लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी
L.B.S National Academy of Administration
मसूरी
MUSSOORIE
पुस्तकालय
LIBRARY
अवाप्ति संख्या
Accession No. — 100674
वर्ग संख्या
Class No. 181.4
पुस्तक संख्या
Book No. Vac

GL 181.4
VAC
100674
LBSNAA

THE BHĀMATĪ: CATUSSŪTRĪ

THE
BHĀMATĪ OF VĀCASPATI
ON
ŚAṄKARA'S BRAHMAṢUTRABHĀṢYA
(CATUSSŪTRĪ)

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

Reader in Philosophy

AND

C. KUNHAN RAJA

Reader in Sanskrit, Madras University

WITH A FOREWORD BY

SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN

THEOSOPHICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE

ADYAR, MADRAS, INDIA

1933

FOREWORD

IT is a pleasure to know that Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī* on the first four Sūtras will now be available to students of Indian Philosophy in an edition brought out in the orthodox style, with a critical introduction, Sanskrit text, English translation and notes. All those interested in Indian Philosophy will be deeply grateful to Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and Dr. C. Kunhan Raja of the Philosophy and the Sanskrit Departments of the Madras University for bringing out this very useful work. While S'aṅkara's *Bhāṣya* is fairly well known among students of Indian Thought, the later thinkers are practically neglected. Vācaspati presents one great section of Advaita Vedānta and his Bhāmatī is second in importance only to S'aṅkara's *Bhāṣya*.

The Introduction, besides dealing with the date of the work and its place in the Advaita tradition, gives a clear and careful account of the central ideas of the *Bhāmatī*: the authoritativeness of scripture and

its compatibility with reason, the nature of Avidyā and its seat, release—ultimate and relative—and Brahman and Īśvara, among others. There are side reflections on similar views in Western Thought which are always interesting. The work will not only add to the reputation of its authors but also help to popularise Vācaspati's views on Advaita Vedānta.

Andhra University, Waltair S. R.
5th May, 1933

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Foreword	v
Introduction	ix
Detailed Table of Contents	liii
Text and Translation:	
Superimposition	1
Desire to Know	63
Definition	119
Scripture-source	137
Harmony	145
Notes	247
Additional Notes	297
List of Abbreviations	313
Corrections	315

INTRODUCTION

I. DATE AND DOMICILE OF VĀCASPATI

ON the strength of a reference in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, it is now generally admitted that Ācārya Vācaspati Miśra belongs to the period round about A.D. 841-842 (898 Vikrama Era).[1] The last verse of the *Bhāmatī* refers to a king Nṛga.[2] While it is held by some that this king has not yet been identified, others[3] believe him to have been a king of Mithila, a predecessor of Nānyadeva, who reigned about 1019 Vikrama Era, *i.e.*, A.D. 962; it is said that this predecessor is named in some inscriptions as Kirātādhipati, and Kirātas are well known to be those who had human vehicles. It is in any case certain that there should have been a good interval between him and Udayana (A.D. 984) who wrote the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi*, as a sub-commentary on Vācaspati's *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*.

[1] See Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 107.

[2] Nareśvarā yaccaritā-'nukāram icchanti kartum na ca pārayanti tasmin mahīpe mahanīya-kīrtau śrīmannṛge 'kāri mayā nibandhaḥ. See also p. 481, under II, i, 33.

[3] See Mm. Dr. Ganganath Jha, Sanskrit Introduction to his edition of the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*. "Nṛga" means "one who has a human vehicle," and kirātas are well known to be such. The same writer gives many reasons, some fanciful, for holding that Vācaspati was a native of Mithila.

That our author belonged to somewhere in Behar or Bengal would appear to be evident from the repeated reference to mustard oil. It has also been said that in what corresponds to ancient Mithila there is a city called Bhāmā (Bhāmatī) and a tank of the same name.

It may be interesting to note a story current in paṇḍit-tradition about the name " Bhāmatī ". In those days (as even today in parts of Upper India), it would appear to have been customary to hold learned discussions on such occasions as marriages. Vācaspati, who listened to such a discussion on the occasion of his own marriage, was so struck by the vagaries of dialecticians that he resolved straightaway to devote himself to the task of setting forth authoritative expositions of all the darśanas. So great was his zeal, so mighty the task and such the patient and tireless devotion of his wife that the couple had grown old before Vācaspati could write finis to his labours. Then alone did Vācaspati realise the magnitude both of his neglect of his wife and of his wife's self-sacrifice ; and as a tardy measure of reparation, he gave her name to the last and greatest of his works, so that she could live on perpetually in the *Bhāmatī*, though not in the bodies of children born of her. The story is so picturesque, so typical of the scholar's neglect and the true scholarly recompense, that it deserves to be true.

II. WORKS

The works of Vācaspati are enumerated in the concluding verses of the *Bhāmatī*. They are as follows :

the *Nyāyakaṇikā* (a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka*), the *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā* (a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*), the *Tattvabindu* (a discussion of language in its relation to meaning), the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* (a commentary on Udyotakara's *Nyāyavārtika*), the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* (perhaps written as a supplement to the *Tātparyaṭīkā*), the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* (a commentary on Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā*), the *Tattvavaisāradī* (a commentary on Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya*) and the *Bhāmatī* (a commentary on Śaṅkara's Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya).[1]

The *Bhāmatī* has itself been commented on by several other works. The most notable of these is the *Vedāntakalpataru* by Amalānanda (13th Century A.D.). This work in turn formed the subject of two commentaries, the *Parimala* of Appayya Dīkṣita (16th Century A.D.) and *Ābhoga* of Lakṣmīnṛsiṃha (17th Century A.D.). The *Ābhoga* is written in the light of the *Parimala* and sometimes criticises it. Other commentaries on the *Bhāmatī* are (1) the *Bhāmatīvyākhyā* or the *Ṛjuprakāśikā* by Śrīraṅganātha otherwise known as Akhaṇḍānanda[2]; (2) the *Bhāmatītilaka*[3]; (3) and the *Bhāmatīvilāsa*.[4]

[1] All the works have been published with the exception of the *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā*, not even a manuscript of which has been found so far.

[2] This has been published in part at Calcutta by Mahāmahōpādhyāya N. S. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī.

[3] Manuscripts of this work are found in the Government Oriental Library, Madras.

[4] Mentioned by Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 108.

III. Relations to Other Writers

The name of the *Bhāmatī* is identified with one of two main streams of Śāṅkara interpretation. Vācaspati owes the major part of what is distinctive in his teaching to Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*. But as the views starting with Padmapāda are known as the tenets of the Vivaraṇa-prasthāna, the views that started with Maṇḍana passed current as the tenets of the Bhāmatī-prasthāna. Vācaspati draws largely on the *Brahmasiddhi*, and sometimes on the *Pañcapādikā*, wherever necessary or possible. Striking verbal resemblances to the former work are indicated in the notes; a few of the resemblances to the *Pañcapādikā* are noted here: bhāṣyam prasannagambhīram; (ahaṅkāra as) idam-anidam-rūpam; mithyā-śabdo 'pahnava-vacanaḥ; śarīram eva śarīrakam śarīrake bhavaḥ śārīrako jīvaḥ; bhikṣu-bhayān na sthālyā anadhiśrayaṇam; so 'yam sānti-karmaṇi vetālo 'dayaḥ; anvaya possible even without reference to asti-kriyā as in rājño 'yam puruṣaḥ.[1]

[1] The references are to pages 1, 18, 4, 40, 63, 91, and 97 of the *Pañcapādikā* (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series). The statements on pp. 63 and 91 of the *Pañcapādikā* are well-known proverbial expressions; what is striking is the use of them by both writers in the same context. The interested student will easily find the corresponding pages of the *Bhāmatī*. Some of the criticism in the *Bhāmatī* would seem to be expressly directed against the doctrines of the *Pañcapādikā*; see the *Kalpataru* on I, iii, 17 (p. 298) and on I, ii, 26 (p. 264). We owe this reference to Mr. T. R. Chintamani (*Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. III, p. 45).

IV. Śruti as Pramāṇa

For Vācaspati, as for all adherents of any orthodox school of Indian Philosophy, Revealed Scripture (Śruti) is the final authority in matters of the Spirit. The Spirit (or Intelligence, Consciousness, the Universal Self, Brahman) is that whereby knowledge is possible; it is itself knowledge. It cannot, without losing its self-hood, become an object of knowledge. It is manifest, since but for its manifestation the whole world would be blind. But it is not manifested by another, since that would lead only to an infinite series of the blind leading the blind. It is self-luminous and self-manifest. Perception, which would have no value but for the manifestation of the self-luminous intelligence in and through it, could not have that intelligence itself for its object. Much less can inference make that its sphere, since it is dependent on concomitances between the perceived. Brahman can be known only through intuition and that only by gifted and disciplined souls, whose minds have been purified by Scripture-ordained duties and concentrated on the Scripture-taught reality. Such minds will by first hearing of the only real, one without a second, reflecting on it and refuting all objections to the doctrine, contemplating the real uninterruptedly for a long time and with faith, realise Brahman. The supreme pramāṇa is Scripture, though it may and indeed has to be helped by reasoning, as an auxiliary, in order to remove the doubts that assail the mind. Such reasoning, however, is strictly

subordinated to the explication and substantiation of Scriptural truth and can in no sense be independent.

Several questions naturally arise out of this: (1) Is such an advocacy of Scripture and subordination of reason consistent with a truly philosophical attitude? (2) How can Scripture maintain non-difference to be the truth where it conflicts with perception which cognises a world of plurality and difference? When there is a conflict between the two, should not perception prevail over the other? (3) In any case, is not Scripture cutting at its own basis in denying authoritativeness to perception, since there would be no Scriptural knowledge, if words and their senses were not first perceived? (4) What is the nature of perception, if it does not cognise a world of diversity?

1. Authority is claimed by Vācaspati not for all Scripture as such, but only for purportful Scripture.[1] For, in Scripture itself there are many restatements and explanatory and eulogistic passages, which cannot claim to be authoritative, except perhaps in dependence on other passages which lay down something new and purportful. The marks determinative of purport are well known; they are: the harmony of the initial and concluding passages, repetition, novelty (*i.e.*, not being otherwise made out), fruitfulness, glorification by eulogistic passages or condemnation by deprecatory passages and intelligibility in the light of reasoning. It is clear from an application of these tests that the

[1] tātparyavatī hi s'rutiḥ pratyakṣād balavatī, na s'ruti-mātram; ananya-labyaḥ s'abdārthaḥ.

entire Scripture has non-duality for purport. The *Chāndogya* teaching, for instance, begins with premising the secondless unity of reality and goes on to identify this reality with the self of the pupil instructed, in the words "That Thou art"; the same teaching is repeated nine-fold to show that it is important and that it is the primary purport; nor is this identity something established in ordinary experience, like the heat of fire, in which case the Scriptural declaration would be a mere re-statement; it is a statement of the novel and hence is purportful; it is fruitful, since the knowledge of it helps one to pass beyond transmigration; the knowledge of it is praised suitably and its opposite is condemned; and the identity of the self with the absolute reality is also found to stand to reason.[1] Though the application of reason figures but as one of the marks of purport, it will be seen on closer examination that reason really plays a much more important part. There are disputes even as to which is the introductory passage and which the conclusion. In the vast body of knowledge called Scripture it is possible to choose a beginning anywhere and call that the introductory passage; such a choice may be found to favour a dualist rather than a non-dualist interpretation. As against this the non-dualist has to make out that all such beginnings are intermediate or secondary (avāntara), that the real beginning (paramo-'pakrama)

[1] On advaita as the purport of all Scripture, see the *Bhāmatī* on I, iii, 33 (especially, p. 343, Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri's edition); mention of creation etc. is not part of the primary intention; see II, i, 34 (p. 482).

is elsewhere, and that this favours non-dualism. Similarly of the conclusion. The interpretation of these in harmony, again, calls for the exercise of reason. And the need of reason will be similarly found in determining what is purportful repetition and what is not, in distinguishing and assigning the fruit, in the ascertainment of the really novel, and in finding out what is glorified and by which passage. So that the authoritarianism of the advaitin is unphilosophical only on the face of it, involving as it does the abundant exercise of reason. True, he says reason finds a place only in so far as it does not conflict with Scripture; but in the end, reason itself has to judge when it conflicts with Scripture and when it does not.

2. But how can Scripture over-ride perception which cognises difference as real? The assumption here is that perception is our first and basic instrument of knowledge; and what is basic may not be rejected. The advaitin replies that no doubt it is first, but it is not basic and unsublatable. Indeed, where there is sublation, it is the earlier that is sublated. The initial statement or cognition has no doubt greater value, because of its position. But there are exceptions to this rule. Where a subsequent cognition arises validly, and it cannot arise except as sublating what goes before, the earlier cognition should necessarily be taken to be sublated; for example, the cognition of nacre could not arise, if the original cognition as silver persisted; hence, the nacre-cognition is admitted to sublate the earlier silver-cognition. Thus, the priority

of perception would of itself be an argument for its sublation by the subsequently resulting Scriptural knowledge, especially when the latter arises without depending on the validity of the former. In any case, as we shall see presently, it is not true that difference is perceived.

3. But surely Scripture is dependent on perception for its very existence! Scriptural knowledge would not be possible except for the prior perception of words and their senses. The reply to this is that all that is required is the existence, the empirical reality, of words and their senses, not their absolute reality. Even in ordinary experience we derive what we treat as valid knowledge from what is not real but is superimposed. Nāga means an elephant, while naga means a tree; the difference in the length of the vowel 'a' is a property not of 'a' itself, but of the audible sound (dhvani) which manifests it; and yet the knowledge which results from this superimposed difference is not delusive. Sounds and their senses are but manifesters of knowledge which is eternal. The former need not and indeed cannot be co-eternal with the latter; so long as they exist and manifest knowledge, their function is fulfilled; an insistence on their absolute reality is vain and unreasonable.

4. Does not perception cognise difference? The answer is in the negative. What we know as determinate perception does appear no doubt to cognise difference. But this is preceded by indeterminate perception. All distinctions are introduced later into

the single positive undifferentiated continuum presented by indeterminate perception. Such perception is comparable to the state of feeling mentioned by Bradley, wherein there is a harmony of the *that* and the *what*, existence and content; it is broken up because of the very finitude of feeling.[1]

For the dialectic on difference, Vācaspati is indebted to Maṇḍana, most of whose arguments are found briefly summarised in the *Bhāmati*.[2] The principal argument, which will bear repetition here, is that difference cannot be real, since it can be neither of the nature of things nor an attribute of them. If difference were of the very nature of things, there would be no things to be different; for, whatever you may say is one thing will immediately break up, because difference is of its nature; similarly of each of its parts; you cannot rest even in the primal atom; there is nothing which can be treated as a unit and in

[1] It is also comparable to what is described in the following lines of Tennyson:

The baby new to earth and sky
What time his tender palm is prest
Against the circle of the breast
Has never thought that "This is I".
But as he grows he gathers much
And learns the use of "I" and "me"
And finds "I am not what I see
And other than the things I touch".
So rounds he to a separate mind
From whence clear memory may begin
As through the frame that binds him in
His isolation grows defined.

[2] On I, i, 4 (pp. 174-179). The notes in that connection may also be consulted.

the absence of any unit there can be no difference either. If, then, difference be said to be an attribute, is this attribute different from its substrate? If not, it is of its very nature, and we have really the former alternative alone. If the attribute is different, then we have three units on our hands, the substrate, the difference which is its attribute and the difference of the attribute from the substrate. And the moment we start inquiring into the relation of this difference to the substrate on the one hand and the attribute on the other, we are launched on an infinite regress. The notion of difference then is unintelligible, and since it pre-supposes the identity at least of a unit that is different, it is reasonable to hold that difference is superimposed on a basis of identity.

May not both identity and difference be real? Do we not indeed find this synthesis abundantly in experience? We do no doubt find their apparent synthesis in experience, but that is no justification for the uncritical acceptance of both. To say that both identity and difference are manifest cannot compel us to say that they are both real, unless all attempt at systematic thinking is to be abandoned. A crown and a bracelet, it is said, are different and yet non-different, different as products, but non-different in respect of their cause, gold. But if they are really non-different, he who wants a crown must be satisfied with the bracelet; if you say that there is difference too between crown and bracelet, then there must be difference between bracelet and gold also, since crown and gold are non-different.

And if, because of the difference between the crown and bracelet, he who wants the first does not want the second, why should it not be that he wants it too, because of their non-difference? Such in bare outline is the criticism of the view of difference *cum* non-difference (bhedā-'bheda).[1] Identity may be found only with difference, but philosophy cannot stop with juxtaposing them; either should be taken to be more fundamental than the other, and the advaitin has shown sufficient cause for not treating difference as fundamental.

What, then, is the goal of knowledge? Is it the pre-rational stage of cognition, analogous to feeling in Bradley's system? Obviously, it cannot be, for, on the pre-rational supervenes the rational, introducing its distinctions and doubts. The goal of knowledge cannot be any such unstable harmony. For him who has attained that, there is perfect peace, no more return to the relational world of diversity and distraction. The final cognition, though characterised as perceptual and indeterminate, cannot then be of the same nature as the indeterminate cognition of the child and the deaf-mute. Between the two, there are only two characteristics in common, the immediacy of cognition and its non-attributive nature. All determinate cognition is attributive; the subject is known to possess a name, a class or a quality. In the indeterminate

[1] The criticism of bhedā-'bheda occurs under I, i, 4 (pp. 175-178). Amalānanda takes it to apply to Bhāskara. The arguments are in substance identical with Maṇḍana's in the *Brahmasiddhi* pp. 63-70; and Maṇḍana is criticising Kumārila.

cognition of the child, there is no distinction of subject and predicate at all. In the final perception, we pass beyond the distinction of subject and predicate, to understand the identity underlying both, not the mere attribution of one with respect to the other. A typical cognition of this character is the recognition " This is that Devadatta ". What is asserted is not the possession of an attribute by a subject, but the identity of Devadatta seen at a different time and place with the Devadatta seen here and now. The judgment is essentially an identity judgment not an attributive one. And yet it is not bare identity that is affirmed, but identity as qualified by the differences of time and place. If the differences were really attributes of Devadatta, forming part of his essential nature, the identity would be impossible. It is therefore said that the differences of time and place are upalakṣaṇas, qualifications *per accidens*, and the identity asserted is so qualified. The difference between this and the bare identity of the pre-rational cognition consists in the stability, certitude and freedom from doubt of the former. For it has been mediated; it has passed through doubt and difference and is rich with their significance, though they themselves persist no longer, not being ultimately real. The attributive judgments of determinate cognition have fulfilled their purpose by extending, harmonising and consolidating the original datum of knowledge. What happens at the final stage is the realisation of the unity and identity of the empery of knowledge, a unity no longer liable

to disruption from within or without, as at the pre-rational level. This is the realisation of akhaṇḍārtha, the impartite sense, which is non-relational in nature (saṃsargā-'navagāhi-jñānam), not because it is infra-relational, but because it has taken up and transcended relations. Nor need one feel that difference and relations have not come in for fair play since they are treated merely as qualifications *per accidens*; for, what matters, the signification, is conserved even in the case of an upalakṣaṇa. The crow on the top of Devadatta's house serves to identify the house for him who seeks it; the identification is the significance; that is never lost, though the crow may fly away and the attribution of the crow sitting there is only a qualification *per accidens*.[1] It is easy to fall into the error of holding

[1] There is little discussion of the doctrine of akhaṇḍārtha in the *Bhāmatī* itself. But it is adverted to in the *Kalpataru*, even in the course of the first four sūtras; and the doctrine is of such vital importance to advaita that at least this passing mention has to be made. The view that the final cognition is characterised by freedom from doubt and delusion and that it is qualified *per accidens* by the differences is elaborated at great length in the *Advaitasiddhi*. Vācaspati's failure to discuss akhaṇḍārtha is susceptible of one of the following explanations. For him, as for Maṇḍana, verbal testimony is not of itself the cause of immediate knowledge. The cognition resulting from such testimony has to be contemplated with faith, unintermittently and for a long time before the final intuition results. From the sentence there results but a mediate cognition which starts the indispensable process of prasaṅkhyāna; it would therefore seem unnecessary to insist on the sentence too conveying a sense that is impartite. Another possible reason is that, unlike Maṇḍana, Vācaspati does not hold to the sphoṭa-vāda, the doctrine that meaning is one and integral and that it is but revealed gradually in the spoken letters and words. He would seem to have more sympathy with the Associationist and the Behaviourist explanations of the acquirement of meaning than with an explanation like that of the Gestalt psychologist. The juxtaposition of such a doctrine alongside that of akhaṇḍārtha would have appeared, to say the least, incongruous. It is worth noting that the doctrine

that the indeterminate cognition is the pre-rational and the pre-relational, that it is but knowledge of the bare subject without its attributes, the bare stem without its modifications. The relations and the attributes and the modification all count in the final cognition, though they cannot count as such, as independently and absolutely real.

The logical theory of Bradley and Bosanquet is generally identified with the predicative view of judgment. Judgment, according to the former, relates an ideal content to a subject in reality. The aspects of the *that* and the *what*, existence and content, exist harmoniously in feeling, but the harmony is imperfect because of the finitude of feeling. Each aspect tends to outrun or exceed the other. Thought tries to cure the defect by a homeopathic method. It accentuates the separation between the *that* and the *what*, sunders them in order to bring them together more effectively. The *that* thus sundered becomes the logical subject, while the *what* is the logical predicate. But, elsewhere, he holds that reality itself is the logical subject of every judgment. Now, obviously, reality as a whole is not a mere *that*; it is the perfect harmony of the *that* and the *what*. Nor

of akhaṇḍārtha is primarily intended to show that statements made in Scripture, despite their propositional form involving subjects, predicates and relations, make known the one and the supra-relational, not the many in relation. A question of some importance is how words in a proposition can have an identical import and yet be non-synonymous; it is discussed at some length by most advaita writers and is briefly referred to by Maṇḍana; the argument is not set out here for fear of prolixity.

is the predicate, logically considered, a mere *what*, a bare content. All this mention of sundering and homeopathic treatment seems then wide of the mark, a defect which Bradley himself recognised in the *Essays on Truth and Reality*.[1] What is characteristic of judgment is the presence of an ideal element. If reality alone were present in the judgment, there could be no judgment, since the latter is relational while the former is supra-relational. Such relations as are affirmed must be within reality. But no judgment establishing such relations alone can claim to absolute truth, since the predication in every case would be not of reality, but of what is in reality. In order to approximate to finality, then, the judgment should seek to identify the ideal with the real; the identity appears, as it were, in a relational form, that of predication. The predicate of the judgment is neither something other than the real, nor a single aspect of the real taken in abstraction from existence; it is something less than the real, in that it comprises inadequately harmonised aspects of existence and content. That judgment is most true which

[1] Reference may be made in particular to pp. 316 and 333 of the *Essays on Truth and Reality*. It is not claimed that the view here explained is expressly adopted by Bradley; but it would appear to be in consonance with his metaphysical principles, and favoured by a great part of what he says in his later writings. Of particular interest in this connection are his rejection of the doctrine of "floating ideas" and of the view that the subject is a "mere *that*". For the Bradleian view of error explained in the next paragraph, see *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd edition, pp. 193, 194, particularly the following: "We have crossed the threads of the connection between our 'whats' and our 'thats,' and have thus caused a collision, a collision which disappears when things are taken as a whole." Bradley's anyathākhyāti, like that provisionally accepted by the advaitin, is of a variety consistent with absolutism, not pluralism.

identifies with reality, as the logical subject, a predicate which requires the least amount of readjustment or supplementation. In essence, the function of the judgment is true identification, not the predication of an attribute. Such a view seems more in accord with the fundamental position of Bradley as well as his own expressed dissatisfaction with the theory of judgment formulated by him earlier. And the approximation it makes to the doctrine of akhaṇḍārtha is not without interest.

