before these changes accrued to me, evidently they are just the changes we have been looking for. The constituents of the Third Stage have to revert, in a sense, to the state of being actual, simply because they must no longer cherish the faith or assurance that the Absolute is there rather than its mere possibility. These may be called conditions precedent to the origin of the Fourth Stage.

And this will certainly not mean that the individuals of the Fourth Stage have to be sceptics. On the contrary, they will have full chance of formulating a scheme of the Universe which will not only be a vastly larger Universe than that of the Third Stage but will also hold the whole of that Universe as but a stage in its boundless course.

But is this account, however accurate, adequate to formulate my whole position on the Fourth Stage, or even on the Third, which might still be continuing in some form in spite of the change? It may or may not be; but it might be extremely useful to examine my own personal status at the moment a little more closely, especially as I feel it may not be altogether straightforward or easily classifiable. A historical event by itself may be just as significant as the logical ground which it must imply.

The fact is that, in spite of the changes I have just referred to, I still live side by side with my contemporaries who are either dogmatists of the old school or sceptics or hold a position midway between them. It would be stupid to suggest that I have completely detached myself from them; and yet it is not possible to hold that

I live and function in exactly the same way as they do. Particularly when I think the categorical structure which constitutes my thought is absolutely different from any ever known in human history. It stands remote and aloof from what my contemporaries are still cherishing in my neighbourhood. So do my logic, ethics, psychology and any other conception which the Universe implies —such as space, time, number, etc.—stand remote from theirs. If, for instance, I fall into conflict, I do not in many cases deal with it by the method of violence or compromise or persuasion, the three well-known methods of ethical tradition. Equally, as I have to live in the social order which is controlled and safeguarded by the State, I do not have to function always in the familiar way in which my contemporaries do. My conception of social organisation is considerably different from that of my contemporaries: indeed, I live a dual life, a life which the State wholly controls and a life which is strictly my own, which the State has no occasion or reason to control. In fact, my activities outside the social order which is under the authority of the State are providing for the future of the whole Universe and therefore, necessarily, for the social order of man, and could not possibly be in conflict with the interest of the State.

At least one conclusion from this personal review is that the changes necessary in the constitution of the Third Stage before its constituents can form the Fourth need not imply complete disappearance of the Third Stage. In some form or other the Third Stage, with its illusions, has still to be in existence while the Fourth is already operating to negate the Third. Besides, since the sole function of the Fourth Stage as it begins is to negate illusion, could it function if illusion had somehow become completely *non est* before it appeared on the scene? This is obviously an extraordinary conclusion—the co-existence of the Third and Fourth Stages. It seems that even if changes have to occur in a radical way in the Third Stage, still they need not affect its very existence at once.

The question therefore arises, how can they exist together and function simultaneously? Again can the constituents of the Third Stage in any circumstances constitute the Fourth—is this conceivable? On the contrary, the appearance of the Fourth Stage means definitely that its constituents must be altogether free from

all the illusory conceptions which firmly rule the Third, namely, first that the Third Stage is the Universe, second that the Absolute is the Reality, third that dichotomy is the nature of existence, fourth that the Third Stage is expected to bring about the fulfilment of the purpose of the Universe.

What would freedom from these conceptions imply? If, for instance, in some tiny corner of the Third Stage, this freedom arises suddenly and detaches some of the constituents from the rest of the Third Stage of the Universe, what does it really mean to the Universe and to the constituents? Where does this new formation belong? Will it still be tied to the Third Stage and, if so, why and in what way?

Obviously the Universe will no longer be only in the Third Stage, as I have so far taken it to be, but in two altogether different Stages, the Third and the Fourth. Here is a dual state of the same species instead of one, and that in the same Universe: and this change had to take place because the Third had already achieved its main objective, the frustration of the common purpose, in at least some significant sense. It could not but give way to the arrival of the Fourth Stage, whatever its scale, if the frustration had taken place even in a partial way.

Two questions arise:

(*a*) Can the Third and Fourth Stages co-exist when the objectives they profess by no means coincide? If the Third Stage was meant to realise illusions and fail, can it co-exist with the Fourth Stage, which was meant to negate illusions and succeed?

(*b*) Assuming that the Fourth Stage does not altogether detach itself from the Third Stage in so far as it is still subject to illusion and falls into conflict, can it in any sense detach itself?

Neither existence nor co-existence is possible if the Stages concerned have to profess and not profess the same objective or follow and not follow the same method of realisation. In no other sense could the issue of impossibility, with reference to existence, arise. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Stages can put forth efforts to realise illusions and to negate them at the same time.

But there is no reason why the Third Stage cannot be a Stage

of realising illusions while the Fourth is actually one of negating illusions. If illusions are necessities, affirmation of illusions obviously falls due, but so also does the negation of them. That is the meaning of existence. It is a dual state. Only the two functions —affirmation and negation—must take place in two different organisations. The Universe can be easily trusted to hold both the Stages at the same time provided we do not forget that it is a Universe of Stages, and not the Absolute. There is no reason why we should forget this. The co-existence of the Third and Fourth Stages, therefore, is perfectly conceivable—this is the answer to the first question.

The answer to the second is in the negative. The Fourth Stage cannot co-exist with the Third and then suddenly detach itself from the Third. Either the Third or the Fourth Stages can exist, or both, provided they exist separately: there cannot be a Stage which somehow is the Third and Fourth at the same time.

It is, however, another matter whether the Fourth Stage can come into existence without being preceded by the Third. As a matter of fact it is only after the Third Stage has achieved its objective—frustration of the common purpose—that the Fourth can appear on the scene. And then its main and only function will be to negate illusion—a process which cannot take place in the Third Stage.

But the fact still remains that negation of illusion cannot take place unless the individuals who are responsible for it have already fallen a prey to illusions. One cannot negate illusions unless one, somehow, is tied up with the life of illusion.

To fall a prey to illusion, again, is simply not to know that one is actually held in illusion; this is the meaning of illusion. For instance, all the members of the Third Stage are necessarily in that condition. It is not possible that anybody in this Stage can be in a position to negate illusion since one does not know that one is in illusion. But one can, as it were, wake up from illusion just as much as one falls a prey to it. There can be definite changes in the state of illusion with the advent of fresh experience to make negation of illusion possible. The individual who has fallen a prey to a state of illusion can wake up to the fact that all that he believed to be Truth, or absolute value, was pure illusion. Negation after that is inevitable. History is full of records bearing on this

awakening. There is a whole logic behind the origin of illusion.

The birth of the Fourth Stage therefore will not be due until at least some of the constituents of the Third Stage have completely changed in their stature and outlook: and this change will occur as soon as the frustration of the common purpose has in some significant sense been actually achieved. This achievement is essential to and indispensable for the change; and it follows that once it has taken place (I mean the frustration, whatever the scale) two events will take place: the proportion of the Third Stage will diminish and the Fourth Stage will appear.

Let us plot out the course of that change, as it begins and ends. The Third Stage, naturally enough, will begin a fresh epoch of frustration after it has completed its first epoch. The initial phase of it will mark a universal fall into the clutches of illusion: there will be no sense, anywhere, that the Third Stage is a realm of possibility—with the two Absolutes which are nothing but 'possibilities'. Conflict therefore will soon fall due, in the sense that three distinct conceptions of the Real and the Unreal will stand opposed to one another. Here is a clear and definite moment of history in which the opposite sides are in a position to demarcate one another's boundaries.

But what happens now? There will be a sudden change in the proportion of the Third Stage: at least a portion of the constituents will leave the Stage altogether and form a Stage of their own. There will be two Stages now instead of one, one of which will be a continuation of the Third Stage, though with diminished proportion, and the other the new Fourth Stage, with a very modest proportion. They will be distinguished by a change in the method of dealing with the conflict between the values. In both cases the conflict will appear, but the values will be interpreted by them in two opposite ways. The Third Stage will continue to regard them as truth whilst the Fourth will regard them as complete illusions. Due to these quite different interpretations the Third Stage will carry on with the old methods of realising the values whilst the Fourth will steadily abstain from realising them. This is negating illusion. Co-existence of the Third and Fourth Stages therefore can easily and legitimately occur—this, at least, is my conviction.

It might be useful if I add to the argument about the nature of

co-existence in the light of my theory of Stages. Evidently the Third and Fourth Stages cannot belong to the same organisation and practise both the methods at the same time. Nor will they both function if there is, necessarily, room for only one of the methods. They can co-exist and function if they belong to different groups and function for different objectives.

There is no reason why the Universe should not make room for alternative methods of dealing with conflict. The main issue is not that of the methods of dealing with conflict; it is an issue whether the Universe is monistic or pluralistic Absolute. If we have to take the Universe to be one or the other it is inconceivable that it can provide for the origin of the opposites in its scheme in any sense. It has to be consistent and integral and rule out the origin of even differences in the Universe.

But there is no reason why the Universe which is not Absolute but must begin and end should not provide for any type of difference, not excluding opposites—on the contrary, nothing that begins in it can afford not to end. No function or procedure in it can claim to occupy all time and all space. The method of warfare, for instance, in dealing with conflict will have to give way to the method of abstention as the time falls due. If the Universe excludes absolutism except as illusion it cannot discriminate between the ethics of affirmation and the ethics of negation. Both ethics must have a chance, in the course of the Universe, and may co-exist in different Stages of that course. The Universe which begins and ends is a Universe of Stages and nothing else. Three altogether different settings for the two ethics, therefore, are due in such a Universe. The Universe may begin with the ethics of warfare and affirmation and gradually reach a stage of co-existence with the ethics of negation and abstention, and finally disappear altogether with neither of the two ethics in the field—the Universe will then enter the second half of the Fourth Stage.

There is no reason, therefore, why we should not conclude that the Third and Fourth Stages can co-exist, with two opposite functions to discharge with reference to conflict between the values. While both of them will have to face conflict between values—this is the point of agreement between them—they will differ altogether in their views as to the nature of the conflict and the values between which it appeared. The view in the Third

Stage will discriminate between the values under the guidance of the principle of dichotomy. This discrimination will make the values alternately both real and unreal, so that the conflict is bound to lie between the real and unreal value. The view in the Fourth Stage will consider both the values as illusory, by the principle of the triadic pattern of Reality; so that in the Fourth Stage the conflict will lie between illusions and the method of dealing with them, therefore, will be different. In the Third Stage both sides will have to put forth their best efforts to realise the value they hold to be real and suppress the one they consider to be unreal. In the Fourth Stage, both sides will equally and wholeheartedly abstain from realising them since they are believed to be completely illusory.

While, therefore, it will be perfectly correct to say that neither of the two Stages is free from conflict—and therefore both of them are liable to illusion, which creates conflict—it will be incorrect to suggest that illusion has the same 'pull' over them. The Third Stage marks the moment when the values appear as possibilities and create impressions that they are actual and true—that they are the real Absolute. No such moment appears in the Fourth Stage. There was no Fourth Stage when the drama of the Absolute was being enacted: it was altogether the monopoly of the Third Stage. But the moment a phase was reached in this enactment when at least the first instalment of frustration fell due, the hour struck for the Fourth Stage—of negation—to begin. Suddenly a change will come over a portion of the constituents of the Third Stage, who cannot any longer believe that the Absolute is real. They become instantly convinced that they have been under illusion, and can only negate it and not fulfil its mission. Illusion from now means two different things—it was Truth in the Third Stage and simulation of Truth in the Fourth Stage.

It is another issue whether the individuals who discover the unreality of their belief still belong to the Third Stage. Evidently they do not; and there can be no common ground between the individuals who believe that the Absolute is actual and those who see clearly that it is only a 'possibility'. Nor is it conceivable that the latter could revert to their position in the Third Stage and lose their place in the Fourth Stage once they have changed. Two things can be said with reference to change: the time for change

from the Third to the Fourth is fixed, it is not at the mercy of 'human will' or 'Divine Grace'; and once it has taken place it stays till it has fulfilled its mission, and then a fresh change arrives.

Perhaps I may now close the enquiry about the co-existence of the Third and Fourth Stages. Both of the Stages have perfect *bona fides* for existence and have no alternative but to co-exist. We cannot take them as 'absolute differents' any more than we can call them identical. We can only say that the Fourth Stage had to be preceded by the Third: the Third Stage had to be there to produce frustration of the common purpose before the Fourth Stage fell due; for freedom from illusion which alone guaranteed the actual organisation of the Fourth State could not appear before frustration had taken place in the Third Stage.

If it was inevitable that the Third Stage should be a Stage of illusion, so that the frustration of the common purpose could be brought about, it is equally inevitable that the Fourth Stage will rise, with freedom from it, so that negation of illusion may equally take place. Once absolutism is quite out of the way—it had to exist in its proper time—the Fourth Stage will appear on the scene and gradually and steadily negate the whole of the Third Stage and restore the sense of assurance and faith.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL SCHOOL

A VERY important question now arises. If we can be convinced about the spontaneous origin of the Fourth Stage on the ground that it is logically necessary—in other words, there is no alternative to it—can we be equally sure of the origin of 'freedom' which actually ushers in the Fourth Stage? What exactly happens to the constituents of the Third Stage who leave the Third Stage and form a new Stage in which they find themselves called upon to negate illusions, instead of realising them?

Can it all be only an issue of what is known as esoteric phenomenon or is it just some normal human experience whether immediately verifiable or not? If there could be nothing in the organisation of the Third Stage, the Stage of illusion, to provide for the negation of illusion—it could only affirm illusion or put forth effort to realise it—from where indeed could the 'freedom' from illusion come?

The answer is simple: once, suddenly, the whole conception of the Universe, as it was held in the three organisations of the Third Stage—the mystical, the humanistic and the dualistic—disappeared, in its place a new conception arose and it is this conception which creates the sense of freedom. Even the date of the occurrence could be verified. There was a radical change spontaneously without warning or preparation—indeed nothing short of a cosmic revolution. And this change appeared only in a minority and not the whole community.

It is quite another issue why this change should have taken place at all. But it did take place: that at least is a verifiable fact of history—and why should it not? Only the form which it took was wholly categorical, and neither esoteric nor empirical. Obviously it was for thought, which was the presiding genius of the Universe at this Stage to dictate and control the origin of freedom—the eternal abode of the categories, the one and only source of evidence. Could we ask for its *bona fides*? Should not the primal source of all evidence be spared that ignominy?

The fact is that thought, which gives freedom the chance of creating the Fourth Stage historically, is only another name for the triadic pattern, the scheme of reality which I have been formulating since 1939: my conviction is that it has guaranteed to the human species the chances for real freedom from illusion at last.

Yet, strangely enough, while freedom was being guaranteed by thought, in the mid-twentieth century a school of empiricism found it necessary to decry thought as artificial improvisation, like a game. The honest charge against thought was that the categories which constituted it were 'meaningless nonsense'—they could not be verified. It almost seemed as if the Third Stage was still rampantly operative even at the doorstep. Let me note the argument behind this decision against thought.

To say that Reality is continuous or discontinuous—or just mystical unity or changeful individuality—is certainly not to raise any expectation in the human mind which can be verified. Indeed, nothing follows such statements like 'refreshing rain after drought' or 'warfare with atomic weapons after prophetic impatience'. Besides, even judged by common sense, human life is nothing if it is not enjoyment of varied kinds or just straightforward misery and suffering. These are all verifiable facts. Where, then, do the categories come in?

The obvious reply, especially if one is in the dialectical field, is: why, then, should we think or make statements which imply categories, a process or function which may not raise any expectations in the human mind? If it is a game, can it be inevitable?

If the answer is that we cannot help but think—it is no longer a game—would that not mean that there is something undesirable in us human beings which makes us think—something which is not of our making and therefore unavoidable? But would it still follow, assuming we accept the hypothesis, that we are in duty bound to right that wrong, as evidently we are always trying to do? We are perpetually playing the game and bitterly regretting that we do so. If the wrong in us had its origin elsewhere, what logic is it that recommends that the duty of 'righting' it should have been vested in us? Should we repeat the mistake of Locke again? If, indeed, we have to trace the origin of our whole being to an agency totally beyond our control—we could not be there

when we were being created—could we with even common sense interfere with the way in which its whole career should work itself out?

Is it arguable, again, that a wrong is ever really righted, or can it possibly be? If the question of righting the wrong has to be raised, it has to be conceded at once that the wrong must be there already, or what will be righted? And if it is there at all, what is the meaning of righting it? (I am aware that this view may give offence to many an orthodox view but I do not mean to do so.)

Nobody believes that wrong is the only embodiment on earth of our Heavenly Father and that it has to be eternal. Could we right it if it were eternal? And if we must accept it as temporal, and therefore liable to end, can anyone deny that its ending, however it might come about, must be a stage in its career—a matter of spontaneous occurrence, as was its beginning? The same agency which was responsible for its origin was bound to be equally responsible for its ending. Where, then, does the Logical Positivist come in in this matter of righting the wrong which he calls by the name of thought? Why should he think that the responsibility is his? Does he claim responsibility for the origin of the wrong?

He could easily be a spectator recording the disappearance of the kind of thought which has held sway over human mind for all the centuries before the twentieth. But could he play any other role unless the belated piety of the twentieth century carried him along in its stride?

If the issue is not one of denying the categories, however, but that of their simple, straightforward verification, one would at once agree that to use such phrases as 'Reality is Absolute' or 'Mystical Unity' is not to raise expectations of the kind which refreshing rain (or atomic warfare) implies. Indeed one need not be in a hurry to quote claims rising from our visiting the Heavenly Father in the rarified atmosphere of our mountain-tops, or the prospect of reaching at some suitable date in the future His own domain in Heaven. Nor is it necessary to go for verifiable evidence to the पुराण *Purānas* or the intensively cultivated mood of our योगिन् *Yogins*—still outstanding. These must have been the greatest moments of exaltation for the human spirit, from which all the energy necessary for the creation of civilisation arose: but they

are not, in the twentieth century, exactly ideal instances of what we mean by verification—besides, the value of civilisation, in whatever clime, is at least under a deep shadow.

But need one also argue that the sudden appearance of the categories—it is recorded historical fact—after long doubt means nothing but nonsense to the human mind? Does it not at least dispel doubt, into which we periodically fall and could it possibly do so unless it creates the indisputable belief that Reality is—and not, as the sceptic claims, the Negative is?

And when the panoramic change—the appearance of the outstanding edifice of the categories against the background of limitless thought—followed, what happened to the human spirit? Was it steeped in doubt and despair again or filled instead with rich, warm expectation of an eternally unfailing Universe, never to end? Who and what, then, is responsible for constituting the Universe wherein the Logical Positivist holds discourse to prove that thought is nonsense, unless it was thought itself?

If the right and capacity of thought to give rise to freedom from illusion remains unimpugned, can one still argue that this freedom from illusion which thought guarantees cannot lead to the negation of illusion? It is inconceivable that the human mind would still persist in the fulfilment of illusion when it had the conviction that the objectives were illusion, and not truth. It can only negate illusion, since it has already been affirmed. As existent value illusion has to be both fulfilled and negated. The principle is that if anything exists it must also non-exist, which is a positive process. So it follows that negation will follow affirmation of illusion.

The Fourth Stage is therefore pre-eminently a categorical stage; the prime energy that works in it is wholly the energy of thought. It is remote from the energy which derives from what we call 'direct experience' of the Real. Between the realm of thought and the realm of concrete reality there is a great gulf: even if thought guarantees the validity of concrete reality it does not follow that it can produce it. The triadic conception of the Universe, for instance, is not the triadic Universe. We know with the aid of this conception that Reality, in its complete form, is, but we do not know what that actually is. This is not an issue of knowledge.

One may, however, still persist in asking whether the expectations raised by the categories may, after all, admit of verification

in at least some sense; and if by any chance they do, would not the form and style of that verification coincide with what the Logical Positivist claims that it should be?

I may suggest at once that the categories need not exclude verification altogether; on the contrary. But it would be meaningless to claim that the metaphysician means by verification exactly the same thing as the Logical Positivist does: that he does not.

If, indeed, he is asked to verify such statements as 'Reality is' in the same way as one expects verification for a statement 'tomorrow it will rain', there will be no reply. Could even God Almighty be expected to present the whole Universe at once, if that was the only way to verify the statement 'Reality is'? The demand is obviously absurd to the metaphysician. But if the Positivist relents and is amenable even to compromise, the metaphysician may guarantee the chance of a gradual verification even of the proposition 'Reality is'. He will start, say, with such instances as 'refreshing rain', 'atomic warfare' and many other agreeable and disagreeable verifications, the stock in trade of the Logical Positivist. Ultimately a moment is sure to be reached in this steady, continuous process when it will be time for any creature on earth, Positivist or Non-Positivist, to see God in His own domain or to be absorbed in the Mystical Unity. Will not such a process verify the statement 'Reality is'? But the process is rather too long and requires great patience and intense humility —may it not be a bit too much for those who cater for the day?

In any case it will be perfectly safe to conclude that the *locus standi* of thought in the Universe is as unimpeachable as that of sensation and image, the chief articles of faith in the Positivist's camp. Thought stands rooted in reality. We think, just as we sense-perceive; and in neither case is it open to us to choose. In the last analysis, the difference between thought and that which is certainly not thought and may be sensation or image is the difference of function and nothing else. Thought and sensation arrive at different times and achieve different results in the course of our life. We cannot do without them or do with only one or other of them; we have to have both of them.

I shall now close the enquiry which raised the issue of the origin of the era of freedom in relation to the triadic pattern of the

Universe with just a short summary of the Fourth Stage, as we have so far seen it. If the Fourth Stage, as it begins, is not only free from the illusory conception of the Third Stage about Reality but has also a definite end of its own to fulfil—the negation of illusion—its constituents must necessarily be at least pseudo-actuals and not mere 'possibility of unity' or 'possibility of individuality'. As such actuals they will naturally stand in a relation of agreement with one another; they will at least agree to negate illusion with the aid of a common conception of Reality. The issue of conflict, the main issue of the Third Stage, will necessarily take a different form. There will be no attempt on the part of the constituents to fulfil illusions—instead there will be joint efforts to abstain from illusion. Finally, perhaps one exceptional comment may be made: the individuals in this Stage will be free from a number of haunting notions of history—the notion of absolute differents, the notion of conflict and of its two forms, contradiction and contrariety.

CHAPTER TWELVE

DIRECT EXPERIENCE AND NEGATION

We have to note that the Fourth Stage is a Stage in which there is no direct experience of the common purpose of the Universe: there is only a categorical experience, which refers to it, and it is this experience which forms the common basis for the life of agreement among the constituents of the Fourth Stage. It is, again, the sole instrument with which they co-operate to negate the Stage of illusion. It is pre-eminently the Stage of thought and should be dissociated from any alignment with what has been known in human tradition as mystical or esoteric.

There are therefore two very important issues to discuss—first, an analysis of the conception of direct experience, as distinct from categorical or indirect experience; and, second, an analysis of the conception of negation which is directly associated with the categorical. Is negation in fact conceivable as an independent function and what exactly is the place of negation, as a process, in the Universe? These are fundamental issues and the proper way to introduce them will be to analyse first the conception of direct experience.

'Direct experience' is a phrase which has served the empiricist of human history almost as his creed. Sensation, the sole and exclusive basis of empiricism has been claimed by him to be 'experience which is immediate and direct'. The implication has been that nothing intervenes between the appearance of sensation in the human mind and some object or entity in the wide world which is distinguishable from the habitat of sensation. It is held that there are two worlds: the world of mind in which sensations appear and the world which in some sense is responsible for the origin of sensations in the minds of individuals. This is in direct line with the Cartesian tradition—I mean, the dual world.

I, too, uphold the view that the issue of direct experience will not arise unless we have occasion to deal with a dual world. Nobody, for instance, will raise the issue in connection with the

Absolute of Parmenides, which did not mean duality. But the dual world of the empiricist cannot be the dual world I mean. In fact it has not been possible for me to accept either the empirical or rationalistic conception of the Universe; and I can suggest at least one instance of the dual world, which I shall describe as the Fifth Stage of the Discontinuous Universe. In my scheme the dual worlds are:

(1) The world in which the common purpose of the Universe is conceived. This world is a society in which individuals exist in a state of identicalness and conceive the common purpose:
(2) The world in which the common purpose of the Universe is fulfilled. This world is also a society in which individuals exist in a state of distinctness and perfect harmony to fulfil the common purpose.

And if we do not go any further, we can conclude that direct experience does imply a dual world—the Absolute, as I have just mentioned, cannot have direct experience.

It so happens that, between the two worlds I have just referred to, nothing intervenes—not, certainly, another world. Not only do they stand as unique, independent and original to constitute duality but they monopolise the whole of existence between them when they exist. Without doubt there also exists another Stage alongside them, but it is the Primal Stage, the presupposition of all the Stages and phases of the Universe.

The phrase 'direct experience', therefore, implies two notions: first, that of dual worlds and, second no intervention between them by any other world. Perhaps I might repeat that these two worlds, though unique and independent, imply one another. There would be no world in which the common purpose could be conceived if it were not that the world of fulfilment is also equally provided for: in the nature of things they are not 'absolute differents', any more than they can be identical with one another. They are just different, complementing each other's function. No instance of a dual world could be so ideally fitted to embody 'direct experience' since it excludes absolutely every other world from intervening between them with an objective of its own.

But it simply is not true that there could be only direct experi-

ence of the common purpose, and nothing but direct experience. On the contrary, the common purpose of the Universe forms the subject-matter of some other experience which is not direct and therefore refers to some other world. This, at least, is my view. The world in question is the Fourth Stage of the Universe, the world of thought which we are discussing at the moment. Here is also a definite experience of the common purpose, but it is categorical and not direct. The common purpose here is just referred to in terms of categories and what follows from this reference is the assurance and belief that the common purpose not only is but is in its full stature. It is this experience which meets the sceptical charge that there is no Reality.

To define 'direct experience', therefore, we have not only to localise the phenomenon in the Fifth Stage of the Universe but also to distinguish it from the categorical experience which takes place in the Fourth. And what this distinction means we shall from now on have plenty of opportunity to discuss. It will be interesting, however, to review for a moment what happens to the distinction between categorical and direct experience in the Third Stage. Does the distinction at all appear in the Third Stage?

We have to note, before we begin the enquiry, that the common purpose of the Universe is wholly in abeyance in the Third Stage. What serves in its place as common purpose are the three conceptions of mystical unity, humanistic individuality and dualistic community. In fact there are three purposes instead of one, as there are three organisations. The question therefore is whether the distinction between categorical and direct experience has been recognised with reference to mystical unity, or humanistic individuality or dualistic community.

The answer is in the affirmative: the distinction as such has been recognised. But since the principle of dichotomy has ruled in every sphere of the Third Stage, the recognition of it has taken only the form which dichotomy permits. Valuation of direct or of categorical experience as a consequence of this has been in no sense uniform or absolute. It has changed from organisation to organisation. No organisation has valued them both equally; on the contrary, all the three organisations have chosen to recognise only one of them, to the detriment of the other. The mystical, for instance, has stood for 'absorption'—which is direct experience

or perhaps even more than that, but not, certainly, categorical. The humanist, on the other hand, who did not provide for the mystical or Personal God in his scheme, had no occasion for either 'absorption' or 'salvation', both of which are instances of direct experience. (I do not consider instances of mysticism if they do not follow from the main position of a school of philosophy.) Knowledge, therefore, was bound to take the place of direct experience in the humanist's scheme and it makes no difference whether it is categorical or empirical. The dualist evidently has stood for direct experience, whether it is called 'salvation' or 'communion'.

