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MĀYĀVĀDA
OR
THE NON-DUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY
(VEDĀNTA)

SĀDHU ŚĀNTINĀTHA

P O O N A
1938

Publisher :—SĀDHU ŚĀNTINĀTHA

Present address—C/o Oriental Book Agency

15 Shukrawar

POONA 2.

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* Those who are interested in the Philosophy of Religion can get my work entitled "Sādhana-Expository and Critical" (Pages 294) by sending only the postage (four annas) to either of the above-mentioned addresses.

P R E F A C E

This work embodies the result of my research on Vedānta Philosophy the study of which occupied my attention for a good many years. I received initiation in Vedāntic line of thinking from the renowned Sādhu Mangal-nātha of Rikhikesh (in 1913) whose Sanskrit works like विचारविन्दु bear testimony to his deep penetration into this most important branch of Indian Philosophy. Afterwards I received instructions from and studied some authoritative works on this system with the distinguished scholar Swāmī Prakāśānanda Puri of Rikhikesh whose erudite exposition of अद्वैतसिद्धि's commentary is well-known among the Sādhu-students of advanced Vedānta. I received much help from Rāmāśrama of Uttarkāśī in learning much about Vedānta-प्रकरण। The practical lessons on the highest Vedāntic Truth and the system of self-discipline for its realisation in life I obtained from the most revered saint Bābā Gambhīrnātha of Gorakhpur whose profound silence and habitual meditative mood in the midst of all circumstances set up a high spiritual ideal before my aspiring soul and roused in me strong desire for systematic Sādhana and truth-realisation. I am deeply indebted to the famous Swāmī Turiyānanda (a fellow-disciple of the celebrated Swāmī Vivekānanda) whose inspiring talks gave much impetus to my Sādhana. I owe a debt of gratitude to the most remarkable Yogī Swāmī Siyārāma of Jambu-Kāshmir for some valuable suggestions on the actual practice of Yoga. I enjoyed the edifying company of Muni Nārāyan of Petlād (Guzrāt) and studied with him वेदान्तसिद्धान्तमुक्तावलि and भेदधिकार। I am grateful to Swāmī Siddhārūḍhra of Hubli (Karnatick) for giving me some instructions on several important topics on Vedānta. I am deeply obliged to Pandit Atmārāma Śāstri of Deccan, a good scholar of Neo-Nyāya and Neo-Vedānta, with whom I studied the three most difficult and important works of Neo-Vedānta, viz. वाचस्पतिकृत

तत्त्वालोक (including many important प्रक्रिया of लघुचन्द्रिका and गुरुचन्द्रिका of अद्वैतासिद्धि), मधुसूदनस्वामीकृत अद्वैतरत्नरक्षण and नृसिंहाश्रमकृत अद्वैतदीपिका। After having gone through all the available printed works on the Non-dual School of Vedānta I gave my attention to the study of Vedānta-manuscripts and studied more than six hundred works (Vedāntic) from different libraries at Bombay, Poona, Baroda, Madras, Tanjore, Srirangam, Mysore, Sringeri, Broach, Nasik and Calcutta. (Quotations from 60 important manuscripts have been given at the end of this book.) I am in deep debt of gratitude to Professor Akshaya Kumar Banerji for substantial help in the preparation of the main text. To this text which is purposely made non-technical, so that it may be intelligible to the general readers, I have added technical discussions which are printed in smaller types and in some places inserted as foot-notes and at the end as appendices (taken from my old manuscript copy). I earnestly request my readers to study, after the perusal of this book, our "Critical Examination of the Non-Dualistic Philosophy, which forms the fifth chapter of our work "The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion"* and having known what can be said for and against the said doctrine to freely rethink about the momentous problems.

AUTHOR

*"The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion," is published in two volumes (Pages 1110), a copy of which will be found in the library of any University or College in India.

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MĀYĀVĀDA

OR

The Non-Dualistic Philosophy (Vedānta).

INTRODUCTION.

I

According to this theory, one changeless differenceless attributeless self-luminous Being is the Absolute Reality. It is in Itself above time and space, above all cause-effect and subject-object relations. There is no second reality, within or outside Itself, from which It distinguishes Itself. It is pure Consciousness, without being conscious of any object, and without the will and effort to do or produce anything. Hence this Absolute Reality cannot be regarded as a self-determining and self-conscious Person, in the sense in which self-determination, self-consciousness and personality are understood by us. In it Being and Consciousness are identical. It does not create or produce this world of effects out of Itself through any kind of self-modification or modification of Its Power or Energy, nor does It create this world out of any other self-existent material by the exercise of will or effort. Therefore It is neither material cause nor the efficient cause of this diversified universe. Any connection with such creation or production would imply some sort of change and relativity in the nature of the Absolute Reality and would be inconsistent with the true character of this Reality, which is absolutely changeless and relationless.

It is obvious that this world of effects cannot be itself self-existent or the product of any other self-existent Reality

or Realities by the side of the Absolute Reality, for such a supposition would involve an evident self-contradiction. This theory reconciles the conception of the absolutely differenceless, changeless, attributeless self-luminous Being as the one non-dual Reality with the experience of the world of changing diversities, by asserting that this experienced world is not *real* in the sense in which that Absolute Self-luminous Being is *real*. Accordingly it is maintained that this world of experiences has no *real* existence, but that it has only *apparent* or *illusory* existence.

Now, every object of experience having only apparent or illusory existence must have as its *substratum* or *ground* some entity with *real* independent existence. Since the former is not *really* produced by nor *really* exists alongside with the latter, no *real* change or duality or relativity is created in the latter by the appearance of the former. In this way the changeless, differenceless, non-dual Absolute Reality is regarded as the *substratum* or *Ground* of this world of experience, which has only *apparent* or *illusory* existence and does not therefore affect the changeless differenceless non-duality of the Reality. But as this apparent or illusory world owes its existence or *appearance* to that Reality, and has in its nature nothing which comes from any other independent source, that Absolute Self-luminous Being must be conceived as its material as well as efficient Cause, though not in the sense in which a cause produces an effect of the same order of real existence with itself. Accordingly, the Absolute Reality is spoken of as the Illusory material and efficient cause of the universe. It is as such cause of the world and as apparently related to this world, that the Absolute Reality is conceived as God. The Godhood of the Absolute, being relative to this world, is as *apparent* as the world itself. Therefore when we think of the Absolute Reality as an omnipotent and omniscient Personality and the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the phenomenal realities of the world, the Absolute is not contemplated in

Its true essential character, but only in Its apparent or illusory character in relation to the illusory world.

To account for the *appearance* of this illusory world on the *substratum* of the Absolute Reality, the recognition of another Principle or Power is found necessary, which also cannot be regarded as *really* existent with the Substratum, but which becomes the source, and in one sense the modifying material cause, of the illusion. This Principle is called *Māyā* or *Avidyā* or cosmic Ignorance. It is through the agency of this neither-real-nor-unreal inexplicable principle that the changeless differenceless Absolute or Brahman appears as a plurality of finite individual selves and diversities of finite objects related to them, and it is as the ground and sustainer of these selves and objects and as related to them that Brahman appears as God.

These are the fundamental elements in the theory we are going to represent here with the principal arguments by which they are supported by its illustrious exponents.

II

The advocates of this theory recognise mainly six sources of valid knowledge, viz. Perception, Inference, Analogy, Implication, Non-perception (of a perceptible object), and Scripture. Of these, Analogy, Implication and Non-perception may be regarded as different forms of Inference, if the term Inference be taken in the wide sense, and they are all ultimately based upon Perception. Perception being necessarily related to particular objects or phenomena with which there may be sense-contact, all those forms of inferential knowledge must be confined within the bounds of those truths which are, somehow or other, positively or negatively, related to those data of perceptual knowledge. Hence the infinite and eternal, unrelated and absolute, transcendental and necessary Truth cannot be an

object of any of these forms of knowledge. Though all finite and temporal, related and conditional, phenomenal and contingent truths, attainable through perception and inference, may presuppose such an infinite, eternal unrelated, absolute, transcendental and necessary Truth, the precise nature of this Truth cannot be ascertained by any of these sources of knowledge. Consequently the only source of knowledge on which we have to rely for the attainment of the knowledge of this Truth is self-evident Scripture. As perception is the primary source of the knowledge of all sensuous phenomenal truths, so Scripture (*Vedānta*) is the primary source of the knowledge of the supersensuous noumenal Truth. Just as the course of our normal life and the advancement of popular and scientific knowledge would be impossible without an implicit faith in the validity of perception and the laws of drawing inferences from the data supplied by it, so the attainment of the knowledge of the Absolute Truth and the ascent to the higher planes of spiritual life would be impossible without a similar implicit faith in the authority of Scripture and the rational laws of interpreting it. It is through faith that we accept the laws of thought and all self-evident truths. We can acquire knowledge of the phenomena of the empirical world and the forces and laws operating within it by means of perception and inference, but if we want to expand the scope of our knowledge beyond the limits of this phenomenal world, if we yearn for knowing the ground and cause of this world, the principle of the origination of this world and the ultimate ideal of our cognitive, emotional and active life, we must have recourse to Scripture.

The scriptural texts are conceived, not as the products of human wisdom, thought and experience, but as the verbal or linguistic embodiments of truths connected with the nature of the Absolute Reality as well as with the nature of duties and virtues and the forms of self-discipline enjoined upon men for emancipation from Ignorance and realisation of

the differenceless unity of that Reality. Thus Scripture is regarded as originating from God, almost in the same sense as the world of finite spirits and objects is regarded as originating from Him. Scripture alone can give us first-hand knowledge of the ultimate character of the self, the world and God and reveal to us that they are in their true character non-different from the Absolute Reality, Brahman. By pursuing the course of self-discipline as enjoined by Scripture and meditating on the nature of the Reality as revealed by it, the individual self can realise the absolute unity of itself with the Reality, and in this state of self-realisation the objective world vanishes as illusory.

The human intelligence, with the help of its inherent logical categories, cannot *independently* acquire knowledge of the Absolute Reality, and of the means of emancipation from the Ignorance which is the source of its individuality and finitude. But it can apply itself to the interpretation of the scriptural texts for the purpose of discovering their true significance and thereby forming an adequate conception of the Reality. Logical principles, being the necessary instruments of the human intelligence for the proper understanding of truth, must be applied, not as independent means of finding out the Absolute Truth, but as means of rationally interpreting and systematising the scriptural texts removing the doubts and difficulties that may arise to the finite mind in connection with their meaning and validity, and establishing the exclusive adequacy of the Truth revealed therein for furnishing the true rational explanation of all the facts of experience. Herein lies the efficacy of logical speculation, so far as the Absolute Reality is concerned.

This is the view of the advocates of the theory under discussion, with regard to the primary source of the knowledge of the Absolute Reality and the scope of logic in establishing the validity of this knowledge. We shall now proceed to represent the principal logical arguments by

which they seek to establish rationally the fundamental concepts of their theory and attempt to place what they accept as scriptural truths on a rational basis. Our representation will be in the following order. First, we shall state the rational grounds for holding that pure Existence or Being is the absolutely real non-dual substratum of the world of experience. Secondly, we shall adduce arguments to demonstrate that one changeless consciousness is the witness or illuminer of all changing mental states, processes and experiences. Thirdly, we shall establish the self-luminosity of this consciousness. Fourthly, we shall demonstrate the absolute non-duality of Consciousness by showing that there cannot be any duality or difference within itself, that there cannot exist more than one self-luminous consciousness and that Consciousness and Existence are absolutely identical. Fifthly, we shall show how the phenomena constituting the world are illusorily identified with this Existence-Consciousness. Sixthly, we shall logically analyse the nature of the principle of causation and then having established its illusory character demonstrate the necessity of recognising the inexplicable cosmic Ignorance to account for the illusory appearance of the diversified universe upon the changeless substratum of that non-dual self-luminous Existence-Consciousness. Seventhly, it will be shown that it is by being illusorily conditioned by this Ignorance that the Existence-Consciousness appears as or is conceived as the self-conscious self-determining omnipotent and omniscient God and as the material and efficient cause of the universe.

CHAPTER I

Proof of Being or Existence as the non-dual

substratum of the world.

It is a matter of universal experience that whatever object is perceived is perceived as existent. We perceive the pot as existent, the cloth as existent, fire as existent, water as existent etc. This is not only true of particular gross objects of sense-perception; it is also true of the general classes (सामान्य) of objects, of the subtle objects of mental experience, of the attributes and activities and modifications and relations of substances. All kinds of entities that are or can be known by means of perception or inference or implication or any other source of valid knowledge, must necessarily be conceived as existent. They convey to the knowing subject the universal notion of existence along with the ideas of their specific characteristics. We cannot know anything without at the same time knowing the existence of it. The knowing subject itself also must be existent in order to know the objects. Even when we think of the negation of anything, the idea of negation itself involves the idea of existence.

Thus, Existence is found to be the universal element involved in the conception of all subjects and objects of knowledge. All other characteristics are changing, all names and forms are changing; all the specific attributes and relations and actions, that pertain to the nature of things and make the things appear to be what they are, are subject to limitations and changes. They are present in some objects and not in others, and even in the same object some of them are found to be sometimes present and sometimes absent. The objects themselves are found to be produced and transformed and destroyed. In all of them

Existence is experienced as the only universal element, admitting of no change or modification or limitation. Existence cannot be limited in space, because space itself must be conceived as existent ; limitation of Existence in space would imply the self-contradictory idea of the existence of non-existent space. Limitation of Existence in time also would involve a similar self-contradiction. As pure Existence cannot be conceived as possessed of any attributes or properties or any distinction of essence and the non-essential, pertaining to its nature, it cannot be supposed to have any modification or change of its character. Since Existence cannot be conceived as non-existent, its production or destruction is inconceivable. A particular object with its specific properties may appear to be existent at a certain time and in a certain place and non-existent at other times and places and can therefore have production and destruction and limitation ; but this is not possible in the case of Existence itself. Since temporal and spatial characteristics and limitations cannot pertain to the nature of Existence, Existence cannot be conceived as consisting of or divisible into parts or differences within itself. Thus Existence must be conceived as the one and non-dual, partless and differenceless, infinite and eternal, attributeless and changeless Reality. If the changing particular features of objects are eliminated, if all specific names and forms, attributes and relations, activities and changes are eliminated, i.e. if all possible eliminable factors of the objects as well as the subjects of experience are eliminated, then one pure undifferentiated unindividuated unlimited formless changeless attributeless Existence or Being alone remains as the *substratum* of all the finite and transitory, particularised and differentiated objects constituting the world. This Existence or Being, therefore, must be recognised as the non-dual Absolute Reality.*

* Having searched for unity in all these diversities (1) the Naiyayika-Vaisesikas recognise that unity is due to the universal pervading genus inherent in individuals and the highest pervading

Here a controversy may arise. It may be objected that though Being or Existence is experienced as the most universal and inevitable element involved in the knowledge of all particular objects as well as all species of objects and is the ultimate residual element remaining in the conception of every object after the elimination of all particularisations and all possible eliminable factors, this can not be accepted as an adequate ground for asserting that genus is Existence (सत्ताजाति). The existence of an entity, say the pot, is due to its relation of *Inherence* with the genus of universal existence (unmodified and different from effects). (2) The Buddhists found unity as illusory. The Existence is the intrinsic characteristic of an entity. According to this view, Existence is momentary and so capable of being interpreted in terms of efficiency (अर्थक्रियाकारित्व). The Buddhists do not recognise the reality of a real independent eternal Universal as the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikas do, nor do they regard the individual as consisting of a two-fold aspect viz. the generic and the specific (सामान्यविशेषात्मक) as the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjalas and some other philosophers do. The Sāṅkhya-Pātañjalas and many Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva sects accept that one non-dual Existence embraces diversities and manifests itself as various. All existent effects are but the modifications of one universal self-existent entity (*Prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala views and God in those Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva views). According to the Jains, Being is not the same in all things ; nor is it of a persistent and unalterable nature ; Being, they say, is subject to production, continuation and destruction (उत्पादव्ययधौव्ययोगित्व). This theory they call the theory of the 'Indefiniteness of Being' (अनेकान्तवाद). (4) The protagonists of the view under discussion (the Non-dualistic School of *Vedānta*) assert that the existence of an entity is nothing but the appearance in it of the substratum Existence which is one, permanent, without beginning, change, or end. Thus of the following four possible alternatives viz. the universal and particulars are different entities, particulars are the only entity and the universal a cipher, the universal and particulars are two aspects of one and the same thing, or finally the universal is the only reality and particulars are merely illusory entities, the fourth is recognised by the Non-dualistic School of *Vedānta*, that is, it is concluded that there is one and only thing of the nature of mere Existence (non-dual) and differences are illusory.

this pure Being is the Absolute independent Reality and the sole substratum of all phenomenal realities. As Being or Existence is nowhere experienced apart from relation to the concrete particular objects of external or internal experience, it is only by the process of abstraction that we can think of Existence separately, and to conceive it as an independent substance would be to regard an abstract feature of things as a thing by itself. Consistently with the general experience, the nature of Existence may be conceived in various other ways. It may be regarded as the most universal *attribute* of all realities of experience, or as the *summum genus* or the *most universal genus* of all objects and species of objects or as a kind of relation pertaining to all kinds of realities. If no one of these alternatives be acceptable, then only it can be regarded as the underlying substratum of these phenomenal realities.

Now, the advocates of this theory point out at great length the logical difficulties involved in all these alternative conceptions of the nature of Existence and establish their own conception as the most rational one. (See our *मायावाद in Hindi*). It is pointed out that Existence cannot logically be regarded as an attribute. Whether an attribute be essential or accidental, it must itself be existent and must be related to an existent substance; a non-existent attribute cannot be related to a non-existent substance. If existence be regarded as an attribute, it must be either existent or non-existent. In the former case, this attribute 'existence' must have another attribute, viz. existence, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus it would lead to an absurdity. In the latter case, there is the absurdity of a non-existent existence being related to a substance. Further, since the attribute 'existence' is not identical with the substance, either this attribute 'existence' must be related to a non-existent substance, or the substance must be conceived as being a reality without having existence. Both these alternatives are inconceivable.

and absurd. Therefore Existence can in no way be consistently conceived as an attribute.

It is also shown that Existence cannot be logically regarded as a genus. The existence of a genus is involved in the existence of the individuals. We may rise up to the conception of higher and higher, or more and more universal, genus, pervading a larger and larger number of individuals; but even the highest and most universal genus must be existent in order to pervade the individuals falling under it. If Existence itself be conceived as the genus, then this Existence also must be regarded as existent in order to serve the purpose of the genus. Should that existence of existence be again regarded as the genus of this existence and should we thus go on making suppositions *ad infinitum*? This is of course absurd. Further, the conception of Existence is involved in exactly the same manner in the conception of the individuals and the classes, the species and the genera, the substances and the attributes, the actions and the relations. This could not have been the case, if Existence had been merely the most universal genus underlying the substances.

Thirdly, it cannot be seriously contended that Existence is a kind of relation. Relation always implies at least two related terms, each of which must be existent, and the relation between which also must be existent. If existence were a kind of relation, then apart from this relation the so-called substances, attributes, etc. would be non-existent and there could be no such relation among them and they could not come into existence at all. It may however be said that the production of a substance or attribute or action consists in its coming into relation with existence. But in that case existence itself cannot be regarded as a relation; but it has to be conceived as some reality, in some sort of relation to which the existence of those objects consists. This means that everything owes

its existence to its relation to Existence. It cannot be said that the existence of a thing consists in its relation to space and time or to senses and the mind or to any other entity, because such relation presupposes the existence of the thing as well as of the space, time, senses, mind etc. to which it becomes related.

Thus it is found that Existence can neither be regarded as the universal attribute of realities nor as the universal genus of all particular realities, nor as a relation among realities. The only possible alternative is that Existence must be regarded as the Reality itself. It is evident that it cannot be thought of as one among a plurality of realities, because all the realities of actual and possible experience involve Existence and they are real only so far as they participate in the nature of Existence. Hence Existence must be conceived as the sole Reality—the one absolute unconditional Reality. It cannot be distinguished from anything, because whatever we may attempt to distinguish it from must either be conceived as existent or be denied as nothing. Therefore there cannot be anything either within or without Existence, from which Existence can distinguish itself. In it there can be no real distinction between 'is' and 'what is', between 'is' and 'is not', between 'subject' and 'predicate', between 'substance' and 'attribute', between 'particular' and 'general', between 'within' and 'without'. It must be conceived as the absolutely differenceless non-dual Reality.

If this be the true nature of Existence, without reference to which no object of direct or indirect knowledge—no phenomenal reality—no substance or attribute or action or relation—can be conceived, then how should we describe the nature of these phenomenal realities which constitute the world? They must of course be conceived as *nothing other than Existence*. All things must, in their ultimate essential nature, be regarded as Existence itself; but the

differences which are experienced among them consist only in their particular names and forms. Thus all objects of this universe must be conceived to be Existence Itself appearing as conditioned and particularised and differentiated by various names and forms. Accordingly, the pot is Existence itself appearing as a distinct entity only due to the form of 'potness' and the name of 'pot' attributed to it. In the same way, all actors and actions are Existence, all knowers and knowables and knowledges are Existence, you are Existence, I am Existence. We all differ from one another only in the diversities of names and forms.

These names and forms can not of course be real in the sense in which Existence itself is real. They are always changing; they appear at one time and place and disappear at another time and place. They have evidently no independent existence,—no existence except in relation to Existence itself. They do not even really pertain to the nature of Existence. If they had any real relation with Existence, each of them would be eternally present, and there would be no birth and death, no production and destruction, no modification and transformation. But as these particular names and forms, which constitute the particularities of the objects of the universe, are always appearing and disappearing, becomes sometimes existent and sometimes non-existent, they cannot be regarded as having any real relation with Existence. Moreover, the relation between Existence and these names and forms cannot be logically defined in any such way as to indicate their reality and the reality of the relation. Hence the necessary conclusion must be that all these names and forms, which particularise the objects and constitute the universe and thereby manifest Existence under various conditions and limitations and relativities, are only illusory appearances of Existence, and that Existence is the sole

real substratum of all these appearances. Thus the differences among all objects of the world are illusory; they are in reality one; there is no room for any real difference anywhere; this means that the world of diversities does not *really* exist. The differenceless non-dual Existence is thus proved to be the sole Absolute Reality.

The Theory of Being.

Let us consider whether Being or Existence is (1) the actual nature of the particular existent things (वस्तुस्वरूप), or (2) an attribute (धर्म) inherent in all existent things, or (3) an all-pervading modifying Substance which transforms itself into all kinds of existent things, or (4) finally the one non-dual Substratum (अधिष्ठान), illusorily manifesting itself into all forms of apparently existent things.

1. Existence cannot be regarded as constituting the actual nature of the particular existent things; because in that case, the actual natures of different things being different, the existences of different things would have to be conceived as different from one another. If the existences of particular existent things be conceived as different, then the universal (अनुगत) knowledge (knowledge of the pervasiveness) of existence,—i.e. the conception that the same existence pervades all existent things, involved in such knowledge as 'this thing is existent', 'that thing is existent', and so on,—cannot be explained. Existence has got no differentiating attribute (such as difference of measure in the case of a lamp), and the said knowledge cannot be said to be contentless; hence existence should be recognised as all-pervading. Further, if existence were the very nature of any finite entity, then, since a thing cannot change its essentially identical nature, it would be impossible for any particular thing to be deprived of its existence. This would accordingly mean that the particular things cannot possibly have any production and destruction. But this is contradicted by our experience. If a thing were always existent, it would have been experienced even before its production and after its destruction.

2. Some observe that Existence (Being) is an attribute (धर्म) of things (and not the nature of things घटादिवस्तुस्वरूप). With regard to the exact nature of this attribute there are different views; e. g. (a) Existence is an attribute opposed to non-existence (असत्त्वव्यावृत्तिव); (b) It is an attribute of being the content of affirmative cognition (विधिप्रत्ययवेद्यत्व); (c) It is an attribute of being the content of valid cognition (प्रमाणविषयत्व) or the capability of valid cognition or its relation; (d) It is the attribute of efficiency (अर्थक्रियाकारित्व); (e) It is the attribute of being (अस्तित्व); (f) It is the attribute of being present (वर्तमानत्व); (g) It is the attribute of universal generality (पराजाति).

Let us examine these views, one by one:—(a) Existence cannot be defined as consisting in the absence of non-existence. Since the conception of non-existence itself is dependent upon that of existence, how can existence be defined in terms of non-existence? It would involve the fallacy of Interdependence, the apprehension and determination of each being dependent on those of the other. (b) Existence cannot be defined as the attribute of being the object of affirmative cognition. In that case, there would be the inversion of invalid illusion and valid perception. That is, there would be the reality of rope-snake also, because even the rope-snake is a content of affirmative cognition; and its negation would be false, because it is not the object of affirmative cognition, but becomes the object of the negative cognition 'this is no snake.' Moreover, there would be the existence of the sky-flower etc., because the cognitions, such as 'the sky-flower is', which are produced through words, are also affirmative in character. If it is objected that the knowledge of sky-flower etc., being produced through words are not direct affirmative cognitions, then those entities which are not directly perceived would become non-existent. Hence Existence cannot be regarded as the attribute of being the object of affirmative cognition. (c) Existence cannot be defined as the quality of being the object of valid cognition. In that case, before a thing becomes the object of valid cognition, it would have to be regarded as non-existent. Moreover, what is the meaning of 'valid cognition'? It would have to be

defined as the cognition of a thing as it really exists. Thus the conception of valid cognition itself involves the previous notion of existence. If now existence be defined in terms of valid cognition, then there would be the interdependence of the ideas of valid cognition and existence. Further, the support of the valid cognition as well as the valid cognition itself is and must be regarded as existent. If, now, the existence of a thing be defined as the quality of being the object of valid cognition, this valid cognition and its support, being existent, must be the object of another valid cognition, which again must for the same reason refer to another valid cognition and so on *ad infinitum*. In this way there would be the fallacy of infinite regression. The difficulties are not avoided by defining existence as the quality of (*not being the actual object*, but) being *capable of standing as the object of valid knowledge*. If to explain the capability of being the object of valid knowledge another capability has to be granted, then it would lead to infinite regression. If it is not granted, then the valid knowledge would be non-existent, and hence all objects would become non-existent. Also, existence would be beyond perception. Thereby, the alternative viz. 'existence is its relation' is also refuted. (d) Efficiency cannot be accepted as constituting the character of existence, because even when there is non-apprehension of it, there is the cognition of existence. If efficiency be the characteristic of existence, then the false snake-biting etc., also will have to be counted as an existent thing, because it has efficiency. If efficiency of efficiency is admitted, then there will be infinite regression, and if not admitted, then all will be non-existent. Besides, as efficiency presupposes existence, it cannot itself be regarded as existence. (e) It cannot be said that existence is the attribute of "Being". To hold that such perceptions, as "this is existent", and "that is existent," have for their content the Being, it should be admitted that Being consists in remaining in some relation. If it will remain by being particularised by the relation of *Inherence*, then there should not be the experience of Being in eternal substances. Eternal substances do never and nowhere remain by the relation of *Inherence*. So the Being cannot remain inherent in eternal substances. But they are also experienced as existent.

Hence existence cannot be said to be the attribute of Being. If this Being is of the nature of remaining by being particularised by the relation of conjunction, then that "remaining" will not be in quality etc. (गुणादि) because quality etc. do nowhere remain in conjunction. The substances (द्रव्य) alone can have conjunction, but quality, action etc. have no conjunction. Hence because the eternal substances have no "remaining" in *Inherence* (in other entities) and qualities etc. have no "remaining" in conjunction (in other entities), there cannot be an all-pervasive existence. Nor can it be said that Being is common to all by being a temporal attribute (कालिक विशेषण). If Being be the "remaining" by being particularised by the relation to time, then owing to the impossibility of the remaining of all produced things in one time, there will be the difference of time which determines that Being, so that Being also will be different. Hence, existence as a temporal attribute cannot explain its all-pervasive character. Nor can it be asserted that the cognitions, such as "this is existent" and "that is existent" have for their object "remaining" in the all-absorbing time (महाकाल), because there is naturally no perception which objectifies the all-absorbing time as severed from distinguishing properties like 'now' 'then' and the like. Even if it be admitted that there is the all-absorbing time in which existence remains, still the fact that existence remains in different durations like now and then, Being, differentiable by them, cannot be denied, because there are perceptions like "now exists" and "then exists". So the explanation of the cognition of pervading existence cannot be given by holding that it is the attribute of Being. (f) Existence cannot be said to be an attribute of being present (वर्तमानत्व), because existence refers to the past and the future as well.

(g) Existence cannot be proved to be the universal genus inherently related to individuals. It is a rule that the perception of a pervading entity necessarily implies the pervasive character of the attribute and the relation of the same entity, because both are contents of the perception. If the attribute of substratum be pervading, but the relation of the attribute and the substratum be non-pervading, then there

cannot be the perception of pervasion. Take for example, the perception of manhood ; here the genus manhood is pervasive, but in case its relation be non-pervading, then this perception cannot be a perception of pervasion ; when we perceive manhood as belonging to this man present before us, the perception is not evidently pervasive, because though the relation of *inherence* of manhood is pervasive in character, still in the present case the temporal relation of manhood being limited in character, its perception is non-pervasive. This example further shows that the perception of one identical content becomes different when modified by different relations : the perception of manhood as inherently related with all men is pervasive and the perception of the same manhood, as belonging to the present man, is limited in character and consequently must be treated as different. If, according to the difference in individual cases of perceptions, in perceptions like 'the book is existent' 'the table is existent', existence is taken to be different, then the attribute of existence becomes non-pervading. If this is the case, then there cannot be the perception of existence as a pervading entity. If this existence is regarded as of the nature of genus, then the attribute, namely the genus of existence, will no doubt be pervading, but the relation of attribute and the substance will not be pervading. To be more plain, if we take into consideration such perceptions as 'the substance is existent' 'the quality is existent', 'action is existent', we find the genus of existence existing in them as their attribute, being inherently related to them ; but if we consider the cases of perceptions like 'the genus is existent' '*inherence* is existent', we find that the genus of existence does not become attribute of genus and *inherence* by being inherently related to them, but becomes their attribute by being related to them by a common relation, namely the relation of having a common support (*एकार्थसमवाय*) ; so the relation of the attribute and its substratum in this case becomes non-pervading ; therefore there cannot be the perception of existence as a pervading entity and consequently existence cannot be predicated of all things of the world.

It is said that the genus of existence is everywhere the object of the knowledge of existence by direct or indirect

relation. But the qualified (विशिष्ट) knowledge which is of the nature of perception takes place everywhere through direct relation with its content. If it could occur through even an indirect relation with the content, then through conjunction etc. of the support of silverness with the stone, there would be the qualified perception of silverness in stones etc. But such a cognition never takes place. So through an indirect relation with its content, there cannot be a direct determinate knowledge of an entity. Besides, the universal knowledge of one uniform form should always be through one uniform relation; otherwise it cannot be of one uniform form, as is the case with the cognition of the object and the cognition of the said cognition. In other words, the distinction of perception is observed through the difference of relation, direct or indirect, with the content. What is valid knowledge is directly related to its support — the self, and what is called the object of valid knowledge is indirectly related to the same, because the object of knowledge is related to the self not directly, but by becoming the content of knowledge whose support is the self. So there are two distinct knowledges with regard to them. Hence the self-same perception of existence cannot be possible in some cases through direct relation and in others through an indirect relation.

Perception of one uniform nature cannot be interpreted differently in different cases, and uniform perceptions must refer to an identical content. If by relation of a dissimilar kind there be a perception of the same kind, then dissimilarity of relation will cease to exist, because the oneness or manifoldness of the contents e. g. relation etc., should be determined through perception. In the present case, because the perception is of a uniform kind, its object namely relation will be one, that is, there will be no dissimilarity of relation.

Thus, in order to explain the apprehension of existence as a pervading entity, another existence separate from genus has to be granted.

The doctrine viz. Existence is the universal modifying substance is not sound. It is not experienced that existence has

got differentiating attributes. Besides, shell-silver and dream-visions which are illusory become experienced as existent, whereas modification implies the same essence of that which is modified and that into which it gets modified. It will be shown that Existence or Being is Consciousness which is constant and is the witness of modifications and as such beyond modification or alteration. Hence the conclusion which the Non-dualist School of *Vedānta* reaches is that the knowledge of the pervasiveness of existence viz., 'this exists,' 'that exists' is not due to some finite object, nor is it due to some momentary attribute, nor is it due to some permanent attribute, (genus of being) altogether different from individuals, nor is it due to some modifying ultimate non-dual Substance from which the universe is both different and non-different, but it is due to the existence which is unmodified Substratum of the universe which cannot be said to be different or non-different or different + non-different from the Substratum. Existence alone appears in the forms of different objects, but these are not real forms actually assumed by Existence.

CHAPTER II

Proof of one changeless Consciousness as the witness of all mental states, processes and experiences.

Now let us follow the advocates of this theory in proving that one non-dual changeless consciousness exists as the illuminer and witness of all mental modifications of all individuals and is the ground of all experience and knowledge.*

* Here let us state the different views about knowledge or consciousness. According to the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikas knowledge becomes known by another knowledge and is not self-luminous. It is a function of the self in conjunction with *manas*. The Buddhists assert that knowledge is not non-self-luminous nor is it known by another, but it is self-luminous. Self-luminosity means that it is the object of itself; knowledge has no support, it is momentary and has beginning. The Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas are of opinion that knowledge is self-luminous, it is the illuminator of itself and others; it is supported in self and has production and the like. According to the Jainas knowledge is self-luminous but has no production and the like; it is with attribute, it has the attribute which falls in the category of the known (such as the attribute of *Jīva's* ever going upwards etc.). According to Sāṅkhya-Pātañjalas knowledge is a function of Intelligence (बुद्धि), which, though by itself non-self-luminous, is illumined by the self-luminous self or *Puruṣa*; this self has no known attribute, but it has individuality (there are many selves or consciousnesses). According to the non-dualistic Vedāntists knowledge consists in the modification of the non-self-luminous mind, which is illumined by the changeless attributeless self-luminous non-dual consciousness, which itself is not an object of knowledge. Self-luminosity does not mean that it is the object of itself, but means that it is itself luminosity; it does not become illuminated by itself or by others. The self-luminous consciousness is not momentary; it has no beginning; but it is beginningless and changeless. Consciousness is without support, bereft of production, void of attributes and is without particularisation. It is manifested as witness-consciousness or the unmodified seer of all objects inner and outer.

(a) The states of waking, dream and sleep are the objects of universal experience. The experience of these different states can be accounted for only by the admission that there is one consciousness pervading all these states. In the absence of one unchanging consciousness along with all these changing states, there could not have been any knowledge of the changes of those states. Without the unity of consciousness, in the presence of which the states appear and disappear and succeed each other, and by which they are illumined and united with each other, the appearances and disappearances of the states as belonging to the same entity could not be known at all. While the waking state exists, the states of dream and sleep are non-existent, and while either dream or sleep exists, the waking state is non-existent. Hence it is not possible for the waking state to experience and remember the state of dream and sleep. The states of the transition from waking to dream, from dream to sleep and from sleep to waking cannot also for the same reason be the matters of experience and remembrance to the waking mind. Similarly, the dreaming or the sleeping state of the mind also cannot have the experience and remembrance of the other states. No state of mind can possibly experience the other states in which it is itself not existent. It may be said that these states being the modifications of the same mind are experienced and remembered and compared with each other by the mind itself. But what does this mean? When the mind is modified in one form or state, the other forms or states into which it may be transformed at other times must be admitted to be absent and must therefore be beyond the scope of its experience and remembrance. If it be the nature of the mind to exist in one or another of these modified forms, then on account of the mutual exclusiveness of these forms it cannot even be experienced that they belong to or are the modifications of the same mind. Hence if the mind is to experience them as its own modifications, the mind:

must be regarded as capable of existing as the one identical on-looker and experiencer of these different forms or states, and therefore must be conceived as having a changeless transcendent existence unaffected and unmodified by these forms. That is to say, the mind must then be regarded as modified as well as unmodified, changing as well as changeless, existing in one or other of the states as well as existing above all these states. This is evidently self-contradictory. Thus the inevitable conclusion is that as the witness or the unmodified experiencer of all these mental modifications one changeless consciousness must be admitted. It has to be admitted that these different states, the presence and absence of the particular states and the nature of the difference between them, are experienced and known by a consciousness, which does not undergo any change along with those changes of states, which does not sleep in the sleeping state nor does awake with the waking state, but which is equally present in the same character in all these states. This consciousness must therefore be distinguished from the mind which is modified into these different states and must be regarded as their unmodified witness.

The absence of this witness cannot be proved. Because the existence of the three states of the mind and their negation are known as dependent on it, the non-existence of this knower cannot be known by the mind at any state and cannot be established by any means. It is obvious that its non-existence cannot be known by itself, because this knowledge would presuppose its presence. So, as the ground of the existence and negation of the three variable states of the mind, the unchanging witness-consciousness ought to be recognised. If all were variable, then variability itself would not be determined. The very notion of change involves a reference to the changeless. The knowledge of the changes implies the existence of a changeless knower.

This knower, however, cannot be an *object* of knowledge. Its presence is presupposed by all knowledge. It cannot be an object of consciousness, but it is consciousness itself. It shines by its own light and is self-established. All those states and their attributes which are objects of experience and knowledge must fall under the category of the unconscious, the seen; because they are not self-illuminating, but are objects illumined by consciousness. The unconscious, the seen cannot be the attribute of the consciousness, the seer, because in that case both would lose their natures. That which is the seer of production and destruction cannot have production and destruction, because the knowledge of one's production etc. is not possible for oneself. If another seer is assumed and so on, then there will be infinite regression. So the seer of all states is other than the seen. Thus, as the limit (अवधि) of all coming and going of states, the existence of one all-seer which is distinct from all objects of the world is proved. Owing to its being the illuminator of all states and owing to its being devoid of all coming and going it is called witness or the unconcerned consciousness.