One may note in passing the Bradleian theory of error as a crossed reference and its similarity to the view of error as anyathākhyāti (apprehension as otherwise). It may be remembered that one of the examples Bradley gives of error is the judgment "Roses are green". The error is possible because of a confusion between the flower and the leaf; the leaves are green, while the flowers are red; but the greenness of the former is erroneously referred to the flowers; when our knowledge extends so as to cover both leaf and flower and becomes more precise, so that each colour is referred to its appropriate substrate, the error vanishes. The anyathākhyāti view, though attributed to the Logicians, has some popularity with Advaitins too in the explanation of sopādhika-bhrama, delusion caused by the presence of an external adjunct. For example, the white crystal seen as red is so seen because the redness of the flower in proximity to it is erroneously referred to it. And the white shell is seen to be yellow, because in the jaundiced person, bile goes forth with

the rays of light from the eyes; and the yellowness of the bile is erroneously referred to the object apprehended by those rays of light. This view is so much to the fore in Vācaspati's account of super-imposition that he seems to be a supporter of anyathākhyāti. And Amalānanda has to rescue him from this charge by pointing to the explanation of the mirage, where at least we have not a crossed reference, but a pure creation which is not determinable as either real or unreal.[1]

V. Primal Nescience

The stream of indeterminable superimpositions is beginningless, so that it is reasonable to look for the cause of each superimposition in an earlier superimposition.[2] But there must be a fundamental vice, an original sin, which is responsible for the superimpositions of the diverse and the relational on the one and the supra-relational. Granted relationing, we can understand the dependence of one relation on another; granted particulars, we can understand their causal dependence. Back of the relations there is a relationing; back of the particulars there is a particularising. This original sin is primal nescience, the ignorance that is the cause (mūlā-'vidyā or kāraṇā-'vidyā). Dependent on this

[1] svarūpeṇa marīcyambho mṛṣā vācaspater matam
anyathākhyātir iṣṭā 'sye' ty anyathā jagṛhur janāḥ.
—*Kalpataru*, p. 24.

[2] In this Vācaspati differs from Padmapāda, who would go straightaway to primal nescience as the cause of all superimpositions.

are derivative ignorances (tūlā-'vidyās or kāryā-'vidyās); and individual delusions are products of these. These delusions are sublatable by other appearances of the same grade of reality as themselves; the cognition of a stick may take the place of the cognition of a snake, where in truth there is neither stick nor snake. Derivative ignorances are sublatable by cognition of the objects to which they relate; ignorance about nacre is removable by knowledge of nacre; primal nescience is removable by knowledge of the supreme reality alone; hence it persists up to the realisation of Brahman. Particularising ceases only with true knowledge, the knowledge of the universal, which is, not outside of, but above particulars.

Two difficulties at least may be raised to the conception of mūlā-'vidyā. The brilliant dialectic of advaitins like Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara has shown the unintelligibility of the causal concept. It is not ultimately real. It obtains, if at all, only in the world of appearance. *In* the phenomenal world of particulars, then, one may be excused for looking to one particular as the cause or effect of another. But what is the sense of asking for a cause *of* the phenomenal world and postulating primal nescience as that cause? Are we not committing the same fallacy as Kant, who, after confining the applicability of the causal concept to phenomena, proceeded solemnly to affirm things-in-themselves as the causes of phenomena? The difficulty so presented appears serious enough. But this at least should make us pause before we condemn the doctrine;

the cause suggested is not trans-phenomenal, but is itself phenomenal. It is not suggested that nescience is noumenal, while its consequences and products are phenomenal, though degrees of unreality are recognised between the cause and the products, these degrees being distinguished, as stated earlier, according to the nature of the means required for sublation. In setting up the alleged causal relation, then, we are dealing with terms, both of which are phenomenal and therefore susceptible of the said relation. Further, the causal relationship as between tūlā-'vidyā and its products is not of the same kind as that suggested between mūlā-'vidyā and the tūlā-'vidyās. It is not suggested that mūlā-'vidyā is a cause in time, so much as the logical ground of the tūlā-'vidyās, for the latter too are said to be beginningless (anādi). Such a relationship is not inconsistent even with the possession of a higher grade of reality by primal nescience; for, is not Brahman the substrate of the entire world-appearance? and is not Brahman the absolute real? The relational world is the world of appearance. It has as its ground the non-relational; but it may also be said to have relating as its more proximate ground. The advaitin believes and rightly believes in progressive development of knowledge. He would concede the doctrine that the effect is pre-existent in the cause, in order to lead the pupil on to deny the separate existence of the effect from the cause. He would concede the doctrine of the concrete universal transforming itself into the particulars, in order to lead the pupil to conceive this transformation as nothing but

an illusory manifestation.[1] He would concede the causing of delusions by a primal nescience in order to lead the pupil to reject finally the concept of cause. The distinction between causal and effected nescience is but relative and there are not sufficient reasons to disagree with it or reject it.

Another and a more serious objection is based on the popular conception of ignorance as mere absence of knowledge. For the traditional advaitin,[2] nescience or ignorance is a positive entity, not a mere negation. And this would well accord with the positive nature of error, which consists not in the mere absence of knowledge, but in the positive assertion of something else as knowledge. It may be thought that it should be a non-dualist's business to reduce the number of entities to one; but this is a misconception. Reality for him is one; but its unity does not conflict with the plurality of phenomenal existents; and it has never been contended that nescience, though primal, is anything but phenomenal. Nor may it be said that in any case there is no justification for ascribing a positive character to what is primarily, if not wholly, negative. For, if ignorance were wholly negative, it could not even be known to exist. Perception would not apply thereto, since what is perceived should be in sense-contact, and a mere negation cannot be in contact with the senses or with anything else. Nor can absence of knowledge

[1] vivarta-vādasya hi pūrva-bhūmir
vedānta-vāde pariṇāma-vādaḥ. (*Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, II, 61.)

[2] *Pace* Y. Subba Rao: *Mūlā-'vidyā-nirāsa.*

be perceived as an attribute of the self, since an attribute can be perceived only in the case of a substrate that is in the sphere of perception; but the self is not in the sphere of perception. Inference, even if it could apply, would give only mediate knowledge, whereas our experience of ignorance is immediate, in the form "I did not know nacre; but now I know" and so on; there is the further difficulty that, being based on perceived concomitance, inference is not possible, where perception is wholly ruled out. Nor is recourse possible to the pramāṇa called non-cognition (anupalabdhi); for, non-cognition again can give only mediate knowledge; further, the self being incapable of perception, its attribute too cannot be perceived, while non-cognition applies only to that of which perception (or some other means of cognition) is possible; truly, there is no cognition of non-existence, except where the substrate of non-existence is capable of being perceived. But we do have experience both of ignorance and of its removal by knowledge. Hence, ignorance (or nescience) is both positive,[1] and indeterminable, even like nacre-silver.

VI. Plurality and Location of Nescience

A distinctive feature of Vācaspati's advaita is the recognition of a plurality of nesciences. If the

[1] Vācaspati's recognition of the two avidyās is apparent from the very first line of his invocatory verse. There is no specific defence of the conception of mūlā-'vidyā. Some of the arguments here mentioned are based on the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, copies of the proofs of which were very kindly supplied by the editor, Mr. M. Hiriyanna (see particularly pp. 65, 66).

world be admitted to be a product of nescience, when nescience is destroyed on the release of a single jīva the world should be destroyed for all other jīvas as well; and there should be no distinction between the bound and the released. One way out of the difficulty would be to affirm the existence of one jīva alone, all other jīvas, the differences of teacher and taught, bound and released, being all alike comparable to the dreams of the single jīva; this jīva has not yet been released; when he is released, the world too would of course cease to exist. But such radical solipsism is unacceptable to the majority of advaitins, who hold that the distinction between the bound and the released may not be ignored, since Scripture declares that certain souls have been released and disbelief in Scripture in such a vital matter as release would necessarily lead to the discrediting of Scripture as such. A plurality of jīvas must be conceded. Our experience even of our finite self-hood is through contact and conflict with other selves. These are no doubt looked upon by the sophisticated mind as mere not-self or inert matter; but primarily the conflict and the contrast is with other selves. That is why the Bhagavatpāda, in speaking of the reciprocal superimposition of the self and the not-self, refers to the latter as the concept "Thou," though one would have expected the author to refer to it as "It" or "That". Vācaspati's own non-dualism will be found to approximate very closely to Berkeleyan idealism, though, perhaps, not to solipsism; and the parallel

will be found to be all the closer in that both the writers insist on the existence of God and of a plurality of spirits, however much that may seem to be in conflict with the idealism they profess. And in so far as he insists on the reality of other spirits, and of our duties and obligations in relation to them up to the stage of final realisation, Vācaspati's doctrine (as also that of Maṇḍana from whom it is derived) should be characterised as realistic rather than idealistic.[1] The stream that culminates in the solipsism of Prakāś'ānanda[2] does not have its source in Maṇḍana or Vācaspati; its more likely source is the view that Brahman is both the locus and the content of nescience, which is but single, and that it is Brahman who through its own nescience seems bound as it were and through its own knowledge seems to be released as it were.[3]

[1] In a sense, all advaita is idealistic, in that the material world cannot have absolute and independent reality, on any variety of advaita. If such a world existed, its very existence could not be known. In the last resort, knowledge is possible only because the self is self-luminous and the self *is* knowledge. If *things* are known, it must be because they are not really other than the self, being super-imposed thereon; see the *saṃvid-bhāmatī*, pp. 34-38; also the *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 7; ekatva evā'yam draṣṭṛ-dṛś'ya-bhāvo 'vakalpate, draṣṭur eva cidātmanaḥ tathā tathā vipariṇāmād vivartanād vā; nānātve tu vivikta-svabhāvayor asaṃsṛṣṭa-paras-para-svarūpayor asambaddhayoḥ kīdṛś'o draṣṭṛ-dṛś'ya-bhāvaḥ?

[2] The author of the *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, the outstanding representative of Vedānta Solipsism or Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi-vāda, the view that perception of things is either the creation of them or is simultaneous with their creation; the latter view seems to have been favoured by Prakāś'ānanda.

[3] Such a view is more in accord with the teaching of Sures'vara, wrongly identified with Maṇḍana. Sures'vara was an immediate disciple of S'aṅkara.

Of the nesciences that constitute the world there should then be as many as there are jīvas. When a particular jīva attains knowledge, his nescience is destroyed and for him the world ceases to be. Other nesciences, however, continue to exist and to bind the souls yet unreleased. It may be possible to explain the distinction on the basis of different capacities (śaktis) possessed by a single nescience. Nescience binds every jīva because in respect of each jīva it has a different capacity to bind; and when a particular jīva is released, that particular capacity is lost, though nescience itself persists for other jīvas. Though such an explanation is plausible, the unity of avidyā is a needless complication. It is said for instance that, though the pain in the foot is not a pain in the hand, the hand reaches forth to pluck the thorn from the foot, because both hand and foot are members of a single organism and thus there is community of feeling. There is no such community of feeling between different individuals since there is no common organism of which they are members. That is why Caitra does not feel Maitra's pain as his own. If the different experiences of Caitra and Maitra were, however, products of a single avidyā, this may discharge the functions of a common organism; and it would be difficult to explain why Caitra does not recall Maitra's pain as if it were his own.[1]

[1] This is a development of the advaitin's explanation of non-recollection (ananusandhāna). It must be confessed that that explanation does not appear to be thorough-going, as it apparently ignores the fact of individuals being members of social and other organisms and thereby sharing each other's joys and sorrows.

The ignorances thus assumed must be located in the jīvas. Brahman who is pure and perfect cannot obviously be the locus of defect; and avidyā, the material cause of all defects, is itself the greatest defect. Apart from this, it is the jīva that is instructed, that strives and acquires the knowledge which destroys nescience. But there can be no relation of destroyer and destroyed except as between what occupy the same locus. The poison drunk by Caitra will not remove the life of Maitra. Hence, nescience must have the same locus as the knowledge which destroys it, *i.e.*, the jīva. But it may be objected that the finitude, transmigration and suffering of the jīva, all that constitute his jīva-hood in short, are the products of nescience; there would be no jīva except as the product of nescience; how then can nescience itself reside in the jīva? The attempted charge of reciprocal dependence will not stand, for the interaction of ignorance and jīva-hood is beginningless. We do not say at any time that ignorance was and the jīva was not, or that the jīva was and ignorance was not. If it be still urged that such dependence is in the last resort unintelligible, we counter it with the question, "why expect intelligibility in the case of nescience?" It is of the very essence of nescience to be unintelligible in the last resort: tad evā 'vidyānām avidyātvam.

VII. Īśvara and the Creation of the World

There being a plurality of nesciences, granted that nescience is the material cause of the world, there

are bound to be a plurality of worlds. In conserving the authoritativeness of Scripture, we seem to have sacrificed the claims of empirical usage, which demands a single world common to all souls. The latter demand is, however, not imperative, since all that is needed is no more than the measure of agreement that exists among the different spectators of an illusion. When the rope is seen to be a snake, as it were, by a number of people, the agreement among them does not prove the existence of a single objective snake. What does exist without happens to be interpreted by all of them in the same manner; if the snake existed objectively it should not be possible for some people to mistake it for a garland. The objectivity of the world, then, is no more than the consilience of illusions.

What happens, then, to the view accepted by the Vedānta that God is the Creator of the Universe? Each jīva would appear to be the creator of his world, through and out of the nescience abiding in him; the world is sustained by his nescience, and is destroyed with its destruction. The true creator, sustainer and destroyer would thus appear to be the jīva himself. If the world be considered to be created by a God, that could be no more than an illusion, on a par with the world-illusion itself. The Creator and His Creatorship would both be figments of the creature's imagination. The jīva is enthroned on high and God apparently reduced to nothing. But such a conclusion can hardly be consistent with the true trend of advaita. It is true that for this system even Īśvara is not

ultimate; endow Him as we may with the utmost knowledge and power, He still falls short of perfection, since the Perfect is beyond all attributes; greatness is significant only in relation to smallness, while the Absolute is neither great nor small and is above relative predications. All this, however, is very different from the position that Īśvara is a figment of the jīva's nescience. On the face of it, Vācaspati would seem to be more idealistic than Berkeley, who conserved the independent reality of God along with that of other souls. And this is all the more difficult to comprehend in the case of Vācaspati, who begins his work with due invocation to Bhava, Kārtikeya and Gaṇapati, and throughout his work betrays little trace of the atheism that is his apparent conclusion. There is no doubt, however, that the possibility of an atheistic conclusion must have struck many of his critics, as the author of the *Kalpataru* is anxious to make out repeatedly that Vācaspati does recognise Īśvara and that they are fools who say there is no place for Īśvara in his system. The truth of the matter seems to be this. Ignorance is bi-polar. It is located somewhere, *i.e.*, it belongs to some one; and it has a content. Though the jīva is the locus, the content is Īśvara. When ordinarily we use the possessive pronoun 'mine' or 'his,' we imply in the person capacity to control what is referred to. Not so in the case of ignorance; I mean by "my ignorance" the ignorance that is in me, not the ignorance that I can control. The control of avidyā belongs not to me with

my limited powers of knowing and acting, but to the omniscient and omnipotent Being. Īśvara too may be said to be the āśraya of ignorance, if by āśraya is meant the content, but not its locus (ādhāra). When, therefore, it is said that my ignorance creates the universe, it does not follow that I create the universe; rather does it mean that Īśvara, the content of my ignorance, uses the ignorance that is in me and out of that as material cause, evolves the world; the ignorance in me, the māyā, the prakṛti is the primal material cause; he who wields it for fashioning the world, the māyin, the arch-juggler, is Īśvara.[1]

At no time then do we have Īśvara without the jīvas or the jīvas without Īśvara.[2] Ignorance is the condition of the existence of both. And when there is ignorance, it must exist somewhere and it must have a content. When this polarity of ignorance is resolved, ignorance itself is transcended and Brahmanhood fully realised. But when ignorance exists, Īśvara is the image which is reflected, as it were, in the various nesciences. The reflections are the jīvas. Vācaspati does not hold that the jīvas are literally reflections,

[1] We are indebted to Mahāmahōpādhyāya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Śāstriar, M.A., I.E.S., for considerable help in understanding this part of the doctrine. See further on the same topic, Mahāmahōpādhyāya N. S. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri's commentary on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, first edition, Calcutta, pp. 2-3. Reference may be made to the *Kalpataru*, particularly p. 404.

[2] Cp. "The personal God of India, Īśvara, issues from the Brahman simultaneously with the ātman, the soul, and both appear together as simultaneous and mutually determined occurrences. It is the same in Eckhart's teaching. Only with and for the soul, with and for the creature, is God, God as person, as subject, and as conscious of objects."—R. OTTO, *Mysticism East and West*, p. 14.

since there can be reflection only of what is visible and in what is visible; and neither Brahman nor avidyā can be said to possess visible form. But he has no objection to using the *analogy* of reflection extensively. The diversities of jīvas are compared to the diversities of the reflections of one face in different media, such as a gem, a sword, a mirror. Vācaspati's own conception of the relation of the jīva to Brahman is that of finitisation of the infinite. Ether is infinite and all-pervasive; but it seems to be confined in a pot as it were; and when the pot is moved, though the pot alone is moved, there seems to be a motion of the ether in it as well. In the same way Universal Spirit defined by the internal organ etc., is the jīva; when the defining adjuncts are got rid of, there is no longer any difference between the jīva and Brahman. The finitising is bi-polar; at one pole stands Īśvara and at the other the jīva. It is not that Brahman is first reflected as Īśvara and that the jīvas are reflections of this reflection, or that Īśvara is a reflection in one medium and the jīvas reflections in another medium.[1]

[1] Vācaspati's position in this question of whether the jīva is an avaccheda or a pratibimba is discussed fully by Appayya Dīkṣita in the *Parimala*, at the close of I, i, 4, where he shows that Vācaspati favours the avaccheda-vāda. Some advaitins hold that māyā is different from avidyās, that the former is collective and single while the latter are diverse, or that in the former the sattva constituent is pure, while in the latter it is impure; and they say that Īśvara is the reflection of Brahman in māyā, while the jīvas are the reflections of Brahman in avidyā. Such a view makes Īśvara very remote and leaves Him little in common with the jīvas. For the various views, see the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, 1st pariccheda, pp. 66-104 (Kumbakonam edition).

VIII. Ritual and Release

Transmigration and its woes being due to nescience, the one way to get rid of them is knowledge, which destroys nescience. But knowledge does not come to all. The ground must be prepared, the mind cleared and the heart made pure for the reception of the truth. Herein lies the use of ritual, the due performance of which purifies the intellect and brings about the desire to know. The fruit of action is non-eternal; hence release can never be attained through ritual. But the desire to know can be brought about through engaging in ritual and this in due course fulfils itself through knowledge and release. It is then as little true that karma has nothing to do with release as that it can of itself bring about release. It is a remote auxiliary (ārādupakāraka) and as such requires to be duly observed in season.[1]

IX. The Final Intuition

When the desire to know has been awakened, one hears the highest truths from the Vedānta, reflects on them, reasons about them, refutes all objections to them, and, being finally satisfied about them, begins to contemplate the supreme Brahman that they teach. By uninterrupted meditation practised with devotion for a long time, the seeker of Brahman attains Brahman;

[1] The Vivaraṇakāra holds that rituals are contributory to knowledge itself and not merely to the desire to know. See the *Siddhāntalesasaṅgraha*, 3rd pariccheda, pp. 350-356.

he obtains, that is to say, an intuition of the one Supreme Intelligence, that is beyond all duality and misery. With that intuition are destroyed nescience and its products; and spirit stands forth having attained the release that was its own essential nature and only seemed to be non-existent, as it were, like the chain round one's own neck, which one forgets and keeps looking for. The intuition is an act of immediate cognition; for, ignorance that is experienced as immediate can be removed only by knowledge which is also immediate; otherwise, it would be like the case of the fever patient who continues to find sugar bitter, though told it is not so and though himself knowing it is not so. Immediate cognition requires the functioning of a sense-organ, here the mind, the organ of internal sense. And this mental perception is made possible only by long-continued contemplation (prasaṅkhyāna) as in the lover's perception of the long-lost damsel, whom he constantly comtemplates. The latter is, of course, a delusion; but the intuition of Brahman cannot be delusive, for Brahman is taught by Scripture, which is free from defect and cannot mislead; further, Brahman is *ex hypothesi* all that is; it cannot but exist; and it is identical with the jīva whose existence cannot be doubted; whence then the possibility of delusion?[1]

[1] It is held by some that immediate cognition may result even from verbal testimony without the functioning of a sense-organ, internal or external, and that the mind in any case is not a sense-organ. This view is mentioned in the notes, together with Amalānanda's criticism thereof. The view that verbal

The final intuition is of the conditioned Brahman, not of the Absolute; for there is still the distinction of subject and object. It is analogous to the absolute truth of Bradley, which, he says, is absolute, only because it is intellectually incorrigible. Of the final intuition too it is true that nothing further is needed to correct it. It destroys the entire world of duality and destroys itself with it. When the powder of the clearing nut is mixed with muddy water to precipitate the mud, that powder itself does not require another precipitant.

X. JĪVANMUKTI

When nescience is destroyed by knowledge, it stands to reason that release is attained straightaway. And this would seem to have the approval of Scripture, which says that, for him who has seen, all karmas (in the plural, not in the dual) cease; prārabdha karma, that which has begun to fructify already, does not seem to be exempted from destruction. When a person attains knowledge, he should become disembodied too. But the position is by no means so simple as that. For one thing, there are Scriptural texts which definitely prescribe physical death as the limit after

testimony is not of itself the cause of immediate cognition is part of Vācaspati's heritage from Maṇḍana. For the other view, see the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 122, the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 39-41, and the *Siddhāntalesasaṅgraha*, 3rd pariccheda, pp. 396-398; the consequential discussion as to how verbal testimony can cause immediate cognition goes on from p. 399 to p. 414.

which alone there is release,[1] or speak of the final release on death of those who have already been released in effect.[2] Embodiment may, then, continue even after the onset of knowledge. Prārabdha karma is like a missile that has begun to take flight; it will drop only when its force is fully spent; when that happens, the body, which is constituted for the enjoyment of that karma, perishes as well, and there is final release. But there is no diminution in the knowledge that has been realised. And there is this advantage in such persons continuing to be embodied, in that they serve as preceptors. None who is yet short of perfect knowledge can be a preceptor of non-dualism; and if he who has attained such knowledge should be disembodied at the same time, there would be no preceptors at all. The texts which speak of release immediately on the onset of knowledge signify but the close proximity of final release, if by such release we mean release from prārabdha karma and its product, the present body. But it is possible to be released even while in the state of embodiment, in the sense that for such a person there is no more knowledge to be acquired; much less is there anything to be done by him. Such a knower may indeed say on the strength of his experience that he is released, though he continues to appear in the body. As Śaṅkara says:

[1] tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimokṣye atha sampatsye.

[2] vimuktaś ca vimucyate.
tasyā 'bhidhyānād yojanāt tattva-bhāvāt bhūyaś cā 'nte viśva-māyā-nivṛttiḥ.

"It should not be disputed whether the Brahman-knower is embodied for a time or is not embodied. How can one's own intimate experience of Brahman-knowledge existing together with embodiment be denied by another?[1]

The position is attractive but hardly clear from the logical point of view. If really there is the persistence of a part or trace of avidyā, (and that is what the continuance of prārabdha karma means), what is the justification for speaking of that state as one of release? Where nescience continues, how can there be perfect knowledge? To appeal to "one's own intimate experience" is only to abandon the test of reason, so vigorously insisted on so long, side by side with the appeal to Scripture. The doctrine of Jīvan-mukti does not therefore commend itself to a logical mind like that of Maṇḍana.[2] But his own position is not very clear. On

[1] Bhāṣya on IV, i, 15.