The main point to note with reference to the valuation of the two experiences is that it has all been without the foundation of truth. It has had no significance, except what illusion could give it. This being so, not even a comparison is due between the Fourth and the Third Stages on this fundamental issue—the distinction between the categorical and the direct.

But the claim has certainly been made that the Ultimate Reality has been both known and actually realised—a claim which finds no place in the Fourth Stage; only I may repeat that all the claims of the Third Stage have been invariably lost in the sea of confusion and doubt in the end. No question arises after that till the Fourth Stage, with the triadic pattern, has appeared on the scene and made a valuation of the Third Stage possible.

I may conclude this account of the distinction between the categorical and the direct by repeating that they do not co-exist and therefore have no chance of clashing or competing with one another. The Fourth Stage is entirely a Stage for the categorical, while it is in the Fifth that 'direct experience' will have its full display. We in the Fourth Stage can have only knowledge of the common purpose, which refers to it; there is no occasion for us to have in this Stage direct experience. That has to wait till we have completely negated illusion and qualified ourselves for the Fifth Stage, perhaps as a radically distinct species.

I am not at all sure what the reaction of my contemporaries will be to this conclusion about our prospects in the Fourth Stage. Some of them who still hold tenaciously that the Third Stage is a Stage not of illusion but of truth are bound to react heavily against it: but there may be others who, like me, must have been dis-

illusioned about the whole of history and who may even react quite favourably. I leave it at that.

The next issue that I shall discuss is the notion of negation; and it so happens that here, too, we can find a parallel in the records of history as we did in the case of 'direct experience'.

The records here refer to my own ancestry. I cannot help feeling that निर्वाण *Nirvāṇa*, the outpouring gift from Gautama the Buddha to the stock of human wisdom, means as a way of life almost the same thing as my 'Negation' in the Fourth Stage does: and this is the second time I have had the good fortune to trace to my lineage the light that came to me. The first time was when I discovered, fourteen years after I had published *The Real and the Negative*, that the categories 'First Continuous', 'Discontinuous' and 'Second Continuous' were referred to in the logical speculation in my ancestry. It is impossible to express my gratitude.

I should not, however, discuss the similarity between *Nirvāṇa* and Negation before repeating the constitution of the Fourth Stage, since the controversies which bear on *Nirvāṇa* make the reference necessary.

The constitution of the Fourth Stage is a dual constitution: one phase of it is in some sense almost a replica of the Third Stage while the other stands firmly quite apart. We have already had opportunity to see that the change from the Third to the Fourth Stage does not imply a complete detachment—it is not time yet that an altogether new species of humanity should come into being. The species of the Third still has to remain in the Fourth, though with considerable difference, and the evidence for this claim is found in the historical fact that the constituents of the Fourth are still liable to the illusions of the Third. No individual of the Fourth can yet claim that he is completely free from illusion or is in a position to fulfil the common purpose of the Universe. It is not possible that such freedom should arise in the Universe till illusion has been completely negated—the illusions have to be negated—and the second half has been lived through, maturing the Image. We shall soon see what that means.

The Fourth Stage therefore cannot introduce the new species; it is only a prelude to such a birth. It is a dual constitution.

But this need not raise any logical issue on the score of existence. There is no reason why the same species cannot exist in two

separate states. The question of identity, as we have seen, is a question of related duality.

What, indeed, is not possible for any group or individual to aspire or attain to is to be in both Stages at the same time. It cannot be possible for the constituents of the Fourth Stage to be liable to illusion and not liable at the same time. If they were to fall into illusion it could not be claimed that they did not fall into illusion; limitation of existence, if the term has any meaning, by any logical injunction does not imply any privation except the self-contradictory state. Any group or individual, therefore, is fully entitled to fulfil illusions or to negate them: both possibilities are equally open. The same species may in one state try to fulfil the illusions which in another it may wholeheartedly negate: and the fact is that, as some of the species which constituted the Third Stage form the Fourth after the new conception of Reality has arisen, they have to negate, and not fulfil illusion. Negation, to them, becomes not only possible but inevitable.

Negation is a positive phenomenon which, in a strictly technical sense, is embodied in the process or state of non-existing or disappearing—as distinguished from the process or state of coming into existence and appearing. Both the processes, as positive existents, are implied by the ultimate metaphysical situation—the dual existence of the two Non-Absolutes, Being and Non-Being, on absolutely equal terms. To be is not only to exist but also to non-exist. Every entity must pass through both the states, and this is possible since the existent is not absolute. The Universe begins and ends, so everything in it has to begin and end—what I call the Positive and Negative have equal shares in determining the career of any entity or being in the Universe. There is nothing absolute in the Universe except as a 'possibility'.

Negation of illusion is therefore a process that necessarily must take place, exactly as affirmation of illusion does: and obviously negation is by no means another name for 'frustration'—it is the common purpose that is frustrated. The whole of this situation—I mean of frustration—is brought about by the clash between the possibilities of the two Absolutes: unity and individuality. It cannot be called a negation of illusions. On the contrary, it is in this state, which is one of confusion and doubt, that the illusions are realised and fulfilled. We live the positive life of

illusion. The illusions do not certainly non-exist or undergo disappearance in this state—the state of disappearance is an altogether different state, one in which the illusions are abstained from.

Indeed, if negation by any chance failed to materialise, the illusions would recur and repeat themselves for ever and ever. Historically they have recurred and repeated themselves till to-day though the values implied by them never failed to reach confusion in the end.

This confusion, by the way, in spite of its continuous presence in all history did not compel human mind to desert the values which it never succeeded in materialising. Here is a singular case of the failure of historical evidence to recommend the decision that the views of tradition are illusory and should not be worked out. Quite other evidence was indicated to guarantee the non-recurrence of the values: which evidence is metaphysical. It could arise on one condition—only if illusion were negated in the light of the triadic pattern of Reality.

Obviously the historical evidence of the rise and fall of values ending in confusion does not bear on the negation or disappearance of the values or on the negation of illusions. The values of the Third Stage still remain and the illusions work to the full to bring about their frustration. In no mood except the sceptical did the human race drop values as illusions, and the worst that happened to values from the sceptical challenge was that they were found to have no evidence to support them. This need not, and did not, prove fatal to the values: on the contrary, it created only a desperate situation for human existence. Action and thought were equally paralysed; the state of doubt continued. The values did not function.

Not before the values were successfully challenged as unreal, therefore, could the illusions disappear. Negation of the values has to take place—it is the values that form the illusions, though they are not known as such.

Negation therefore is a distinct process which intervenes between the frustration of the common purpose in the Third Stage and its fulfilment in the Fifth Stage. It is a process which does not fall due before the Third Stage has in some sense frustrated the common purpose and the rise of the Fourth Stage has become

imminent, with a complete change in the categorical conception of the Universe.

Perhaps I might now, with some expectation, refer to my ancestry to verify my claim about negation as a process of supreme significance. Did not Gautama the Buddha mean 'negation' when he so emphatically enunciated the doctrine of *Nirvāṇa* as the central core of his thought? What else did he—or could he—possibly mean?

Historically only a competent Buddhist scholar is in a position to form a judgment on such a vast issue. For myself, I can only argue on purely logical grounds that the Buddha could not in any form mean the 'void' as the total achievement of *Nirvāṇa*. Why, indeed, should he? The void cannot be the 'indefinable' or 'inexplicable' of the Vedantist: it is another name for the Negative. If the Buddha was far too painfully aware of the law of suffering, which grinds incessantly, to accept the blank Negative or to be swayed even by the sceptic, could *Nirvāṇa*—the moment when the flame goes out—in any sense be compared with the void? What, then, did he mean? Why was he taken to be the advocate of the void?

The records hold that he did not deny the Positive; and one may argue that he perhaps found the Positive much too abstruse and mysterious to be tied up with the Eightfold Path. At any rate, it was in his almost persistent refusal to define the Positive—so strongly upheld by the Vedantist—that the Western mind found at least some evidence of a realistic approach in the East. Somehow the Buddha thought that the Eightfold Path and the Positive could be kept distinct and separate, and yet that separation would not embarrass the prospect of solving the main issue of life—the removal of suffering for good.

Does it not follow, then, that the Buddha may have felt assured that a line had to be drawn between the Positive and the Negative in any sphere of the universe—that there are two moments in life which are separate and distinct and equally real?

Perhaps I ought not to claim or disclaim anything more on behalf of the Buddha or of Buddhism. (I shall have occasion when I review my ancestry in another volume to analyse the Buddha's position at length.) I should, however, warn my readers that I did not by any means associate the Buddha with or dissociate him

from my scheme of thought, which could not but accept negation as a distinct process of the Universe. My only claim about the Buddha is that his *Nirvāṇa* accepted that principle too. It is another question whether he was right in his analysis of the problem of life to which he applied *Nirvāṇa* as a solution. Historically, the problem of suffering is still continuing in spite of untold efforts of man to put an end to suffering by the practice of the Eightfold Path. This is no disrespect to the authority of the Buddha for whom my respect has never faltered. Exactly the same thing has to be said with reference to any authority in human history so long as we have to stand periodically face to face with the great figure of the sceptic.

Indeed there need be no undue pressure on human judgment from any authority, however austere. Authority is not another name for Reality. At least my ancestral tradition left judgment surprisingly free and did not demand any undue restriction on it. No Hindu could ever lose his deep respect for his tradition.

The point I want to make however, is that *Nirvāṇa* and negation, whatever their similarity, derive from altogether different metaphysical conditions, which were a *sine qua non* to them. Negation in my scheme follows from the triadic pattern of Reality while *Nirvāṇa* followed from one of the two fundamental interpretations of Mystical Unity. The Buddha, as far as I know, was the creator of this interpretation which was the direct opposite of the *Ātman*, or the Vedantic view.

This is not the place, however, to discuss the agreements and differences between these two schools of interpretation. There is just one point which has to be stressed and I shall claim the privilege of doing so. I am not aware—I am not a scholar of Buddhism—that the Buddha, or any of the commentators who followed in his steps, formally recognised that the Mystical Unity was the common background of the Vedantist and the Buddhist. Perhaps they did and perhaps did not. But there can be no doubt that both schools were opposed to humanism, which frankly built on individuality. My contention is that an agreement between Buddhism and Vedantism on the basis of Mystical Unity has to be assumed if the common opposition to individuality has to be accounted for. There is no alternative. The opposition to

'individuality' is not possible without a positive basis and that basis must be 'unity'. All cases of opposition must imply a duality of value and conception, and the fact is that my ancestry in its Vedantic form upheld the Mystical Unity as the Reality and its main opposition was directed not to Buddhism but to humanism, which stood for individuality and against Mystical Unity. It has been my privilege to show that the historical records hold three distinct claims about Ultimate Reality; and these arose on three distinct valuations of unity and individuality. It is impossible to give an account of Buddhism without this background.

It is another matter why the Buddha did not discuss this view, always assuming that he did not. If it be a fact that he was absorbed in the solution of the ethical problem so that suffering, as a result of false valuation, might cease, it was not necessary that the issue should arise at once. It all depended on how seriously the Buddha took his own analysis of the problem and how much he came to believe in its finality as only an ethical problem. This is a difficult question to probe. But there can be no doubt that his analysis was one of the two which the common hypothesis of the Mystical Unity indicated as a necessity in the cosmic scheme. The *Ātman* view of the Mystical Unity had to be conceived and worked out just as much as the *Nirvāṇa* view and it was only a question of fact which of the two fell due in the history of Mystical Unity in the sixth century B.C. The point to note is that both views, in the cosmic scheme, were equally guaranteed the chances for recognition and acceptance though they were diametrically opposed to one another. Since neither of them was real or unreal and both were subject equally to the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal, what they could both claim in the name of cosmic justice is only a rise and fall. If the Buddha advocated *Nirvāṇa* as the truth it did not mean that he was necessarily correct and that the Vedantist was wrong—what it meant is that *Nirvāṇa* was fully due in that part of our ancestry and was bound to prevail in the sixth century B.C. And this may be precisely the explanation why the Buddha had no time to go deeper into the problems of life or of Reality and concluded his analysis entirely on the basis of the failure of Vedantism. If by any chance he had gone deeper he would have realised that the failure of *Nirvāṇa* was equally provided for in the years that were to follow.

This is not unnecessary criticism of the Buddha and if I have at all made it in my review of *Nirvāṇa* my main object has been to point out that there was an existing background of positive Reality which made his attempt to solve the problem of suffering at all possible. The Buddha was in duty bound to recognise that, if he was perfectly justified in rejecting the *Ātman* view of that positive reality, in exactly the same way the Vedantist was justified in rejecting his view. If I go further and ask whether there was any Positive in my ancestral background other than the Mystical Unity, the answer will be in the negative. I take the privilege of suggesting that no other Positive was conceivable in my ancestral history. The Mystical Unity stood in it as the Ultimate Reality face to face with individuality, its direct opposite. And so I may be permitted to add that if *Ātman* and *Nirvāṇa* did not solve the problem on behalf of Mystical Unity, that was as it should have been. Exactly the same thing happened to Platonism and Atomism, or to Catholicism and Protestantism, with reference to 'Individuality' and 'Community'. The three schemes of Reality, whether in external or in internal conflict, finally produced the same result—complete confusion.

But I have every reason to take *Nirvāṇa* as a parallel case to my Negation, and I hold that in both cases what stands out is the necessity of a process of negation in the course of the Universe. In technical terms, if suffering had to occur in the Universe, it had also to be put an end to, or in other words, if illusions had to be posited in the Universe they had also to be negated. There are moments when the whole of the energy of the Universe has to be devoted to a negative act, exactly as there are moments when the whole energy has to be spent on a positive act.

The next issue is the issue of thought or categorical experience —an issue which arises like a perennial plant in my scheme. The reason why I have to raise it is simple: I have made the definite suggestion that if the sole function of the Fourth Stage is to negate the illusions of the Third, that negation must take place under the direct guidance of categorical experience. We have to ask whether thought, which is the supreme achievement of the Fourth Stage unaided by 'direct experience' of the common purpose, can achieve the negation of illusion.

The answer is in the affirmative—thought can negate illusion

unaided. The common purpose, whatever it is, has nothing to do with that negation.

To many in the twentieth century this unusual feature of my position might assume the proportion of nothing more robust than what is called technique. Without doubt thought is not and cannot be another name for the Universe. If, still, it is a cosmic phenomenon, its main function is to supply evidence and so it could be called by the name of technique.

But it would be odd if we called the metaphysician by the name of technician; we have at least to call him a master-craftsman to whom is due the reappearance of the concrete Universe after it has lain deep in the matrix of confusion and doubt. Even if the reappearance of the Universe is not exactly creation of the Universe, the logician or metaphysician who is responsible for the reappearance is certainly not a mere technician. The issue is therefore not whether Thought is only technique, but whether its achievement as evidence could be considered to be just as ultimate in importance as the achievement of the Universe itself—the Universe that existed without a beginning, or began in the Primal State of the Discontinuous Universe or started creating in the Second Stage.

Thought is indisputably on a par with the Universe. But for Thought, the Universe would have remained steeped in illusion after it had reached the Third Stage. The species which found its habitat in that Stage would have eternally perished in conflict and risen only to perish again. No historian need demur.

To me at any rate the contribution of thought has been frank and immense. I cannot hold any other view. Indeed, if I have to choose a God in the twentieth century I should unhesitatingly recognise the divinity of Thought. I owe to no other agent or principle the chances I have to-day to live under the shelter of Truth; and if still this frank utterance sounds overdrawn or rhapsodic, I mean it without hesitation.

But nobody in the twentieth century would be in doubt as to how at least the empiricist of our times will react to my claim; and it makes no difference whether his unholy overtures to the logician are taken seriously or not. There has been in recent times too much indifference to Thought to permit a ready, generous assent to my claim from any school. And certainly it would be of

no avail to refer to the classical atomist or his seventeenth-century protégé to improve its prospects.

But could I, as if to redress the balance in my favour, incline towards the rationalist for approval? I have no alignment with Plato or Descartes any more than with the atomist or empiricist. And certainly it would be immaterial if I were assured that those who followed the lead of '*Cogito*' could not entertain any doubt about Thought. And it would be wantonly depreciating the credit of any philosopher who flourished in Europe since Descartes to doubt that he had any basis but the '*Cogito*' to build on. Not even the robust contribution of the German mind could be immune from that supreme European liability called the Cartesian.

The thought which '*Cogito*' sponsored and on which modern Europe is built is not my theme or concern. I do not certainly mean that thought when I ask the question: can thought or the categorical structure negate the Third Stage without any direct experience of the common purpose of the Universe?

Perhaps I ought also to refer to the view familiar in history which classified thought as a 'possibility' with no capacity to bring about or achieve any result. Could this view accept my claim about thought? It is needless to ask the question. It is the 'concrete actual', according to this view, which was frankly opposed to thought and which might possibly negate illusions, if necessary. All shades of empiricism implied it.

Strangely enough, the view in question stands on a whole system of thought and defines the concrete and actual in terms of the changeful Absolute, though not always noticed or admitted: or, to put it in more familiar terms, the concrete and actual is that which is known as matter, or energy, or force—something which is supposed to have indisputable capacity to achieve results or create changes. The Real, in this view, actually is the 'changeful concrete'; and it is the 'concrete real' and not the 'unreal possible' that can be trusted to bring about any change which is truly effective. Thought in this school is possibility—a matter of definition—and not actual, or concrete, reality which is objective and therefore must be incapable of achieving such a result as the total negation of the Third Stage.

It has to be demonstrated, therefore, that thought is not a

'possibility' if sensation is not; that thought has the same right to be actual as sensation is frankly claimed to have; that there is nothing to choose between them from the point of view of validity.

I shall have to give evidence that thought is not what it has been taken to be in the Third Stage any more than sensation is what the opponents of thought have claimed it to be. In other words, I shall have to show that the charge that thought is a 'possibility' applies equally to sensation if we do not judge either of them on the hypothesis of the Third Stage, which is nothing but the Stage of possibility.

The main issue underlying all this controversy, however, is very much deeper than it appears—it directly bears on what is known as the distinction between mind and matter. I have therefore to make a close review of this distinction, since in no other way can I bring out the true nature of thought and its rightful place in the Universe—or, for the matter of that, of sensation. And once the true nature is known one can easily answer the question whether thought can negate illusion unaided by direct experience.

Let me begin the review in the form of a question: why did the distinction between mind and matter arise, if the ultimate issue in all history was one of solving the problem of Reality or the Negative? Is not all enquiry at bottom only an attempt to meet the sceptical challenge, whether in the shape of the Absolute Negative or in what is called Illusion?

Might not one think, even at this late hour, that the Absolute of Parmenides should have been chosen in preference to any other conception of Reality—and be done with the issue of existence? Why did we unnecessarily complicate the solution of the problem of existence by raising such issues as the distinction between mind and matter, or thought and extension and others almost equally ultimate? Are they not with us still outstanding, unsolved and obscure?

On any view of history, the complications arose for a very simple reason. Parmenides was found to be quite wrong in 'boosting' the Absolute (to speak in homely language) as the only Reality, thereby implying that it failed to account for the 'changeful many', which had to be recognised. There was no

chance of solving the issue of existence in the Parmenidean way. Hence the issue arose.

But why did Parmenides or any other thinker like him fall into such a difficult mood when his opponents did not? There must have been a reason for it.

Unfortunately that reason was not known either to Parmenides or to his critics, in spite of its deep, ultimate significance. The reason was that Reality, or Being, was not the Absolute as it was formulated by Parmenides; and it made no difference if his critics tried to preserve it with some modifications which certainly damaged its credit. The Real, or Being, still remained unknown and untraced in its true proportion.

This is an unusual thing to say in the twentieth century but it is true. And no tradition which followed classical thought in good time had occasion either to resume the enquiry afresh or seriously to question the Absolute of Parmenides, whether modified or not. The Universe, however, continued to function: as it had an eternal right to do.

It was exactly because of the injunction, or implication, of this 'right' that sometime or other a Stage had to appear in the course of the Universe in which the Absolute would come into existence as possibility—and that in two forms. These forms, it was ordained, would compete with one another, with the claim that they equally represented the truth when actually they stood as completely illusory. Obviously there was no escape from such a provision, since it descended from an eternal right. The scheme of the Universe is that the objective which it had to cherish means realisation in two forms, frustration and fulfilment. And it is only the Absolute which is a possibility, the 'mad Absolute', as somebody said, which can guarantee frustration.

My suggestion is that it is in the career of the two competing Absolutes of the Third Stage that the precise grounds for the origin of the distinction between mind and matter can be found. These will be evident if we just analyse, for instance, the two schools of humanism—Platonism and Atomism—and their respective schemes of 'class' and 'aggregate' which worked out the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal in their history. Humanism is one of the three competing schemes of history which derived from the 'possibility of the Absolute'.

There can be no question that the 'atom', which perpetually changed, was calculated to produce results—could it possibly change without producing results? The notion of change would be meaningless without that assumption. The 'atom' could by no means be considered as static, or quiescent, or the void—a state in which no results are produced. Its nature is to split itself, as modern technology suggests. Besides, inasmuch as this change does not imply what is called an ideal, or common purpose, but just takes place in an aggregate of atoms (to get rid of the relationship between them which marks the presence of the Unreal in their career) only the atom, it must be supposed, produces results.

Equally one cannot possibly associate such changes, which produce results, with the instances of a class which stand in an order of hierarchy. The class is the Platonic, or Aristotelian, view. If, still, one has to introduce the notion of change in some sense or other, even into the economy of a class, it will not be change of a kind which could produce results. The reason is that the result, in its complete and final form, is already implicit in the class scheme, existing as the Idea, or Form, or Universal. The question here is not one of producing results but of shedding illusions, or removing ignorance, or bridging the gulf between the instance and the ideal: it is only in this way that the instances of a class can reach their true nature, the Idea or Form. The change that was indicated in the class scheme, therefore, had necessarily to be very different from that in the aggregate scheme. In a scheme of Reality which upholds the changeless as the Ultimate Reality, the changeful, unless as the Unreal, must be out of place. Nor would the changeless, or the totality, have any place in a perpetually changing Universe without beginning or end.

May we not argue, then, that the issue of change in the class scheme must be one of thinking and knowing, a function with which we unhesitatingly credit the mind? And would not then the issue in the aggregate scheme, by the same line of argument, be one of production, with which energy, or force, or matter—or any notion allied to them—has been proverbially linked? If the individual in the class scheme is to get rid of illusion to find the Truth which is eternally present, surely he has to discover, and not to create; to find evidence for the Real and not to produce it. And exactly the opposite will happen to the individual in the

aggregate scheme, where he will be not discovering but, instead, creating. Do not these two processes, then, point respectively to the two conceptions of Reality: that which has been familiar as 'mind' and that which has been known as 'matter'?

At any rate, it is this analysis which reveals the origin of the distinction between matter and mind: and naturally also reveals the prospect of solving the issue of the opposition between the two claims, one of which judged Reality in terms of production while the other regarded it as knowledge. I feel that the issue between the actual and the possible, or thought and action, and all other allied issues should recede into the background after this.

Indeed there is nothing to choose between the two hypotheses:

(1) Reality exists as an entity which is eternally changing and producing results—a hypothesis which could not but give rise to the primacy of such notions as energy, force, power and their ontological basis, matter or substance.
(2) Reality exists as an entity which is total and static, which does not have to produce results but provides for a process which negates illusion and therefore is knowing. It is a question of supplying evidence which removes illusion or the mantle of ignorance which covers truth.

But the historian has faithfully given us an account of the drama of conflict between these two primal Absolutes—the Absolute which produces without any hesitation and the Absolute which contemplates with perfect balance or equipoise. And as we in due time took our descent from this primal conflict we had to worship either in the temple of the spirit or in the cavern of the atom, recently christened 'Bomb'. The distinction between mind and matter is by no means a scientific or philosophic creation; it has been rooted deep in the Universe which I have called the Third Stage of the Universe. There have been dual Gods, if we want to put the name of the Absolute in theological terms, within the range of the Third Stage, the stage of tradition and history.

The conclusion from this analysis is that thought, however it may be expected to remove ignorance, cannot negate illusion since it is incapable of producing results—a very strange conclusion. Illusions are positive facts which create conflict and through

conflict produce frustration. How can they be negated by thought, which only produces evidence?

I cannot therefore produce evidence for my thesis that thought, unaided by Reality, can remove illusions if I go by the traditional view of mind and matter. I have to drop my claim, unless this view—which has prevailed in the Third Stage—changes, due to the impact of the triadic pattern of Reality. The issue is therefore one of determining how exactly the Third Stage, with its dichotomy, changes due to the impact of the triadic pattern as it gives way to the Fourth Stage. It is a question whether this impact does in fact produce results to suit my thesis. If by any chance it does, I shall be able to relieve mind and matter of the incompatibility which was imposed on them by the dichotomy of the Third Stage. No other procedure is either possible or necessary.

I shall, therefore, ask whether it is possible that the two constituents—possibility of unity and possibility of individuality—will remain unchanged in the Fourth Stage in spite of the triadic scheme, exactly as they were in the Third? Will the three organisations also, built in the Third Stage as their habitat—the mystical, the humanistic and dualistic—continue to function as they have been doing in spite of the changes in the conception of Reality in the Fourth Stage? Is it possible that the whole of this illusory Third Stage will go on creating conflict and producing frustration of the common purpose in spite of the radical changes in the categorical conception of Reality in the Fourth Stage?

The answer is in the negative. Even if the Third Stage to all appearances still stands upright and fresh, as if nothing had happened to it, in spite of the changes, it is by no means the same, at least in its volume or proportion. It has certainly had to lose its monopoly of the Universe which we call history. A portion has been, as it were, cut out of its huge structure to lay the foundation for the Fourth Stage; and in this portion, at any rate, individuals with a conception of the Universe which replaces altogether the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal cannot but appear. In no sense, indeed, does the constitution of the Third Stage survive in the Fourth. The Fourth is pre-eminently the Stage of non-absolute actuals and equals, the Stage of harmony and co-operation rather than of perpetual conflict leading to frustration as it gradually takes its proper shape. It is the Stage of Truth at its first appearance.

The precise issue at the moment, therefore, is whether the Stage of Truth could retain in its constitution the two main constituents, unity and individuality (and also mind and matter, which were directly allied to them). Can we, in other words, reinterpret unity and individuality so that they may be detached from the dichotomy of the Third Stage and fitted into the scheme of the triadic pattern as it appears in the Fourth Stage?

Without doubt it would be grossly tampering with the three organisations, the only medium of carrying out the basic need of illusion, if we propose to retain them as well. But would exactly the same difficulty arise with, say, the two main constituents, unity and individuality (and mind and matter) if we try to remove their complicity with possibility and illusion? We should certainly not raise any such issue, that of retention, about the dichotomy since it was the root and branch of the age of illusion.

But the historic reason, it has to be noted, why the question of retaining the constituents of the Third Stage in the Fourth arises is that cosmically a change from the Third Stage to the Fourth has fallen due. It is time that the Fourth Stage should be formed since the Third has already reached its first quota of frustration sufficiently to indicate the arrival of the Fourth. And this formation of the Fourth Stage would imply a fresh transformation of the Third, exactly as the formation of the Third Stage was achieved by the transformation of the second state of distinctness of the Second Stage.

What is of immediate importance for us to discuss is how much exactly of the Third Stage will stand this fresh transformation? Will at least the two pairs of notions, unity and individuality, mind and matter, easily bear reinterpretation, so that they may be transferred to the Fourth Stage?