(b) Here we have to prove witness-consciousness through the analysis of the knowledge of mental phenomena. In this connection we shall discuss four points:—namely (1) that the fact of remembrance of past experiences demands the recognition of a witness-consciousness; (2) that the only logically tenable conception of the states and processes which we experience within ourselves is that they are the modifications of one mind-substance and are thus identical with the mind and that their experience as belonging to the same mind presupposes a changeless witness-consciousness; (3) that the knowledge of the mind and its modifications cannot be explained in any other way than by admitting one unchanging self-luminous entity illuminating those modifications and

(4) that this changeless self-luminous entity, viz. witness-consciousness is indispensable for the knowledge of the production, the continuity of existence and the destruction of phenomena.

Now let us take up these points in order :—(1) It cannot be denied that the thing which is now remembered must have been previously experienced. Previous experience must be taken as one of the necessary conditions of remembrance. If it were otherwise, then the thing which was not experienced would be remembered. Because there is agreement in presence as well as in absence, of memory with previous experience, we know that they are causally related. Now, it is also evident that the experience cannot be regarded either as the sole cause or as the direct cause of remembrance, because many objects of experience, being forgotten, are not remembered, and because when remembrance occurs, it occurs after the actual experience is destroyed and sometimes even long after. The destruction of experience also cannot be its cause, because when destroyed, experience is absent, and the absence of all types being of a like nature, mere absence of anything cannot be the cause of any effect. If from the absence of experience remembrance could be produced, then anything and everything, not previously experienced, could be remembered, and the experience of anything would not have been the necessary pre-condition of its remembrance. Further, in that case the recollection of an apparently forgotten object through concentration of attention and the improvement of memory through practice would not be possible. If some phenomenon is proved to be the necessary pre-condition and originator of some other phenomenon, but is found to be non-existent at the moment immediately preceding the production of that effect, we have to recognise its presence in some subtle form. Accordingly, as remembrance is universally recognised as the effect of

previous experience and as this experience is not found to be actually present at the time of the production of remembrance, it is logically necessary to admit the existence of the experience in the subtle and unmanifested form, called impression (संस्कार). It is a universal rule that the cause must exist immediately before the production of the effect ; it may however exist either in a gross and perceptible form or in a subtle and imperceptible form. If this were not the case, then the cause-effect-relation would not be determined. Thus, remembrance is due to impression and impression is due to past experience.

Now, if this is admitted, then it must also be admitted that the actual experience, the impression and the remembrance belong to the same support or are the modifications of the same mind. Otherwise the experience of one person might produce impression in the mind of another, and this might produce remembrance in a third person. But this does not occur. Hence they must be recognised as the modifications of the same mind. But these modified states of the mind are actually different from one another, and one cannot be the object of the knowledge of another. They must therefore present themselves to the same consciousness, which remains unmodified and witnesses them as related to each other and as modifications of the same mind. So the explanation of remembrance demands the recognition of one changeless witness-consciousness of experience, impression and reproduction.

(2) Here a question may arise as to what is the relation of the states and processes like those of experience, impression and remembrance with their support, the mind. Does the mind consist in the succession of these states and processes, or is it a substance with which these states and processes are associated as attributes, or are they actions performed by the mind-

substance without itself undergoing any essential change, or is the mind a substance of such a nature as to be itself modified into these states and processes? If the first alternative be accepted, then the mind should be merely a general name for the plurality of phenomena of a certain kind and there would be no such entity that could really be called mind. In that case how can we account for the essential connection among these phenomena? How can the experience of an object, its impression and its remembrance be essentially linked with one another? How can the occurrence of one be dependent upon that of another? They should be wholly unconnected phenomena, having no principle of unity underlying them, and the relation of invariable succession or concomitance experienced among them could not be accounted for. To account for such relation, the unity of their support must be acknowledged. This support is the mind-substance, which must be distinguished from the plurality of phenomena,—the diverse states and processes—that are experienced.

But if these phenomena be regarded as the attributes or actions of the mind-substance, then also difficulties arise. Are the attributes or actions related to the substance without producing any change in its nature or is the nature of the substance itself changed through the appearance and disappearance of those phenomena? If the substance remains wholly unchanged, then it is difficult to understand how the attributes or actions be causally related to one another. Attributes or actions cannot have any independent existence and cannot by themselves produce any effect. It is a substance with attributes and actions that can produce effects. Further, if the mental phenomena are externally related to the mind-substance without in any way affecting its nature, then the mind itself must have an attributeless, actionless, changeless nature. It would

then be pure Existence. In that case all these mental phenomena would be merely ascribed to the mind and not pertain to its nature. But it would not then furnish any adequate explanation for the well-ordered appearance and disappearance of causally related attributes or actions. Moreover, no logical relation could then be determined between such a mind-substance and those attributes or actions. If, on the other hand, the nature of the mind is changed along with the changes of those states and processes, then the mind as conditioned and particularised by one state must be different from that as conditioned and particularised by another, and for witnessing or experiencing them as belonging to the same mind, a consciousness remaining identical throughout these changes must be admitted.

For the purpose of adequate explanation of the systematic appearance and disappearance of those states and processes and the essential causal connection among them, the only alternative, therefore, is to hold that the mind is a substance modifying itself into those phenomena. If this is the nature of the mind, then the mind should always remain in one or another of the modified forms. It should be in the waking or dreaming or sleeping state, in the knowing or feeling or willing state, in the state of perception or impression or remembrance, and so on. The mind cannot be conceived as existing apart from any of such modified forms. When all gross and perceptible modified forms are absent, it must exist in a subtle modified form. There is transformation from the gross to the subtle state and from the subtle to the gross state. If this modification be accepted as the essential nature of the mind-substance, then these modified forms of the substance must be regarded as essentially identical with the substance itself. Thus the relation between the mind and its states and processes must be logically admitted to be the relation of *identity*. The processes of perception, inference,

remembrance, etc. are accordingly nothing but different conditioned and particularised forms in which the mind exists and exhibits itself. This implies that there is identity of essence among all these mental modifications, and the deep-seated causal connection and the uniformity of succession and concomitance among them can be reasonably accounted for on the basis of this essential identity.

But the essential identity of the mental modifications with the mind-substance does not preclude differences among them, because identity does not mean absolute non-difference. Absolute non-difference is obviously absurd in this case. The mental modifications are evidently different from one another. On account of these differences the problem of knowledge—that aspect of the problem which we are discussing here—remains unsolved. How can these different mental phenomena be known and recognised as the modifications of the same mind? Since the modifications cannot know each other and since the mind is constantly changing from one modified form into another and always exists in one or another of the modified forms, the mind and its modifications alone cannot supply any answer to this question. For the solution of this problem it is necessary to admit the existence of one changeless self-luminous consciousness, which witnesses all these modifications and their relations without being itself modified or affected in any way. We shall next take up this point for a little more detailed discussion.

(3) Four alternatives may be suggested for explaining the knowledge of the mental modifications and their relations to one another and the mind :—(I) Either these mental modifications are self-luminous, (II) or they are cognised by each other, (III) or they are known by the mind-substance which is their support, (IV) or finally they are witnessed by some consciousness which is beyond these states and their support. (I)

Of these the first alternative is not tenable. These modifications and the relations among them appear as contents of cognition; so they cannot be regarded as self-luminous. If these states were independently self-luminous, then no one of them could have been the object of the knowledge of another, and comparison of them would not have been possible. The apprehension of a relation among different factors requires the knowledge and the simultaneous conception of those factors by the same knower. In the case of the independent self-luminosity of the mental modifications, there would be no such identical knower and no such knowledge and conception. Hence those mental states could not be compared with one another and consequently there would not be the apprehension of the relation among them. Thus their difference and manifoldness would remain unknown. As their characters are essentially relative, in the absence of the relations among them they themselves would remain unknown and unknowable. Therefore their self-luminosity is untenable.

(II) These states cannot become direct objects of knowledge to each other, because they are successive and do not meet together. Further, that which knows must be either self-luminous or illumined by some other entity. If each knowing state is self-luminous knower, then each being subject as well as object of knowledge, must be self-luminous as well as non-self-luminous, and this is absurd. If on the other hand, each becomes a knower by being illumined by another self-luminous knower, then all these apparently knowing states are really of the nature of objects of knowledge and presupposes one self-luminous consciousness, which is not the object of any knowledge.

(III) The support (mind) which is identified with the states cannot perceive them, because with the production and destruction of every state it also gets transformed. Because there is neither entitative nor spatial difference between the substance and its modified form, this form cannot be objectified by

the substance. The supposition of the possibility of the mind being the knower of these successive states and relations would make the mind a transcendent self-luminous consciousness and not the modifying support of those states. (IV) Hence some consciousness which prevades all these but is at the same time without states, must be accepted. Otherwise we cannot explain remembrance, difference of these states and their production and destruction. Without one changeless permanent subject of our psychic activities we cannot have a stream of thought. Even a stream has its identity, and anything which we call a unity is something more than the sum of its parts.

(4) In order to know production, abiding and destruction, there should be one and the only one immutable consciousness which is the witness of the moments of production, abiding and destruction. If for witnessing the witnessed things, there is transformation in the witness, then this transformation must either be simultaneous with witnessing or witnessing must come after transformation. If transformation and witnessing take place simultaneously, then it cannot be said that the witness requires transformation for witnessing. If transformation comes before witnessing, then its witnessing will be interposed at the moment of its transformation. Hence, it should be accepted that because the witness-consciousness is the illuminator of transformation, it is not subject to transformation. If there were no consciousness to witness time and temporal transformations—no witness which is void of all kinds of transformation and devoid of limitation of time (as the presupposition of time and space),—then the knowledge of time and transformation due to that would not be possible at all.

(c) We shall now prove the necessity of witness-consciousness by the analysis of stream-cognition (धाराज्ञानं). The person who has continuous knowledge about some

object, say the pot, remembers after that cognition that so long he experienced only this thing and did not know any other. Thus, this remembrance consists in the remembrance of the ego relating to a continuous period of time, that of the process of stream-cognition and that of the ignorance of other objects. Now, if they had not been experienced at the time of the stream-cognition, then the above-mentioned remembrance would not have been possible, because remembrance must have for its object what was experienced. Without admitting the previous experience of the objects, their remembrance cannot be explained. Now, the question is, how can the experience of the ego, the continuity of the cognition of the same object, and the ignorance of other objects, at the time of the stream-cognition be accounted for? Neither the mental modification nor its support—the mind—can account for it. The mind is at that period in a continuous state of modification into the cognition of the object, which is its sole content. This object-absorbed modified condition of the mind cannot at the same time make the *ego* and the *ignorance* its objects of experience. Not only that; the fact of the *continuity* of the cognition also does not become the object of its experience, because at every unit of time there is one mental modification, which cannot make another modification of another moment its object of experience. Thus the stream-cognition and its support and the ignorance of other objects are not the contents of the stream-cognition, the object with which the mind is occupied is alone the content of this cognition. But as all remembrance presupposes experience, so in order to offer explanation for the aforesaid remembrance of the stream-cognition and its support—the ego, and the ignorance of other things, one persistent unmodified consciousness higher than the ego and not liable to be transformed with the mental modifications, but capable of witnessing all of them must be recognised. Because there is no discontinuity in the stream, there will be no production

of knowledge having for its object the ego or its modifications in the shape of knowledge. So as the witness of the ego and its modification, the eternal consciousness has to be acknowledged. The stream-cognition, because it is objectified by the self-luminous eternal consciousness, is remembered.

Opponent (Naiyāyika):—There is nothing called self-luminous eternal Consciousness. Knowledge is not self-luminous, but it merely manifests objects and becomes illuminated by another knowledge distinct from it. The after-knowledge or post-perception (viz. I am possessed of the knowledge of a pot) is consequent upon the mere consciousness of the object (viz. this is a pot). The said remembrance is due to the post-perception of the stream-cognition. Both perception (व्यवसाय) and post-perception (अनुव्यवसाय) are supported in the self (unconscious); they are attributes of the ego and not beyond the ego.

Answer:—Here it may be asked whether post-perception comes after respective cognitions or after the stream-cognition. The first is not possible. In that case it would disturb the uninterrupted cognition of the object e. g. the pot. In other words, if the perception of the perception intervene in the way, then due to the occurrence of perception of a dissimilar kind in the middle, the continuous perception of the object would not take place. The result would be the breach of continuity of the ego and the break of the stream itself. This assumption would further contradict our direct cognition of continuity and would not at all explain the memory of it. If it be objected that that cognition (post-perception) is not of a dissimilar kind because it has for its object the pot; to this we reply as follows:—when the person has got the desire to know the pot, and the accessories of external knowledge, namely contact with sense-organs etc., are there, the above cognition of the perception is not possible in the middle of the stream-cognition. Owing to the strong desire for knowledge of the pot, its knowledge must continue. If even in the middle of the stream-cognition, there is a cognition of cognition, then that must evidently be due

to the strength of the materials that favour the cognition of cognition, and if this is the case, then there would not be at that time any knowledge that refers to the external object. Moreover, if the perception of the pot is cognised on the way, then there should not be the remembrance, such as "I did not know anything else except the pot," because the knowledge of the pot which is different from the pot was cognised at that time. The aforesaid second alternative is not also sound. The cognitions beginning from the first which are destroyed cannot be cognised after the stream-cognition. Thus, it is found that at the time of the destruction of the stream-cognition, there is no direct experience of the ego, of the stream-cognition and of the ignorance of entities other than the object continuously perceived ; and it has been shown that these cannot be directly perceived at the time of the stream-cognition ; so in no way the direct experience of these three through mind or ego can take place. Hence the attempt to explain the said remembrance either through the perception of the stream-cognition in the middle or through the perception of the stream-cognition after its cessation proves a failure. Therefore the witness of the nature of eternal perception which explains (साधक of) the stream-cognition as a whole (that is, from its beginning to its end and not by parts) must be recognised.

The view (Bhātṭa-view) which accepts that knowledge is inferential (inferred through knownness produced in the object) cannot also explain the said remembrance, because the establishment of an inference is based on the knowledge of the existence of the middle term (हेतु) in the minor term (पक्ष) and that of the co-existence of the middle term with the major term (व्याप्तिज्ञान). So the cognition of the stream-cognition will be, according to this view, due to various cognitions intervening in the middle of the stream and this would mean a denial of the stream itself.

So for the explanation of the said remembrance, the self-luminous consciousness beyond the ego is to be accepted.

Opponent (Naiyāyika)—The stream-cognition can otherwise be explained. When the last member of the stream-

cognition is known through the mind, the previous cognitions are experienced through the contact of generality (सामान्यत्वज्ञान-सन्निकर्ष)---the contact of knowingness (through contact of generality, all members sharing the generality can be directly perceived).

Answer:—The cognition of the stream-cognition cannot be a case of perception through the contact of generality. The contact of generality can take place, if an object which is the support of generality is present before the sense; if there be no jar present before us, the perception of all jars of the universe through the contact of jariness, cannot occur. But it is a matter of everyday experience that in the case of the stream-cognition, even after the lapse of an hour, when all the members of the stream are decidedly destroyed, when no member of the stream exists, we happen to remember that we perceived an object continuously for a period of time, and it is futile to conceive of its knowledge gained through the contact of generality. Further, even if it is granted that there can in this case be such a contact, still it would only give us the cognition of the various members of the stream and not that of their occurring at distinct moments of time. In other words, all members of the stream would be experienced as sharing the generality called knowingness and not as successive and continuous. Moreover, at the time of cognition of the last member of the stream, the previous members do not exist; so their apperception (अनुव्यवसाय) cannot take place, because the apperception of what is not presented is not proper.

Opponent (Prabhākara):—Without accepting the witness-consciousness, we can explain the said remembrance in another way. The stream-cognition is self-luminous. As the support of the stream-knowledge, the ego is manifested. The knowledge which is inherent in the ego is the illuminator of the knower, the known and knowledge. Hence, through the consequent impression which objectifies the ego and the stream-cognition, the said remembrance is made possible.

Answer:—This view, because of its not recognising the witness-consciousness cannot explain the remembrance of

ignorance about other objects such as "I did not know any other thing but the one continuously perceived." You cannot, consistently with your position, admit that the ignorance of other objects i. e. unknown objects, is illuminated by the self-luminous knowledge. If such is the case, then known objects must be known to some other knower, that is the witness-consciousness. This would mean virtually the negation of your position and the acceptance of our view.

Moreover, the cognitions inherent in the ego are produced and produced knowledge is manifested as an object; but objectification of an entity by itself is not possible. Hence the produced knowledge is not self-luminous. The ego and knowledge inherent in the ego cannot have for their illumination another ego and knowledge respectively and also they cannot themselves know themselves. So for the explanation of their illumination, one independent, eternal, self-luminous witness-consciousness should be accepted.

Thus if there is no eternal self-luminous witness-consciousness, then the remembrance of stream-cognition would have been impossible. Though the consciousness is eternal and so without destruction, still owing to the destruction of the various members of the stream-cognition which are its contents, there can arise impressions which are the cause of memory.

(d) The advocates of the theory offer another kind of proof of the witness-consciousness. It is a well-known fact that certain forms of activities and certain kinds of phenomena become the causes of pleasure to those who experience them. Take the case of dancing. A person knows that dancing becomes a cause of joy. Knowing this, the person proceeds to dance with the desire of deriving pleasure from it. This cause-effect-relation that obtains between the agreeable action and the feeling of pleasure can hardly be explained but by the recognition of a witness-consciousness over and above the ego. This is ascertained by the following considerations.

The determination of the cause-effect-relation between two entities implies a knowledge of the effect invariably following from the cause. But in the case under consideration this knowledge of the invariable sequence between the experience of a phenomenon like dancing and the experience of pleasure cannot be explained as the knowledge of the modifying mind or ego. The pleasurable feeling is solely due to and immediately follows from the experience of the phenomenon as agreeable (इष्टान्न) and does not require any other auxiliary condition for its production. Consequently, no other experience should intervene between the experience of the agreeable phenomenon and the agreeable feeling. So after the occurrence of the experience of phenomenon and before the occurrence of the experience of pleasure, there is no intervening state of the mind or mental modification, in which the mind can objectify and know the immediately preceding experience of the phenomenon; because as soon as the mind's modification in the form of this experience ceases, its modification in the form of the experience of pleasure arises, and when the experience of pleasure occurs, pleasure alone should be known. Moreover, as it is a rule that joy, whenever it occurs, must be known, the knowledge of joy would arise only as a result of the destruction of the knowledge of the agreeable phenomenon, and consequently the sequence of the experience of the pleasure and the experience of the agreeable phenomenon (which is past) cannot be known by the ego. The determination of the cause-effect-relation between the experience of the agreeable phenomenon and the experience of pleasure must be admitted to be dependent upon the knowledge of both of them at the same time and their invariable concomitance in presence and absence, or at least in presence. But as it is not possible for the modifying ego to know (as has been shown) both these experiences and their invariable sequence, it would be impossible for us to establish this cause-effect-relation, if the

modifying mind of ego were the only instrument of knowledge and there had been no knower above it. It is also to be noted that in most cases of the type mentioned there appears to be an unbroken continuous series of experiences of the agreeable phenomena almost simultaneously accompanied by a corresponding continuous series of experiences of pleasure. The two series of experiences appear to run parallel to each other. What really happens is that the mind is too rapidly modified from moment to moment, and each moment of the cognitive modification is immediately followed by the moment of the emotional modification. On account of the incessant modification, the two series seem to run concurrently. But in such cases no particular modification can be supposed to be the knower of another modification or of itself. Hence the ego which is being constantly modified, cannot establish the causal relation. But though it is impossible for the ego to know by itself the cause-effect-relation the knowledge of the cause-effect-relation is undeniable. Hence to explain this knowledge the unmodifiable witness-consciousness over and above the ego must be recognised as the ultimate self-luminous knower.

Opponent :—The knowledge of causal relation in such cases can otherwise be explained. After the experience of joy, there occurs a cognition which has for its content both the experience of dancing and the experience of joy, and the relation of invariable sequence of the latter with the former is thereby known by the ego. The recognition of the witness-consciousness is thus groundless.

Answer :—This cannot be. Only the present entity becomes the object of direct perception. If what is not present is admitted to be the object of direct perception, then there cannot be the determination of the real nature of an object through perception and consequently it will be impossible to utilise without doubt the cognised object in activities of life. But there is utilisation of a perceived object for daily use without

any wavering of mind. Therefore, as at the time of the aforesaid knowledge, the dancing is not present, so it cannot be the object of direct perception. Moreover, there is the rule that whenever one cognition has for its content two independent entities (समूहात्म्येन), they must be cognized as co-present. So even if the joy and the agreeable object become the content of one knowledge, still they would be known as co-present entities and consequently one cannot be known as following the other; therefore the cause-effect-relation existing between them cannot be known. The cause and the effect cannot be co-present, the latter must succeed the former. They, no doubt, become the contents of the same knowledge, when the causal relation between them is known; but the cognition of the relative priority of the former to the latter is involved in this knowledge. But this knowledge of the priority of one to the other is not possible, unless the two are cognised separately by the same knower, which afterwards brings together in idea these two cognitions in their proper relation of sequence. In the absence of such previous experiences of them in succession, the pleasure and the pleasurable object, if they become contents of the same knowledge, would be merely co-present entities like the left and right horns of a bull, and the said cause-effect-relation will not be established.

Opponent:—Though we cannot directly perceive that the joy follows the presence of the agreeable object, still this sequence between the object and the joy can otherwise be determined. The remembrance of the agreeable object is there, and from this we can infer that there occurred the perception of this object. And it can then be inferred that the experience of the agreeable is the cause of the experience of joy.

Answer:—This is not reasonable. By direct perception the antecedence of the experience of the agreeable object and the succession of the feeling of joy have not been known. Because there is no presence of the two in direct perception as antecedent and consequent, there cannot be the ascertainment of the cause-effect-relation between them. Such presence is always cognised by direct perception and not through inference having its reason remembrance.

Opponent:—Joy has a cause because it is an effect. By this inference it will be proved that the contact of the agreeable is the cause of joy.

Answer:—No. From this general rule it can be deduced that joy would have a cause, but no definite cause can be inferred. Consistently with this rule, it may, for example, be inferred that the conjunction of the self and the internal sense-organ is the cause of joy. In this way one may suggest various causes of joy and is not bound to support your theory that the experience of dancing in this case is the cause of joy. Moreover, the mere knowledge that joy has a cause cannot account for the activities people resort to (e. g. dancing) in order that they may experience joy.

Opponent:—The following inference will prove that dancing is the cause of joy :—All special attributes of the self are due to non-eternal knowledge (as is the case with will). Joy is a special attribute of the self. Therefore joy is due to non-eternal knowledge.

Answer:—In the first place, this inference simply begs the question, since without the recognition of the witness-consciousness, the experience of the production of the will from non-eternal knowledge cannot as well be explained. Thus, the example of production of the will just cited is a point which is yet to be proved and is not one to be utilised in silencing the opponent. Moreover, through this inference, even if joy be acknowledged as due to produced knowledge, it will never be established that the particular knowledge, namely knowledge of dancing alone, is the producer of joy.

Opponent:—The cause-effect-relation between the experience of the agreeable and the experience of joy can well be explained through extraordinary contact namely contact of generality (सामान्यलक्षणासन्निकर्ष). There is in joy the generality, namely joyiness, and in knowledge of the agreeable there is the generality, namely knownness of the agreeable. Through supernatural contact (knownness of the agreeable) all agreeable entities can be known, and similarly all joy will be known.

After the cognition of the agreeable and that of joy are over, all agreeable entities and all joy can simultaneously be known and through that the agreeable is established as the cause of joy.

Answer :—Though, through supernatural contact called generality, the knowledge of all agreeable entities and that of joy may occur, still through it the priority of the knowledge of the agreeable and the posteriority of the knowledge of joy cannot be known. Because the preceding of the knowledge of the agreeable and the following of the cognition of joy cannot be known through this contact and because this knowledge is necessary to understand the cause-effect-relation, so there will not be the understanding of the cause-effect-relation in question.

To sum up :—an entity is known as the cause of another entity, if the former invariably precedes the latter and the latter invariably succeeds the former. Knowledge of causality implies the knowledge of such antecedence and sequence. Now if the dancing is to be known as the cause of the feeling of joy, then there must be some consciousness which is related to both the experience of the dancing and the experience of joy. This consciousness that relates to both these cognitions cannot be produced and changeable in nature, as has been shown above. Hence that knowledge can be explained only if the all-illuminating presence of the eternal witness-consciousness is acknowledged. (See our अद्वैततत्त्वप्रबोधिनी in *Sanskrit*).

(e) In order to prove the unity of this changeless consciousness, the advocates of this theory adduce arguments to show that this consciousness is not merely the witness of the states and processes we experience within ourselves,— of the phenomena relating to the ego or the mind — but it is also the illuminator of the outside or extramental objects of experience. Before contact with our sense-organs, the extramental objects remain unknown to us. Whenever an object, for example, a jar, is known, its known form cannot be separated from and conceived as unrelated to the knowledge, of which it is the object. But from this it cannot be inferred that the object has no existence outside the

mind or apart from the mental modification in which knowledge consists. If the object had no extramental existence, then there would be no difference between knowledge and fancy, no valid distinction between knowledge and error or illusion, no meaning in the experience that it was previously unknown and has been afterwards known, no validity of the recognition of the object (on the occasion of its second, third or fourth perception) as having been perceived once or twice or thrice previously. The very fact of knowledge implies that its object exists in the unknown condition previously to knowledge and that the knowledge is produced through the contact of the object with the senses and through some mental modification. Thus we find that in relation to any particular mind, an object has the property of unknownness, which is supplanted by the property of knownness, which is produced through the process of knowledge. Now, this property of unknownness cannot evidently be regarded as essentially related to the nature of the object, for in that case this property could not have been destroyed without the destruction of the object itself and the property of knownness could not have been produced in it. So unknownness in the object must be regarded as a produced property and it must have a cause. The cause by which the unknownness is produced must be such an entity as is contradictory to knowledge, because it becomes driven out by knowledge. That entity may be positive or negative. But it is not sound to suppose that the unknownness is due to negation of knowledge. If it were so, it would never be known to us. But it is a fact that the unknownness of an object becomes somehow known to us. If this fact is not admitted, then the desire felt by the cogniser for the removal of the unknownness of an object and the activities conducive to the contact of the sense-organ with the unknown object made by the cogniser cannot be explained. The knowledge of negation requires the knowledge

(remembrance) of its counterentity (what is negated). In the present case this knowledge is not possible, because the knowledge of knowledge contradicts the knowledge of its negation. If there be no knowledge, then there is no question of the knowledge of the negation of knowledge. Hence it should be admitted that the unawareness (veiling) is due to some positive entity. This is Ignorance.*

* Ignorance cannot be the prior negation of knowledge in general, because the counterentity of such negation is always a particular content and not contents in general. Prior negation (अज्ञान) is the producer of its counter-entity and at the production of its counterentity it does not exist. If the perception "I do not know" has for its object the prior negation of all knowledge, then it will not be contemporaneous with knowledge of ignorance which is also a knowledge (so ignorance cannot be any other kind of general negation). Nor can ignorance be the prior negation of a particular knowledge. As prior negation has for its counterentity a thing that would come into being in future, so if ignorance be the prior negation of a particular knowledge, then it will be the negation of a particular experience that would take place in future, but we find that there are things which will never in future be known by a person, still the person has ignorance about these things and says that he does not know them. If ignorance be the prior negation of a particular knowledge, then it will not be capable of being directly perceived before the production of this particular knowledge or at the time of its production, or after its production; in other words, there will be then no experience of ignorance. When this particular knowledge is not produced, the perception of it, the counter-entity of the said prior negation, as particularised by this particular cognition, is not there; hence the experience of the prior negation of particular knowledge is not possible before its production. At the time of production of any knowledge the perception of the prior negation of that knowledge is not possible. The question of a prior negation being perceived after the production of its counterentity cannot arise, because prior negation is always destroyed with the production of its counterentity. The prior negation of a particular knowledge cannot be directly perceived, because the materials to know the future

Now, this positive ignorance cannot be regarded as merely subjective; but it must be conceived as having objective reference. The unknownness is perceived as attributive to external objects, and knowledge of those objects consists in the destruction of that unknownness in them and the production of knownness in its place. It is the ignorance pertaining to and veiling the nature of the objects, that makes them unknown to the individuals. There is the experience of unawareness regarding outside things; on hearing of a particular thing a person perceives that "this is unknown to me" and after acquiring knowledge of the thing he perceives that "I did not know this thing before." This positive objective character of the ignorance related to external objects is more clearly corroborated by our experience of illusory objects. In cases of illusory perception the real nature of the object present before the perceiving subject is veiled and remains

knowledge do not exist at the time of prior negation. Moreover, the knowledge (remembrance) of that which is negated is required for the knowledge of negation. In the case the cognition of prior negation, the negated object must be remembered not with its general characteristics, but with its distinctive individual features. Hence there is contradiction. But if ignorance is accepted as a positive entity, its perception in that case, not being dependent on the remembrance of the counterentity, will not imply this contradiction.

The cognition 'I do not know' cannot have for its object the negation called destruction of a particular knowledge. That particular knowledge which is not yet produced cannot be previously destroyed. If ignorance is the absolute negation of a particular knowledge, then ignorance and knowledge being counterentities cannot be co-existent, but the very fact of the knowledge of ignorance shows that ignorance and knowledge are co-existents (so it is not mutual negation). Moreover, there is the experience that through knowledge ignorance is destroyed; but as all kinds of negation of knowledge cannot be destroyed by knowledge, ignorance cannot be the negation of knowledge.

unknown, and an illusory object with illusory properties is perceived in its place. The perceptient subject cannot be regarded as creating or imagining the illusory object with its illusory properties by consciously veiling the true nature of the real object present, for in that case he would not suffer from the illusion. But the illusory object, perceived by him, must be regarded as a positive entity produced by a positive cause. This positive cause having veiled the real nature of the object produces the illusory object. This positive cause is such as to be capable of being destroyed by true knowledge, the appearance of which destroys that cause and its effect, the illusory object. This cause is therefore called Ignorance, the contradictory of knowledge. It cannot be defined either as a real entity or as an absolutely non-existent entity, for in the former case it could not have been destroyed by knowledge and in the latter case it could not have produced illusion. Hence this Ignorance is to be conceived as an *inexplicable* positive entity, and this is the cause of the property of unknownness of the unknown objects. As this inexplicable entity pertains to the nature of the objects unknown, it must be regarded as objective in character.

Now, it is obvious that those extramental objects with the property of unknownness are not self-luminous; because in case of their self-luminosity they would not be objectified by knowledge, nor could their difference be known, nor could there be doubt about them. So they should be illumined by some other entity. That illuminator cannot be outer lights etc., because the latter belong to the same category. The unknownness in the objects and the ignorance which is its cause cannot be illumined by senses or the mind, because at the contact of the objects with the senses and the mind, knowledge is produced and the unknownness with its cause ignorance is destroyed. That in the presence of which it cannot exist should not be regarded as its sustainer and illuminer. If unknownness

and ignorance could be known through a source of valid cognition, then after such knowledge, the object would appear as unknown. In that case valid knowledge would be fruitless and meaningless, because it would neither be able to remove ignorance and unknownness about things nor to produce knownness in them and acquaintance with their real nature.

It may be said that the ignorance with regard to external objects is not really perceived when it is present, but inferred after they are known. The knowledge of an object being produced, it is logically inferred that there must have been the absence of knowledge, i. e. ignorance, with regard to the object before the production of this knowledge. That this is not an accurate statement and a logical view of the matter must have been clear from the foregoing discussion. If this were the real position, then ignorance would mean mere prior negation of knowledge, and unknownness would not be a destructible objective property of the unknown things. In that case illusion also could not be explained. But as unknownness has been proved to be a positive objective property and ignorance a positive cause of this unknownness, the knowledge of them cannot be the product of the knowledge of the object, which destroys them. When the knowledge of the object occurs, it is known to have certain properties, including knownness. From this knowledge we cannot infer that it previously possessed some opposite property, such as unknownness, which is no more. Further, as this knowledge has never any direct experience of ignorance or unknownness, and as the invariable concomitance between prior unknownness and posterior knowledge can never be observed, this prior unknownness can never be an object of inference. Not only that; in the absence of the already present knowledge of ignorance and unknownness, it could not even be known that the knowledge of the object is produced. The

knowledge of the production of knowledge presupposes the knowledge of ignorance and unknownness related to the object. Moreover, in many cases we make efforts to know the unknown objects,—we adjust our attention, exercise our powers of observation, move to and place ourselves in suitable position, take the help of necessary instruments, and so on and so forth, for the purpose of the destruction of ignorance and the acquisition of knowledge with regard to them. Such efforts would not be possible, if we had no experience of the unknownness of the objects previously to their becoming known to us and if the unknownness had been known by inference from our acquired knowledge of those objects. There cannot be any desire and effort and action to destroy what is not known to be present or to know what is not known to be unknown. Thus, it is proved that the consciousness of the unknownness and its source, viz. Ignorance, pervading the unknown objects, is not the product of, but is presupposed by, the actual knowledge of the objects.

Moreover, we find a causal relation between the previous unknownness of an object and the knowledge which is produced. In the absence of the unknownness in the object, its knowledge could not be produced, for in that case the knowledge would be non-produced, i. e. eternal. It cannot be said that first of all, the object is known through direct perception and afterwards there is the knowledge of this causality. The knowledge of this causality cannot be the result of direct perception (प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण). At the time of direct perception of the object, the property of unknownness in the object or the object as conditioned by that property of unknownness is no more; hence the knowledge that the unknownness of the object or the object as unknown is causally related to its first perception cannot take place through the said perception. To obtain the knowledge of the causality by means of inference it is necessary to observe

the concomitant persistence and non-persistence of the cause and the effect, such as the existence of the unknown pot is uniformly followed by the perception of the pot and its non-existence is uniformly followed by the absence of such perception. As according to the supposition made here, there is no knowledge with regard to the existence of the unknown object before its perception and at the time of the perception the unknown object is non-existent, no concomitant persistence and non-persistence can be experienced between the unknownness of the object and its perception and therefore no causal connection can be ascertained between them. But the causal connection itself cannot be denied, because the very nature of the first perception of an object or the produced knowledge of an object, as distinguished from remembrance and eternal knowledge, implies that it must be preceded by the unknownness of the object, and in the absence of the previous unknownness such perception or knowledge cannot take place. Therefore it is necessary to admit some source of knowledge, by which the unknownness of the object can be known before the object is perceived and known,—a source which equally reveals the unknownness and the knownness—the ignorance and the knowledge—of the object.

Now, pursuing the mode of reasoning of this school of thought, we have found here that our knowledge of the external objects presupposes the property of unknownness in the objects, that this property of unknownness must be regarded as positive in character and pertaining to the nature of the object, that this property being destructible by knowledge must be conceived to be caused by a positive entity veiling the nature of the objects and having a character contrary to that of knowledge and that it is this positive entity which is called Ignorance. It has also been found that this Ignorance and its effect the property of

unknownness of the objects are neither self-luminous nor perceptible to the senses nor inferable from the knowledge of the objects nor capable of being known through any kind of mental modifications. This has led to the conclusion that there must be some source of the knowledge of the Ignorance and the unknownness pertaining to the objects, other than the generally recognised means of our valid empirical knowledge. What can be the nature of this source? All forms of knowledge due to mental modification and the Ignorance related to objects being mutually exclusive, the knowledge of the Ignorance must be due to a source which is unmodified and which has no contradictory relation with the Ignorance. Hence it must be admitted that it is the changeless self-luminous consciousness which witnesses the Ignorance and the unknownness pertaining to the objects.

This changeless self-consciousness has previously been proved to be the witness of all mental modifications,—all the states and processes we experience within ourselves. It is the presence of this consciousness which makes possible our waking, dreaming and sleeping states, our knowledge and remembrance, our desires and actions and enjoyments. Now it is proved that it is the same changeless consciousness which witnesses and reveals the existence of the unknown objects and the ignorance which veils their existence and nature from the senses and the mind. Thus this changeless consciousness is proved to be the witness, illuminer and revealer of knowledge as well as ignorance, of the known as well as the unknown objects, of the inner as well as the outer entities. This being the case, there is no ground for holding that there are different consciousnesses for different individuals, for the knowledge of the individuality and the differences among individuals must itself be witnessed and revealed by one identical consciousness, and in the absence of this unity of consciousness

the different individuals could not possibly know each other and recognise themselves as individuals, and even if different individuals existed, each would be confined to his own experience and the world of his own knowledge and ignorance, and the world could not be regarded as having any objective existence. Thus it is one non-dual changeless self-luminous consciousness that must be conceived as the witness and revealer of the entire universe of mental and extramental relative realities.

CHAPTER III.

Proof of Self-luminosity of Consciousness

Let us now have a little more detailed examination of the question of the self-luminosity of Consciousness, and the necessity of this self-luminous Consciousness for illumining knowledge.*

* Philosophers uniformly admit that an object is manifested or illuminated by knowledge, but there is a difference of opinion regarding the illumination of knowledge which illumines the object. According to Sāṅkhya and Vedānta, the knowledge which manifests an object does not take the help of any other entity for its own manifestation. This is known as the doctrine of the self-luminosity of knowledge (स्वतःप्रामाण्यवाद). According to the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas knowledge is not self-luminous, it merely manifests objects and becomes illumined by another knowledge distinct from it. The subsequent knowledge that illumines the previous one is, according to the Naiyāyikas, a perception of perception, and according to the Bhāṭṭas, is an inference based on the awareness (knownness) produced in the object, and there can be no perception of perception (called अनुव्यवसाय—apperception.) Apperception means the knowledge which is produced after the previous cognition which it reveals. For example, after the knowledge of the book, I know that I know the book. The knowledge of the book is व्यवसाय (previous cognition) and the knowledge of the knowledge of the book is अनुव्यवसाय (apperception of the previous knowledge). (The object with its knowledge, they say, is known through apperception.) According to the Bhāṭṭas, just after the knowledge of an object, we can understand through direct perception that an attribute called awareness (ज्ञातता) is produced in it. From this awareness we draw the inference that the knowledge about the object was produced in me, because it is a rule that wherever awareness is perceived as identified with the object, there the object has become a content of knowledge. Thus, the inference of knowledge about the object is based on the ground of awareness produced in it. The view upheld by the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas is opposed to the doctrine of self-luminosity of knowledge.