[2] See the *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 129-133. It is possible to make out that Maṇḍana holds to one consistent view on this question, that there is final release only on the dissolution of the body, that though knowledge is attained and avidyā destroyed at an earlier stage we have still an adept alone, not a perfected being, that, in short, there is no Jīvan-mukti. Such an attempt has the merit of simplifying Maṇḍana's position, while being on the whole faithful to it; but it does not free him from the inconsistency of holding that though avidyā is destroyed its saṃskāra persists. Maṇḍana argues that because of the use of the plural "karmāṇi" (in "kṣīyante cā 'sya karmāṇi") even prārabdha karma should be taken to be destroyed with the onset of knowledge. If that too is destroyed, how can the body persist? If it be said to persist because of saṃskāra, while saṃskāra is admitted to be akiñcitkara and to have no power to bind, why then should it be said that the sthita-prajña is only a sādhaka, not a siddha? Either avidyā persists, in which case the so-called Jīvan-mukta is only a sādhaka, or it does not persist, in

the one hand, he would make out that release comes only with physical death, and that the descriptions in Scripture and traditional lore of those who have passed beyond the guṇas or are well established in wisdom refer to the seeker not the sage, the devotee not the perfected one. On the other hand, however, he seems to admit the possibility of the body continuing for a time even after release, not because of a part of avidyā, but because of the impression (saṃskāra) of avidyā, *i.e.*, what is left over of its original momentum. Avidyā, he says, has the power to bind, not so its bare impression. He, who knows that the image in the mirror is a bare reflection characterised by the defects of the mirror, no longer worries about the defects in the reflection, though by the strength of impression he continues to see the face in that way. To the question whether the released one continues to be embodied, Maṇḍana would thus seem to give two inconsistent answers—one negativing embodiment and another permitting it, but as caused by the impression of nescience, not by nescience itself. And to either position grave objections may be raised.

The description of him who is well established in knowledge (sthitaprajña)[1] cannot apply to a mere adept; for, the latter is still proceeding from stage to

which case he is a siddha. Maṇḍana seeks to avoid both positions, and the result seems to be neither happy nor consistent; but Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, the learned editor of the *Brahmasiddhi*, seems to be of a different opinion.

[1] The reference is to the description in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, II, 55-61.

stage of contemplation gaining increased firmness at every stage ; he whose knowledge can thus be surpassed by himself cannot be said to be well established. And no one in such a state of growth can be a preceptor of non-dualism. If, on the other hand, it be said that the preceptor is the man of perfect knowledge, who yet continues to be embodied, the difference between us extends only to the cause of such embodiment and your explanation is no better than mine. What is saṃskāra itself but a trace of avidyā ? There is no impression except as produced by some cause ; and when the whole notion of cause and effect has been realised to be illusory, how can there be the persistence of an effect ? If you say the impression is such that it cannot bind, we say the same of the trace of nescience whose persistence we recognise. We say that when there is perfect knowledge, prārabdha karma can only work itself out and not avail to create any fresh karma or other bondage.

One would seem compelled, therefore, to rest with this unsolved contradiction of the co-existence of bondage and release in the Jīvan-mukta. And this is the position of most advaitins. It is permissible, however, to speculate on a possible solution of the contradiction. The preceptor is he whom the pupil may legitimately regard as qualified to be such, not necessarily he who proclaims himself to be such. When such a person attains perfect knowledge, it may be that he, as an individual, is at that very time released. For him there is neither a trace of ignorance nor the

impression of ignorance. The psycho-physical configuration, however, which was spoken of as his body, may continue to exist and function for a while, shorter or longer, according to the extent of the momentum still left in it. The saṃskāra of avidyā does exist, but for the body, not for the released spirit. It is this configuration which is spoken of as alive; it is that which is looked up to as the preceptor; it is on the dissolution of that that one speaks of the final release of that jīva. It may, however, be asked legitimately how the inert psycho-physical organism can function in the absence of intelligent guidance. If there is such guidance, is it not provided by the soul whose release is under discussion? If it does provide such guidance, how can we claim to be out of our original difficulty as to the co-existence of bondage and release? The answer we suggest is that there may be intelligent guidance; but the guidance is not by the particular soul, as particular; it is by Īśvara with whom the released soul has become one. Īśvara can and does express Himself through all manner of media for showing His Grace to suffering humanity. What more natural than that He should employ this psycho-physical organism which by due discipline and austerities has been perfected as far as it may be?

But with this we pass on to the further question as to the nature of release. If the jīva is a finitisation of Brahman, with the cessation of the adjuncts and of the process of finitisation, one should expect the jīva to become identical with Brahman. And this indeed

seems to be what the Scriptures teach when they say that he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself. But if it is true that the finitisation is bi-polar, that Iś'vara at one pole is related to the jīvas at the other, as if they were reflections of Himself, that the reflection is in the different nesciences each of which is located in a different jīva, it seems difficult for the jīva to become identical with Brahman, when a particular adjunct is removed. When a face is reflected in a number of mirrors, on the removal of a particular mirror, the reflection therein becomes identical with the face-as-reflected not with the face-in-itself. The latter identity can come about only when all mirrors are removed, when there is no further possibility of reflection. Similarly the attainment of Brahmanhood may result only when all nesciences are removed, that is to say, when all jīvas are released. Up to that time, release can consist only in identification with Iś'vara.[1] Hence it is not impossible that on the release of any particular jīva, Iś'vara with whom that jīva has become identical may actuate for a time the psycho-physical organism which persists for a while because of the

[1] The notion of release as attainment of identity with Iś'vara is dealt with at great length by Appayya Dīkṣita in the concluding pages of the *Siddhāntales'asaṅgraha*, as well as in the *S'ivādvaita-nirṇaya*, sections, 3·2351 to 3·2355. The attainment of identity with pure Brahman can be only on the final release of all. The notion of sarvamukti (release of all) is not elaborated anywhere by Vācaspati, but he does refer to it in the commentary, on II, iii, 40 (p. 617). It is legitimate to infer that the whole superstructure raised by Appayya is not untrue to the foundations in Vācaspati's own teaching. That S'aṅkara himself countenanced such a view is very plausibly made out by Appayya.

strength of its initial momentum. But if avidyā has ceased to exist for the released soul, how can it exist for Īs'vara? The reply is that our conception of Īs'vara is of a pure being standing over against nescience, not bound by it, but certainly limited by it, while yet controlling it. This nescience is in truth neither real nor unreal, being indeterminable. But *as we conceive the Lord*, He is certainly limited by nescience, though when we become the Lord, on release, it will not be experienced as a limitation. The advaitin's ideal thus conceived cannot breed self-sufficiency; for, salvation is possible for all, and till that consummation is attained, the world-process consisting in the elaboration and manifestation of nescience will not cease; till the final release of all, therefore, release can at best be identity with God, who, for all his omniscience and omnipotence, is yet limited. Nor is the identification with Īs'vara the same as the attainment of lordly powers said to be possible by the contemplation of Brahman in one or other of the saguṇa forms. The latter leads not to absolute lordship but only to the ability to create what is required for one's own enjoyment in heaven. There is no destruction of nescience, and consequently the lordly powers so acquired may be exhausted by exercise, so that a return to the original unlordly condition becomes possible. He who has realised non-duality, however, becomes fully and wholly identical with Īs'vara. He has not only the power to create but also the responsibility to rule and the duty to destroy. For him there is no

more Nescience; hence the declaration of non-return to saṃsāra.

The thoughtful student of Vācaspati may, perhaps, find little that is original in him. For the distinctive aspects of his teaching, he owes much, as has been said, to Maṇḍana. Where he differs from Maṇḍana, he elects to follow Śaṅkara, not, perhaps always wisely.[1] But there have been very few to excel or rival Vācaspati in the versatility and the extent of his scholarship, his vigour of style and clarity of presentation. The thoughts that so far we have been able to trace to Maṇḍana would have remained little known and barren but for Vācaspati's linking them up with Śaṅkara's teaching. About Maṇḍana's own advaita doctrines, there has been as much uncertainty and speculation as about his personality, in spite of scraps of information vouchsafed here and there in the course of commentaries on other works. If the publication of the *Brahmasiddhi* makes us realise Vācaspati's indebtedness to Maṇḍana, it makes no less clear our own indebtedness to Vācaspati for popularising and keeping alive such a unique line of non-dualist doctrine.

[1] For example, in the criticism of sphoṭa-vāda. On this subject see article on "Vācaspati's criticism of the sphoṭa-vāda," *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, VI, p. 311.

For the study of the *Bhāmatī* in the first instance one of the editors—Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri—had the able guidance of Vedānta Viśārada Paṇḍit K. A. Lakshmana Sastri of the Sanskrit College, Mylapore; the same scholar was of considerable help in going through the *Kalpataru* and the *Ṛjuprakāśikā*; and the editors' grateful thanks are due to him in full measure. For the book as a whole both the editors are responsible; but the translation of the *Bhāṣya* was done in the first instance by Dr. Kunhan Raja, while the rest was primarily the work of the other editor.[1] Both in manuscript and in proof the book has had the advantage of suggestions and criticisms from several scholars, particularly, Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Darśanakalānidhi Kulapati S. Kuppuswami Sastri of the Presidency College; to him we owe a great debt for the kind permission to use the *Brahmasiddhi* in proof and for the trouble he took to free the translation from inaccuracies as far as possible; our thanks are also due to Professor K. A. Nilakanta Sastri of the University of Madras, and Professors P. Narasimham and P. P. S. Sastri of the Presidency College, Madras. To these as well as to Sir S. Radhakrishnan, who has been so good as to contribute a Foreword, we take this opportunity of expressing our deep sense of gratitude. The *Bhāmatī* is admittedly a difficult work; and a translation for the first time is almost necessarily tentative

[1] For the text, the Vani Vilas edition of the Catussūtrī Bhāmatī has been followed for the most part.

and imperfect; despite reasonable care in the first instance, we have had to introduce several alterations and additional explanatory notes. The readers' attention is requested to these in making use of the text and translation. We are thankful to the Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, for undertaking the publication, and to the Vasanta Press for finishing the work so well.

DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS

[*N.B.* The summary in italics relates to the *Bhāṣya*, and the rest to the *Bhāmatī*; the arabic numerals in brackets give the pages.]

A. SUPERIMPOSITION

I. *Existence of Superimposition* (1).

Invocation (2); Objections to the study: content already known (3); unfruitfulness (4); interpretation of the first section of the Bhāṣya (5); reply to the first objection: true nature of the self is not known (7); scriptural declarations of the true nature of the self are purportful, not secondary or figurative (8); it is valid though opposed to perception, since empirical validity of the latter is not annulled (8); priority of perception not a ground for non-sublation; the apaccheda-nyāya (9); empirical cognition of the self is untrue (9); the word "self" is used not secondarily of the body; conditions of secondary usage (10); self-identity known to the inquirer, not to the man in the street (11); the self is not finite like the body (11); the concept 'I' illusory even for the vijñāna-vādin (12); it is due to reciprocal super-imposition of substrates and of attributes (13); illusory cognition is its cause and empirical usage its fruit (13); non-discrimination as the cause of illusory cognition (14); objection that there are not two realities; reply—"coupling the true with the untrue"

(14); beginninglessness of super-imposition (15); objection: if bodies etc., are manifest they are real; if not, there can be no coupling (15); reply (16).

II. *Definition of Superimposition* (16).

Explanation of the definition (17); the definition is neither too wide (17); nor too narrow(18); explanation of the superimpositions of yellow shell, the reflected face (18); manifestation alone does not constitute reality (19); even of the unreal there can be manifestation (19); the Mīmāṃsaka view of non-existence as another mode of existence and the criticism of the Buddhist view that cognitions cause the appearance of the unreal (20); cognition can neither be determined by nor invariably linked with the unreal (21); reply to the Mīmāṃsakas (21, 22); the superimposed is *like* what was formerly seen (22); but really it is indeterminable (23); the purity etc., and reality of the intelligent self (23); different views of superimposition: ātmakhyāti (23, 24); criticism of above by akhyātivādin (25); his criticism of the view that the superimposed is created (25, 26); his view that all cognitions are valid (26); that delusion is but non-apprehension of the distinction between the directly apprehended and the remembered (26, 27); the anyathākhyātivādin—his criticism of akhyāti (28, 29, 30); his view of super-imposition (30, 31, 32); indeterminability recognised in all the definitions (32).

III. *Possibility of Superimposition on the inner self* (33).

The saṃvid-bhāmatī (34-37); difficulties in the manifestation of the self (34); view that consciousness

is self-manifest, the self being merely its locus (34, 35); refutations of the above (35, 36, 37); light is one, determinate, identical with the self and objects are superimposed thereon (37, 38); difficulty of superimposition on the self which is a non-object (38, 39); reply—non-objectness not invariable (39); appearance of agency, enjoyership, objectness etc. due to defining adjuncts (40); ānanda, nityatva etc., not really different from caitanya (40); Jīvatva as idam-anidam-rūpa (40, 41); immediacy of realisation of the inner self (42); possibility of superimposition even on what is not manifest: a prauḍhi-vāda (42, 43).

IV. *Nature of Superimposition* (43, 44).

Called Nescience (43); the cause of all evil (44); means of removing it (45); impossibility of its recurrence (46.)

V. *Means of valid knowledge have reference to one characterised by Nescience* (47).

Means of valid knowledge function only when there is conceit of self in the body, senses etc. (48); without their functioning there would be no empirical usage (48, 49); they cannot function without control (49); control is not possible except by a body on which the nature of the self is superimposed (49); the unattached self, in the absence of superimposition, is not a knower (50); where there is no knowership, the means of valid knowledge do not function (50).

VI. *Resemblance of learned persons to beasts etc.* (51, 52).

VII. *Sacred teaching (other than the Vedānta) relates to one characterised by Nescience* (53, 54).

Activity prescribed in sacred teaching requires the self's relation to another world, not its freedom from the migratory cycle (54); these teachings function *before* the realisation of the self as taught in the Vedānta (55); the karma-kāṇḍa and the Vedānta relate to different spheres; analogy of the śyena sacrifice (55).

VIII. *Nature of Superimposition repeated* (56, 57).

Superimposition of attributes exemplified (57); superimposition of substrate exemplified (58).

IX. *Removal of this beginningless cause of evil is the purport of the entire Vedānta* (59, 60).

Etymology of śārīraka-mīmāṃsā (61); summary of *prima facie* view (61, 62); summary of final view (62).

B. Desire to Know

I. *First aphorism stated* (63); "*atha*" *means* "*ānantarya*," *not* "*adhikāra*" (64), *nor* "*auspiciousness*" (65); *what is it that goes before?* (65).

Brahman-knowledge, free from doubt, is the one supreme benefit (63); seems to be unattained because of Nescience; illustration of necklace round one's neck (63); doubt implied as cause of the inquiry (64); primacy of the aphorism justified (64); etymology of mīmāṃsā, śāstra and sūtra (64); primacy of the "desire to know" (65, 66); "jijñāsā" distinguished from "mīmāṃsā" (66); auspiciousness effected by "atha" only when used in another sense (68); "reference to what has

gone before" does not differ in effect from "immediate succession" (68, 69): correct view; there is dependence on what goes before, only where there is a statement of alternative views (69).

II. *Succession not to knowledge of ritual* (70); *no sequence intended nor a relationship of Śeṣa and Śeṣin or of Adhikṛtā 'dhikāra* (71).

Ritual not subsidiary to apprehension of the sense of the sentence (71); Brahman-intuition results from hearing, reflection and contemplation (72); sacrifices etc. are of service to that contemplation by destroying impurities opposed to beatitude or by purifying the person or because of the discharge of the three obligations (73); the rites may subserve contemplation too by saṃyoga-pṛthaktva (74); refutation of the above *prima facie* view: Brahman-intuition is not a product or a modification or an attainment (75, 76) or something purified (76, 77); Brahman-intuition is not itself Brahman, nor is free from adjuncts; itself the last adjunct on the brink of destruction (78); not invalid like an imagined idea, because of the immediate experience of the jīva from the first (79); intuition effected by the antaḥkaraṇa aided by the impression consequent on the repetition of the Vedānta Texts; no co-presence between contemplation and ritual (79).

Objection: in spite of knowledge, impressions of Nescience persist; example of the bilious person spitting out sugar; ritual needed to root out these impressions; they may succeed in the task, though

themselves part of Nescience; example of certain poisons, the clearing nut etc. (80).

Reply: impressions of Nescience may continue, but the enlightened one has no faith in ritual; he who has no faith is not eligible to engage in ritual (81); ritual performed by ineligible persons has no fruit (81), and not required for contemplation (82).

Objection: prohibitions too would not apply to the vidvān, and there would be transgressions of the moral law (82).

Reply: Even the jīvanmukta has slight traces of Nescience, though he has no faith in rituals; but faith is required only for doing, not for refraining (82); there can be no transgression of prohibitions (83); ritual not required even in the origination of contemplation (83); rites are remote auxiliaries (83), as generating the desire to know (84). Tapas explained as eating in moderation (84); obligatory rites purify by destroying sin already incurred (84). Saṃyoga-pṛthaktva unjustifiable, because of prolixity (85). Stages in the functioning of ritual towards the desire to know (85). Ritual unnecessary where non-attachment has already resulted (86). The *Jābāla* text does not intend to declare the presence of a rule of succession (87). Both Scripture and codes intend but an emphasis on non-attachment (88). Nor is sequence established by pāṭha, sthāna, mukhya or pravṛtti, because there is no relationship of subsidiary and principal (88); nor is there the eligibility of a person already eligible for something else (89).

III. *Difference between the two "Desires to know" in respect of content and fruit* (90), *in the dependence or non-dependence of the content on observances* (90), *in the existence or non-existence of their contents* (91), *in the related texts prompting to activity or merely instructing* (91).

Etymology of viṣaya (92); in spite of the apparent injunction "ātmā jñātavyaḥ," there is no directing to activity in respect of Brahman, since it cannot be produced (93); nor in respect of contemplation or knowledge from verbal testimony, since neither is aprāpta so as to call for a scriptural injunction (93).

IV. *The Preliminaries stated* (94).

Discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal, not of the nature of certitude (95), nor of the nature of doubt, but the apprehension of difference between substrates in general, as also between their attributes, as eternal and non-eternal (95); absolute denial of truth impossible (96); non-attachment and how it arises (96); śama, dama etc. explained (97).

V. *Explanation of "therefore"; perishability of all enjoyment, even that acquired for the hereafter, while Brahman-knowledge bears permanent fruit* (98).

Possibility of non-attachment questioned; pain should be remedied, not pleasure avoided (99); scriptural declaration of the imperishability of heavenly pleasures sublates inference of perishability (99); reply: pain cannot be remedied because of the defects of dependence on external means and diminution persisting in all produced happiness (100); diminution etc. evidenced by

Scripture too in addition to inference; hence texts to the contrary have a secondary sense (100); Brahman-knowledge the supreme human goal (100).

VI. *"Brahma-jijñāsā" explained as a sixth case-compound with the sense of object; Brahman does not mean caste etc.* (101).

Refutation of the fourth case compound (101, 102); Brahman is that which will be defined later (102); refutation of "the residuary sense" of the sixth case (102, 103), because knowledge requires an object and Brahman is that object (103).

VII. *Further refutation of the residuary sense* (104),

The objection and the reply imply concealed views (104).

VIII. *Further defence of the residuary sense; refutation: acceptance of the principal involves the acceptance of everything dependent on it* (105); *Scriptural support for Brahman being the object* (106); *explanation of "jijñāsā"* (106); *Brahman-knowledge exterminates Nescience and is hence the human goal* (106).

Both objector and respondent come out with their real views (105); knowledge culminating in realisation is the object of desire (107); Brahman-realisation is the human goal, though it is incapable of generation, modification, purification, or attainment (107, 108); hence its knowledge is sought (108) and this is possible only with the help of the inquiry into Brahman (109).

IX. *Objection: impossibility of desire to know, whether Brahman be known or unknown* (109).

Reply: Brahman does exist and is well known as the self (110).

Existence of a general understanding of Brahman even prior to the enquiry (111); the attributes of Brahman (111, 112); etymology of Brahman (112); no one fails to cognise his own self (113); and the self is Brahman (113).

X. *Objection: being known, Brahman need not be inquired into* (114); *reply: conflicting views about its distinctive nature; several such views stated* (114, 115); *necessity for inquiry into Vedānta aided by reasoning not inconsistent therewith* (115).

Conflicting views must have a common basis (115); such views about the denotation of the "thou" (116); similar views about the denotation of "that" indicated (116) and directly stated (117); the basis of such views (117); need for inquiry (118); place of reasoning (118).

C. DEFINITION

I. *Definition of Brahman stated* (119); *explanation and justification of "janmādi"* (120, 121); *explanation of "this" in "for this"* (121, 122); *complement of the aphorism* (122).

Objection: No definition is possible since no pramāṇa applies (119, 120); reply: taṭastha-lakṣaṇa stated as possible (120); justification for treating Brahman as the cause, not the pradhāna etc. (121, 122); need for intelligence (122), and omniscience and omnipotence (123).

II. *Justification for considering only the three; viz., origination, sustentation and destruction* (124).

Other modifications of "being" mentioned (124), and shown to be included in the three (125); the mention of these three alone brings to mind the appropriate Śruti about creation etc. (125); else would be brought to mind the *Nirukta* which does not teach the first cause (125).

III. *Pradhāna, primal atoms, chance etc. ruled out* (126); *origination etc. used by some as grounds for inferring the Lord* (126).

IV. *Present aphorism not intended to set forth an inference* (127), *the purpose of these aphorisms being to inquire into and string together Vedānta texts* (127), *Brahman-realisation being possible by such inquiry alone* (128), *inference serving only to confirm the sense of the texts* (128).

Explanation of "manana" and "yukti" (128).

V. *Scripture not the sole authority, but experience etc. too, where applicable* (129), *since Brahman-knowledge culminates in experience* (129), *and relates to an existent* (130); *not a kārya which allows of option* (130), *and in respect of which prescriptions and prohibitions are purportful* (130); *a "thing" admits of no options* (131); *hence knowledge of it depends not on the human intellect* (131), *but on the thing itself for validity* (131).

Reconciliation where there is conflict between prescriptions etc. (132); doubt and error do not introduce option into things, not being dependent on their nature (133).

VI. *The existent is open to other means of knowledge besides the Vedānta*; *contingent non-authoritativeness of the latter* (134); *reply*: *Brahman not a content of the senses* (134); *the aphorism of origination etc. intended not to suggest an inference* (135), *but to exhibit Vedānta texts* (135); *the definitive text among these* (136).

Objection: Vedāntas would be restatements of inferential knowledge (134); the inner self not an object of the senses (135); sāmānyato dṛṣṭa inference not applicable (135); Brahman's vivarto-'pādānatva explained (136).

D. SCRIPTURE-SOURCE

I. *Source of Scripture necessarily an omniscient being* (137); *author necessarily knows more than the content of the work, and Scripture itself is omniscient* (138).

How Ṛgveda etc., are Śāstras (138); how they are like the omniscient one (139); not all knowledge is expressible though possessed (140); "effortlessness" applied to creation signifies slightness, not absence, of effort (140); words and sentences non-eternal (140, 141); hence creation of these by the Lord is possible though He has no absolute liberty (141, 142); essential nature of the Vedas identical in every creation (142); single authorship not inconsistent with faith in the work (142).

II. *Alternative interpretation*: *Scripture is the pramāṇa for Brahman* (143). *Possible doubt that*

inference is suggested by the second aphorism is removed by the present aphorism (144).

E. HARMONY

I. *Brahman not evidenced by Scripture whose purport is ritual* (145); *Brahman-texts futile or subsidiary to injunction of rituals or injunction of contemplation etc.* (146, 148); *the existent is in the sphere of other pramāṇas and hence Śruti in relation to it is non-authoritative* (147); *arthavāda passages find purport in syntactical unity with injunctions* (147); *statement of the final view* (148).

Contingent non-authoritativeness for the Vedāntas, because of failure of non-dependence (145); they can be neither non-authoritative nor unfruitful (146); they teach the agent, deity etc. of ritual or prescribe contemplation etc. (146); no injunction possible, even of an originative nature, in the case of the existent (147); content of the injunction is a *becoming* (147); application, procedure, eligibility etc., are present even in the originative injunction, though unintended (148).

II. *Explanation of "but" and "harmony" in the aphorism* (149, 150); *purport of the texts not to teach agent, deity, etc.* (150); *Brahman, though existent, is not the content of perception etc.* (150); *oneness of Brahman and the self to be known through Śāstra alone* (154); *Śāstra not futile because of the absence of what is to be rejected or accepted* (154); *even from the*

realisation of Brahman results the attainment of the human goal (154); *teaching of Brahman not subsidiary to contemplation* (155); *for then all duality is quashed* (155); *and there can be no resurrection thereof* (155).