If the dual Non-Absolutes of the Second Stage were transformed into the dual 'possibilities of the Absolute' in the Third Stage, does it not follow that an exactly similar change, though in the reverse order, would have to take place in the 'possibilities' of the Third Stage, to initiate their entry into the Fourth Stage? If the 'possibility of unity' and the 'possibility of individuality' have actually completed their specific function in the Third Stage, what can happen to them after that other than re-transformation into their original form of Non-Absoluteness? The other alternative

is their complete disappearance, which would mean collapse of the Universe itself.

Can either of these grim consequences follow if the fulfilment of the common purpose of the Universe still remains to be worked out? Surely one cannot discriminate between the validity, or necessity, of fulfilment, as a need of the Universe and that of frustration, which is the other cardinal need? If, however, collapse of the Universe is not possible, should the notion of re-transformation itself create any difficulty if the process of transformation did not? If, indeed, no contradiction arose when the Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being in the state of distinctness of the Second Stage changed their form to suit the inauguration of the realm of 'possibilities', why should not they revert to their actual form when the realm of 'possibilities' automatically comes to an end? The Discontinuous Universe, after all, is a Universe of Stages; continuity forms no part of it, if the notion is understood in the traditional sense. On the contrary, the Non-Absolutes, the primal constituents, are expected to pass through as many Stages as conceivable: and the only condition that applies rigorously to the existence of Stages is that no Stage should introduce any entity, or existent, which can conceivably contradict the features of duality, Non-Absoluteness and equality. And the fact is that this condition has been faithfully observed, even in the Third Stage, since it is a Stage in which the 'possibilities of the Absolute', not the actual Absolutes, functioned which alone could bring about that contradiction. Indeed, the only chance for contradiction was neutralised in advance—the Absolute had no part to play since it was impossible for it to exist as an actuality. And the 'possibility of the Absolute', as we know, is incapable of bringing about contradiction since it is only a 'possibility'.

Besides, the Third Stage (since it was a stage of possibility) not only does not imply contradiction of the state of distinctness of the Second; it also re-introduces the features of duality and equality which the Non-Absolutes of the Second Stage eternally implied. The constituents of the Third Stage are dual, namely the 'possibility of unity' and the 'possibility of individuality', and they materialise their equality by the strange process of the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal. What they cannot preserve is the feature of non-absoluteness, as it is inconceivable that 'possibility

of the Absolute' can be non-absolute. Besides, what is needed in this Stage is the frustration of the common purpose, and not a revival of the state of distinctness of the Second Stage which would be powerless to bring about frustration.

There is nothing, therefore, to stand in the way of the reappearance of the Non-Absolutes to form the constituents of the Fourth Stage and the re-transformation of the constituents of the Third Stage.

The question therefore is, how exactly will the re-transformation take place? Can any of the constituents of the Third Stage be retained to serve as constituents of the Fourth, provided we can transform their shape by a fresh interpretation?

We have to note, before we begin this enquiry, that the changes from the Second to the Third Stage, though they were perfectly harmless to the ultimate metaphysical implications of the Universe do not certainly imply that the Universe, in the Third Stage, is still the Universe of the bare duality of non-absolute Being and Non-Being, or that the relationship of opposition between them is only another name for a relationship of conflict. There is no Non-Absolute in the Third Stage; in its place, what appears is the 'possibility of the Absolute' in its two forms. Indeed, as we have seen, it is 'possibility' that constitutes the Third Stage, and not by any means actuality. And if, still, the principle of equality has been preserved, it has been preserved only by the roundabout method by which unity and individuality have alternately been real and unreal.

Evidently the fact of retention of the Third Stage in the Fourth will automatically exclude both the constitution and constituents of the Third Stage as they exactly were. To retain the Third Stage in the Fourth is not to repeat it. The Fourth Stage cannot conceivably under any pretence accommodate such notions as dichotomy, 'possibility', monistic Absolute and pluralistic Absolute.

What it can safely accommodate are the constituents, provided it is possible to dissociate them from their complicity with such notions as 'possibility', absoluteness or dichotomy, by a fresh interpretation. Obviously one cannot reinterpret the 'Absolutes' or 'dichotomy' or 'possibility': it would be absurd to take the Absolute in the sense of the Non-Absolute, or 'possibility' in the sense of 'actuality', except when we are bound hand and foot in illusion—and nobody can conceive of dichotomy in the sense of

real and unreal in terms of absolute equality. All these are strictly forbidden by the Laws of Thought.

But the terms 'unity' and 'individuality' which are associated with the term 'Absolute'—they are understood to mean specifically the two types of the Absolute, monistic and pluralistic—need not be permanently burdened with that interpretation. If unity has to be taken to mean the monistic Absolute or the Mystical Reality in the Third Stage one could still preserve the term 'unity' with some significance even if the notion of monistic Absolute is found to be self-contradictory: and exactly the same prospects could be guaranteed to individuality under similar conditions. I have described both the Absolutes as logically impossible—no record of history has so far attested to their validity—I can therefore retain these two terms for the Fourth Stage provided I can find ways and means of doing so.

Perhaps I shall easily succeed if I go back to my ultimate metaphysical situation. As my readers know, the dual Non-Absolutes, as they came to exist in the Primal Stage, provided for both the conceptions, unity and individuality. Existence of the dual Non-Absolutes here means related duality, which embodies three individuals, two of which are distinct whilst the other represents the state of identicalness. And if we go over to the next stage, the creative, one of its states, the state of identicalness, appears in the form of common purpose, which can only mean unity, whilst the other state appears in the form of distinctness, which can only mean individuality. Between them they provide for both unity and individuality. Here is the original meaning of the two terms —unity and individuality.

Would it not be perfectly legitimate, then, to retain the two terms 'unity' and 'individuality' of the Third Stage for the Fourth, on the ground that the meanings they bore in the Third were altogether illusory? And is there any other way of forming the constituents of the Fourth Stage?

Besides, this transformation does not imply an altogether new interpretation. On the contrary, it is tantamount to a reversion on their part to their original sense. If the fact is that unity and individuality existed in the Primal and Creative Stages of the universe as concrete entities in the state of related duality, it is only right that they should revert to their non-absolute, actual state in its

full significance as soon as the drama of illusion which cost them for a time their original status had been completely played out.

If there is no difficulty, then, in re-transforming unity and individuality into their original forms, what will be the immediate result? Will the Fourth Stage be at once a state where actual, non-absolute and equal individuals are prepared to fulfil the common purpose?

The immediate change will take only the form of a fresh conception of the Universe—a strictly categorical change. The individuals concerned will cease to believe in the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal and will be fully convinced that they are truly actual individuals and both non-absolute and equal—nothing more in the way of change will happen to them. They will not at once be free from the illusions they have been subject to under the influence of the dichotomy—nor will they have direct experience of the common purpose. Such changes cannot take place before they have negated their illusions with the help of the categorical assurance.

The immediate issue for them will therefore be to negate the illusions. It is one thing to be categorically assured about the truth of a conception, quite a different thing to be rid of the habit of working out the illusory conception. This is an issue of action which has to be gone through after the illusory conception has been fully superseded by the true.

I could now discuss the organisation of the Fourth Stage, since it has been found that unity and individuality between them will form its two primary features—its objective and its constituents. There will be no difficulty in forming its constituents with individuals of the Third Stage after they have been re-transformed into their non-absolute form; nor can there be any doubt as to what can be its ideal, or objective—which is frankly unity.

It will be wise, however, to postpone this discussion since I have not yet dealt with the other question, whether mind and matter can also be re-interpreted and fitted into the economy of the Fourth Stage. This was my main problem, as I wanted to discover whether my thesis that thought unaided can negate illusion is capable of being defended against the traditional charge that it is not.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE ISSUE OF MIND AND MATTER

THE issue now is one of finding accommodation for mind and matter in the Fourth Stage—we have to discover where exactly in the constitution of the Fourth Stage mind and matter can legitimately appear, if they appear at all. If in any case they have to change substantially to be accommodated in the Fourth Stage, what will be the form of that change? Can we find a place for them exactly as we have found a place for unity and individuality? Will they yield to fresh interpretation as unity and individuality did?

It is evident to me that we can trace an answer to this question by a close analysis of two well-known categories, experience and existence, with special reference to the relationship between them —it seems that there is no other method which may be equally availing.

The analysis has a dual form. It will formulate the meaning of the two terms: existence and experience—this is the historical analysis—and it will record their significance in a categorical setting.

Obviously existence must mean experience since the non-existent is non-experience: this needs no evidence. That which exists must at least be a centre of experience, if only to escape being confused with the non-existent or the void, which is not a centre of experience on any count. In no sense is the term 'experience' another name for the Absolute Negative, or the non-existent. Just as the terms 'existence' and 'non-existence' are ultimate terms, so equally should be the terms 'experience' and 'non-experience'. It is inconceivable that the existent could be non-experience, the reason being that it is not the Negative.

If the 'absolute differents', for instance, cannot be supposed to exist it is because they fall beyond the range of experience which admits of reference, statement and communication—terms which imply relationship. So also is the ultimate, non-referent and non-distinct phenomenon—sensation—a perfect case in point. If sensation, which is self-absorbed, had not been in a position to be

referred to—the image refers to it—the issue of its existence would not arise. Perhaps this is what Berkeley, the Irish philosopher, meant by *'esse in percipi'*. The idea of existence which excludes experience in any shape or form is meaningless.

To exist, again, is at least to be referred to—a feature which forms the basal condition of existence. Existence implies duality: the Absolute is only a possibility.

If the Universe had been just 'Being' as Parmenides thought it was, there would be no reference to it nor any sense of distinction within itself. It would be totality. The issue, whether it could and would exist would then not arise and nobody would either affirm or deny it. If, however, it was both affirmed and denied, the reason is that both Plato and Democritus, who claimed to be existent beings outside the Absolute, firmly disputed the Parmenidean claim of the isolated Absolute. This is referring to the Absolute. Again, to refer is only to know. The existents which refer to one another do not become identified with one another; they only know each other. The existent may also be referred to as a future event, even as it may be referred to as a past event. Further, events which are simultaneous may mutually refer to one another. Here is implied a fresh theory of knowledge which will be discussed in Chapter Fifteen.

The case of Parmenides to which we have just referred is not, however, the only historical instance of Being. There is another context in which 'Being' appeared as the subject of a categorical proposition—'Being is'. In this case the issue of existence arose with a view to reply to the sceptical position which stood for non-existence. The universal claim was that it is Being, and not Non-Being, that is existent. Can one think that this claim is not an instance of experience? That would be pointless.

But existence and experience are not terms which can by any stretch of imagination be regarded as synonymous; they are distinct human claims which can easily be verified. Even if we vary the form of the issue and introduce the terms 'facts' and 'experience', exactly the same conclusion will have to be drawn. If history, for instance, is a record of facts, it is equally a record of experiences. Evidently facts and experiences cannot live apart, especially in a Universe in which some of the species at least communicate in language. The point is that if fact as such had to

exist, something else also had to if only to refer to it. Existence is dual by nature as I have already said. The minimum form of existence, therefore, must imply at least two mutually referring facts. Most certainly no fact ever did, or could, exist by itself. It is only in an organisation of related individuals that facts, entities and individuals exist or can exist; neither the Absolute nor the solipsist ever existed except in our imagination. And they all exist as centres of experience in so far as they are related and refer to one another.

Perhaps I ought also to repeat that the two Absolutes, one of which produced and created results while the other had no results to create but a totality of results to approach, both equally implied experience. One might easily argue that those who held that the Absolute was changeful believed that it experienced the changes which it had to undergo. Would the changeful Absolute miss the experience for which it was wholly responsible, while others who had nothing to do with those changes had a perfect right and capacity to make a comment on them? Equally, on the same line of argument, could one claim that the changeless Absolute was at least sure that it was changeless? Could we help it? Any doubt on that score would leave no Absolute behind. Indeed, neither what we call mind nor what is claimed to be just matter, whatever their differences, could be supposed to contradict the notion of experience, if we are not propagandists of any school.

It will be perfectly correct to say that, like the term 'existence', which was common ground between all competing schools of thought and practice, the term 'experience' should be equally taken as common ground between them. If either of these terms were inconceivable or impossible, the case for a Universe could not be made—perhaps it was by an oversight that the term 'Being' was taken as the only ground common to the competing schools.

My suggestion is that even while metaphysic appeared in its maiden attempt to establish the category of Being a duality was on the horizon—the duality of existence and experience—though it escaped the notice of the metaphysician: and that René Descartes' '*Cogito*' was the first attempt to make up for that deficiency. Even if we cannot take '*Cogito*' by itself as evidence but only as a long-neglected addition to the classical 'Being', perhaps the pic-

ture of the evidence so far supplied by history will be more complete: and it will be useless to object to such an amendment by questioning it on the ground that Descartes had nothing to say on it. After all, one has to go by the logic of the Cartesian thought and not necessarily by the reports or records, which may or may not coincide with it.

Could we not now utilise this notion of experience as the additional common ground between all types of the existent—the idea that all existents have to be centres of experience? But the issue is by no means closed. A logical issue still remains to be discussed; how could the same entity be both existent and experience at the same time? The solution of this problem has to be postponed till we have discussed the nature of category: the issue that we have to discuss immediately is how the two terms, as we have just interpreted them, stand in a strictly categorical setting?

It is perfectly arguable that, in any ultimate speculation, the moment a case for existence is made by a disproof of the claim for non-existence, a fresh issue arises, the issue of identity. If it is proved beyond doubt, by the establishment of the category of Being, that there is an existent Universe, what follows is the imperative need of recognising its identity. The notion of 'Being' is by no means a synonym for 'existence'. As the primal category which introduces the Positive, it only establishes the fact that there is an existent Universe. What that Universe is still remains to be known. Indeed the sole function of the category of 'Being' is to prove that the sceptic was wrong—that there was no such thing as the Absolute Negative. It is pre-eminently negative in its contribution and can simply give the information that the Universe exists.

But the moment the case for the existent Universe is made, automatically a case for its identity also is made. By the Law of Identity the existent is inconceivable without identity, except in the Primal Stage of the Universe where existence only excludes non-existence. It is just existence. There must be first a necessity for the Universe to disprove the sceptical claim that the Negative is. But if the Universe has to exist and create it must be capable of bearing an identity; that is the direct implication of the Law. Here, then, are two distinct notions: the notion of 'existence' as distinguished from non-existence, namely the Primal State; and

the notion of existence as contrasted with the notion of indeterminateness and the non-void—the Creative Stage (which is the Second Stage of the Universe).

From these notions it is clear that the concrete existent has at least to be non-void and non-indeterminate, on the ground that nothing that exists can help being the opposite of the void. It is here, therefore, at the very inception of reinstating the Universe after doubt, that the notion of that which fills in the void—what we call matter, or substance, or 'stuff'—arose. Equally, since that which exists must necessarily be determinate and distinguishable, the notion of mind (or that which conceives the objective) arose.

The two notions are quite distinct. We have first the notion of that which produces and is substantial, the direct opposite of the void which does not produce and is not substantial: and second the notion of that which provides for distinctness and determinateness and is the opposite of that which is indistinct and indeterminate. The term 'indeterminate' implies opposite objectives, which is another name for the Negative, which is impossible.

Two other comments may be added. The two notions, however distinct, are inseparable. Nothing can exist unless it presupposes both the notions. No entity which exists can contradict them; nor is it necessary that it will be identical with, or similar to, them. It is another question what they will necessarily be, as we shall presently see.

The conclusion therefore follows that the existent Universe, or any entity in it, must presuppose a dual factor or identity: that which is responsible for the fact that the existent Universe is not the void, but its opposite, and therefore is capable of producing results: and that which determines that the Universe should be neither indistinguishable nor indeterminate. The Negative is both void and indeterminate. It is the latter which is eminently capable of fixing the objective, or end, or purpose, of the Universe. Whatever the Universe, or the entity, may be it will not be intelligible if we do not read it in the light of the dual factor.

Incidentally it will be a mistake to define the stone, for instance, as mere 'stuff', or 'matter', which can only move, or produce results, even as it will be quite inaccurate to describe the human being as only 'mind', which can only know. Subject to a long

explanation,[1] I may add here that there never was a stone which had no 'mind' any more than there ever was a human being which could not be called 'substance'. There was only an illusion about them.

But how does this long analysis as to the nature of the existent help us to trace the relevance of mind and matter to the economy of the Fourth Stage? I raised the issue of this relevance after unity and individuality had been found a place in the same economy. Are we now in a position to decide about mind and matter?

It will be wise to repeat that according to my analysis, mind and matter are only categorical presuppositions of experience, and not existent entities. This means that the individual which exists in the Fourth Stage must at least presuppose both mind and matter as a mark of its validity—that is to say it has a right to exist. Unless there had been categorical provision for both the factors, the non-void which produces results and the non-indeterminate which fixes the end or objective, there would be no chance for disproving the sceptical claim—and therefore for establishing the validity of the individual. Even the issue as to whether the Universe exists rather than the Negative would not arise, though the Universe would still continue to exist—only in the form of the sceptical challenge.

The question here is not one of producing or of what is called 'verifying' the individual or the existent. It is one of proving that a claim to exist is valid and not the claim to non-exist. This proof is necessary since the whole of the concrete world has fallen into confusion. Mind and matter, and not the concrete individual, constitute the proof for the existence of the concrete individual. This is called categorical presupposition and needs long analysis to bring out all the implications, especially with reference to the full significance of the notion of individuality. I shall just mention, however, that the individual when fully known will appear under three definite forms: Reality, possibility and necessity. There are three types of the individual: the individual as real, the individual as possible, and the individual as necessary.

It is the 'real individual' which I shall call entity, since it alone conceives the common purpose of the Universe. Neither the

[1] See Chapter 9, page 157.

'possible individual' nor the 'necessary individual' has anything to do with the conception of the common purpose and its fulfilment. Their achievements are quite different. The 'possible individual' frustrates the common purpose by the mechanism of the realm of possibility, conflict and dichotomy—it is quite oblivious of the common purpose which it frustrates. The individual which is 'necessity' removes the uncertainty produced by the frustration and builds up the era of expectation in which 'image' is the guiding principle.

If we use the term 'real' for the first individual, we shall have to use the term categorical for the second two, which in turn will have to be called by the dual name: the 'possible', or the Negative, and the 'necessary', or the Positive.

Obviously we deal in the Fourth Stage with the individual which is neither real nor a possibility but necessity; and the conclusion from my main thesis is that mind and matter stand to this individual as its categorical presupposition and not by any chance as its constituents—and that means only that no individual in the Fourth Stage could be defined as non-mental or non-material.

This is my view of the issue of mind and matter, though by no means in its final form. As I proceed, I shall elaborate the precise implication of the notion of categorical presupposition. It is not a simple issue and this is my first attempt to formulate it.

But even this is unusual enough after long epochs of speculation. And if I record it at all at this stage I do so for one simple reason—it is sufficient evidence that mind and matter can be assimilated into the Fourth Stage, though it may not be in the way in which unity and individuality were assimilated.

A question may still be raised, however,—is the stone, for instance—which certainly exists in some sense or other—to be regarded as a composite, or joint product of the dual factor, mind and matter? Could it preserve its uniqueness which it cannot afford to lose if it has to be composite? It does not seem conceivable that the stone could be, as it were, the handiwork of mind and matter and yet remain a strictly unique individual.

But why should one presume that the stone could exist only as a product, or composite, if it must exist? The presumption would arise on the hypothesis that mind and matter are the determining or constituting factors of the stone, or of any entity which

exists. There will be no way of avoiding it if the hypothesis is due or true.

The issue is therefore whether precisely this hypothesis is meant when I definitely hold that the dual factors, matter and mind, are the categorical presupposition of the stone, or of any other entity which exists, like the stone, presumably as individuals.

I do not mean this: what I do mean is that no stone, or human being, or any entity which claims to exist as concrete individual, could come out of the range of the confusion into which it periodically falls if the metaphysician did not prove to the full satisfaction of the sceptic that it is existence and not non-existence that is conceivable. In other words the case for the Negative has to be completely neutralised. This is the only method by which the concrete entity which has fallen into confusion can be taken out of it. To come out of confusion, however, is not to be created or produced. It is only to undergo a change of state. It is to lose the state in which the concrete is in abeyance. And this change is brought about by the categories which supply the proof. Can mind and matter, which do not exist but which supply the proof, constitute the concrete? Can the stone which is in abeyance be constituted by them?

I may add, by the way, that this familiar contribution by the metaphysician does not mean that existence is also thereby proved to be an entity which exists, and therefore is concrete. Existence cannot exist, since it is a category. Conceivability, which alone establishes the category, does not create the actual or the concrete. The concrete or the entity is eternal. What conceivability does create is the negation of the view that the concrete has no claim to existence—the view formulated by the sceptic. What is more, after this negation whatever can be, or is, concrete forthwith earns the right to exist. The concrete, though it is eternal, may be in abeyance.

Existence, or any other category, is therefore only a medium of evidence, or proof, which testifies to the validity of a claim to existence on the part of an entity. It would be impossible to claim that there is such a thing as Reality in any shape or form if we had not the direct benefit of the categories. Without doubt they supply only evidence, or proof, and do not produce anything concrete, nor are they concrete in themselves: but this assurance, before the

direct experience of the concrete entity, is a *sine qua non* of that experience. To me this is one of the ultimate issues and will be known in my following analyses as the issue of knowledge and Reality.

The position that mind and matter do not constitute any entity, or the concrete, however, but serve them only as categorical presuppositions, though perfectly simple and straight-forward is unusual and unfamiliar. It implies at least a number of issues, principally that of thought both in its negative and its positive forms. Thought therefore has to be discussed, not merely for throwing more light on my present thesis but also for my main proposition that thought alone can remove illusions, unaided by any direct experience of Reality.

It is necessary now, therefore, that I should review as fully as possible the whole question of the origin of thought, and as that will imply, among other issues, an account of scepticism and its antecedents I shall discuss that account as a preliminary to my main enquiry. Some of my comments in the course of this long analysis will have to be repeated as the angle of analysis changes. Thought, in my scheme, happens to be the prime mover of the Universe as it appears in the Fourth Stage, and as my view stands remote both from the classical and the contemporary outlook on thought, my account cannot be too careful, or too circumspect, in exploring every avenue that leads to it.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

ORIGIN OF THOUGHT

It is familiar history that scepticism in at least the realm of thought has played a very conspicuous part. It has appeared in human history when the whole range of dogmatism at intervals entered the phase of confusion. The sceptical conclusion has been that Reality is not, and the negative is. It would be pointless to question the significance of either the prelude to scepticism or the assertion of the claim itself. At least two facts stand out in our history: the Universe has periodically appeared in a state of paralysis which made statement and action impossible; and this state was invariably followed by the sceptical claim.

Both facts, however, as it is apparent, are subject to periodic occurrence. There is nothing permanent about them. If they come into existence, they also go out of existence. If, indeed, the Universe had chosen to perpetuate the state of paralysis, there would have been no '*Cogito*' and neither a negative nor a positive metaphysic; which was impossible. Soon, however, the sceptic appeared on the scene with the claim that the state of paralysis was the result of a very simple event: the rival evidence supplied for Reality by the competing schools of dogmatism held nothing between which one could choose—there was no evidence for the Positive, there was evidence only for the Negative. This is the only interpretation of scepticism in human history.

The sceptic's hypothesis in essence is that the chances for the existence of the Universe rose and fell with the evidence for and against it—as if the issue of existence was an issue only of evidence. The Universe, whether it were an eternally existing Reality or resulted from creation, or emanation, or diminution, in every case had to produce evidence to testify to his claim for existence. This was the sceptic's demand. The immaculate eternity of the Universe made no difference to him if by any chance the evidences for it were lacking. One might almost say that the sceptic was deputising for the Laws of Thought.

Technically, a distinction is drawn between truth and evidence

which is but a technique of finding truth, and in this distinction it is the technique which is deliberately considered to be of paramount importance. If, still, it is the Universe in which this drama has to be played—there is no alternative—it looks strange that the Universe does not even hesitate to submit to man in that drama.

But what does this cosmic drama mean? Does it add to the credit or glory of the Universe? If the Universe, on any showing, is eternally immaculate, where does the need of evidence come in its course, however long? Why should it have to stand at the bar of the human species and bear witness even to its claim to existence? Does it not imply that a mere technique, whose only function is to find evidence for Truth—obligation or duty it may be—claimed to supersede Truth? And is this not the familiar charge which all mystics brought against the rationalist?

There is, or can be, no answer to this if we still hold that the Eternal Universe is also the Absolute: we cannot possibly account for the fact that human judgment could be in a position to challenge the Universe if we have to accept that the Absolute is the heart and soul of the Universe. Indeed there would be no sceptic in the Universe of the Absolute—nor an elaborate state of conflict in its course which could precipitate only confusion and doubt. Nor would there be any chance for the negative in such a Universe—there could be only room for uninterrupted flow of self-enjoyment which Parmenides might have legitimately claimed for his 'real Absolute'.

But the fact is that the category in its primal, negative form did arise, sponsored by the sceptic, every time conflict ended in confusion and doubt. The Positive was completely and absolutely challenged. These are verifiable facts of history. The claim was made ruthlessly that there is no Universe; and if by any chance the alternative to the Absolute was the Evil God, the sceptic would have prevailed for ever and ever. The category in its primal form would have raised an eternal bonfire of the Positive.

But there was no such bonfire since the alternative to the Absolute was not the Evil God. The primal category was but an interlude and not by any means the major theme—that honour was left for the category which followed the Negative to present. And in that major theme all the story which seemed to discredit

Truth—and the Universe—by making evidence supreme boldly put on a meaning which neither the Absolute nor the Evil God could possibly resist. That meaning even made the Universe look truly sane for the first time in our history. Here was sudden, colossal change.

The account I have just given is historically verifiable, but it does not coincide with the outstanding claim that the Universe is another name for the Absolute. Neither scepticism, which is negative thought, nor the assertion of the primal 'Being', which is positive thought, can have any legitimate place within the range of the Universe if it is Absolute. What, then, is at the root of the cosmic misdemeanour which occurred when the sceptic demanded evidence? What, again, is at the bottom of the periodic confusion into which the Universe has fallen in spite of its being regarded as Absolute? For answer, I have to go back to the review of thought, and this review will analyse two issues: the issue of the origin of thought with its two forms, the Negative and the Positive; and the meaning of the term 'category' which constitutes thought.

It may be permissible to explain, before I begin this enquiry, why I revert to the analysis of thought time after time. It is because the position I am holding on the nature of thought is far too original, and central, to be exhausted by mere analysis or review. If I have put thought in the Fourth Stage of the Universe as the prime mover, and the sole guarantor, of Truth I shall never know if I have done justice to it. We are dealing here with the prime mover of a whole Stage of the Universe. At times I feel I am not just writing a book; what indeed I am recording I do not know. But ever since I came to this most unusual position it has been my anxiety to make it as clear to my contemporaries as it is to me. Shall I ever succeed?

Thought, in my scheme, is not a feature of the Primal Stage of the Universe, nor is it a constituent of the Creative Stage which follows. It is, indeed, a very late appearance. But when it actually enters the Universe, the Third Stage has already reached the first phase of frustration.

Let me repeat the history of the origin of thought.

If the reader refers to the conflict which the Third Stage raised between its three organisations and notes that the normal end of this conflict was complete frustration of the values which the

conflict involved, it will be seen that thought for the first time entered into the economy of the Universe in the Third Stage, after frustration appeared.