Here four alternatives may arise :—(1) It may be held that knowledge is possible without being illumined i. e. it may illumine its objects without itself being illumined ;

Whenever knowledge is produced in the self, then alone the self becomes manifest; and when knowledge is not produced, the self remains unmanifest, and consequently at that time it exists in an unconscious state like such objects, as the book, the table etc. This is the view of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas concerning the self. Thus the manifestation of self means the production of knowledge in the self. It is to be noted that the self even when known, does not become the object of knowledge, but because of the manifestation of knowledge in it, through its connection with the mind and the senses, appears as conscious. The difference of the self from unconscious things consists in this that in the unconscious objects, knowledge is not produced at any time, but in the self knowledge is produced through its conjunction with the mind (the inner instrument of knowledge).

Prābhākaras also hold with the Naiyāyikas, that the self is in itself an unconscious entity, and knowledge is produced in it through its conjunction with the mind; whenever there is the production of knowledge, there is manifestation of the object, and the self never becomes an object of knowledge, though due to the production of knowledge in it, it is illumined. The difference of the two views is this that according to the Naiyāyikas, the self becomes illuminated through another knowledge called apperception, but the Prābhākaras do not admit the illumination of the self through apperception. The Prābhākaras observe that knowledge by being produced in the self illuminates itself, its object and its own support—the self. If it is asserted, they observe, that knowledge and the self, the support of knowledge, are illumined through apperception, then there will be the fault of infinite regression; so to avoid this regression they hold that knowledge is self-luminous and that along with the manifestation of the object, its knowledge and the self are manifested. The Vedāntist (the Non-dualistic School of Vedānta) sees the fault of the superfluity of hypotheses (शैत्य) in this view too, inasmuch as it asserts that knowledge and the self, its alleged support, are two separate entities and to avoid this defect has recourse to the theory that knowledge or consciousness is identical with the self and is self-luminous.

(2) It may be supposed that knowledge illumines its objects by being itself the object of and illumined by another knowledge; (3) Thirdly, it may be maintained that knowledge is illumined by inference from illumination of objects, i. e. having known the objects first, we infer that we have knowledge; (4) Fourthly, knowledge may be regarded as due to self-luminous consciousness.

(1) Of these, the first alternative cannot be accepted. If knowledge were unillumined, then at the time of knowledge we would be conscious of objects alone without being conscious that 'we know the objects'. But in our normal knowledge we become at the same time conscious of the object known, the subject knowing, and the relation between the two, viz. knowledge. If this were not the case, then the object once perceived by a person could not have been remembered by him as the content of his own knowledge or recognised by him on second perception as having been previously perceived by himself, and a man's own knowledge might appear to be as good as another man's knowledge. Further, it cannot be conceived how knowledge without itself being illumined can bestow light on the objects. It seems absurd to think that the objects are revealed by the light thrown upon them by knowledge, but knowledge itself is in darkness, having no light either of its own or received from another entity.

(2) Secondly, it cannot be said that knowledge is illumined by being the object of another knowledge. In that case the flow of knowledge would go on without end, because that other knowledge also being non-self-luminous must be illumined by being the object of another knowledge, and so on. Hence the fallacy of infinite regression would be unavoidable. The fallacy of infinite regression should be associated with other faults as well, namely (1) that the antecedent cognition being destroyed as soon as the subsequent cognition occurs should be unable to account for

the illumination of the latter (प्राप्लोग) ; (2) that each of the cognitions being non-luminous by itself and there being no ultimate self-luminous entity, there should be no revelation of any of the cognitions and hence none of the cognitions should be able to account for the illumination of the object (आविनिगम्यत्व) and (3) that all the cognitions of the series being unilluminated, all of them together also should be inadequate to account for the illumination of the object (प्रमाणापगम—the fault of accepting many knowledges of which we have no experience). The net result would be that knowledge of objects should be impossible on the supposition that one knowledge has to depend upon another knowledge for its illumination.

(3) Thirdly, knowledge cannot be illumined by inference. Inferential knowledge is dependent upon the direct knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the data and the object of inference. If there be no direct knowledge of the knowledge of objects in any case, and if there be nowhere any first-hand knowledge of the relation between the knowledge of objects and knowledge itself, this knowledge can never be the object of inference. Further, inferential knowledge also is a form of knowledge and it is meaningless to say that knowledge itself is not self-luminous, but that it is illumined by inferential knowledge. The only alternative that can have any plausible sense is that one knowledge is known by another knowledge, and the fallacies involved in it have been pointed out above. *

* If knowledge is not self-luminous, that is, if that knowledge becomes an object of another knowledge, then the relation of knowledge to the knowledge of knowledge becomes inexplicable. The relation may be conceived either as conjunction or as inherence or as identity or as a subject-object-relation. There cannot be the relation of conjunction, because according to the opponent knowledge and knowledge of knowledge are both supported in the self and so they are

(4) Therefore in the end, we have to accept that there is one self-luminous consciousness which is the knower or illuminer of knowledge. The recognition of a changeless eternal non-empirical self-luminous consciousness underlying the modifying mind or ego and the objects of its knowledge, desire and enjoyment can alone furnish adequate

both its attributes, but there can be the relation of conjunction only between two substances. Though the relation of inherence between the self and its attributes is admitted, still such a relation between attributes inherent in the self is not admissible. One knowledge being different from another, there cannot be the relation of non-difference between the two knowledges. Besides, the opponent is wrong in maintaining that an entity can have the relation of non-difference with itself because a relation always implies some difference, real or apparent.

The opponent cannot also say that there is the subject-object-relation between the cognition and the cognition of cognition, because the opponent, as will be shown presently, fails to explain the nature of this relation. This subject-object-relation must either be included in one of the seven categories of the opponent, or it must be an entity that does not come under any of these seven categories. [According to this theory, the world-system can be interpreted in terms of two kinds of categories or classes of entities पदार्थ, namely positive and negative. Of these, the positive categories, which are altogether distinct from each other, are six in number, viz. substance (द्रव्य), attribute or quality (गुण), action or movement (क्रिया), genus or universality or generality (जाति or सामान्य), inherence (समवाय) and speciality or particularity or ultimate differentia (विशेष) Substance has qualities and movement, and is the immediate basis of phenomena]. Of these two alternatives, the latter cannot be upheld by the opponent, because that would be going against his own position and we show that he cannot consistently uphold the first alternative. This relation cannot be said to be a substance, because this relation subsists between two cognitions, which are attributes, but a substance never rests in attributes, whereas an attribute rests on a substance. This subject-object-relation cannot be an attribute, because it subsists between two cognitions which are attributes, and an attribute is never supported in another attribute. This relation cannot be an action,

explanation for all these phenomena. Ignorance which veils the nature of objects and knowledge which unveils are both illumined by this self-luminous consciousness, which is eternally present at their back and is their unmodified witness. The sense-contacts and the mental modifications, through which the non-egos or the extramental things are illumined and their existence and nature are revealed, are themselves illumined by the changeless self-luminous consciousness. It is for this reason that at the time of knowledge, the knowing ego, objects

as in that case it will not be supported in an attribute, because an action is always supported in a substance and not in an attribute. The relation of knowledge and the knowledge of knowledge cannot be the genus called existence, because the genus 'existence' being present in another knowledge which has no connection with this knowledge, that other knowledge will become the knowledge of this first knowledge and thus there will be the fault of unwarrantable stretch. The said relation cannot also be regarded as any other genus excepting the genus of existence; because of its subsistence in attributes, it cannot evidently be the genus of substance or that of action; and if it is the genus of attributes, the other attributes besides knowledge will, owing to their possession of the genus of attributes, become cognitions, and thus the fault of unwarrantable stretch is unavoidable. This relation is not the विज्ञेय, because the category of विज्ञेय does not rest on attributes, but it rests on eternal substances. The said relation cannot be said to be inherence. It will be proved later that there is no such thing as inherence. The relation of knowledge and knowledge of knowledge cannot be negation; because mere negation is everywhere the same, so this alleged negation will rest in things which are not objects of the knowledge in question, that is to say, the knowledge which objectifies knowledge will also take others for its object. But this is not experienced. It cannot also be asserted that the knowledge is known by another knowledge remaining unrelated to it, because then there will be unwarrantable stretch. Because the absence of relation is without difference, it will be everywhere uniform. Hence the fault. Thus it is proved that knowledge is not known by another knowledge.

known and the act of knowledge become the related contents of the same knowledge. It is by being revealed by this consciousness that ignorance and unknownness relating to objects also can be known, and it is on this account that desire and effort for the removal of ignorance and acquisition of knowledge become possible. It is the changeless superempirical unity of this self-luminous witness-consciousness that reveals the empirical unity of the diverse modifications of the mind or the ego and the empirical unity among the amazing diversities of the universe and renders the relation between the mind and the objective world possible. This self-luminous consciousness is the ultimate subject, to which the empirical ego or mind, its modifications and their objects are alike objects. From the ultimate standpoint these latter are all unconscious, because they are non-self-luminous; and the self-luminous changeless subject alone is conscious. It is through the reflected light of this consciousness that the ego or the mind appears to be conscious, and the ego being thus brightened by the illumination of pure consciousness sheds its lustre upon the external objects and becomes conscious of them. Self-luminosity, which is involved in the very notion of consciousness, pertains and can possibly pertain only to the changeless superempirical witness.

It remains unmodified in its self-shining nature even in the states of trance, swoon and dreamless sleep.

Dreamless Sleep.

When a person awakes from dreamless sleep, he has the remembrance, "I had sound sleep" "I did not know anything." About this knowledge, no doubt can ever be entertained; and it cannot be said to be erroneous, because it is not contradicted afterwards. It is not remembrance of any experience of the waking mind, because the said remembrance refers to an experience of the state of sleep. Because the remembrance has for its object an experience of dreamless sleep and because this

experience is qualified by the condition of not knowing anything whatsoever, it cannot be said that it is the recollection of what has been experienced in the state of dream. Dreamless sleep alone is the state of ignorance of all objects and not the state of dream, because in dream things are experienced. This remembrance, therefore, proves that there is actual experience of ignorance at the state of sound sleep and that ignorance is a positive entity capable of being experienced and remembered.

Opponent (Naiyāyika)—It is not a case of remembrance at all, but an inference having for its object the negation of knowledge during the time of dreamless sleep. At the time of waking when knowledge appears, it is inferred that in the state intervening between this state and previous waking state, there was no knowledge at all, on the following grounds :—

(1) Firstly, there is no remembrance of any internal or external phenomena that might be experienced during the time of sleep, and if there had been any experience, it would have been remembered as in the case of preceding states of waking and dream ; (2) secondly, at that time there was no material for experience, such as sense-contact and mental activity ; (3) thirdly, sound sleep is a particular state (distinct from the waking and dream), in which there is temporary cessation of the connection between the self and the mind, the mind and the senses, and the senses and objects.

Answer :—The above-mentioned three reasons are not to the point. (1) The first argument is this: in the state of dreamless sleep, there was no knowledge, because we have a remembrance of the fact that at that time there was the self merely, and no remembrance of the fact at that time that there was the self as possessed of knowledge. If this reason is valid, then there should not be the remembrance of the self even: at the time of dreamless sleep, there is according to the opponent, entire negation of knowledge, and so there cannot, at that time, even be the knowledge of the existence of the self, devoid of all cognitions, and consequently there cannot be aforesaid remembrance. Moreover, the self, as conceived by the opponent,

is by itself unconscious; hence it cannot have the experience of its own existence in dreamless sleep, therefore the self cannot be remembered at the time of waking and thus the above reason namely remembrance of the self merely is not proved. Before the aforesaid inference, it cannot be proved that dreamless sleep is negation of knowledge of all objects, so there cannot be the knowledge of the middle term namely non-remembrance of the self as possessed of cognition during dreamless sleep. In other words, because there is no knowledge of dreamless sleep before the knowledge of negation of entire knowledge, the aforesaid reason cannot be proved before the inference is actually made.

(2) Now, about the second reason. Without knowing the negation of entire knowledge, the negation of materials of knowledge cannot be known, because through the negation of effect (knowledge), the negation of materials of knowledge has to be known. So it comes to this, that through the negation of knowledge, the negation of the materials of knowledge has to be known and through negation of materials of knowledge, the negation of knowledge has, the opponent observes, to be known. Hence there is the fallacy of interdependence. Owing to this fault, the knowledge of the middle term is impossible.

(3) About the third:—If by particular state, you mean dreamless sleep, then the major (साध्य) and the middle (हेतु) terms will be one because dreamless sleep is the negation of knowledge and the major term is also the negation of knowledge. But this cannot be, because if the middle term and the major term are identical, then the attempt to establish the major term through the middle term is meaningless. If by dreamless sleep, you mean a state separate from waking and dream states, then also it would not be correct. Because there is knowledge in dream and waking states, and because there is no knowledge in dreamless sleep, so we understand that dreamless sleep is separate from the dream and the waking states, but such understanding cannot take place before the knowledge of the negation of knowledge. Without understanding of negation of entire knowledge, the separateness from waking and dream states cannot be known, hence the reason of the inference will remain unknown, and when a reason is unknown, there can be

no inference. The third ground leads to no conclusion, because it involves the fallacy of Interdependence. That there is cessation of connection between the self, the mind and the senses and the objects is certainly not directly experienced, but can be inferred from the absence of knowledge at that state. How then can the absence of knowledge at that state be inferred from this premise? The argument should rather be reversed. The reality of the state of sound sleep, in which such cessation of connection may occur, can be established, only if what is called absence of knowledge at that state is directly experienced.

Thus, it is shown that it cannot be proved through an inference that the state of dreamless sleep is a state of negation of entire knowledge.

The negation of knowledge in dreamless sleep cannot be experienced at that time. In order to know negation, the knowledge of its substratum and that of the negated is necessary. Without knowledge of the substratum and that of the counterentity of negation, the negation of knowledge cannot be experienced in sleep. If both these knowledges remain there, then it will contradict sleep. The said negation is not the object of the source of valid knowledge called non-apprehension (अनुपलब्धिप्रमाण). That negation whose counter-entity and substratum are known, becomes the object of the said source of valid knowledge. Nor can it be said that the negation of knowledge relating to the time of dreamless sleep is inferred after awakening, because there is no reason for such an inference. If it be said that we do not remember to have possessed any knowledge during dreamless sleep, hence such absence of non-remembrance is the ground of the aforesaid inference, then it can be pointed out that such an assertion is not valid, because the absence of remembrance is not the invariable concomitance of the absence of perception.

Opponent—The self relating to the time of sleep has the capacity of not knowing things. This is the reason for the inference of the negation of knowledge.

Answer—This is not accurate. It has been shown that the negation of knowledge cannot be known, likewise the said

capacity of the self also cannot be known. And because that capacity is not known it will not be the ground of the inference of the negation of knowledge. If through the negation of knowledge that capacity is inferred, then there will be inter-dependence.

If the said knowledge be the remembrance of the negation of knowledge, then as all remembrance is based on apprehension the negation of knowledge should be apprehended in dreamless state. The remembrance of what is negated and the knowledge of the substratum of negation are the causes of the knowledge of negation, and in dreamless sleep, these are absent. Hence, the negation of cognition in dreamless sleep cannot be experienced. Even though there is really negation of knowledge in dreamless sleep, still owing to this reason it cannot be experienced. Thus the knowledge 'I did not know anything at the time of sleep' is not the remembrance of the negation of knowledge.

Finally, it has to be accepted that the said knowledge has not for its object negation. Because of unwarrantable stretch, the knowledge without its object is not possible, hence the said knowledge should have for its object something positive. This knowledge is not inference having for its object something positive. Without investigation of the reason for an inference and invariable concomitance of the reason with the thing to be proved, there occurs the knowledge of ignorance of dreamless sleep such as 'I did not know'; hence it is not a case of inference. So it should be taken as the remembrance of positive ignorance. At the root of remembrance there must be some knowledge. To explain both the luminosity of ignorance and the said remembrance it should be acknowledged that there is self-luminous consciousness and also some subtle knowledge (indeterminate modification of ignorance) which gets modified.

Consciousness of the dreamless sleep is devoid of the empirical self, because in that state such experiences as 'I see' 'I enjoy' etc. which bear testimony to the existence of the empirical self, are absolutely absent. The knowledge of a substance must always be with attributes, so the cognition of

the ego must always be determinate in character as is seen in the case of such cognitions e. g., 'I know', 'I enjoy', etc., and if there are determinate cognitions in dreamless sleep, then that state would be no more. Nor can it be said that ego is experienced at that time as an impression (संस्कार), because impression is inferred through its effects (remembrance) and never appears as a content of perception. As at the time of dreamless sleep there is absence of the ego (the ego the agent that remembers is apprehended at the time of waking and not remembered), hence ignorance is not experienced at that time as qualified by space and time, therefore there is no remembrance implying spatio-temporal remoteness (तत्ता thatness), but there is remembrance qualified merely by ignorance, without any reference to space and time. In dreamless sleep ignorance is manifested through consciousness particularised by the subtle mind, and by the impression which is of the nature of destruction of the subtle mind remembrance is possible at the waking state. After having awaked from dreamless sleep, we remember ignorance relating to all objects such as "I did not know anything." By the reasoning (अन्यथाअनुपपत्ति) such as if there were knowledge of objects during dreamless sleep, then there could not have been at the same time ignorance relating to all objects, the negation of knowledge is inferred. In other words, when the experience of ignorance is being accepted at the time of dreamless sleep, due to the impression produced from that, the ego qualified with ignorance is remembered at the time of waking. This experience is of the following form :—"I slept and I did not know anything". Hence by the remembered ignorance, the inference of negation of knowledge is possible.

Thus, through the analysis of dreamless sleep the existence of the self-luminous consciousness is established.

Self-luminosity of consciousness, it must be noted, does not mean that it knows itself. Where there is complete changelessness and non-difference, there cannot be the subject-object relation. Relation implies difference, and non-difference is no relation. Nor can it be said that the same consciousness is the knower in one aspect and the

known in another aspect. If the knower-aspect becomes known, then again another knower-aspect has to be assumed and so on (infinite regression). If in its aspect of knower alone, Consciousness is self-luminous, then as its other aspect is not self-luminous, the self-luminous consciousness has for its object something that is not self-luminous. Consciousness can neither in its entire nature nor in two different aspects, be simultaneously or successively the seer and the seen. The object, being by nature, dependent and unconscious, cannot belong to or be innate in luminosity. So self-luminosity does not mean self-objectification of consciousness, but implies self-existence and self-manifestation independently of any relation to any other luminous entity or consciousness. Self-luminosity of consciousness is thus due to its specific nature and not due to any objectification, intrinsic or extrinsic.

CHAPTER IV.

Proof of non-duality of Consciousness.

It has so far been shown that our consciousness of the diverse mental states and processes as the modifications of the same mind, our consciousness of the ignorance and unknownness pertaining to external objects, our consciousness of the desire and effort to remove the ignorance and acquire knowledge of the objects, our consciousness of the knowledge and remembrance of the diverse objects as belonging to the mind, etc.,—all these logically imply the existence of one changeless self-luminous consciousness, which is the permanent witness of all these non-self-luminous phenomena, to which all of them appear as objects, by the light of which all these are illumined and revealed, due to the presence of which all these can be known to have their transitory related existence, in the absence of which the production, the continuity and the destruction of none of them could be known and remembered and no experience would be possible. It has been mentioned that this consciousness is regarded by the exponents of this system as non-dual. But the full significance of this conception of non-duality has not yet been discussed and logically demonstrated.

The non-duality, according to this theory, implies absolute unity and complete absence of difference. In order to establish the non-duality of Consciousness it has to be demonstrated that (1) there is no duality or plurality within itself (स्वगतभेद)—i. e. it has no aspects or organs or parts which can be distinguished from one another and from the whole, (2) there is no reality *outside itself*, which is of *like nature* with itself (सजातीयभेद) and from which it can be

differentiated, and (3) there is no reality *outside itself*, which is of *unlike nature* with itself (विजातीयभेद) and from which it can be differentiated. If consciousness be an organic unity consisting of aspects or organs or parts, or if there be a plurality of real individual consciousnesses, or if the objects of consciousness be really different from consciousness itself, then consciousness cannot, according to this view, be regarded as non-dual in the strict sense of the term.

First, it has to be demonstrated that there cannot be any distinction of parts and parts, aspects and aspects, and of parts or aspects and the whole in the nature of self-luminous Consciousness. If the self-luminous consciousness contain parts or aspects within itself, then the self-luminosity must belong either to the whole or only to the parts or aspects or to the whole as well as to its parts or aspects. If the first alternative be accepted, then the whole self-luminous consciousness is to be conceived as consisting of non-self-luminous or unconscious parts or aspects, and this is evidently absurd, because the whole of one nature cannot be made up of aspects or parts of a contradictory nature. If they are of such contradictory natures, the relation of whole and parts or unity and aspects or organism and organs cannot possibly exist between them; because the parts or aspects or organs being regarded as essential constituents of the nature of the whole consciousness, the whole would in that case have to be conceived as both self-luminous and non-self-luminous, conscious and unconscious at the same time. This is absurd. Moreover, any change in any part or aspect or organ would involve a change in the nature of the whole, i. e. the consciousness would then be changeable, and in that case it would be incapable of explaining the phenomena which necessitate its recognition. The only relation that exists between the conscious and the unconscious is that of subject and object, the illuminer and

the illumined ; and if this be the relation between the self-luminous consciousness and its assumed parts or aspects or organs, then they are really different entities. That is to say, the witness-consciousness is one undifferentiated entity having no parts or aspects or organs, and the so-called parts, aspects or organs are merely unconscious objects revealed or illumined by its luminosity, and falsely appearing as its contents or constituents. Secondly, if the parts or aspects alone are regarded as self-luminous, then also it is inconceivable how a combination of self-luminous parts or aspects can constitute a non-self-luminous or essentially unconscious whole. Further, as no self-luminous part or aspect can be related either as the subject or as the object with another self-luminous part or aspect,—since no self-luminous entity can be connected with any other entity without objectifying it and since only non-self-luminous entities can be so objectified—there cannot possibly be any connection or combination among the so-called self-luminous parts or aspects. Moreover, if the whole consciousness is non-self-luminous, how can the self-luminosity of the diverse parts or aspects account for the diverse related phenomena of experience, for the explanation of which its existence has been recognised ? If the diverse self-luminous parts or aspects could illumine diverse phenomena, then for the unification of these knowledges again a higher self-luminous consciousness would have to be recognised, which must be differenceless within itself. In that case the recognition of the plurality of self-luminous entities to be illumined by that consciousness would be unnecessary as well as illogical. Thus this alternative also has to be abandoned as irrational. Thirdly, it is illogical to conceive the whole as well as the parts or aspects self-luminous. If each of the parts or aspects be self-luminous, it would be self-complete, and it would not be conscious of itself as a part or aspect of any entity. If it were to be conscious of anything of which it is a part or aspect, then it

would have to make the whole, the other parts or aspects as well as itself the objects of its knowledge, and this is utterly inconsistent with their being regarded as self-luminous. The same inconsistency would arise if the whole were to be conscious of itself as the aggregate of self-luminous parts or aspects. Thus it is evident that the relation of the whole and parts or aspects can in no way be conceived as existing within the nature of the self-luminous consciousness. The self-luminous witness-consciousness must therefore be absolutely differenceless within.

The second point which has to be demonstrated for proving the non-duality of consciousness is that the existence of more than one self-luminous consciousness cannot be rationally conceived. It is a fact of our actual experience that there is a countless plurality of conscious beings in the universe, and the cognitions, feelings and desires of each are different from those of others. Commonsense naturally leads us to conclude that every individual has got his own consciousness, which enables him to experience the unity of his own diversified cognitive, emotional and volitional life as distinct from that of every other individual, and that if the consciousness had been the same in all individuals, there would be no consciousness of individuality at all, and there would be no difference between the knowledge, feeling and will of one individual and those of the others.

But according to the theory we are representing here, these very facts, instead of proving the plurality of consciousness, establishes the absolute unity of the self-luminous witness-consciousness. It is asked, how does the consciousness of individuality arise? This evidently implies the knowledge of one's own finite particularised existence as distinguished from, related to and limited by the similar particularised existence of other conscious beings. If the

particularised conscious existence of one's own self and that of other conscious beings be not at the same time the objects of the same consciousness, this knowledge of individuality cannot arise. Now, if the consciousness of the particularised conscious existence of one's own self and of other conscious beings means the consciousness of one's own self-luminous consciousness and other self-luminous consciousnesses, then it must involve the supposition that the self-luminous consciousness can make itself the *object* of its own knowledge and that one self-luminous consciousness can make other self-luminous consciousnesses the *objects* of its knowledge and also that self-luminous consciousnesses have points of difference from one another which also can become objects of those consciousnesses. All these are absurd self-contradictory suppositions. The very notion of self-luminosity implies that it cannot be the *object* of its own knowledge or of the knowledge of any other knower. It implies pure subject-ness, pure knowerhood, pure changeless witnessing character. Whatever can belong to the class of knowable objects must be non-self-luminous, because it must be illumined by the luminosity of its knowing subject. If there were really different individual self-luminous consciousnesses, they could not have become known to each other, and on account of the absence of this knowledge the conception of individuality could not have arisen at all. Each would have been confined to and complete in itself.

Thus we find that the different individual conscious beings that become the objects of the knowledge of themselves and of one another cannot rationally mean different individual self-luminous consciousnesses. They are different individual egos related to one another and illumined by the same self-luminous consciousness. Each ego becomes conscious of itself as an individual retaining its unity in the midst of various modifications through which it passes, and this particularised consciousness of ego is

possible owing to the reflection of the luminosity of the non-particularised, non-individuated differenceless witness-consciousness upon the modifying ego. This ego may be said to have a relative *subject-object* character, it being object to the absolute subject, viz. the changeless self-luminous consciousness, and becoming subject in relation to its modifications and their objects through the reflected luminosity. In the absolute sense an entity cannot be both subject and object of knowledge. It is through its own modifications that each ego attains knowledge of the embodied manifestations of other egos and on the ground of those manifestations infers the existence of those other egos. The plurality of egos and their manifestations thus become the objects of the knowledge and conception of each individual ego. This relative and mutual subject-object relation among the individual modifying egos would in no way be possible, unless they were all objectified and illumined by the same identical changeless self-luminous witness-consciousness. If any individual conscious being had existed outside the consciousness which illumines any particular ego, they could never be known or even supposed to exist by the latter, because not only knowledge, but supposition also is a form of mental modification which must be illumined by the consciousness and which cannot possibly objectify and become conscious of any being beyond the range of the consciousness. Thus it is proved that the experience which the individuals have of their own individuality and of the presence of other individuals is explicable only on the recognition of one universal all-pervading changeless differenceless self-luminous consciousness.

Moreover, every individual conscious being is convinced that he experiences the same objective world as is experienced by others. In the absence of the objective existence of the knowable world, the term 'valid knowledge' itself would be meaningless, and the

denial of valid knowledge involves an obvious self-contradiction, because the denial itself, being a form of knowledge, would be invalid. Now, the question is, how can the same objective world be the object of knowledge to a plurality of conscious beings and how can they know that it is the same world? If the knowing subjects had been independent of and unrelated to one another, there could be no inter-communication among them. Each would then have a separate world, and the existence of these separate worlds also would not be known to any one. This would lead to an inconceivable position. The possibility of the experience of the same objective world by the different knowing subjects necessarily implies that these knowing subjects are related to a world which is the object to one universal consciousness. An object can have no existence without reference to a subject by which its existence should be illumined, and accordingly the world cannot be conceived to have any objective existence without reference to one universal self-luminous consciousness as the absolute all-illuminating witness-subject. Thus the objective world which exists as the object of the one absolute self-luminous consciousness must be regarded as being known by the numerous conscious subjects. These individual conscious subjects or egos must therefore be regarded as having only dependent and derivative consciousness; that is to say, they are not distinct independent self-luminous consciousnesses, but they are non-self-luminous entities subjectified by the reflection upon them of the luminosity of the one all-pervading self-luminous consciousness. Thus the impossibility of the duality or plurality of self-luminous consciousness is fully demonstrated.* In

* Though consciousness is really without differences, still the perception of difference of consciousness cannot be denied. Hence, we proceed to show that the difference of consciousness is not its intrinsic character, but is something conditional. It is a generally

order to demonstrate the absolute non-duality of the self-luminous consciousness, it now remains to be shown that there is no self-existent reality whatsoever from which this consciousness can be differentiated. It has so far been logically established that there do not exist more than one self-luminous Consciousness and that within the nature of this one Consciousness also there is no distinction of parts or organs or aspects. But besides this self-luminous Consciousness there appears to exist an unconscious objective world, which includes both the mental and the extramental regions and the existence of which is illumined and revealed by the luminosity of this consciousness. Unless it can be proved that this objective world does not exist or that it is non-different from this self-luminous Consciousness, the absolute non-duality would not be established.

recognised fact that consciousness is not experienced in any region excepting the body. This fact, we are showing below, cannot be explained, if consciousness is regarded as the attribute of the self, be it all-pervading, atomic or of the size of the body. No explanation can be offered why the experience of consciousness should be confined to a particular body, if consciousness were the attribute of the all-pervading self, because in the partless self there cannot be the simultaneous presence and absence of consciousness. This fact is also inexplicable, if consciousness be regarded as the attribute of the atomic self. Since the attribute cannot exist outside of and as separated from its own substratum, and since the substratum in this case is atomic and confined to some particular point of the body, it cannot be conceived how the attribute consciousness can pervade the whole body. Consciousness cannot even be treated as the attribute of the self conceived as of the size of the body, because though thereby the universally recognised experience of consciousness throughout the body can be explained, still this conception, being antithetical to the very concept of self as an eternal entity, cannot be considered as an explanation of the phenomenon. So it has to be admitted that consciousness is not supported in any substance, but is itself a substance. But to explain its presence in the body, it may at first sight appear that it should be taken to be of the size of

Now, as a result of our previous analysis of the nature of the objective world, we arrived at the conclusion that one differenceless changeless absolute Existence is the sole real substratum on which all the diverse kinds of changing relative phenomena appear, that all the mental and material phenomena which are actual and possible objects of experience are really non-different from this substratum-Existence, that they are merely variable names and forms appearing to particularise this essentially indivisible and unmodifiable Existence, and that from the metaphysical standpoint they are nothing but illusory appearances of this Existence. In accordance with this conclusion pure Existence is the sole objective Reality. Taking that conclusion with our present conclusion with regard to Consciousness, we apparently find two ultimate realities, viz. self-luminous Consciousness as the absolute changeless Subject, the revealer of Existence, and pure differenceless attributeless

the body. Now, to find out whether it is really of the size of the body or not, we have to consider whether it is with parts or without parts. It cannot be said to be with parts. If it is with parts, then to produce this whole made up of parts, besides consciousness, its parts would be needed, but we are not aware of the existence of such parts. If these parts are themselves conscious, then there would occur many knowledges simultaneously and there is no proof about it. So, it may be suggested, that the partless consciousness is experienced as of the size of the body. But even this suggestion is absurd, because that which is partless can never be really composed of parts. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that all-pervading consciousness is experienced in that way owing to some extraneous conditions. Hence, the non-difference of consciousness is natural and its difference, conditional. Besides, when there is the knowledge of extraneous conditions, there is the knowledge of difference of consciousness, so the difference of consciousness must be conditional in nature. Thus, to conclude, we may frame the following inference with regard to non-difference and identity of consciousness :—the consciousness is really one because its difference is not manifested without the particularisation of objects as in the case with *ākāśa*.

Existence as the absolute object illumined and revealed by Consciousness. But can they be rationally conceived as two separate Realities? Let us examine the point.

Proof of Identity of Consciousness and Existence.

First, let us try to conceive Consciousness and Existence as two distinct entities. Since in accordance with our previous conclusions Existence is the sole substratum and ground of existent entities and Consciousness is the sole source of all illumination and manifestation, Existence conceived as apart from Consciousness must be non-illumined and unmanifested, and Consciousness conceived as apart from Existence must be non-existent. It is of course absurd to think that Existence should be illumined, i. e. should be revealed as existent, by the luminosity of non-existent Consciousness. Unless Existence is illumined, i. e. be revealed as existent, it would be virtually non-existent. To avoid this self-contradiction, Consciousness must be regarded as existent. Now, Consciousness can be existent, either by being a particularised form or, appearance of Existence or by being identical with Existence itself. But the former alternative, if accepted, would lead to absurdity, because in that case Existence by itself would be neither self-luminous nor objectified and illumined by any self-luminous entity, and therefore its reality could never be revealed and it would be as good as non-existent. It cannot of course be supposed to be witnessed and illumined by a particularised appearance of itself, which must be illusory in character. Further, a self-luminous entity cannot be conceived as the product or appearance of any other entity;—if its existence be derivative, its luminosity also must be derivative. Hence the only rational view is that Existence and Consciousness are identical, so that we may speak of the Ultimate Reality as self-existent Consciousness or as self-luminous Existence.

It may be argued that Existence is the name given to the sole self-existent substratum of all objective particularised existences and Consciousness is the name given to the sole self-existent and self-luminous ground of all knowledge and illumination ; both are self-existent, one being the ultimate object and the other ultimate subject, hence ultimately two self-existent realities have to be recognised. But this contention raises fresh difficulties. If Consciousness and Existence are two distinct self-existent realities, how can there be any significance of the terms subject and object applied to them. Subject has meaning only with reference to its object, and object has meaning only with reference to its subject. Consciousness as the self-existent subject without any object to be known either within or outside itself is meaningless; and Existence as the self-existent object without any self-luminous subject to know and illumine it is equally meaningless. To attach meanings to them, Consciousness and Existence must be regarded as related to each other as subject and object. If this relation is admitted, they are no longer conceived as absolutely distinct self-existent realities. There must be admitted such a bond of relation between them, that each is what it is in relation to the other. In that case both of them should be not ultimate realities, but relative phenomenal realities, demanding the necessity for some higher self-existent Reality of which they are the related manifestations. In that self-existent Reality, Consciousness and Existence, subject and object, must be united. Thus it must be admitted that ultimately Consciousness and Existence are not two Realities, but the same identical Reality.

This is further demonstrated by the analysis of the meaning of self-existence itself. The very notion of self-existence involves the notion of self-luminosity. A being which has to depend upon another being for its self-manifestation or self-illumination cannot be regarded

as existing by itself, and hence it would be regarded as having imperfect relative dependent existence, related to and depending on some superior Being for its being revealed as what it is. But as it is impossible to conceive of any Being other than and superior to pure Existence, the capacity for its revealing itself must also be essentially inherent in it. This means that the idea of consciousness is essentially involved in the very idea of pure self-existence. Self-existence and self-luminosity are really identical. It is to be noted here that Consciousness cannot be regarded as the attribute of Existence nor can Existence be regarded as the attribute of Consciousness. The relation of substance and attribute would imply that the attribute limits or modifies the nature of the substance and that the substance as it is in itself is to be, at least conceptually, distinguished from the substance with the attribute. No such distinction can be thought of here. Pure Existence can not be thought of without self-luminosity nor can pure Consciousness be thought of without Existence. Therefore neither can be regarded as modifying or particularising the nature of the other. Hence the absolute identity of self-existence and self-luminosity and therefore of Absolute Existence and Absolute Consciousness has to be admitted.

Thus it is established that the Absolute Existence or the Absolute Consciousness is without any kind of duality or plurality within itself or outside itself. This is the true conception of non-dual Brahman, as advocated by the religio-philosophical system we are expounding here.

CHAPTER V.

The Theory of Illusory Causation

From the foregoing discussion it is clear, according to this school of philosophical thought, that if we logically analyse the nature and the concepts of our knowledge and experience and seek for the ultimate condition of the possibility of the valid knowledge of ourselves, our mental states and processes and the world of conscious and unconscious objective realities, we are inevitably led to the conception of an absolutely differenceless changeless attributeless self-luminous self-existent Reality, which may be called pure Consciousness (चित्) or pure Existence (सत्), which is one without a second (एकमेवाद्वितीयम्) and which precludes the possibility of the existence of any other equally real being of like or unlike nature, whether within or outside Itself (स्वगत-सजातीय-विजातीय-भेद-रहित). This non-dual Reality has been indicated by various names, such as *Brahman*, *the Absolute*, *the Substance*, *the Existent*, *the One*, *the Absolute Spirit*, etc. by different thinkers, subscribing to this line of metaphysical speculation.

Now, as this non-dual Reality is regarded as the sole self-existent Being, it must be capable of accounting for the appearance of the undeniable variety of experiences and experienced objects constituting the manifested world. How is it possible that this Absolute Reality is a differenceless changeless actionless attributeless entity and the one without a second entity to act upon It or to be acted upon by It, but at the same time It is the sole ground and source of the amazing diversities? How, inspite of producing and sustaining such a boundless diversified world of mutually related and wonderfully regulated conscious and unconscious beings, can this Reality be regarded as absolutely non-dual and absolutely

changeless and effortless and attributeless? How can this beginningless and endless stream of productions and preservations and destructions of numberless varieties of objects be logically compatible with the absolute non-duality of the ultimate Reality and its changeless actionless attributeless character? Unless these questions are satisfactorily answered, the theory of this non-dual Absolute is far from being established. We have now to explain how the exponents of this theory attempt to logically answer these questions.

First of all it has to be proved that this attributeless non-dual Consciousness can furnish an adequate causal explanation for the world of derivative existences and can satisfy the demand of the fundamental Principle of Causality. For this purpose it is necessary to analyse the nature of this Principle and to ascertain what conditions must be fulfilled to satisfy its demands.