Upakrama and upasaṃhāra as determinative of the sense of texts (150); illustration from the texts about the upāṃśu sacrifice (150); Brahman thus settled to be the purport of the Vedāntas (150, 151); non-authoritativeness cannot be as referring to existent things (152); or as dependent on the human intellect (152); *objection*: a human origin may be inferred for the Vedas, as referring to existents (152), not if they refer exclusively to what is to be done (152); *reply*: if by kārya the implied apūrva is meant, apauruṣeyatva would result even for injunctions to worship a Buddhist Caitya (153); if for the latter human origin is *seen*, it may be *inferred* for the Vedāntas (153); from Brahman-realisation there is *direct* attainment of the human goal (155); two varieties of the attained and the abandoned (155): the attained, as it were and the abandoned, as it were (156).

III. *Veda relating to the self is authoritative independently of injunctions, since self-knowledge is of itself fruitful* (158); *authoritativeness not established through inference* (159).

Difference of Vedāntas from arthavādas like "he howled" (158); authoritativeness of the Vedānta dependent on generating indubitable knowledge of what is not already known (159); it is intrinsic (159); hence no example is necessary (160).

IV. *Objection: Brahman intimated only as the object of contemplation* (160); *analogy of the āhavanīya fire etc.* (163); *pravṛtti or nivṛtti the fruit of the Śāstra* (163); *authority to support this position* (164); *knowledge of Brahman enjoined for him who desires immortality* (165).

Brahman not the purport as the relation of words thereto is not known (160); it is neither to be rejected nor accepted and hence cannot be declared by a prudent man (160); words have for purport what is to be done (161) and not an existent (161); that a word has a certain sense has to be known by inferring the cognition of that sense in another who hears the word, through his pravṛtti or nivṛtti as probans (161); pravṛtti and nivṛtti characteristic of sacred teaching (161); transmigration does not cease with knowing the sense of "That thou art" (162); from hearing, one does not attain the human goal, as reflection and contemplation are also prescribed (162); of the self, as subsidiary to contemplation, there is certitude of existence (163); contemplation cannot be of the superimposed, as it would not be of the self (163); the person eligible for contemplation of Brahman is understood on the rātri-satra-nyāya (165).

V. *Objection (contd.): though the objects of the two enquiries are different, only as occasioned by an injunction of contemplation is there the quest of Brahman* (166); *futility of texts not relating to an injunction* (167); *no resemblance to "this is a rope, not a snake," as happiness, misery etc. continue even for him who has*

heard (168); *reflection and contemplation are also enjoined* (168).

The intuition (darśana) of the self cannot be the object of an injunction (166, 167); draṣṭavyaḥ etc. are not real injunctions (167).

VI. *Reply*; *ritual and Brahman differ in respect of their knowledge and fruit* (169, 170); *gradations of happiness consequent on performance of ritual* (170, 171); *gradations of misery* (172); *final release not the fruit of religious duty* (173), *being natural and eternal* (173).

Fruit of Religious Duty surpassable and destructible (169); oneness of jīva and Brahman is eternal and unproduced (170); removal of Nescience occurs even with the rise of knowledge, which results naturally for the mind aided by the impressions of reflection and contemplation (170); no apūrva needed (170); analogy of apprehension of musical notes (171); no injunction needed for contemplation, as the latter is even otherwise known to result in intuition (171); nor a niyama-'pūrva, as in pounding the paddy (171); hence texts about contemplation etc. are only apparent injunctions (172).

VII. *Two kinds of eternality* (174); *non-embodiment is immutably eternal* (174); *if subsidiary to a kārya, Brahman would be non-eternal, as also final release* (175).

Evolving eternality not absolute (174); view of whole and part as different yet non-different (175, 176); non-difference in the causal aspect, difference in the effect-aspect (176); criticism (176, 177, 178); either

difference or non-difference should be assumptive (179); grounds for holding difference to be assumptive (179).

VIII. *Śruti shows final release to follow immediately on Brahman-knowledge* (180), *and excludes anything else to be done in between* (181); *support from the Preceptor Akṣapāda* (182).

Knowledge instrumental to release only as removing two-fold Nescience (180); definition of ācārya (181); explanation of the Nyāya aphorism (182).

IX. *Knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the self not an imagined identification, nor a superimposition, nor what is due to association with a distinctive mode of activity* (184); *nor a purification* (186); *objections to its being sampat etc.* (186); *Brahman-knowledge dependent on the object, not on the activity of the man* (187); *no room for activity to enter, not even through Brahman being the object of the knowing or contemplating activity* (187); *Scripture cited* (187, 188); *purport of Śāstra to remove difference posited by Nescience* (188), *not to give demonstrative knowledge of Brahman* (188); *removal of differences of cogniser, cognised etc.* (189); *no fear of non-eternality of release* (189).

Sampat and adhyāsa explained and distinguished (183, 184); association with a distinctive mode of activity explained (184, 185); in all three, self is subsidiary and contemplation is the principal (185); purification explained (185); refutation of the above possibilities: texts about the self are anārabhyā-'dhīta (186); no non-inconstant connection with rites, as for the ladle made of parṇa wood (187); Brahman not the object of

the cognising activity (187); words cannot give demonstrative knowledge even of worldly things, much less of the transcendent (188).

X. *Non-eternality of release, if it be a product or a modification* (190).

XI. *If of the nature of oneself, Brahman is already attained: even if not so, the all-pervasive Brahman cannot be attained: hence no room for activity* (191).

XII. *Brahman being eternally perfect and pure, no excellence may be added to it or defect removed therefrom; hence release is not the purified and needs no activity* (192).

XIII. *Release is not manifested through purificatory acts, as the self cannot be the locus of an act* (193); *otherwise its non-eternality would result* (194).

Nescience located in the jīva; hence Brahman is certainly eternally pure (194); assuming impurity, it cannot be purified by an act inherent in another, while no act can inhere in it (194).

XIV. *Objection: acts inhering in the body purify the self* (195); *reply: what is purified is the self as associated with the body* (195, 196, 197); *purification is of that alone which is made the content of empirically valid pramāṇa* (196).

XV. *No other channel for activity* (198); *knowledge the one means* (198).

XVI. *Objection: knowledge is an act of the mind* (198); *reply: no; nature of act explained* (198, 199); *and distinguished from that of knowledge* (200, 201).

Acts like contemplation not established prior to an injunction (200); but knowledge of Brahman results from texts for those who can understand them (200); injunction not purportful, as it cannot be effected or not effected or effected in a different way (200, 201); contemplation and culmination in experience not enjoined as they are well known even in the absence of the injunction (201).

XVII. *Imperatives found in Scripture about the self have not the enjoined for content* (202); *but they turn one away from the objects of natural activity* (202, 203).

XVIII. *With Brahman-realisation, there is destruction of all obligations* (205); *Brahman not subsidiary to an injunction of contemplation* (205).

XIX. *The self is understood from the Upaniṣads alone, does not transmigrate, is of the nature of Brahman and occurs in a topic of his own; this self is neither non-existent nor unknown* ((206).

Purportfulness and śāstratva established for the Vedānta, even as teaching the existent (206); words are apprehended in experience in relation to existents (207); because usage with such purport is seen and it is possible to infer cognition of the existent in him who understands the word (207); description of Sumeru (207); an onlooker ignorant of the language, but knowing the cause of the father's happiness infers in the father the cognition of his son's birth as produced by the messenger's words (208); usage of words in relation to the existent is intelligible because of fruitfulness (208); inference as to the Vedāntas having the existent for

content (209); etymology of Upaniṣad (209); grounds for the self not being subsidiary to what is to be done (209, 210); how Brahman can be signified by the Vedānta, through elimination of defining conditions (210); impossibility of removing that which gets so defined (211).

XX. *The self is the witness of the denotation of "I"* (211): *not known through the vidhi-kāṇḍa or through reasoning* (211); *impossibility of refuting or of subordinating it to an injunction* (212): *imperishability, eternal purity, intelligence and freedom of the self* (212): *it is what is principally revealed in the Upaniṣads* (212).

All others except the self, being indeterminable and unstable perish; but not the self, the material cause of all these (214); it is immutably eternal (215).

XXI. *Purport is declared to be ritual only in the case of prescriptions and prohibitions* (215); *the existent taught by Scripture cannot be other than existent* (215); *even what is for the sake of an act is not itself an act, but a thing* (216); *the self may be taught in the same way* (216); *such teaching purposeful as leading to cessation of transmigration* (216).

Purport of words is not only kārya or what subserves kārya (217); nor is it the sense of each word independently (217); teaching of word-sense an inevitable intermediary to sentence-sense, which is the purport (218); conjunction with other word-senses needed, not with what is to be done (218); even statements related to the activity of being signify not that activity but only a relation (219).

XXII. *Prohibitions relate to desisting from an act and that is not an act* (224); *the negation does not signify anything other than indifference consisting in desisting from what is established by one's own nature* (224); *indifference is caused by non-existence made known by the negative particle, and it subsides of its own accord, like fire without fuel* (225).

Prohibitions do not have for purport what is to be done (220); for kārya depends on the existence of volition, and volition on its determinant, and the determinant must be a doing (220); substance and quality are related to kārya only through the doing (221); when substance and quality fall within the injunction, they do so as complements to the doing (221); connection of material and deity is not the content of prescription in "there is that *āgneya* etc.," (222); even in "make a pot," the substantive is only what is desired, not what is enjoined (222); if prohibitions had kārya for purport, exclusion would have to be understood in all cases, as in the Prajāpati-vrata, and the other function of negation would have to be abandoned (223); cessation is not itself what is to done (224); nor is voluntary effort to desist prescribed (226); what is prohibited is cognised as instrumental to evil, and this is the cognition of its non-existence (226); this cognition is the cause of the perpetuation of indifference (227); the imperative suffix restates what is established even otherwise by passion and shows its instrumentality to evil (228); and this cognition dies out of itself like fire whose fuel has been consumed (229); the Mīmāṃsaka

declaration of futility applies only to such narratives etc., as do not subserve the human goal (230).

XXIII. *Statements about the existent are profitable* (230); *transmigratoriness does not exist as before for him who has realised Brahman* (230, 231); *illustration from the wealthy man and the man with ear-rings* (231, 232); *embodiment is due to illusory knowledge, while non-embodiment is eternal* (233); *embodiment not caused by merit and demerit, because of reciprocal dependence* (233); *because the self is not an agent, not even indirectly like kings etc.* (234).

Brahman-intuition compared to the intuition of musical notes by the mind purified through the hearing and practice of music (232); it removes the presentation of the entire universe and itself therewith (232).

XXIV. *Conceit of self in the body is illusory, not secondary* (235); *for secondary usage depends on the prior apprehension of difference* (236); *the concept "I" is applied to the body etc. non-figuratively, through non-discrimination, even by learned men* (237); *hence illusory* (237); *consequently when this illusion is removed by true knowledge there is jīvanmukti* (238); *support from Śruti and Smṛti* (238); *no transmigratoriness as before for him who has realised* (238).

Some unseen cause needed to explain superimposition since valid perception or doubt would be appropriate otherwise (237).

XXV. *Brahman is not subsidiary to injunctions of reflection and contemplation, since these too are for the sake of realisation* (239); *Scripture is the pramāṇa*

for Brahman, because of harmony of the texts, not because of Brahman being the content of an injunction (240); *hence the commencement of a new Śāstra is justified* (240); *but not if its purport were an injunction to contemplate* (241); *all means of valid knowledge terminate in "I am Brahman"* (242); *they are contentless and non-authoritative on the realisation of the non-dual Brahman* (242); *support from the verses of a Brahman-knower* (242).

No prescription of manana and nididhyāsana, since their culmination in intuition is established by co-presence and co-absence in experience (239); they are not principal rites (239); nor are they subsidiary rites, like purification, since the self is neither used nor to be used anywhere (240), and, as propounded in the Upaniṣads, is opposed to the observance of rites (240); oneness of the self and Brahman not merely different from but opposed to Religious Duty (241); non-authoritativeness follows at that stage for *all* pramāṇas (242); explanation of the verses of the Brahman-knower (242); explanation of the secondary and illusory selves (243); dependence of loka-yātrā and even enlightenment on these conceits (243); knowership etc., possible only prior to self-realisation (243); the self to be realised is not other than the knower (244); the non-valid yet gives rise to absolutely real experience, up to the ascertainment of the self (244); the intuition which is absolutely real is unproduced (244); short of that there is Nescience and in its producing or destroying other Nescience there is no unintelligibility (245); Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad cited in support (245).

भामती—चतुःसूत्री

ब्रह्मसूत्रशांकरभाष्यम्

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविष-
यिणोस्तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतर-
भावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्, तद्धर्माणामपि
सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः—इत्यतः अ-
स्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्म-
त्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्या-
सः, तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च वि-
षयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्। तथा-
प्यन्योऽन्यस्मिन्नन्योऽन्यात्मकतामन्योऽन्यध-
र्मांश्च अध्यस्य इतरेतराविवेकेन अत्यन्त-
विविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः, मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः,
सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य, 'अहमिदम्, मम इ-
दम्' इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः।

BRAHMASŪTRABHĀṢYA

OF S'AṄKARĀCĀRYA

OF the spheres of the two concepts of "Thou" and "I," the object and the subject, with their natures opposed to each other like darkness and light, when it is established that one cannot intelligibly be of the nature of the other, the more is it unintelligible for their attributes too to be one (in the substrate of) the other; on this account, the superimposition of the object, the sphere of the concept of "Thou," and of its attributes, on the subject, the intelligent self, the sphere of the concept of "I," and (conversely) through an error in respect of that, the superimposition of the subject and its attributes on the object, can properly be only an illusion. Yet, after superimposing on each the nature and the attributes of the other through non-discrimination of each from the other in the case of attributes absolutely distinct (among themselves) as also of substrates (similarly distinct), there is this natural empirical usage like, "I am this," and "this is mine," coupling the true with the untrue, with its cause in illusory cognition.

THE BHĀMATI

1. We render obeisance to that immortal Brahman, the immeasurable bliss and knowledge, from whom as Lord with the two kinds[1] of indeterminable Nescience as ministers, there are the illusory manifestations of ether, air, fire, water and the earth—and from whom came forth this universe, movable and immovable, high and low.

2. The Vedas are His breath, His glance the five elements, the (universe) movable and immovable is His smile,[2] His sleep is the final deluge.

3. To the Vedas and to Bhava, which are eternal and associated with six *aṅgas* as also with manifold imperishable properties (*or* indeclinables) we render obeisance.[3]

4. We render obeisance to Mārtaṇḍa, to Tilakasvāmin,[4] and to Mahāgaṇapati, who are worthy of universal adoration and are the dispensers of all fulfilment.

5. Obeisance to Vyāsa, the secondary Creator,[5] the author of the *Brahma-sūtras*, the incarnation of the cognitive energy of the Lord Hari.

6. Having rendered obeisance to Śaṅkara, of wisdom pure, of grace the ocean, we (proceed to) analyse the clear (yet) deep[6] commentary written by him.

7. As the waters of a highway are purified by falling into the current of the Ganges, even so are the lowly words of those like us, by their conjunction with the work of the Master.

भामती

अनिर्वाच्याविद्याद्वितयसचिवस्य प्रभवतो
विवर्ता यस्यैते वियदनिलतेजोऽबवनयः ।
यतश्चाभूद्विश्वं चरमचरमुच्चावचमिदं
नमामस्तद्ब्रह्मापरिमितसुखज्ञानममृतम् ॥ १ ॥

निःश्वसितमस्य वेदा वीक्षितमेतस्य पञ्च भूतानि ।
स्मितमेतस्य चराचरमस्य च सुप्तं महाप्रलयः ॥ २ ॥

षड्भिरङ्गैरुपेताय विविधैरव्ययैरपि ।
शाश्वताय नमस्कुर्मो वेदाय च भवाय च ॥ ३ ॥

मार्तण्डतिलकस्वामिमहागणपतीन् वयम् ।
विश्ववन्द्यान्नमस्यामः सर्वसिद्धिविधायिनः ॥ ४ ॥

ब्रह्मसूत्रकृते तस्मै व्यासायापरवेधसे ।
ज्ञानशक्त्यवताराय नमो भगवतो हरेः ॥ ५ ॥

नत्वा विशुद्धविज्ञानं शङ्करं करुणानिधिम् ।
भाष्यं प्रसन्नगम्भीरं तत्प्रणीतं विभज्यते ॥ ६ ॥

आचार्यकृतिनिवेशनमप्यवधूतं वचोऽस्मदादीनाम् ।
रथ्योदकमिव गङ्गाप्रवाहपातः पवित्रयति ॥ ७ ॥

अथ यदसंदिग्धमप्रयोजनं च न तत्प्रेक्षावत्प्रतिपित्सागोचरः, यथा समनस्केन्द्रियसंनिकृष्टः स्फीतालोकमध्यवर्ती घटः, करटदन्ता वा ; तथा चेदं ब्रह्मेति व्यापकविरुद्धोपलब्धिः । तथा हि— बृहत्त्वाद्बृंहणत्वाद्वात्मैव ब्रह्मेति गीयते । स चायमा कीटपतङ्गेभ्य आ च देवर्षिभ्यः प्राणभृन्मात्रस्येदंकारास्पदेभ्यो देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयेभ्यो विवेकेन 'अहम्' इत्यसंदिग्धाविपर्यस्तापरोक्षानुभवसिद्ध इति न जिज्ञासारपदम् । न हि जातु कश्चिदत्र संदिग्धे 'अहं वा नाहं वा' इति । न च विपर्यस्यति 'नाहमेव' इति । न च 'अहं कृशः, स्थूलः, गच्छामि' इत्यादिदेहधर्मसामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनादेहालम्बनोऽयमहंकार इति सांप्रतम् । तदालम्बनत्वे हि 'योऽहं बाल्ये पितरावन्वभूवं स एव स्थाविरे प्रणप्तृननुभवामि' इति प्रतिसंधानं न भवेत् । न हि बालस्थविरयोः शरीरयोरस्ति मनागपि प्रत्यभिज्ञानगन्धो येनैकत्वमध्यवसीयेत । तस्माद्येषु व्यावर्तमानेषु यदनुवर्तते तत्तेभ्यो भिन्नं यथा कुसुमेभ्यः सूत्रम् । तथा च बालादिशरीरेषु व्यावर्तमानेष्वपि

Now, that of which there is no doubt or that which is profitless cannot be the sphere of a desire to know on the part of a prudent inquirer, as, for instance, a pot present in bright light and coming into contact with the sense (of sight) along with the mind; or the teeth of a crow. So too, is this Brahman; hence the knowledge of what is opposed to (the presence of) the pervader [7] (of the inquiry, *i.e.*, doubt and profit). It is thus: the self alone is called Brahman, because it is great or it causes to grow. This (self) is known through indubitable, non-erroneous and immediate experience of the nature of "I," as distinct from the body, the organs, the mind, the intellect, their objects, (in short) from whatever may be designated by the term "this"; (this experience exists) in all living beings from the worm and the moth to gods and sages; hence the self cannot be the object of a desire to know. No one indeed doubts "Is this I or not-I?" or makes the mistake "this is not I at all". Nor is it admissible to say that, since judgements like "I am lean, stout," "I go," etc., are seen to be used in apposition with qualities of the body, the body [8] is the substrate of the word "I". If that were the substrate, the recognition "I, who while young enjoyed (the company of) my parents, now, when I am old, enjoy (the company of) my grandchildren" would not come into being. There is not, verily, as between the bodies of youth and old age the slightest trace of recognition, whereby identity could be determined. Hence, that which is constant in whatever variable, that is different from the latter, as a string om the flowers (strung thereon). So too, the factor which s designated by the word "I" and is constant even in the ariations of the bodies of youth, etc., is different from

these. Further, the very person, who in dreams possessed of a divine body enjoys pleasures suitable thereto, seeing himself when awake to be endowed with a human body and saying "I am not divine, but human," experiences the substrate of I-ness, which is distinct from the body and unsublated, though sublated in respect of the divine body. Further, he, who becomes a tiger by his *yoga*, experiences the self as non-different in spite of differences of the body; hence, the body is not the substrate of I-ness. Hence too, even the organs are not its substrate, since even where the senses are different there is the recognition of the substrate of I-ness, in "I myself that saw now touch it". The distinction of that (self) from objects is but too patent. The intellect and the mind, being but instruments, cannot properly be substrates of a cognition of "I," which reflects the agent (not the instrument). Statements like "I am lean, I am blind," etc., which are made even though there is no non-difference (between the body and the self), are, as we see fit to hold, suitably understood as in some way figurative, like the statement "the galleries shout (meaning that the people in the galleries shout)". Therefore, it is established that the self, which is understood from the exceedingly patent experience of the "I," distinct from the body, the organs, the mind, the intellect,[9] the objects, (in short) from whatever is designated by the term "this," is, because of the absence of doubt, not the object of a desire to know.

(This is so) also because there is no profit (from the inquiry). It is thus: salvation which consists in the cessation of transmigration is the profit here desired to be set forth. Transmigration has for its cause the non-experience of the true nature of the self, and is to be got

परस्परमहंकारास्पदमनुवर्तमानं तेभ्यो भिद्यते । अपि च स्वप्नान्ते दिव्यं शरीरभेदमास्थाय तदुचितान्भोगान्भुञ्जान एव प्रतिबुद्धो मनुष्यशरीरमात्मानं पश्यन् 'नाहं देवो मनुष्य एव' इति देवशरीरे बाध्यमानेऽप्यहमास्पदमबाध्यमानं शरीराद्भिन्नं प्रतिपद्यते । अपि च योगव्याघ्रः शरीरभेदेऽप्यात्मानमभिन्नमनुभवतीति नाहंकारालम्बनं देहः । अत एव नेन्द्रियाण्यप्यस्यालम्बनम्, इन्द्रियभेदेऽपि 'योऽहमद्राक्षं स एवैतर्हि स्पृशामि' इत्यहमालम्बनस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । विषयेभ्यस्त्वस्य विवेकः स्थवीयानेव । बुद्धिमनसोश्च करणयोः 'अहम्' इति कर्तृप्रतिभासप्रख्यानालम्बनत्वायोगः । 'कृशोऽहम्' 'अन्धोऽहम्' इत्यादयस्तु प्रयोगा असत्यप्यभेदे कथंचित् 'मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति' इत्यादिवदौपचारिका इति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः । तस्मादिदंकारास्पदेभ्यो देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तः स्फुटतराहमनुभवगम्य आत्मा संशयाभावादजिज्ञास्य इति सिद्धम् ।

अप्रयोजनत्वाच्च । तथा हि—संसारनिवृत्तिरपवर्ग इह प्रयोजनं विवक्षितम् । संसारश्च आत्मयाथा-

त्यानुभवनिमित्त आत्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानेन निवर्तनीयः। स चेदयमनादिरनादिना आत्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानेन सहानुवर्तते, कुतोऽस्य निवृत्तिः अविरोधात्? कुतश्चात्मयाथात्म्याननुभवः? न हि 'अहम्' इत्यनुभवादन्यदात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानमस्ति। न च 'अहम्' इति सर्वजनीनस्फुटतरानुभवसमर्थित आत्मा देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्तः शक्य उपनिषदां सहस्रैरप्यन्यथयितुम्, अनुभवविरोधात्। न ह्यागमाः सहस्रमपि घटं पटयितुमीशते। तस्मादनुभवविरोधादुपचरितार्था एवोपनिषद इति युक्तमुत्पश्याम इत्याशयवानाशङ्क्य परिहरति—**युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः इति।**

अत्र च **युष्मदस्मत्** इत्यादिः **मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तं** इत्यन्तः शङ्काग्रन्थः। **तथापि** इत्यादिः परिहारग्रन्थः। **तथापि** इत्यभिसंबन्धाच्छङ्कायां यद्यपीति पठितव्यम्। इदमस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोरिति वक्तव्ये युष्मद्ग्रहणमत्यन्तभेदोपलक्षणार्थम्। यथा ह्यहंकारप्रतियोगी त्वंकारो नैवमिदंकारः, 'एते वयम्, इमे वयम्, आस्महे' इति बहुलं

rid of by knowledge of the true nature of the self. If that (transmigration) which is beginningless persists alongside the beginningless knowledge of the true nature of the self, how can there be the riddance of the former, there being no opposition (between the two)? And how can there be non-experience of the true nature of the self? Other than the experience of "I," there is indeed no knowledge of the true nature of the self. Nor can this self, which is other than the body, the organ etc., and which is established by the very patent experience of "I" common to all men, be negatived even by a thousand Upaniṣads, that being opposed to experience. A thousand Scriptures, verily, cannot convert a pot into a cloth. Therefore, because of opposition to experience, we see fit to hold that the Upaniṣads have but a figurative sense. Raising a doubt, with these ideas in mind, (the commentator) answers it (thus): **"Of the spheres of the two concepts,"** etc.