Evidently the values which were involved in the conflict were concrete and claimed to be absolute and actual. They were not categories, with which alone thought deals. In fact, the main issues were raised between the two claims about the Real: unity and individuality. It is these two claims, or the conceptions they implied, which have been taken to be the only form in which Reality is supposed to exist in the Third Stage. They certainly have not been taken as categories, or possibilities, or abstractions. How, then, could there be thought before frustration arrived?

But what happened when the concrete values in their ultimate proportion reached the stage of frustration? Did they still survive? Could the conflict still continue? In other words could the state of confusion which frustration meant—the state of *impasse* or complete paralysis of activity—leave in the Universe any room except for the Negative and the Void? Without a doubt no value was left functioning, so no decision could be taken on the basis of a value as to how to find the way out of the *impasse*. What did happen, then?

What actually happened was the sudden appearance of the sceptic. His claim was that it is the Negative, and not the Positive, that is. In other words, the Negative in its absolute form entered the economy of the Universe for the first time at this point. The sceptic's position was that, since there is nothing to choose between the evidences in support of the competing values in the conflict, there is no case for the Positive. Consequently, the case for the Negative arises. The Positive, it has to be repeated, was not considered to be even a possibility.

There can be no question about the historicity of the sceptical claim. At any rate, the advocates of the competing values had nothing to say since they had completely lost all the concrete or positive values. The Universe of the Third Stage at the moment was bereft of all values ever conceived. The competing sides in the conflict had only the negative state to fall back upon. There was no choice before them except what the sceptic recommended: the void seemed to be the only prospect left. This was the historical position, obviously; it was also the logical situation, since the

Negative was perfectly conceivable. Even if it was bound to turn out soon to be impossible as concrete fact, for a moment at least it could stand as the only alternative. And so it stood, and nobody could disagree.

This historic stand by the sceptic for the Negative is another name for thought. Here is an experience which never appeared before while the incessant conflict between the positive values was raging. There was no sign or trace of an experience of possibility before the moment of frustration was reached. It was the sceptic who for the first time introduced possibility as human experience into the economy of the Third Stage as he duly arrived after frustration came on the scene.

Once introduced, its reality could not be questioned either historically or logically. Besides, since it actually appeared it was necessarily conceivable: and certainly it cannot be identified either with the 'concrete actual' or with the 'absolute Negative', both of which appeared in the scheme of history.

But what happened after the sceptic, the protagonist of the Negative, had stood for the possibility of the Negative? What did thought achieve in its primal negative appearance? Did the competing advocates of values in a state of confusion accept the sceptical alternative? Evidently there was no other way out—they had to. The state of inactivity to which they were reduced by confusion and impasse could not continue for ever. That which does not function must die: this is the law of the Universe. Did not the sceptic's alternative mean exactly that? And was there any other alternative which the dogmatists could claim when they had lost all that they ever professed? It seemed inevitable that the case was for a normal, natural passage into a state of extinction if nothing else intervened.

But it so happened that the passage into that state did not materialise. However intelligible as possibility, the Negative proved to be impossible as fact, since, in its attempt at materialisation, it contradicted itself. Here was a demise of the sceptic: and so inevitably extinction of the values did not take place. What took place was immediate restoration of faith and assurance in the validity of the Positive as distinguished from the Negative. Thought took on a new phase: it advocated the necessity of the Positive and, with the 'possibility of the Negative' turning out to

be impossible, the Positive turned out to be 'necessity'. Here is the second phase of thought where it deals with necessity. And in both cases it deals with categories which do not exist. The conclusion is, 'Being is and Non-Being is not' in the place of 'Non-Being is and Being is not' as was held when scepticism prevailed.

But what happened, again, after the sceptic had gone and faith was restored? Did the whole Universe, as it still lay deep in confusion, come out into the open at once?

It is difficult to answer the question if we want historical records to verify it at every turn—in any case I do not claim the competence as an historian to offer an adequate answer. But it is certainly possible to argue that Being is at once the first and last category after the Negative that the ancients ever considered. The issue, after 'Being', was no doubt one of defining 'Being', and the term used for that defininition as far as I know was the 'Absolute'. My contention is that the term 'Absolute', in spite of the controversies which hedged it round, was not taken as a category. If anything, it was taken to be the Ultimate Reality—at least that is how I find the records testify. I need not refer to any other term used side by side with 'Absolute' which was necessarily less ultimate. All the terms used connoted Reality, whether ultimate or dependent; none of them was a category which does not exist. Thought, therefore, did not function in classical history after it introduced the Positive in the shape of 'Being'. There was an immediate return to the old values of tradition which had led to confusion and scepticism. These values were 'possibilities', as our readers know, but they were considered to be 'actual realities'.

Let me suggest one or two illustrations bearing on the point from my own ancestry.

The 'Being', or the Positive, after it had excluded the Negative or Non-Being came to be defined in my ancestry as Mystical Unity. This is the nearest, I think, to what Parmenides much later in Greek history, suggested to the humanist as the form of Ultimate Reality. I am positive that no Hindu of any merit would call it a category any more than Parmenides did. The same comment will apply unreservedly to the two opposed interpretations attached to it—*Ātman* and *Nirvāna*. They certainly are not categories. And if I mention the supreme classic figure, Sri Krishna, of the गीता *Gitā*, it would be lunacy to pretend that Sri Krishna was only the

name of a category. The Hindus never even dreamt of worshipping a category—they might have raised a historical being to the esoteric status of a God, though keeping it at a safe distance from Mystical Unity. Incidentally, it may also be said that they never brought down the Mystical Unity to the realm of the profane, or called it divine.

Nor would it be at all correct to describe the myriad gods and goddesses in the Hindu Pantheon, or the पुराण *Purānas*, as nothing but categories. They should legitimately be called symbols or images, on which the Hindu concentrates to break through the veil of Illusion and reach the Mystical Unity; the realm of the image is, by all the records, one by itself to the Hindu.

I need not refer to any other authority. The point is that if we go by the classical history of our species, the categorical enquiry which began with the establishment of the Positive after the demise of the sceptic suddenly stopped. The enquiry was not continued: instead the Universe went back to its ancient form and began to function as it had done before it fell into confusion—as if nothing had happened to it. The categorical proposition 'Being is' never was fully stated. It was at once swamped by the dead weight of the Absolute.

This is in the main a logical conclusion; and the facts which have led me to this conclusion are precisely two: I have not come across in the records a third category after Being and Non-Being apart from the third category of my ancestry which is on the same level as Being and Non-Being. Nor have I noted in the records any radical variation in the manner in which the Universe Process has functioned throughout our long history. It has been invariably a drama of conflict and the scene set for it has held three ultimate organisations in which unity and individuality played the leading parts. The theme of this drama was to produce the final result of a clash between Mystical Unity, 'Individuality' and 'Community'—that of complete frustration. Each time the drama reached its fifth act of utter confusion an interval followed. It took the form of an epilogue in which a review was made with the conclusion that man had at least the choice of leaving the Universe for good. There was instantly a pilgrimage for freedom in the void, but it ended in paradise!

I could not think of a more graphic or vivid picture of the

interlude of scepticism between the moment of frustration in human history and the moment of return to faith for reconstruction. Far be it from me to minimise its significance, perhaps nothing ever happened to man which could so mortally wound his dignity as this interlude. It seemed at the time that nothing of him would be left, not even his bones that could be buried. Indeed, the shock was so immense that man had to reach the state of anticlimax and recover his balance at once. Faith returned as quickly as it left. The interlude was like a bad dream quickly forgotten. The work of reconstruction began and in exactly the same style and rhythm as before. The void did not materialise—we know the logical reason.

But where now was thought, which made the return of faith and balance possible? Did it still continue, so that the faith might endure and the work of reconstruction have the chance of realising its function? Was the category of Being followed by other categories to complete the assurance?

There was no thought, since man returned to rebuild the Universe at once without waiting for further assurance. After the assurance came that Being, or the Positive, is, not only was there no Negative but also no thought, which did not deal with the concrete but only a category.

A question however at once arises which in its full bearing is both technical and historical. Could man do without complete assurance from thought if he must needs have assurance from thought? Was there anything else to serve him as the source of assurance after frustration had overwhelmed him? If thought was the only means by which he could get back to his positive life could he possibly do without complete assurance, and the whole system of categories which constitute that assurance? This is the technical issue.

The historical issue is why man chose to leave thought and turn to the concrete, or the Real, again after thought had given him only his primal assurance by the category of 'Being'. Why did he choose to build his home again with the Absolute, which had led him to complete frustration of values?

Here is an obvious discrepancy, and the reason for it may be for the moment left open. What can be pointed out is that the records clearly show that man had to pay heavily for this discre-

pancy in procedure. Every time the choice was made to forego complete assurance by thought, he had to face in the end the same grim experience of complete frustration. By the records, at least, cycle after cycle followed in which the drama of rise and fall repeated itself. Still there must be a reason.

But again another question arises: what shall we do with this complete assurance by thought when it comes embodied in nothing but a system of categories? Without doubt a category is a source of assurance and unless we have such assurance there is no chance for us to return to the Positive, and the concrete, in their true form where alone we conceive objectives and fulfil them: but what can we do with just a bare system of categories? Does not a dilemma then arise? On the one hand we have to have assurance by categories to escape the nemesis of the void; on the other, this life of assurance does not promise us the concrete and the Positive at once. What, indeed, is the value of mere assurance if there is no sign in it, for instance, of the God we want to worship, or of the ideal beauty we want to adore? Do we have the chance even of the moderate mode of living which our statesmen have been always trying—and failing—to build for us?

Whether I can give an answer to this question which may at once satisfy my contemporaries, or not, it is certain that there is no other way out. We have to have a state of existence where we have to depend wholly upon bare assurance about Reality. The alternative is the stillness of the void. There is no other answer to the question, if answer it I must.

But assurance by thought certainly is not only an empty issue of escaping the void; on the contrary, if it is a bulwark against stark-eyed death—the Negative—it is also the only means of negating the illusions which precipitate the frustration of values. If, indeed, we are still in the throes of illusion we have to negate them; and it is the categorical structure of Reality that alone can serve as a guide to our efforts to negate them. It is only when we have actually achieved that end that we shall be in direct contact with Reality; and this will be preceded by the Image which will serve as a prelude to it. There is no alternative.

Does this not then add to the credit of thought, and to the categories, which bring indisputable assurance to man—this negation by thought? Could we expect direct contact with the Real

when we are still overrun by illusions which have led to the frustration of all that we ever followed? Have we ever been free from them? Have they not time after time made us run after the will-o'-the-wisp only to meet the dread of the void?

The conclusion of my case for thought is that there is no valid ground for objecting to it or to the state of assurance that it introduces. It may at this point, while I am still engaged in the history of the origin of thought, be both legitimate and useful if I refer to a discussion of the notion of possibility. The reason is obvious.

I shall refer back to *The Real and the Negative*. The notion of possibility is one of the earliest of two notions—co-existence of the Positive and the Negative, and the possibility of both—which laid the foundation of Reality in my scheme as I saw it in 1937. The point that I made was that, since the possibility of the Negative was conceivable—I discussed possibility to start with in terms of the phrase 'possibility of the Negative'—it had a logical right to be existent provided there was no valid obstacle.

The Laws of Thought do not imply, or assert, that nothing can exist without an identity. All that they imply is that if anything exists with an identity, that identity must not be contradictory—'A' can be 'A' or 'Not-A' but it cannot be both. The Laws apply if the identity exists. The possibility of the Negative, therefore, can easily exist, though not with an identity. It can have only the logical right to put forth effort to develop identity and be actual, which may or may not succeed. This right we have seen did not materialise: the possibility of the Negative did not become actual—a fact with an identity. This was as far as I saw in 1939. The possibility of the Negative was neutralised by the possibility of the Positive: the two possibilities neutralised each other.

It is only necessary to modify my account in *The Real and the Negative* by one fresh suggestion: there can only be two instances of possibility altogether, the possibility of unity and the possibility of individuality. In both cases the logical right to be actual by putting forth effort was foredoomed to failure. There was no alternative.

As a possibility again, in the nature of things, can have only a prospective identity, it cannot come into existence with the knowledge that it is, after all, a possibility. It is bound to remain ignor-

ant of what it actually is. What, instead, it will be conscious of being is another question.

The reason why it lacks self-knowledge is not only that it has no actual identity, but that it would cease otherwise to be an effort to realise its prospective identity, which it cannot afford to be without. It is one thing to be non-existent, a different thing to be just ignorant of one's own self.

It is easy to see that a possibility with the clear knowledge that its efforts as possibility will necessarily fail to develop identity cannot be expected to put forth effort. Such a possibility cannot even be conceived of. It would not exist at all. Since, however, the fact is that it has actually been conceived, the question whether it can have self-knowledge does not arise. Both the possibilities, whether of unity or of individuality, therefore must necessarily exist, though without the awareness that they are just possibilities and cannot have an identity which could materialise.

What, then, can be the actual form in which the possibility will exist? Will it not in any case stand at least as an experience in order to exist at all? And will that not mean that it is bound to feel certain that it is actual with an identity of its own; and so is fully entitled to fulfil its objective whatever that may be?

Is there an alternative for this unless we think that a possibility does not exist? Will any history allow us to do that? The possibility of unity, for instance, as a matter of history gave rise to the Hindu group organisation. In this the Mystical Unity served as the ideal goal, while the multiple, which was neither Being nor Non-Being, aimed, by suitable effort, at absorption in the Unity or to reach the state of *Nirvāna*. On the other hand, the possibility of individuality gave rise to the humanistic organisation, in which individuality was the ideal goal which the unreal or changeful multiple sought hard to realise.

But what indeed has been the final result in either case? The result has been that in both cases the organisations failed to materialise their objectives; that is exactly what was expected to happen since they are organisations based on the possibility of unity and the possibility of individuality. Can we deny after this that possibility did exist?

This account of the notion of possibility, by the way, is my own account. It has no connection whatever with what possibility

has been taken to mean in tradition. But can we not trace the origin of the notion of illusion which has played such a conspicuous part in my ancestral history to it?

Is it not possible to describe the actual state of the 'possibility of unity', for instance, as it exists by the well-known term 'illusion'. Can we find even a trace of belief in it that it is or can be a 'possibility'? If it has to have a distinct experience, which testifies as well to its identity as to its objective, and if that experience definitely is that it is actual in every way (when it is, truly speaking, a 'possibility') are we not justified in calling it an existent which is steeped in illusion?

Here is the origin of the notion of illusion in our history. I hope I have given some idea as to its logical status and shall not have to find a defence for it in terms of figure and metaphor. We can, it seems to me, trace it easily to the category of 'possibility', which is firmly entrenched in the cosmic scheme. If my predecessors missed this interpretation, it was wholly because they did not get past the range of the 'possibility of the Absolute'.

But now a very serious question arises about the illusions: can it be held that the illusions by themselves can persist even though the conflict which they precipitate ends in complete frustration of values? Is that possible?

Clearly, in a state of complete frustration of values nothing positive survives which can function as value—call frustration by whatever name one likes, confusion or state of contrariety or doubt. But it is a state which should properly be called the state of abeyance, the negative state: the values in it do not become extinct but they remain as totally inoperative. No doubt they are liable to complete extinction if they are actually contradicted, but so far that has never taken place in history. Besides, the sceptic failed to by-pass their claim to existence, since he could not establish the Negative. So in the end the values remained in a state of abeyance, totally inoperative. And the fact is that as soon as the Positive returned, after the assurance rising from the necessity of Being, the values and the illusions began their career again.

It is perfectly arguable, therefore, that in at least this specific sense the illusions have been persisting throughout our history. They have come and gone for unlimited cycles—the possibility of their recurrence has never disappeared, and there will certainly

be no change in the career of illusion before 'possibility' is fully and completely neutralised by Truth—I have referred to this already.

The fact of history obviously is that none of the three organisations accepted either a defeat or confusion as final. The fight either revived after a time—here is the issue of simple contradiction, or what is known as rise and fall (how many revivals have, for instance, taken place in the career of Hinduism up to to-day) —or confusion gave place to full faith and assurance. One can easily trace the rhythm of failure in the course of all civilisation; nobody need try to find out from any record whether conflict was fought to a finish, or a value done to death for ever. But at times claims in stentorian tones were heard that a specific fight, with peculiarly deadly weapons or beliefs, would put an end to conflict for ever, so that a specific 'peace' would be established in the whole Universe, which no Universe in the future would find it possible to get rid of. Indeed, nothing more substantial will be found than a human claim that illusions can be destroyed, which claim sooner or later met its own refutal in the very creed it professed.

The possibility of revival will still persist, and it follows that it will have to be neutralised if we want the Positive to prevail in its true form. This is exactly what Thought, with its complete assurance, can achieve. Only a system of categories, which alone can embody this assurance, is in a position to negate the illusions. When that system has appeared, persistence of illusion will be a thing of the past. In no other way could this happen.

But it may still be argued: could one possibly hand over to thought, and the categories, the function of removing our illusions and making us at least clean and free to receive the light of Truth? I need not refer to the modern school of speculation which has no room for thought in any scheme of the Universe. Perhaps the point at issue arose with them not on the validity of thought so much as on what was believed to be thought in history. It was in any case a domestic conflict, since sensation, like thought, accepted the same basic hypotheses—the Universe of history. Both schools had to believe in the Absolute, though in opposite forms. I have discussed their standpoint in *Related Multiplicity* and found it to be just an episode, about which history never had any scruple.

The issue that I am raising is different: can thought, which is a system of categories, deal with such a potent force in the Universe as illusion without any aid from the concrete and complete Reality? This question I have already raised in another context. It is permissible to raise it again since it is so unusual and completely unorthodox. Can we live and function at all if we have no direct experience of the concrete and complete Reality? Are we expected in that state to negate illusion, the source of all that we want to avoid? If we have nothing to do with the true life of worship or beauty, or any value which fulfils our deepest desire, is it possible that we shall, and can, rest content with the mere assurance that they exist? Can the concrete and complete Reality be in abeyance if the assurance about it has finally arrived? And if it must exist as fully real, to exist at all, could we by-pass it if only for the sake of tasting the assurance about it? How could any mind help wanting the God to worship at once, provided that he had every evidence that the God truly exists?

But the fact is that even if we have full and complete assurance from thought that God is, we shall still fail completely to come into direct contact with God if we have not rid ourselves of our illusions. Nobody ever held that one could be in illusion and yet see God. What is the point of being in illusion then? But if we are in illusion we shall be necessarily prone to worship the false gods —even God's grace can be of no avail. Assurance by itself, however strong and clear, will not create in us the God-hunger, so to speak. No miracle will give us the sight to see the true God if we have not cleansed ourselves of illusion. This is the meaning of 'purification', whether by Grace or by austerity. The illusions have to be removed and the process that will bring it about is in addition to thought (which only produces assurance); this process is action which follows thought but which negates or 'abstains from' illusion. We abstain from illusion after we have had the assurance about Reality from thought.

The issue is therefore not whether we can produce the direct experience of God by mere categorical assurance about divinity— we cannot. But certainly it is the categorical assurance, and not God or direct experience of God, that is expected to remove illusion.

If illusion, again, appeared in the Universe in spite of the fact

that the true God, in whatever sense we use the term, never was absent, the issue of removing illusion need not be an issue of Divine co-operation. That issue must be frankly and absolutely an issue for man to resolve, the issue of categorical assurance. It is Truth or ज्ञान *Jñāna* that is expected normally to remove illusion. If illusion had to be in the Universe in which the true God rules, the same Universe was in duty bound to make room for Truth to remove it. Truth is not another name for Divinity; it is assurance about Divinity. And all this will be perfectly consistent and valid if we do not confuse the true God with the false God of tradition. If we do not forget that we are dealing with the Universe of the dual Non-Absolute, and not of the Absolute (in its two forms), there will be no occasion for us to avoid the Fourth Stage where negation of illusion takes place. We shall see that the phase of austerity is a necessary cathartic in our career, and not before we have gone through it could we be even pure in spirit to receive the Grace of the true God.

In other words, the true God is not the God of tradition, who was supposed to be capable of achieving any result. If there really was such a God in existence—I mean, the God of tradition—it would have been superfluous to introduce the necessity for negation of illusion by Truth or thought. The God of tradition, as the Absolute, could easily make any process in the Universe unnecessary and redundant, provided He wanted to intervene Himself to bring about relief in any situation. Indeed, it is this implication which one could easily read into the Christian conception of Grace and forgiveness, and perhaps also of crucifixion. The Christian God, as He was Almighty, could take into His own hands the administration of the Universe in detail and suspend even the moral obligation of man—which the law of कर्म *karma* in the Hindu scheme would not. This is by no means a defence of *karma*, however, or a criticism of Grace, or crucifixion. Once the conception of Divinity, or Mystical Unity, in the shape of the Absolute formed the basis of a scheme, the issue of interference or non-interference with Law in the Universe was bound to arise. But if that whole conception of Reality is indisputably found to be illusory, no God will be left behind either to interrupt or to expedite any process in the Universe of Stages. Each Stage, whether constituted by the 'possibles' or the 'actuals', will work out

its economy in its own way to achieve a definite and specific purpose. What, therefore, direct experience of Reality could entail as an achievement is bound to be altogether different from the negation of illusion which falls to the share of Truth, or thought, which deals with the categories. This achievement would be fulfilment of the common purpose of the Universe, which implies the negation of illusion by thought as a prelude or preliminary necessity.

The period of austerity in the Fourth Stage therefore cannot be avoided. If thought alone brings complete assurance about Reality by a system of categories, that assurance ought to be sufficient for guiding and controlling the period of austerity. In fact it will not be possible to avoid it. To be logically assured that the three conceptions of Reality, the mystical, the humanistic and the dualistic, were completely illusory and appeared on the scene for the sole purpose of achieving frustration of the common purpose of the Universe is to be necessarily withdrawn from the orthodox procedure with reference to them. The issue no longer is one of being persuaded but that of being compelled to see that there is no alternative to negating them. If we have persistently acted to realise them, in spite of repeated failures, since the beginning of history, it will be necessary now to abstain altogether from realising them. The period of austerity will intervene, not as a matter of choice but of absolute necessity. This is what I mean by negating illusion.

I have now reviewed the whole history of thought and can in conclusion repeat that scepticism could not arise in the Third Stage before the stage of frustration was reached, and that it could not in any sense form the Fourth Stage. The sceptic belongs to the Third Stage, exactly as the dogmatist does. He is as deeply involved in illusion as the dogmatist is; and if there is a difference between them, the difference is that, while the dogmatist believes in the Positive, the sceptic believes in the Negative. Both sides are identified with the Third Stage and both reach in the end virtually the same result—either confusion or self-contradiction. Neither of them has any idea that what they hold to be Positive and Negative respectively are equally 'possibilities' and have nothing to do with the actual Reality.

The account I have given of thought takes us right back to its

initial stage where it followed the demise of the sceptic and the discovery that scepticism produced the same Dead Sea fruit as dogmatism. This account is definite evidence that the Universe did not follow the sceptic to the grave where he was buried with the Negative. If the Negative could not be, the Positive had to be —so ran the cosmic writ.

I have now to complete the account of thought by tracing its full status; and this means that I have to trace the whole of the categorical structure which the initial stage, marked so well by the category of Being, indicated. Here is the first appearance of the Positive, which is to be distinguished as well from the Negative of the sceptic as from the Positive of the dogmatist. It will serve as the beginning of the enquiry which will discuss the complete form of Thought, which has been invariably missed by the dogmatist of the Third Stage.

I am entering now the heart of my enquiry. The issues will change again—I mean that we shall no longer be comparing or contrasting the Fourth with the Third stage of the Universe, We shall, instead, be looking forward to the Fifth Stage where the Universe is expected to reach its fulfilment.

The immediate issue now will centre round the notion of the Positive. I have noted already that the Positive of the Third Stage is no longer of any use whatsoever. It has perished in the vacuum of confusion which marked the frustration of the Third Stage. What Positive, then, has to take its place in the Fourth Stage? If there has to be a Positive—the Positive of the Third Stage is now a thing of the past—can the Positive of the Fourth Stage be the concrete and complete Reality, which certainly must be Positive? Or can we not conceive of quite another Positive, which can be distinguished from the concrete and complete Reality as well as from the illusory Positive which has disappeared in the bonfire of the Third Stage?

We can: and that Positive is the categorical Positive.

The question now is, what do we mean by the categorical Positive? What does it achieve? Does it at once replace the illusory Positive, which claimed to represent Reality and failed to establish that claim by the true form of the Positive?

The answer is in the negative. The replacement of the illusory Positive cannot take place until the assurance about the true

Positive has been completely restored. This is a very important issue. The fact is that there has been a complete lack of this assurance about the true, or concrete Positive in the whole of the latter part of the Third Stage, and there could be no change in this state of uncertainty—even after scepticism died a natural death—until the categorical Positive appeared in the place of the Negative. The uncertainty, as we have seen, arose in the second part of the Third Stage after the frustration in the first part, and what the sceptic did was to exploit it to establish the Negative. It will be unnecessary to suggest that the sceptic was anxious to remove uncertainty by certainty; on the contrary, his belief was that the issue was not one of certainty and uncertainty about Reality, it was one of the Absolute Negative, which gives a quietus to all values or existence.

If the Positive of the Fourth Stage, which is the categorical Positive, does actually restore assurance about Reality by replacing uncertainty, what can be its status in the Universe? Can it possibly be taken as the true form of the Positive? What significance would then be left to the function of removing uncertainty by certainty, and its actual realisation by the categorical Positive? The categorical Positive cannot be identified with the concrete Positive; that is impossible.

But a question may be raised. Could we not get back to Reality, or the concrete Positive, without the necessity of passing through a state of existence in which we shall just get rid of the state of uncertainty about the concrete Positive?

Here arises the specific issue of thought, or knowledge or belief, which is my main theme.

There are a number of reasons why the state of certainty should follow the state of uncertainty. We have to be certain about Reality if we have been in a state of uncertainty about it. If we can conceivably be certain or uncertain about Reality, we have to have both the experiences. Whatever is conceivable is bound to be actual, provided there is nothing to contradict it: this is a primary law of the Discontinuous Universe. And once uncertainty about Reality has taken place, the very presence of uncertainty is evidence that there must have been its direct opposite to contradict it—nothing else could. Besides, every experience has to have a dual form by virtue of the fact that the Ultimate Reality is dual—

Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being. Finally, Reality itself cannot remove the situation in which the uncertainty about it prevails since it had its own specific objective to fulfil. And we may repeat that Reality is not absolute.

The state of uncertainty has to be followed by the state of certainty. We have to have assurance about the true, or concrete, Reality before we can have any direct experience of it. Neither the Fourth Stage nor the categorical Positive can altogether be superseded by the direct experience of the concrete Positive. It is one thing to be certain or uncertain about the concrete Reality, a different thing to be directly in touch with it. My ancestry did distinguish between knowledge, *Jñāna*, of the Mystical Unity and Absorption in it. And if I may fail to accept *Ātman* as the final interpretation of Ultimate Reality, I do accept the distinction between *Jñāna*, knowledge, and Reality. We cannot possibly skip the stage of knowledge.

Besides, there is a positive function which knowledge alone can discharge; and this is one of the reasons why the categorical Positive must precede the concrete Positive, when the time falls due for their appearances in the scheme of the Universe. As knowledge of the Reality which is true, perhaps its chief function is to remove the illusory concept of Reality which prevailed in the Third Stage. It is that illusory conception, as we have seen, which was responsible for the frustration in the Third Stage and all that followed from it.