The Principle of Causality primarily means that every non-eternal phenomenon must have its cause, which must be sufficient to produce it. Now, what must be the relation between the effect and its cause? Here different systems of philosophy are found to differ. According to some, the effect is nothing but an aggregate of causes (संघातवाद). Several causes being conjoined with one another appear in the form of an effect, which therefore is neither a newly originated substance nor a modification of the causes. But if this had been the inevitable nature of the causal relation, then no effect could be produced from one cause. In our normal experience, however, we meet with cases of an effect produced from a single cause as well as those of an effect produced from a conjunction of causes. Further, in cases of such conjunction, does the effect possess the same nature and the same properties as the constituent causes? If the same nature and the same properties of the constituent causes are present, then in truth no effect is

produced. If the effect is something different with different properties from the combining causes, as it is generally found to be, then a new thing must be regarded as having originated from the causes. Moreover, do the conjunctions of causes occur by chance, or does any fixed conjunction pertain to the essential nature of the ultimate causes, or is it the nature of the causes to pass through different forms of conjunctions and to appear in newer and newer forms, or are the various conjunctions due to the action of some extraneous agency upon the causes? The acceptance of chance-combination would be inconsistent with the principle of Causality itself and would lead to the denial of any system or harmony in nature. In the second case, the same effect or effects would be eternally present and there would be no causal operations and no productions and destructions in the world. The acceptance of the third alternative would virtually amount to the acceptance of the doctrine of the spontaneous modification of the causes into effects, because without modifications in their internal nature there would be no ground for different forms of conjunctions. In the fourth case, there arises the necessity for recognising some efficient cause different from the material causes. Moreover, if all things, not excepting the ultimate causes, have only momentary existence, as the upholders of this view of causation maintain, then not only every effect must be regarded as newly originated, but there would be no possibility of conjunction of causes at all. This would logically lead to the denial of the law of Causation and the acceptance of universally condemned theory of *Spontaneous generation* or *Causeless production*.

According to the view of another school, the effect is *newly originated* from the conjunction of causes and its new properties also are produced from the properties of the causes (आरम्भवाद). The effect does not exist in any unmanifested form in the causes (असत्कार्यवाद), but it is produced from them and is altogether different from them.

Thus, all effects are complex entities, and all complex entities are of the nature of effects. Ultimate causes must, according to this view, be innumerable simple indivisible substances called atoms, from the various combinations of which the well-ordered diversified world is produced. But as these atoms are inert and unconscious, a conscious active efficient cause is recognised to account for their movements, combinations and regulated operations.

But this view also does not give a true account of the nature of causation. As the effect is considered to be altogether different from the causes, and not present in them in any unmanifested or potential form, it cannot account for the reign of law in the causally related objects of the world, because in accordance with this conception of causality any effects may be produced from any causes. An appeal to what is called *Prior negation* is useless, unless it is something positive and means the capacity or the *potentiality* for the production of the effect. If the presence of the capacity or the potentiality to originate the effect before the production of the effect is admitted, it would virtually mean the recognition of the presence of the relation between the cause and the effect even before the manifestation of the effect, and this would amount to the acceptance of the doctrine of the *pre-existence* of the effect in the unmanifested form in the cause. If, on the other hand, *prior negation* is nothing more than mere negation, then it would mean merely the absence or non-existence of the effect, and its special reference to any particular entity would be absolutely meaningless; hence in that case no fixed and systematic cause-effect-relation would prevail in the world.

If this potentiality of the effect in the cause is admitted, then the effect cannot be regarded as altogether different from the cause. There must be at least the identity of essence between the cause and the effect. Moreover, in

that case, the ultimate cause of the world of effects cannot be a plurality of distinct self-existent material atoms of fixed characters, because the potentiality of the effects cannot be present in any one of them separately, nor in any combination of them, for no such combination originally exists. This should therefore lead to the recognition of one ultimate material cause with the potentiality of all the effects constituting the world.

Further, the appeal to a conscious efficient cause also is of no avail, because if the material atoms are self-existent units of eternally fixed characters and altogether distinct from and of different natures from the so-called efficient cause, how can there possibly be any relation between it and them, and how can it possibly act upon and regulate them according to its plan and purpose? If recourse is had to the omniscience and omnipotence of the efficient cause, then the material atoms as material cause would be unnecessary, the power of its thought and will being sufficient to produce all effects without any material.

Many other schools of thought, therefore, legitimately deny the absolute origination of the effects at their production and their absolute non-existence in the cause before their production, and they maintain that the relation between the cause and the effect implies the pre-existence of the effect in the potential or unmanifested state in the cause before its production (सत्कार्यवाद) and that its production consists in the modification of the cause so as to bring it out from the unmanifested state to the manifested form (परिणामवाद). Accordingly causation means, not new creation, but transformation of the cause into the effect. Hence so far as the form is concerned, the effect is different from the cause, but so far as the substance is concerned, the effect is identical with or non-different from the cause. Thus a relation of difference as well as non-difference (भेदाभेद) must exist between the cause and the effect.

When this principle is applied to the investigation of the ultimate cause and its relation to the effect-world, it is inferred that the ultimate cause must be of the nature of absolute potentiality, that it must be an absolutely unmanifested entity (अव्यक्त) in which the entire world of effects is existent in the undifferentiated unmanifested imperceptible state, and that the production of the world must consist in the progressive modification and transformation of this entity from the unmanifested to the more and more manifested forms, from the undifferentiated to the more and more differentiated forms, from the subtle and imperceptible to the more and more gross and perceptible forms.

Among those who adopt this view, there are schools which hold that this ultimate unmanifested modifying cause is a distinct real entity called *Prakṛti* essentially unconscious, and having eternal *conjunction* with an indefinite number of self-luminous individual souls, the presence of which is necessary to illumine it and to enable it to modify itself. But they cannot offer any satisfactory logical explanation as to how two such absolutely distinct kinds of entities can be conjoined together, how the self-luminous souls can be related to and influence and have agreeable and disagreeable experience of the modifications of the material cause without being themselves changed or modified in the least, how the absolutely distinct self-luminous individuals can be related to the same objective world and can possibly know one another, and how all of them being eternally conjoined to the ultimate material cause different souls can possibly experience the effects with different degrees of joy and sorrow and some are disjoined and liberated from them. Nor can they explain the well-regulated self-modification and self-manifestation of the unconscious material cause without reference to some such self-luminous agency.

Finding the difficulty of this position, some other schools conceive the unmanifested material cause as the

Power or Energy, as governed and regulated by one supreme omniscient and omnipotent self-conscious Being, who is regarded as the Efficient cause of the world of effects. But in this case also, if the Power or Energy, which is modified, has a distinct self-existence and has a definite nature of its own different from that of the self-conscious Being, the relation of the regulator and the regulated between the two remains unaccountable, and if this self-conscious Being is really omnipotent and omniscient, the recognition of a separate material cause for the production of the effects becomes wholly unnecessary.

For this reason, others regard the Power or Energy as belonging to the self-existent self-conscious self-determining Being, who is one without any other rival self-existent entity and who is therefore the material as well as the efficient cause of the diversified universe. According to this view, this sole ultimate Reality, the absolute self-existent self-luminous Entity, becomes itself modified into the world of effects by the exercise of Its inherent power or energy. The world of effects is regarded as existent in the unmanifested or potential state in Its power, and It is regarded as modifying Itself freely into this manifested world. But this view also cannot be logically maintained. According to this view, the non-dual self-luminous Being must have to be conceived as at the same time the subject and the object, the illuminer and the illumined, the regulator and the regulated, the manifestor and the manifested, the modifier and the modified, the creator and the created. The presence of such distinctions within the nature of the Being would make It a being of complex nature and therefore of derivative existence. It would make that Being composed of parts or aspects or organs and therefore a composite embodied Being; and every composite embodied being is non-eternal, liable to development and degradation and destruction. We have already pointed out in greater details

that a truly self-luminous Being cannot have any such differences within Its own nature nor any different entities of like or unlike nature outside of Itself.

The exponents of the doctrine of the real self-modification of God—the supreme self-luminous Being with Energy—cannot logically explain how God can remain the same unchanged Being, while modifying Himself into the plurality of conscious and unconscious finite realities of the universe. If the Energy pertains to His essential nature, the transformation of the Energy must mean the transformation of Himself, and the original eternal God should be regarded as non-existent in creation. If the Energy is regarded as essentially foreign to His nature and accidentally related to Him, some causal explanation would be demanded to account for this relation and this is of course unavailable. Further, though God may in this view be conceived as retaining His identity, He cannot consistently be asserted to be the material cause of the universe, because the modification of the Energy would not mean His self-modification. If it be held that God with the Energy inherent in His nature modifies Himself into the world of effects and still maintains His identity in the same way as the individual ego maintains its identity in and through the mental modifications, then, as has been shown before, this knowledge of the unity in the midst of changes must imply the existence of a changeless witness-consciousness above that self-modifying God. To hold that God himself is in one aspect the changeless witness-consciousness and in another aspect modified into diverse phenomenal realities would also raise various logical difficulties as to the significance of and relation between these two aspects. Are these two aspects equally essential to the nature of God? If they are, can there be changes in one of the essential aspects without

affecting the other? If this be possible, should it not imply that the Divine nature is composite, essentially constituted of two altogether distinct natures and should not reason demand a superior cause for this composition? If this change in one essential aspect of the Divine nature with any change in the other is not regarded as possible, on the ground that the two aspects pertain to the one eternal nature of God, then either the entire Divine nature should undergo changes and God would lose His identity, or the entire Divine nature should remain changeless and God would not be the self-modifying material cause of the world. If neither of the alternatives be acceptable, then one of the so-called aspects may be regarded as constituting the real essential nature of God and the other as non-essential and unreal expression of His nature. If this view is accepted, then the changeless self-luminous consciousness must necessarily be regarded as constituting His real essential nature because this alone demonstrates His unity, non-duality and identity, and the changing Energy must be regarded as the non-essential unreal expression of His nature. From the logical point of view it is useless to proclaim that God has the *unique inscrutable power* to modify Himself into the world of effects as well as to exist as the changeless transcendent witness of those modifications, because it is the nature of this so-called inscrutable power that logic seeks to analyse and rationally conceive, and leaving it as inscrutable would mean the admission of the insolubility of the problem and the abandonment of the rational quest of truth.

Thus it is found that none of the views, cherished by the other schools of philosophical thinkers, with regard to the nature of causation and the relation between cause and effect, can satisfy the logical tests and can rationally ascertain the nature of the ultimate cause of the world and

trace the origin of this world of diversities from any supposed self-existent cause. These diversities can neither be proved as absolutely non-existent before their manifestation in the nature of the ultimate cause, nor can they be proved as really existent in the unmanifested state in the nature of the cause. They cannot be proved to be merely aggregates of unregulated material atoms nor to be absolutely new products from divinely regulated material atoms nor to be manifestations from an absolutely unmanifested unconscious entity nor to be modifications of one Energy regulated by God nor to be self-modifications of one self-luminous omnipotent God Himself. All such views, when logically analysed and criticised, involve insurmountable difficulties.

What, then, can be the view of causation, which can logically furnish a causal explanation of the world? On epistemological and ontological grounds it has been demonstrated that the Ultimate Reality, which can be accepted as the unquestionable ground of all knowledge and all existences, must be one non-dual changeless differenceless attributeless self-luminous Consciousness. Now, to satisfy the requirements of the Law of Causality, this Consciousness must be shown to be adequate to give birth to the diversities of the phenomenal universe without any the least change or transformation of Its own nature. The existence of the diverse effects also must be of such a character as not to contradict the non-duality, the differencelessness and the changelessness of the ultimate cause. Does our normal experience supply us with any such instances of causal relation, in which effects are observed, but the cause is not found to be affected in any way by the production of the effects? Yes, this is what we experience in cases of *Illusory Causation*.

Take for example such cases as those of *rope-snake*, *shell-silver*, *mirage* etc. In such cases we actually observe the snake, the silver, the water etc. on the

substratum of the rope, the shell, the desert etc. The former must be regarded as the effects of the latter, but still those effects do not affect the real nature of their respective causes in any way. The rope, the shell, the desert remain as they are, their characters remain after the production of the effects exactly the same as before their production, they undergo no modification, and their existence is in no way limited by the effects; but still the effects are found to be produced. In such cases the causes, though remaining exactly the same and not undergoing change in any aspect, *appear as or manifest themselves* as the effects. Their real nature is somehow veiled and they appear or manifest themselves as — and not transform themselves into — something other than what they are. These are cases of Illusory Causation. Since the cause does not really become the effect nor does it really produce the effect, the effect cannot be said to be as real as the cause. On the other hand, since the effect is actually observed, it cannot be regarded as altogether unreal. Hence in such cases of causation, the cause being accepted as real, the effect must be conceived as neither real nor unreal,— neither really existent like the cause nor absolutely non-existent like a hare's horn or a barren woman's child. Again, as the real cause does not really modify or transform itself into any real effect, no change can be said to occur in the nature of the cause, and as the one does not really produce another real entity as the effect, no duality can be said to arise out of this sort of causation. The illusory effect being not of the same order of reality as the cause, or strictly speaking, the substratum, such causation cannot be said to increase the number of real entities and thereby to create a limitation upon the cause. It is through illusory identification with the real cause, that the illusory effect is perceived as really existent.

It is this conception of Causation which can be quite logically applied to the production of the world of diversities from the non-dual Consciousness, and can furnish an adequate causal explanation of the world. The non-dual Consciousness *appears* or *manifests Itself* as the world of diversities without having Its nature in any way modified and Its non-duality in any way affected. Since the Consciousness does not really produce the world or actually modify or transform Itself into the world, but merely *appears* as the world, Its nature remains eternally changeless. The world, being not a real product of the effort of the Consciousness nor a real modified form of It, cannot be said to be real in the sense in which the Consciousness is real. But since it is a world of experience, since the appearance of the world of mental and material plurality cannot be denied, it cannot be said to be absolutely unreal or non-existent. If it had been absolutely non-existent, it could not have been an object of experience nor could it have any practical efficiency. On the other hand, if it had been absolutely existent, its existence could never have been absent, it could never have passed into non-existence nor could even be thought of as non-existent, it could not have birth or destruction, it would not disappear even at the unveiled self-manifestation of the Consciousness. Hence this world of effects cannot be said to be either absolutely real or absolutely unreal, either as existent or as non-existent in the absolute sense. It must therefore be conceived as an *inexplicable* entity having an apparent reality or illusory existence.

Now, as the world is not real or existent in the sense in which the Consciousness is real or existent, it cannot be said that a second real or existent entity has been produced by or from It, and hence the absolute non-duality of the Consciousness is in no way vitiated. Thus it is logically demonstrated that though the self-luminous Consciousness is the eternally attributeless, changeless, differenceless non-dual absolute Reality, though It is never really modified or

particularised in any way, though It never acts or is acted upon, still It is the source or ground or cause of the phenomenal universe of multifarious conscious and unconscious changing objects, in the sense that It illusorily *appears* or manifests Itself as this universe, or, in other words, It is sole Substratum on which this universe illusorily appears. This is the theory of the Illusory Causation of the world or, the Appearance of Brahman as other than what It is (विवर्तवाद), and this is the most logical causal explanation of the world.

It may be objected that the doctrine of Illusory Causation has no foundation in normal experience ; cases of rope-snake, shell-silver, etc. are not cases of causation at all, because no snake or silver is produced there. Such illusory appearances cannot be said to have even any apparent reality outside the mind of the duped observer. They are only subjective visions of individuals. These illusions have been differently interpreted by different schools of philosophers. Some regard them as cases of mistaking one thing for another previously experienced thing (अन्यथाख्याति). Due to the close resemblance between the thing present and some previously experienced thing, the former, when its special features are not clearly noticed on account of distance or insufficient light or some defect in the senses of perception, may immediately awaken the memory of the latter and this object of remembrance is projected outside and is perceived in the place of the substance present. This is how illusory perception occurs, and in such a case the present substance cannot be regarded as producing the object perceived. Others hold that cases of illusion are cases of perceiving some object in a place where it does not exist (अस्तख्याति); they are really cases of imagination in which the products of imagination are projected and perceived outside. According to others, they are mere cases of non-perception of the specific features or the entire nature of an existent object (अख्याति). According to others again, they are

cases of spontaneous self-projection and perception of the observer's own self or of his ideas outside of himself (आत्मव्याप्ति).

All such interpretations of the phenomenon of illusion are, however, psychologically untenable. So long as illusion continues, it is a pure case of perception. The man under illusion does not experience that he is recollecting any previously observed entity or that he is exercising his imagination or that he is projecting his own mind outside of himself or that he is not perceiving something present before him. At the time of illusion, the perceived object does not appear as illusory. The illusory object is perceived exactly in the same way as any other phenomenal object of sense-perception is perceived. The observer actually perceives the object and knows it as existing independently of himself and his mental functions. The elements of remembrance, etc. may be present there, as they are present in cases of the recognition and classification of a validly perceived object. The reactions of such illusory perceptions in the mind and the body of the observer are also exactly analogous to those of valid perception. Hence psychologically illusory perception also must be admitted to be a case of perception. This being the case, the presence of the illusory object before the senses of the observer and some sort of contact between the object and the senses must be admitted. But the illusory character of this perceived object is known, when as a result of deeper penetration the same substance is known in its true character and this knowledge contradicts the former perception. The fundamental difference between valid perception and illusory perception lies in this that the former is uncontradicted (अबाधित) and the latter is contradicted (बाधित). The uncontradicted perception is regarded as representing the true nature of the perceived substance, and the contradicted perception implies that the true nature of the substance was veiled at the time of that perception and that the substance appeared as something other than

what it really is. Hence as an object of perception the illusory entity must be regarded as produced and cannot be regarded as altogether non-existent at the time when and at the place where it is perceived ; but as that perception is contradicted by the more careful perception of the true nature of the substance known to be really present there at that time, and as with the true acquaintance with the nature of the substance the object of that perception disappears and is cognised to have never been really present there, that object cannot be regarded as really produced and really existent at that time and place. Thus the illusory object cannot be explained either as existent or as non-existent, either as produced or as non-produced; consequently a separate category, viz. *inexplicable* (अनिर्वचनीय) has to be applied to it.

In this view of the case, the real substance is to be regarded as the unchanged substratum, which, with its true character veiled, appears in the form of the illusory object, and which should in that sense be conceived as the ground or cause of that object ; that object on the other hand is to be regarded as neither-real-nor-unreal inexplicable apparent effect of that substratum. In point of relation, this apparent effect cannot be regarded either as different or as non-different or as both different and non-different from the substratum. Since this illusory entity has no real existence either within or outside or as an attribute of the substratum, it cannot be logically conceived as different from the substratum. Since it appears and is perceived as other than the substance and since its appearance and disappearance do not in the least affect the nature of that substratum, it cannot be conceived as wholly non-different from it. Both difference and non-difference cannot in the same sense be applied at the same time and place to the same entity in relation to the same other entity on account of their mutual contradiction and exclusiveness. Hence in

this respect also the illusory effect is to be regarded as *inexplicable*.

Now, what the illusory effects (प्रतिभासिक) like rope-snake, shell-silver, etc. are to the phenomenal realities (व्यावहारिक सत्ता) like rope, shell, etc., the entire world of phenomenal existences is to the Absolute (पारमार्थिक) Non-dual Existence-Consciousness. The Consciousness-Brahman is the changeless differenceless non-dual substratum of the world, which is its illusory effect. Brahman illusory appears as this world. This phenomenal world is not the product of the imagination of the individual conscious beings, who also are included in this world. It does not depend for its existence upon the experiences or errors of these individuals. So far as these individual conscious beings are concerned, the world has its objective existence and is the object of valid experience of all. But still its very nature is of the illusory character, because when the true character of the Absolute Reality-Brahman is revealed, the diversities of the world are contradicted and cannot therefore be regarded as really existent. Accordingly in the noumenal sense Brahman alone eternally exists in its differenceless changeless cause-effect-less subject-object-less non-dual self-luminous character and is therefore alone really existent, and from this point of view the world of diversities does not at any time really exist at all; on the other hand in the phenomenal sense the world of diversities has conditional derivative changing existence without any beginning or end in time, and its existence is derived from, conditioned and sustained and illumined by the self-existent self-luminous Brahman, which is its eternal substratum or ground or cause. The world has no existence apart from the existence of Brahman, but in appearance it is different from the latter. It appears as real through its illusory identification (आध्यासिक तादात्म्य) with the Substratum, Brahman.

Thus the world is neither real nor unreal, neither existent nor non-existent,— it is unreal and non-existent in the metaphysical sense and real and existent in the empirical sense,— and it is therefore spoken of as *inexplicable* in terms of logical categories. Again, it cannot be described either as *different from* Brahman or as *non-different from* It, and in this respect also it is logically inexplicable. As it has not the same order of reality with Brahman and cannot be regarded as a different entity, the non-duality of Brahman remains unaffected. As it is not really produced from Brahman, Brahman remains eternally changeless and self-luminous.

CHAPTER VI.

The necessity for the recognition of Cosmic Ignorance.

It has been found that the conception of Illusory Causation is the only logically admissible view with regard to the nature of the causal relation between the Absolute Reality — Brahman — and the phenomenal world of our objective experience. Now let us further analyse the nature of this causal relation and find out its implications.

In every case of illusory experience the following factors are present, viz. (1) there is a substratum, the nature of which undergoes no real change or modification, (2) the true nature of this substratum is veiled from the view of the observer, (3) in the place of the substratum there is the appearance of some object other than the substratum and possessing characteristics different from those of the substratum, (4) the apparent object has no existence apart from and independent of the existence of the substratum, and it is experienced at the place where the substratum resides and during the time the substratum is present there, (5) the object appearing in illusion is identified with the substratum and the two are not distinguishable during its continuity, (6) when the true nature of the substratum is unveiled and is experienced as it really is, the object as it was illusorily perceived disappears or is known to be really non-existent and to have never been actually produced as a real effect, (7) illusory experience is distinguishable from valid experience by this fact that the former is contradicted and proved to be false by the latter, while the latter is not so contradicted and proved to be false, (8) there may be some elements or features in respect of which the illusory object participates in the real nature of the substratum, while other elements

or features are superimposed upon it, and when the illusion disappears and the true nature of the substratum is known, the former elements or features are found abiding the substratum and the latter vanish as false.

From the above analysis of the nature of illusory causation it is evident that there must be some cause for the veiling of the true character of the substratum and its appearance as something other than what it is, and that this cause must be such as is destroyed by the valid knowledge of the substratum. The true knowledge of the substratum and the veiling of its nature cannot exist at the same time. So long as the veiling and illusory appearance continue, the knowledge is absent, and when the knowledge is present, the veiling and illusory appearance vanish. What can be the cause of such veiling and illusion? Being contrary to and destructible by knowledge, this cause can appropriately be called *Ignorance*. This *Ignorance* is not certainly the mere *absence* of knowledge, because from mere *absence* or *negation* of an entity, nothing positive can be produced. Being the producer of the positive illusory appearance the *Ignorance* must be positive, but being the opposite of knowledge, it is given the name of *Ignorance*. Thus the presence of a positive *Ignorance* associated with the substratum must be recognised to account for the illusory appearance of false entities on the substratum. It is this *Ignorance* which modifies itself into the illusory appearance, on the substratum, of entities other than what it is. This *Ignorance* cannot have any existence apart from or independent of the existence of the substratum and cannot therefore be regarded as *real* or *existent* in the sense in which the substratum is *real* or *existent*. It cannot be regarded as any real power or attribute or aspect or part of the substratum, because in that case the valid knowledge of the substratum would involve the knowledge of this ignorance also as pertaining to the substratum and could not destroy it. It is self-evident that true knowledge does not

destroy what is real ; it always destroys what is false. On the other hand, since it creates over the substratum a positive veil which the substratum by itself would not create and manifests on the substratum the positive perceptible apparent objects which the substratum by itself would not manifest, this Ignorance cannot be said to be absolutely unreal or non-existent in the sense in which a mere negation of a thing is unreal or non-existent. Hence the Ignorance, which is associated with the substratum and becomes modified into the illusion, is found to be neither real nor unreal, neither existent nor non-existent, and is therefore to be regarded as *indefinable* or *inexplicable* (अनिर्वचनीय). Thus the conclusion is that the substratum being *apparently* conditioned and particularised by—and not *really* changed or modified by—the neither-real-nor-unreal-inexplicable power of Ignorance becomes the material cause of the illusory objects appearing on it.

From our previous discussion we have been led to the conclusion that Brahman — the absolute self-luminous Existence — is the sole substratum of the universe, and the universe is of the nature of illusory appearance on It. As in the cases of particular illusions, this beginningless cosmic Illusion also must necessarily imply an inexplicable Cosmic Ignorance, which having veiled the true changeless differenceless self-luminous character of Brahman and having apparently conditioned and particularised It, makes It appear as the ever-changing plurality of conscious and unconscious finite beings constituting the universe. Brahman as apparently conditioned by this Cosmic Ignorance is thus the material cause of the universe.

From the above interpretation of the nature of Ignorance and its relation to the substratum of Illusion, it must be obvious that the recognition of the Cosmic Ignorance along with Brahman does not amount to the admission of

two material causes of the universe. Since this Cosmic Ignorance with its product,—the illusory world,—is contradicted and proved to be not really existent by the true knowledge of the substratum, Brahman, and since this Ignorance cannot be conceived as having any existence apart from the existence of Brahman, it cannot be regarded as a *real entity* either by the side of Brahman or even pertaining to the nature of Brahman. If Ignorance had any reality outside Brahman, no relation could ever be established between two such essentially distinct entities having no community of nature between them, and Ignorance could not then veil the nature of Brahman and make It appear as the illusory world. If the relation be regarded as possible, then the Ignorance, instead of vanishing away at the appearance of the true knowledge of Brahman, would be revealed more vividly in its true relation to Brahman; in that case Brahman and Ignorance must both be *objects* of the same knowledge, in order that their relation may be known, and must therefore presuppose a superior self-luminous Consciousness. Thus Brahman cannot be regarded as the self-luminous Existence and at the same time having a relation with a real second entity, viz. Ignorance. Nor can this Cosmic Ignorance be conceived as a real attribute or aspect or part or power within the nature of Brahman, for in that case also it would not be contradicted by true knowledge of Brahman. If it be urged that this contradiction itself is an unwarranted assumption, then the doctrine of Illusory Causation itself would have to be abandoned and Brahman would have to be regarded as really creating the world by the effort of His thought and will or as really modifying Himself into the world of diversities. But all possible forms of real causation have already been examined and found to be beset with insurmountable logical difficulties. The doctrine of Illusory Causation has been resorted to as the only logical explanation of the appearance of the world consistent with

the conception of the non-dual self-luminous changeless Existence established on the strength of the epistemological and ontological study of our experience. This Illusory Causation leads to the conception of Ignorance, which must be contradictory to true knowledge, though not the mere absence of knowledge. This Ignorance, therefore, cannot be a real entity or a real power or attribute or aspect or part of the Substratum Brahman. Hence the non-duality and changelessness of Brahman is in no way disturbed by the Cosmic Ignorance, and the recognition of this Ignorance does not amount to the admission of a second cause.

But still as this Cosmic Ignorance must be regarded as a positive entity, and not the mere absence of true knowledge, it is not wholly unreal or non-existent. Therefore it is to be conceived as a principle incapable of being defined either as real and existent or as unreal and non-existent, either as different from Brahman or as non-different from Brahman, and hence it is an *inexplicable cause* of this inexplicable illusory world.

A question may be raised as to whether this inexplicable Cosmic Ignorance is to be regarded as the material cause of the world along with the substratum, Brahman, or as its efficient cause. The latter alternative is logically untenable. The fundamental difference between an efficient cause and a material cause lies in this, that the continued existence of the effect demands the necessity of the continued existence of the material cause, but not that of the efficient cause. The efficient cause, having moved and regulated the material cause and having either modified it into the effect or created the effect out of it or made it appear in the form of the effect, may disappear from the field or cease to be directly related to the effect ; but the effect continues ; it does not disappear with the disappearance of the efficient cause ; it is not destroyed with the destruction of the efficient cause ; it does not cease to exist with the cessation of the operation of the efficient cause. Moreover, the effect does

not participate in the nature of the efficient cause ; by the analysis of the nature of the effect we cannot discover the nature of the efficient cause therein. But this is not the case with the material cause. The material cause cannot disappear or cease to exist without at the same time leading to the disappearance or the cessation of the existence of the effect. By analysis of the nature of the effect, the presence of the material cause is found in it. By the analysis of the nature of the pot and the cloth we always find the presence of the earth and the thread respectively, but not the presence of the potter and the weaver in them. The pot and the cloth cannot continue to exist without the continuity of the existence of the earth and the thread, but they do not require the continuity of the existence of the potter and the weaver for the continuity of their existence. The material cause is immanent in and pervades the effect ; but the efficient cause, unless it is also the material cause, does not pervade the effect and is only outwardly related to it.

Now, if we apply this test to the Cosmic Ignorance, we are bound to regard it as the material cause, and not as the efficient cause, of the illusory world. The illusion continues only so long as the Ignorance continues. As soon as the Ignorance disappears and ceases to veil the nature of the substratum, the illusion also disappears,—all the illusory objects that appear on the substratum automatically vanish. The Ignorance is immanent in and pervades the entire nature of the illusion. Illusion would not be illusion at all unless it was a manifestation of Ignorance with regard to the nature of the Substratum. Hence the particular illusory objects appearing on the substratum must be regarded as the particular forms of the manifestation of Ignorance. The Ignorance veiling the nature of the substratum is to be conceived as being modified into the illusory appearances on that substratum. Accordingly, the inexplicable Cosmic Ignorance inexplicably related to and veiling the nature of non-dual Brahman must be conceived as the modifying.

material cause of the illusory appearance of the diversified universe upon that absolute substratum. Thus Brahman is the unmodified material cause and Ignorance is the modified material cause of the universe. But Ignorance being neither real nor unreal, neither different nor non-different from Brahman, there are not really two material causes of the universe. Since the Cosmic Ignorance appears to exist through its identification with Brahman, there is only one real material cause, namely the substratum, Brahman, and the other is an apparent inexplicable material cause which accounts for the inexplicable nature of the effect.

As Brahman is the sole self-luminous Existence and the inexplicable Cosmic Ignorance is eternally related to It, the illusory world also is eternally superimposed (अध्यस्त) upon It. The Ignorance and its product, viz. the world, are sustained and illumined by the self-existent self-luminous non-dual Brahman. There is no necessity for any separate efficient cause in this case, because such necessity arises only when the material cause is unconscious and inert. In the case of a self-luminous material cause, there is no distinction between the efficient and material cause. Thus Brahman with the inexplicable Ignorance eternally associated with It, eternally illumined and revealed by It and eternally veiling Its true non-dual differenceless changeless character, is eternally the material as well as the efficient cause of this illusory universe (अभिन्न-निमित्तोपादान).

One pertinent objection may be raised here. In our ordinary experience the illusions take place with reference to finite imperfect individual observers. There are three necessary conditions found to be involved in the illusion viz. the substratum, the finite observer, the ignorance or non-apprehension of the true nature of the substratum. To these three may be added a fourth condition also, constituted of distance, insufficient light, defective powers of observation, etc. In the case of what is called the Cosmic

Illusion, there are no finite imperfect observers existing previously to the production of the world, that can be ignorant about the nature of Brahman and perceive Brahman as the illusory world. Brahman Itself cannot of course be subject to the Ignorance about Its own nature. How then can such an illusion arise? How can the world be regarded as the illusory product of Brahman through Ignorance? If the world appears on or is evolved from Brahman irrespective of malobservation by any finite observer, then the world must be regarded as a real effect produced by the cause, and not an illusory appearance.

Now, according to the view we are expounding this objection has not much force. From our previous analysis of the nature of illusory perception, we have found that an illusory object is as good an object of perception as any other object of valid perception, (the essential difference being that the former is contradicted, and the latter is not). The observer only perceives the illusory object as it appears on the real substratum; he plays no part in the production or appearance of the illusory object. It must be admitted that, without a percipient subject, the illusory object cannot be known. But that is also the case with colour, taste, sound, etc., which cannot be known to exist and cannot even be thought of apart from relation to the senses of sight, taste, hearing, etc. of the percipient subjects. But we cannot on that account assert that colour, taste, sound, etc. do not exist as extramental entities or properties of extramental things, that they have no objective reality, that they are the products of the senses. Just in the same way the illusions may not be known to appear and may not even be conceived by us apart from the experiences of percipient subjects; but that does not mean that they are the products of such experiences of the subjects or of their imperfect knowledge or imperfect power of observations or of their imagination or mental modification. The illusory objects are, as previously shown, not subjective appearances, but

objective entities perceived by the observers. The Ignorance also, it has been proved, does not mean the absence of the knowledge of any particular individuals, nor the product of the mind of any individuals ; but it is a positive inexplicable entity pertaining to the substratum, and illumined by the same changeless consciousness, by which the mental modifications of the observers also are illumined. Thus the observers form no parts of the cause or the ground of the production or appearance of the illusory effects, which are wholly due to the substratum veiled by Ignorance and manifested as other than what it is. This being the case there can be no valid objection against holding that the world is illusorily produced by Brahman through the veiling of Its nature by Cosmic Ignorance. The finite knowing beings, having no causal potency in the production of this Cosmic Illusion or manifestation of the Cosmic Ignorance, cannot be regarded as a necessary presupposition of the appearance of this illusory world. The finite conscious beings are themselves also products of this illusion. They also are illusory manifestations of Brahman through the Ignorance. Since they are characterised by the capacity for knowledge, endowed with different grades of knowledge, and liable to commit errors and entitled to attain truth, it is they who perceive the illusory world, who are the percipient subjects experiencing these illusory objects that comprise themselves, their likes and their opposites. The experiencing minds being present, the experience of illusion is present, but these minds are not the producers of the illusion. As the Substratum Brahman is eternal and infinite *beyond* time and space, so the Cosmic Ignorance also veiling and diversifying the nature of Brahman is without beginning and is not the effect of any other cause, though it is destructible by the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman. Consequently the illusory world consisting of innumerable subjects and objects, conscious and unconscious beings, being the effect of the beginningless cause, is beginningless

in time. The conscious subjects being thus always present, the experience of the illusory world by the conscious subjects also has been going on from time without beginning. Those conscious subjects who can, by means of proper spiritual self-discipline and metaphysical reflection, transcend their ego, remove the veil of Ignorance and perceive their identity with the self-luminous consciousness, realise that this Consciousness is the eternally changeless non-dual Existence, that It never produces or modifies Itself into any real effects, that the world of effects is illusory.

With regard to distance, insufficient light etc., these are not necessary conditions for the production of illusion, but only auxiliary conditions for the experience of illusion in particular cases, where in the absence of these conditions the observer is expected to perceive the true nature of the substratum. But these conditions are of no importance in cases of natural illusion. Since the very subject-object-relation between the ego and the world is illusory, since the ego and the mind and the senses, themselves the product of illusion—are naturally so constituted as never to make the non-dual Consciousness the direct object of their perception and always to look upon It through the veil of Ignorance, the question of those conditions does not arise at all. So long as the illusory ego continues, the experience of the illusory world must continue ;—the ego lives and moves and has its being in the illusory world. When the ego-hood is merged, one non-dual self-luminous contentless changeless Consciousness alone shines and the world of effects is found never to have any real existence at all.

CHAPTER VII.

The Conception of God.

The foregoing discussions have led us to the following conclusions : (1) One differenceless changeless Existence is the ultimate Reality experienced as immanent in all the actual and possible objects of experience, including the egos of the experiencers themselves, and that all objects, including all the conscious and unconscious beings of the world, are experienced as existent only through their identification with that non-dual Existence and they are only particularised and conditioned forms of the manifestations of this Existence. The diversities of conscious and unconscious beings, constituting the universe, have therefore no independent self-existence ; they are all substantially identical with the one non-dual Existence, and the differences among them are consequently only apparent, and incapable of being defined either as real in the sense of being absolutely existent or as unreal in the sense of being absolutely non-existent. (2) One changeless differenceless impersonal self-luminous Consciousness is the ultimate witness or knower or subject illumining and manifesting all knowledge and experience, all ignorance and illusion, all mental modifications of all individual conscious beings, and all actual and possible objects of knowledge, thought, emotion and desire of all individuals. (3) The Existence and the Consciousness are not two ultimate Realities related to each other, but one Absolute unrelated Reality. This Absolute Self-luminous Reality is absolutely non-dual, having no difference within Itself and no entity of like or unlike nature outside Itself. It is cause-effect-less subject-object-less, relationless, actionless, changeless, differenceless, powerless, attributeless, self-luminous non-dual Reality, and

there can not possibly exist any other real entity either within or outside It, either as Its cause or as Its effect, either as Its knower or as Its object of knowledge, either as Its part or as Its attribute. This Absolute Non-dual Reality is Brahman. (4) This Brahman is the Substance of the universe as well as the Revealer of the universe, and It must also be the sole Ground of the production of the diversities of the universe. (5) The nature of the existence of the diversified world as the effect of Brahman, the nature of its relation to Brahman and the nature of the causation have to be so conceived as neither to contradict our universal experience of the world as a system of objectively real phenomena nor to contradict the non-dual changeless relationless self-luminous character of Brahman, the Absolute Reality. This necessitates the acceptance of the theory of Illusory Causation, according to which the world is the illusory effect of Brahman. Being an illusory entity, the world is neither real nor unreal, neither different nor non-different from Brahman ; it has only apparent existence ; essentially it is nothing but Brahman, but it appears as other than Brahman ; the cause is nothing but the unchanged substratum and the effect is its manifestation in an apparently different form. The appearance has no existence other than the existence of the Substratum, and it does not imply any change or difference in the substratum or the presence of another real substance by its side. (6) The illusory causation implies the presence of the Cosmic Ignorance, veiling the essential nature of Brahman and making It appear as the illusory diversities of finite conscious and unconscious beings. This Ignorance is an inexplicable positive principle, being neither real like Brahman nor unreal like the hare's horn, neither existentially different from Brahman nor absolutely identical with It in character. Hence the presence of the Ignorance with Brahman does not imply any duality of the ultimate Reality nor any change or modification or relativity in the real:

character of Brahman. But it *apparently* conditions and particularises the nature of Brahman and creates the illusory world of diversities upon Brahman, which eternally remains as changeless self-luminous non-dual Substratum. It is through identification with Brahman—the sole Existence—that the illusory phenomena of the world are experienced as real or existent, and it is by the luminosity of Brahman—the sole self-luminous Consciousness—that they are illumined and manifested. (7) Brahman as apparently conditioned by the inexplicable Ignorance is thus the absolute material cause of the universe. Brahman being self-luminous and Ignorance being illumined by Brahman and the effects being of an illusory character, no other efficient cause is necessary for the production of such effects from such a material cause. Hence Brahman as apparently conditioned by Ignorance may be conceived as the sole cause—material as well as efficient—of the universe. This causality, though not really affecting the changeless non-dual character of Brahman, furnishes the rational explanation for the objective world as it is experienced.