Here, (the text) from **"Of the spheres"** etc., up to **"can properly be only illusion"** is the statement of the doubt. (The text beginning) from **"Yet"** is the statement of the answer. As against the expression **"Yet"** (of the next sentence), the word "though" has to be supplied in the statement of the doubt. Where the words "of the spheres of the two concepts 'this' and 'I'" should have been used, the word "thou" is used (in the place of "this") to indicate the absolute difference (between the contrasted aspects of experience). The counter-correlate of the word "I" is not the word "this," so much as the word "thou," since there is seen extensive[1] usage of expressions like "We are this, we

are that ". *The self of the nature of intelligence is the subject (viṣayin),* the non-intelligent intellect, organs, body and objects, are the objects of cognition (*viṣayas*). For, these bind the intelligent self, that is to say, make it determinable through their own form.[11] As an example of absolute difference, which is the ground of the impossibility of reciprocal super-imposition, (there is mentioned) **"like darkness and light".** Never indeed, can one understand such utterly different things as light and darkness each to be of the nature of the other. This is stated thus: **" when it is established that one cannot intelligibly be of the nature of the other."** The one being the other means the one having the nature of the other, that is to say, the identity of the one with the other; this is unintelligible.[12]

Be this so. Let there be no reciprocal identity between different substrates (*i.e.*, the self and the not-self); there may occur yet the reciprocal super-imposition of their attributes, such as inertness and intelligence, eternality and non-eternality etc. Even where substrates are distinguished, there is indeed seen to occur super-imposition of their attributes, *e.g.*, in the crystal though apprehended as different from the flower, yet because of its absolute transparency, there arises the illusion of redness, in the experience " red crystal ", generated by the reflection of the hibiscus flower. To this it is said: **" for their attributes too."** The existence of the attributes of one substrate in the other, *i.e.*, their mutual transfer; this is unintelligible. This is the idea: it is indeed a substance with colour, which, on account of its absolute transparency takes on the reflection of another substance with colour, though

प्रयोगदर्शनादिति । चित्स्वभाव आत्मा विषयी, जडस्वभावा बुद्धीन्द्रियदेहविषया विषयाः । एते हि चिदात्मानं विसिन्वन्ति अवबध्नन्ति; स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्वन्तीति यावत् । परस्परानध्यासहेतौ अत्यन्तवैलक्षण्ये दृष्टान्तः—**तमःप्रकाशवत्** इति । न हि जातु कश्चित्समुदाचरद्वृत्तिनी प्रकाशतमसी परस्परात्मतया प्रतिपत्तुमर्हति । तदिदमुक्तम्—**इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ** इति । इतरेतरभावः इतरेतरत्वम्, तादात्म्यमिति यावत्; तस्यानुपपत्ताविति ।

स्यादेतत् । मा भूद्धर्मिणोः परस्परभावः; तद्धर्माणां तु जाड्यचैतन्यनित्यत्वानित्यत्वादीनां इतरेतराध्यासो भविष्यति । दृश्यते हि धर्मिणोर्विवेकग्रहणेऽपि तद्धर्माणामध्यासः, यथा कुसुमाद्वेदेन गृह्यमाणेऽपि स्फटिकमणावतिस्वच्छतया जपाकुसुमप्रतिबिम्बोद्ग्राहिणि 'अरुणः स्फटिकः' इत्यारुण्यविभ्रम इत्यत इदमुक्तम्—**तद्धर्माणामपि** इति । इतरेतरत्र धर्मिणि धर्माणां भावो विनिमयः, तस्यानुपपत्तिः । अयमभिसंधिः—रूपवद्धि द्रव्य-

मतिस्वच्छतया रूपवतो द्रव्यान्तरस्य तद्विवेकेन गृह्यमाणस्यापि च्छायां गृह्णीयात्, चिदात्मा तु नीरूपो विषयी न विषयच्छायामुद्ग्राहयितुमर्हति। यथाहुः—

'शब्दगन्धरसादीनां कीदृशी प्रतिबिम्बता'

इति। तदिह पारिशेष्याद्विषयविषयिणोरन्योन्यात्मसंभेदेनैव तद्धर्माणामपि परस्परसंभेदेन विनिमयात्मना भवितव्यम्, तौ चेद्धर्मिणौ अत्यन्तविवेकेन गृह्यमाणावसंभिन्नौ, असंभिन्नाः सुतरां तयोर्धर्माः, स्वाश्रयाभ्यां व्यवधानेन दूरापेतत्वात्। तदिदमुक्तम्—**सुतरां** इति। **तद्विपर्ययेण** इति। विषयविपर्ययेणेत्यर्थः। **मिथ्या**शब्दः अपह्नववचनः। एतदुक्तं भवति—अध्यासो भेदाग्रहेण व्याप्तः, तद्विरुद्धश्चेहास्ति भेदग्रहः, स भेदाग्रहं निवर्तयंस्तद्व्याप्तमध्यासमपि निवर्तयतीति। मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तं यद्यपि तथापीति योजना।

इदमत्राकूतम्—भवेदेतदेवं यदि 'अहम्' इत्यनुभवे आत्मतत्त्वं प्रकाशेत। न त्वेतदस्ति। तथा हि समस्तोपाध्यनवच्छिन्नानन्तानन्दचैतन्यैकरसमुदासीनमेकमद्वितीयमात्मतत्त्वं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहास-

apprehended as different from itself; the intelligent self, however, is the colourless subject and cannot take on the reflection of the object. As they (the Bhāṭṭas) say: "Of sound, smell, taste etc., in what way can there be reflection?"[13] Hence it follows by elimination that mutual transfer of the constantly associated attributes of the object and the subject is possible only on the basis of the reciprocal connection of these two. If these two substrates being apprehended as absolutely distinct are unrelated, their attributes are even more clearly unrelated, they being further removed from each other by the interposition of their respective substrates. This is stated thus: "**the more,**" etc. "**Through an error in respect of that**" means through an error in respect of the object. The word "**illusion**" signifies concealment. This is what is said: super-imposition is pervaded by non-apprehension of difference; the opposite thereof, *i.e.*, the apprehension of difference, is present here, which, getting rid of that non-apprehension of difference, gets rid also of the super-imposition pervaded thereby. "Though they can properly be only illusion, yet": this is the construction.

This is the underlying idea.—(All) this might be so, if the true nature of the self were manifest in the experience of the "I". This, however, is not so. It is thus: the true nature of the self is declared in Scripture, traditional codes (*smṛti*), epics (*itihāsas*), and mythologies (*purāṇas*) as undefined by any limiting conditions, as of the one consistency of endless bliss and intelligence, as indifferent, as one and without a second. Nor can those (statements) which have the purport of teaching the self as of this nature, through their introductory, intermediate and

concluding passages, and through purportful repetition, be made figurative even by Indra. For, from repetition results the eminence of the object, as in "Lo, beautiful, lo, beautiful!", not its littleness; nor even figurativeness (that being) remote indeed. The experience of the "I," exhibiting as it does the self as finite and as confounded by a multitude of griefs and sorrows, how can it have the true nature of the self for its sphere? Or how can it be undeluded (experience)? Nor can it be said that since Scripture is opposed to perception, which is the elder means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*)," the former alone as dependent on the latter should be declared invalid or figurative; for, since that (Scripture) is not of human origin and is free from even the suspicion of any defect, and since its validity is self-revealed by the very fact of its conveying knowledge, it is independent (of any other means of knowledge) in respect of its effect, *i.e.*, valid knowledge. If it be said that though independent in respect of the knowledge (it generates), yet since it is dependent on perception in respect of its origin, and since there is opposition to that (perception), there will be the non-validity of Scriptural teaching, consisting in its non-production,—no (we reply); for, there is no opposition to its origination (by perception). Scriptural knowledge does not indeed annul the empirical validity of perception, whereby it would itself cease to be, because of the non-existence of its cause; rather (does it annul) the absolute (validity of perception). Nor is its cause the absolutely true (perception), since true knowledge is seen to arise from means of knowledge which are empirically though not absolutely

पुराणेषु गीयते । न चैतान्युपक्रमपरामर्शोपसंहारैः क्रियासमभिहारेणेदृगात्मतत्त्वमभिदधति तत्पराणि सन्ति शक्यानि शक्रेणाप्युपचरितार्थानि कर्तुम् । अभ्यासे हि भूयस्त्वमर्थस्य भवति यथा 'अहो दर्शनीया अहो दर्शनीया' इति, नाल्पत्वमपि प्रागेवोपचरितत्वमिति । अहमनुभवस्तु प्रादेशिकमनेकविधशोकदुःखादिप्रपञ्चोपप्लुतमात्मानमादर्शयन् कथमात्मतत्त्वगोचरः कथं वानुपप्लवः? न च ज्येष्ठप्रमाणप्रत्यक्षविरोधादाम्नायस्यैव तदपेक्षस्याप्रामाण्यमुपचरितार्थत्वं वेति युक्तम्, तस्यापौरुषेयतया निरस्तसमस्तदोषाशङ्कस्य, बोधकतया च स्वतःसिद्धप्रमाणभावस्य स्वकार्ये प्रमितावनपेक्षत्वात् । प्रमितावनपेक्षत्वेऽप्युत्पत्तौ प्रत्यक्षापेक्षत्वात्तद्विरोधादनुत्पत्तिलक्षणमस्याप्रामाण्यमिति चेत्, न, उत्पादकाप्रतिद्वन्द्वित्वात् । न ह्यागमज्ञानं सांव्यवहारिकं प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रामाण्यमुपहन्ति येन कारणाभावान्न भवेत्; अपि तु तात्त्विकम् । न च तात्त्विकमस्योत्पादकम्, अतात्त्विकप्रमाणभावेभ्योऽपि सांव्यवहारिकप्रमाणेभ्यस्तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । तथा

च वर्णे ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादयोऽन्यधर्मा अपि समारोपिताः तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः। न हि लौकिकाः 'नागः' इति वा "नगः" इति वा पदात्कुञ्जरं वा तरुं वा प्रतिपद्यमाना भवन्ति भ्रान्ताः। न चानन्यपरं वाक्यं स्वार्थे उपचरितार्थं युक्तम्। उक्तं हि—'न विधौ परः शब्दार्थः' इति। ज्येष्ठत्वं च अनपेक्षितस्य बाध्यत्वे हेतुः न तु बाधकत्वे, रजतज्ञानस्य ज्यायसः शुक्तिज्ञानेन कनीयसा बाधदर्शनात्। तदनपबाधने तदपबाधात्मनः तस्योत्पत्तेरनुपपत्तेः। दर्शितं च तात्त्विकप्रमाणभावस्यानपेक्षितत्वम्। तथा च पारमर्षं सूत्रम्—'पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत्' इति। तथा च—

पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वं
तत्र नाम प्रतीयताम्।
अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षाणां यत्र
जन्म धियां भवेत्॥—इति॥

अपि च येऽप्यहंकारास्पदमात्मानमास्थिषत तैरप्यस्य न तात्त्विकत्वमभ्युपेतव्यम्, 'अहमि-

valid. Thus, the qualities of short and long, though foreign to letters (belonging as they do to sound: *dhvani*), being super-imposed thereon, are causes of true apprehension; those who in the world understand by *nāga* and *naga* different objects such as elephant and tree are not, verily, deluded people.

Nor may it be said of a word not having any other purport that it is used figuratively in respect of its own sense. It has indeed been said: "The meaning of a word in an injunctive statement cannot be other (than its primary one)."[15] The priority of what is not depended on is a ground for its being sublated, not for its sublating (another means of knowledge), for, it is seen that the earlier cognition of silver is sublated by the later cognition of nacre. If the former were not sublated, the origination of the latter (cognition) whose essence is the sublation (of the former) would not be intelligible. And it has been shown that the absolute validity (of perception) is not depended on. So too the aphorism of the great sage (Jaimini): "Where there is the relationship of earlier and later, the earlier is weaker, as in the case of the archetypal rite (*prakṛti*)."[16] And to the same effect (is the verse): "The superiority of the later over the earlier is cognised where their cognitions arise not as reciprocally dependent."[17]

Further, those who acknowledge the self as the substrate of I-ness, even by them the truth of that (cognition) cannot be admitted, since in the judgement "I am in this very abode, (but) cognising," the omnipresent self is apprehended as finite, in the same way as to the man

on the ground, big trees on the top of a high peak appear as blades of grass. Nor is it admissible that the experienced finiteness is of the body, not of the self. For then the experience would not be of the form "I (am)," etc.; nor would it be of the form "cognising," if (the word "I" be taken to be used) in a secondary sense (of the body). Further, when it is agreed as between the speaker and the understanding listener that a certain word has the connotation of another, then the use is secondary; it follows in the wake of awareness of difference. It is, indeed, thus: when the word *agnihotra*, which (ordinarily) denotes the obligatory rite of that name, is used in the statement "he offers the *māsa-agnihotra* oblation" in another context ascertained to be (of a) different (nature), in connection with an act related to the *kuṇḍapāyinām ayana*, the use (of the word *agnihotra*) based on the similarity of what is to be accomplished (in both cases) is secondary;[1] so too the use of the word "lion" in the case of a pupil who is known from experience to be different from a lion. (Here, however) the primary denotation of the word "I" is not indeed experienced as determinately and specifically other than the body etc., in which case alone that word would have the secondary sense of body etc. Nor may it be understood that, where by long usage a term has a secondary sense, there is no recognition of the sense being secondary, as is the case with *taila* (lit. sesamum oil) as applied to mustard oil; for, here too, only where difference is established, in respect of viscidity, being extracted from sesamum etc., there is the conceit of mustard oil etc. being primarily

हैवास्मि सदने जानानः' इति सर्वव्यापिनः प्रादेशिकत्वेन ग्रहणात् उच्चतरगिरिशिखरवर्तिषु महातरुषु भूमिष्ठस्य दूर्वाप्रवालनिर्भासप्रत्ययवत्। न चेदं देहस्य प्रादेशिकत्वमनुभूयते न त्वात्मन इति सांप्रतम्। न हि तदैवं भवति 'अहम्' इति, गौणत्वे वा न 'जानानः' इति। अपि च परशब्दः परत्र लक्ष्यमाणगुणयोगेन वर्तत इति यत्र प्रयोक्तृप्रतिपत्तोः संप्रतिपत्तिः स गौणः। स च भेदप्रत्ययपुरःसरः। तद्यथा, नैयमिकाग्निहोत्रवचनोऽग्निहोत्रशब्दः प्रकरणान्तरावधृतभेदे कुण्डपायिनामयनगते कर्मणि 'मासमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति' इत्यत्र साध्यसादृश्येन गौणः, माणवके चानुभवसिद्धभेदे सिंहार्तिसिंहशब्दः। न त्वहंकारस्य मुख्योऽर्थो निर्लुठितगर्भतया देहादिभ्यो भिन्नोऽनुभूयते, येन परशब्दः शरीरादौ गौणो भवेत्। न चात्यन्तनिरूढतया गौणेऽपि न गौणत्वाभिमानः सार्षपादिषु तैलशब्दवदिति वेदितव्यम्। तत्रापि स्नेहात्तिलभवाद्भेदे सिद्ध एव सार्षपादीनां तैलशब्दवाच्यत्वाभिमानः, न त्वर्थयोस्तैलसार्षपयोर-

भेदाध्यवसायः। तत्सिद्धं गौणत्वमुभयदर्शिनो गौणमुख्यविवेकविज्ञानेन व्याप्तम्, तदिह व्यापकं विवेकविज्ञानं निवर्तमानं गौणतामपि निवर्तयतीति।

न च बालस्थविरशरीरभेदेऽपि 'सोऽहम्' इत्येकस्यात्मनः प्रतिसंधानाद्देहादिभ्यो भेदेनास्त्यात्मानुभव इति वाच्यम्। परीक्षकाणां खल्वियं कथा, न लौकिकानाम्। परीक्षका अपि हि व्यवहारसमये न लोकसामान्यमतिवर्तन्ते। वक्ष्यत्यनन्तरमेव हि भगवान्भाष्यकारः—'**पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात्**' इति। बाह्या अप्याहुः—'शास्त्रचिन्तकाः खल्वेवं विवेचयन्ति न प्रतिपत्तारः' इति। तत्पारिशेष्याच्चिदात्मगोचरमहंकारम् 'अहमिहास्मि सदने' इति प्रयुञ्जानो लौकिकः शरीराद्यभेदग्रहादात्मनः प्रादेशिकत्वमभिमन्यते नभस इव घटमणिकमल्लिकाद्युपाध्यवच्छेदादिति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः।

न चाहंकारप्रामाण्याय देहादिवदात्मापि प्रादेशिक इति युक्तम्। तदा खल्वयमणुपरिमाणो वा स्याद्देहपरिमाणो वा। अणुपरिमाणत्वे 'स्थूलोऽहम्, दीर्घः' इति च न स्यात्। देहपरिमाणत्वे तु

designated by the word *taila*. It is not however, determined that there is identity between *taila* and mustard oil. It follows then that secondary usage is pervaded by the cognition of the difference between the primary and the secondary by those who know both. Here, the pervader, *viz.*, cognition of difference eliminating (itself) also eliminates the secondary usage.

Nor may it be said that though the bodies of youth and old age are different, yet, from the recognition of an identical self in the judgement "I am he", it follows that there is an experience of the self as different from the body etc. Such a judgement is, verily, that of the critic, not of the man in the street. Even critics do not surpass the generality of men in respect of practical life. Indeed, the revered commentator says this presently in the words: **"And because there is no distinction from beasts etc."** Even outsiders say: "It is, verily, those who reflect on the *teaching* that make this distinction, not learners." Hence by elimination we see fit to hold that finitude is understood of the self by the man in the street who says "I am in this very abode etc.," in the same way as ether is cognised as limited by pot, ewer, basin etc.

Nor is it meet to say, in order to conserve the validity of (the use of) the word "I,"[19] that the self too, like the body etc., is finite. In that case, its size should be that of an atom or that of the body. If that of an atom, there would not be the usage "I am stout, or (I am) tall"; if that of the body, then, as made up of parts, there would result non-eternality, as in the case of the body. Further, on

this view, it must be either the aggregate of parts that intelligises or each part by itself. On the view of each part intelligising by itself, in the absence of a consensus among the many independent intelligences, either the body would be distracted or non-action would result, as the consequence of simultaneous activity in opposed directions. If intelligence be associated with the aggregate, then when one part is injured, the intelligent self too being injured in part would not intelligise. Nor is there seen any fixed relationship of co-existence among the many parts. When any one part is damaged, the aggregate cannot intelligise in the absence of that part.

Even if cognition (*vijñāna*) be the substrate, the illusoriness of the concept "I" continues the same, for, that (concept) manifests a permanent substance, while cognitions are fleeting. In this way, expressions like "I am fat, I am blind, I go" etc. are explained as due to superimposition.

The concept of "I" having been in this way shown to be (worthless as) a rotten gourd, the revered Scripture may proceed unhindered to remove from the self notions consequent on the experience of "I," such as agency, enjoyership happiness, misery, grief etc. Hence, in the words "**after superimposing on each**," etc., there are elaborated the nature, cause and result of the concept "I," whose illusoriness is well-known from all trustworthy Scripture, traditional codes, epics and *purāṇas*. Superimposing the nature of one of two substrates—the body and the self—on the other,

सावयवतया देहवदनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। किंच अस्मिन्पक्षे अवयवसमुदायो वा चेतयेत्, प्रत्येकं वावयवाः। प्रत्येकं चेतनत्वपक्षे बहूनां चेतनानां स्वतन्त्राणामेकवाक्यताभावादपर्यायं विरुद्धदिक्क्रियतया शरीरमुन्मथ्येत, अक्रियं वा प्रसज्येत। समुदायस्य तु चैतन्ययोगे वृक्ण एकस्मिन्नवयवे चिदात्मनोऽप्यवयवो वृक्ण इति न चेतयेत्। न च बहूनामवयवानां परस्पराविनाभावनियमो दृष्टः। य एवावयवो यदा विशीर्णस्तदा तदभावे न चेतयेत्।

विज्ञानालम्बनत्वेऽपि अहंप्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तत्वं तदवस्थमेव, तस्य स्थिरवस्तुनिर्भासत्वादस्थिरत्वाच्च विज्ञानानाम्। एतेन 'स्थूलोऽहम् अन्धोऽहम् गच्छामि' इत्यादयोऽपि अध्यासतया व्याख्याताः।

तदेवमुक्तेन क्रमेण अहंप्रत्यये पूतिकूष्माण्डीकृते भगवती श्रुतिः अप्रत्यूहं कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वसुखदुःखशोकाद्यात्मत्वमहमनुभवप्रसञ्जितमात्मनो निषेद्धुमर्हतीति। तदेवं सर्वप्रवादश्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणप्रथितमिथ्याभावस्याहंप्रत्ययस्य स्वरूपनिमित्तफलैरुपव्याख्यानम्—**अन्योन्यस्मिन्** इत्यादि। अन्योन्य-

स्मिन्धर्मिण्यात्मशरीरादौ अन्योन्यात्मकतामध्यस्य—अहमिदं शरीरादीति । 'इदम्' इति च वस्तुतः, न प्रतीतितः । **लोकव्यवहारः** लोकानां व्यवहारः । स च 'अयमहम्' इति व्यपदेशः । इतिशब्दसूचितश्च शरीराद्यनुकूलं प्रतिकूलं च प्रमेयजातं प्रमाणेन प्रमाय तदुपादानपरिवर्जनादिः ।

अन्योन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्य अन्योन्यस्मिन्धर्मिणि देहादिधर्मान् जन्ममरणजराव्याध्यादीनात्मनि धर्मिणि अध्यस्तदेहादिभावे समारोप्य, तथा चैतन्यादीनात्मधर्मान् देहादावध्यस्तात्मभावे समारोप्य 'ममेदं जरामरणपुत्रपशुस्वाम्यादि' इति व्यवहारो व्यपदेशः । इतिशब्दसूचितश्च तदनुरूपः प्रवृत्त्यादिः । अत्र च अध्यासव्यवहारक्रियाभ्यां यः कर्ता उन्नीतः स समान इति समानकर्तृकत्वेन '**अध्यस्य व्यवहारः**' इत्युपपन्नम् । पूर्वकालत्वसूचितमध्यासस्य व्यवहारकारणत्वं स्फुटयति—**मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः व्यवहारः** इति । मिथ्याज्ञानमध्यासः, तन्निमित्तः, तद्भावाभावानुविधानाद्व्यवहारभावाभावयोरित्यर्थः ।

e.g., "I am this body" etc. The (identification with) "this" (is) a matter of fact, not a matter of knowledge.[20] "**Empirical usage** (*lokavyavahāraḥ*)" means the usage of the world; that is designation of the form "I am this". By the word *iti* (in *aham idam iti*) there are indicated the acceptance, rejection etc. of what are known by means of valid knowledge to be beneficial or injurious to the body etc.

There is also the super-imposition of the attributes of one substrate on the other, *e.g.*, imposing the bodily attributes of birth, death, old age, disease etc., on the substrate, *i.e.*, the self on whom bodies etc., have been super-imposed, and similarly the attributes of the self such as intelligence etc., on the body etc., on which self-ness has been super-imposed; there is consequently the empirical usage, *i.e.*, the mode of speech "Mine is this—old age, death, son, cow, ownership etc." By *iti* (in *mame'dam iti*) is indicated activity etc. suitable to the above experience. The statement "**after superimposing** (there is) **the empirical usage**" is intelligible,[21] since the agent that is inferred for the acts of super-imposition and empirical usage is but one and the same. By indicating priority in time for the superimposition, it is made clear that it is the cause of the empirical usage, in the word: "**empirical usage with its cause in the illusory cognition**" etc. "Illusory cognition" is superimposition;[22] having that as the cause; that is, the existence or non-existence of empirical usage follows on the existence or non-existence of that (superimposition).