I might repeat that there is no Reality in the Third Stage but only a conception of it which is illusory. It follows that Reality cannot appear before the illusory conception of it is replaced by true conception. In no case could the function of Reality be to contradict the illusory conception of it. Its only function is to conceive the common purpose of the Universe and to guarantee its fulfilment.

Indeed, if the categorical Positive had not appeared after the debacle of scepticism, neither the illusory conception of Reality nor its frustration which followed, would have moved away from the scene of action. And since it was inevitable that they must move away, the categorical Positive had to intervene to bring about that cosmic retreat.

The categorical Positive therefore became due after the Nega-

tive contradicted itself for three distinct reasons: first to introduce the state of certainty in the place of uncertainty; second, to build up 'knowledge of Reality' as distinct from Reality itself; and third, to remove the illusory conceptions of Reality which prevailed till then and to establish the principle on the basis of which the method of abstention could proceed, so that the illusory values could be completely negated.

But what exactly is meant by the term 'categorical'? If the categorical Positive exists, the term 'categorical' must form the keynote of its existence—this is a simple truism. What, then, is meant when I say that the category is not concrete Reality and that it does not exist?

Perhaps I have not so far been sufficiently precise in my description of category, but I certainly do make a distinction between the categorical Positive and the concrete Positive: and I mean thereby that they are distinct and both are existent. The categorical Positive cannot be non-existent—the Negative is neither categorical nor concrete.

But the categorical Positive is not the concrete Positive, nor as an experience does it refer directly to the concrete Positive. Direct reference to the concrete Positive is only possible to the organisation of individuals who are expected to fulfil the common purpose which it conceives. This is indisputable. It follows, therefore, that we get only assurance and evidence about the concrete Positive from the categorical Positive. We are fully equipped to believe in the concrete Positive after we have had an experience of the categorical Positive. There can be no uncertainty left after this, nor the need to hold to an illusory conception of it.

Besides, it must exist as Necessity since it is neither Reality nor Possibility. Nor can it be the Negative, which is self-contradictory; and therefore it must be positive, especially as it produces assurance about Reality. It is unique and independent with a specific function in the universe like any other existent.

Perhaps I ought to explain. If the categorical Positive gives evidence for Reality by referring to it in terms of such notions as existence, dual Non-Absolute, triadic pattern, etc., it does not mean that Reality is just existence, or dual Non-Absolute or triadic pattern, or any other category which is equally conceivable. There can be no instance anywhere in the Universe which will

stand as bare existence or Non-Absolutes or triadic pattern, or related duality. No doubt, as categories, or as categorical Positives, they will not be contradicted by the actual Reality: on the contrary, Reality will be fully evidenced by them if only to remove the sceptical challenge to the Positive in any form. The evidence will also remove the illusory conception of Reality that led to the sceptical situation. But the categories, as evidence, will never constitute, or determine, or embody, the actual concrete Reality. What the actual Reality is capable of achieving will be remote from what the categories severally or in combination can be conceived to achieve, even supposing that they exist as entities. Reality is eternally complete, unique and independent. In no sense can what is eternally complete be classified with or related to what is categorical, whose chief function is to serve it as only evidence—and nothing more than that. It is one thing for the concrete Positive to be testified to, or evidenced, quite another to be drawn into direct relationship with it, in the shape either of whole and part or of related aggregation.

Besides, it is easy for the complete to preserve its uniqueness and independence, in spite of the fact that it has to submit to categorical testing, since it does not suffer from absoluteness, which would obviously make testing impossible. In the triadic Universe which admits of Stages, even the trial of the concrete Positive at the bar of the categorical Positive is perfectly conceivable. If the concrete Positive has had to be in abeyance for the cosmic necessity of inaugurating the Third Stage, that of possibility, there could be nothing inconsistent or unnatural in such a change of condition. Abeyance only means that the concrete Positive for a time functions in the Third Stage as a possibility, under the rule of dichotomy. Why should it not? Such a change is perfectly conceivable, since continuity—as a mark of identity— is not a logical necessity. After all, the concrete Positive belongs to the Discontinuous Universe. It is open to it to cease to be concrete and to become a possibility, which is not concrete: and its retransformation to the concrete state is conceivable after the Universe has finished with the categorical which paves the way for that transformation. All these changes are equally provided for in the cosmic scheme: what is not provided for is the contradictory—the state of being concrete, possible and necessary at the same time.

If the category, therefore, must exist—since it is positive, not negative—its existence can only mean that it refers to the concrete and complete Reality in the shape of knowledge and belief which are not entities like the concrete Reality. In one sense only can it be said that it does not exist—it does not exist as the concrete Reality, it only refers to it. This is the meaning of the statement that the category is not concrete, or does not exist.

If, for instance, we compare the category with, say, 'sensation' or 'image' as we generally take them, we have to admit that they all form existing experiences or unique centres of experience. Not only that, the image arises to refer to the sensation after it is gone. Equally, when we refer to a 'barking dog', to take another instance, after we have had the experience of 'barking', we certainly refer to the objective world which is not part and parcel of us. It is 'dog' to us, and we claim to be human beings ourselves—two very different worlds. Here are two instances of reference. And one may on the strength of this comparison argue that a category need not be an unusual centre of existence simply because it only 'refers'. There is a difference between it and the other centres of experience, without doubt, but this only means a variation in the precise method of 'referring'. The category refers to the Reality, with which it is not in direct contact. Nothing of that Reality to which it refers can be even guessed from the category. In the case of the image and the barking dog, the two centres which refer and are referred to bear a relation to one another which is direct. Clearly the sensation must be gone before the image appears to refer to it, while the image of 'barking' may, and does, co-exist with the 'barking dog' though there is an interval between them to make reference possible. In both cases there is not only the assurance that the sensation exists or that the barking dog exists but also an actual experience of what the dog and the sensation could be. A category never reaches that point. Therein lies all the difference between a category, image and sensation on the score of reference.

Where, then, do we stand in my scheme on the issue of knowledge if we know what category is? What, again, is thought, and what is the thinker (who must be an individual if he is anything) supposing the category is as we have just found it to be?

The thinker, in my scheme, is in direct descent from the Third

Stage; we can easily trace his lineage. A change comes over the individual in the Third Stage as he spontaneously comes to think of and refer to Reality in its true form. There is naturally a sharp awakening in him when he becomes aware that he has been altogether subject to illusion in the whole of the Third Stage. The immediate result is that he has to discard the illusory conception of Mystical Unity, or humanistic individuality, and to abstain from realising the values which these conceptions directly imply. Here are two distinct changes in him, which entitle him to the status of the Non-Absolute and actual, though by no means in full proportion. He ceases to be a 'possibility', and no longer holds that Reality is Absolute; one may almost say that here is a prelude to the birth of a new species.

And if I now turn to knowledge and thought, I can also make one or two further definite comments: a distinction is made between knowledge and reality in a way in which it was never made; and they are placed in altogether separate and independent stages.

We are called upon at this point to know Reality and, with true knowledge, to pave the way for the direct experience of Reality. The issue is one of knowledge, and not one of direct experience: it is only when true knowledge removes the illusory conception of Reality and leads on to complete abstention from all illusory values that the era of construction can be expected to begin.

This is my view of knowledge, which is evidently unorthodox and strange, and I may be excused for being curious to know how my contemporaries will react to it. And yet their answer may be perfectly easy to guess. If they judge my conclusions only in terms of the standards of the Third Stage, the question simply will not arise: but if, by chance, they have passed the peak of scepticism—as I have—and are completely disillusioned about the values, Mystical Unity, or humanistic individuality, or dualistic community, there need be no doubt about their reaction. The issue whether even those who are disillusioned may persist in the Third Stage, in spite of the continued frustration of values, ending in scepticism, should not be raised. Since the Third Stage had to arise in the cosmic scheme, it is foolhardy to speculate about the span of its existence and I should leave it at that.

But now that the Fourth Stage has definitely arisen there will

be no horizon for its setting; it will steadily grow in its proportion till it monopolises the whole of existence, except what has already been covered by the Primal and Creative Stages—there can be no question about this. The Third and Fourth Stages, as we have already seen, will carry on working out the two opposite methods of fulfilling and negating illusions until the stock of illusions is exhausted—after all, the Third Stage began with a purpose and will have to realise that purpose, no matter how long it takes to come to an end.

It would, however, be ungracious to ask whether there is any obligation for me either to advise my contemporaries or to bring them a message of hope—to follow all established tradition. Truth is not a monopoly of any section of our species, and if, still, it be a fact that my contemporaries and I do not worship at the same shrine, we can easily preserve our mutual respect for one another: the two Stages we belong to, in spite of their remoteness in perspective, form part of the same Discontinuous Universe. It would be invidious to draw a line between illusion and truth on the ground of valuation—that, at least, is my view. It should be easy, on the contrary, to prove, even on the issue of merit or credit, that there is nothing to choose between positive and negative values. Only the Universe does not end with either illusion or truth: it has another course to run, which is quite distinct from the Discontinuous. And when we are on that road it will be interesting to look back and find out how the long ages of the Discontinuous Universe stood after they had achieved their end. Was there really injustice done to any of us?

It is, of course, difficult not to be realistic when the perspective suddenly changes, and so far as I am concerned the changes have been enormous indeed. But we all still have our feet firmly placed on the same earth: perhaps both my contemporaries and I are on different difficult errands and shall not yet meet, however we may desire it. Does it matter where we explore? What matters is what we bring to the common fund.

I have to repeat that the Fourth Stage is close at hand and that it is a Stage in which thought will be our chief control and guide. We shall have as our stock-in-trade knowledge, and not the Real to which that knowledge just refers. The thinker is an individual who knows, and acts by the ethics of abstention in the light of that

knowledge so that illusion may be negated and may never return to our Universe.

Knowledge, or thought, is not another name, however, for what we have so far called mind, or spirit: it has to be fully understood that those who are in the Fourth Stage are not treading the path of the Third.

There is still one more point which has to be discussed before I close this long review of the origin and nature of thought and knowledge; this refers to the precise meaning of 'category' which may still be lying unexplored.

I shall start with a review of the two terms, mind and spirit. Both terms are considered to be entities that exist if we follow the traditional position on them. In fact, they are considered as ultimate realities according to a celebrated school of thought.

I do not agree with this school, but not on the grounds on which the materialists disagree. On the contrary, I disagree with the materialists equally, with reference to their claim that it is matter, and not mind, that is the Ultimate Reality. The Ultimate Reality, to me, is the dual non-Absolute; and if mind and matter at all appear in my scheme they do so just when the Fourth Stage begins with what we have described as the categorical Positive as its constituents. Mind and matter, like many other notions such as Being, Non-Absolute, etc., form the categorical Positive in my scheme. And if we note that the categorical Positive does not mark Reality, or possibility, but marks necessity it follows that mind and matter, like any other categories, exist as necessity, and not as possibility as they did in the Third Stage.

Perhaps I may repeat again that the categorical Positive is knowledge, and that knowledge means assurance or certainty about Reality. And since knowledge is nothing but necessity of mind and matter, mind and matter as categories can only refer to the Real and not produce or embody the Real. And as categories they can exist only as necessity and certainty, and as nothing else. This is my view—perhaps the most unorthodox ever known.

We have to note especially that the categories are the necessities of Reality, and not Reality; they are not independent entities by themselves which are expected to have their own ideals to conceive and realise. If they exist and function they do so as necessity of Reality—which means that, as evidence, they testify to Reality

when Reality is in need of testimony. They stand, therefore, as certainties, replacing uncertainties and possibilities, and removing the illusory, whether in conceptions or realisation. This is a function which they did not exercise in the Third Stage when they were just possibilities.

It looks, however, as if the category in so far as it evidences Reality, and does not constitute it, takes Reality to pieces: indeed there is no reason why the notion of abstraction or analysis should not have arisen in tradition as it did. Did not tradition take the individual and the concrete to pieces? Nobody can deny, except in ultra-dogmatic mood, that categories, abstractions, ideas, all of which had to be distinguished from the notion of the individual or the concrete in tradition, have a meaning. To call the category meaningless is to recognise it as at least conceivable. But as there has been no way in tradition of removing the incompatibility between the category and the unique individual, both analysis and synthesis as methods of explanation turned out to be abortive attempts. It has been possible for me as a matter of sheer good fortune to separate the category from the Real which is actual, unique and non-absolute, since I have been able to distinguish between Reality and the evidence for it.

And it became clear to me after this that, while the Real stood always as unique, concrete and complete, the evidence for it was bound to evolve from bare Being to as complex a category as possible. There has naturally been an attempt to build up evidence which, like all superstructures, had to begin from the foundation and gradually reach the apex. And this meant meeting a hydra-headed form of challenge from the Negative in the shape of illusion.

The category, I may repeat, is neither the Real (to which it refers) nor any conceivable entity. Here is indeed a strange phenomenon which neither introduces the Real, which must be concrete and complete, nor an existent entity, which can either conceive or fulfil a common purpose. Its total achievement is to produce a state of certainty to remove uncertainty and to negate the illusory both in conception and realisation. It is wholly negative in its achievement except in so far as it stands as the only possible source of confidence and assurance.

In no other sense are mind and matter or any category con-

ceivable in the Fourth Stage. They cannot be real and concrete nor be taken as just possibilities. Mind and matter, as I have said, are 'possibilities' in the Third Stage and, as categories, in the Fourth they only refer to the concrete Reality as 'necessities'. They therefore embody the third type of individual which all those in the Fourth Stage are.

It is another issue what the value and significance of the 'phenomenon of necessity' is. If, indeed, we could do without removing uncertainty—the total result of the Third Stage—and the illusory conceptions which produced that uncertainty, perhaps we could do without knowledge, or thought, or the category, altogether. We should remain as individuals which the realm of possibility gave us the chance to be. We should never be Reality if we could not be Necessity. But it is inconceivable that the Universe could, once it had created uncertainty, leave it eternally existing; it had to make room as well for 'certainty', 'knowledge', 'thought'—and, for that matter, for the thinker. If there had to be a state of uncertainty as the necessary consequence of the Third Stage, the Stage of 'possibilities', there had to be a state of certainty before the realm of the actual concrete could reappear. The Fourth Stage therefore has to intervene between the Third and the Fifth as a Stage whose job, to use a homely expression, is to 'clear the mess'. It is in the Fourth Stage that the common purpose appears in the garb of assurance or certainty after a long and delirious frustration of values—as if the Universe wanted a long rest after the Third Stage before it could take up the task of fulfilment on the Fifth Stage. Such a rest could not have been due before the nature of the universe had been, as it were, examined and tested in every conceivable detail, beginning from bare Being right up to its most complicated intricacies. This is precisely the function of the thinker, this examination. As an individual the thinker is neither the actual non-Absolute Being nor Non-Being in its complete fullness nor is he a mere 'possibility of the Absolute' of the Third Stage: but as categorical Positive he certainly is no longer troubled by the illusory conception of the Third—in fact it rests with the thinker wholly to clear the atmosphere of illusion which has settled down in the Universe since the Third Stage. This is evidence that he is at least allied to the Non-Absolute actuals of the First and Second Stages, although we must never forget that the

thinker does not concern himself with conceiving or fulfilling the common purpose. He is not Reality but necessity. The most that can be claimed on his behalf by way of positive contribution is self-liberation—मोक्ष *Mokṣa*, by *Jñāna*—so that the image may arise to complete the second half of the Fourth Stage. Here the liberated individual no longer refers to the Real through the categories. With the last vestige of illusion gone in the first half of the Fourth Stage, he stands with all other individuals in a relation of absolute equality, which the actual and Non-Absolutes are entitled to. His categorical equipment is no longer of any use; in its place is bound to appear the image, which will still refer to Reality—but only as image and not category. How momentous all this is!

I am fully aware that my claims are extraordinary, and certainly it would be stupid of me to press them on my contemporaries—it might even compromise their significance. I feel at times that I should not go any further in developing them. What I have now recorded was not on my horizon in the year 1939 when I brought out *The Real and the Negative*. As a personal note I may add that it would be easy for me to listen to voices which have not stopped ringing in my ancestral home, in spite of long ages of heavy weather; I would rather, if I listened to the promptings of ages, be looking for events to happen instead of stating a case to unloosen the tangles of history. Perhaps events will happen—and for the same reason that made the formulation of the scheme of the Universe necessary. Perhaps I should also say that it was no part of my expectation, ever, to watch *The Real and the Negative* suddenly appearing in my life, with the fresh interpretation of the Laws of Thought, and the formulation of the notion of 'possibility'—and that in a way sufficiently robust and fresh to build up the outline of the Universe in a triadic pattern, the boldest piece of craft in the realm of thought. Nobody knows that better than I do. But it did not come on the field of battle where the orthodox spirit serves his call of duty. I never felt that one could make a case on the field of battle; one could only shed blood, which for long ages mankind has been storing in its veins. If I ever had any desire it was to abolish conflict from all existence, and not to create it.

But curiously, that is not to be yet. Even Sri Krishna, in

the *Gītā*, made a case only for वर्ण-आश्रम-धर्म *varṇa āśrama Dharma*—justice, but not peace. My contemporaries seem to be bent on protracting warfare. Whether they honestly seek peace or war on its own terms, it seems they have no intention of abolishing conflict. All that they want is to rule the beautiful earth because they think it is their duty to do so, with a direct message from on high, or because authority to them is another name for humility. If by chance some stray from the path of authority, and from the conflict which authority breeds, they are instantly taken to be like the blot on the verdant spring—gnats which swarm incessantly—to stand between the evening glory of the sun and the home of man.

I cannot find any other reason for the sudden appearance of this piece of craft in the realm of thought than an urge for peace. It makes no claim, nor is it an apology, but certainly it conveys a warning. The Universe has reached a stage when it must undergo a catharsis. The illusions must leave and at least '*mokṣa*' must be attained; and what will bring it about is '*Jñāna*'. भक्ति '*Bhakti*' and कर्म '*Karma*' or सिद्धि '*Siddhi*' will follow the liberation; they are not different modes of reaching the same goal, they are specific modes which have their own time and Stage and achieve different results. It is the specific function of *Jñāna* to inaugurate the Stage of complete liberation from illusion. The plan of work that it indicates is to negate them: we have to mature knowledge and, with the assurance that it is destined to bring us, eliminate the illusory conceptions of Reality and abstain from working out the values which these conceptions created. Here is austerity and asceticism, but not at the expense of any value or for the sake of any value. What have been known as values must all go. This is real detachment. All the heavens of history must give way to *Jñāna*, so that the human spirit may rise out of that clean catharsis and enter the stage of '*Bhakti*' which, to me, is the realm of image that follows *Jñāna* and builds in expectation of the Real.

It is only when we reach this state that we shall realise what our true proportion is. If the whole of the Third Stage, which we have so far called the Universe is, in the language of figure, but a nightmare which ends in the fast-vanishing twilight of scepticism, it is still a drama which has enacted the theme of self-immolation. If blood has been shed and anguish of heart has risen

to its supreme height, it has also been a record of triumph. We have stood it all unflinchingly, whatever torture we have been put to by the Powers that be. And this is because we wanted all this as a matter of free and full choice, and not for fantasies such as expiation of sins or purification of souls. When the Universe suddenly chose to be overcast with illusion, that was exactly what was expected to happen to it. It only meant that the drama of illusion and truth which was due after the Creative Stage had to be played. The Real still stood as effulgent as ever, though too far from the Stage of illusion to be confused with it.

We may ask, what exactly is our true proportion? What are we as individuals to-day? If we have been changing with the Universe ever since it came into being, into how many phases have we been drawn till to-day, when at last we have begun a phase of the Fourth Stage? If we have been individuals right from our birth in the Primal Stage—the Universe never had anything else as its constituents—what is the type we shall come to assume as we cease to be 'possibilities' of the Third Stage and actually know Reality for the first time? If to know means to be a category, or to exist in a state of certainty and as necessity—the state of all the conceivable categories beginning from Being to the Second Continuous—what type of individuality does that state of existence constitute? There is no doubt that this state refers to Reality, which is the only meaning one could attach to true knowledge; but what exactly do the necessity and certainty of Being, or any other category or categories, mean? Is it Being, the Positive, which as an abstraction, formed the prevailing view of the Third Stage? And if that is impossible—the reasons are already known—have we to take ourselves as literally 'necessity of Being' and 'certainty of Being' instead of being just straight-forward 'Being'?

The answer to these questions is that there are three types of individual conceivable:

(1) the individual as actual, non-absolute and perfectly equal to all other such individuals;

(2) the individual as possible and not non-absolute, i.e. he is either a possibility of unity or a possibility of individuality: this is in the Stage in which he is steeped in illusion and finds

himself in perpetual conflict. Here the dichotomy appears and so the distinction between the Real and the Unreal prevails;

(3) the individual as categorical Positive: this is the state of certainty and necessity, as distinguished from uncertainty and possibility. Here dichotomy disappears and equality reappears.

We have to take our individuality to mean certainty and necessity of, for instance, Being, existence, non-absolute, Continuous, Discontinuous or any category that we may run into. We stand as centres of experience which refer to Reality, in a form which embodies the necessity and certainty of Being, or of any other category. It is not 'Being' or 'non-absolute' or 'Continuous'. It is 'certainty of Being', 'certainty of the Non-Absolute' or 'certainty of the Continuous'. We exist, naturally, as individuals who are neither Reality nor possibility, but certainty. And by the time we have gone through all possible categorical experiences, we, as necessity and certainty, shall be at our height. There will be no chance of falling into illusion about Reality again because we shall then be in a state of complete certainty and necessity, which refer to Reality without an alternative.

Obviously the whole conception is not only unorthodox but extremely difficult. We exist as knowledge which refers to Reality. Both knowledge and Reality are positive: positive in the form of knowledge, positive as such, complete and eternal. This form appears or exists as categories. Being is a category and as such is not Reality or the eternal concrete, but it is essential to Reality as evidence which removes the illusion about it. But Being or any category, for instance mind or matter, space or time, though it serves as evidence does not exist as an entity as, for instance, the concrete Positive does. To constitute evidence all that is necessary is that the category must be thinkable so that what exists is the 'necessity of Being', of mind, of matter, of space or of time. The individual is the necessity of mind and of matter, and not mind and matter, and so on. There can be no question of a conflict or clash between mind and matter since they constitute necessities in a series of developing forms. Knowledge, therefore, is a potent and powerful existence; it removes the illusory conceptions.

But knowledge is about Reality and is not Reality. It cannot produce anything, whilst Reality can and does. It is as far remote as possible from Reality. What it can bring about is the complete negation of illusory conceptions or possibilities. Once we have reached the stage of necessity and certainty, we have reached liberation—*Mokṣa*. This is the negative stage par excellence, and involves austerity and asceticism in their pure form. It introduces the ethics of abstention in the place of the ethics of realisation. It negates warfare between competing values and lays the foundation of a society of individuals who are no longer in conflict, but are in harmony, with fundamental agreement about Reality. Soon this assurance and expectation is bound to mature into an image through which they will then refer to Reality rather than through the categories.

Have we not, then, a sense of our true proportion? Could we still be subject to the lords of the universe and the powers that be? Should we still be called upon to submit to authority, which is inconsistent with *Jñāna?* Could such authorities survive where *Jñāna* prevails?

The issue has a direct bearing on the affairs of our species in the world to-day. Obviously the clash is at its fiercest between the groups of men who believe in the 'atom' that produces results and creates perpetual change and those who believe in fulfilling ends or reaching out to the 'complete and perfect'. I have discussed this already. Technically the clash is between those who take Reality to be centres of energy which produce results and bring about changes and those who take it to be mind, or spirit. On a deeper view, as I put it in 'The Towering Wave', the clash is between the two fundamental organisations of history: the group and the individualist societies.

But have we still to submit to mind and matter, or to the group or the individualist, when it is not necessary to carry on with the illusory conceptions of mind and matter—or with organisations which find their central interest in Mystical Unity or humanistic individuality? Are these not the remnant of the Third Stage and completely illusory? Can we cultivate knowledge, or *Jñāna*, of the Fourth Stage and practise the values of the Third? I see no reason why we should not—some of us not only do not stop at seeing why we should not but also find it practicable to apply

the ethics of abstention to actual problems of life as they arise.

But this is not by any means meant as a reflection on my contemporaries or even as a suggestion for helping them with a review of life. After all, it is a cosmic issue when exactly a stage of the Universe should finally come to an end; it is not for the human mind to calculate, unless it is a part of the triadic scheme that it should. If my ancestry was bold enough to visualise the योगा:: *Yogas*, perhaps they had a right to do so, as the mystics claimed the right of foreseeing things. It might still be pointed out to me that I have split the Universe into Stages myself, though on grounds which are not mystical and yet which no humanist would accept: it is very strange that where my ancestors put the arrival and existence of कलियुग *Kali Yugas*, I should have put the arrival of the Fourth Stage, the Stage of Negation. It is stupid to pass over such similarities as coincidences—a meaningless term which the scientist very often uses when he cannot point to the deeper relations behind. It is with deep gratitude that I acknowledge my debt of obligation to my ancestors. Where should I be to-day if I had not had my individuality nurtured by their care? It was overwhelming to me when I discovered, fourteen years after the publication of *The Real and the Negative*, that the 'Continuous, Discontinuous and Continuous' as logical concepts were fully known to my ancestors. I could easily quote other such similarities; and nothing would have given me greater joy than to have discovered similarities in other traditions. I am sure they are there. After all, the social systems were all after the same goal—to make a case for Reality.

But it has been my earnest attempt to fulfil history and not merely to repeat it. There is a duty enjoined on all who come after the scriptures and the *Purānas*, and my mind chose the discipline that it implied. My fervent wish is that I may escape the blind alleys of personal prejudice in my effort to straighten out the intricate tangles of history.

But what exactly have I found in straightening out the intricacies like many of those who preceded me? Have there been any clues anywhere to Truth which was the common quest—any sign of सत् चित् आनन्द *Sat cit Ānanda* which were the avowed goal of my ancestors? There have been great movements in the ages that followed the वेदा: *Vedas* which have meant incalcul-

able effort to build, massive endurance in the shape of bold enterprises, endless meditation, and unheard-of, boundless sacrifice. There is no record of history extant which will not bear out the claim to such movements and their results, which were considered to be the ripest fruit of our civilisation—as if the basis of the Universe was laid on them. If, still, warfare, with its violence and devastation, kept pace constantly with such results, invariably the plea was that the basis could not be built without warfare. In the very attempt to build, so the cosmic writ ran, there was a call to destroy. One must not build if one cannot destroy, or destroy in the spirit if one cannot destroy in the flesh. I found sooner or later, as everyone did before me, an enigma—nothing short of it—in the heart of our history and this soon took the fully familiar shape of the dialectic. No historian of any pretence, primeval or modern, missed the glaring evidence of the enigmatic in our history. It is only despair or broken pledge which dares one to put a gloss on it. Perhaps such attempts in the twentieth century mark the anticlimax and may be a sign of the end—the end of long epochs of enigmatic bewilderment.

What has struck me particularly has been that the three outstanding civilisations of history produced great and towering giants if we look for unflinching self-sacrifice or devotion, which sought nothing but the ever-rising pile of flames to quench its thirst, or concentration with nothing left but the image it relied on by the time it ended. The records are full of such. How many cosmologies of tremendous energy and spirit wandered from the sun, the moon and the stars for the species, or knelt at the door of the wind, the rain and the earth, praying for help to build? It is difficult for me not to bow my head in eternal gratitude to all traditions for their stupendous efforts to build, so that *Sat cit Ānanda* would be attained once and for ever for our species.