Now, the inexplicable Cosmic Ignorance, apparently conditioning the attributeless changeless differenceless self-luminous non-dual Brahman and making It the sole material and efficient cause of the universe, eternally endows Brahman with an *apparent relative* character. In this relative character Brahman as conditioned by Ignorance is to be conceived as really related to the world of effects. Being the sole material and efficient cause of the entire world of effects, this conditioned Brahman must be conceived as self-determining and omnipotent. Since the entire universe of particular conscious and unconscious beings and their relations and activities is illumined by and revealed to Brahman, Brahman must be conceived as partly self-conscious and omniscient. Thus Brahman in this relative character is legitimately conceived as the perfectly self-conscious

and self-determining, omnipotent and omniscient, infinite and eternal Being. This is the conception of Personal God. The entire world owes its existence to Him, it is sustained and regulated by Him; it is from Him, by Him, to Him and in Him that the world exists; in this sense He is appropriately described as the Creator, Preserver, Regulator, Knower and Enjoyer of the universe and is the immanent Self of the universe. But as His existence and luminosity is not exhausted in the manifested universe and as He eternally exists in His all-transcending all-unifying all-regulating all-knowing and all-enjoying perfect unity in the midst of the beginningless and endless diversities of His creation or self-expression, He has an eternal transcendent character as well. He is within all and above all. The particular conscious beings (*Jivas*) are born of Him and are wholly subordinate to Him. He is the sole determiner of their destinies.

From this relative point of view, God or conditioned Brahman may be conceived as modifying Himself into the world of conscious and unconscious beings without losing His identity, because the modifications of Ignorance are attributed to Brahman with whom it is identified, and the particular names and forms that constitute the specific characters and the individualities of these beings are nothing but the modifications of Ignorance.

Again, this Cosmic Ignorance, which veils the real character of Brahman and manifests It illusorily as a plurality of changing objects, may be relatively regarded as the eternal self-concealing self-diversifying creative Power of God, and God as the Person possessing this Power. God by virtue of this unique Power, conceals His transcendent self-luminous differenceless character and eternally manifests Himself as the countless diversities of conscious and unconscious finite beings. Thus in His transcendent aspect He is eternally one without a second, self-luminous

and changeless, above time and space, but in His manifested aspect He is eternally modifying Himself into, creating and illumining the plurality in time and space.

The relation between Brahman (the Substance) and this Cosmic Ignorance (the Power) may be thought of as one of difference in one aspect and as one of non-difference in another aspect. As the Power exists in, by and for God and has no existence apart from His existence, it is to be conceived as non-different from Him, and on that account the modification of the Power is legitimately regarded as the modification of God Himself. But as the Power belongs to the Person, whereas the Person cannot be regarded as belonging to the Power, as the diverse modifications of the Power can be known to be related to one another and to belong to the same Person on account of the essential changeless unity of the Personality, and as in case of the absolute identity of the Power and the Person there would be no notion of Power at all, the Cosmic Power must be conceived as different from, though not independent of God or Brahman. In this sense, it is to be said that the Power of Brahman is eternally modifying itself into the world of diversities, while Brahman as the owner, mover and transcendent illuminer of the Power and its modifications remains eternally unchanged in His non-dual self-luminous character. From this point of view it may also be said that Brahman or God is the efficient cause of the world, and His Power or Energy is the material cause ; God with Power is the total cause—the efficient as well as material cause—of the universe.

Thus it is shown that the conception of one omnipotent and omniscient, self-conscious and self-modifying Personal God—or Brahman endowed with the Cosmic Power and glorious attributes--creating, sustaining and regulating the world, is not fundamentally inconsistent with the theory we are representing here and is not wholly rejected by the exponents of this theory.

But from the philosophical point of view, it has been demonstrated by the exponents of this theory that this conception of God is the conception of a Being with a concrete and composite character and cannot be accepted as the true conception of the Absolute Reality, that the relation between the different aspects of His nature cannot be logically determined and established, that the notions of Substance and Attributes, Personality and Power, Identity and Modifications, Transcendence and Immanence, Difference and Non-difference, etc. which are involved in this conception cannot be consistently substantiated as equally real in accordance with the logical principles. When the ultimate logical conclusion is sought for, this conception of God resolves itself into the conception of one attributeless changeless differenceless self-luminous non-dual Existence as the Absolute Reality and the conception of one neither-real-nor-unreal inexplicable Cosmic Ignorance neither different nor non-different from It, veiling Its true character, and illusorily manifesting an apparent plurality of objects upon this Existence as the Substratum. As the conception of God is made up of the conception of the non-dual self-luminous Existence conditioned by that of the inexplicable Ignorance, God cannot be regarded as the Absolute Reality. Brahman being conceived as God in relation to and as conditioned by Ignorance, the reality of God cannot be of a superior order to that of the Cosmic Ignorance which apparently conditions Brahman and the objective world which is its effect. As the Cosmic Ignorance and the world have only an *apparent* reality, the Personal God, i. e. Brahman conceived in relation to the Ignorance and the world, must also have only an *apparent* Reality. As Brahman cannot be regarded as the Personal God except by reference to the world, the Personality of Brahman, i. e. His Godhood, must be regarded as of illusory character like the world. So long and so far as the world is accepted as real, its self-modifying material and efficient cause, its

omnipotent and omniscient creator and sustainer and ruler, i. e. the Godhood of Brahman, must of course be conceived as equally real. But when the true character of Brahman as the non-dual differenceless self-luminous Existence reveals itself and the world is known to be the illusory product of inexplicable Ignorance on this changeless substratum, the Godhood, which is attributed to Brahman through His relation to this world, must also be regarded as illusory, and Brahman as the non-dual changeless Existence untouched by any relation or condition must alone be conceived as real.

APPENDIX A.

The Theory of Causation.

Let us discuss the relation between cause and effect and clearly indicate how it leads to the conclusion of *Mayāvāda*. Let us refute the doctrine that the effect is different as well as non-different from its cause. We point out the defect of the theory with the help of an illustration namely the pot is the effect of the earth. Here the earthen thing with a peculiar shape is the meaning of the word 'pot', and not mere earth as devoid of this peculiar shape. The knowledge of mere earth does not amount to the knowledge of the pot, nor the word pot is applied to it. Now, if the pot is non-different from earth, then when before the production of the pot, we experience mere earth, we should experience the peculiar form of the pot. Moreover, if the pot is non-different from the earth, then earth would not be the cause of the pot as it does not become the cause of itself.

Opponent—Because there is difference between the cause and the effect, we do not experience the pot before its production and because of that difference, earth becomes the cause of the pot.

Refutation—Then you mean to say that the cause and the effect are non-different inspite of their differences. So, after the production of the pot, though there is a difference between pot and earth, yet that difference is not contradictory to the existence of their non-difference. Thus, even before the production of the pot; that difference will not contradict the existence of their non-difference. And the effect being non-different from its cause, the objection urged at the outset of the discussion holds good. That is, before the production of the pot, there will be knowledge of the pot and there will be no cause-effect-relation between the pot and earth. If difference of earth and pot is, as you say, the cause of the non-apprehension of non-difference of earth with the pot, then why should not even after the production of the pot, be the non-apprehension of the non-difference. Moreover, if difference of the pot from earth is the determinant of the production of the pot from earth, then when

even after the production of the pot, that difference is there, so the pot should have been produced again after its production. In other words, if difference is the cause of non-perception of the pot in earth and is also cause of the production of the pot from earth, then even after the production of the pot, on the one hand the pot would not be perceived and on the other the same pot would come into being. But this is not experienced. So difference is not the cause of non-perception of non-difference nor is it a cause of the pot being the effect of earth.

Opponent—Though there is non-difference of pot before the production in earth, still because there is non-existence of the pot before its production we do not perceive it.

Refutation—This cannot be. As there is non-difference of the pot in the earth and as there is non-difference of the earth in the pot, so earth being there, the pot must be there. So how can there be the non-existence of the pot.

Opponent—Your objection is not valid, because the pot, in the form of the pot, is not non-different with earth.

Refutation—If, as you say, the pot is not non-different from the earth in the shape of the pot, then the talk on non-difference of the pot with earth is meaningless and if there is no non-difference of the pot with earth, then the theory of the non-difference of the effect with cause, inspite of their differences, will not hold good.

Opponent—Verily there is non-difference of the pot in earth i. e. the pot has non-difference with the earth in the form of earth.

Refutation—The alleged pot too is earth and that earth exists even before the production of the pot. If pot be the substratum of the non-difference of earth, the existence of the pot must be at the time when there is mere earth. So the same objection retains its full strength in this case also. In other words, you cannot explain the non-perception etc. alluded to before.

Opponent—In order to explain non-perception of the effect before its production, we should hold that the effect was then non-existent.

Answer—In that case, your theory will not be distinct from the doctrine of absolute difference of the cause and the effect*.

By above considerations, it is demonstrated that by the theory just discussed, the felt co-existence (सामानाधिकरण्य) of the cause and the effect cannot be explained.

Now, let us discuss the nature of the relation between the cause and the effect in the light of our view and throw light upon their co-existence.

Question—Then, what, according to you, is the relation between the cause and the effect.

Answer—It is the relation of identity (तादात्म्य). As in the case of the experience "this pot", the pot is experienced as identical with "this", so in the experience "the earthen pot", the pot is experienced as identical with earth. An entity which is non-different from another in its existential aspect, and yet in whom there is the difference from the latter, is said to be identically related with the latter. Though in an attribute, there is the difference from its substratum, still in so far as its existence is concerned, the attribute is non-different from its substratum. Similarly, though in so far as its existence is concerned, the effect is non-different from its cause, still in the effect, there is the difference from the cause.

Objection—How can there be the sameness of existence, when the effect is the locus of difference from the cause ?

* The effect cannot be said to be absolutely different from its material cause, because they are never experienced as existing separately. In case of such difference there could not be an inseparable co-existence between the cause and the effect. There is no perception of the cloth remaining in these threads, as there is the perception of the vessel as the support of the fruit, supported in it. If it were thus experienced, then the difference of the cloth from threads would become perceived like the difference of the fruit from the vessel. If it is said that owing to *Inherence*, there is no perception of difference, then the *Inherence* and the absence of perception of difference would become interdependent. Thus it is proved that there is no such relation as the relation of *Inherence* through which two terms which are absolutely distinct will appear united as inseparable.

Answer—The difference between the cause and the effect cannot be ignored. As the pot and the potter-stick are different, so the pot and its material cause-earth are different. If this difference of the effect from the cause is ignored, then there will be faults pointed out in connection with the refutation of the doctrine of their non-difference. But inspite of their difference, the effect has no existence independent of the cause. Hence, the relation of identity is constituted by a difference which does not differentiate the existence of the entities which are different भिन्नत्वे सति अभिन्नसत्त्वाकत्वम् = सत्त्वानवच्छेदकभेदत्वम्

Objection—If such be the case, then how can there be the perception of non-difference.

Answer—The perception of non-difference of the effect from the cause is due to their difference which does not distinguish their existence. If difference becomes the distinguishing mark of existence of entities differentiated, then the perception of their non-difference is not possible, but if difference does not distinguish existence, then the perception of non-difference of entities differentiated is possible.

To explain, there are two kinds of difference (1) the difference that distinguishes the existence of the entities differentiated, as is the difference between the pot and the potter-stick and (2) the difference that does not distinguish the existence of entities distinguished, as is the difference of the pot and earth. The first is existent and the second is not existent. In other words, the difference between substratum and its counterentity, which are independent (separable) entities, becomes the distinguishing mark of their existence, but the difference between a substratum and an entity depending on it is a difference that does not distinguish their existence. Because the potter-stick is experienced independently of the pot, therefore their difference distinguishes their existence, but because the pot is never experienced independently of earth, therefore their difference does not distinguish their existence.

The experience of the effect as depending on the experience of its material cause cannot be explained but by the recognition

of the fact that inspite of their differences, the existence of the effect is constituted by the existence of its material cause. For example, such perception as "the golden ornament" and "the earthen pot" can only be explained if it is maintained that inspite of the difference of the ornament and gold, and that of the pot and earth, the existence of the ornament and the pot are constituted respectively by the existence of gold and earth. Such perceptions do not refer to the alleged genus of earth that resides in the pot and other individuals, because there is no proof about the existence of a pervading genus distinct from the material cause. The perception bears testimony to the identity of the attribute with its substratum and of the individual with the alleged genus. It cannot be asserted that because of the *Inherence* of the alleged genus in individuals there is the said perception of identity, since *Inherence* is an unproved thesis. Even granting its existence the perception of non-difference is impossible because of the absolute difference of *Inherence* from the terms it relates.

The difference of the effect from its material cause is distinct from mutual negation because it is perceived as having no reference to the meaning of the word 'no'. The pot is never the locus of the negation of earth and hence there is never the predication—the pot is not earth, but there is the predication that the pot is not the stick. This fact throws a new light on the nature of the difference of the effect from its material cause. The difference of the pot from the stick, being the separator of their existence, can be said to be existent-difference. In fact wherever there is existent difference, there should be difference of existence too. But from this it does not follow that the difference of the effect from its material cause, being not the separator of their existence, is non-existent. It has been shown before that the effect cannot be said to be non-different from its cause. If the difference between the effect and the cause were non-existent, then they would have been non-different. Thus, the difference of the effect from its material cause, being neither existent nor non-existent must be inexplicable. It has already been shown that the relation of the effect with its cause cannot be said to be one of absolute difference, non-difference or that

of difference as well as non-difference. Hence, the difference of the effect from its cause must be inexplicable. *

* The theory of non-existent-effect is not tenable. Nothing what is non-existent i. e. without distinction is produced. The non-existent cannot have the distinction namely the attribute of being the counter-entity of prior negation. If it is non-existent, then it will never be related to the past, present and future times, hence the production of the nature of 'relation to the first moment' cannot happen. If the effect is existent before its own production, the operation of cause will be to no purpose and non-apprehension of it is not proper. Hence the effect must be inexplicable.

Objection—If there is prior existence of the inexplicable effect, then it will contradict its non-perception and the operation of the agent will be futile. The view of the prior non-existence of the inexplicable effect is not also sound. If the production of the non-existent is accepted, its relation with its cause will be impossible.

Answer—Existence is that which is not negated in the past, the present and the future and there is no proof about the separate genus of existence. And non-existence is void like hare's horn which cannot be perceived as existent in any substratum. Now, if the existence of the effect is recognised, then it will be not negated in all times, therefore before its production also there will be its experience and the operation of the agent would be useless. Moreover, there will be the impossibility of its destruction, because the destruction of such existence is not experienced. And, if it is non-existent, then being void, there can be no question about its production. Hence the effect must be distinct from the existent and the non-existent. Owing to the faults of the two views, the effect cannot be accepted as both existent and non-existent.

Opponent—(Jaina) It is to be recognised that in the material cause, the effect is existent in some form and also non-existent in some other form. If the pot were wholly existent before its production, then the activity for its production etc. would be to no purpose. And if it were wholly non-existent before its production, then it could not come to existence even through the operation of the cause. Hence, for the purpose of making the operation of the cause fruitful, the effect should be taken as somewhat existent and somewhat non-existent before its production.

The difference of the effect from its cause being inexplicable, there is no contradiction in their existence being the same, inspite of their difference. Where there is difference that is existent, there alone the existence of the differentiated entities cannot be one and hence there would be contradiction in the recognition of the identity of existence inspite of difference. In other words, inexplicable difference is quite compatible with the

Answer—Though there is the experience of existence and non-existence, as conditioned by the difference of time, space and modes, still it is not that what is non-existent in another place or at another time becomes non-existent in its own place or in its own time. This contradicts all perceptions. Moreover, the question arises : whether existence and non-existence reside at one time or at different times. The first is not possible because it is contradictory to have both at a time. In no case, through a correct apprehension, existence and non-existence are experienced at the same time. Because one takes hold of the mind by the suppression of the other, therefore the union of existence and non-existence of one thing cannot be known simultaneously. The second also is not logical. Because in that case the nature of existence and non-existence being due to temporal conditions will not characterise the essence of the thing. Moreover, even due to the influence of temporal differences, the existential nature of an object cannot really be changed. Besides, a thing sharing similar characteristics with others in respect of some of its properties cannot be reduced to those objects.

Opponent's logic (सममङ्ग) is based on an unsound attempt of juxtaposing contradictories like existent and non-existent. If existence and non-existence are the attributes of a thing, then in the state of non-existence even, there will be presence of existence, because like non-existence, existence is taken as an attribute of the thing. The attribute cannot remain without some support. So at the time of non-existence even, the thing, its support, will remain. Besides, non-existence cannot be an attribute of things, because that which is an attribute must be existent. If existence and non-existence are both the attributes of the effect, then its non-existent nature would remove its existence and *vice versa*. Besides, being existent in nature, the effect will not be produced in character; so at no time, it will be an effect. Existence as well as non-existence cannot, at the same time, constitute the

identity of existence. From this it follows that there is no contradiction between inexplicable difference and the negation of difference of existence. So there is nothing contradictory if two inexplicably different entities be non-different in existence. In other words, because the effect and its difference are distinct from being existent, there is identity of the cause in the effect. If the effect and its difference were existent, then in the effect, the identity of the nature of non-different existence with the cause would not have remained. From the above, it is also clear that the experience of co-existence of the effect with its material cause is due to the inexplicability of their difference, had they been really different, there would not have been the experience of their co-existence. Real difference is opposed to co-existence but inexplicable difference is not.*

essence of a thing. If so, then these two should always be perceived in things; but this is absurd, Now if existence and non-existence be neither the essence nor the attribute of the effect, but be something else, then the existence and non-existence of that something will have nothing to do with the existence and non-existence of the effect. Thus it is proved that the effect is inexplicable.

The opponent maintains that existence and non-existence are both real and their identity is also real, and therefore taken as such, their theory will give rise to contradiction. If to evade this difficulty, it is held that these contradictory characters are apparent, then this involves an abandonment of the recognised view of the school and implies an acceptance of our theory—the theory of the Inexplicable.

* In order to explain co-existence of the material cause and its effect, as is corroborated by the experience “the earthen pot” we have to maintain that the effect is both different as well as non-different from its material cause. Though generally there is contradiction between difference and non-difference, still both difference and non-difference can abide together as is the case with conjunction whose existence and non-existence reside in one substratum through the difference of particularisations. Such a view should be accepted on the strength of experience. But though there is the experience of both silver and shell respectively, still by an examination of the strength and weakness of these two experiences, we find that the existence of the contents of these experiences is not

Now let us discuss the nature of the root material cause of the world and show that the pervading existence is its material cause and there is, besides, another inexplicable principle which is also the material cause of inexplicable world. According to the view expounded here that cause is the material cause from which the effect is produced as non-different. Non-difference of the effect from its material cause means that the effect has no separate existence apart from the existence of its material cause and thus its difference from the latter is inexplicable. Though there is of itself, its absence of existence as separate from the existence of its material cause, still because of its inexplicable difference from the cause, the cause-effect-relation is possible.

Because existence pervades all things, so it must be their material cause. It cannot be asserted that the all-pervading genus of existence is designated by the word existence and not the material cause. The perception of existence as a pervading entity covers even the cases of all categories, positive and negative and consequently cannot safeguard the view that existence is a genus. If there can be a perception of a pervading entity, even in the absence of the pervading object, then perception will not establish the existence of its content. If even in the absence of a pervading entity, there be the perception of pervasion, then there will be no such category as the genus. Perceptions such as 'the pot is existent' 'the cot is existent' establish the non-difference of existence with different objects.

of the same order (when a shell is taken as silver, silver is apparent and shell is empirical). Similarly difference and non-difference also should be taken as of different essences. In the case of difference as well as non-difference, we fail to explain the relation of non-difference with difference without recognising difference as apparent or unreal. So it should be acknowledged that difference is apparent (प्रातिभासिक) and non-difference on which difference is based is empirical (व्यावहारिक). Logically considered, two contradictories, if their existences are of the same order (समानसत्ताक), cannot remain together. Hence one must be of less essence or existence than the other. And difference of less essence cannot be contradictory to non-difference of more essence. So such difference as well as non-difference should be accepted in the case of the relation of the effect with its material cause.

But such perceptions cannot establish the *Inherence* of the genus of existence in different objects. As perception testifies to their non-difference, so the latter cannot be related through *Inherence* to the former, since entities which are different in nature can alone be so related. The experience of non-difference of existence with objects brings into light the absurdity of the view that existence is a separate attribute of things and proves that as earth is the material cause of the pot, which is never experienced as different from earth, so existence is the material cause of all things. What is called genus is nothing but sameness and this sameness is the sameness of the material cause through the variety of its effects. The nature of earth is the generality of all earthen things because of its being the same; and separate from earth and its transformation the pot, no valid cognition bears testimony to the existence of earthness or pothood, pervading individuals. So one's own essence is its generality. Thus existence being the essence of all things is the reality of all. When that reality is predicated of all objects of experience, it is designated as 'existence,' but when it is taken as pervading individual objects and not objects in general, it is designated by such words as substantiality, earthness, pothood, clothness. Hence the all-pervading Reality of the nature of existence is the material cause of the world. In the experience of the co-existence of the pot with existence, the identity of the nature of the absence of difference from the substratum-existence becomes the object.

Now, if mere existence would have been the material cause of the effect-world, then its effect and its difference from the effect would have been existent and not inexplicable, but for the sake of the relation of identity between the cause and the effect, this inexplicability is required. If the effect and its difference were real, then because this difference would differentiate the existence of the effect from the existence of its material cause, therefore effect's identity of the nature of existence, non-different from its material cause would not have been possible. In order to give explanation of this inexplicability, some inexplicable material cause of the effect-world, besides existence, must be granted. This cannot be the efficient cause, because the efficient cause does not pervade its effect. (*Adṛṣṭa* is merely an efficient and not

a material cause.) Without the material cause corresponding to the effect, the inexplicable production of the effect is impossible. If some inexplicable material cause of the effect and also of its difference from the material cause is recognised, then this inexplicability can only be possible and thereby the identity of cause with effect will be explained. So an inexplicable primordial material cause besides existence must be granted.

APPENDIX B

The theory of Error.

There are different theories of Error. Some (the Prābhākara-Mimāṃsakas) deny false knowledge by asserting that it consists of two separate knowledges of two different objects namely the perception of 'thisness' of the shell and remembrance of silver. Others (Yogācāra Buddhists) deny false knowledge by regarding silver as non-distinct from intelligence. Others (the Rāmānujists) refute false knowledge by admitting that there is real silver in the shell, and others (the Jainas) by calling it existent as well as non-existent. There are others who accept false knowledge. Of them, some (Nihilist Buddhists) hold that error consists in the perception of non-existent silver in the shell. Others (the Naiyāyikas) are of opinion that there is the perception of silver which remains in another place and not where it is seen. According to this view, the false knowledge is one and qualified in character and its object is pre-experienced, distant and real. According to the Vedāntic theory both knowledge and its object are false. The said silver is present before the eyes, is newly produced, lasts as long as knowledge of it lasts and is apparent or false.

Now let us prove that the above-mentioned six theories are not sound by showing that the perception of silver (बोध), activity towards it (प्रवृत्ति) and its later cancellation or negation (बाध) do not lend support to those theories.

The Prabhākara-view (अख्याति perception of 'thisness' of shell and remembrance of silver) is not tenable. The

qualified cognition such as "this is silver" (and not independent such as 'thisness' and 'silverness') is the proof about the perceived character of silver. By the recognition of two knowledges the activity of the person desirous of having silver cannot be explained. By the cognition namely 'this' there cannot be activity (owing to unwarrantable stretch अतिप्रसङ्ग). And the cognition of silver cannot lead to activity towards shell without making shell its object, because the cognition of and desire for one object cannot prompt a person to direct his activity towards a different object. It cannot be said that there is activity due to non-discrimination between cognitions which are presented independently. If the two knowledges become manifested, then there cannot be the absence of their discrimination. The non-knowledge of difference (i. e. non-discrimination), which is not in awareness, can never be the producer of activity, unless it gives birth to any qualified knowledge, i. e. knowledge not about mere 'this' or mere silver, but about the 'this' qualified by silver. Through cancellation namely 'this is not silver' — it is known that the absence of silver refers to the 'something' that is present before the eyes. Where there is the occurrence of a possibility, there can be its denial. This is only possible, if silver were produced as identified with 'this.'

The Yogācāra-Buddhist-view (आत्मख्याति the shell-silver is merely an idea) is not sound. If the shell-silver would have been inward, then there should not have been the experience of the identity of the silver with the external thing and there should not have been activity towards the external thing and there should not have been the negation of that silver through the knowledge of the external reality of the shell. Because in non-difference, the relation of the subject and the object is not possible and because the experience of difference of silver from knowledge is non-contradicted, the illusory silver is established to be different from its knowledge.

Now let us discuss the Rāmānuja view of error (सत्ख्याति). According to this doctrine, when there is relation of the defective eyes with an object (the shell), the real manifestation (the experience of silver) is produced from real materials (constituents of silver) existing in that object. Though in the

shell-silver the materials of the shell are greater in quantity than those of silver, still when, owing to defects, it is not perceived, the materials of silver which are less in quantity comes within the range of sight. But this view is not correct. The perception such as 'this silver' can be explained, in case, we admit that the shell-silver was produced at the time of perception; so for the explanation of the perception of the shell-silver, the parts of silver should not be recognised in the shell.

If in the shell, silver can remain, then like shell, it could always be known, but this does not happen. Over and above, as according to the opponent, the knowledge of silver has for its object existent silver, so for the perception of silver in the shell, he need not recognise the defect of organs as well as non-manifestation of the shell as the cause of the perception. Moreover, the knowledge of silver in the shell, in which the parts of the shell are greater in quantity than those of silver should not be treated as a case of illusion, as is found in the case of the knowledge of milk mixed with a greater quantity of water. In both these cases, the objects (silver and milk), being perceived as non-different from their supports (shell and water), the two perceptions are of the same character, and just as the latter is not treated as illusory, so the former should not also be treated as illusory. Moreover, the opponent admits defect as the cause of illusion, and at the same time he takes the object of an illusory experience as an existent, but this is contradictory. Besides, the greater part of the shell cannot be said to be a hindrance to the apprehension of silver. If it were so, then even at the time of the presence of the defect, there would have been, owing to the presence of the greater quantity of the parts of the shell, the absence of the apprehension of silver. But this does not happen. Moreover, we apprehend even a small quantity of silver which is mixed with a great quantity of shell, so, in the case of illusion, the defect cannot be said to be the cause of the non-recognition of the greater quantity of the shell.

Now about activity. Here a question regarding the cause of this activity may legitimately be asked.

Opponent—The qualified knowledge, which has for its object the substance-attribute-relation between the shell and silver is the cause of activity towards shell. Such qualified knowledge of the shell and silver takes place because the difference of the shell and silver is not understood.

Refutation—This cannot be, because the shape of silver and the shell being known, their difference must be known. It is admitted by you that silver and the shell are both known and as such their forms must be known. Moreover, if the manifestation of the substance-attribute-relation between the shell and silver is through mutual dependence, then there will be erroneous knowledge. Because the substantive is understood as the attributive and the attributive is understood as the substantive, there will be erroneous knowledge and this would imply an abandonment of opponent's position. Even if the substance and the attribute be taken as independent entities, still the same defect will follow; and the substantive and the attributive cannot be independent because the manifestation of the substance-attribute-relation is determined by their mutual dependence.

Now about cancellation. This theory cannot explain cancellation.

Opponent—Our theory can explain cancellation because in cancellation, a person knows that the thing which I regarded as containing much silver has not that much, but it has a large quantity of the shell in it.

Refutation—This cannot be. If it were so, then we should have the notion of cancellation in the case where a small quantity of silver is kept within a greater quantity of the shell.

Opponent—The knowledge of the shell cancels silver because the knowledge of silver is due to non-manifestation of the characteristics of the shell.

Refutation—This is not possible. Because, according to you, the silver is existent in the shell as is the case with the silver existing in the shop, so you cannot hold that the said silver is due to non-manifestation of the shell. Like the

knowledge of the silver in the shop, which is produced through its own materials namely sense-contact etc. and which is not based on the non-manifestation of the shell, the knowledge of the said silver will not also be due to non-manifestation of the shell. So the above assumption is invalid.

Besides, as, according to the opponent, both the shell and silver are existents, the perception—"this is not silver" cannot refer to the absolute non-existence of silver in the shell because in that case silver will be illusory. So this perception must refer to the mutual negation of silver and the shell, but this mutual negation cannot amount to cancellation of either the shell or the silver, (also it is not that the antecedent is bound to be cancelled by the subsequent).

Moreover, according to the theory of existent silver, there cannot be the cancellation characterised by disappointed activity or obstacle to activity, because there is no difference in it from the knowledge of real silver. Even in the case of real silver, when the object is, somehow, taken away and a piece of the shell is left before, there is disappointed activity caused by that piece of shell placed just before us and the obstacle to activity caused by the perception "this is not silver." So there should be the cancellation in both the cases of real silver and the shell-silver, because both the knowledges objectify the existent silver and in both cases, the disappointed activity and the obstacle to activity are the same. Besides, if the obstacle to or non-production of activity be treated as the cancellation, then in the case of the illusion of any object which does not attract our interest, there should have been at once the knowledge of cancellation, because there is no occasion of activity there. Besides, when the opponent concludes that silver is existent always, how could there be disappointed activity or obstacle to activity?

Opponent—That knowledge of silver is not efficacious and also there is its contradictory apprehension such as "this is not silver;" hence there is disappointment and obstacle to activity.

Refutation—If at the time of the knowledge of silver, there be such knowledge that this is inefficacious, then there will not be such disappointed activity. If at the time of

the apprehension of silver, it is understood that this silver is efficacious, then it would be reckoned as that (efficacious) which it is not. This would entail the abandonment of opponent's position and will amount to the assertion that something is not really what it appears to be. Moreover, because both silver and the shell are existents, it cannot be conceived how the apprehension of shell-ness will be contradictory to that of silver whereby the said activity will be hindered. And because both the objects are real, cancellation cannot be treated as the obstruction of the apprehension of silver. Moreover, if the knowledge of a greater quantity of shell amounts to the cancellation of silver, then there should have been the cancellation in the form "I saw here silver before and now I do not see that," but there should not be the cancellation in the form "this is not silver."

Thus this realistic theory of error, due to its failure to explain illusory perception, the resulting activity and the cancellation, is rejected as irrational.

The theory of perception of distant silver (अन्यथाख्याति) is not tenable. The knowledge of the shell-silver is not indirect because it is experienced that I perceive the silver before the eyes. This knowledge is not of the distant silver. The distant silver cannot be known by the eyes. The eyes do not act without taking the help of fixed auxiliaries like the sense-contact. There cannot be perception of the qualified without relation to both the attributive and the substantive. The understanding does not take the substantive for its object without directly knowing the attributive. Though there is the material of qualified knowledge namely the relation to the substance and the indirect knowledge of attribute, still in the absence of the relation with the attribute, the qualified knowledge does not take place. If it did, then owing to the same reasoning, it may as well be held that without directly knowing the substantive, qualified knowledge can take place, which is absurd. So in every qualified perception, the relation with the attributive is necessary. If the relation with attribute is not the cause of perception, then there would be the perception of the qualification of fire in the mountain and there would not be the inference (such as the mountain contains fire because it has smoke).

because there is the material of perception except the relation with the attribute (fire).

Opponent—Let us show how the distant silver is being here perceived. Take for example the ocular perception of the fragrance of a piece of sandal-wood situated at a distance from the eyes. It was already known by smelling the sandal-wood that there is sweet smell in it, but afterwards by having seen the sandal-wood from afar even without smelling it, we can perceive with the eyes that it is fragrant. Here, the previous knowledge of perfume of the sandal-wood serves as the contact required for the visual perception of fragrance. The perception of silver in the shell is a similar perception and not remembrance. Though the silver is distant, still on account of the contact of knowledge (ज्ञानलक्षणा सन्निकर्ष this knowledge is remembrance arising out of the knowledge of similarity etc), after the remembrance of silver, we perceive silver as non--different from the object 'this' present before the eyes. This is illusory perception.

Refutation—The example of the fragrant sandal is inapt, because, in that case, we do not perceive perfume. If it were perception, then there would have been the knowledge namely "I see the sandal-wood and smell its perfume." Everyone experiences that he sees the sandal-wood and remembers its perfume (or makes inference, as from seeing white sandal-wood and not from red one). Even if it is admitted that the perfume of the sandal-wood which was previously apprehended is known through contact called knowledge, still the shell-silver cannot be said to be perceived because the attribute of silver had not, at any time, been known in the shell and what was not known cannot be obtained in remembrance. The silver which was known already is here non-existent, so the perception of it is not possible. Besides, through contact called knowledge there should have been a general knowledge of silver which is of the form "I know silver," but there cannot be a particular knowledge of silver due to a particular sense-organ namely the ocular perception of silver (the ordinary perception) like "I am perceiving silver."

The said perception cannot be produced through any defect of visual perception, because the defect cannot be

the producer of the knowledge of a real attribute (silverness). According to the opponent, in the case of the perception of silver, the attributive (silver) is also real like the substantive (shell). If it is accepted that by the defect the visual perception of a distant thing is possible, then through it alone, even in the absence of qualified knowledge, activity towards the qualified object will be possible. So there will be no illusory experience and the theory of the opponent will not stand. Besides, if the defect can produce illusory perception, then why should it not also produce an apparent object of that perception? Over and above, in the present case, the perception which establishes the thing before the eyes is present. Because the silver is perceived and at the same time there is no real silver present, it has to be accepted that some apparent or inexplicable (which cannot be said to be existent or non-existent or both) silver is present there.

Without ordinary perception with regard to silver, there cannot be activity to possess it. Moreover, the activity is towards that alone which is known to have the attribute of silver (रजतत्त्व). And this attribute cannot be known in the shell because this attribute cannot manifest itself independently, but it always manifests itself as an attribute of its substratum-silver. So in order to account for the activity towards silver, directed to the shell, the non-difference of silver should be known in the shell. This can only be, if silver becomes produced in it. If, at the time of illusion, the identity of silver in the thing 'this' (the shell) was not manifested, then the cancellation, namely "this is not silver," would become objectless. Silver being situated at a distant region, the relatedness of silver in the shell is non-existent and the cancellation of the non-existent is not possible. Cancellation is the denial of what was attributed before. If on the strength of perception an inexplicable object which is different from the existent and the non-existent is admitted, then it is possible to explain cancellation. So it is not proved that the object of illusion is located in another place.

The theory that the object of illusion is altogether non-existent like hare's horn (असत्ख्याति) is not logical. Though by words which designate non-existence, verbal knowledge is

produced, still the sense-organs do never know the thing which is not related to them. Though the form of the non-existent exists in the mind as a subjective content, still this subjective idea never refers to the non-existent as an extramental entity. Where there is verbal knowledge having no objective reference, there the content of knowledge is never perceived. The non-existent has no particularisation, so it cannot manifest itself as having the particularisation "silver". Though at a subsequent moment, that silver is not manifest, still when it was manifested, it was, it must be admitted, present there. If this is not the case, the existence of nothing will be established. If what is absolutely non-existent be accepted as attributed in the case of illusory perception, then there cannot be the difference of manifestation in the case of various illusory perceptions and no activity can be produced by such perceptions. Mere use of word and the knowledge void of object are found in the case of non-existent things and they lead to no activity. The perception of silver has not for its object the non-existent like hare's horn because there is the rule that the manifestation namely "this is silver" is with a substratum (साधिष्ठान) and the cancellation "this is not silver" is not an unqualified negation (सावधिक) and also because it is directly perceived (अपरोक्ष).

Opponent—(सदसत्त्व्याति)—Because but by a recognition of a thing having existence and non-existence as its aspects, the perception and cancellation cannot be explained, so it must be admitted that the thing is existent as well as non-existent.

Answer—If it were both existent and non-existent, then due to its existential aspect, the shell-silver and its existential aspect would have been real and thus would not have been cancelled; or due to its non-existential aspect, the silver and its existence also would have been non-existent and thus would not have been directly apprehended. It cannot be said that owing to temporal differences, the very same thing can be both existent and non-existent. If a thing possesses two forms, then at the time of one form, the other must either be lost or remain. It cannot be said that at the time of one form, the other is lost, because, even after the illusion, there is the recognition such

as "this is that shell." It cannot also be said that at the time of one form, the other remains, because in that case, at the time of the knowledge of the shell, the silver which was perceived before would have been cognised. Thus the content of erroneous perception is not existent as well as non-existent.

Perception and cancellation can be explained in the following way: Owing to difference of the object from non-existence, there is its perception and owing to its difference from existence, there is its cancellation.

Opponent :—If it were other than the existent, then it would not have been perceived as is the case with the non-existent. If it were other than the non-existent, then there would not have been cancellation as is the case with the self. Hence, the shell-silver is neither different from existence nor from non-existence, but it is existent as well as non-existent.