Having thus stated the nature of superimposition and its fruit, *viz.*, empirical usage, he states its cause in the words **"through non-discrimination of each from the other,"** *i.e., through non-apprehension of (their) distinctness.* Now, why should it not be that there is no difference at all? And thus, (if there were none), there would be no superimposition. To this he says: **"of the attribute and the substrate which are absolutely distinct."** Distinctness from the absolute standpoint means non-identity in the case of substrates, and non-confusion in the case of attributes.

Be this so. The delusion as to identity conditioned by non-apprehension of the difference between two real entities is intelligible, like the delusion of the identity with silver in the case of nacre, because of non-apprehension of their difference. Here, however, there is no real entity like the body, other than the intelligent self, which is the absolute reality. Whence then the non-apprehension of the distinctness of the intelligent self? Whence the delusion of identity? To this he replies: **"by coupling the true with the untrue."** The construction is: after superimposing because of non-apprehension of distinctness (through coupling the true etc.) The true is the intelligent self; the untrue are the intellect, the organs, the body etc.; coupling these two substrates; coupling means yoking. Because there cannot be any real coupling of the phenomenal with the absolutely real, there is used the *cvi* suffix (*mithunī-* instead of *mithunam-*), which signifies *what is not that becoming that as it were.* This is what is said: the imposition of what does not appear being impossible, what is required is the *cognition* of what is imposed, not its *real existence.*

तदेवमध्यासस्वरूपं फलं च व्यवहारमुक्त्वा तस्य निमित्तमाह—**इतरेतराविवेकेन** इति। विवेकाग्रहणेनेत्यर्थः। अथ अविवेक एव कस्मान्न भवति, तथा च नाध्यास इत्यत आह—**अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः**। परमार्थतो धर्मिणोरतादात्म्यं विवेकः धर्माणां चासंकीर्णता विवेकः।

स्यादेतत्। विविक्तयोर्वस्तुसतोर्भेदाग्रहनिबन्धनस्तादात्म्यविभ्रमो युज्यते शुक्तेरिव रजताद्भेदाग्रहे रजततादात्म्यविभ्रमः। इह तु परमार्थसतः चिदात्मनोऽन्यन्न देहाद्यस्ति वस्तुसत्, तत्कुतः चिदात्मनो भेदाग्रहः कुतश्च तादात्म्यविभ्रमः इत्यत आह—**सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य** इति। विवेकाग्रहादध्यस्येति योजना। सत्यं चिदात्मा, अनृतं बुद्धीन्द्रियदेहादि; ते द्वे धर्मिणी मिथुनीकृत्य युगलीकृत्येत्यर्थः। न च संवृतिपरमार्थसतोः पारमार्थिकं मिथुनमस्तीत्यभूततद्भावार्थस्य च्वेः प्रयोगः। एतदुक्तं भवति—अप्रतीतस्यारोपायोगादारोप्यस्य प्रतीतिरुपयुज्यते न वस्तुसत्तेति।

स्यादेतत्। आरोप्यस्य प्रतीतौ सत्यां पूर्वदृष्टस्य समारोपः समारोपनिबन्धना च प्रतीतिरिति दुर्वारं परस्पराश्रयत्वमित्यत आह—**नैसर्गिक** इति। स्वाभाविकः अनादिरयं व्यवहारः। व्यवहारानादितया तत्कारणस्याध्यासस्य अनादितोक्ता, ततश्च पूर्वपूर्वमिथ्याज्ञानोपदर्शितस्य बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरादेः उत्तरोत्तराध्यासोपयोग इत्यनादित्वात् बीजाङ्कुरवन्न परस्पराश्रयत्वमित्यर्थः।

स्यादेतत्। अद्धा पूर्वप्रतीतिमात्रमुपयुज्यते आरोपे, न तु प्रतीयमानस्य परमार्थसत्ता। प्रतीतिरेव तु अत्यन्तासतो गगनकमलिनीकल्पस्य देहेन्द्रियादेः नोपपद्यते। प्रकाशमानत्वमेव हि चिदात्मनोऽपि सत्त्वं न तु तदतिरिक्तं सत्तासामान्यसमवायोऽर्थक्रियाकारिता वा, द्वैतापत्तेः। सत्तायाश्चार्थक्रियाकारितायाश्च सत्तान्तरार्थक्रियाकारितान्तरकल्पने अनवस्थापातात् प्रकाशमानतैव सत्ता अभ्युपेतव्या। तथा च देहादयः प्रकाशमानत्वान्नासन्तः चिदात्मवत्, असत्त्वे वा न प्रकाशमानाः; तत्कथं सत्यानृतयोर्मिथुनीभावः?

Be this so. When there is cognition of what is superimposed, there is the superimposition of what was formerly seen, while *that cognition itself is conditioned by* superimposition; thus, (the defect of) reciprocal dependence seems difficult to avoid. To this he says: "**natural**". This empirical usage is natural, beginningless. Through the beginninglessness of the usage, there is declared the beginninglessness of its cause—superimposition.[23] Hence, of the intellect, organs, body etc., appearing in every prior illusory cognition, there is use in every subsequent instance of superimposition. This (process) being beginningless, like (the succession of) the seed and the sprout, there is no reciprocal dependence; this is the meaning.

Be this so. Certainly, it is only the prior appearance that counts in imposition, not the absolute reality of what appears. But even appearance is unintelligible in the case of the body, the organs etc., which are wholly unreal, and are comparable to the lotus-pond in the sky. The reality even of the intelligent self is but manifestation, and nothing other than that, like the inherence of the class-Being (*sattā-sāmānya-samavāya*) or practical efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritā*), as (the admission of) these would lead to duality.[24] Further, with the postulation of another Being and another practical efficiency (to determine the reality) of this *Being* and this *practically efficient*, we shall have an infinite regress. Hence, manifestation alone has to be admitted as constituting reality. Thus, the body etc., since they are manifest, are not unreal, being like the intelligent self; or else, if unreal, they cannot be manifest; how then can there be the coupling of

It may be asked: what is this thing called superimposition? The reply is: the appearance elsewhere, with a nature like to that of recollection, of what was seen before. Some speak of it as superimposition elsewhere of the attributes of another; but some others say that, when there is the superimposition of one on another, it is a delusion conditioned by the non-apprehension of their distinctness; others, however, say that, when there is the superimposition of one on another, there is an assumption in the latter of an opposite attribute. But in any case, it does not depart from the property of one appearing as having the attributes of another. And this is our experience in the world: nacre appears as if silver; the moon though one appears as if having a second.

the true with the untrue? In the absence of this (coupling) whose difference is it that is not apprehended? and from what? That (non-apprehension of difference) failing, whence the superimposition? With this in mind, the objector says: "**What is this thing called superimposition?**" The (pronoun) "what" has the sense of an objection. The respondent meets the objection by simply giving the definition of superimposition well-known to the world: "**The reply is—the appearance elsewhere, with a nature like to that of recollection, of what was seen before.**" *Avabhāsa* is that appearance which is terminated or depreciated. Termination or depreciation is sublation by another cognition; by this, it (*avabhāsa*) is said to be an illusory cognition.

आह—कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति । उच्यते —स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः । तं केचिदन्यत्रान्यधर्माध्यास इति वदन्ति । केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यासस्तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम इति । अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासस्तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मकल्पनामाचक्षत इति । सर्वथापि त्वन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति । तथा च लोकेऽनुभवः—शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवादिति ।

तदभावे वा कस्य कुतो भेदाग्रहः? तदसंभवे कुतोऽध्यासः? इत्याशयवान् आह आक्षेप्ता—**कोऽयमध्यासो नाम** इति । क इत्याक्षेपे । समाधाता लोकसिद्धमध्यासलक्षणमाचक्षाण एवाक्षेपं प्रतिक्षिपति—**उच्यते—स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभास** इति । अवसन्नः अवमतो वा भासः अवभासः । प्रत्ययान्तरबाधश्चास्य अवसादोऽवमानो वा । एतावता मिथ्याज्ञानमित्युक्तं भवति ।

तस्येदमुपव्याख्यानम् '**पूर्वदृष्ट**—' इत्यादि। पूर्वदृष्टस्यावभासः पूर्वदृष्टावभासः। मिथ्याप्रत्ययश्च आरोपविषयारोपणीयमिथुनमन्तरेण न भवतीति पूर्वदृष्टग्रहणेनानृतमारोपणीयमुपस्थापयति। तस्य च दृष्टत्वमात्रमुपयुज्यते न वस्तुसत्तेति दृष्टग्रहणम्। तथापि वर्तमानं दृष्टं दर्शनं नारोपोपयोगीति **पूर्व**—इत्युक्तम्। तच्च पूर्वदृष्टं स्वरूपेण सदप्यारोपणीयतया अनिर्वाच्यमित्यनृतम्। आरोपविषयं सत्यमाह—**परत्र** इति। परत्र शुक्तिकादौ परमार्थसति। तदनेन सत्यानृतमिथुनमुक्तम्।

स्यादेतत्। परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभास इत्यलक्षणम्, अतिव्यापकत्वात्। अस्ति हि स्वस्तिमत्यां गवि पूर्वदृष्टस्य गोत्वस्य परत्र कालाक्ष्यामवभासः। अस्ति च पाटलिपुत्रे पूर्वदृष्टस्य देवदत्तस्य परत्र माहिष्मत्यामवभासः समीचीनः। अवभासपदं च समीचीनेऽपि प्रत्यये प्रसिद्धम्, यथा नीलस्यावभासः पीतस्यावभास इति। अत आह—**स्मृतिरूप** इति। स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपमस्येति स्मृतिरूपः। असंनिहितविषयत्वं च स्मृतिरूपत्वम्।

This is the further commentary on that (definition): "**what was seen before**" etc. *Pūrva-dṛṣṭā-'vabhāsaḥ* means the appearance of what was seen before. The illusory appearance cannot come about without the coupling of the imposed element with that on which it is imposed; hence what is untrue and superimposed is understood by the words "what was seen before". The word "seen" is used to indicate that it (the superimposed element) counts only as *phenomenal* not as *absolutely real.* Even thus, what is now seen is not capable of being imposed; hence the use of the word "**before**". What was seen before, though real in its own nature, is yet, as superimposed, indeterminable and hence unreal. The locus of imposition, which is real, is stated in: "**elsewhere.**" Elsewhere, in nacre etc., which are absolutely real. Thus is declared the coupling of the true with the untrue.

Be this so. "The appearance elsewhere of what was seen before"—this is no definition, being too wide. There is, verily, in the cow, Kālākṣī, "the appearance of cowness" seen before in the cow, Svastimatī. There is also the appearance elsewhere, at Māhiṣmatī, of Devadatta formerly seen at Pāṭaliputra. (Both these appearances are) valid. The word "appearance (*avabhāsa*)" is indeed well-known as applied to valid experience, as in "the appearance of blue, the appearance of yellow" etc. To this he says: "**of a nature like to that of recollection.**" Its nature is like the nature of recollection. The non-presence of the object is of the essence of recollection; while recognition, which is valid, is of a present object. Hence, (the definition is) not too wide.

Nor is it too narrow; for, even dream-cognition which is of the same nature as delusive recollection is of this nature (given in the definition). There too, verily, because of the non-presence of the recollected parents etc. not being reflected upon, on account of the defect of sleep, there is here and there the superimposition of the time and place when they were formerly present and seen. Thus, the same definition is to be applied also to (experiences like) "the shell is yellow," "sugar is bitter". It is thus: the yellow, which resides in the bile that is in contact with the exceedingly pure rays going forth from the eye,[25] is experienced in dissociation from the bile; the shell too is experienced (but) with the whiteness concealed by a defect (in the sense-organ); the non-relation of the yellow colour to the shell is not experienced; because of similarity in respect of non-apprehension of non-relationship, the appositional relation previously seen in (experiences) like "yellow mass of gold, yellow *bilva* fruit" is imposed on yellow-ness and shell-ness and one speaks of the yellow shell. In this way too may be explained the apprehension "sugar is bitter".[26] Similarly, rays of light from the organ of sight come in contact with the pure mirror or sheet of water facing the cogniser, but they are reflected therefrom by the stronger rays of the Sun's light, and coming into contact with the face, apprehend the face; because of a defect, however, they do not apprehend the face as where it really is, *i.e.*, not facing oneself, but impose on it the property of facing oneself that belongs to the formerly seen mirror or sheet of water.[27] Thus, the definition

संनिहितविषयं च प्रत्यभिज्ञानं समीचीनमिति नातिव्याप्तिः ।

नाप्यव्याप्तिः, स्वप्नज्ञानस्यापि स्मृतिविभ्रमरूपस्यैवंरूपत्वात् । तत्रापि हि स्मर्यमाणे पित्रादौ निद्रोपप्लववशादसंनिधानापरामर्शे, तत्र तत्र पूर्वदृष्टस्यैव संनिहितदेशकालत्वस्य समारोपः । एवम् 'पीतः शङ्खः' 'तिक्तो गुडः' इत्यत्राप्येतल्लक्षणं योजनीयम् । तथा हि—बहिर्विनिर्गच्छदत्यच्छनयनरश्मिसंपृक्तपित्तद्रव्यवर्तिनीं पीततां पित्तरहितामनुभवन्, शङ्खं च दोषाच्छादितशुक्लिमानमनुभवन्, पीततायाश्च शङ्खासंबन्धमननुभवन्, असंबन्धाग्रहणसारूप्येण 'पीतं तपनीयपिण्डम्' 'पीतं बिल्वफलम्' इत्यादौ पूर्वदृष्टं सामानाधिकरण्यं पीतत्वशङ्खत्वयोरारोप्याह 'पीतः शङ्खः' इति । एतेन 'तिक्तो गुडः' इति प्रत्ययो व्याख्यातः । एवं विज्ञातृपुरुषाभिमुखेष्वादर्शोदकादिषु स्वच्छेषु चाक्षुषं तेजो लग्नमपि बलीयसा सौरेण तेजसा प्रतिस्रोतः प्रवर्तितं मुखसंयुक्तं मुखं ग्राहयत्, दोषवशात्तद्देशतामनभिमुखतां च मुखस्या-

ग्राहयत्, पूर्वदृष्टाभिमुखादर्शोदकदेशतामाभिमुख्यं च मुखस्यारोपयतीति प्रतिबिम्बविभ्रमोऽपि लक्षितो भवति। एतेन द्विचन्द्रदिङ्मोहालातचक्रगन्धर्वनगरवंशोरगादिविभ्रमेष्वपि यथासंभवं लक्षणं योजनीयम्।

एतदुक्तं भवति—न प्रकाशमानतामात्रं सत्त्वम्, येन देहेन्द्रियादेः प्रकाशमानतया सद्भावो भवेत्। न हि सर्पादिभावेन रज्ज्वादयो वा स्फटिकादयो वा रक्तादिगुणयोगिनो न प्रतिभासन्ते, प्रतिभासमाना वा भवन्ति तदात्मानस्तद्धर्माणो वा। तथा सति मरुषु मरीचिकानिचयम् 'उच्चावचमुच्चलत्तुङ्गतरङ्गभङ्गमालेयमभ्यर्णमवतीर्णा मन्दाकिनी' इत्यभिसंधाय प्रवृत्तः तत्तोयमापीय पिपासामुपशमयेत्। तस्मादकामेनापि प्रकाशमानस्याप्यारोपितस्य न वस्तुसत्त्वमभ्युपगमनीयम्।

न च मरीचिरूपेण सलिलमवस्तुसत् स्वरूपेण तु परमार्थसदेव देहेन्द्रियादयस्तु स्वरूपेणाप्यसन्त इत्यनुभवागोचरत्वात्कथमारोप्यन्त इति सांप्रतम्; यतो यद्यसन्तो नानुभवगोचराः कथं तर्हि

applies to the delusion of reflection too. In the same way are to be explained suitably delusions like the perception of two moons, loss of the sense of direction, the fiery circle, the *fata morgana* (*gandharva-nagara*),[28] the snake seen in the bamboo.[29]

This is what is said: it is not that manifestation alone constitutes reality, in which case, bodies, organs etc., by the very fact of manifestation, would be real. It is not as if ropes etc., do not appear as snakes etc., or crystals etc., as endowed with red colour and so on; nor, as thus appearing, do they really become those objects or endowed with those attributes. If that were so, one would conclude in the case of a mirage[30] that it is the Mandākinī which has come down close by, with her garlands of constantly agitated waves high and low, and proceeding (thereto) should be able to quench one's thirst by drinking of that water. Hence, of what is superimposed, even though manifest, absolute reality cannot be admitted, even though this (conclusion) be not desired.

Nor is it admissible to ask thus: "in the mirage, the water is unreal, but in its own nature (as mirage) it is absolutely real; whereas, the body, organs etc., are unreal even in their own nature, and as such cannot be the sphere of any experience; how then can they be superimposed?" For, if what is unreal cannot be the object of any experience, how then do the mirage etc., which are unreal, become the sphere of experience as water etc.? Though real in their own nature, they (the mirage etc.) cannot become real as water etc., as well.

It may be said: there is nothing called non-existence (*abhāva*) as distinct from existence (*bhāva*). An existent considered as of the nature of another existent becomes non-existence; but in its own nature it is but existence. As is said: "Non-existence is but another existent considered in relation to something else." [1] Hence, this, which may be explained as another mode of existence, may well be in the sphere of experience. The world, which is absolutely unreal, devoid of any capacity, devoid of any (true) essence, how can it be an object of experience? How, again, can it be superimposed on the intelligent self? Nor is it admissible that, though the objects (of experience) are wholly devoid of any capacity (to appear), the respective cognitions, through the capacity residing in them as cognitions, of themselves give rise to the appearance of the unreal, as a product of a unique nature, and that this capacity (of the cognitions) to make the unreal appear is Nescience. What is this faculty of cognition whereby it makes the unreal appear? What is it that it is capable of? If it is the unreal, is it effected or only made known by it? It cannot be effected, since that is unintelligible in the case of the unreal. Nor is it what is made known, since there is no other cognition known (other than that which makes manifest); further, (what is thus manifested being unreal and requiring its relation to the new cognition to be explained), infinite regress would result. If now, it be said that it is the very essence of cognition to manifest the unreal, what is this relation between the real and the unreal? If it be said that the

मरीच्यादीनामसतां तोयाद्यात्मतयानुभवगोचरत्वम् ? न च स्वरूपसत्त्वेन तोयाद्यात्मनापि सन्तो भवन्ति ।

यद्युच्येत—नाभावो नाम भावादन्यः कश्चिदस्ति, अपि तु भाव एव भावान्तरात्मना अभावः स्वेन रूपेण तु भावः । यथाहुः —

'भावान्तरमभावो हि कयाचित्तु व्यपेक्षया' ।

इति । ततश्च भावात्मनोपाख्येयतया अस्य युज्येत अनुभवगोचरता । प्रपञ्चस्य पुनरत्यन्तासतो निरस्त-समस्तसामर्थ्यस्य निस्तत्त्वस्य कुतोऽनुभवविषयभावः, कुतो वा चिदात्मन्यारोपः ? न च विषयस्य समस्त-सामर्थ्यविरहेऽपि विज्ञानमेव तत्तादृशं स्वप्रत्यय-सामर्थ्याददृष्टान्तसिद्धस्वभावभेदमुपजातमसतः प्रका-शनम्, तस्मादसत्प्रकाशनशक्तिरेवास्याविद्येति सां-प्रतम् । यतो येयमसत्प्रकाशनशक्तिर्विज्ञानस्य किं पुन-रस्याः शक्यम् ? असदिति चेत्, किमेतत्कार्यम्, आहोस्विदस्या ज्ञाप्यम् ? न तावत्कार्यम्, असत-स्तत्त्वानुपपत्तेः । नापि ज्ञाप्यम्, ज्ञानान्तरानुपलब्धेः, अनवस्थापाताच्च । विज्ञानस्वरूपमेव असतः प्रकाश इति चेत्, कः पुनरेष सदसतोः संबन्धः ?

असदधीननिरूपणत्वं सतो ज्ञानस्य असता संबन्ध इति चेत्, अहो बतायमतिनिर्वृतः प्रत्ययतपस्वी यदस्य असत्यपि निरूपणमायतते। न च प्रत्ययस्तत्राधत्ते किंचित्, असत आधारत्वायोगात्। असदन्तरेण प्रत्ययो न प्रथत इति प्रत्ययस्यैवैष स्वभावः न त्वसदधीनमस्य किंचिदिति चेत्, अहो बतास्य असत्पक्षपातः यदयमतदुत्पत्तिः अतदात्मा च तदविनाभावनियतः प्रत्यय इति। तस्मादत्यन्तासन्तः शरीरेन्द्रियादयो निस्तत्त्वा नानुभवविषया भवितुमर्हन्तीति।

अत्र ब्रूमः—निस्तत्त्वं चेन्नानुभवगोचरः, तत्किमिदानीं मरीचयोऽपि तोयात्मना सतत्त्वाः यदनुभवगोचराः स्युः। न सतत्त्वाः, तदात्मना मरीचीनामसत्त्वात्। द्विविधं च वस्तूनां तत्त्वम्—सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च। तत्र पूर्वं स्वतः, परं तु परतः। यथाहुः

'स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां नित्यं सदसदात्मके।
वस्तुनि ज्ञायते किंचिद्रूपं कैश्चित्कदाचन॥'

—इति। तत्किं मरीचिषु तोयनिर्भासप्रत्ययस्तत्त्वगोचरः? तथा च समीचीन इति न भ्रान्तो नापि

relation of cognition, which is real, to that which is unreal is that the former is made determinate under the control of what is unreal, lo! how very fortunate is this poor cognition that attains to determination even through the unreal. Nor does cognition do anything thereto, since being the support (of any such thing) is inappropriate in the case of what is unreal. If it be said that the cognition is not controlled by the unreal, but that it is of the very nature of cognition not to appear apart from the unreal, lo! unfortunate indeed is this partiality for the unreal, whereby cognition is invariably linked to the unreal, though neither originating therefrom nor of the same nature as that.[32] Hence, body, organs etc., which are wholly unreal and have no (true) essence, cannot become objects of experience.