But no civilisation, as the Cosmic decreed, could last longer than its rival which certainly did not let it grow as it wanted to; and the great and towering giants who built them had to seek asylum on the shores of the seas or on the banks of the rivers so that they might rest in peaceful coolness after the terrific blast of warfare, which never stopped. This, ultimately, has been the total significance of greatness. If it built, it also madly destroyed: and in

the end nothing of it was left except perhaps an echo resounding in the wind.

After this, to have the courage to think that greatness can still be found in the vast amphitheatre of history, which stood as a beacon for all times, is to make our last bid to defy or destroy. To put up still the bare moral virtues as the true source of greatness, or to find in law and custom that which sustains the human spirit to face the heaviest odds before the dark night stands upright to claim it, or to select for homage the unbending martyr or hero who chose the unknown and the mysterious, is pathetically to repeat a very old story tarnished with age but not to create a new one. All this single-minded devotion to what struck one as the surest way to *Moksa* was only an apotheosis of a value which had its rival always facing it with a devotion equally single minded and austere. The drama enacted between them had as its theme self-immolation and not, as they held, *Moksa*. Nothing came in the end of all this mirage of speculation and practice but the deepest conviction that it was all mystery, deep and unfathomable. Some even asked with bitter anguish—could it then be the creation of the Evil One who spared the species no torture ever contrived? Or how is it there was no escape even by eternal death?

Why should I have to repeat this thrice-told tale? The fact is that I have to repeat it: it seems to me that we are still, as ever, in the mood to select values, as if there have been values which we could trust—we thought there were. And indeed why should we cease to select if our ancestors did not, as some may add? If there is no authority to hold us, are we not free to choose what value we like, since there is no need to enquire if it is a value? How cynicism returns to the fray if evangelism does, time after time!

But the situation may well not be so anarchic as it was even two decades ago. In the mid-twentieth century we have at least a test by which we can judge any claim to greatness or heroism. Personally, I hold with confidence that the test is whether the hero or the martyr can detach himself from the whole situation of conflict in which he is involved instead of detaching himself from just the one or the other value, both interlocked in conflict. No hero or martyr, by the reading of history, ever detached himself from the conflict as such on the tacit understanding that he

recognised his opponent as his equal. If he chose to give up his earthly prospects he did so with the firm conviction that there was a spiritual realm where he would find what he had not found on earth. It possibly did not strike him that his rival in good time was sure to follow him into his spiritual realm to contest his claim. The realms of the Universe belong to the same Universe; no realm of the Universe of history was free from the sway of conflict. If there has been anything as pervasive as the Universe—the Universe of history—it is what we know as conflict.

In fact, the issue of conflict as such never arose in history; what the hero and the martyr stood for was a value which implied the conflict and not its withdrawal. The values which gave birth to heroism and martyrdom could not survive if the conflict was not there to hold them. It was never seen in history that the conflict lay between civilisations which hung in the air without a common background. Between the value which the group civilisation recognised as ultimate, Mystical Unity, and the one which the humanist upheld as ultimate, Individuality, nothing existed which could lead to even a comparison between them. Here was a clash between two clean opposites and it was not possible that either of them could prevail: it was fantasy when at least some chose to look for a middle ground between them.

What has happened is that while conflict as a phenomenon has been taken for granted, its true nature as it is waged to the bitter end is not realised. So the paradox arises: while conflict has to be fought with no success, there is never any reason why it should be fought. There is no alternative since the whole of the Third Stage which breeds conflict, is a Stage of possibility or illusion. One may repeat that conflict, like the Universe of history, has been all-pervasive.

And if the twentieth century has suggested a way out and formulated a test of judging heroism and martyrdom, it is a century of thought and knowledge or is on the verge of being so. With a true conception of reality definitely rising in the mid-twentieth century, it is possible to-day to remove the basis of conflict—the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal. What is no longer called for is waste of energy and destruction of the human spirit on the altar of a value which cannot prevail. It applies universally whether to the state or church, not to say the market-

place. We have to remove the whole situation of conflict between the values which, under false pretences, made the best of our species choose as the ideal, suffering and its culmination in extinction. This means that the heroes and martyrs of both sides must collaborate instead of fighting to death, and negate their respective illusions, with the full assurance that they are essentially non-absolute, equal and actual.

This is solving conflict by real detachment; and however hard may be the method by which this will have to be brought about, it will not be without a background of agreement in knowledge and the prospect of sure achievement.

Here is a chance for fresh heroism; it will not demand self-torture or self-abnegation or as some have said, self-abasement. It will stand at least firmly apart from the martyrdom of the Gospels which was preached in all lands and climes though in varied forms. To what depths of agony the human spirit fell in that martyrdom one can only faintly guess from such records as portray the emotions of the master-artists in rhythm. The whole community of man has been led to glorify the tortuous scene in ecstasy. How the earth shakes! But why this blasphemy? Why wantonly crush the pure, incorruptible life, fresh as the bloom of early spring? For whose benefit? Could one ever forgive the Creator of the Universe, if there were one, who tricked the pure virgin spirit that could rise to any eminence any day and share the boundless delight of Heaven with all. For eternal shame?

Detachment of sacrifice by martyrdom has not touched the heart of conflict—it could not. It has never had the courage to question conflict, but has felt compelled to keep it alive. To what end? Does even the Creator know, if he is still alive?

If the main issue then is not martyrdom, or moral law, or custom, what could be the issue? How shall we come out of the world of shame, of humiliation and of abasement?

My plain answer is that the issue is the complete abolition of conflict, which will efface the two competing values that constitute it and make of us the new species of the future. The keynote is not martyrdom, or heaven, or moral virtues; it is simple *Jñāna*, or knowledge, or the vision of Truth. Everything else follows in its train; and it will follow, even if we might still be hesitating or seem to be lost in doubt. No longer is it just an issue of choice

which was given to man by the priest—and at a moment when the priest himself felt painfully puzzled about the Truth.

If the abolition of conflict, then, should be our goal, and not the repudiation of a value, and if knowledge, or *Jñāna*, should be the means and not the realisation of a value, how should we, as community, stand so that we may be a medium for the achievement? If changes there have to be, whether in our common goal or in the constitution of a common life, what should exactly be the form of that change?

We have already noted the radical change which has taken place in the community in the shape of a division between the small minority who have to stand apart (with their fresh conception of Reality) and the community at large which goes on cultivating the conceptions which they have been used to in all tradition. The individuals who form this new group have a definite scheme which has to its credit two achievements:

(*a*) It shows that the Universe is not the Absolute; nor is it run by a dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal; it is a universe which is triadic in its form and has the dual non-Absolutes as its constituents. What it is in detail is now a familiar story.

(*b*) It shows also that the Universe of history—the three organisations in a state of perpetual clash with one another—formed a definite stage in the Universe, which I have described as the Continuous, Discontinuous and Continuous, with a specific purpose. It was by no means, as it was supposed, the only Universe. Its purpose is on the way to being rapidly realised, in that it may soon be replaced by another Stage of the Universe with a different purpose.

The occurrence of the division is an indication that the replacement has already begun and will not stop before it is finally completed.

It is another issue how long this replacement will take to complete itself—that is a matter for speculation which the cosmologist will have to solve in course of time. What is of special interest is to find out how the individuals who have formed the first historical nucleus of this change compare with what they themselves were before. What difference does the change actually make

to them? Does it make them a different species, so that they have to lead a life at once remote and distant from the life their contemporaries lead?

The answer is difficult to give. But there are some obvious changes in them which can be easily noted. The individuals who form the new group cannot in the nature of things believe in the traditional values in any form derived from the two possibilities of the Absolute; the values are no longer to them what they had so far taken them to be. Indeed, the whole scheme of realising the values which tradition held turn out to be completely illusory in the light of the new conception. This much of change, at any rate, whatever its significance, took place in the Fourth Stage immediately it came into existence: and how very momentous this change is one can easily comprehend by noting that the individuals professing it cease altogether to be members of any of the three communities of history: the Mystical 'group', the Humanist 'class' or Judaic 'community'. Such a change never took place in the whole history of the Vedantist and the Buddhist, or of the Platonist and the Atomist, or of the Catholic and the Protestant—since they never left their parent society, which was either 'group' or 'individualist' or 'dualist', in spite of acute differences between them.

The second change derives from the vision that the members of the group have to form as to their main object in life, and this vision appears after they find, in the light of the triadic pattern, that there is no objective, or purpose, which they can fulfil. Since they have only knowledge—and no direct experience of the Universe, fulfilment of its objective is out of the question. And this purposeless state of things is bound to continue so long as knowledge has not removed the illusions to which the members still remain subject.

The third change is that it is necessarily a negative life that they are called upon to lead; this life consists in negating the illusory values by the method of abstention instead of putting forth effort to realise them.

The third change automatically follows from the second. If there is no positive objective which they can fulfil there can be scope only for what may be called negative activity or abstention from the realisation of the illusory objectives of the Third Stage,

which have now all turned out to be illusory. In fact they are called upon to spend their time in nothing but abstention, and that for two reasons:

(*a*) Not before the illusory objectives which are still surviving have been negated can the positive objectives appear. This is the special feature of this scheme.

(*b*) There is no alternative to negating the illusory objectives since they have to be either realised or abstained from. To realise them is to repeat the frustration of ages, which is now impossible.

These are the three broad changes which distinguish the group by virtue of their reception of the fresh conception of Reality. It is these changes which distinguish them from the bulk of the main community. If we consider them from the point of view of these changes, we cannot possibly hold that they belong to the same community, whether it be mystical, humanistic or dualistic. Human society, in consequence, becomes dual for the first time in its form of existence. The Universe itself, as it entered the Fourth Stage, became a dual Universe.

The issue after this, evidently, is whether the two societies can at all meet or co-operate in spite of their differences and it is by no means a difficult issue. As a matter of history they do. But it will be quite incorrect to say that they act from a common conviction. What happens, in fact, is that the new society does not all the time succeed in keeping to this strict way of living—I mean, the needs of human existence cannot all be met by it as the new way of life has yet to reach its full development. Besides, one has to draw a line between the society in the name and shape of its principle and the society as it appears as a historical nucleus. There can be no doubt that the society, as an embodiment of principle, can never capitulate to the traditional societies which it has discarded—that is impossible. It can only grow in proportion and finally stand out in the name of the whole community of man. As the Laws of Thought, for instance, cannot be denied by any human mind except when it is in deep sleep or fantasy, so the maxim that knowledge is truth, and not Reality, with its chief function to replace the illusions about Reality, will not recede once it has appeared. Here is a departure from all the three main principles of tradition

(which cannot claim the same authority since they are bound periodically to be contradicted by one another). Indeed, the whole question of principle finally clarifies, the moment truth or knowledge comes on the scene.

The issue about the historical nucleus which embodied the principle is, however, a different issue. Though it is perfectly correct to claim that the historical nucleus will never be absent once it has appeared as the only seat of authority, it is not so easy to be emphatic about the personnel who constitute it. At least, not till the new society has had a chance to build up a self-sufficient mechanism for at least the major interests of the human species, may it be possible to be confident about the loyalty or constancy of the individuals coming within its sphere. One cannot be certain of the constancy or loyalty of an individual on the ground that he professed the principle. All that one can be certain of is that all professions mean a dual event: reception of the Truth, in whatever form, and a contribution to the historical nucleus proportionate to it. Nothing in the future will contradict this dual event, but this need not mean loyalty in the sense of a steady, continuous contribution. Nor need it mean recanting the profession. What else it does mean it is impossible for me to say. There is no creed in it. It leaves the individual mind free to choose, although it has equally given that mind a standard which can never perish. I shall leave it at that.

The historical nucleus, however, appears with the formulation of the principle.

If the individuals of the Fourth Stage have undergone three broad changes by which they can be distinguished, what happens to them as existent individuals? If they do not belong to any of the three organisations of the Third Stage, nor behave as the Vedantists and the Buddhists, or their corresponding numbers, the Platonists and Atomists, or the Catholics and the Protestants do, have we to conclude that they have formed an altogether different species? If again they are no longer 'possibilities' yet are not Reality but distinctly 'necessities', how do they function as categorical Positives which they are?

This is our next issue, and one which has to be closely discussed. And since it directly bears on the notion of individuality, the central issue, it might be wise if I repeat my position on

individuality once again in a short review before I proceed to the main discussion. This will make my position complete.

By the phrase 'categorical Positive', the technical name for the individuals of the Fourth Stage, as it must be familiar by now, I mean two things. These individuals are not either the Reality—that is to say, the Non-Absolutes, actual and equal, who conceived the common purpose of the Universe and fulfilled it—or the 'Possibilities', who fell into illusion and believed the Absolute to be actual and real when it was pure 'possibility'. They are 'Necessities' of every conceivable form of the Positive or Being, as distinguished from the Negative; if they exist as individuals, they do so precisely as 'Necessities'. This is the specific form of their existence, exactly as 'possibility' is the form of existence of the Vedantist, the Catholic, the Platonist and their opposite numbers, or as Reality is the form of existence of the Non-Absolute which conceives the common purpose and fulfils it.

We may ask again, however, whether 'necessity of the Non-Absolute' means an existent Non-Absolute, or 'necessity of mind and matter' means mind and matter, as if 'Necessity' were only another name for Reality. The reply is that they do not. There is no such thing as the 'Non-Absolute', or 'mind and matter' as existent entities; but there are such existents as 'Necessity of the Non-Absolute' and 'Necessity of mind and matter', exactly as there is such a thing as 'Possibility of the Absolute' instead of the Absolute. No category exists either as the Reality (to which it only refers) or as an entity by itself. It exists only as a 'possibility' or as a 'necessity'.

Mind and matter, for instance, have existed as entities and clashed with one another in the Third Stage. They appear as incompatibles in it. In the end they disappear into nothingness so that the claim that they are entities perishes.

It is not possible that we can revive them as entities unless we want to repeat the story of frustration—which we do not. Nor can we call them Reality, since they are not Non-Absolutes or 'actuals' which conceive the common purpose and fulfil it. We have to call them 'Necessities', which have no alternative and constitute nothing but knowledge, or evidence, or belief.

Another equally important point to note is that neither the question of necessity nor that of possibility can arise with regard

to the individuals who embody Reality. And the reason for this is that both 'Possibility' and 'Necessity' imply Reality. If there were no Reality, and therefore only the Negative, there would be neither 'Possibility of the Absolute' nor the 'Necessity of the categories'. But if Reality had to be—philosophy is only a scheme of Reality—both the 'Possibility of the Absolute' and the 'Necessity of the categories' had to be too. I have discussed the reasons. Three types of individual at once follow: the real individual, the possible individual and the necessary individual. So the individuals in the Fourth Stage stand as 'knowledge'; which is not Reality but is certainty and assurance about Reality and takes the form, naturally, of the categorical Positive, or the necessity of categories.

But as we have seen already, here arises the important issue of the three notions—Creation, the Negative and evidence. I have to repeat that what would appear as Creation after the Negative has been neutralised is not Reality as it eternally is but the evidence for it. Reality is eternal and complete and does not lend itself to any scheme of creation. Either it is or the Negative is. If, however, the Negative is not and cannot be, it does not follow that the Reality must at once be, as Parmenides thought; on the contrary, it had to have evidence intervening between itself and Negative. The fact is that the Negative has played a distinct part in the Universe, though it could not validate its claim to actuality. As it has undeniably taken the shape of 'possibility' it has been responsible for the creation of the situation in which Reality has to go into abeyance. All this has happened as part of the scheme of the Universe—indeed this 'abeyance' is entirely in the interest of Reality, in as much as it offers to Reality the chance of having its common purpose frustrated.

Here is a seeming paradox: Reality can be supposed to have made provision for its own abeyance—how this cosmic oblivion accounts for the grim records of history! And when Reality, by that provision, actually fell into abeyance, it had to be restored to actuality which meant another provision equally at the initiation of the Reality. It had to be arranged by Reality that in good time Reality would have to submit its claim to reappearance to thought for evidence and proof. The proof had to arise to demonstrate that the claim to existence on the part of Reality was valid—and this meant also a disproof of the claim to existence on the part

of the Negative. There had to be a Stage in the Universe to enact the theme of proof and disproof. Here is the seeming paradox.

The issue of creation is therefore the issue of evidence about the claim to existence of Reality, and not about Reality itself. Reality, as such, cannot be created but its claim to existence, in the shape of proof, can be: and this is possible since Reality is not another name for the Absolute or for the notion of 'Perfection', on which Descartes built. It is a Triadic Reality and easily makes room both for itself and for the proof of its own existence. How strange the theories of 'creation' and 'emanation' of history look after this!

If, however, creation must imply the negative as a presupposition, even though creation refers to evidence of Reality and not to Reality, must it exist in a form which is not unique and simple but a system of notions, beginning from the elementary notion of Being and steadily rising to the proportion of the Second Continuous? Does not such a system introduce not only the notions of the 'complete' and the 'incomplete' but also that of heirarchy, —notions which I have shown have no place in the triadic pattern?

I see no reason why a series or system of categories must imply either a relation of the complete and the incomplete or one of hierarchy between them.

The Triadic Universe, or the Universe of Stages, for instance, does or can exist only in the form of a series. The Continuous, Discontinuous and Continuous is a series which had in my sense no beginning and no ending and yet had both beginning and ending intervening in their course. The Discontinuous, again, which begins and ends, is predestined to have five Stages in succession, some co-existing and some not. Finally, the two ultimate constituents, Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, appear in all the Stages in different forms. There is no sign of hierarchy or dichotomy here or anywhere in the Universe, except as illusion in the Third Stage.

So the categories, as they appear in the Fourth Stage, may easily be taken as a series without involving any relation of the complete and the incomplete. Each of them, on the contrary, is bound to be unique, offering a specific evidence, as in fact it does, to disprove the Negative.

But it is another issue whether the categories should form a series at all. There is perhaps more than one reason. The most important reason is that the categories, as they establish the evidence for Reality, must take as many forms as are needed to remove the various illusory forms of the Positive. Since these are responsible for the abeyance of Reality it is for the categories to remove them. The main issue is to remove these forms after the Negative, in its absolute form, has been replaced by the category of Being.

I have to repeat that evidence for Reality in its concrete and complete form is necessary since the realm of 'possibility' has led to the abeyance of that Reality by reason of the dichotomy of the Real and the Unreal, which dichotomy takes the shape of three organisations. Each of these three organisations with their illusory ideas about the Positive naturally has to be removed by a specific category. For instance the two Absolutes of the Third Stage have to be removed by the dual Non-Absolute of the Fourth, and so on. This is the main reason why the categories have to appear in the form of a series.

The second reason is that if Reality did not admit of creation, since it was complete and eternal, surely there could be evidence for its creation or reappearance after being in abeyance. Since, again, the void or the Absolute Negative formed the only background to the origin of evidence, the notion of creation was bound to imply the most elementary Positive—Being—as its beginning and gradual formulation of the superstructure. Such a process, again, is perfectly conceivable. In fact it is the alternative to it that is not conceivable, since it must be the Absolute which is impossible. If evidence for Reality, therefore, has to appear after the void, or the Negative, has reached immolation in self-contradiction, it was bound to take the non-absolute form and therefore to start with Being as the elementary category, ending with the most complicated category. This is the second reason.

One might refer, by the way, to the traditional ways of meeting the need of creation by 'diminution of the complete' or 'emanation from unity'. In both cases creation meant the appearance of the world of multiplicity. It could not mean even duality, whereas the issue of creation in my scheme becomes the issue of a series, though not necessarily that of the complete or the incomplete.

We can now go back to the main issue, whether the Fourth

Stage is a Stage of an altogether new species, since we now know for certain the nature of the individuals who are to constitute it. Since the individuals are categorical positives in the shape of knowledge, or 'necessity', or 'certainty', how will they form the organisation? What will be their relation to one another as individuals?

A very important issue arises here which has to be discussed before the question of organisation is brought up for review: this issue concerns the notion of 'belief' as distinguished from that of 'entity' or Reality. Does the categorical Positive stand as only 'belief' and not as the entity or Reality, which conceives the common purpose and fulfils it? This raises the final issue about individuality.

Evidently, the notion of belief has to be distinguished from the notion of entity—or Reality, as I have called it. There is no doubt that both Reality and belief exist but they can in no circumstances be confused. Whilst Reality is concrete and complete, belief is either 'possibility' or 'necessity'; and so their functions are necessarily different. The term 'individuality', however, applies to all of them equally.

In fact, if there had been no occasion for the origin of the Third realm, or the Stage of 'possibilities', there would be no such thing as belief; but since the realm of possibility did arise, belief not only arose as an existing phenomenon but it arose in two forms in succession—one in illusory form in the Third Stage and the other in its true form in the Fourth Stage.

We shall trace the origin of belief in the Third Stage first. The Third Stage, as we know, has taken the shape of three organisations with the three competing claims about reality of Mystical Unity, Humanistic Individuality and of Dualistic Community. These are positive claims to Reality which are at variance with what Reality actually is—I mean non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, and not dual Absolutes in a state of opposition.

The question why this departure was made with reference to Reality in the Third Stage, or why the departure took the shape of a positive claim that Reality is actually the Absolute, need not be raised. The departure had to take place and that exactly in the form I have just mentioned, as my readers already know. But the claim is by no means correct though it can be made quite con-

sistently in view of the dual non-absolute nature of Reality. It is perfectly in order that the realm of possibility should have arisen and with it the claim that the Absolute, which is only a 'possibility', is actual.

It is from this incorrect and illusory claim that belief, as a phenomenon, arises. At any rate, when this claim proves to be mistaken, by the complete frustration of the three conceptions of Reality, followed by scepticism, the conclusion is bound to follow that the Third Stage has not been dealing with Reality at all, and if still, the Third Stage is an existing Stage with a distinct activity to its credit, one has to conclude that the individuals who held the values could not be called by any name other than 'belief'.

This is my explanation of the origin of belief as a phenomenon. It means that a form of existence which simulates Reality, but is not Reality, lapses in the long run into the state of being the Negative. This is, as we have already seen, another name for illusory existence, or the fulfilment of illusion. The individual in this Stage is not an entity which is actual or non-absolute but a possibility which, truly speaking, exists as illusion. It becomes full-fledged belief when all its illusions or simulated Reality turn out to be Negative. Could not one argue, therefore, that the individual had to be belief if it was fully aware that it was not Reality and yet existed? What else could it be? It could not be Nothing. Between Reality or the concrete and the Negative, there is such a thing as belief.

A fresh change, however, is bound to follow. If the individual not only becomes convinced that he is not Reality but just a mistaken belief, and also is led to accept the sceptical conclusion, the mistaken belief will have to be contradicted by a true one, otherwise the Universe cannot continue.

Besides, if scepticism, which is the normal conclusion of the Third Stage cannot materialise its claim, there is still the state of uncertainty and confusion, the legacy of the Third Stage, to be disposed of. Again, the values whose frustration was responsible for the state of confusion equally have to be removed, since the fact is that scepticism does not contradict them but only questions their validity for lack of evidence. Even this questioning, as we know, is of no avail since the sceptic has indisputably failed to make a case for himself.

What, indeed, has fallen due inevitably is a process which will replace the state of uncertainty and negate the illusory values with their corresponding practices. Here is therefore occasion for another Stage which will introduce the positive form of belief, the function of which will be to negate false belief and save the Universe from imminent collapse.

The individual in the Fourth Stage accordingly cannot be Reality but must be belief. And this belief, indisputably, will appear as knowledge and truth, and not as illusion: so that the individual in the fourth stage will be not only fully certain that Reality is, in its complete stature, but that his main function is to negate the whole of the Third Stage, with all its illusions.

It is now possible to return to our main enquiry about the Fourth Stage to assess its total significance—how do the individuals stand to one another in the new society and what exactly are they by way of contrast with what they were in the Third Stage? Are they really a new species?

I have recorded the four distinct changes: that they form a new group or society of Beings; that they have no objective or positive purpose to fulfil; that their function is negative—to negate by abstention the illusory objectives of the Third Stage; and that they are beliefs and not entities.

These are extraordinary changes though they are still not capable of giving birth to a new species. In fact, the individuals who are human beings in the Third Stage still remain so except for the fact thay they are expected only to negate the mode of life they were leading when they were in the Third Stage. This means that the basis of their existence in the Third Stage, the illusory conception of Reality and the mechanism of their efforts to fulfil the values which emanated from it, both change radically. Here is a completely negative form of existence indispensable to the reappearance of the Positive which alone can pave the way to Reality. Indeed, the individual undergoes a catharsis at this moment which to some orthodox institutions may look almost like 'atonement'. I have already discussed the Buddha's claim as an instance of the Negative.

What, then, is the procedure? How will the individuals form the organisation for it? What will be their relationship to one another as they negate or abstain?

Indisputably, there will be no sign of the dichotomy in this organisation. The individuals cannot be in a relationship of the Real and the Unreal any longer, since they do not profess the mystical 'unity', or humanistic 'individuality', or dualistic 'community'. They hold instead a definite conception of Reality which unmistakably proves these to be illusory: they must stand in a relation of harmony to one another and naturally they are bound to consider themselves as equal to one another, with the sole purpose of negating in collaboration their common liability to illusion.

Indeed, this is precisely the moment in human history when the notion of relationship undergoes a radical change for the first time. The traditional distinction between equality and hierarchy no longer applies to it—it stands by itself and defies classification under either of the two notions. With the disappearance of dichotomy from the field of the Fourth Stage, the term which seems to be more relevant is 'preparation for unity'.

In any event the significance of the change is incalculable. Here for the first time the effort of man to realise and to fulfil—even if it takes a negative form—is guaranteed success. The reason is obvious: agreement about the new conception of Reality and about the need for negating illusion under its guidance is bound to remove conflict—there being no dichotomy prevailing. This deep agreement as to the nature of Reality is bound to question the values which emanated from the illusory conceptions and therefore the action that followed them in the Third Stage naturally has no *raison d'être;* it has to yield to its opposite form. It is this radical change which embodies collaboration in negating—I have used the term 'abstention' for negation—which replaces the earlier form of action well known to be realisation.

Indisputably the issue cannot be any longer one of success or failure. It can only be success—provided that the principle which stimulates it truly lies behind abstention. It is another question whether the principle actually lies behind abstention or not; it is not enough that the principle itself is real or that this principle is not unknown. The issue still remains whether the principle is actually operating. If there is failure, this only confirms that the principle did operate and will operate again—in the last analysis this is a cosmic issue.

It may fairly be concluded now that the two marked features of the new organisation are the absence of conflict and disagreement and the presence of equality. What has to be noted, still, is that the objective of this organisation is to negate, and not to fulfil: and so the assumption behind it is that the individuals (who stand equal to one another) believe that they are subject still to the illusions of the Third Stage—as if the community of individuals was on the eve of confessing to themselves that they were not only in delusion but are, in addition, perfectly capable of getting rid of their delusion! How the shades of evangelism come back! There is, however, no Ultimate Being on the scene to help them out, but only 'knowledge' to stimulate the confession. Nor is 'confession' by itself enough to promise a liberation: the individuals have to earn it by what may be called the hardest effort—abstention—ever known. When Reality actually comes on the scene, it is found to have a function of its own which has nothing to do with 'confession' or 'liberation'. This is true evangelism, if the term has to be restored.