Answer—This account is not accurate. Existence cannot be said to be the *conditio sine qua non* (प्रयोजक) of perception, hence the deduction that what is devoid of existence cannot be perceived cannot bear examination. If it were so, then in those things which are eternally beyond the cognizance of sense-organs (अतीन्द्रिय), there would have been the absence of existence. When things beyond the senses, even by being existent are not perceived, so existence cannot be said to be the essential condition of perception, but something besides existence should be regarded as its essential condition. Thus, there is no such invariable concomitance that wherever there is perception, there is existence. If it be objected that the universal concomitance of perception and existence is proved by the example of the self which being by nature, existence, is perceived, then it can be said that the perception of the self can as well be explained through its self-luminosity and so to interpret the perception of the non-self-luminous entities, the example of the self should not be cited.

As existence is not the cause of perception, similarly non-existence is not the cause of cancellation. The absolute negation of non-existence is not possible. If the alleged negative valid knowledge having for its counterentity—non-existence is admitted, then non-existence also, because of the

validity of the said knowledge of negation would turn out to be existent. The objection that when the knowledge of the invariable concomitance namely 'what in non-existent is not perceived' is perceived, therefore the object of it, namely non-existence must also be perceived, is not sound; because the invariable concomitance in non-existence which is void of relation with space and time etc, is impossible. Invariable concomitance of two objects means the particular correlation of both in one space or time. The non-existence has no location, hence it cannot be concomitant with any entity. Therefore, the knowledge of the non-existent is like the knowledge of the past which is taken to be objectless. So it is established, that non-existence cannot be the content of immediate apprehension. The non-existent object is nothing but the knowledge of non-existence. Hence, the understanding of the said invariable concomitance has for its object this knowledge of non-existence, therefore non-existence is never objectified by perception.

By the above discussion it is proved that non-existence is not the cause of cancellation, but is the cause of the absence of immediate apprehension. So non-cancellation of an entity cannot be said to be the criterion of its existence and cancellation the criterion of its non-existence. Thus, it is proved that though it is simpler to characterise existence as the cause of immediate apprehension and non-existence as that of cancellation, still facts as they stand contradict such a characterisation. From this it follows that owing to its cancellation, the shell-silver is other than existence, and owing to its immediate apprehension, distinct from non-existence. Thus, it is shown that though the recognition of the category of the inexplicable over and above that of existence and non-existence involves complexity of thought, still for the sake of logical accuracy, we cannot help but recognise it. To conclude, due to our failure to explain the preception and the cancellation of the shell-silver in any other way but by the recognition of the inexplicable, the shell-silver should be recognised as different from the existent and the non-existent.

In case, it is recognised that the shell-silver is produced then and there, then alone, the qualified perception of it can be

explained and not in any other way. There cannot be the knowledge of relatedness (वैशिष्ट्य) in mind, if there is no corresponding objective relatedness in the object. Because (a) without the object, knowledge cannot be produced, (b) the non-existent cannot be objectified, (c) the inward cannot have vivid outward manifestation, (d) the empirical silver cannot be cancelled and (e) the distant silver cannot be perceived, so it is known that some apparent silver, which is produced at that time, becomes the object of the knowledge of the said silver. The thing, which is accepted in accordance with perception, will not be existent before that perception. Because the shell-silver is simultaneous with perception, it is called apparent. The apparent character of the shell-silver implies its non-existence in another time different from the time of its perception and not its being produced by perception. The shell-silver is not phenomenal like pots and other things of our empirical world. The shell-silver and the like are negated during the time of our empirical activity, so they are not empirically existent. At the time of their perception they are not negated, so their apparent existence cannot be denied. In the case of pots etc., at the time of empirical activity they are not negated, so their empirical existence cannot be denied. Thus the shell-silver is apparent and not phenomenal. Such inexplicable apparent silver is called false. Because the shell-silver is not perceived by a person without defect and there is cancellation such as "here is no silver" and also recognition such as "false silver was manifested" the falsity of silver must be accepted. The non-existent or the existent or the existent + non-existent cannot be taken as false. So the said silver will fall in the category of false entity. Because of the cancellation of the perceived silver, it must be different from the true silver. Cancellation denotes the invalidity of previous knowledge by denoting the absence of the reality of the object previously perceived. If after the knowledge of a content, a knowledge of the negation of the said content takes place, then the content previously experienced must be false. If it were not the case, then the cancellation of the said content would not have been valid. So by preception and cancellation it is known that what is not real is perceived.

"By the above discussion, it is proved that the shell-silver is false. Now let us prove that the relation of it with the shell is also false. Because there is apprehension such as "this silver," we should accept its identity in the substratum before the eyes. But after the knowledge of the shell, the identity of silver in the substratum before the eyes ('this') becomes negated by the cancellation "this is not silver." If at the time of illusion, there was no apprehension of the identity of silver in the object before the eyes, then cancellation would have no object to which it has to refer. On the other hand, if it is said that the inherence of mere attribute of silver was manifested in the shell, then there should have been the cancellation namely "here there is no attribute of silver." So it must be admitted that the identity of silver in the shell is manifested. The felt identity of the shell-silver with the shell is peculiar in character because everywhere 'this' is experienced as identical with 'silver' as is corroborated by the normal experience—"this is silver," but here silver is found to be identical with the shell. Thus this identity should be taken as inexplicable. That is, the 'thisness' of the shell, which is contradictory to the attribute of silver, is found to be correlated with the latter, so in accordance with the perception of the shell-silver, it must be admitted that the co-existence of the 'thisness' of the shell and of the attribute of silver must be false. This identity cannot be existent because the shell is not silver. Also it is not provable that the identity of the silver which is perceived here (that is, the identity which is perceived as determined by both) is elsewhere. So illusory or inexplicable identity should be accepted (though the two attributes namely difference from existence and difference from non-existence are contradictory, still their false identity is not contradictory).

Now let us prove that the knowledge of shell-silver is inexplicable or false. The knowledge having for its object an inexplicable entity is also inexplicable, otherwise it would not be the knowledge having the inexplicable as its object. Owing to the falsity of content, the knowledge referring to that content is cancelled. If the said knowledge would have naturally been incapable of being cancelled, then the object of that knowledge would not have been cancelled. Had illusory

knowledge been valid, it could not have been removed by valid knowledge. The knowledge of the shell-silver must be illusory, because, in the first place, it is neither a knowledge of the existent nor that of the non-existent; secondly, because all other explanations of this experience but the present one are riddled with contradictions; and thirdly, because such a recognition is in consonance with the normal experience of the general run of people who feel that there is illusory experience.

Thus it is found that the content silver, the relation of the silver with the shell and the knowledge of silver are alike false. This will apply to other cases of error such as rope-snake. etc.

In compliance with these two cognitions viz. apprehension and cancellation, it has to be admitted that the denial in all times "here there is no silver" refers to the real (empirical) silver and the experience of silver refers to the presence of silver during the time of illusion (i. e. to apparent silver). The perception of silver objectifies the illusory silver which was present there and the cognition of denial objectifies its absolute negation which is nothing but the substratum in which the illusory silver was perceived. Though the empirical silver is not the object of illusion, yet after the perception of its substratum (the shell), it arises in remembrance and the denial of it is possible because the knowledge of the substratum (the shell) provokes the remembrance of the counterentity (the empirical silver).

Ignorance as the material cause of Illusion.

Now, we are showing below that ignorance a false principle is the material cause of false knowledge and false object. According to some philosophers the wrong knowledge (विपर्यय) of silver in the shell has for its material cause the self, accompanied by the defective sense-organs. But this view is not tenable. The self (consciousness) which is by nature devoid of parts, cannot by itself or through other agencies become modified either in the form of the shell-silver or in the form of the knowledge of the shell-silver. Besides, the production of some effect from a partless entity is not possible without its conjunction with efficient cause, but as the self (being partless) has no conjunction with any efficient cause, the production of

the knowledge of silver from the partless self is hardly conceivable. So the self cannot be the material (modified) cause of anything. Nor can mind be the material cause of false knowledge. The modifications of mind are due to the relation of the object with sense-organs, but as there cannot be conjunction of sense-organ with the apparent object which does not exist previously (and hence the defects of the senses cannot be the said cause), mind which is not independent with regard to the perception of outside objects cannot be the material cause of illusory knowledge. Because the mental modification of the nature of valid knowledge cancels false knowledge, mind cannot be the material cause of that false knowledge. What cancels something cannot be the *conditio sine qua non* (सधक्) of that thing. Then what is the material cause of illusory knowledge? To this our reply is that ignorance should be reckoned as that cause. In the state of ignorance alone, the illusory knowledge of the substratum is there and in the absence of the former, the latter is absent; so ignorance should be recognised as the material cause of that knowledge. As there can be false knowledge with regard to an unknown object and not with regard to a known object, that knowledge must be due to ignorance. So false knowledge of any object is preceded by the ignorance of its substratum, and without this ignorance false knowledge cannot be.

Now let us show that ignorance is the material cause of the illusory object. The defective sense-organs cannot be the cause of the production of the object, because as sense-organs, their business is to produce knowledge and not the object; being defective in character, they may somehow or other disturb their own function, but cannot perform a new one. Besides, the defect in sense-organs has for its support the person, hence it cannot be the material cause of the illusory object which exists outside the person. The shell cannot be the cause of that silver; if it were so, then at the time of cancellation of silver, the alleged effect namely silver ought to have been felt because the cause of that silver namely the shell is yet present. When milk is modified in the form of curds, there can neither be the illusion such as "this is curds," nor the cancellation "this is not curds". Moreover, as after its modification, a thing does not

preserve its previous nature as is the case with milk, so the shell after being transformed into silver will not again be the shell.

We find that when there is knowledge of the substratum, the illusory object as well as illusory knowledge remain no more. From this we can understand that the illusory object and illusory knowledge are brought into being by the same cause. If their causes (material) were separate, then the elimination of the one would not necessarily amount to the elimination of the other. We have found already that the material cause of false knowledge is ignorance, so we infer that the illusory object has also for its material cause—Ignorance. Over and above, if a thing which is of a lower degree of existence is illusorily identified with a thing of a superior order of existence, then the ignorance of the latter must be the cause of the illusion of the former; if it were not the case, then the knowledge of the latter would not have amounted to an elimination of the knowledge of the former. Ignorance should be regarded as the material cause and not efficient cause. If ignorance be the efficient cause of an illusion, then even in the absence of ignorance, there would occur a possibility of the actual existence of silver in the shell. Had not ignorance been the material cause of shell-silver, then there would not have been its identity with ignorance, and owing to the absence of this identity, there would have been the appearance of silver, even when that ignorance is destroyed. The elimination of ignorance is the elimination of illusion because illusion is the embodiment of ignorance. Hence ignorance is not the efficient but the material cause of illusory appearances. As ignorance is not only effective in the production of the shell-silver, but also effective in maintaining its duration, so like the earth which is the cause of both production and duration of the pot, ignorance must be the material cause of illusion. Because due to the identity of the material cause and its effect, they do not remain in different places, so the silver which is perceived as resting on the shell should have its material cause (ignorance) resting on the same substratum. If the silver were existent like the shell, then like the latter, it would have been perceivable even at the time of cancellation. Hence, the

shell-silver is not existent. If both silver and the shell were illusory, then both would have been cancelled. Hence in this case, there is no illusion of both the shell and silver. Therefore it is established that the shell alone is manifested as silver which is a product of the ignorance residing in the shell. Because illusion is destroyed by knowledge, it is known as ignorance. Because it manifests the unreal and conceals reality, it is of the nature of a veil. This ignorance makes the substratum known in one aspect (as 'this') and unknown in another (as the shell). If it were altogether known or absolutely unknown, then there could not have been the illusory experience. Without that which veils the real nature of things, there cannot be an illusion. In the absence of this veil, covering outward objects, the illusion about them cannot be produced. Without a veil in the support, there cannot be attribution of something to or misapprehension of it. If the support is perceived partially and not fully, then alone the attribution of something to it is possible. Therefore illusory experience has for its material cause the veiling of the external thing which is misperceived. Ignorance is this veil.

Through the discussion on illusion, it has been found that illusory object and its knowledge are mere modifications of ignorance and are consequently not separate from ignorance. It has already been shown that ignorance is illuminated by the witness-consciousness, so illusory knowledge and illusory object are also illuminated by the same witness. As the witness-consciousness and illusory object are contradictory in nature, in as much as the former is self-luminous and the latter is non-self-luminous, so their identity cannot be real. Hence, it must be admitted that their identity is illusory.

Now, let us proceed to show that dream-experience and its object are alike inexplicable and ignorance is their material cause. In order to prove this, we have first of all to refute two antagonistic views on dream,—(1) dream is a case of remembrance and (2) that it is a case of perception due to contact called knowledge (remembrance). Dream is not remembrance, because in dream we do not always experience objects in the particular place or places in which they were experienced, but in remembrance, we experience objects with their previous

local references. Besides, in remembrance, the substantive and the attributive are reproduced exactly in the manner in which they were experienced; but as in dream, the substantive and the attributive previously experienced together are often experienced as detached from one another, dream cannot be a case of remembrance. If the pre-experienced things were manifested in dream, then there should have been a reference of 'thatness' or remoteness in dream. It cannot be said that due to defect, that reference is taken away, because in that case, due to the operation of defect, the nature of impression would have been altered. If it be asserted that the dream-objects are manifested through perception obtained as the product of remembrance (by the contact called knowledge), then the dream-objects would have always been perceived as attributives and would have never been manifested as substantives; but the very fact that the dream-objects are known as 'this' implies that they are perceived as substantives too. Moreover, through contact called knowledge, only the objects that were previously experienced, can be perceived; but in dream, even objects previously not experienced are known; so dream-objects cannot be said to be known through such a contact. Hence, it has to be admitted that inexplicable objects are manifested in dream. Moreover, had dream been the attribution of the *remembered* upon the *remembered* or if it were remembrance, then its perception would have been impossible and its knowledge would have been indirect like the blind person's attribution of whiteness upon things remembered or like the remembrance of the meaning of words through words. Hence to explain the perception of dream (and also of fancy), it has to be admitted that the objects of dream (and of fancy also) are superimposed by ignorance on the witness-consciousness whose nature is perception and they are made perceptible by the same consciousness.

It should be admitted that in dream, there is the illusion of objects. Now, what is the substratum of that illusion? In this case, nothing outside can be the substratum. That which is known in one aspect and unknown in another can alone be the substratum of an illusion. In dream the knowledge of an outside object is not possible, because the physical eyes are not

then operative. At that time, the outward region has no relation with sense-organs; so it cannot be known; therefore the superimposition of dream cannot take place in what is particularised by the outward region. It may be objected that because the remembrance of external space is possible in dream, so the sub-tratum of dream is what is particularised by the outward region; but the objection is not valid. Due to the remembrance of the external space, the substratum of dream could have been particularised by external space, provided the mental modification of the nature of the said remembrance could reach external region; but as in dream, the sense-organs are not at all operative, the said mental modification cannot reach external space. Accordingly in dream, the substratum of illusion cannot be particularised by the external space. A mental modification can never be the cause of the agitation of ignorance residing in the substratum of illusion, unless that mental modification reaches the substratum, as in the case of the knowledge of 'thisness', which after reaching the shell excites the ignorance in the shell and thus becomes the cause of super-imposition (अयस) of the silver upon the shell.*

* According to the Vedāntists, the process involved in the perception of the shell-silver is this: when there is the relation of the defective eyes with the shell, due to the obstruction caused by this defect, instead of being perceived as the shell, it is perceived as 'this'. In other words, the mental modification of the form of 'this' flows to the region of the shell and becomes identified with the shell, not of course by taking it as the shell, but by taking it as 'this'—i. e. some object present before the eyes. The mental modification flows to the region of the object in order to remove external ignorance that resides in the outside object. After that, due to their being related by the mental modification of the form—'this', the substratum consciousness particularised by 'this' i. e. by the object present before the eyes, manifests itself as non-different from the substratum-Consciousness particularised by the mind. And thus, the preception of 'this' takes place. Now let us state how this perception is transformed into the perception—'this is silver'. The perception of the shell-silver is due, on the one hand, to the absence of removal of the ignorance veiling the consciousness particularised by the shell and on the other, to the transformation of this ignorance into silver.

Moreover, if what is particularised by the external space becomes the substratum, then the dream-objects should not be experienced as different from outer space, but they should have been experienced as identified with that space. It cannot be said that in the mind which is the substratum of remembrance, those objects are superimposed. Without perception of the substratum, the perception of the illusory is impossible. What is remembered is not perceived. Hence the self which is the perception of itself is the substratum of dream-illusion.*

Because there is no modification of the form of the shell which will remove the ignorance veiling the Consciousness particularised by the shell, it remains undestroyed, and because the mental modification of the form of 'this' is caused by a defect, the said ignorance becomes excited. But this is not all. Due to the similarity of 'this'—the object present before the eyes—with silver, the impression of silver is roused in the mind through remembrance, and as a result of this, ignorance residing in the Consciousness particularised by 'this' modifies itself in the form of silver and the ignorance residing in the Consciousness particularised by mental modification of the form—'this' modifies itself in the form of false knowledge of the silver. Thus takes place the illusory perception of silver. These are steps involved in the illusory perception : firstly, there is the manifestation of ignorance particularised by the object shell through the witness-consciousness beyond mind; secondly, from that particularised ignorance, some inexplicable, extramental silver is produced; thirdly, there is the visual perception of that silver because the silver is produced in the consciousness particularised by 'this' with which the mind or mental modification which flows out becomes connected; fourthly, there is illusory identity of the shell with that silver.

* According to this Vedāntic view, Consciousness alone is the illuminator of all objects of the three states (waking, dream and sleep). Consciousness reflects itself in mental modification and never becomes itself modified. Had consciousness been capable of modifications, then being partless, in its first modification, it would have modified itself wholly and the result would have been that no other knowledge would have taken place. Besides, finding that there is no cognition in dreamless sleep, due to the absence of mental modification, we can conclude that knowledge is nothing but a reflection of consciousness in mental modification. So the

What, then, is the material cause of dream? A mental modification must be a valid cognition, and as such, cannot have the form of an apparent dream-object. So a mental modification cannot be the material cause of dream-objects. It is ascertained elsewhere (in Error) that ignorance is the material cause of illusion; so in the case of dream-illusion also, ignorance must be admitted to be the material cause and not mind (mind is the अवच्छेदक—that which particularises ignorance).

transformation of consciousness is an untenable thesis. What actually takes place is that in internal knowledge consciousness illumines the mental modification alone and in external knowledge consciousness reveals the object.

Where the sense-organ comes into contact with the external object, the mind becomes modified in the shape of that object, and consciousness being reflected in that mental modification becomes the illuminator of that object. This is perceptual knowledge.

When a mental modification in the form of an object present before the senses (say that of the smoke in the mountain), being co-operated by the impression of invariable concomitance (say of the smoke and the fire) gives rise to the mental modification in the form of the invariable concomitant (the fire) though it is not present before the eyes, inferential knowledge takes place. When without the intervention of the knowledge of such invariable concomitance, through the mere impression due to past experience, mental modification rises in the form of objects already experienced, then the consciousness becomes reflected in that modification. This is remembrance.

Thus, in all cognitions, be it perceptual, inferential or reproductive, Consciousness is uniformly the illuminator, and the distinction of those various cognitions is not based on any distinction of consciousness, but upon the various ways in which the mental modification arises, in which the consciousness is reflected. The same remark may be made with reference to the objects of valid and invalid cognitions, in as much as the contents of both are revealed by the same consciousness and the difference of both is ultimately due to the manner in which mental modification, the reflecting medium of the self-same consciousness, arises. Thus, it is found that the consciousness is by nature eternal luminosity, and it is only due to its reflection in mental modifications, that it appears as an effect.

APPENDIX C.

Cosmic Ignorance.

We have found that ignorance is the inexplicable principle which modifies itself as inexplicable effects. From this we can infer that the effect-world which is inexplicable has for its material cause cosmic ignorance. To make it more clear: we found that false productions are due to ignorance. Illusory appearances like shell-silver are false because they are (1) inexplicable, (2) illusorily identified with the substratum, and (3) of less essence than the substratum. A thing which is not superimposed (the manifestation of a less existent upon a substratum of a greater existence constitutes superimposition अध्यास) on another can alone claim equal existence with the latter. If the existence of shell-silver were of an equal degree with that of the substratum, then it would not have been called false and its substratum would have been unknown and there would have been no order of illusion and cancellation. Now let us see whether these conditions of falsity are found in the case the empirical world.

(1) If we look to the phenomenal or empirical world from the view-point of the substratum, we find that it is distinct from existence (which is self-luminous non-dual Reality not negated at any time). It is distinct from non-existence. The non-existent is never treated as possessed of causality, the property of being an effect, permanence, impermanence and the like. Besides, the known universe is being known by being related to existence; but there cannot be the relation between the existent and the non-existent. Because the relation is supported in two related terms and because the non-existent cannot be the support of any entity, the relation of the existent with the non-existent cannot be established. Hence the world is distinct from existence and distinct from non-existence i. e. it is inexplicable (false)*

* Objection—That which is alike different from two contradictions must also be contradictory.

Let us discuss the nature of the world from the viewpoint of Consciousness. Because the knowables are not self-existent and self-manifest, their difference from consciousness cannot be determined. The difference of the seer (द्रक्) and the seen (द्रव्य witnessed) cannot be perceived, because the seer is never seen. The difference of the unseen from the seen or of the seen from the unseen cannot be known, because the knowledge of difference is dependent on the knowledge of its substratum (अनुयोगी) and its counterentity (प्रतियोगी). As the seer cannot be the object of another knowledge which is the knower of its difference, the difference between the seer and the seen cannot be known; and oneself cannot be the proof of one's own absence. Thus the seer, being not the content of cognition, can neither be the substratum nor the counterentity of difference or negation. Thus, it is shown that the difference of the world of experience from the self-luminous seer-consciousness is inexplicable.

Answer—The objection against the inexplicability may either be based on the idea that existence is nothing but the absence of non-existence, and non-existence nothing but the absence of existence, or on the idea that though non-existence is not reducible to the absence of existence and *vice versa*, still wherever there is existence there is the absence of non-existence, and wherever there is non-existence, there is absence of existence.

The first objection is not sound because we do not admit that the absence (absolute negation) of existence is non-existence and the absence of non-existence is existence. According to us, existence is what cannot be cancelled in the past, present and future, and the absence or negation of it is not non-existence. We do not hold that existence is the absence of cancellation and that cancellation is non-existence, but according to us, existence is the absence of cancellation in the past, present and future and non-existence is what is incapable of being perceived as existent in any substratum. (In non-existence, there cannot be the identity with existence. What is identified with existence is perceived as having the property of existence as its mode (प्रकारक); hence what is not identified with existence cannot be perceived as having existence as a property of it. Because hare's horn etc. are not superimposed in the substratum-existence, so they

Because the seer and the seen are not objectified by one knowledge which is different from these two and proves their existence, the non-difference of them cannot be known. There cannot be substance-attribute relation between the seer and the seen, because they are not objects of one knowledge, but the substance and its attribute must be the contents of one cognition. One seer cannot simultaneously be the seen (either as an attributive or as a substantive) and its seer.

The world of experience cannot be said to be different as well as non-different from Reality of the nature of Consciousness, because one object, in one reference, cannot be different as well as non-different from another object. Besides, because the world of experience is many and Reality is one, and as one cannot be many and *vice versa*, so the world of experience cannot be both different and non-different from Reality. Moreover, difference

cannot be the object of perception having existence as its mode. The things like pots etc. are attributed in the substratum-existence as identified with it, so they are objects of perception having existence as their mode. When existence and non-existence are of this nature, there is no contradiction in recognising the absence of that existence and non-existence in any entity. When existence and non-existence are thus found not to be their mutual negation, the first objection raised against inexplicability falls to the ground.

The second objection is also found to be illogical. If it were established that wherever there is the absence of existence, there is non-existence, then there would be the relation of invariable association between the two; but this is not proved. The non-existence is not invariable concomitant of the negation of existence, because in the shell-silver which is endowed with the absence of existence (of the nature of absence of cancellation in the past, present and future), there is also the absence of non-existence. Because there is no invariable concomitance of the negation of existence and non-existence and that of negation of non-existence and existence, the second objection against the inexplicable is refuted.

The doctrine of the inexplicability of the world of experience does neither mean that its nature is not expressible in words, nor is it a confession of our inability to know the nature of the same, but it is a mere statement of the exact nature of the world of experience.

being the denial of non-difference and *vice versa*, if the knowledge of difference refers to non-difference as well, then there would be at the same time the affirmation and denial of one content. But no valid cognition can simultaneously perform these two functions viz. affirmation and negation of the self-same content.

Thus, it is proved that because the world of experience cannot be explained as different or non-different or different as well as non-different from consciousness, it is inexplicable.

(2) Now let us show that the world is illusorily identified with existence-consciousness. By the perception "the pot is existent" "the cot is existent", the reality of pot etc. cannot be asserted, because existence and the pot and the cot are not one thing. Existence is pervading in character being alike predicable to different objects; and hence the knowledge of existence cannot refer to different objects. When existence is not a genus and yet it is experienced as co-existent with various objects of experience, it must be admitted that the individual existence is being objectified in experience as non-different with those objects. Had there been a difference of things from that one existence, then as there is no relation of co-existence between different objects of experience (the identity of separate existents is not possible), there would not have been the experience of co-existence of existence with those objects. The identity of the object with substratum-existence means that the object has no existence independent of the existence of the substratum-existence, though the object is different from the substratum-existence. Real non-difference of two entities which are opposite in nature is not really possible, but their illusory non-difference is possible. In order to get a knowledge of the relation of co-existence an experience of two things (terms) is indispensable, but their real existence is not indispensable. Though the silver has no real existence, still its co-existence with existence is corroborated by the experience—"the shell-silver is an existent." When the nature of one entity is apprehended in a different entity, the said apprehension must be due to the illusory superimposition of the nature of the former entity upon the latter. The substratum of superimposition is one by

whose pervasion the superimposed things are manifested and which is the ultimate ground (अवधि) of those superimposed entities. Though there is differentiation of the superimposed in the substratum, still there is the absence of the difference of the substratum in the superimposed; hence, through the perception of their identity of this type, their co-existence is known.

The identity of pots and the like with existence cannot be said to be real. If the existence had pertained to the essential nature of pots and the like, then because things cannot shake off their intrinsic nature, their existence would have persisted even before production and after destruction. Non-existence also is not their natural attribute. In that case even after origination, they would not have been existent.

Opponent—Existence and non-existence are not the intrinsic characteristics of things, but existence is due to the operation of the cause and non-existence is due to the operation which produces the negation or destruction of things.

Answer—In order to own these two attributes if the thing remains in the past, present and future, then the operation of the cause becomes fruitless and its non-existence is not possible. If the thing does not remain, then the thing and its non-existence cannot be existent at one time, and so the essence of the thing and that of non-existence become severed, as a result of which the thing cannot be the support of non-existence. The nature of support and that of the supported can never be severed. Thus both existence and non-existence cannot be the attributes of things.

Besides, if the relation of things with existence be accepted as natural, then it should be admitted that that relation is identity, because such a relation must be primary and not derivative and in this case other primary relations (such as conjunction, inherence) are not possible. Such being the case, of the two relata which become identified the one should share the nature of the other. In that case, if negation be of a positive nature, then because the positive entities are always existent, the alleged negation will be eternal. If the positive is taken as of the nature of negation, then all positive entities will be reduced to nil and hence the world will be null and void.

Therefore it should be admitted that the relation between existence and other things is nothing but their illusory identity. Hence their existence and non-existence are nothing but the substratum under different conditions. What cannot be designated as existent or non-existent cannot have real identity with transcendental existence.

After proving the superimposition of the world of experience upon the substratum existence, now we propose to prove the superimposition of the same upon the self-same substratum considered as consciousness. Because conjunction and real identity (implying difference as well as non-difference) of the unconscious things with witness-consciousness are not possible, the relation of the former with the latter must be illusory identity. If the relation of the witness and the witnessed is different from its own related terms, then there will be an infinite regression and if entirely non-different, then their relation would have been impossible. The real non-difference between consciousness and unconsciousness is not possible; so the notion of non-difference through co-existence ('ego is manifest', 'pot is manifest') implies that the unconscious world is illusorily identified with the substratum-consciousness. The manifestation of consciousness by being united with the unconscious is not different kinds of knowledge of two separate things (अव्यति) because there is their qualified perception; the said manifestation is not the perception of distant unconscious things (अव्यवस्थाति) because beyond consciousness, the unconscious cannot be known; that manifestation is not the perception of modification of consciousness (आत्मव्यति) because consciousness is immutably eternal; that manifestation is not the perception of the non-existence (असत्त्वति) because it is perceived; so the said perception of the partless unmodified consciousness with the unconscious should be taken as inexplicable (अनिर्वचनीयत्वति). If it were not so, then there would have been the absolute separation of consciousness and the unconscious and there would not have been the manifestation of their union.

In the case of an illusory identification, the two related terms namely the substratum and the superimposed are neither

both false nor both real, but the substratum is, by nature, real and the other is false. In the present case, because there is no proof about the separate existence of the unconscious and the witness-consciousness, either of them must be false. Existence-consciousness which is self-luminosity pervades all things which are separate or exclusive of each other, so the true reality of the substratum is proved. Hence, there is no other alternative left save to infer that this world of experience which is unconscious in nature, is false.

(3) This world of experience is false, because its existence is of a lower order than that of the substratum-consciousness. This world is not of the nature of self-luminosity and at the same time it is not non-existent. It has existence through the existence of one only self-luminous existence, so its existence is of a lower order than that of its substratum. Because the appearances are not independently excluded from one another, nor are they absolutely distinct from their substratum, nor can they be of the essence of the unmodified self-luminous Reality, therefore they must be of less essence than the truly existent Reality. This mundane series cannot remain in the partless, complete (full) and immutable existence. If consciousness has real identity with the mundane series, then there will be no consciousness. If consciousness is non-different from the unconscious which is taken to be existent in the degree in which it is itself existent, then it will not be endowed with differences of the unconscious, because the affirmation and negation of equally existent entities cannot abide together at one time. If consciousness's identity with the unconscious be of the same essence as the consciousness, then at the time of the abiding of the world the unconscious would not be, because the world cannot be conscious and unconscious at the same time in the same sense. Two contradictories, viz. difference from consciousness and non-difference from it, having the same essence, cannot abide together at the same time. So it must be admitted that as in the case of illusion, the illusory appearance by being pervaded by the form—'this' which is separate from it is manifested, so the empirical world also, by being pervaded by the nature of existence-consciousness which is separate from it is manifested. Thus in the real substratum of the nature of

self-luminous existence-consciousness the manifestation of unconscious world having less essence must be false. Falsity means dependent existence. Dependence means what is not self-luminous existence and also not non-existent, but is of less essence than the substratum by whose existence and luminosity it appears as existent and manifest (it becomes the counterentity of absolute negation in the substratum.)*

The same conclusion we reach by the analysis of our experience 'I am a man,' 'I am the doer' etc. Because the self is separate from the body this perception is erroneous and not real. Because the unawareness is illumined by eternal consciousness and it is with regard to the unaware thing that there is validity of perception, therefore on the strength of perception the self is found as separate from the body. When the self is known as separate from the body, the perception such as 'I am a man' should be counted as illusory. Similarly through a discrimination of the ego and the self (consciousness), it is known that they are of contradictory natures : one is the seen, the other is the seer ; one is transient, the other is its ultimate substratum ; the one suffers modification, the other is unmodified ; the one is non-self-luminous, the other is self-luminous. In that undifferentiated, ever-complete consciousness

* Though, according to our view, the nature of consciousness is everyone's existence and hence there is no difference in the nature of existence, still the particularised consciousnesses are the respective existences. So owing to the inequality of the natures of particularisation, those existences also are different, hence the variety of existence is not impossible.

In the above discussion (in proving the falsity of the world) the following procedure has been resorted to : at first, we determined the falsity of illusory things (प्रतिभासिक) and found out therefrom the conditions of falsehood. The property of being apparent (illusory) is ascertained before the ascertainment of the falsity of all empirical objects (व्यावहारिक). Afterwards by looking at the empirical world from the view-point of the substratum existence-consciousness, we found in it those conditions of falsity and therefrom we inferred that the empirical world (the minor term पक्ष of the inference of falsity) is false.

(self), the manifestation in the form of the ego which is an object of consciousness, is endowed with the particulars of the body etc., is distinct or separate from others and is transient, is not possible. Hence it is to be accepted that because the manifestation of oneness of two things having contradictory natures cannot be possible without superimposition, the manifestation of oneness of both of these is based or dependent on mutual superimposition as is the case with the identity of 'this' with the shell-silver. The joys etc., which are the attributes of mind become experienced as the attributes of the self, and this is not possible without the illusory identification of mind and the self. The empirical knower, the support of temporal cognition is unconscious because it is an object of the witness-consciousness, and the witness-consciousness which is self-luminous in nature cannot be its own knower, nor can it be known by others ; hence it is by illusion alone that there is the appearance of agency etc. in the self. Though really the self has the absence of non-difference with the ego, still because the ego is superimposed on it, the ego is experienced as non-different from the self and not as an object.

As the cause of these false appearances some false principle has to be inferred. Existence-consciousness alone cannot account for these. Existence-consciousness is non-dual, self-luminous and the final limit of all. So it cannot modify itself partially or wholly. So both existence-consciousness and ignorance are the material causes of this illusory world. The effects of ignorance are of equal existence with ignorance, so ignorance is their modified material cause as distinguished from their unmodified material cause which is the substratum existence-consciousness. The world in its aspect of impurity and the like is absolutely different from Reality, hence Reality (existence-consciousness) cannot be counted as the modified cause of such a world, so its material causality should be deemed as illusory. Hence Reality is the material cause of this world by being its substratum merely and not by being modified in its form. And the substratum must be the seat of the absolute negation of the superimposed, so both of them have unequal existence. If the world be the effect of consciousness

alone, then unconsciousness (जडत्व) in the world becomes accidental. Because the world is both real-unreal, it must have the material both real-unreal. In the absence of one pervading material, the pervading or universal cognition of all objects as unconscious would be groundless. As the forms of falsity and unconsciousness which are the forms of ignorance are experienced in the world of experience, so ignorance is its material cause. So we come to the conclusion that the inexplicable cause of the world of experience is no other than cosmic ignorance.

By establishing the falsity of the world of experience, inexplicable cosmic ignorance has been traced as its material cause. Now by looking at the same world of experience from the standpoint of the ultimate reality—the substratum existence-consciousness, the same theme is being proved.

The substratum-consciousness is self-luminous, unborn existence and void of known attributes, so it is beyond the limitations of time, space and other things. It reveals itself otherwise nothing would have been revealed, but it is never revealed in its full nature (अखंडपरिपूर्णत्व). So the same thing is known and at the same time not known. This can be possible, if there be the principle of ignorance.* Without ignorance

* I-consciousness cannot be said to be different or different as well as non-different from Brahman. There cannot be absolute difference between '*Jiva*' and Brahman because consciousness has been proved to be non-dual. The self is not separate from consciousness because it is not the object of consciousness and it is perceived. Brahman and *Jiva* cannot have the relation of the genus and the individual, the substance and the attribute, the cause and its effect, essence (स्वरूपत्व) and its adjunct (विशिष्ट), the whole and the part, and in the absence of such relations, there can nowhere be found difference as well as non-difference. *Jiva* is not a real part or transformation of consciousness which is immutable. That consciousness having limitation is the *Jiva*. In this self-luminous Reality which is our own nature, we do not find the right experience (I am Brahman) and we find the wrong experience (I am not Brahman). Therefore it should be admitted that this particular experience happens owing to impediment. This

there cannot be the knowledge in one form and absence of knowledge in another. This veil is the basis of superimposition. For the superimposition of a thing, it is required that the thing (substratum) should be manifest in general and its aspect which is contradictory to superimposition should be veiled. Hence, the fulness (of the substratum existence-consciousness,) which is contradictory to superimposition being veiled and its aspect of revealing being unveiled, there is superimposition of the world on the nature of consciousness. And this is due to ignorance. The essence of existence-consciousness, because it shines, becomes the ground (साधक) of ignorance and by being not manifested in its aspect of fulness becomes the object of ignorance. * The substratum-obstruction of luminosity of Reality is not other than ignorance. The real obstruction of the luminosity of the self-luminous is not possible, so its obstruction is unreal or inexplicable. Thus, it is dependent on ignorance. (In dreamless sleep ignorance is the veil of consciousness; hence elsewhere also ignorance is its veil).

* The support of ignorance is consciousness. It cannot be seated in unconscious things. If there is perception of anything, then it is no more veiled, hence the veil seated in that unconscious thing cannot be known by valid knowledge. In case the veil is known, there cannot be the knowledge of that thing at that time. And if there is no perception of the thing, then the veil supported in it cannot be known, because there is no understanding of the thing at that time. So there is no proof of ignorance being supported in unconscious things. The unconscious things such as the pot etc. are particularisations of consciousness particularised by ignorance; hence they remain unknown unless and until their unknownness is not removed by temporal cognition. Both ignorance and unknown objects are alike superimposed on consciousness; as a result of this, ignorance becomes the predicate of that object, though its real substratum is consciousness. Due to the non-production of temporal cognition which is opposed to unknownness of objects, things can be unknown, as such it should not be held that they are the substratum of ignorance. Ignorance having for its object the ever-complete Reality is non-different from the ignorance having for its object the pot etc. because the said Reality alone, owing to its being conditioned by respective limited objects, becomes the object of limited experience.

existence by being particularised by causal ignorance becomes particularised by effects also; hence there is the identity of the nature of one existence in modifications and in the modified. Though, through the pre-eminence of its aspect of unconsciousness, causal ignorance has difference from existence, still because its existence is by the existence of the substratum, the cognition such as "the world is existent" is possible.