To this we reply: if what has no (true) essence be not within the sphere of experience, are these rays real *as water*, in such wise that they may come within the sphere of experience? (The pūrvapakṣin says): They have no (true) essence (in the nature of water), since the rays are not of the nature of water. The essence of things is of two kinds, real or unreal, the former in respect of themselves, the latter in respect of things other than themselves. As is said: "The essence of things is grasped by some at some time or other either as real or as unreal in respect of (those things) themselves or in respect of others."[33] (We reply): Is the cognition of water in the rays in the sphere of the true? Then, being valid, it would not

be delusive; nor would it be sublated. (The pūrvapakṣin rejoins): certainly, it would not be sublated, if it apprehended the rays, which truly are not of the nature of water, as not of the nature of water. When apprehended as of the nature of water, however, how can it be non-delusive or non-sublated? Lo! then (we reply) of the rays whose nature is non-waterness, their nature as waterness is not real, since they, being non-different from non-waterness, cannot intelligibly be of the nature of waterness; nor is it unreal; for, it is recognised by you, in the words "Non-existence is existence in another form, not anything else, since no (such thing) is proved,"[21] that the unreality of one thing is but another thing. Nor is the imposed form another thing; if it were, it should be either the rays or the water in the Ganges. On the first alternative, the cognition would be of the form "rays," not of the form "water"; on the latter (alternative), it would be of the form "water in the Ganges," not "(water) here". (Further) if the particular place be not recollected, it should be (of the form) "water" (merely), not "here". Nor is it admissible that this is something wholly unreal, a mere falsehood devoid of all existence, since that cannot intelligibly be within the sphere of experience; this has been said earlier. Hence, the water superimposed on the rays has to be recognised to be indeterminable, being neither real nor unreal nor yet real and unreal, this (last) being self-contradictory. Thus, in this way, the superimposed water is like absolutely real water, and for that reason is like what was formerly seen; but really that is

बाध्येत। अद्धा! न बाध्येत यदि मरीचीनयं अतोयात्मतत्त्वानतोयात्मना गृह्णीयात्। तोयात्मना तु गृह्णन् कथमभ्रान्तः, कथं वा अबाध्यः? हन्त! तोयाभावात्मनां मरीचीनां तोयभावात्मत्वं तावन्न सत्, तेषां तोयाभावादभेदेन तोयभावात्मतानुपपत्तेः। नाप्यसत्; वस्त्वन्तरमेव हि वस्त्वन्तरस्यासत्त्वमास्थीयते

'भावान्तरमभावोऽन्यो न कश्चिदनिरूपणात्'

इति वदद्भिः। न चारोपितं रूपं वस्त्वन्तरम्; तद्धि मरीचयो वा भवेत्, गङ्गादिगतं तोयं वा। पूर्वस्मिन्कल्पे 'मरीचयः' इति प्रत्ययः स्यात्, न 'तोयम्' इति। उत्तरस्मिंस्तु 'गङ्गायां तोयम्' इति स्यात्, न पुनः 'इह' इति। देशभेदास्मरणे 'तोयम्' इति स्यात्, न पुनः 'इह' इति। न चेदमत्यन्तमसत् निरस्तसमस्तस्वरूपमलीकमेवास्तु इति सांप्रतम्, तस्यानुभवगोचरत्वानुपपत्तेः, इत्युक्तमधस्तात्। तस्मान्न सत्, नासत्, नापि सदसत् परस्परविरोधात्, इत्यनिर्वाच्यमेवारोपणीयं मरीचिषु तोयमास्थेयम्; तदनेन क्रमेणाध्यस्तं तोयं पर-

मार्थतोयमिव, अत एव पूर्वदृष्टमिव; तत्त्वतस्तु न तोयम्, न च पूर्वदृष्टम्; किं तु अनृतम् अनिर्वाच्यम्। एवं च देहेन्द्रियादिप्रपञ्चोऽपि अनिर्वाच्यः; अपूर्वोऽपि पूर्वमिथ्याप्रत्ययोपदर्शित इव परत्र चिदात्मन्यध्यस्यत इति उपपन्नम्, अध्यासलक्षणयोगात्। देहेन्द्रियादिप्रपञ्चबाधनं च उपपादयिष्यते। चिदात्मा तु श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहास-पुराणगोचरः तन्मूलतदविरुद्धन्यायनिर्णीतशुद्धबुद्ध-मुक्तस्वभावः सत्त्वेनैव निर्वाच्यः। अबाधिता स्वयंप्रकाशतैव अस्य सत्ता, सा च स्वरूपमेव चिदात्मनः, न तु तदतिरिक्तं सत्तासामान्य-समवायः अर्थक्रियाकारिता वा इति सर्वमवदातम्।

स चायमेवंलक्षणकोऽध्यासः अनिर्वचनीयः सर्वेषामेव संमतः परीक्षकाणाम्; तद्भेदे परं विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यनिर्वचनीयतां द्रढयितुमाह—**तं केचित्** इति।

अन्यधर्मस्य ज्ञानधर्मस्य रजतस्य; ज्ञाना-कारस्येति यावत्। अध्यासः **अन्यत्र** बाह्ये। सौत्रान्तिकनये तावद्बाह्यमस्ति वस्तुसत्; तत्र

not water, nor what was formerly seen; but it is untrue, indeterminable. In the same way, even the universe of bodies, organs etc. is indeterminable; though novel, yet they are superimposed on something other, *i.e.*, the intelligent self, in the same way as what was presented in prior erroneous cognitions. This is intelligible, since the definition of superimposition applies. The sublation of the universe of bodies, organs etc. will be explained later. As for the intelligent self, it is in the sphere of Scripture, traditional codes, epics and *purāṇas*; as ascertained by reasoning based on and not in conflict with these, it is of the nature of purity, intelligence and freedom, and is determinable as certainly real. Unsublated self-luminosity is its reality; that is of the very nature of the intelligent self, not something other (than this), such as inherence of the class-Being, or practical efficiency. Thus, everything is clear.

Superimposition, which is indeterminable and has been defined as above, is admitted by all inquirers, but there are considerable differences of detail. For this reason, in order to establish its indeterminability firmly, he says: "**Some speak of it**" etc.

"**Of the attribute of another,**" *i.e.*, of the attribute of the cognition, here, of silver; that is to say, of the form of the cognition. The superimposition is "**elsewhere,**" *i.e.*, outside. According to the Sautrāntika teaching, there is external reality; the imposition thereon of what is of the form of cognition (is superimposition). Even according

to the Vijñānavādins, though there is no external reality, yet there is an external falsehood created by the impressions of beginningless Nescience, and on this there is the imposition of what is of the form of cognition. And this is the justification: there is the general rule that whatever is experienced in a particular form should be accepted in that form, since its being other than that results (only) from a cognition of greater force which sublates it. When the sublating cognition "this is not silver" is intelligible even as sublating the *this*-element alone, it is not meet to take it to extend to the *silver*-element. For, if the substrate "silver" were sublated, then, both the silver and its attribute of "this-ness" would be sublated; it would be better to take it that the attribute "this-ness" alone is sublated, not the substrate "silver" as well. Hence it follows that silver which is sublated in respect of externality is by presumption confined to knowledge within us. Thus follows the imposition outside of what is of the form of cognition.

"But some others," *i.e.*, those who are not satisfied with the doctrine of imposition as of the form of cognition, "say that when there is the superimposition of one on another, it is a delusion conditioned by the non-apprehension of their distinctness". They state the reason for their dissatisfaction. That silver etc. are of the form of cognition should be established either by experience (perception) or by inference. Inference in this regard will be refuted later. As for experience, it must be either

ज्ञानाकारस्यारोपः । विज्ञानवादिनामपि, यद्यपि न बाह्यं वस्तुसत् तथाप्यनाद्यविद्यावासनारोपितमलीकं बाह्यम् ; तत्र ज्ञानाकारस्यारोपः । उपपत्तिश्च—यद्यादृशमनुभवसिद्धं रूपं तत्तादृशमेव अभ्युपेतव्यमित्युत्सर्गः ; अन्यथात्वं पुनरस्य बलवद्बाधकप्रत्ययवशात् ; 'नेदं रजतम्' इति बाधकस्य इदंतामात्रबाधेनाप्युपपत्तौ न रजतगोचरतोचिता । रजतस्य धर्मिणो बाधे हि रजतं च तस्य धर्म इदंता च बाधिते भवेताम् ; तद्वरमिदंतैवास्य धर्मो बाध्यताम्, न पुना रजतमपि धर्मि ; तथा च रजतं बहिर्बाधितमर्थादान्तरे ज्ञाने व्यवतिष्ठत इति ज्ञानाकारस्य बहिरध्यासः सिध्यति ।

केचित्तु—ज्ञानाकारख्यातावपरितुष्यन्तो वदन्ति—**यत्र यदध्यासः तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम** इति । अपरितोषकारणं चाहुः—विज्ञानाकारता रजतादेरनुभवाद्वा व्यवस्थाप्येत, अनुमानाद्वा । तत्रानुमानमुपरिष्टान्निराकरिष्यते । अनुभवोऽपि रजतप्रत्ययो वा स्यात्, बाधकप्रत्ययो

वा। न तावद्रजतानुभवः। स हि इदंकारास्पदं रजतमावेदयति न त्वान्तरम्। 'अहम्' इति हि तदा स्यात्, प्रतिपत्तुः प्रत्ययादव्यतिरेकात्। भ्रान्तं विज्ञानं स्वाकारमेव बाह्यतयाध्यवस्यति, तथा च नाहंकारास्पदमस्य गोचरः, ज्ञानाकारता पुनरस्य बाधकप्रत्ययप्रवेदनीयेति चेत्, हन्त बाधकप्रत्ययमालोचयत्वायुष्मान्। स किं पुरोवर्ति द्रव्यं रजताद्विवेचयति आहो ज्ञानाकारतामप्यस्य दर्शयति? तत्र ज्ञानाकारतोपदर्शनव्यापारं बाधकप्रत्ययस्य ब्रुवाणः श्लाघनीयप्रज्ञो देवानां प्रियः। पुरोवर्तित्वप्रतिषेधादर्थादस्य ज्ञानाकारतेति चेत्, न। असंनिधानाग्रहनिषेधादसंनिहितो भवति। प्रतिपत्तुरत्यन्तसंनिधानं त्वस्य प्रतिपत्रात्मकं कुतस्त्यम्? न चैष रजतस्य निषेधः, न च इदंतायाः, किं तु विवेकाग्रहप्रसञ्जितस्य रजतव्यवहारस्य। न च रजतमेव शुक्तिकायां प्रसञ्जितं रजतज्ञानेन। न हि रजतनिर्भासस्य शुक्तिकालम्बनं युक्तम्, अनुभवविरोधात्। न खलु सत्तामात्रेणालम्बनम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

the cognition of silver or the cognition that sublates it. It is not the experience of silver (that intimates its nature to be the form of cognition); for, that makes known silver as having for its substrate, the "this," not what is within; for, in that case, because of the non-difference of the cogniser from the cognition, it (the cognition) would be (of the form) "I (am silver)". (The ātmakhyātivādin may say): delusive cognition determines its own form to be external; and thus, its sphere is not the substrate of the word "I"; its being of the form of cognition is to be known from the sublating cognition. If this be said, (we reply): lo! let the long-lived one reflect on this sublating cognition. Does that distinguish from silver the object present before us, or also show of it that its nature is of the form of cognition? The intelligence of that person beloved of the gods,[35] who says of the sublating cognition that it has the function of making known (the prior experience to have) the form of cognition, is indeed to be praised! If it be said that (its being) of the form of cognition follows by presumption from the negation of the presence (of silver) before us, no (we reply); for, from the denial of the non-apprehension of non-proximity, it would become non-proximate (to the cogniser); whence then the extreme proximity to the cogniser such that it is of his own nature? And this (sublating cognition) denies neither the silver nor the this-ness, but the empirical usage of silver occasioned by the non-apprehension of distinctness. Nor by the cognition of silver is silver itself occasioned in nacre; for, the presentation of silver cannot have nacre as its basis, that being opposed to experience. Nor is it

the basis as existent alone (not as known), since that would be too wide (a basis); for, existentiality being common to all things, it would follow that any of them could be the basis. Nor (is nacre the basis) as the cause (of the cognition), for, the senses too are causes. Hence, the meaning of the word "basis" is but manifestation. And since nacre is not manifest in the cognition of silver, how can it be the basis? Or if manifestation be admitted, how can there be no opposition to experience? Further, since the senses etc., are seen to have the capacity to generate valid knowledge, how can illusory cognition result from them? If it be said that in conjunction with defects they acquire the capacity to (generate) illusory cognition, no (we reply), since defects can cause only the counter-action of the generative capacity (of a cause); else even from the parched *kuṭaja* seed there would result the springing up of a banyan shoot. Further, if cognitions fail to be constant to their (proper) spheres, there would result loss of confidence in everything. It should, therefore, be recognised that all cognition is valid. Thus, the cognitions—"silver" and "this"—are of two kinds, memory and experience; here, "this" is the apprehension of a mere object in front (of us); because of a defect, the class-nature of nacreity, which is there, is not apprehended; the bare "that," which has been apprehended, calls up, because of similarity, the memory of silver, through reviving the impressions (of the former experience of silver). That (memory) though, of the nature of an apprehension of what has been apprehended, stands as bare apprehension, the element of (the content) having been apprehended being lost through a

सर्वेषामर्थानां सत्त्वाविशेषादालम्बनत्वप्रसङ्गात् । नापि कारणत्वेन, इन्द्रियादीनामपि कारणत्वात् । तथा च भासमानतैवालम्बनार्थः । न च रजतज्ञाने शुक्तिका भासते, इति कथमालम्बनम् ? भासमानताभ्युपगमे वा कथं नानुभवविरोधः ? अपि चेन्द्रियादीनां समीचीनज्ञानोपजनने सामर्थ्यमुपलब्धमिति कथमेभ्यो मिथ्याज्ञानसंभवः ? दोषसहितानां तेषां मिथ्याप्रत्ययेऽपि सामर्थ्यमिति चेत्, न, दोषाणां कार्योपजननसामर्थ्यविघातमात्रे हेतुत्वात्; अन्यथा प्लुष्टादपि कुटजबीजाद्वटाङ्कुरोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । अपि च स्वगोचरव्यभिचारे विज्ञानानां सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात्सर्वं ज्ञानं समीचीनमास्थेयम् । तथा च 'रजतम्', 'इदम्' इति च द्वे विज्ञाने स्मृत्यनुभवरूपे । तत्र 'इदम्' इति पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यमात्रग्रहणम्, दोषवशात्तद्गतशुक्तित्वसामान्यविशेषस्याग्रहात् तन्मात्रं च गृहीतं सदृशतया संस्कारोद्बोधक्रमेण रजते स्मृतिं जनयति । सा च गृहीतग्रहणस्वभावापि दोषवशाद्गृहीतत्वांशप्रमोषात् ग्रहणमात्रमवतिष्ठते । तथा

च रजतस्मृतेः पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यमात्रग्रहणस्य च मिथः स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च भेदाग्रहात्, संनिहित-रजतगोचरज्ञानसारूप्येण 'इदम्', 'रजतम्', इति द्वे एते अपि ग्रहणस्मरणे अभेदव्यवहारं सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशं च प्रवर्तयतः। क्वचित्पुन-र्ग्रहणे एव मिथः अगृहीतभेदे, यथा 'पीतः शङ्खः' इति। अत्र हि विनिर्गच्छन्नयनरश्मिवर्तिनः पित्तद्रव्यस्य काचस्येव स्वच्छस्य पीतत्वं गृह्यते पित्तं तु न गृह्यते। शङ्खोऽपि दोषवशाच्छुक्ल-गुणरहितः स्वरूपमात्रेण गृह्यते। तदनयोर्गुण-गुणिनोरसंसर्गाग्रहसारूप्यात् पीततपनीयपिण्डप्रत्यया-विशेषेणाभेदव्यवहारः सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशश्च। भेदाग्रहप्रसञ्जिताभेदव्यवहारबाधनाच्च 'नेदम्' इति विवेकप्रत्ययस्य बाधकत्वमप्युपपद्यते; तदुपपत्तौ च प्राक्तनस्य प्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तत्वमपि लोकसिद्धं सिद्धं भवति। तस्माद्यथार्थाः सर्वे विप्रतिपन्नाः संदेहविभ्रमाः, प्रत्ययत्वात्, घटादिप्रत्ययवत्। तदिदमुक्तम्—**यत्र यदध्यास** इति। यस्मिन् शुक्तिकादौ यस्य रजतादेरध्यास इति लोक-

defect. Thus, there is non-apprehension of the difference between the memory of the silver and the apprehension of the bare object before us, whether in their own nature (as cognitions) or in respect of their contents; hence, because of resemblance to the cognition of silver, where it is actually in (sense-) contact, the two cognitions—"this" and "silver"—though different (in nature) as perception and memory, bring about empirical usage as non-different and appositional designation. In some cases, again, there are but two perceptions whose reciprocal difference is not apprehended as in "the shell is yellow". In that case, as (for instance) in the case of a pure crystal, there is apprehended as present in the rays of light going forth from the eyes the yellowness of the bile, but the bile itself is not apprehended. The shell too, because of some defect, is apprehended as barely existent, but as devoid of the quality of whiteness. Because of similarity in respect of the non-apprehension of the non-relation between the quality and the qualified, there is empirical usage as non-different and appositional designation, in exactly the same way as in the cognition of the yellow mass of gold. (When there is sublation) what is sublated is the empirical usage as non-different occasioned by the non-apprehension of difference; hence is intelligible the sublating nature of the cognition of distinctness in the form "not this"; and this being intelligible, there is also established what is established in the world—the delusiveness of the prior cognition. Therefore, all cognitions doubtful or delusive, about (the nature of) which there is dispute, are true,[36] because they are cognitions, like the cognition of a pot etc. This is the view explained in the words: **"when there is the superimposition of one on another."** When on

nacre etc., there is what is well-known to the world as the superimposition of silver etc., that is not conditioned by the cognition as something else, but it is rather a delusion conditioned by the non-apprehension of the distinctness between (on the one hand) silver and the memory of it which by the loss of the element of (the content) having been apprehended stands as bare apprehension, and (on the other hand) the bare object which is present before us as "this" and the cognition thereof. And delusiveness consists in the appositional designation of memory and apprehension with reference to each other, and in the empirical usage as silver etc.

"Others, however," who are not satisfied even with this, "say that when there is superimposition of one on another, there is an assumption in the latter of an opposite attribute". This is the underlying idea: it is (knowledge) common to all that because of the cognition "this is silver," there is for him who seeks silver activity and appositional designation in respect of the substance in front (of him). That cannot come about from the bare failure to apprehend the reciprocal difference between memory and apprehension or their respective spheres; for, how could the activity and speech of an intelligent being, which are conditioned by apprehension, result from bare non-apprehension? Now, it has been said that it results not from bare non-apprehension, but from memory and apprehension, where their difference in respect of their nature and contents is not apprehended; because of the similarity to the valid cognition of silver before us, they give rise to empirical usage as non-different and appositional designation. (To this, the supporter of anyathākhyāti replies:) Now, the similarity of this to the valid cognition

प्रसिद्धिः नासावन्यथाख्यातिनिबन्धना, किं तु गृहीतस्य रजतादेस्तत्स्मरणस्य च गृहीततांश-प्रमोषेण गृहीतमात्रस्य यः 'इदम्' इति पुरोऽवस्थिताद्द्रव्यमात्रात्तत्प्रज्ञानाच्च विवेकः, तद-ग्रहणनिबन्धनो भ्रमः। भ्रान्तत्वं च ग्रहण-स्मरणयोरितरेतरसामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशो रजतादि-व्यवहारश्चेति।

अन्ये तु—अत्राप्यपरितुष्यन्तः—**यत्र यद-ध्यासस्तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मकल्पनामाचक्षते।** अत्रेदमाकूतम्—अस्ति तावद्रजतार्थिनः 'रजत-मिदम्' इति प्रत्ययात्पुरोवर्तिनि द्रव्ये प्रवृत्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशश्चेति सर्वजनीनम्। तदे-तन्न तावद्ग्रहणस्मरणयोस्तद्गोचरयोश्च मिथो भेदाग्रहमात्राद्भवितुमर्हति। ग्रहणनिबन्धनौ हि चेतनस्य व्यवहारव्यपदेशौ कथमग्रहणमात्राद्भवे-ताम्? ननूक्तं नाग्रहणमात्रात्, किं तु ग्रहणस्मरणे एव मिथः स्वरूपतो विषयतश्चा-गृहीतभेदे, समीचीनपुरःस्थितरजतविज्ञानसादृश्येना-भेदव्यवहारं सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशं च प्रवर्तयतः।

अथ समीचीनज्ञानसारूप्यमनयोर्गृह्यमाणं वा व्यवहारप्रवृत्तिहेतुः, अगृह्यमाणं वा सत्तामात्रेण। गृह्यमाणेऽपि 'समीचीनज्ञानसारूप्यमनयोरिदमिति रजतमिति च ज्ञानयोः' इति ग्रहणम्, अथ वा 'तयोरेव स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च मिथो भेदाग्रहः' इति ग्रहणम्। तत्र न तावत्समीचीनज्ञानसदृशी इति ज्ञानं समीचीनज्ञानवद्व्यवहारप्रवर्तकम्। न हि 'गोसदृशो गवयः' इति ज्ञानं गवार्थिनं गवये प्रवर्तयति। 'अनयोरेव भेदाग्रहः' इति तु ज्ञानं पराहतम्; न हि भेदाग्रहे अनयोरिति भवति, अनयोरिति ग्रहे भेदाग्रहणमिति न भवति। तस्मात्सत्तामात्रेण भेदाग्रहः अगृहीत एव व्यवहारहेतुरिति वक्तव्यम्। तत्र किमयमारोपोत्पादक्रमेण व्यवहारहेतुः, आहो अनुत्पादितारोप एव स्वत इति? वयं तु पश्यामः—चेतनव्यवहारस्य अज्ञानपूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः आरोपज्ञानोत्पादक्रमेणैव—इति। ननु सत्यं चेतनव्यवहारो नाज्ञानपूर्वकः, किं तु अविदितविवेकग्रहणस्मरणपूर्वक इति। मैवम्। न हि रजतप्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रस्मरणं

may be the cause of empirical usage either by being apprehended, or by its bare existence, without being apprehended. Even if it be apprehended, the apprehension must be of the form "Of the cognitions 'this' and 'silver' there is resemblance to valid cognition," or of the form "Between those very two no difference is apprehended in respect of their nature or contents". Of these, the cognition "this is *like* valid cognition" cannot lead to empirical usage in the same way as valid cognition. The cognition "*Gavaya* is like a cow" does not, verily, induce activity in respect of a *gavaya* in him who seeks a cow. As for the cognition "non-apprehension of the difference between those very two," that is self-contradictory where there is non-apprehension of difference, it cannot be of the form "between the two"; nor, when there is the apprehension "between the two," can there be non-apprehension of difference. Hence, it must be said that the non-apprehension of difference, not being itself apprehended, is the cause of empirical usage by the bare fact of its existence. Is it, then, the cause of empirical usage through creating an imposition or of itself without creating an imposition? This is how we look at it: since the empirical usage of an intelligent being cannot intelligibly be consequent on ignorance, (it must be effective) only as creating an imposed cognition. Now (it may be objected) it is true that the activity of an intelligent being is consequent not on ignorance, but on apprehension and memory whose distinctness is not known. Not so (we reply); truly, it is not the memory of the bare root-meaning of the word "silver" that causes activity; for, it is undisputed that the activity of one who seeks silver is directed to the substrate of "this-ness".