But to return to the issue as to how the individuals stand to one another: if as individuals they must be unique and at the same time they must work together, as they belong to an organisation, how do they preserve their uniqueness and relationship? This is an old issue and I have to raise it here for two reasons. First, since the primary condition of duality, Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being, has to be observed whatever Stages the Universe may be in, the individuals who form plurality and not mere duality in the Fourth Stage have to abide by that ultimate principle—they have to be dual in some sense or other, since each individual has to be either Non-Absolute Being or Non-Being and both alternately. Secondly, since related duality, the solution of the problem of uniqueness and relationship does not apply to the Fourth Stage (as it formed a specific part of the Stage of frustration) *prima facie* a fresh account of the solution has to be given.

It so happens, however, that no fresh account is needed and the reason is that it, too, is a specific form of the Stage of frustration. It is a Stage which removes the uncertainty created by the Third Stage: it has no positive contribution to make. The problem applies only to the First and Second Stages.

The issue that does arise refers only to duality, as I have just

mentioned. I have to show that the individuals, though they are neither dual nor multiple, but plural, do in spite of this fact observe in their actual existence the ultimate condition of duality. This is a central issue. Obviously, duality here means two specific functions: first each individual has to formulate and receive alternately; and secondly each individual has to be active and passive alternately as it negates.

This is the specific form which duality must take in the Fourth Stage, as far as I can see, and these follow from two cosmic provisions. Just as the individuals cosmically have to be dual—Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being—so they must be associated with the dual function of conceiving the objective and realising it—we have discussed this already. These are the only conceivable functions—if individuals exist they must function. It is only the functionless individuals that do not exist—as it is put in the twentieth century, those who do not work do not eat!

Four specific functions follow from the two basal functions mentioned above. If, for instance, an individual formulates a conception the others have to receive it, and *vice versa*. Equally if an individual generates an experience the others have to function passively with reference to it, and *vice versa*—and function they must, as I have mentioned already, since a functionless individual is another name for the Negative.

I may repeat again that the individuals never cease to be dual in their true proportion, whether they appear as multiple or plural. What changes in them is the form of their duality. Indeed, nothing ever adds to or subtracts from the duality of Non-Absolute Being and Non-Being till their dual stage automatically comes to its normal end—that of unity—as a mark of complete fulfilment. This happens in the Fifth Stage.

Whether the individuals, again, as existents, survive in the Fourth Stage as mental, or material, or spatial, or temporal—exactly as they were in the Third Stage—does not arise provided we choose to preserve the meanings these terms bore in the Third Stage. If the individuals change radically, certainly no individual will be found who is either a mystic, or a humanist, or a dualist of the Third Stage. No longer will unity and individuality be found operating in this scheme of reality as they did in the schemes of the mystic and of the humanist: nor will mind and matter be

functioning as they did in the Platonists' scheme or in that of his rival, the Atomist—and the same applies to space and time, since they have all been reduced to categories. And so the individuals exist, as they must, as just 'certainties' of mind and matter, or space and time—which is another name for the individuals of the Fourth Stage. And it is in this concentrated form that they serve as the source of strength behind the action which I have called 'abstention', which negates the conflicts of the Third Stage between mind and matter, or space and time, or unity and individuality. Not only do mind and matter, or space and time, or unity and individuality cease to exist as entities—and so to clash—but as knowledge, which is their true form, they do away with the illusory claims on behalf of the Third Stage. The Fourth Stage, therefore, is not a spatio-temporal structure, as we usually call the Third Stage. If it at all makes room for the spatio-temporal structure, this structure as it appears in the Fourth Stage is held by the individuals of that Stage to be illusory: so that they form only subject-matter for negation. (What happens to our mathematicians and scientists after this ought to be obvious, though it is not possible for me to go into my account of space, time and number in any detail in this volume.)

It is not necessary to ask whether the individuals persist in the Fourth Stage with their capacities as sense-perceiving, imagining and thinking existents. Whatever the capacity and equipment of the individuals in the Third Stage they are not in any way lost, except that they all change in the light of the new conceptions. The sense-organs are expected to remain but they will no longer be working out the mystical or the humanistic objectives—on the contrary, they will be abstaining from them. If they are capable of realising a mystical purpose they can also abstain from realising it. This change is radical; and if what it actually means to our sense-organs cannot be discussed here I shall illustrate very broadly what happens by giving an account in the next Chapter of the actual procedure of negation in one or two instances.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

It will be interesting to find out how exactly the controversy about knowledge in modern European thought will stand if knowledge is taken to be only another name for the individual.

The issue will be: if the individual in the Fourth Stage is knowledge and does not exist as 'mind that knows' or as 'object that is known', can the controversy still persist? And the immediate answer is that if the whole controversy arose on the ground of a belief that the Reality was constituted by two substances, Thought and Extension—or, more strictly, mind and matter—obviously it cannot survive the discovery that mind and matter are but categories which do not exist as entities and therefore do not either clash or harmonise. There cannot be a problem of knowledge if knowledge as such is the hall-mark of the individuals that exist in the Fourth Stage—or, to be precise, if knowledge means the 'accumulated necessities of every form of the Positive' in the shape of the individual (and therefore of both mind and matter, or conciousness and substance, or every other category) can there be any meaning in the problem of knowledge?

Obviously, the issue is no longer that of the problem of knowledge, which drops out altogether. It is one of finding out how the individuals, as centres of knowledge, will exist and function in the organisation of the Fourth Stage. If we have nothing but instances of knowledge to deal with, what can such a situation mean? Can it give rise to any problem, not to say that of knowledge?

It is the same issue as that which I just raised regarding the organisation of such instances, and I might repeat that the instances will act simultaneously to negate the illusory conceptions of Reality and to abstain from realising the values which emanated from them. This is perfectly possible since they all hold to the same conception of Reality. Here is a common agreement under which, as unique instances of knowledge, they are expected simultaneously to negate, though in specific ways. They will act and re-

act upon one another in the shape of formulation and reception, or generation and passive acceptance so that the total result in the end must lead to the fulfilment of actual negation—there can be no problem on this or any score.

The problem that does arise is that of communication, which is another name for mutual action and reaction. What does communication really mean in the Fourth Stage? It does not mean mutual interpenetration or sharing of the same experience directly by both sides—no such sharing is possible, since the same experience cannot exist in two unique centres. This is a familiar issue which may be illustrated. When, for instance, one centre formulates a conception, all the other centres must be receiving it; which means that two unique experiences must occur simultaneously—the experience which will follow formulation in one centre will be quite different from the experience which will follow reception in the other. Equally, when one centre generates an experience another must passively accept it; which means that two specific experiences will occur simultaneously in the two centres. It will be a mistake to think that there is or can be only one experience, which appears in both centres in succession or simultaneously—as if the same guest calls on different houses. No such thing can happen.

I have raised the issue of communication since it is relevant both to the field of experience (where knowledge is discussed as a problem) and to the Fourth Stage (where there is no such problem). The centres remain distinct in both cases, I mean in the Third and the Fourth Stage: whilst they are all instances of knowledge in the Fourth Stage they are altogether different entities, for example, instances of thought and extension, which are incompatible with one another in the Third Stage. If, still, communication has to take place in both cases it is because there is an organisation in both which is essential to existence. The centres cannot be absolute differents, however placed. My claim is that, whilst the different instances in both organisations function without losing their uniqueness, they share their mutual experiences. The process by which this is accomplished is 'reference' and its main achievement is dual experience.

Perhaps the notion of 'dual experience' has to be more clearly defined. I shall take as an illustration an ordinary experience.

If I hear a sound I instantly have the conviction that some other centre, which may be a human individual, or an animal or an aeroplane, must be making the sound outside me. There are therefore two sounds occurring at the same time and in two specific centres. These centres and the experiences of specific sounds they happen to embody never meet, but they certainly refer to one another. So that both the centres embody in succession two experiences located in themselves—one of hearing, or making a sound and another of referring to the other centre which must be either making, or hearing, a sound. Both experiences, whether of themselves or of the others, take place in the same centres and are wholly accountable to the centres themselves; so that there is no occasion whatsoever for two centres to meet, actively or passively, to form an idea of each other. They keep strictly separate though they know of each other as fully as possible.

The point is that inasmuch as the two centres mutually refer to one another they get a clear view of one another, and in that dual manner. Each centre forms, as it were, a complete organisation in itself. They do not only have full experience of themselves (as making a sound, or hearing it, as the case may be) but they equally have full experience also of the other centre (which may be making or hearing the sound)—only the centre which hears the sound does not make it which the other does—that is not possible. There are also two types of 'hearing sound' and two types of 'making sound', an active and a passive type, occurring in two centres which never meet: and these appear in the same centre and are therefore caused separately. It is in this way that the two centres form a complete idea of the organisation to which they belong: by the act of mutual reference. This is communication—at least, in my view.

I will take another illustration, this time from the traditional viewpoint.

If a star radiates light, to quote from the scientific records, the scientist is believed to be recording it. This receiving of the light is called knowing. The star does not know the light that it radiates while the scientist who knows the light does not radiate it. Here are two distinct functions according to scientific tradition: the generation of light by the star which is inorganic and the knowing

of the light by the scientist who is human. It is only the human centre that is supposed to know. Strangely enough, the inorganic centre which radiates, if it cannot know has to submit to the process of being known. Why? Simply because it radiated light—an unpardonable offence. This seems to be the basic position in tradition and the problem of knowledge arose on the ground of incompatibility between the two centres. The problem is still being discussed—naturally.

I have stated this traditional presentation of the case with a view to suggest a fresh interpretation for it, which was just hinted at in *The Real and the Negative*. I shall quote the interpretation without bringing in the change which the Fourth Stage introduces. The interpretation is that the star and the scientist can be supposed to refer to one another, not mutually to interpenetrate, at fatal expense to one another's integrity. They can preserve their uniqueness and the distance between them by this act of mutual reference, which they cannot do by mutual interpenetration.

The star and the scientist, again, may be supposed to undergo two distinct experiences simultaneously. The light that is generated by the star may well constitute one specific type of light, whilst the light that is received by the scientist may well constitute another specific type: so that neither of them will ever know the light which the other knows—they can only refer to one another. The moment the scientist is aware of the sensation of light he will spontaneously be aware of the star generating it. This generating star, however, as it appears in the experience of the scientist will not be the actual generating star—it will be a passive form of the star which the scientist alone can impersonate. Exactly the same dual experience will appear in the star with reference to the scientist. It will be a surprise to the scientist to be assured that the star has got hold of him in the same way as he has got hold of the star.

I hope I have made the notion of dual experience clear. Every function has a dual form in order to escape the state of being 'absolute differents'. This is an old issue. Besides, if existence and experience must imply relationship, it is only duality of function that preserves relationship. Nothing else can.

This means obviously a colossal change, the gravity of which it is impossible to exaggerate. The consequences are bound to affect not only the relationship between the Platonist and the Atomist,

or between the Vedantist and the Buddhist, or between the Catholic and the Protestant: they will affect equally the relationship between the human being and the animal, or the plant, or the stone.

With the prevailing distinction between mind and matter gone, neither of the two well-marked relationships will survive. What we call the inorganic, on the so-called ground that it has no mind and therefore cannot know, will come to occupy the same status of individuality in the Fourth Stage as what we call human being, on the so-called ground that it has mind and can know, or is not in a state of being known. They will both be reduced to what we have described as 'belief', or 'knowledge', or 'necessity' or 'category'. Instead of being either 'mind' or 'matter' as entities, they will be 'certainty of mind' or 'certainty of matter', which exist but which are not entities or possibilities. Two things at least will happen to them. They will all become 'belief and 'knowledge' referring to Reality; and the relationship between them will become one of harmony and equality.

Questions will at once arise, however, can the stone or the plant, for instance, stand on the same footing as a human being—exactly as a human being does with another human being? Is this possible? Can one possibly verify such a change? Will a plant, or a stone, again, ever communicate with us or share their joys and sorrows with us as we human beings are expected to do with human beings? To say that they can may be poetry or phantasy in a supersentimental mood, but it is not common sense not to say rational thinking—this will be the almost universal reaction. It will be ridiculous to expect that one can verify such a change if by verification we mean what takes place in the objective world with which we have been fully associated in the Third Stage. This world, no doubt, is still continuing in our experience, inasmuch as we are subject to the illusions of values. In a very real way, we live, move and have our being in them, since we have to negate the illusions. There can be only one conclusion if we approach this world of illusion for verification—the claim is ridiculous. Perhaps with one voice the non-human world will say: 'We stand where we are, apart and aloof from the human world; we would rather for ever "move" if necessary rather than cultivate opportunities for intimacy with human society where they "think" and "know";

we are called upon to do nothing else but to provide food and fodder for the human race.'

I have nothing to say against any of these claims. If we have no other objective world than that of the Third Stage, we shall have either to drop the issue of verification or wait for verification till the objective world of history is replaced by an altogether different world. Is there any reason why we should not wait?

But why should we wait for that verification, one might argue again. On what grounds shall we wait? Is it not ridiculous to suggest that we should wait when to wait means to plunge into the void?

But is this really so? On the contrary, there is not only the whole assurance from knowledge on the basis of which our effort to negate or obliterate the objective world stands: the objective world itself has been proved by that knowledge to be illusory. Is the objective world then still surviving, except as illusion, fully known to be illusory? Do we ourselves, again, stand as entities as we thought we did? How could we then stand to lose anything which is of real value when we negate the objective world of history, which has so far produced nothing but frustration? Do we not, on the contrary, have every chance of getting rid of our illusions and making ourselves fit to receive the blessings of the true objective world whenever and in whatever form it will come?

Indeed it will be meaningless to argue still that we may be absorbed by the Negative, or the void, if we are fools enough to abandon the world that is still sprawling around us? To remove the illusory world with the aid of knowledge which fills us with assurance of Reality is not to invite the void; on the contrary, it is to remove once and for ever its periodic appearance. If nothing else is, at least knowledge itself is an eternal guarantee against the return of the Negative.

If there is no alternative to negating the dichotomy of history which introduced the distinction between mind and matter and the glaring incompatibilities between the inorganic, the organic and the psychical, should we be surprised if there is no alternative to believing that the stone and the plant are on the same footing as animals and human beings? Will not all these incompatible centres of existence automatically appear as centres of 'belief' and 'knowledge' once we succeed in abstaining from working out the illusion

of the Third Stage? Need we, then, be surprised if we find ourselves members of the same organisation as centres of knowledge in a state of harmony—with all the distinctions such as 'human and non-human' completely gone?

It is a different issue whether the non-human world will form the Fourth Stage at the same time as the human world has already formed it and it is not possible that I should undertake an analysis of this issue at the moment. I can make only one observation. Since the Third Stage has been constituted by three organisations, it follows that all the constituents in each organisation are bound to belong to one another. Every one of them has to be either mystic, or humanist, or dualist, as the case may be. If the human being is a mystic in one organisation, the stone or the plant of that organisation is bound to be the same. Why should not the same type of change take place in the stone as in the human being? Can the human being exist in the Fourth Stage without the stone, or the plant, or the animal? I do not think I should say anything further.

But one can certainly say much more about the non-human beings who have actually completely changed and are full members of the Fourth Stage along with the human. To be precise, there are no longer human and non-human beings in the sense in which there were in the Third Stage. On the contrary, they are all unique individual centres of 'belief' and 'knowledge' which refer to Reality and negate the illusory conceptions or values in specific ways. Naturally they will refer to one another as equals.

At any rate, to me the scientist and the star now stand in a relationship which is totally distinct from what they were in the Third Stage. They, as individuals, are centres of 'knowledge' and 'belief' as distinguished from Reality, and the relationship between them is not distinguished by the principle of dichotomy. They are both actual and equal to one another. Besides, they have a common agreement, in so far as they refer to Reality in terms of the triadic pattern and proceed to negate the illusory values in collaboration.

Their main function is to remove the illusory conceptions which they held in the Third Stage, and not to realise them. Naturally they cannot consider themselves as either atomic Reality or its opposite—spiritual or ascetic beings. Into their identity as 'know-

ledge' and 'belief', on the contrary, all the categories from Being to the Second Continuous have entered in their true colours as 'necessities'; so that they can all equally negate the false and illusory conceptions of Reality and abstain from realising illusory values—and this they will do uniquely, sharing their specific contributions by mutual reference and dual activity.

This solution, by the way, did not appear in *The Real and the Negative*; in fact there was no suggestion of the 'Stages' of the Discontinuous Universe in the first formulation of my scheme, nor was the conception of the 'individual' fully analysed in it. I have for the first time in this volume seriously raised the problems of Cosmology. Only the dawn of thought which heralded the day for me inspired my first volume: the rest of my contribution remained to be worked out.

I do not now distinguish the star and the scientist in terms of matter and mind as I did, following the lead of modern European thought, in *The Real and the Negative*. And it makes no difference if a claim was made in this, my first volume, that both the scientist and the star had the capacity of knowing on the ground that if the fact of receiving sensation implied consciousness there was no reason why the generation of sensation should not. Nor does it matter that the scientist and the star were defined as unique centres producing unique sounds, or light. In every one of these claims the definite hypothesis implied that mind and matter exist as entities. I depart now from all these claims since I discard this hypothesis, which goes against the grain of my main position in this volume. The 'individuals' in the Fourth Stage are not entities, but are 'beliefs', or 'certainties', or 'knowledge', which are not entities. The main reason why they are not entities is that they neither conceive a common purpose nor fulfil it. As 'knowledge' and Truth, constituted by the 'necessity of mind' and the 'necessity of matter', their sole function is to remove false or illusory conceptions of Reality and to be instrumental in advancing the negation of illusory values. The Fourth Stage is the period of catharsis and austerity in our Universe. Perhaps the Buddha very nearly reached this Stage—or did he completely reach it?

I think I have said enough to prove how catharsis should operate in the Fourth Stage. I could have chosen to illustrate it also in the field of space, time and number, but this would have intro-

duced a range of speculation for which I am not yet quite prepared. My effort in this volume is to lay down the main system and I can leave its application to specialised fields to those who immediately follow the metaphysician to take charge of later developments. All that I can do here is to suggest the nature of space and time in the light of my main position.

Like unity and individuality, or mind and matter, space and time naturally cease to be entities, not to say Reality: they become instead 'necessities', so that they enter into the blood and bone of the individual, so to speak, as categories. Individuals, as centres of 'belief' and 'knowledge', have full benefit from the contribution of space and time as they have from all other categories. What change this will imply in the traditional view about them it is for my readers to conclude, but my concern is to define the two categories space and time as they enter my system.

They are not categories of the same order as unity, individuality, mind or matter. They are less ultimate and they definitely presuppose mind and matter. If there were no such categories as mind and matter there would be no occasion for the experience of space and time. Let me explain this.

We have seen that mind and matter stand for the non-void, in so far as it has been proved to be the direct opposite of the void; which means that they stand respectively for the notions of mind which formulates the objective and substance which produces results. We have seen also that the Discontinuous Universe begins and ends, whether in relation to the Continuous or with reference to its constituents in any shape or form. To be a unit of the Discontinuous is to begin and end. These issues have already been discussed at length and I shall now merely suggest further that if we read the categories of 'beginning' and 'ending' in the light of the identities and functions of mind and matter we at once get the two categories of 'time' and 'space'. 'Space' means the beginning and ending of matter or substance whilst 'time' means the beginning and ending of mind as function. To think by imagery or observation of the beginning and ending of any instance of substance or matter is to think of space: and, since every such instance begins and ends, we have an experience which refers to it, which experience is space. Equally, when we have the experience which marks the ending of any instance of substance and does not stop

before reaching the beginning of another instance it is also an experience of space and is our conception of 'empty space' or 'distance'. The notion of 'interval' is replaced by that of 'space'.

The same thing happens to the beginning and ending of function. Both time as evidence and time as the interval between two instances of evidence are intelligible in the light of beginning and end.

At present I shall go no further and shall leave my suggestion to germinate.

Perhaps I should add once more, however, before closing this chapter, that since my present labour is to complete the outline of the Universe I cannot be drawn into the next major enquiries concerned with the filling-in of the outline. I have not, therefore, in this volume made any attempt to digress into the specific problems of the sciences. It is indeed for the scientists to begin that enquiry, when the leaders of thought in the scientific world find themselves in the mood to do so. Sooner or later the scientist will arise to undertake this task.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

REVIEW AND CONCLUSION

As I conclude this outline of Reality I may perhaps claim the privilege of making some personal comments. I do not know whether this outline can have relevance as a philosophic scheme to the orthodox mind. Can it be that the Infinite of my scheme—another name for the two Continuous Universes—will leave any impression on the orthodox mind which is normally steeped in the Infinite, or in the Absolute, of tradition? Can any mind which traditionally holds to the belief that the Absolute is the only Reality possibly visualise my Triadic Universe?

The situation may easily remind one of Parmenides, as he stood facing the humanist. With the Absolute firmly held in his mind it is not possible that Parmenides could have formed any conception of the 'changeful multiple' which he could conscientiously judge—it was bound to appear to him as the Negative, which proverbially has no form. Or to take a more modest example, when we actually see a ghost, or a snake in the wood when there is really a rope, nobody can convince us that we are seeing something else. The same mind cannot accommodate two distinct experiences at the same time, especially if they contradict one another. One of them must be considered to be the Negative.

It seems to me that the Non-Absolutes of my scheme may appear to the orthodox mind as the changeful multiple did to Parmenides, or as the snake appeared to the mind which saw the rope. They will appear as the Negative. If the Non-Absolutes cannot be classified either as the 'opposites' of the Absolute, or as an emanation from or diminution of it, what else can they be if not the Negative? There seems to be no other possibility, which means that the Non-Absolutes will be literally *non est* to the orthodox mind.

It may however be argued that since a conception of the Negative is possible, it has to be taken as existing, if only as a possibility. It cannot be called non-existent. Indeed, to the sceptic it was the Negative, and not the Positive, that had evidence for its

validity. To prove, therefore, that the Infinite of my scheme and the Non-Absolutes are negative is not to disprove their existence. The issue is not whether the Negative does or does not in any sense exist; since it is conceivable, it has a right even to exist as fact. But it is not an absolute right. In fact the Negative does not exist as fact. Its existence as possibility, however correct, means only that it is the void, or formless. Of what use is the formless or the void? What, then, is the point of the argument?

If it follows that to both the orthodox mind and to Parmenides, the two robust advocates of the Absolute, the Infinite of my scheme, the Non-Absolutes, can only appear as the Negative, or the formless void, will they still form subject-matter for judgment, or for a review, or even for comment?

Yet another equally distinct issue may be raised, referring to a similar difficulty. Can the Absolute, in its turn, exist to the Non-Absolute if the Non-Absolute does not exist to the Absolute? Should not they be taken, on the contrary, as absolute differents if we take either of them to be non-existent to the other? Where, then, should I stand—how could we argue at all about them?

Logically, the whole of my philosophic scheme is an evidence that the Non-Absolutes are fully in a position to conceive of the Absolute and to judge it even though the Absolute, in the nature of things, is debarred from judging the Non-Absolute. The Absolute has formed the Third Stage of the Triadic Universe as a possibility. It has served the purpose of frustrating the common purpose of that Universe, although it has had no experience of the Triadic Universe as a matter of course.

One cannot therefore argue that the Absolute has to be non-existent to the Non-Absolute because the Non-Absolute is non-existent to the Absolute.

And historically one can cite as evidence the case of the Absolute itself as it stands in relation to the Unreal in the dichotomy of the Third Stage. No metaphysician claimed parity in the Cosmic organisation for the Absolute and the 'changeful many'. The Absolute existed to the Unreal in a form in which no Unreal could stand to the Absolute—the privilege was onesided. Nobody ever claimed that the 'limited individual' could conceive of God and judge Him in the same way as God (as an Omniscient Being) was entitled to judge him. Indeed, God has so far been non-existent to

the human mind in spite of intense human efforts to comprehend Him. But did anybody ever imply that man was never existent to God?

The issue is not, however, one of relationship, either between the Non-Absolute and the Absolute or between God the Creator and finite individuals, His creation. In both cases relationship existed: but that relationship did not imply parity, or exact similarity, between the Non-Absolute and the Absolute or between God and His creation. Why should it? Do the stones know us? But we do claim to know them—that, at least, is the traditional theory of knowledge which many still hold firmly.

The practical issue which arises may, however, easily be serious. Can the Infinite of my scheme share the same social order with the Absolute of tradition if the Non-Absolute is non-existent to the Absolute? If the hypothesis is that they can neither clash nor harmonise with one another, is it conceivable that they will both work together in the same organisation, which must imply a common purpose?

The answer is obvious and I need hardly refer to the direct consequence which is bound to follow from the fact that my philosophic scheme must in the nature of things be non-existent to the orthodox mind. There will not even be a moral obligation laid on the orthodox mind—I mean for such a simple thing as a review of that scheme. There will be no occasion for such minds to bring their colossal standards of judgment, whether classical or modern or even contemporary in origin, to bear upon my scheme. If, by a cosmic arrangement over which they have no control, the proportion or significance of my philosophic scheme falls outside the range of the orthodox mind then the social order over which they preside cannot make room for that scheme, even as a phantasy.

What happens, then, to the practical issue? If the Absolute and the Non-Absolute cannot share the same social organisation (since they cannot conceivably have a direct purpose in common) where is the new School going to find accommodation? It will have to live and function and will not die out, since it is committed to solve problems, not to provoke conflicts and not in consequence to suffer—which could cost it its existence.

These issues have to be raised, though they may seem to many to be disproportionate. The fact is that between my Infinite

and the Absolute of tradition there is nothing which may serve so that they can live in a common organisation. The issue of accommodation for my Infinite is by no means a phantasy. It cannot in any sense expect to function by the side of the Absolute as the opponents of the Absolute did, waging bitter conflict with it. The situation in the mid-twentieth century is quite different from any that ever arose in our chequered history and the practical issue I have raised would have remained unsolved, as it did with many an original thinker, if by a cosmic chance a change had not already taken place in the social order, which change alone can provide accommodation for my scheme. This change is the direct result of a similar change in the economy of the Universe. I have to put on record a momentous fact. The Universe now is a dual Universe, one part of which is a continuation of what I have described as the Third Stage, whilst another part is a clear departure from the Third Stage which I have called by the name of the Fourth Stage. There are in consequence two economies co-existing peacefully. Indeed the orthodox, who are tenaciously holding authority and power as usual, have not even a sense of the presence of the Fourth Stage, whilst the individuals of the Fourth Stage run their own economy in complete isolation, with their own ethics and way of living.

The question of finding accommodation for the Fourth Stage therefore does not arise, since it appeared spontaneously within its own society. What has made that appearance possible is the conception of Reality which the individuals of the Fourth Stage profess and the ethics of abstention which derives from that conception. (Incidentally, here is perhaps the only consistent interpretation of the notion of co-existence: even civilisations, however incompatible, can co-exist if at least one of them follows the ethics of abstention—the only way that incompatibles can co-exist.)

The issue of co-existence does not, however, bear the remotest implication of what is known as 'changeless permanence'. If co-existence is an altogether new phenomenon in our history, which did not appear before the mid-twentieth century—there was only perpetual clash between the three well-known organisations until that moment—it is bound equally to come to an end. In the Universe which we have called Discontinuous everything begins and ends: and this can only mean that the orthodox, who have

been in complete control over the perpetual warfare of history, will have in time to disappear. This is the Law of the Universe: and it follows that the social order will pass automatically under the control of the new position, with the ethics of abstention—whose main motive is to abolish warfare and the conflicts which gave rise to it.