To sum up:—along with existence-consciousness which is the substratum of the world, there must be another modifying principle. That principle should be such as (1) is not produced from anything, (2) is not existent or non-existent, (3) has the capacity of manifesting itself as false things, (4) has no independent existence, (5) is unconscious, witnessed and supported in the substratum, (6) through which its support does not get modified, (7) by which the transcendent nature of the substratum is partially veiled and it is made to appear as a plurality of effects, (8) through which the substratum (in which there is absolute negation of the appearances) of more essence manifests as endowed with appearances of less essence illusorily identified with it. These conditions are fulfilled in the case of ignorance and no other thing of such a character is experienced, so cosmic ignorance is inferred as the root material cause.*

* Ignorance has two forms, one is of the unconscious energy, another is contradictory to knowledge. (If ignorance had a beginning, then it would not have been ignorance. The word 'ignorance' denotes that it becomes eliminated by the rise of knowledge which is contradictory to it. From this it follows that before the rise of knowledge ignorance remains in all times. This would not have been, if ignorance were with a beginning. Besides, ignorance is the material cause of effects relating to the beginning of creation, so it is beginningless.) Of these the latter is not perceived in the pot and the like. Ignorance becomes contradictory to knowledge by remaining in the same substratum as that of knowledge. The pot and the like are not the supports of knowledge. The other form of ignorance is perceived even in the pot and the like. The

The world owes its existence to the substratum Existence-Consciousness (Brahman), as well as to Ignorance which veils and apparently distorts its nature. Ignorance is an inexplicable agency, incapable of being described as absolutely real or absolutely unreal, as being partless or with parts etc. (Hence it is called Māyā). Ignorance and its productions being not on the same plane of reality with Brahman do not affect Its non-duality and Its changeless attributeless character.

experience of unconsciousness in the pot and the like has for its object ignorance which is its material cause. It has been proved that unconsciousness which is the uniform characteristic of all effects is not separate from ignorance. Therefore in the pot and the like there is the experience of ignorance. By the pre-eminence of unconscious energy ignorance is the material cause of space and the like, (beginningless appearances are dependent on the presence of ignorance.)

APPENDIX D

Quotations from important manuscripts

अमुद्रितग्रन्थेभ्यः कानिचिदुद्धरणानि ।

(क) “ किमिदं सत्त्वं स्वरूपं वा मानयोग्यत्वं वा तत्सम्बन्धो वा सत्ताश्रयत्वं वा सत्तैकार्थसमवायो वा भावत्वं वा विधिप्रत्ययवेद्यत्वं वा अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं वा अन्यद् वा ? न तावदाद्यः, घटस्वरूपस्य सत्त्वे षटादेरसत्त्वप्रसंगात् । षटादिस्वरूपस्य सत्पदार्थत्वे घटस्यासत्त्वप्रसंगात् । सर्वस्वरूपस्य तथात्वे प्रत्येकं सर्वेषामसत्त्वप्रसंगात्, सत्पदसंकेतानन्त्यानुगतव्यवहारनिरालम्बनत्वप्रसंगाच्च । न द्वितीयो मानयोग्यतायां योग्यतान्तरस्वीकारेऽनवस्थानात् तदस्वीकारे तदसत्त्वे सर्वासत्त्वप्रसक्तेः, सत्त्वस्यातीन्द्रियत्वप्रसंगाच्च । तत एव न तृतीयोऽपि । न तुरीयः सामान्यादेरसत्त्वापातात् । न पञ्चमः, द्रव्यस्याकारणवतः सत्तासमवाययोश्चासत्त्वापातात् । नापि सत्तासम्बन्धित्वं सत्तातत्सम्बन्धयोरसत्त्वप्रसंगात् । नापि षष्ठः भावत्वं सामान्यमौपाधिकं वा । आद्ये सामान्यादेस्तदभावप्रसंगात् । द्वितीयेऽपि द्रव्यादिभ्यस्तस्य भेदेऽपराद्धान्तो गुणादेः सामान्येतरानाश्रयस्य तदभावप्रसंगाच्च । द्रव्याद्यन्तर्भावे पूर्वत्रिकरूपत्वे सामान्यादौ न स्यात्, सामान्याद्यन्तर्भावेऽपि सामान्यादौ न स्यात् । नापि सप्तमः । गगनकुसुमादेरपि सत्त्वप्रसंगात्, अस्ति गगनकुसुममिति शाब्दप्रत्ययोत्पत्तेः, प्रत्यक्षविधिप्रत्ययविवक्षायामप्रत्यक्षाणामसत्त्वं स्यात् । नापि अष्टमः, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वेऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वस्वीकारेऽनवस्थानात्, अस्वीकारे सर्वासत्त्वप्रसंगात् । न चरमोऽनिरुक्तेः । असत्त्वव्यावृत्तत्वं तदिति चेत्, न, प्रतीतौ इतरेतराश्रयात् । ”

(आनन्दपूर्णविद्यासागरविरचिता “ न्यायचंद्रिका ”)

(ख) “ प्रपञ्चविषयसद्बुद्ध्याप्याधिष्ठानतयानुगतं ब्रह्मैव सिध्यतीति तत् सत् । न च घटादिस्वरूपमेव सद्बुद्धिविषयोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम् ।

... लाघवेन प्रपञ्चे सद्बुद्धेरेकविषयत्वेन परस्परविलक्षणानेकविषय-
त्वायोगात् । सम्भवति हेको विषयः, अन्यथा गोत्वादेरप्यपलापः स्यात् ।
घटादिपदाभिधेयतत्स्वरूपमात्रस्य सद्बुद्ध्यालम्बनत्वे घटः सन्निति द्वयाकार-
प्रतीत्ययोगाच्च । सत्त्वे च घटादेः प्रागुत्तरकालयोरपि तत्सत्त्वं स्यादिति कार-
कव्यापारानर्थक्यम् । यत् सत्तत् सर्वदा सदेवेति नियमात् । सत्स्वरूपस्या-
सत्स्वरूपत्वानुपपत्तेश्च सदा सदेव स्यात् । न हि धर्मस्येव स्वरूपस्यापि समय-
भेदेन नानात्वं भवति । तथात्वे तदेकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न वा सत्त्वं न घटादि-
स्वरूपं किन्तु तद्धर्म एवेति वाच्यम् । सतो घटादेः स्वासत्त्वधर्मित्वायोगात् ।
असत्त्वस्य कादाचित्कधर्मस्य स्वाश्रय विनासंभवाच्च । एतेन वर्तमानका-
दाचित्काभावप्रतियोगित्वमेव घटादेः सत्त्वं न तुच्छत्वमिति निरस्तम् ।
कादाचित्काभावकाले प्रातियोगिस्वरूपासंभवेन तत्प्रतियोगित्वधर्मायोगात् ।
प्रतियोगिकाले च कादाचित्काभावासंभवात् । घटादेः सदा सत्त्वे प्रागुत्तर-
कालयोरनुपलम्भोऽपि न स्यात् । तस्मान्न सद्धीर्घटादिस्वरूपविषया ।

नापि सत्ता धर्मः, सत्ताविशिष्टस्य सत्पदार्थत्वे सत्ता सती न
स्यात् । तत्र तद्वैशिष्ट्याभावात् । सत्ताद्वये प्रमाणाभावात् । स्वस्य स्वेन
सम्बन्धाभावात् । अभेदस्यासम्बन्धत्वात् । अपि च सत्ताधर्मिणो घटादेरसत्त्वेन
धर्मित्वायोगेन तत्सत्त्वं सत्ताधर्मित्वप्रयोजकं वाच्यम् । तद् यदि सैव सत्ता
तदा प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकत्वासम्भव आत्माश्रयप्रसङ्गश्च । सत्तान्तरं चेत्तेनैवालं
किमनया । एवं तत्रापि पर्यनुयोग इति न सत्ता धर्मः । किंच न तावदियं
जातिः सर्वानुगतसद्बुद्धेः पराभ्युपगतजातिविषयत्वायोगात् । सामान्यादि
हि निःसामान्यमिति तन्मतम् । नच सामान्यादि असत् । नच सामा-
न्यादौ सद्बुद्धिः सत्तासामानाधिकरण्यमवगाह्य इति वाच्यम् । एका-
कारसद्बुद्धेः क्वचित् सत्तासमवायः क्वचित्तत्सामानाधिकरण्यमालम्बन-
मिति विषयभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । अन्यथा गुणादीनामपि सद्बुद्धित्वेनैव
सद्बुद्धिः स्यात् । तर्हि रूपत्वादीनामपि त्वन्मते तद्वृत्तिधर्माणामिव
परंपरया सत्तावैशिष्ट्येन सद्बुद्धिविषयत्वोपपत्तेः । एवमास्त्विति चेत्तर्हि

लाघवाज्जगन्मूलकारणमेव सेति ब्रह्मैव सत् स्यात् ।* तदध्यस्तप्रपञ्चकल्पित-
ब्रह्मतादात्म्यात् सद्बुद्धिरिति न प्रपञ्चस्य पृथक् सत्ता । § न च
सत्तोपाधिरूपसामान्यमिति वाच्यम् । तत्र न तावत् प्रमाणविषयता
सत्ता ज्ञाने प्रमाणत्वस्य सद्विषयतालक्षणत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयात् स्वविषय-
त्वापाताच्च । प्रमाणयोग्यत्वं सेति चेत् । योग्यतानिरूपकघटत्वादेः
सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां दुर्निरूपत्वेन तद्योग्यताऽसिद्धेः.....योग्यताया
अपि धर्मिणो भेदाभेदाभ्यां दुर्निरूपत्वाच्च । ननु सत्त्वासत्त्वौदासीन्येन
विद्यमानार्थविषयं ज्ञानं प्रमेति नोक्तदोष इति चेत्तर्हि शुक्तिरज-
तादिसाम्यमेव प्रपञ्चस्य स्यात्, तज्ज्ञानस्याप्युक्तप्रमात्वसम्भवात् । †

* सत्स्वरूपप्रतियोगिकं तादात्म्यमेव सत्तास्वरूपसम्बन्धेन सदाकारधीविषयः ।
तादात्म्यं सदित्यत्रापि केवलोपहिततादात्म्ययोः स्वरूपसम्बन्धः तादात्म्ये तादात्म्यान्तरास्वी-
कारात्, तादात्म्यभिन्नयोरेव केवलोपहितयोस्तादात्म्यस्वीकारात् । अतः सदाकारबुद्धौ नानु-
गतसम्बन्धहानिः।...तादात्म्यस्याविद्यायां तादात्म्यान्तराननुभवेन स्वरूपमात्रं सम्बन्धः ।
तादात्म्यभिन्नस्य तु स्वरूपातिरिक्त एव सम्बन्धोऽनुभवानुरोधात् स्वस्य स्वप्रतियो-
गिकसम्बन्धत्वस्यानुपपन्नत्वादिनिर्वाच्यं परम् । (अद्वैतचन्द्रिका-अद्वैतसिद्धिटीका)

§ सतः स्फुरतश्चानिर्वचनीयमन्यथात्वमध्यासः ।

† (क) शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायां इदमर्थग्रहणरजतस्मरणात्मकज्ञानद्वयाद-
न्यत्वस्यप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वादिद्वयस्य भ्रमात्मकज्ञानत्वस्यनिर्विषयत्वाद्योगेन तद्विषयस्य यावद्बाधम-
नुवर्त्तमानस्य सदसद्विलक्षणस्य रजतस्य सिद्धेः । नेदं रजतमिति बाधस्य रजतार्थिनः प्रवृत्तेश्च
पुरोवर्तिरजतविषयस्य देशान्तरीयत्वमान्तरत्वं वा दुर्वचं, आदौ सन्निकर्षाभावादपरोक्षानुप-
पत्तिः, न च दोषाख्यात् संनिकर्षात् तत्स्यादिति वाच्यं; दोषस्य वस्तुन्यग्रहान्यथाग्रहेतुत्वेन
कलसस्य तत्त्वग्राहकत्वायोगात् । दर्पणप्रतिबिम्बितरजतस्येव देशान्तरीयरजतस्य ग्रहे तद्देशीय-
पदार्थान्तरग्रहापत्तेश्च, दोषवत् संस्कारस्यापि सन्निकर्षत्वं प्रकल्प्य व्यवहितद्रव्यादेरेष्यपरोक्षो-
पगमसंभवेनानुमित्याद्युच्छेदापत्तेः । द्वितीये, आन्तरत्वेन रजप्ररजतवत् इन्द्रियान्वयव्य-
तिरेकविधानानुपपत्तिः । नाप्यसत्, तस्य शशशृंगवत् बाधापरोक्षप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः ।
तस्मादस्ति सदसद्विलक्षणं रजतम् । (नीलकण्ठनिर्मितं वेदान्तकतकम्)

(ख) साक्षाच्चानुरोधेन प्रवृत्त्यनुरोधेन चापरोक्षे अर्थोत्पत्तिस्वीकारः ।

(तत्त्वविवेकटीकाविवरणम्)

(ग) इदं रजतमिति प्रत्ययानुरोधः, बाधकज्ञाननिरसनयोग्यं प्रतिभाससमान-
कालीनं मिथ्यारजतमंगीकर्तव्यं बाधकप्रत्ययानुरोधाच्च त्रैकालिकरजताभावः । तथा
चानुभवो नास्त्यत्र रजतं मिथ्यैव रजतमभात् इति ।

(बोधेन्द्रसंयमिकृतं अद्वैतभूषणम्-पञ्चपादिकाविवरणसंग्रहः)

अतो नद्वैतश्रुतिविरुद्धा प्रपञ्चस्य सत्ता कल्पनीया । अतएवार्थक्रियाकारित्वं सत्त्वमित्यपि न । रजतादेरपि प्रीतिद्वेषाद्यर्थक्रियासत्त्वात् तत्सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ॥

(घ) नास्त्यत्र रजतमिति कालत्रयेऽपि रजतस्यासत्त्वमेव गम्यते, मिथ्यैव रजतमभात् इति भ्रान्तिसमये रजतस्य विद्यमानतावसीयते, तेन उभयसंविदनुरोधात् कालत्रयनिषेधस्य परमार्थरजतविषयत्वं शुक्लज्ञानविवर्तपुरोवर्तिरजतविषयत्वं च भ्रान्तिकालीनरजतविद्यमान-
तानुभवस्य कल्पनीयम् । (चित्सुखाचार्यविरचिता विवरणभावद्योतनिका)

(घ १) भ्रमलक्षणकार्यस्य कारणकल्पनाया आवश्यकत्वात् उक्तान्वयव्यतिरेकयोः (अज्ञानस्य अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोः) व्यापकत्वमात्रग्राहकत्वेऽनुपस्थितकारणान्तरकल्पनागौरव-
मित्युपस्थितत्वादज्ञानकारणत्वग्राहकत्वमेव । तच्च तत्त्वज्ञानाभावरूपं न कारणमित्यतिरिक्तमेव तथा । (विशेषादर्शनस्य दोषत्वाभ्युपगमेपि तत्सत्त्वे तत्त्वज्ञानमेव दुर्लभं तदसत्त्वे कारणपौ-
ष्कल्यमेव दुर्लभमिति तत्त्वम् । किंच, न कुत्रापि तददर्शनं दोषः, तथा सति धर्मिज्ञानकाले तदेव किमिति नोत्पद्यते सन्निकर्षादिसामग्रीसत्त्वादिति तत्प्रतिबन्धकतया दोषान्तरस्यावश्यकत्वेन तस्यैव भ्रमकारणत्वादिति दिक्) । (रामदेवरुता तत्त्वदीपिका-पञ्चपादिकाविवरणटीका)

(१ क) अभाव एव नत्रर्थः तस्य ज्ञानविरोधित्वमेव कल्प्यत इति चेत्, तत्र वक्तव्यं किं ज्ञानप्रागभावो वा नत्रर्थः किंवा तद्व्यसस्तदत्यन्ताभावो वा त्रितयान्यतरो वा । नाद्यः । निर्णीतिविस्मृतेरपि न जानामीति प्रयोगदर्शनात् । न च तत्राप्युत्पत्त्यमानज्ञान-
प्रागभाव एव तदर्थ इति वाच्यम् । पूर्वज्ञानजन्यसंस्कारानुद्धेधः पुनश्चैतन्यावरणं वा हि विस्मरणं, न ज्ञानप्रागभावस्तद्व्यसो वा, अन्यथा निर्णीतिविस्मृतेरपि न जानामीति प्रयोगा-
पत्तेः । न च तयोरन्यतरस्यैव तत्र नत्रर्थेति वाच्यम् । अनुगुणप्रसंगात् । न द्वितीयः, प्रागभावसमयेऽपि न जानामीति शब्दप्रयोगदर्शनात् । घटज्ञानदशानन्तरमपि घटं न जाना-
मीत्यनुभवापत्तेश्च । नापि तृतीयः चेतनानां न जानामीत्यभिलाषाभावप्रसंगात् तेषु ज्ञानान्य-
न्ताभावाभावात् अचेतनेष्वेवाज्ञानापत्तेश्च । नापि चतुर्थः, गौरवप्रसंगवदननुगमापत्तेश्च । अन्योन्याभावस्तु शंकिनुमनर्ह एव । तस्मात् ज्ञानविरोधी भाव एव अज्ञानं न ज्ञानाभावः ।

(पञ्चपादिकाविवरणोज्जीवनी)

(१ख) (त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि इत्यत्र) ज्ञानाभावे त्वदुक्तमर्थमित्यनुवादानुपपत्तेः ज्ञाते तु न जानामीति व्याघातात् मम तु भावरूपाज्ञानस्य सविषयस्य साक्षिण्यध्यासात् प्रतिभासो न जानामीति च न विरोधः । (ब्रह्मसूत्रोपन्यासवृत्तिः)

‡ अर्थक्रियातो भावानां सत्त्वप्रतीतिर्वक्तव्या । सा चार्थक्रिया सत्त्वेनानुभूयमाना कारणसत्तां गमयति । तत्र तस्याप्यन्यत इत्यनवस्थानात् न क्वचित् सत्तावगम इति शून्यं जगद्भविष्यत् । ननु स्वज्ञानार्थक्रियायाः स्वयंसिद्धत्वात् नानवस्था, न, तर्हि अर्थक्रियातः सत्तावगमो ज्ञानस्य स्वमाहात्म्येनैव सत्तावगतेः । अथ ज्ञानस्यापि स्वात्म-
प्रमाणत्वात् स्वयमेव स्वस्यार्थक्रिया इति तत्राह—न हि स्वरूपमेव स्वस्यार्थक्रिया, कार्य-
कारणयोर्भेदप्रसिद्धेः । (अज्ञातनामलेखकरुता पञ्चपादिकाव्याख्या)

.....तस्मात् सर्वप्रपञ्चानुगतसद्बुद्ध्यालम्बनं सत्ता प्रपञ्चाधिष्ठानं ब्रह्मैव ।§ यद्यपि निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्म शास्त्रैकवेद्यं तथापि तत्तत्प्रपञ्चतादात्म्यापन्नं तत्सत्तात्मना सर्वप्रत्ययेषु प्रथते । यथा परेषां सत्ता परा जातिः स्वस्वरूपेणादृश्यमानापि व्यक्तिविशेषे दृश्यते । एवमनुगतसद्बुद्ध्यनुगृहीतसद्व्यश्रुतिसिद्धा सद्व्यक्तिरेकैवेति सद्व्यग्रम् । प्रपञ्चस्तु सदन्यत्वाच्छुक्तिरजतवदनिर्वचनाय* इति न सद्व्यक्षतिः” । × (नृसिंहाश्रममुनिविरचितं अद्वैतब्रह्मानुसन्धानम्)

(ग) “ सुखदुःखादीनां कादाचित्कत्वात् कार्यत्वनियमे तदन्वयिकारणस्याहंकारस्य, अहं सुखी दुःखी इत्यनुभूयमानस्य, नान्तरेण स्वाधार-विक्रियां सुखिदुःखित्वभाव उपपद्यते । अतोऽहंकारस्य विकारित्वेन मृदादिवत् जाड्यादनुभवितृत्वानुपपत्तेः, तदनुभवितान्यः साक्षी अभ्युपगन्तव्यः ।† ... साक्षित्वं नाम चेत्यसत्तायां चेतयितृत्वनियमः, स्पर्शवत्पदार्थे विद्यमाने अवकाशदातृत्वनियमवत् आकाशस्य, तच्च साक्ष्ये विद्यमाने साक्षित्वाय विकारापेक्षायां व्यवहितत्वान्नोपपद्यते ।....न हि कूटस्थबोध-

§ काल्पनिकसांशत्वप्रतीत्यप्रतीतिवशात् अधिष्ठानत्वसंभवात् । (शारीरकन्याय-मणिमाला)

* प्रपञ्चस्तु न सदस्तु, सत्तासत्त्वयोरेकत्र विरोधात् । नच कालभेदेनोभयं किं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् । सत्त्वं हि न स्वरूपं नापि सत्ताजातिमत्त्वमित्युक्तं किन्तु बाधायोग्य-स्वरूपं तच्च कादाचित्कसत्त्वे विरुद्धयेत । असतो नाशप्रतियोगित्वादिधर्माङ्गीकारेऽसत्त्वव्या-कोपः । ननु एकस्य सदसदात्मकत्ववत् तद्विलक्षणमपि विरुद्धमिति चेत्, न विरुद्धयोरपि मृषातादात्म्योपपत्तेः । ननु सदसतोरेव मृषातादात्म्यं किं न स्यादिति चेत्, न, मृषाशब्दार्थस्यैवानिर्वचनीयत्वात् । नहि प्रमातृणामसामर्थ्यादनिर्वचनमपि तु विषयस्वाभाव्यात् ।

× तात्त्विकद्वैतविधुरं सद्वस्तु अद्वैतम् । (वेदान्तकौमुदी)

पूर्वरूपे स्थिते नष्टे वा वस्तुतोऽन्यस्यान्यात्मकत्वानुपपत्तेः मायया ह्यन्यादिव रज्जु-सर्पवत् ब्रह्मणोऽतत्ततोऽन्यधाभावत्वात् (एकस्यैव परिणामं विना अन्यधाभावात् मिथ्यात्वं स्फुटं) जगतस्तद्विवर्तत्वं वाच्यम् । विवर्तत्वं चाधिष्ठानसत्तयैव सद्ब्रह्मानामिति न स्वतः सत्ताऽस्ति ।

† तत्तद्विशेषणनाशे तत्तद्विशेषणविशिष्टस्यापि नाशापत्त्या अनित्याहंकारादिधर्मित्वे धर्मधर्मिणोस्तादात्म्यातिरिक्तसम्बन्धानङ्गीकाराद्ब्रह्माणामनित्यत्वेन धर्मिण आत्मनोऽप्यनि-त्यत्वापत्तिः स्यात् । (नैषकर्म्यसिद्धिसारार्थः)

मन्तरेण बुद्धेराविर्भावतिरोभावसिद्धिरस्ति । † ...सुषुप्त्यादौ बुद्धचभावं
प्रतिक्षणं तदवृत्त्यभावं चातैव वेत्ति इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । स्वरूपाभावस्व-
विकाराभावयोः स्वेन द्रष्टुमशक्यत्वात् । ...भावाभावयोरेकवेद्यत्वानियमात् ।
...प्रमात्रा च प्रमेयप्रमाणविलक्षणभावाभावाभ्यां तद्वदेव संविद्व्यावर्तकः
प्रतीयते । प्रमातृसंवेदनं जागरिते प्रमात्राभाससंवेदनं स्वप्ने प्रमात्रभाव-
संवेदनं सुषुप्त इति नानापरिणामवत्तया संविद्रूपेण संविद्व्यावर्तकः
प्रतीयते । तस्माद् यथा बाह्यप्रकाशः सवित्रादिः घटादेरवभासकः समान-
जातीयप्रकाशान्तरनिरपेक्षोऽपि प्रमातृबुद्धिप्रकाशमाकाङ्क्षते, एवं प्रमाता
प्रमेयप्रकाशकः स्वसमानजातीयबुद्धिप्रकाशानपेक्षोऽपि चित्प्रकाशसा-
क्षिसंवित्प्रकाशमपेक्षत इत्युपपद्यते । साक्षी तु पुनः प्रमात्रवभासक-
त्वात् तत्प्रकाशभासं च नापेक्षते, रूपादिरहितत्वाद् बाह्यालोकप्रकाशं
च नापेक्षते, स्वसंविद्रूपत्वात् संविदन्तरं च नापेक्षते । न चान्य-
दपेक्ष्यं प्रकाशान्तरमस्तीति तस्मिन्नप्यपेक्षा नोपपद्यते । अतः प्रमातृवत्
प्रकाशापेक्षा न भवतीति नानवस्था ।जडत्वस्यैव ग्राह्यत्वप्रयोजक-
त्वात् प्रमात्रालोकघटादिष्वजडे संवित्साक्षिणि तदभावोपपत्तेश्च । ¶

†(क) देहेन्द्रियादिष्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वगतस्य निरवयवस्यात्मनो न परिस्पन्दपरिणामल-
क्षणक्रियावैशात्मकं कर्तृत्वमुपपद्यते । न च प्रयत्नाश्रयत्वेनापि कर्तृत्वं, प्रयत्नस्यान्तः-
करणधर्मत्वात्, अनित्यस्य नित्यगुणत्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।

(चित्सुखाचार्यकृता नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिभावतत्त्वप्रकाशिका)

(ख) एकस्थैवात्मनः कर्मकर्तृभावः सर्वथा रूपान्तरेण च नोपपद्यते ।

(विद्यासुरभिः—नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिटीका)

(ग) अवगतेः कूटस्थत्वश्चानुभवसिद्धम् । किं स्वेनैव परिणामित्वं प्रतीयते अन्येन वा ।
नायः, स्वप्रागभावसाधकत्वासंभवात्, स्वस्योत्पत्तिवत्परिणामस्याप्यसाधकत्वात् । न च
परोक्षत्वेन स्वप्रागभावज्ञानं, केवलरूपेणानुमित्या प्रत्यक्षेण चापरोक्षसाधनासंभवात् । न
द्वितीयः, स्वप्रकाशो भेदासंभवात् प्रतियोग्यसिद्धिः ।

(उपदेशसाहस्रीगूढार्थदीपिका)

¶ (क) न सत्त्वेकं स्वप्रकाशं तत्त्वमनपेक्ष्यानेकात्मकस्य जडस्य विश्वस्य सिद्धिः
साधयितुं शक्यते । (सर्वमतसंग्रहः)

अक्रियावत्वाच्च कूटस्थत्वेन संविद्रूपातिरिक्तरूपान्तराभावात् संवित्स्वरूपे
चान्यापेक्षाभावात् सिद्धो निरपेक्षसाक्षी । ”* (अखिलात्मकतं नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिविवरणम्)

(घ) “ नृत्यज्ञानं सुखजनकं (इत्यत्र) प्रत्यक्षमेव कारणताज्ञानं
वाच्यमिति,† तच्च पौर्वापर्यरूपसहचारज्ञानाधीनं, तच्च तदुभयकालीनं
जन्यं न सम्भवतीति नित्यम् । ... सुखादीनामयुगपद्भावित्वेन तावद्-
गोचरमेकं सिध्यन् नित्यं सिद्ध्यति, इत्यस्य चाहंकारधर्मार्थत्वं विरुद्धम् । ”§
(अद्वैतरत्नकोशभावप्रकाशिकाव्याख्या)

(ख) साक्षी चाविद्यातद्रूपन्यतरोपहितचैतन्यम्, विशिष्टचैतन्यस्य विशेषणजाड्य-
प्रयुक्तजाड्यसत्त्वेन विषयानवभासकतया साक्षिस्वीकारः । साक्ष्युपाधिकोटौ मायाशब्दिना-
विद्यायां जाड्यसत्त्वेऽपि तस्या उपाधितया विशेषणत्वाभावेन तद्गतजाड्यमुपहिते न
प्रसरति ।
(सर्वमतसंग्रहविलासः)

* अस्ति तावत् प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धिः मयेदं विदितमिति, इतरथा स्वपरसंवेद्ययोरविशे-
षापत्तेः । स चात्मा न स्वगोचरः संविदो द्वैरूप्यापातात् । प्रयोगोऽपि नात्मा स्वाश्रयप्रकाश-
प्रकाश्यः प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवत्, नापि विषयसंविद्यत्वात् तदन्तरेणापि स्फुरणात् ।
प्रयोगोऽपि नात्मा स्वातिरेकिसंविदधीनासिद्धिः संवित्कर्मतामन्तरेण अपरोक्षत्वात् संवेदनवत् ।
नाप्यनुमानधर्माभ्यां, अवाधितापरोक्षप्रतिभासत्वात्, परिशेषात् स्वतःसिद्धिरित्यर्थः । तथा च
प्रयोग आत्मा स्वप्रकाशस्ततोऽन्यथानुपपद्यमानत्वे सति प्रकाशमानत्वात् न य एवं न स
एवं यथा कुम्भ इति ।
(ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यप्रकर्षार्थः)

† इदानीं सुखादिसाक्षिरूपेणाप्यहंकारधर्मातिरिक्तं ज्ञानं निरूप्यते । यदेष्टज्ञानमुत्-
पद्यते तदा तन्नियमेन कश्चिज्ज्ञानातीति वाच्यम् । एवं तदनन्तरभावि सुखं चेति तयोः
कार्यकारणभावग्रहः । सुखार्थी हि नृत्यादिज्ञाने प्रवर्तत इति तस्य तयोः कार्यकारणभाव-
ग्रहो वक्तव्यः ।

§ सुखादिसाधकनित्यसाक्ष्यनुभवानङ्गीकारेऽन्वयादिदर्शनासंभवे ज्ञानसुखादीनां कार्य-
कारणत्वग्रहासंभवः । नृत्यज्ञानं च निरपेक्षमेव सुखजनकमिति तदनन्तरं तद्व्यवयेवेति न
सुखात् पूर्वं तदनुव्यवसायः संभवति । सुखानन्तरं तु सुखमेव ज्ञातव्यमित्यनुपस्थितस्य
ज्ञानस्य कथं कारणताग्रहः । [अयमाशयः—प्रथमक्षणे इष्टज्ञानं, द्वितीयक्षणे सुसौत्वत्तिः, सुख-
त्वस्य चावश्यवेद्यत्वात्तृतीयक्षणे सुखत्वस्य निर्विकल्पकं, तत्क्षणे चेष्टज्ञानस्य नाशोऽपि
स्यात्, चतुर्थक्षणे सुखसविकल्पकज्ञानं, पञ्चमक्षणेऽनुव्यवसायो भवतीति वक्तव्यम् । परन्तु
सुखसविकल्पकपूर्वक्षणे (सुखत्वस्य निर्विकल्पकक्षणे) इष्टज्ञानस्य नष्टत्वात् पञ्चमक्षणे
विषयाभावादेवानुव्यवसायो न स्यात्] । तस्मात् सुखादिसाधकं नित्यसाक्षिज्ञानमवश्यमभ्यु-
पगन्तव्यम् ।

(ङ) † “ मानं तावन्न मानप्रवृत्तेः प्रागज्ञातार्थसाधकं संभवति मानस्याप्रवृत्तत्वादेव तत्र । नापि मेयमेव स्वविषयाज्ञानं साधयति तस्य जडत्वेन भासनशक्त्यभावात् । ...मानप्रवृत्तेः प्राक् तद्विषयाज्ञाने मानान्तरमपि न प्रवर्तत इत्यवश्याभ्युपेयं, अर्थासिद्धौ तदवच्छिन्नाज्ञानसिद्धेरसम्भवात् । ... मानप्रवृत्तेः प्रागेवाज्ञातत्वं न बुद्धं चेदवगन्तव्योऽयमर्थो मयेति तद्बुभुत्सया मानं प्रवर्त्य बोद्धुं कोपि न प्रवर्तत † ... प्रागज्ञातत्वासिद्धौ सिद्धयदपि मानबलेन वा बुद्धं किंवा स्वभाव इति निश्चयो न सिद्धयेत, सिद्धे वागन्तुकत्वानिश्चयात्तदसिद्धौ च प्रागज्ञातत्वकल्पनायोगात् । § ... तस्मादनात्मनोऽज्ञातत्वासंभवात्तन्निष्ठस्य तत्त्वावेदकत्वं नास्ति, अज्ञातार्थाधिगन्तृत्वाभावात् । ” § (विश्वदेवविरचितसिद्धान्तदीपः-संक्षेपशारीरकव्याख्या)

(च) “ अस्ति कश्चित् चक्षुरादिव्यापारदशायामेव घटादिज्ञानदर्शनात् कादाचित्कज्ञानपरिणामी, स च अहंकारः; अहं घटं न जानामीत्यनुभवान्न च स आत्मा स्वस्यैव स्वपरिणामद्रष्टृत्वे कर्तृकर्मविरोधात् । किं च अस्ति तावत् घटादिज्ञानधारानन्तरं एतावन्तं कालं घटमनुभवन्नहमासमित्यहंकारतत्परिणामानुसन्धानम् । तच्च पूर्वानुभवजन्यं, न च घट-

† इदानीं अज्ञातविषयसाक्षिरूपेणाप्यहंकारधर्मातिरिक्तं ज्ञानं निरूप्यते । अज्ञातत्वावच्छेदकघटाद्यस्वीकारे चाक्षुषादिवृत्तेः विषयेन्द्रियसम्बन्धादिजन्यायाः पूर्वदृष्टस्य दृश्यमानेन ऐक्यप्रत्यभिज्ञादेश्वानुपपत्तिः । ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः प्रागज्ञातत्वेनानुभूतस्य परामर्शदर्शनादज्ञातत्वमनुभवसिद्धम् । अज्ञाततया साक्षिवेद्यं न प्रमाणमपेक्षते ।

† यद्यज्ञानं प्रमाणगम्यं भवेत् तदा तदज्ञानं च प्रमाणगम्यमेवेति तस्य तस्य ज्ञेयस्याज्ञानं प्रमाणेन पूर्वं ज्ञात्वा तत्तज्ज्ञेयमिति अनवस्थानात् न किञ्चित् सिद्धयेत् ।

§ यथा शुक्लात्मना दृश्यमानस्य घटस्य न कदाचिदपि कृष्णात्मत्वं तथा जडस्य ज्ञातमिति रूपेणैव दृश्यमानस्य न कदाचिदप्यज्ञातरूपत्वं ततः तत्स्वभावत्वनिश्चयः ।

§ (क) अज्ञातत्वस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वेन हेतुनानुभवनेवाज्ञातत्वेन प्रतिपन्नघटादीनामज्ञानानिवर्तका अक्षाद्यो मात्वं यान्ति अज्ञातज्ञातता (अज्ञातज्ञापकत्वात्), अन्यथा मानसिद्धाज्ञातत्वस्य माननिवर्त्यत्वायोगात् ।

(आनन्दपूर्णविद्यासागररुता न्यायकल्पलतिका-बृहदारण्यकभाष्यवार्तिकटीका)

(ख) प्रमाविरोधित्वसविषयकत्वविशिष्टज्ञानस्यानावृतसाक्षिसम्बन्धवत्त्वं साक्षिणोऽज्ञाननाशकत्वेऽनुपपन्नम् । (श्रीसिदासुखरुता सारचन्द्रिका-अद्वैतसिद्धिलघुचन्द्रिकासारः)

ज्ञानधाराया अहंकारो ज्ञानं वा विषयो भवति वेद्यज्ञानवादे तदयोगात् । न वा स्वाविषये ज्ञानं संस्कारमुत्पादयति घटज्ञानधाराकाले त्वहमर्थतज्ज्ञानयोरपि काचिन्नान्या ज्ञानधारास्ति । अतस्तत्राहंकारतद्धर्मसाक्षी तद्धर्ममतिरिक्तः कश्चिदनुभवोऽस्तीति स एवात्मा । निरवयवस्यानुभवरूपात्मनः संप्रयोगाद्यसंभवे तत्परिणामानुपपत्तेरित्यनात्मा परिणामी जडोऽहंकारः, तद्द्रष्टृचिद्रूपात्मन्यध्यस्तः, अन्यथा चिदचिदोरेकत्वानुभवायोगादिति परिणामिजडस्वभावतद्द्रष्टृचैतन्यसमुदाय एवायमहंकारः । * चैतन्यमहंकारे शरीरघटादौ चाधिष्ठानतयानुस्यूतम्, घटः स्फुरतीति घटादावपि स्फुरणानुभवात् । † न च घटः स्फुरतीत्यात्म-

* (१) दुःखदिकं नात्मधर्म आत्मग्राह्यत्वात् घटवदित्यनुमानात् दुःखिनो ममात्मेति प्रत्यक्षाच्चाहमर्थद्वैतसिद्धिः । (अद्वैतमुक्ताकान्तिः)

(२) दुःख्यस्मीति दुःखरूपेण परिणामिरूपं भाति तदैव जिह्वासितदुःखरूपं प्रति धर्मितया प्रेमास्पदं सुखरूपं भातीति रूपद्वयमनुभूयते ।

(आनन्दपूर्णरुतं पञ्चपादिकाविवरणटीकारलम्)

(३) अहमित्येतावन्मात्रानुभवो नास्त्येव किन्तु अहमुपलभ इत्यादिरूपोऽहमन्तर्भावः । तथा च यथाऽयो दहतीत्यनुभवे दहतीति दग्धंशोऽय इति दाह्यांशश्च स्फुरति तथा अहमुपलभ इत्यनुभव उपलभ इत्युपलब्धंशोऽहमिति च उपलब्धजडांशः स्फुरति इत्यहमुपलभ इत्यनुभवविशेषमादाय अहमर्थस्य अध्यासरूपत्वं संगच्छते । (भाष्यरत्नप्रभाया व्याख्या)

अहंकारस्य ज्ञानकर्मतया घटादिवदनात्मत्वात्तत्साधकस्य प्रकाशसापेक्षरूपत्वादात्मनः तयोर्भेद एवोचितः । अहंकारस्य चैतन्यकर्मत्वात् चैतन्यव्यावृत्तत्वात् चैतन्ये प्रतीयमानेऽपि अप्रतीयमानत्वात् (सुषुप्त्यादौ) इत्यादिन्यायात् आत्मान्यत्वमेव । तर्हि कथं भिन्नयोरात्माहंकारयोरेकत्वानुभवः, घटादिवत्तद्गतत्वरूपादिवच्च अहंकारतद्धर्मवात्मनः सकाशात् किमिति पृथक् नानुभूयते इति चेत् शरीरेक्याभिमानवत् मिथ्यातादात्म्याध्यासादेकत्वावगम इत्यवेहि ।

‡ अहमिति पराग्व्यावृत्तो ज्ञानाश्रयोऽहंकारोऽनुभूयते, चैतन्यं तु घटः स्फुरति पटः स्फुरति अहं स्फुरामीति चाहंकारपदवाच्यपि सर्वत्रानुवृत्ततया प्रतीयते, स्फुरणस्यैव चैतन्यत्वात् । चैतन्यं चात्मा । आत्मा संविद्भिन्नः संवित्कर्मतामन्तरेणापरोक्षत्वात् संविद्भवत् । अहंकारस्य दृश्यत्वेन तद्द्रष्टृसिद्धौ कर्मकर्तृविरोधेन तदन्यत्वसिद्धौ तस्यापि ज्ञानाश्रयत्वे दृश्यत्वेनानवस्थापस्याहंकारद्रष्टा ज्ञातिरूपः सिध्यति ।

संवेतज्ञानविषयत्वानुभव इति वाच्यम् । वेद्यज्ञानेन स्वविषयत्वस्य घटादि-
निष्ठस्यानुभवितुमशक्यत्वात् । अनुव्यवसायेनानुभूयत इति चेत् । न, तदा
व्यवसायविषयत्वस्य वर्तमानत्वासंभवात् । घटनिष्ठस्य व्यवसायविषयत्वस्य
तदविषयस्यानुव्यवसायेन विषयीकर्तुमयोगाच्च । नहि बाह्ये व्यवसायाविषये
मनःसामर्थ्यमस्ति ।*नापि स्वप्रकाशज्ञानविषयत्वं घटः स्फुरतीति
व्यवहियत इति वाच्यम् । अन्यज्ञानस्यास्वप्रकाशत्वात् । नापि ज्ञानजन्या
ज्ञातता, तत्स्फुरणजन्यत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । एतावन्तं कालं इदं नास्फुरादि-
दानीं स्फुरतीति स्फुरणकादाचित्कत्वानुभवस्याज्ञाताभिव्यक्तस्फुरणविषयत्वे-
नोपपत्तेस्तदभावकल्पनायोगात् । ज्ञातताया अनन्तरं निरसिष्यमाणत्वाच्च ।

* (क) जिज्ञासितस्य ज्ञानस्यानुव्यवसायवेद्यत्वे सुषुप्त्यादिविरामप्रसंगः । नच
सामग्र्यन्तरप्रतिबद्धत्वात् जिज्ञासितमपि सर्वदा न ज्ञायत इति न सुषुप्त्यादिविरामप्रसंग इति
वाच्यं, इमं घटं जानामीति सन्निकृष्टघटानुव्यवसायस्थले घटज्ञानसामग्र्यां विद्यमानाया-
मेवानुव्यवसायदर्शनेन सामग्र्यन्तरस्य तदप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । जिज्ञासितस्य च तस्य ग्राह्यत्वे
अन्योन्याश्रय अज्ञाते जिज्ञासायोगात् । ज्ञानज्ञाने सति जिज्ञासा, तस्यां च सत्यां
तज्ज्ञानामिति । किं च ज्ञानभेदे तत्क्रमे च तत्कारणमनःसंयोगभेदक्रमावेव प्रयोजकौ
वक्तव्यौ । अन्यथा धारावहनस्थले ज्ञानभेदेन तत्क्रमयोरनुपपत्तेः । न च तत्र प्रागभावभे-
दाद् भेदः, सजातीयप्रत्यक्षविभुविशेषगुणानां पयथिणोत्पत्तिस्वभावाच्च क्रम इति वाच्यं,
प्रागभावस्य प्रतियोगिभेदाधीनभेदकत्वेन प्रतियोगिभेदस्य तद्भेदाधीनत्वे अन्योन्याश्रयात्
कारणक्रमाधीनकार्यक्रमोपपत्तौ निर्धीजस्वभावकल्पनानुपपत्तेश्च । तथाच व्यवसायानुव्यव-
साययोः भिन्नसंयोगजन्यतया, अनुव्यवसायक्षणे व्यवसायस्य नष्टत्वात् तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वानु-
पपत्तेः । सामग्रीभेदतत्क्रमयोरेव कार्यगततत्प्रयोजकत्वं, सर्वत्रैवं दर्शनात्, तौ चात्र
सुलभौ, अनुव्यवसायसामग्र्यां व्यवसायस्यानुप्रवेशादिति चेत्, तथापि ज्ञानविषयसविकल्पक-
निर्विकल्पकाद्यनेकक्षणव्यवहितत्वाद् व्यवसायस्य प्रतीयत इति वर्तमानत्वप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिः ।

(स) ज्ञानत्वनिर्विकल्पकानन्तरं व्यवसायनाशादनुव्यवसायस्य वर्तमानज्ञानविषयत्वं
न स्यात् । किंचैवमनुव्यवसायधारा स्यात् । नच बाह्यसामग्री तत्प्रतिबन्धिका, घटसन्निकर्षे
सत्यपि घटं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायदर्शनात्, धारावाहिकस्थले एकैकज्ञानस्यानुव्यवसायाभावे
धाराप्रत्यक्षाभावप्रसंगाच्च । तस्मात् न अनुव्यवसायः प्रामाणिकः ।

तस्माच्चैतन्यं घटाद्यधिष्ठानमाभिव्यक्तं तत्स्फुरणं घटादेरपरोक्षत्वाधर्मप्यात्म-
चैतन्यतादात्म्यमभ्युपेयमेवेति† चैतन्यमहंकारविषयादिष्वनुस्यूतम् । ” §

(नृसिंहाश्रमविरचिता “ विवरणभावप्रकाशिका ”)

(छ) “ घटं जानामीति विशिष्टप्रत्ययो ज्ञानांशे घटादिसम्बन्धा-
वगाही तदंशे तद्विशिष्टबुद्धित्वादित्यनुमानेन संयोगादिबाधातदन्यसम्बन्धे
कल्पनीये क्लृप्तस्य तादात्म्यस्यैव सम्बन्धत्वे लाघवमिति लाघवज्ञानात्
संयोगाद्यतिरिक्तः तादात्म्यसम्बन्ध एव सिध्यति, स च जडाजडनिरूप्य-
त्वादनिराच्यः पर्यवस्यतीति स आध्यासिकसम्बन्ध उच्यते । ”*

(त्र्यम्बकशास्त्रिकृता “ दृक्दृश्यसम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः ”)

(ज) “ अयं च विशेषणविशेष्यभावः किं द्रव्यादिष्वन्तर्भूतो-
ऽनन्तर्भूतो वा प्रमीयते । अन्तर्भवेऽपि किं द्रव्यादित्रिकेऽन्तर्भूतः सामान्या-
दित्रिके वा । प्रथमे सामान्यादीनां नित्यत्वादिभिर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो न

† घटः स्फुरति पटः स्फुरतीति दृक्दृश्ययोस्तादात्म्यानुभवात् । अज्ञानं अज्ञानाश्र-
विषयाः साक्षिचैतन्येऽध्यस्तास्तेन परस्परमभिसम्बन्धस्तेषामवभासते ।

§ अस्ति तावत् एकरूपापरोक्षत्वप्रतीतिः सकललौकिकी । अन्यथाऽपरोक्षशब्दस्या-
नेकार्थत्वप्रसंगात् । न च विषये गौणो व्यवहारः, ज्ञानधर्मयोगेन प्रवृत्त्यभावात् । किन्तु
ज्ञानीयविषयतारूपसंबन्धेनेति । मुख्यत्वे बाधकाभावाच्च । अन्यथा तद्विषयकत्वेन ज्ञाने
तथाव्यवहार इत्यस्यापि शक्यवचनत्वात् । न चैषाऽनुगतैकनिमित्तमन्तरेण संभवति
इति अपरोक्षतापि सर्वत्रैकैव, अन्यथा जात्युच्छेदापत्तेः । न तावत् अनेकसम्बन्धत्वम-
नुगतत्वं, जातिन्वाद्युपाधौ तदभावापत्तेः, परस्परव्यावृत्तमणिगणसूत्रस्य तत्त्वाभावप्रसंगाच्च ।
किन्तु सकलविशेषतादात्म्यापन्नत्वमेव । तच्चास्त्येवापरोक्षतायाः । सा हि ब्रह्मस्वरूपम् ।
स एव चानुभवः । सन्ति च सर्वविशेषाः तत्तादात्म्यापन्नाः सर्वस्योपादेयस्य तत्रैवोपादाने
कल्पितत्वात् ।

* न च दृश्ये दृशः संयोगस्तावत् सम्भवति, तस्य द्रव्यमात्रवृत्तित्वात् अद्रव्यस्यापि
दृश्यस्य सत्त्वात् । नापि समवायः, अनभ्युपगमात्, अभावादौ दृश्ये तदयोगाच्च, नापि
विशेषणता, तस्याः भावप्रतियोगित्वात्प्रतिपत्तेः । ... दृग्विषयताया विप्रकृष्टसम्बन्धिद्वय-
निरूप्यत्वेन पारमार्थिकत्वाऽनुपपत्तिरेव दृक्दृश्यसम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः । सा च प्रकृते अप्रत्यूहति
दृश्यत्वनिर्वाहकसम्बन्धान्तरस्यानभ्युपगमेपि क्षत्यभावात् । ... आध्यासिकसम्बन्ध इत्यस्य
अनिर्वाच्यसम्बन्ध इत्येवार्थः । नचैवं दृश्यमात्रनिर्वाच्यत्वासिद्धिः, विषयाद्यनिर्वाच्यत्वेन
विना सम्बन्धानिर्वाच्यत्वस्यैवानिर्वाहात् । (त्र्यम्बकशास्त्रिकृता श्रुतिमतानुमानोपपत्तिः)

स्यात् ।†....किञ्च वर्तमानेऽपि विषयविषयिभावो नामैकसम्बन्धो नोभयाधारे संबद्धचते विषये विषयिभावस्य विषयिणि च विषयभावस्य वृत्त्यसंभवात् । अथ एको विषयीऽन्यो विषयोऽयमेव विषयिविषयभावः तथापि तयोः परस्परधीनसिद्धिकत्वान्नैकस्यापि सम्बन्धः संगच्छते । किञ्च स्फोरकसम्बन्धाज्जायमानं स्फुरणं प्रमेयाश्रयं जायते प्रमात्राश्रयं वा; प्रथमे न तेन द्वैते व्यवहारावतारो रेखयेव जडविकारत्वाच्चास्फुरणत्वमपि स्यात्, रेखावदेव, प्रमात्राश्रयत्वे च घटः प्रकाशत इति व्यवहारो न स्यात् । अथ तदाकारत्वात्तद्व्यवहारः; न, आकारानिरूपणात् । न तावद् विषय एवाकारः स्फुरणस्य, प्रकाशाप्रकाशयोर्विरुद्धरूपत्वान्नापि विषयवदाकारो मूर्तत्वाद्यनिष्ठधर्मप्रसंगात्, नापि विषयव्यापकत्वं प्रदीपवदसंसर्गात्, नापि विषयस्य तास्मिन् प्रतिबिम्बितत्वं, मूर्तस्यामूर्ते प्रतिबिम्बभावाददर्शनाद्देहादिव्यवधानाच्च, नापि विषयकर्मता, स्फुरणस्य प्रकाशमात्ररूपस्याक्रियात्वेन कर्मकारकनैराकाङ्क्ष्यादनुमानादौ च व्यभिचारात्, इतरथा तत्राप्यापरोक्ष्यप्रसंगः । तद्व्यावृत्तत्वं चेत्

†द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायात्मकं किल वैशेषिकसमये विश्वं, तेषु किमयमन्तर्भूतो वा अनन्तर्भूतो वा । ... विषयविषयिभावस्य द्रव्यादिष्वन्तर्भावे स्वीक्रियमाणे सामान्यादिभिः सह सामान्यादिसंवेदनस्य यो विषयविषयिभावलक्षणसम्बन्धः सं न स्यात्, सम्बन्धस्य द्रव्याश्रितत्वात् द्रव्यादिषु वान्तर्भूतस्य द्रव्याद्यात्मकत्वात् द्रव्यादीनां सामान्याद्याश्रितत्वमभ्युपगमविपरीतं प्रसज्यत इत्यर्थः । तथाहि—गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यमुच्यते, तत्र विषयविषयिभावस्य अन्तर्भूतत्वे द्रव्यस्य सामान्यास्थितत्वमभ्युपगतं विपरीतमनिष्टमापद्यते सम्बन्धस्य द्विष्टत्वात्, ज्ञानाश्रयत्वमप्यापद्यते । तथा सामान्यवान् गुणः संयोगविभागयोरनपेक्षमकारणं गुणः, तदन्तर्भूतत्वे विषयविषयिभावस्य गुणस्य सामान्याद्याश्रितत्वमनिष्टमापद्यते । तथैकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागयोरनपेक्षकारणं कर्म, तदन्तर्भूतत्वे विषयविषयिभावस्य कर्मणः सामान्याद्याश्रितत्वप्रसंगः । तथानुगतप्रत्ययकारणं सामान्यं तदन्तर्भूतत्वे विषयविषयिभावस्य सामान्याद्याश्रितत्वमापद्यते । तथा व्यावृत्तकारणं विशेषास्ते च द्विविधाः सामान्यविशेषघटत्वादयः नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो विशेषाः । तदन्तर्भूतत्वे विषयविषयिभावस्य विशेषाणां सामान्याश्रितत्वप्रसंगात् । तथा समवायान्तर्भूतत्वे विषयविषयिभावस्य समवायस्य तत्संवेदने सम्बन्धो न स्यात् समवायस्य समवायाश्रितत्वप्रसंगात् । ... द्वितीयपक्षे सममपदार्थस्वीकारः सिद्धान्तक्षयावहः प्रसज्येत्यर्थः ।

चक्षुरादेरपि स्फुरणप्रसंगः, विषयत्वस्य चाद्याप्यसिद्धेः । तस्मात् स्फुरणसं-
गानिरूपणात् द्वैतस्फुरणव्यवहारोऽविचारितरमणीय एव । ”*

(जनाह्वनविनिर्मितः “ तत्त्वालोकः ”)

* (क) विषयविषयिभावो हि मूलसम्बन्धपूर्वको वक्तव्यः, अन्यथातिप्रसंगात् । मूलसम्बन्धश्च तयोः (चैतन्यजगतोः) तादात्म्यं संयोगः समवायो वा । चैतन्यजगतोस्तादात्म्यं न सम्भवति । चैतन्यस्याजडत्वेन जगतो जडत्वेन वैलक्षण्यात् । नापि संयोगः सम्भवति । निरवयवस्य चैतन्यस्य तदयोगात्, गुणादिना तदयोगाच्च । नापि तयोः समवायसम्भवः, अयुतसिद्धयभावात् । अत एव विषयविषयिभावलक्षणं सम्बन्धं प्रति कथ्यते मूलसम्बन्धो न प्रतीयते । ननु जन्यजनकभावो वा विशेषणविशेष्यभावो वा चिच्छेत्ययोः विषयविषयिभावं प्रति मूलसम्बन्ध इति चेत् । न तावत् जन्यजनकभावः सम्भवति, चितो नित्यत्वात् । अतीतादौ ज्ञानजनकत्वाभावेन ज्ञानविषयत्वाभावप्रसंगात् । चक्षुरादेरपि घटादिज्ञानविषयत्वप्रसंगाच्च । तस्यापि तज्जनकत्वात् । ननु प्रतीयमानत्वे सति जनकत्वं विवक्षितमिति चेत्, न, प्रतीति-विषयत्वस्यैव प्रतीयमानताशब्दार्थत्वात् तस्य चाद्याप्यनिरूपणात् । नापि विशेषणविशेष्यभावो विषयविषयिभावं प्रति मूलसम्बन्धः, चाक्षुषज्ञानमपि चक्षुषोऽपि घटादिज्ञानविशेषणत्वेन तद्विषयत्वप्रसंगात् । जन्यजनकभावविशेषणविशेष्यभावयोरपि मुख्यसम्बन्धत्वाभावेन मूलसम्बन्धापेक्षणाच्च । अन्यथा वनस्थदण्डादेरपि घटादिकारणत्वप्रसंगः, देवदत्तविशेषणत्वप्रसंगश्च । किञ्च विशिष्टज्ञानजननयोग्यत्वस्य विषयविषयिभावं प्रति मूलसम्बन्धत्वे घटपटज्ञानयोगपि विषयविषयिभावप्रसंगः, स्वरूपस्य तत्रापि भावादतीतादिपदार्थानां विशिष्टज्ञानजनकतायां विषयत्वप्रसंगश्च । ननु सम्बन्धान्तरमन्तरा विशिष्टप्रत्ययविषयत्वमेव चिच्छेत्ययोः विषयविषयिभावं प्रति मूलसम्बन्ध इति चेत्, न, विषयत्वस्यैव सम्बन्धात् प्रागसिद्धः सम्बन्धसम्बन्धिनो-भेदनियमेन सम्बन्धिस्वरूपस्य सम्बन्धत्वानुपपत्तेश्च । तस्मात् सम्बन्धान्तरानिरूपणात् तदभावे च जगत्सिद्ध्यनुपपत्तेः जगत्प्रतिभासार्थं चैतन्याश्रिताविद्याविवर्तत्वेन जगतश्चेत-नस्य च आध्यात्मिक एव सम्बन्धो वक्तव्यः । तदा जगतोऽज्ञानाश्रयविषयचिदात्मविवर्तत्वे अमुष्य जगत उपलभ्यत्वमुपपद्यते । आध्यात्मिकसम्बन्धसम्भवात् इत्यर्थः ।

(ख) नच सम्बन्धविशेषासम्भवेऽपि सम्बन्धसामान्यनिश्चये, सत्यसम्बन्धत्वं निश्चित-मिति वाच्यं, सम्बन्धत्वस्य दुर्वचत्वात्, प्रतीतिबलादुत्प्लुष्टं तदङ्गीक्रियत इति चेत्, न, असम्बद्ध्या प्रतीत्या विषयासिद्धेः । विषयविषयभावसम्बन्धेन विषयसम्बद्धा प्रतीतिरिति चेत्, न घटावाच्छिन्नस्फुरणेन यो घटस्य सम्बन्धः स किं तेनैव स्फुरणेन गृह्यते अन्येन वा ! आद्ये तेन स्वमविषयीकृता कथं स्वस्य विषयेण सह सम्बन्धो गृह्येत, सम्बन्धज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धिद्वयगोचरत्वनियमात्, अन्यथा सम्बन्ध इत्येव गृह्येत नत्वस्यानेन सम्बन्ध इति । तादृग्ग्रहे च नोभयित्वसिद्धिः । न चोभयित्वग्राहकमानशून्यः सम्बन्धो भवति । अथ स्वं

(३) “ अस्य कार्यकारणतादेः वस्तुवृत्त्या वस्तुत असद्वा कार्यं सद्वा कार्य* कुर्वद्वा कारणमकुर्वद्वा कारणं संबद्धं वा साक्ष्यमसंबद्धं वा इत्येवं विचारे कार्यकारणतादेः केनापि प्रकारेण निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वेन वस्तुतोऽसंभवादाविद्यकत्वमेव वक्तव्यम् । †

विषयीकुर्वता स्वस्य विषयसम्बन्धो गृह्यतामिति चेन्न, आत्माश्रयात्, स्वस्य स्वविषयकत्वे मानाभावाच्च । अथ स्वयमेव स्वस्य स्वविषयकत्वे मानमिति चेत्, न, विषयत्वस्य स्वानतिरिक्तत्वे स्वस्य स्वं विषय इति वाक्यस्य स्वस्य स्वमित्यर्थः । तथा चोद्देश्यासिद्धिः । विषयत्वस्य स्वातिरेके च घटेनेव तेन समं विषयिविषयभावे मानाभावः । अथ घटस्फुरणस्य घटविषयकत्वमन्येन स्फुरणेन गृह्यत इति द्वितीयः पक्षोऽस्त्विति चेत्, न, स्फुरणान्तरस्य घटविषयकस्फुरणविषयकत्वं केन प्रमाणेन सिद्धमिति पर्यनुयोगात्, स्फुरणान्तरेण इति चेत्, ह्येतैवमनवस्था, असिद्धिश्च । तस्मात् दृक्दृश्ययोः कार्यकारणयोश्च सम्बन्धो निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् मायिकः, तादृशेन च सम्बन्धेन यत् संबद्धं तत् सुतरां मायिकमिति सिद्धम् ।

(सदानन्दविरचितः स्वरूपनिर्णयः)

* (क) न तावत् कार्यद्रव्यं पटादि, कारणात् तन्वादेस्तत्त्वतोऽतिरिक्तं समवैति किन्तु कारणस्यैव तन्वादेरन्यत्वानन्यत्वाभ्यां दुर्निरूपमवस्थामात्रम् । (ब्रह्मसूत्रन्यायमणिमाला)

(ख) असतः कारणाधीनसत्त्वलक्षणकार्यत्वस्यानुपपत्तेः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कर्ममसदिति प्रतीतो पूर्वकालः कार्यस्य विशेषणं प्रतीयते । न च तत्कार्यस्यासत्त्वे युज्यते । असति विशेषणप्रवृत्तेर्दर्शनादनुपपत्तेश्च । किं प्रागभावसत्त्वेन घटस्यायातं, घटस्वरूपं तु तदाऽसदेव सत्तासमवायस्य स्वरूपसत्त्वस्य वा तदाऽभावात् । न हि घटसत्ता पटसत्ता भवति । न हि अभावप्रतियोगित्वमेव सत्त्वं तदाऽसतोऽभावप्रतियोगित्वानुपपत्तेश्च । सत्तासमवायित्वस्यैव सत्त्वेन उत्पद्यमानत्वे च तत्पूर्वं सत्तानुपपत्तेः । तथा च सत्तासमवायित्वस्यैवोत्पत्तिर्त्वे तत्पूर्वं कार्यस्यासत्त्वान्न तस्य सत्तादिसमवायित्वमिति मोक्षतिर्निरूपयितुं शक्यते । सत्कार्यपक्षे अभिव्यक्तेः सत्त्वेऽसत्त्वे च तज्जनकत्वासम्भवात्, अनभिव्यक्तेः सत्त्वे निरासानुपपत्तेः, असत्त्वे च नित्यनिरस्तत्वेन निरासानुपपत्तेः । तस्मात् सत्कार्यबादोऽप्यनुपपन्नः । किंच सत्कार्यवादे कारणगुणव्यापारः सन् इत्येव वक्तव्यः । अन्यथा अस्तस्तस्योत्पत्त्यनुपपत्त्या कार्योत्पादनस्यैवासंभवात् । कारणगुणव्यापारस्य च सामग्रीलक्षणस्य नित्यत्वे सर्वदा कार्योत्पत्त्यवश्यभावे सुषुप्तिमूर्च्छादिकं न स्यादित्युभयतः पाशा रज्जुः । अस्मन्मते सत्त्वासत्त्वादिप्रकारैरनिर्वचनीयमायाजन्यत्वेन कार्यस्यापि तादृग्रूपतया कस्यापि दोषस्याप्रसक्तेः, नहि मायिकपदार्थे किञ्चिद्भूषणमस्ति मायिकस्य युक्त्यसहत्वस्य भूषणत्वात् ।

† (क) अवस्थितस्य पूर्वावस्थात्यागेनोत्तरावस्थापत्तिः परिणामोऽन्यथाभूतस्य तथाभूतस्यान्यथाभूतपूर्वा न सम्भवतीति परिणामहीनम् ।

(आनन्दपूर्णमुनीन्द्रकृतं
ब्रह्मसिद्धिव्याख्यानम्)

(ख) पूर्वरूपे स्थिते नष्टे वा अन्यस्य ज्यात्मतानुपपत्तेः । (सिद्धान्ततत्त्वम्)

(ग) आत्मानात्मनोश्चिदचित्त्वेन वास्तवाभेदासिद्धौ सामानाधिकरण्यात् तदभेद-
श्चिरध्याससम्भावनां गमयति । (चित्सुखाचार्यकृता ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यभाष्यप्रकाशिका)

(घ) मिथ्यात्वं अध्यासविषयत्वं अध्यासश्च तच्छून्ये तदवभासः तदसम्बन्धिनि-
तत्प्रतीतिः । (प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वभूषणम्)

(ङ) स्वानधिकरणवृत्तित्वस्य तत् (अध्यास) लक्षणत्वात् । न चाभाववद्वृत्तित्वं
भावस्य विरुद्धं, विषयसत्ताकत्वेनाविरोधात् । (व्याससूत्रविवृतिः)

(च) दुर्निरूपत्वात् परमार्थसत्यत्वप्रयोजकचित्स्वभावत्वविरहाच्च मायामयत्वम्
(विद्याश्री-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यव्याख्या)

(छ) स्वप्नादौ यद् यद् दृश्यं तत्तत् मिथ्या इति व्याप्तिं निश्चित्य विश्वगतदृश्यत्वेन
व्याप्तिं स्मरति यद्यद्दृश्यं तत्तत् मिथ्येति तदैव मिथ्यात्वव्याप्यदृश्यत्ववद्विश्वमिति लिंग-
परामर्शरूपमुत्पद्यते ततो विश्वं मिथ्येति ज्ञानमनुमितिरूपमुत्पद्यते । (वेदान्तानुमितिः)

(ज) तूलाज्ञानकल्पितमिन्नत्वे सति सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हं चिद्भिन्नं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात्
जडत्वात् परिच्छिन्नत्वात् शुक्तिरूप्यवत् । (वेदान्तार्थनिरूपणम्)

(झ) अनुमानमपि मिथ्यात्वे मानं तथाहि चिद्भिन्नं सत्तातादात्म्यापन्नं स्वप्रकारक-
प्रतीतिविशेष्यताव्यापकभूतसंसर्गाभावप्रतियोगि दृश्यत्वात् घटवत् । अत्र प्रतियोगिता-
प्रकारताघटकसम्बन्धेन प्रकारतावच्छेदकधर्मेण चावच्छिन्ना बोध्या; तेन सम्बन्धान्तर-
धर्मान्तरावच्छिन्नाभावमादाय नार्थान्तरं, अभावश्चावच्छिन्नवृत्तिकान्यत्वेन विशेषणीयः,
तेनाव्याप्यवृत्त्यभावमादाय नार्थान्तरं, अन्योन्याभावमादायार्थान्तरवारणाय संसर्गतिः ।...
एतदेव प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं मिथ्यात्वमिति वदन्ति ।

(स्वयंप्रकाशानन्दसरस्वतीरचितं वेदान्तनयभूषणम्)

(त्र) मिथ्यात्वमपि मिथ्यैव दृश्यत्वाविशेषात् । (वेदान्तसर्वस्वसंग्रहः)

(ट) ननु मिथ्यात्वं मिथ्या न वा । आद्ये प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वप्रसंगः; तत्सत्यत्वविरोधि-
धर्मस्य मिथ्यात्वात्; द्वितीये च तस्य सत्यत्वेनाद्वैतक्षतिरिति चेन्न । मिथ्यात्वानुमानस्य स्व-
सत्तानिरूपकत्वाधिकरणे पारमार्थिकस्वात्यन्ताभावपर्यवसानेनोक्तविकल्पानवकाशात् तत्प्रति-
योगिप्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वानापाताच्च । न च मिथ्यात्वानुमितेर्मिथ्यात्वं स्वेनानुमित्यन्तरेण
वा; नायः, अभेदे विषयताऽसंभवात्, न द्वितीयः, अनुमित्यन्तरानवस्थापातादिति वाच्यम् ।
प्रपञ्चत्वसामान्यावच्छिन्नस्वरूपेणानुमितित्वविशेषावच्छिन्नरूपेण च घटस्य स्वरूपमित्यन्त्र-
वोपाधिकभेदेनैव स्वमिथ्यात्वविषयानारोपोपपत्तेरिति संक्षेपः ।

(अभिहोत्रसूरिकृता अद्वैतरत्नकोशपूरणी-तत्त्वविवेकदीपनव्याख्या)

ततश्च निर्भेदमेवात्मतत्त्वम् । ”†

(नृसिंहाश्रमविरचिता “ संक्षेपशारीरकतत्त्वबोधिनी ”)

(अ) “पूर्णानन्दचिद्धन एव स्वात्मन्यध्यस्ततयानाद्यनिर्वाच्याविद्याशक्त्या×

(ठ) ब्रह्ममात्रकार्यत्वस्य प्रपञ्चे अभ्युपगम्यमाने जडत्वस्य आकास्मिकत्वापत्तेः ।
सत्यानृतात्मकप्रपञ्चस्य सत्यानृतोपादानकत्वानियमात् । (तत्त्वपदार्थावेवेकः)

† (क) अविषयत्वात् दृशो न भेदाभावधर्मिता नापि प्रतियोगिता ।

(आनन्दानुभवरुतं इष्टसिद्धिविवरणम्)

(ख) अनुभवः सर्वत्रैक एव भवितुमर्हति स्वतः सर्वत्रैकरूपत्वेनावभासनात् आकाश-
गोत्वादिवत् ।...चिद्रूपत्वात्मनः शक्तिरपि स्वतो न भवति । (पञ्चपादिकातात्पर्यद्योतनी)

(ग) ज्ञानाभेदो विषयस्याप्यनिर्वचनीयः स्वीक्रियते संविदाभेदो रूपरोक्षता इति
ग्रंथात् तथाच ज्ञेयं ज्ञानाभिन्नं न तु ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाभिन्नं ज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वापत्तेः ।

(रघुनाथशिरोमणिरुतः खण्डनभूषणमणिः)

(घ) अथ ब्रह्मणो द्वैताभावस्य च स्वीकारात् अद्वैतव्याघात इत्याशंक्याह—सौग-
तेति । यथा सौगतप्रामाकराभ्यां अभावस्य भावादनतिरेकः स्वीकृतः, यथा च नैयायिकैरभावे
प्रध्वंसादौ अभावप्रतीतिरन्योन्याभावादौ प्रतियोगिनो यो भावस्तस्यातिरेको न स्वीकृतः
तद् यथा इह प्रध्वंसेऽन्योन्याभावो नास्ति इति तथा अस्माभिरपि द्वैताभावस्य ।

(परमानन्दरुतं खण्डनमण्डनम्—खण्डनसायटीका)

×(क) यच्च साक्षिणो निर्विशेषस्याविद्यादिसाधकत्वं न सम्भवतीति परेण प्रसंगादुक्तं;
तदसत्, परमार्थतो निर्विशेषस्यापि साक्षिणो अविद्यादिविषयत्वरूपविशेषस्यानिर्वाच्यस्यो-
पगमेन तत्संभवात् । न च सिद्धायामविद्यायां तद्विषयकत्वरूपसाक्षितासिद्धिः, सिद्धे
च साक्षिण्यविद्यासिद्धिरित्यन्योऽन्याश्रय इति वाच्यं; साक्ष्यज्ञानविषयविषयिभावानाम-
नादितया उत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ चान्योऽन्याश्रयायोगात् । न चैवमज्ञानतुल्यकालीनानामनादि-
दृश्यानामज्ञानार्थान्तरत्वे प्रमाणाभावेन तेषामनाविद्यकतया ज्ञानानुच्छेद्यत्वलक्षणपारमार्थि-
कत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यं; तज्जन्यत्वादिरूपाविद्यकत्वाभावेऽपि तदात्मकतारूपतद्भावेन पार-
मार्थिकत्वायोगात् । (शारीरकभाष्यभानुप्रभा)

(ख) ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वस्य मायानिबन्धनत्वात् मायायां चासम्भावनीयाभावाद्
विवर्तवादे च कात्स्न्यैकदेशविकल्पानवकाशात् ।... एवं च उपादानत्वे “नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्”
इति न्यायेन ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वप्रसंगापादनं प्रत्युक्तम् । रज्जुभुजंगवत् लौकिकमायाविविधसृष्ट-
गजादिवद्वा विवर्तसृष्टिस्वीकारात् सर्वदोषनिराकरणोपपत्तेः । एतेन साकल्येन परिणामे
दुग्धवत् पुनः पूर्वावस्थाऽसम्भवप्रसंग इति प्रत्युक्तम्; परिणामवादानङ्गीकारात् । ... माया-

अन्तःकरणतत्परिणामविषयभावेन वर्तमानः प्रमात्रादिभावं भजते । तत्र च अन्तःकरणपरिणामावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं घटाधिष्ठानचैतन्यस्थाज्ञान-निवृत्तिफलोत्पादनेन तत्र प्रमाणं भवति, तदेव चैतन्यं स्वरोपितस्य घटस्य प्रकाशः फलमिति च गीयते । एवं पारंपर्यक्रमेण घटव्यवहारहेतुत्वात् व्यावहारिकं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणमिति गीयते । ”

(‘ न्यायतत्त्वविवरणम् ’- बृहदारण्यकभाष्यवार्तिकव्याख्या)

(४) “ चैतन्यं ह्यन्तःकरणसाक्षिभूतं बाह्यघटावच्छिन्नं चैक-मप्यन्तःकरणावच्छेदानवच्छेदाभ्यां भिद्यते, आकाशमिव घटाद्यवच्छेदानव-च्छेदाभ्याम् ।† ततश्च चक्षुरादीन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाद्यनुसारेण अन्तःकरणं यदा वृत्तिद्वारा बाह्यघटादिना संयुज्यते तदा प्राकृतेनानवच्छिन्नमपि विषयाव-च्छिन्नं चैतन्यमवच्छिद्यत इति । एकोपाध्यवच्छेदादुपाध्यनवच्छेदप्रयुक्तो यो भेदस्तद्रहितं भवति । घटाधिष्ठानचैतन्येन च घटोऽभिन्न इत्यन्तःकरणा-वच्छिन्नचैतन्येनाप्यभिन्नो भवति । § ततोऽपरोक्षार्थविषयिण्या वृत्त्याऽपरोक्षया घटावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणं निवर्तत इत्यनावृतसंवित्तादान्म्यात् घटोऽपरोक्षो

गतानेककार्यसंस्काराणां मायामात्रत्वेनावस्थानात् मायायाश्च परमेश्वरशक्तिवागमात् शक्तिशक्तिमतोश्च भेदाभावादेकस्यैवाद्वितीयस्य ब्रह्मणः कारणत्वे न कोऽपि दोषः । यदुक्त-मुपादाननिमित्तयोः लक्षणभेदात् एकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति, तत्र ब्रूमः । न वयमुपादाननिमित्तयोरे-कत्वमभ्युपगच्छामो येन प्रसञ्जयेम विरोधम्, किन्तु एकस्योपादानत्वं निमित्तत्वं चोपाधि-भेदेनोपपादयामः; ईक्षणादिभ्यापारावच्छेदेन ब्रह्मणो निमित्तत्वं विवर्तमानमायासत्तास्फूर्ति-प्रदत्वेनोपादानत्वं चेत्यभ्युपगमे विरोधाभावात् ।

(रामतीर्थकृतं वाक्यार्थदर्पणम्-शारिरिकशास्त्रार्थसंग्रहः)

† यद्यपि वस्तुमात्रविषयमेव प्रत्यक्षं तथाप्यज्ञानोपाधिकमेव वस्तु अवभासयति निरुपाधिकवस्तुनो निरस्तनिखिलव्यवहारत्वात्, तत्र विषयविषयिभावानुपपत्तेः ।

(तत्त्वशुद्धिः)

§ घटादिचाक्षुषानन्तरं तदुपरमेव्यभानापादकावरणास्तत्वात् तदुत्तरदिनान्तरेपि घटमहं साक्षात्कारोमीति प्रतीतिवारणाय प्रमातृचैतन्ययोस्तादात्म्यलक्षणोपरागसिद्धये वृत्तिनिर्गमनकल्पनाया आवश्यकत्वात्, तथाच सति विषयतदाकारवृत्त्यो एकदेशस्थत्व-लभात् तदुभयावच्छिन्नचित्तोस्तादात्म्यसिद्धिः । (त्र्यम्बकशास्त्रिविरचितं प्रमाणतत्त्वम्)

मान्य इति प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था । ‡ अत्र च यद्यपि प्रमातृविषयादिवैतन्यमेकं तथापि घटावच्छिन्नं अज्ञातं सत् प्रमेयम्, तदेव निवृत्ताविद्यं सत् प्रमाण-
फलम्, वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नं प्रमाणम्, अन्तःकरणविशिष्टं प्रमात्रिति न प्रमाणादि-
सांकर्यम् । ”*
(नृसिंहाश्रममुनिप्रणीतं “ तत्त्वविवेकदीपनम् ”)

‡ तत्तदुपाध्यवच्छेदेनैव तदुपहिते तत्तदुपाधिप्रतिबिम्बतादान्योपगमात् न चैत्रस्य
सुखभोगदशायां मैत्रस्य अहं सुखं भुजे इति व्यवहारापत्तिः । (जीवब्रह्मैक्यम्)

* सर्वगतस्याप्यात्मनोऽविद्यावृत्तस्यान्तःकरणोपाधिनाहंकर्तृत्वप्राप्तस्येदमंशस्य परिणा-
मत्वात् अनिदमंशस्य चिद्रूपत्वाच्च परिच्छिन्नान्तःकरणोपाध्यभिब्यक्तिमपेक्ष्य विषयविशेषं
प्रति मातृसत्त्वं सिद्धम् । (प्रबोधपरिशोधिणी-पञ्चपादिकाख्याख्या)

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