Will it be stupid to argue, then, that the Universe, now that it has become dual, has automatically produced a cleavage in the human community, with two distinct loyalties existing side by side? And does not this in turn mean that the phenomenon of co-existence of loyalties must be the only feature common to the rest of the earth our species has chosen for a dwelling? What is evident to me is that the orthodox are no longer responsible for the preservation of the human community as a whole, by their warfare or by their peace (which is the root of their warfare). There is a social order working side by side with it in all spheres which does not need their protection. On the contrary, sooner or later it is certain to relieve the orthodox of the burden of exercising control which has weighed on them for untold ages. This, to me, is the full significance of the change that has taken place in the Universe to-day. The new society is by no means to be judged by its proportion in relation to the orthodox—one cannot help thinking of the Saurases of pre-history!

It may legitimately be added that the new society, unlike the orthodox, is not restricted to a limited perspective of the Universe; it has knowledge of its full stature, which the orthodox never possesses. And this gives it the assurance that it is somehow working in unison with other societies—societies which never entered into the schemes or outlines of the Universe of the orthodox. Here is indisputably an expansion of the panorama which, as it includes fresh societies, makes up for the absence of any contact or collaboration with the orthodox on this earth.

The sense of independence and faith in the new society automatically deepens. The Universe appears as a home and ceases to be a domicile created for our species, and man's dignity comes back to him like a lost treasure and not as a gift from on high. What will happen after this to the esoteric record of our species is another matter—perhaps we shall no longer need to discard it as phantasy nor associate it exclusively with orthodoxy.

It might be thought that I am only repeating the rhythm of *The Real and the Negative* in my concluding volume, with an epilogue which gives me a chance to write my own review. Perhaps I am. There is such a thing as judging one's own self when it is not in one's way. I may perhaps claim the right, therefore, to bring out the main implications of my position as they appear to me. It seems to me essential that I should, since I have not just drawn afresh an old outline of the universe but perhaps stood, as it were, on the roof of the Universe to scan an altogether strange horizon. As I wrote I had no plan or prevision to guide me—I simply had to write, though after a long preparation faced by repeated frustrations. This is almost the first time I am sensing the proportion of my claim, and a review is therefore called for, if not for any wide audience at least for my own personal benefit.

What has struck me persistently in the course of the last two decades—this is the period in which the system has come to shape itself—is that I have been since 1936 serving as nothing but an instrument or medium of experience. Beginning from my sudden experience—I can give the date and the hour—of the 'possibility of the Negative' and the fresh interpretation of the Laws of Thought, nothing ever came to me which I could trace to any deduction from premisses, or to the result of intense living according to my ancestral code, or to the fruits of impact with the keen intellects of the two hemispheres which I have known so well.

Yet I cannot possibly hold that what emerged as a system could be called by the familiar name of metaphysic or by the less familiar name of prophecy. It is not metaphysic, since I cannot trace it to the Absolute which my ancestors held to lie embedded in the individual as the 'witness', or to the Ideas which according to the humanist are latent or inborn in the individual. Both conceptions of Reality have been replaced by the Triadic Pattern. For a similar reason my system cannot be called prophecy, since the individual, to me, unless it takes the form of 'possibility', does not have to believe in Divinity whether as Personal God or as Divine Agency, which sonship and prophethood imply. And certainly I cannot go by the judgment of the realm of possibility which is bound to be illusory.

What then shall I call the system which emerged? The only

legitimate description of it is 'Necessity', or 'Knowledge' or *Jñāna*, which is another name for the individual of the third type, and which appears as a matter of course and in its own time. In fact the instance where the new conception has actually arisen is the only evidence of its existence—besides, this is the first time that the conception has arisen and it could not have arisen earlier or later.

Do I not make the individual the sole representative of existence whether as Reality or 'Possibility' or Necessity, which are the three forms of its existence? Is it possible really to measure the supreme significance of this claim? Does it not once and for ever deposit Reality in the individual, and make him or her the symbol of Reality?

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of what I have had to record is that the Universe has already undergone a radical change. This change does not mean a shuffling and reshuffling of the three varied experiments of history, or a frantic effort at revival; it is the replacement of the whole outlook of history by a quite different one. It has been my attempt to present its features as precisely as I could, and I may here merely repeat that the radical change means for us, the human species, the acceptance of Knowledge, or *Jñāna*, as the prime mover of the Universe. It alone will remove all the illusory conceptions and values which we have so far followed, and will imply a change in the ethics of action we have so far pursued. We have to make negation of values rather than their realisation our chief concern: we have to abstain from illusion in a spirit of austerity instead of putting forth effort to realise it in expectation of joy. It means abolition of warfare by mutual abstention and a paving of the way for construction.

To recognise Knowledge as the prime mover, however, is to draw a line of distinction between Knowledge and Reality, and to recognise the uniqueness of both. Its supreme significance lies in the fact that Knowledge has a function all its own which cannot be confused with that of Reality, to which knowledge only refers. As we have just said, it is negative and not positive, frankly destructive and not constructive, evidentiary and not productive. It only negates and does not fulfil.

This separation of Knowledge from Reality, as they do not co-exist within the same realm, clearly cuts at the root of what we call verification—a very strange development. If the only objective

world where verification has been supposed to take place is completely removed by Knowledge on the ground that it is illusory, chances for verification drop out as a matter of course. But the method of thought, which has through all history contested verification, does not automatically revive. It has already been replaced by Knowledge, which has no resemblance to what we have called thought in history. Knowledge which refers to Reality is neither thought nor sensation, the only tests of verification of history. The separation of knowledge from Reality, therefore, is a momentous change.

But what is even more strange is that even thought, or *Jñāna*, does not survive after Reality has been restored in the shape of Reality in the Fifth Stage. In fact, in that realm *Jñāna* has no function to discharge. It will be the age of *Karma*, or fulfilment (*Siddhi*), as I have said. Knowledge wholly disappears after it has negated the illusions of the Third Stage, or the whole of what we have so far taken to be the Objective world. And the disappearance of Knowledge is a sure sign that the realisation of the need for negation is no longer outstanding. We enter then the realm of Reality, or the Positive, which conceives the common purpose of the Universe and fulfils it. Not even image, or *Bhakti*, which functions in the second half of the Fourth Stage, survives. Neither truth nor illusion has anything to do with this realm—after my ancestors I have to repeat नेति नेति *ne'ti, ne'ti* with regard to it. It is not a Stage which can be called even by the name of certainty or uncertainty.

It may still appear strange to many that I am ending with a note of what sounds like absolute negation, and nothing else. In one sense this is true—what that sense is, I have discussed already in my review of *Nirvāna*. Indeed, I have not made any attempt to portray the Positive of Reality. Personally I have had no experience of Reality other than the assurance I have derived from Knowledge which has been the only source of my faith in Reality—it is not possible to have direct experience of Reality. But I value this assurance which certainly is not negative; on the contrary, it is positive enough to remove all my illusions, a removal which is indispensable to the appearance of Reality and ultimately to the direct experience of it. How very satisfying this assurance is can easily be gauged if it is realised that the mind filled with it can

never be in doubt again. Two things are guaranteed by assurance for all time:

(1) Illusion will be removed. There is no alternative to negation after that assurance; the method of abstention is bound to follow the method of realisation. It then is no longer a matter for argument whether we shall abstain or fight.
(2) Removal of illusion, or of the state of suspense—the total product of conflict—is bound to be followed by the state of certainty and by liberation.

I cannot help feeling that this interim period of certainty and complete assurance, which is more than mere freedom from suspense and doubt, may be wanted by the human mind on its own account. It may be valued as such.

And this is possibly part of the reason—there is the logical reason, too—why it becomes apparent that the state of negation or knowledge, is bound to be followed by a state in which the individual will refer to Reality, not through category but through image. Here there will be no trace of Negation since conflict will be conspicuous by its absence. Illusion will be completely uprooted; and in its place a positive process—the process which builds on image, in expectation of the arrival of Reality—will prevail.

The point which has to be noted is that even the arrival of the image in the place of the category necessarily implied complete negation of illusion. The Negative and the process of abstention form the very backbone of all that will take place before Reality appears.

This may, however, I am constrained to think, appear to my contemporaries as a deliberate reversal of the expectations which Europe in the last two centuries has been led to cherish under the leadership of science. It may be argued that at a moment when the discovery of atomic energy claims to have solved the problem of production, it is not permissible that one should preach the doctrine of negation, or austerity, which aims at detachment from all the values mystical and historical. It will be asked, has not the issue of history centred in the need for production as the one central need, since no effort of man ever succeeded in meeting human demand with adequate supplies? Has not the main problem till to-day been entirely that of technique and of the discovery

of energy which could raise adequate and proportionate supply; since there was nothing wrong with the values? All great minds in all ages have agreed about the preservation of the human species and the building up of an organisation for joy and peace. Nobody has wanted suffering on its own account, and everybody has hated the idea of taking life for the sake of taking life. So run the arguments.

But how was it that if destruction still was brought about its consequence should have fallen upon the human species more than on any other, directly or indirectly—was that the way to preserve the species? And why was not the organisation for peace and joy built up? Could such an organisation be raised if the issue of defence and order formed the central need for which the States had to provide? Is it not a fact, again, that centuries of warfare in the human community have produced a warlike spirit which has had to specialise in the art of killing?

These are thrice-told tales and it is against the background of such grim and shrieking facts of human history that both cynics and sceptics arose—the martyr was not the last figure on the scene—not only to question values but to deny existence itself.

Indeed, there have been no such things as 'values' or 'human species' as eternal entities, only three distinct types of them in perpetual clash with one another. We never could define peace and joy except in forms which brought about warfare, and life was not sacrosanct as such but only as a type, which was supposed to be true and pure. There were three standards in the light of which life was judged. Then was it ever judged? What did not come up to the standard was like the goat, which deserved only purification by sacrifice.

May not one argue, then, as it has been argued many a time, that what needs looking after, first and foremost, is the 'value', and not production? If we could agree about the values, we could also agree about production, and not the other way about. It is in fact simple truth that, like every other interest of our species, production has taken three distinct forms which were frankly and openly incompatible. If atomic energy produces what it can produce, on a scale beyond any expectation, it will meet the needs of supply of only one type of our species. Even this supply will have to stop sooner or later under the pressure of the other type of

energy which we have immemorially called spirit. If we are balanced in our judgment we shall not forget that the atom never is free from challenge from the spirit, exactly as the spirit never is free from challenge from the atom. No doubt the twentieth century still is an 'atomic century'; but it may any day cease to be atomic as it became atomic, at a certain point. It will be a mistake to claim that the atomic age has created any radical change in the Universe. It has created only one of the periodic diversions in terms of justice, the keynote of our social order. And as the atomic epoch is reaching its end it is only natural that it should raise the prospect of destruction of our species on a scale which at least the unbalanced amongst us fear might bring back the glacial age, or what the European mind still calls the 'primitive'. There is no substance in all this, since the age of Truth has already arisen. I can definitely hold that the century is no longer either atomic or spiritual in the sense it has hitherto been.

Only this arrival, of the age of Truth, does not mean that it will take us straight to the gate of Heaven.

There is still a period of austerity to go through before we have any chance to obtain direct experience of Reality and to fulfil the common purpose of the Universe. This is our real and precious privilege when we are freed from illusion.

But even if by sheer accident and not choice we miss this privilege, we shall have to plunge straight back into the life of conflict. And then it will be our destiny again alternately to profess and practise values which clash and serenely to end with the choice between cynicism and scepticism. There will be no escaping this, though we thought, at times, in the spirit of martyrs, that we had conquered the evil or the pain. Even martyrs neutralise their gains (for they belong to different types) and clash. It would indeed be ridiculous in the twentieth century to claim that we can make one of the competing values prevail in the end for ever. That claim lay inherent in all martyrdom, whether of the Spartan or of the spiritual type. We may seek 'revival' again and use any means or technique at hand to make a success of it; but we shall soon have to face our antagonist, the opposite revival. The total achievement in the end will fall like a blight upon the posterity of both, who will be called upon to bear the brunt of it all. It is lunacy to utilise methods of science, whether pure or mixed, for achieving a

spiritual need. Such effort can only kill science as much as it destroys the spirit. And when this technique is flamboyantly followed it is a sign that neither spirit nor science will be of any avail much longer. This is the end of mechanised martyrdom. Perhaps that is exactly as it should be.

Could there be a plea, then, to avoid austerity, which stands for negation of both the competing values which are normally coming to their end? Should we still tenaciously cling to one of the values, trying by any means to save it if only to escape austerity, when it is certain that it will soon be overwhelmed by its opposite? Should we even for mere respite choose the final goal of cynicism or scepticism rather than the clean and pure path of austerity? Does not this path promise the end of conflict and of all its travails which culminated in producing the cynic and the sceptic, the two pillars of despair?

It is time that I should bring this epilogue to an end with two final comments: one on ourselves, with respect to our capacity to grasp the true significance of the Ultimate Reality so far recorded in history; another, on the Universe as we leave it. By the records of history we are still as far remote from the mystery of Ultimate Reality as we ever were or could possibly be; we have never known it as its stature and ultimacy demanded that we should. This is perhaps also the reason why we have not as yet discovered what actually our own true proportion might be. If by any chance we had known ourselves truly we should not have been so impatient to leave the whole of our earthly career almost as soon as we had begun it to be joined at once to what we considered to be our real home, Heaven, Unity or Individuality. Perhaps our chief interest in all the ages has centred mostly in ourselves; we have not even had the courage to develop a deep, genuine assurance about what Ultimate Reality is or could be. In the records it was either a 'Light' to dazzle human sight; or a Judge who set a commandment for us to obey, or a much too remote and unfathomable Presence to be approached, or just a placid state of Eternal Calm. What has really all the time absorbed us is our actual existence, steeped in suffering. Indeed, the pressure of the ages has borne so heavily on us that we even, in a fit of disproportionate despair, stooped to the unspeakable conceit of bringing the Ultimate Reality down to earth. We forgot that the Universe is not exactly our domestic

concern: we could not dispose of it as our mystical, humanistic and dualistic moods led us to believe that we could. And yet the stark fact is that, if nobody could question the ultimacy of Truth or the utter impossibility of escaping from what we have called the burden of existence, it was nothing short of an obligation that we should find a way of dealing with it which we could confidently call our own.

No doubt the critic has pointed out often enough how the Ultimate Reality itself looked almost like a note of despair and made it practically impossible for our species to behave in a steady, dignified manner. (If we know our sceptic at all, we cannot help noting in him a sense of utter amazement that things should have been left with such a complete lack of evidence or proof.) We may honestly plead for ourselves if we like, but the issue is not one of pleading, or of yielding to the temptation of the sceptical mood of complete indifference. The issue is one of finishing the job which we began in Time's indefinite past and finding out what other patterns of existence there could be which could keep us busy till the end of all time.

It is permissible to add that to-day we can find out how exactly that job can be finished. If we accept that it is the era of thought which is on the horizon, this will mark the last stretch of our journey in carrying the burden of existence. If the job is to carry the burden to its destination it is open to us to-day to do it ourselves with complete faith and assurance. We shall be at long last free from perpetual dread and anxiety lest we give offence by not keeping to the letter of the Law, or by not obeying the Spirit. There will be no such Law or Spirit. The era of thought is the era of Knowledge, or *Jñāna*, which dispels ignorance. It is the birthright of our species, by the exercise of which we have the supreme chance of making the Universe free from illusion so that it may once again inaugurate the Truth.

The arrival of this long awaited moment means that we shall, as we go on negating illusion, draw closer and closer to the distant range of the common purpose, our final goal. As thought, with unerring precision, helps us to negate illusion with perfect faith and assurance the result will be the consolidation of our home on earth. Here in this central home of our species, the whole edifice of thought will stand as the one bulwark of our strength;

and what will rule in it is the serene light of contemplation at its maximum brilliance. Could not one believe that a glow from it might unwittingly have strayed sometimes to scintillate in the rhythm which the master-artist had already brought into being? And if that birth has been possible, what must be the glow of the rhythm which the Image, with resplendent graciousness, will bring to give sanctity to the heart of thought? The Fourth Stage will be nearing conclusion as the Image rises on the horizon to reach us, as it were, at the gates of the Fifth Stage.

What these enormous changes in our prospects mean will be vivid if we place them against the background of the Universe we are on the verge of leaving. I shall make one last comment on it. Could even the best of minds at any time call it by any name other than mystery, which in plain simple language meant the absence of light on its main motif and mechanism? My ancestry enjoined a prayer for more light, as the day began, with the sun on the horizon. That was the only prayer left for the elect.

And how did those sunk in misery find that Universe as they began the day? It is familiar history that the Universe was nothing but a snare to them, which left no loopholes for escape. Even the thoughtful and scholarly called it a stratagem, a maze of astuteness—out to achieve its own end, whatever the cost.

But why was there all this manoeuvring in the heart of the Universe? Against whom? Not certainly against the weak creature nor against the Evil God who had no chance with the Omnipotent or the Onmiscient. Personally, if I had not stumbled upon the Truth of the Universe, sunk deeply in its core, it would be impossible for me to uphold even the phantasy of the Merciful God: there would be room only for the Evil God. I would not call it mystery—why should there be mystery when the Universe could be at least straightforward and honest? If suffering had to be the keynote of existence, why not call it by its proper name, a value? I have at least seen that it is a negative value.

This Universe of illusion I am convinced, is nearing its end. The age of phantasy is practically over: we cannot keep it longer than it will last. We have to turn now to Truth, which is another name for Knowledge, and austerity or *Jñāna*.

The note on which this epilogue is ending is almost harsh compared to the one which inaugurated my theme in *The Real and*

the Negative. There was so much of colour and movement in that inauguration. Almost two decades have passed over my head since that blessed moment in my life. I have seen life steadily all these years in the protecting light of that theme. My faith has not dimmed, but deepened. But I did not realise until I saw 'thought' in its purity that the scene is being rapidly set for austerity with *Jñāna*, or Knowledge, as its central guide. It is time now for action. History now begins another phase, and the age which is just on the horizon will find our species already climbing the path of pilgrimage. From now on it will be one steady ascent with clean ascetic rigour, unrelenting but fully assured. Not for a moment will the pilgrims falter. And how the lofty heights will glisten as all the blooms at their feet steadily rise to reach out to the blue horizon which rests serenely on their snowy heads! In the days which nobody remembers, my ancestors found the Image of Divinity enshrined in the still, vacant space between the blue horizon and the creamy heights of snow, just where the sun daily rises and sets; it was the one source from which all life came as a blessing to earth. Shall we not reach that Blue Heaven as we come to the end of our pilgrimage? Will not the true Image then point the way to our last Stage, the Stage of Fulfilment?

It is now time for me to stop.

INDEX

Abeyance of Reality, 257
Absolute, the, 65, 82-83, 278
Absolute Negative, *see* Negative
Absolute Positive, *see* Positive
Abstention, 253, 262-263, 266, 285
Activity, 104-105
Aristotle, 16, 33, 63, 93
Asceticism, 102
Atman, 191-193, 220
Atomism, 17, 31-32, 37-38, 80, 197-198

Becoming, 30, 34
Beginning, 59-62, 91, 104-105, 117
  of function, 276
Behaviourism, 53
Being, 6, 7, 29-30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 41, 70-72, 76, 78, 85, 93, 102-103, 120-121, 123
  Non-Absolute, *see* Non-Absolute
Beings, historical, 94
Beings, Society of, *see* Society
Belief, 260-262
Berkeley, 9, 207
Bhakti, 243
Body and mind, *see also* Mind, Matter, 7
Bradley, 81
Buddhism, 79, 137, 190-193

Categorical, the, 6, 19, 51, 146-147, 186, 234-237
Categorical Positive, 231-235, 255-256
Categorical pre-supposition, 211
Categories, function of, 70
  necessities of Reality, 239-240
Certainty, 8, 232-233, 285
Chaos, 1-2
Co-existence, 119, 280
Cogito (ergo sum), 9, 13-17, 29, 45-46, 52-54, 56, 155, 157, 195, 208, 215
Common purpose, 77, 110, 113, 183
Communication, 268-271
Conception, 113
Concrete, the, 19, 69-70, 94, 123, 213, 245
Concrete Positive, the, 231-235
Conflict, 121, 125, 174-176, 199-200, 221, 249-251, 264, 285
Confusion, 136
Conscious, the, 5
Continuous, the, 1, 2, 40, 58, 62, 64, 75, 99, 158-159, 252
  First, *see* First
Contradiction, 71, 101
Cosmology, definition of, 1
Creation, 67, 90, 257, 259
Creative Stage, *see also* Second Stage, 99, 108, 110-118, 120, 147

Democritus, 16, 30, 34, 207
Descartes, 9-16, 45-49, 54, 195, 208-209
Direct experience, 183-205
Discontinuous, the, 1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 40, 57-58, 62, 64, 75, 99, 104, 158-159, 252
  spontaneity of, 3
Distinctness, 77, 87, 107
Dogmatist, the, 230
Doubt, 8
Dualistic (scheme of history), 139
Duality, 69, 78-79, 82, 86, 102, 108, 163, 202, 264-265
  related, *see* Related
  of individuals, 265

Empiricism, 52, 81, 177-182, 183
Ending, 104-105, 117
  of function, 276
Equality, 131, 166, 202, 264
Evidence, 112, 257, 259
Existence, 66, 90, 213
Existentialism, 18, 138, 150
Experience, 4, 5, 8
  centres of, 6, 236, 268-270
  direct, *see* Direct
  dual, 268

Fact, 27
Fifth Stage, 114, 185, 231
Finite, the, 7
First Continuous, the, 91, 111
First Stage, *see* Primal Stage
Fourth Stage, 162-176, 177, 180, 185, 187, 203, 230, 241, 258, 266
  individuals forming, 253-255, 259-260, 265-267, 273, 280

Function, 67-68, 105, 276

Group society, 86, 225

Harmony, 121
Hegel, 18, 31, 79, 137-138, 150-157, 160-161
Hindu scheme (of society), 43
Historical, the, 146-147
  nucleus, the, 255
History, *see also* Dualistic scheme, 27
  triple organisation of, 79, 139, 177, 200, 252
Humanism, 33, 36, 38-40, 80, 86, 139, 192, 197
Hume, David, 81

Identicalness, 77, 107, 123
Identity, 67-69, 71-73, 209
Illusion, 43, 92-93, 96-109, 121, 128, 135, 170, 172-173, 221
Incompatibility, 19-23
Individualism, 86
Individuality, 44, 122, 133, 168, 201, 211-212, 245
Individuals, *see also* Duality, 244-245
Inequality, 128
Infinite, the, 3, 7, 30-31, 63, 279

Jñaña, 229, 242, 243, 246, 283-284, 289, 290-291

Kant, 31, 156
Knowing, 6, 10
Knowledge, 18, 236-239, 245-246, 267-276, 283, 289, 290-291

Leibnitz, 50
Locke, 178
Logical positivist, *see* Positivist

Matter, 7, 17-18, 201, 206-214, 256, 274-275
Mind, 5, 7, 17-18, 201, 206-214, 256, 274-275
Moksa, 243, 246
Multiple, the, 70
Multiplicity, 11, 22
Mutual reference, 269
Mystical (scheme of history), 139
Mystical Unity, 191, 220

Necessities, 255-256
Necessity, 239-242, 285
  of the categories, 257
Negation, 183-205, 254, 285
Negative, the, 3-5, 24-25, 29, 32, 34-35, 37, 73, 91, 94, 121, 257
Neutralisation, 91
Nirvaña, 187, 190-193, 220, 225
Non-Absolute Being, 58, 65-66, 68-69, 70, 72, 83
Non-Absolutes, the dual, 83, 108-278
Non-Being, 6-7, 29-30, 32, 36, 38, 41, 58, 62, 65-66, 68-69, 70-72, 76, 78, 83, 85, 93, 102-103, 120-121, 123
Non-conscious, the, 5

Objective, the, 67-68
Occasionalism, 49
Omnipotence, 49
Ontological argument, 13-15, 45
Opposites, 124-127, 150-160
Opposition, 131, 160-161
Organisation, 22, 34
Orthodox mind, the, 277

Parallel lines, 49
Parmenides, 16, 29-33, 36, 38, 42-43, 48, 55, 74, 123, 133, 137, 152, 154-155, 166, 196-197, 207, 220, 277
Particular, the, 60
Phases, 118
Plato, 16, 30-34, 37-38, 65, 81-82, 195, 197, 207
Positive, the, 3, 5, 29, 30, 32, 34-35, 37, 48, 73, 121, 231
Positivist, the Logical, 18, 52, 179-182, 227
Possibility, 130, 132
Possibility of the Absolute, 131, 257
Possibles, the, 95
Pragmatism, 81
Primal stage, 67-68, 70-71, 88-95, 99, 106-109, 120, 147, 204
Problem, 25-26, 28, 35-36, 49-55
Protagoras, 74
Proximate Reality, 163
Purpose, 91, 93, 105, 107, 114

Real, the, 7, 41, 43, 73, 134
Realisation, 105, 113, 123-124
Reality, 58, 74, 83, 122, 245
  abeyance of, 257
  atomistic view of, 3

Related duality, 84-85, 115, 121, 160, 165
Relationship, 66, 78-79, 83, 87, 117, 118-138, 263, 270-271

Sartre, 150
Sceptic, the, 230
Second Stage, *see also* Creative Stage, 67, 102, 106-107, 110-117, 125
Series, 122, 258
Simultaneity, 118-119
Society of Beings, 95, 123
Space, 275
Spinoza, 50
Spirit and matter, *see also* Mind, Matter, 7
Sri Krishna, 220, 242
Stages, *see* Universe of Stages, *see also* First, Third, etc., Stage
Substance, 12

Tension, 24, 121, 124-127
Thinker, the, 236-237, 241
Third Stage, 95-96, 112-113, 126, 131-132, 142-144, 148, 166-167, 170-172, 185, 187, 203, 261
Thought, 183, 185, 193-196, 199, 205, 214, 215-266, 289
  Laws of, 71, 73-75, 101, 160, 254
Time, 65, 75, 275
Triadic (pattern) 74, 115, 139, 164, 175, 178, 180-181, 191, 253, 258, 282
Truth, 92, 290

Ultimate Reality, *see also* Reality, 1
Uncertainty, 232-233
Uniqueness, 69, 77
Unity, 44, 55, 86, 133, 168, 201
Universe, form and constitution, 64-76
  incompatibles in, 19
  Continuous, *see* Continuous
  Discontinuous, *see* Discontinuous
  of duality, 48
  of Related Duality, 84
  of Stages, 67, 98-99, 258
Unreal, the, 7, 41, 43, 73, 134

Vedantism, 191-193
Verification, 27

लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी, पुस्तकालय
Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration, Library
मसूरी
MUSSOORIE. 100841

यह पुस्तक निम्नांकित तारीख तक वापिस करनी है।
This book is to be returned on the date last stamped.

दिनांक Date	उधारकता की संख्या Borrower's No.	दिनांक Date	उधारकता की संख्या Borrower's No.

GL 190
MAL
100841

100841

अवाप्ति संख्या
Acc No. ~~JNU5447~~

वर्ग संख्या 190
Class No. Mal

पुस्तक संख्या
Book No. _____

लेखक
Author B.K. Malik

शीर्षक
Title Non-Absolutes

190
Mal

~~JD 1542~~

LIBRARY
LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI
National Academy of Administration
MUSSOORIE

Accession No. 100841

1. Books are issued for 15 days only but may have to be recalled earlier if urgently required.
5. An overdue charge of 25 Paise per day per volume will be charged.
3. Books may be renewed on request at the discretion of the Librarian.
5. Periodicals, Rare and Reference books may not be issued and may be consulted only in the library.
5. Books lost, defaced or injured in any way shall have to be replaced or its double price shall be paid by the borrower.