How can one be active in respect of the substrate of "this-ness" unless one desires it? It is self-contradictory to say that he desires one thing and works for something else. And, not knowing that it is silver which is the substrate of the "this-ness," how can one who seeks silver desire it? If one says (that desire is) due to (the substrate of the "this-ness") not being apprehended as not of the nature of that (silver), that (one) is to be answered thus: since it is not apprehended to be of the nature of that (silver), why is not one indifferent to it? Thus, this intelligent being pulled in opposite directions by acceptance and indifference is unsettled, and is finally settled in the attitude of acceptance by the imposition of silver on the substrate of "this-ness";[37] thus, the non-apprehension of difference is the cause of the activity of an intelligent being, through creating superimposition. It is thus: because of the non-apprehension of difference the quality of silver is imposed on the substrate of "this-ness"; the fact that what belongs to that class (silver) is advantageous is next brought to mind; that (advantageousness) is next inferred in respect of the silver (imposed) on the substrate of "this-ness," as it belongs to that class; then, he who seeks silver engages in activity in respect of that (imposed silver); thus is the sequence established. The memory of silver in general cannot help one to infer the advantageousness of the substrate of "this-ness," as the *probans*, silver-ness, would not be known to reside in the subject. Perception (of subject and *probans*) in the same place is, verily, the cause of inference, not perception in different places. As is said: "(Inference follows) from perception (of *probans* and subject) in the same place by one who knows the relation

प्रवृत्तावुपयुज्यते । इदंकारास्पदाभिमुखी खलु रजतार्थिनां प्रवृत्तिरित्यविवादम् । कथं चायमिदंकारास्पदे प्रवर्तेत यदि तु न तदिच्छेत् ? अन्यदिच्छत्यन्यत्करोतीति व्याहतम् । न चेदिदंकारास्पदं रजतमिति जानीयात् कथं रजतार्थी तदिच्छेत् ? यदि अतथात्वेनाग्रहणात् इति ब्रूयात्, स च प्रतिवक्तव्यः, अथ तथात्वेनाग्रहणात् कस्मान्नोपेक्षेतेति । सोऽयमुपादानोपेक्षाभ्यामुभयत आकृष्यमाणश्चेतनः अव्यवस्थितः इदंकारास्पदे रजतसमारोपेणोपादान एव व्यवस्थाप्यते, इति भेदाग्रहः समारोपोत्पादक्रमेण चेतनप्रवृत्तिहेतुः । तथा हि—भेदाग्रहादिदंकारास्पदे रजतत्वं समारोप्य, तज्जातीयस्योपकारहेतुभावमनुचिन्त्य, तज्जातीयतयेदंकारास्पदे रजते तमनुमाय, तदर्थी प्रवर्तते इत्यानुपूर्व्यं सिद्धम् । न च तटस्थरजतस्मृतिः इदंकारास्पदस्योपकारहेतुभावमनुमापयितुमर्हति, रजतत्वस्य हेतोरपक्षधर्मत्वात् । एकदेशदर्शनं खल्वनुमापकं न त्वनेकदेशदर्शनम् । यदाहुः—"ज्ञातसंबन्धस्यैकदेशदर्शनात्" इति । समारोपे त्वेक-

देशदर्शनमस्ति। तत्सिद्धम्—एतद्विवादाध्यासितं रजतादिज्ञानं पुरोवर्तिवस्तुविषयम्, रजतार्थिनस्तत्र नियमेन प्रवर्तकत्वात्; यद्यदर्थिनं यत्र नियमेन प्रवर्तयति तज्ज्ञानं तद्विषयं यथोभयसिद्धसमीचीन-रजतज्ञानम्; तथा चेदम्; तस्मात्तथा—इति। यच्चोक्तम् अनवभासमानतया न शुक्तिरालम्बन-मिति, तत्र भवान् पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम्—किं शुक्तिकात्वस्य 'इदं रजतम्' इति ज्ञानं प्रत्यना-लम्बनत्वम् आहोस्वित् द्रव्यमात्रस्य पुरःस्थितस्य सितभास्वरस्य? यदि शुक्तिकात्वस्य अनालम्बन-त्वम्, अहा! उत्तरस्यानालम्बनत्वं ब्रुवाणस्य तवैवानुभवविरोधः। तथा हि—'रजतमिदम्' इत्यनुभवन्ननुभविता पुरोवर्ति वस्तु अङ्गुल्यादिना निर्दिशति। दृष्टं च दुष्टानां कारणानामौत्सर्गिक-कार्यप्रतिबन्धेन कार्यान्तरोपजननसामर्थ्यम्, यथा दावाग्निदग्धानां वेत्रबीजानां कदलीकाण्डजनकत्वम्, भस्मकदुष्टस्य चौदर्यस्य तेजसो बह्वन्नपचनमिति। प्रत्यक्षबाधापहृतविषयं च विभ्रमाणां यथार्थत्वानु-मानमाभासः, हुतवहानुष्णत्वानुमानवत्। यच्चोक्तं

(*vyāpti*)." This perception in the same place occurs in superimposition. Hence is established (the following inference): the subject of dispute, *i.e.*, the cognition of silver etc., has the object before one for its content, since in him who seeks silver etc., it invariably induces activity in respect of that (object in front); that cognition which invariably induces activity in him who seeks a thing has that thing for its content, as in the valid cognition of silver admitted by both of us; this (cognition) is also so; therefore, that is so (*i.e.*, the cognition of silver has the substrate of "this-ness" for its content). As for what was said about nacre not being the basis, since it is not presented, you being questioned will have to explain this: of what is it that you say it is not the basis of the cognition "this is silver"? Is it of the nacreity or merely of the white bright substance in front? If not being the basis belongs to the nacreity, certainly, (we agree). As for the latter not being the basis, you alone who assert it contradict experience. It is thus: he, who has the experience "this is silver," does, while so experiencing, indicate the substance in front with his finger etc. It is also seen that where causes are obstructed by a defect in the production of their normal effects they acquire the capacity to produce other effects; *e.g.*, the seeds of the cane parched by the forest-fire produce plantain-stems; the digestive fire of him whose stomach is affected by *bhasmaka*[38] can digest a large quantity of food. The inference of the truth of delusions which are deprived of their contents by sublating perceptions is fallacious, like the inference that fire is not hot. As for what was said about the loss of confidence in all

means of valid knowledge if illusory cognitions be said to be inconstant (to their contents), that is met in the *Nyāyakaṇikā* by us who declare that (for cognition) there is self-validity through (the very fact of) its conveying knowledge and not through its constancy (to its content); hence it is not dilated on here.[39] The criticism of the doctrine of the loss (of the memory-ness) of memory has been stated here only in brief; it is to be learnt in detail from the *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā*. Hence it is said: "**others however say that when there is superimposition of one on another there is an assumption in the latter of an opposite attribute.**" When on nacre etc., there is imposition of silver etc., there is the attribution of the properties of silver etc., which are opposed to that very nacre etc.: this is the construction.

Now, let there be these differences among inquirers; what of that in the present context? To this he says: "**But in any case,**" etc. The assumption of the attributes of one thing in the case of another, that is untruth (*anṛtatā*); we have explained above that that is indeterminability. From that (it would follow that) in the systems of all inquirers this indeterminable assumption of the attributes of one thing in another has necessarily to find a place; hence this indeterminability is an accepted doctrine in all systems: this is the meaning. The idea is that this must be admitted, though unwillingly, by those who maintain the view of non-apprehension (of difference between memory and apprehension) inasmuch as they favour the invariability of appositional designation and activity.

मिथ्याप्रत्ययस्य व्यभिचारे सर्वप्रमाणेष्वनाश्वास इति, तत् बोधकत्वेन स्वतःप्रामाण्यं नाव्यभिचारेणेति व्युत्पादयद्भिरस्माभिः परिहृतं न्यायकणिकायामिति नेह प्रतन्यते। दिङ्मात्रं चास्य स्मृतिप्रमोषभङ्ग-स्योक्तम् ; विस्तरस्तु ब्रह्मतत्त्वसमीक्षायामवगन्तव्य इति। तदिदमुक्तम्—**अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासस्तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मकल्पनामाचक्षते** इति। यत्र शुक्तिकादौ यस्य रजतादेरध्यासस्तस्यैव शुक्तिकादेर्विपरीतधर्मकल्पनां रजतत्वधर्मकल्पनामिति योजना।

ननु सन्तु नाम परीक्षकाणां विप्रतिपत्तयः, प्रकृते तु किमायातमित्यत आह—**सर्वथापि** इति। अन्यस्यान्यधर्मकल्पना अनृतता, सा च अनिर्वचनीयतेत्यधस्तादुपपादितम्। तेन सर्वेषामेव परीक्षकाणां मते अन्यस्यान्यधर्मकल्पनानिर्वच-नीयावश्यंभाविनीत्यनिर्वचनीयता सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त इत्यर्थः। अख्यातिवादिभिरकामैरपि सामा-नाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशप्रवृत्तिनियमस्नेहादिदमभ्युपेयमिति भावः।

कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषयेऽध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणाम्? सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति; युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनोऽविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि। उच्यते—न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः, अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात्, अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः। न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यासितव्यमिति। अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालास्तलमलिनतामध्यस्यन्ति। एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यप्यनात्मनामध्यासः।

न केवलमियमनृतता परीक्षकाणां सिद्धा, अपि तु लौकिकानामपीत्याह—**तथा च लोके अनुभवः शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासत** इति। न पुना रजतमिदमिति शेषः।

स्यादेतत्। अन्यस्यान्यात्मताविभ्रमो लोकसिद्धः, एकस्य त्वभिन्नस्य भेदभ्रमो न दृष्ट इति कुतः

Again, how can there be the superimposition of the object and its attributes on the inner self, which is a non-object? For, everyone superimposes an object on another object that is present before him; and you say that the inner self, which is outside the concept of "Thou," is a non-object. The reply is: now, this is not invariably a non-object, because it is the object of the concept "I," and because of the immediacy of the realisation of the inner self. And there is no rule that an object can be superimposed only on another object that is present before one. For, upon ether, though not perceptible, the unthinking superimpose surface, impurity etc. Similarly there is no contradiction in the superimposition of the non-self even on the inner self.

This untruth is established in the case not only of inquirers, but also of the man in the street; hence he says: **"And thus is our experience in the world—nacre appears as (if it were) silver."** "This, again, is not silver"; this is the complement (to the above sentence).

Be this so. The delusion that one thing is of the nature of another is established in experience; but there is not seen the delusion of difference in the case of what is one and non-different; whence the delusion of difference for the *jīvās* who are not different from the intelligent

self? To this he says: "**the moon, though one, appears as if having a second.**"

In the words "**Again, how,**" etc., the superimposition on the intelligent self is again objected to. This is the meaning: is this intelligent self manifest or not? If it be not manifest, how can there be the superimposition of objects and their attributes thereon? There is not, verily, the superimposition of silver or its attributes on a non-manifest substance in front (of us). If this self is manifest, it does not stand to reason that it is inert, and manifested in dependence on another, like a pot etc.[10] (The self that is manifest should be either self-manifest or manifested by another; it is not the latter; nor can it be the former.) Verily, the same thing cannot be both agent and object, because of contradiction. The object is, indeed, that which can bear the fruit of activity inherent in another; the knowing activity is not inherent in another (than the self); how, then, can that (self) be the object thereof? Nor can the same be both self- and other- (dependent), because of contradiction. But if inherence (of the knowing activity) in another self be admitted, the known self would become a not-self (not being the subject of that activity). Further, for that (another knowing self would be required, and) for that (another), so that there is infinite regress.

(He who holds that consciousness is self-manifest, but not the self, may say:) be this so. The self, though inert, though manifest in the cognitions of all things, is agent alone, not object, being, like Caitra, not characterised by bearing the fruit of activity inherent in another. In Caitra's reaching a city through activity inherent in

चिदात्मनोऽभिन्नानां जीवानां भेदविभ्रम इत्यत आह—**एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवत्** इति ।

पुनरपि चिदात्मन्यध्यासमाक्षिपति—**कथं पुनः** इति । अयमर्थः—चिदात्मा प्रकाशते न वा ? न चेत् प्रकाशते, कथमस्मिन्नध्यासो विषय-तद्धर्माणाम् ? न खल्वप्रतिभासमाने पुरोवर्तिनि द्रव्ये रजतस्य वा तद्धर्माणां वा समारोपः संभवति । प्रतिभासमाने वा न तावदयमात्मा जडो घटादि-वत्पराधीनप्रकाश इति युक्तम् । न खलु स एव कर्ता च कर्म च भवति, विरोधात् । परसमवेत-क्रियाफलशालि हि कर्म, न च ज्ञानक्रिया परसमवायिनीति कथमस्याः कर्म ? न च तदेव स्वं च परं च, विरोधात् । आत्मान्तरसमवायाभ्युप-गमे तु ज्ञेयस्यात्मनः अनात्मत्वप्रसङ्गः । एवं तस्य तस्येत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः ।

स्यादेतत् । आत्मा जडोऽपि सर्वार्थज्ञानेषु भास-मानोऽपि कर्तैव न कर्म, परसमवेतक्रियाफल-शालित्वाभावात्, चैत्रवत् । यथा हि चैत्रसमवेत-क्रियया चैत्रनगरप्राप्तावुभयसमवेतायामपि क्रिय-

माणायां नगरस्यैव कर्मता, परसमवेतक्रियाफल-शालित्वात्, न तु चैत्रस्य क्रियाफलशालिनोऽपि, चैत्रसमवायाद्गमनक्रियाया इति ।

तन्न, श्रुतिविरोधात् । श्रूयते हि 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इति ।

उपपद्यते च । तथा हि—योऽयमर्थप्रकाशः फलं यस्मिन्नर्थश्च आत्मा च प्रथेते स किं जडः स्वयंप्रकाशो वा ? जडश्चेत् विषयात्मानावपि जडाविति कस्मिन् किं प्रकाशेत अविशेषात्, इति प्राप्तमान्ध्यमशेषस्य जगतः । तथा चाभाणकः—

'अन्धस्येवान्धलग्नस्य विनिपातः पदे पदे'

इति । न च निलीनमेव विज्ञानमर्थात्मानौ ज्ञापयति चक्षुरादिवदिति वाच्यम् । ज्ञापनं हि ज्ञानजननम्, जनितं च ज्ञानं जडं सन्नोक्त-दूषणमतिवर्तेतेति । एवमुत्तरोत्तराण्यपि ज्ञानानि जडानीत्यनवस्था । तस्मादपराधीनप्रकाशा संविदु-पेतव्या ।

तथापि किमायातं विषयात्मनोः स्वभावजडयोः ? एतदायातं यत्तयोः संविदजडेति । तत्किं पुत्रः

himself, though the product inheres in both Caitra and the city, the object-ness belongs to the city alone, since to that belongs the property of bearing the fruit of activity inherent in another, and not to Caitra, though he too bears the fruit of activity, as the act of going is inherent in Caitra (alone).

This is not (sound), because of opposition to Scripture. Scripture, indeed, says: "Truth, knowledge, infinitude *is* Brahman."

This is intelligible too. It is thus: that fruit, which is the manifestation of the object, that in which the object and the self manifest themselves, is that inert or self-manifest? If that were inert, both the object and the self would be inert; which, then, would be manifest in which, there being no distinction (among the three)? Thus would result non-manifestation for the whole universe. (Nor can the reciprocal dependence of these three be of any avail); and thus the proverb: "As the blind holding on to the blind falls at every step." Nor may it be said that cognition, being itself hidden, (yet) makes known both the object and the self, like the sense of sight etc. (which, themselves unperceived, yet cause perception); for, to make known is to produce cognition, and the cognition that is produced, being inert, would not surmount the above-mentioned defect (of the blind leading the blind). Thus, the subsequent cognitions too being inert, there would be infinite regress. Therefore, consciousness should be acknowledged to be manifested without dependence on another.

Even thus, what is gained (by you) for the object and the self, which (you hold) are both inert by nature? This is the gain. (you may say), that the consciousness of

them is not inert. (But it does not follow that the object and the self, the causes of consciousness, are not inert); in that case, because the son is a scholar, should the father be a scholar too? It is of the very nature of the self-luminous consciousness to be related to the object and the self: if this be said, alas! then, it is equally the nature of the scholarly son to be related to his father. (You may define the relation thus): the manifestation of consciousness is along with the manifestation of the object and the self, never without the manifestation of the object and the self; this is its nature. If this be said, is consciousness, then, different from the manifestation of consciousness (on the one hand), and the manifestation of the object and the self (on the other)? If that were so, then, consciousness would no longer be self-manifest, nor would consciousness be the manifestation of the object and the self. Then, (you may say), the two manifestations, of consciousness and of the object and self, are not different from consciousness; these two are but consciousness. If this be said, then, what is said in "consciousness (goes) along with the object and the self," that (alone) is what is said in "(the manifestation of) consciousness (goes) along with the manifestation of the object and the self" (so that there is no advance in your position)." (Hence), what is desired to be stated by you (that the self, itself inert, is the locus of the self-manifest consciousness) does not result.

Nor is there concomitance with the object in the case of that consciousness which has objects past and future for its sphere (though such concomitance has been assumed in the argument so far). Since there is generated the cognition of rejection, acceptance

पण्डित इति पितापि पण्डितोऽस्तु ? स्वभाव एष संविदः स्वयंप्रकाशाया यदर्थात्मसंबन्धितेति चेत्, हन्त पुत्रस्यापि पण्डितस्य स्वभाव एष यत्पितृसंबन्धितेति समानम् । सहार्थात्मप्रकाशेन संवित्प्रकाशो न त्वर्थात्मप्रकाशं विनेति तस्याः स्वभाव इति चेत्, तत्किं संविदो भिन्नौ संविदर्थात्मप्रकाशौ । तथा च न स्वयंप्रकाशा संवित्, न च संवित् अर्थात्मप्रकाश इति । अथ संविदर्थात्मप्रकाशौ न संविदो भिद्येते, संविदेव तौ । एवं चेत् यावदुक्तं भवति संविदात्मार्थौ सहेति तावदुक्तं भवति संविदर्थात्मप्रकाशौ सहेति । तथा च न विवक्षितार्थसिद्धिः ।

न चातीतानागतार्थगोचरायाः संविदोऽर्थसहभावोऽपि । तद्विषयहानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धिजननादर्थसहभाव इति चेत्, न, अर्थसंविद इव

हानादिबुद्धीनामपि तद्विषयत्वानुपपत्तेः। हानादि-जननाद्धानादिबुद्धीनामर्थविषयत्वम्, अर्थविषयहा-नादिबुद्धिजननाच्च अर्थसंविदस्तद्विषयत्वमिति चेत्, तत्किं देहस्य प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयोगो देहप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ति-हेतुरर्थ इत्यर्थप्रकाशोऽस्तु? जाड्यादेहात्मसंयोगो नार्थ-प्रकाश इति चेत्, नन्वयं स्वयंप्रकाशोऽपि स्वात्मन्येव खद्योतवत्प्रकाशः, अर्थे तु जड इत्युपपादितम्।

न च प्रकाशस्यात्मानो विषयाः; ते हि विच्छिन्नदीर्घस्थूलतयानुभूयन्ते; प्रकाशश्चायं अन्त-रोऽस्थूलोऽनणुरह्रस्वोऽदीर्घश्चेति प्रकाशते; तस्मा-च्चन्द्रेऽनुभूयमाने इव द्वितीयश्चन्द्रमाः स्वप्र-काशादन्योऽर्थोऽनिर्वचनीय एवेति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः। न च अस्य प्रकाशस्याजानतः स्वलक्षणभेदोऽनु-भूयते। न च अनिर्वाच्यार्थभेदः प्रकाशं निर्वाच्यं भेत्तुमर्हति, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न च अर्थानामपि

or indifference relating to that as content, there is concomitance with the object: if this be said, no (we reply); because the cognition of rejection etc., like the consciousness of the object itself, cannot intelligibly have that (past or future object) as content. Because of giving rise to rejection etc., the cognition of rejection etc. too have the object as content; and because of giving rise to the cognition of rejection etc., which have the object as content, the consciousness of the object too has that (object) as content: if this be said, since the conjunction of the body with the self that puts forth effort is the cause of the setting up and cessation of bodily activity in respect of an object, is that (conjunction) too (we ask) a manifestation of the object? Because of its inertness, (you may say), the conjunction of the body and the self is not a manifestation of the object. Now, though this (consciousness) is self-manifest (unlike the afore-said conjunction), its luminosity, like that of a glow-worm, is only in respect of itself; in respect of objects, however, it is inert; this has been explained (by the analogy of the scholarly son's father).

Nor are objects of the very nature of light (*i.e.*, of consciousness, as the Vijñānavādins say); they are experienced as finite, as long or gross, while light manifests itself as internal, neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long. Therefore, we see fit to hold that the object, which is other than the self-manifest, is certainly indeterminable, like the second moon experienced along with the moon. And no natural differentiation is experienced in this light as such (so that there is no obstacle to its identity with the self, which is one). Nor can differences among objects,

which are indeterminable, introduce differences into light, which is determinate, as that would prove too much." It will also be shown later that reciprocal difference does not come in the line of valid knowledge. Therefore, this very light, which is self-luminous, one, immutable, eternal, without parts, is the inner self, *i.e.*, the self that knows the determinate self to be other than the body, organs etc., which are indeterminable.

That self, not being other-dependent for its manifestation, and being without parts, cannot be an object (of cognition). How, then, can there be the superimposition thereon of the attributes of objects, *i.e.*, of bodies, organs etc.? The word "**how**" (in the commentary) is in the sense of an objection. This superimposition does not stand to reason; this is the objection. Why does it not stand to reason? To this he says: "**For, every one superimposes an object upon another object that is present before one.**" This is what is said: that, whose manifestation is other-dependent and which has parts, appears other than what it is, being apprehended in its general nature, but not apprehended in its specific nature, because of defect in the organs (of cognition). The inner self, however, not being other-dependent for its manifestation, does not require for the knowledge of itself any organs, by defects in which it would itself become defective. Nor has it any parts, in which case, it could be apprehended in some part, but not in others. It cannot, verily, happen that the same (thing) is at the same time and by itself both apprehended and not apprehended; hence on the view of the self-luminosity (of the self) there can be no superimposition. (And) even if it be never manifest, there can

परस्परं भेदः समीचीनज्ञानपद्धतिमध्यारते इत्युपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते । तदयं प्रकाश एव स्वयंप्रकाश एकः कूटस्थो नित्यो निरंशः प्रत्यगात्मा अशक्यनिर्वचनीयेभ्यो देहेन्द्रियादिभ्य आत्मानं प्रतीपं निर्वचनीयमञ्चति जानातीति प्रत्यङ्, स चात्मेति प्रत्यगात्मा ।

स चापराधीनप्रकाशत्वात् अनंशत्वाच्च अविषयः, तस्मिन्नध्यासो विषयधर्माणाम्, देहेन्द्रियादिधर्माणाम्, **कथम्?** किमाक्षेपे । अयुक्तोऽयमध्यास इत्याक्षेपः । कस्मादयमयुक्त इत्यत आह—**सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति** । एतदुक्तं भवति—यत्पराधीनप्रकाशमंशवच्च तत्सामान्यांशग्रहे करणदोषवशाच्च विशेषाग्रहे अन्यथा प्रकाशते । प्रत्यगात्मा तु अपराधीनप्रकाशतया न स्वज्ञाने कारणान्यपेक्षते, येन तदाश्रयैर्दोषैर्दुष्येत् । न चांशवान्, येन कश्चिदस्यांशो गृह्येत, कश्चिन्न गृह्येत । न हि तदेव तदानीमेव तेनैव गृहीतमगृहीतं च संभवतीति न स्वयंप्रकाशतापक्षे अध्यासः । सदातनेऽप्यप्रकाशे पुरोऽवस्थित-

त्वस्य अपरोक्षत्वस्याभावान्नाध्यासः । न हि शुक्तौ अपुरःस्थितायां रजतमध्यस्यति 'इदं रजतम्' इति । तस्मादत्यन्तग्रहे अत्यन्ताग्रहे च नाध्यास इति सिद्धम् ।

स्यादेतत् । अविषयत्वे हि चिदात्मनो नाध्यासः, विषय एव तु चिदात्मा अस्मत्प्रत्ययस्य, तत्कथं नाध्यास इत्यत आह—**युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य** इति । विषयत्वे हि चिदात्मनोऽन्यो विषयी भवेत् । तथा च यो विषयी स एव चिदात्मा । विषयस्तु ततोऽन्यो युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरोऽभ्युपेयः । तस्मादनात्मत्वप्रसङ्गादनवस्थापरिहाराय युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतत्वम् ; अत एव अविषयत्वमात्मनो वक्तव्यम् ; तथा च नाध्यास इत्यर्थः ।

परिहरति—**उच्यते—न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः** । कुतः ? **अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात्** । अयमर्थः—सत्यं प्रत्यगात्मा स्वयंप्रकाशत्वादविषयोऽनंशश्च ; तथापि अनिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्यापरिकल्पितबुद्धिमनःसूक्ष्मस्थूलशरीरेन्द्रियावच्छेदकभेदेन अनवच्छिन्नोऽपि वस्तुतोऽवच्छिन्न इव अभिन्नोऽपि भिन्न

be no superimposition, since it is not before us, *i.e.*, is not immediately experienced. Silver is not, verily, superimposed in the form "this is silver", when nacre is not present before us. Hence it follows that there can be no superimposition both when there is complete apprehension and when there is total non-apprehension.

Be this so. If the intelligent self were not an object, then indeed, there could be no superimposition thereon; but it is the object of the concept "I". Why then can there be no superimposition? To this he says: "**which is ever outside the concept of 'Thou'.**" For, if the intelligent self were the object, the subject (*viṣayin*) would be other than that. And thus, he who is the subject is himself the intelligent self; the object, however, should be admitted to be other than that, and in the sphere of the concept of "Thou". Hence, "being outside the concept of 'Thou'" is (stated) for the purpose of remedying the possibility of non-selfhood (for the self) and of infinite regress; hence it is that not being an object has to be predicated of the self; and thus, there is no superimposition: this is the meaning.

He answers this: "**The reply is—now, this is not invariably a non-object.**" Why (not)? "**Because it is the object of the concept 'I'.**" This is the meaning: true, the inner self being self-manifest is not an object and is without parts; but yet, having attained to the state of the *jīva*, though not really defined by the particular defining conditions posited by indeterminable beginningless Nescience, such as the intellect, the mind, bodies subtle and gross, and the organs, he appears as if defined; though not different, he appears as if different; though

not an agent, he appears as agent; though not an enjoyer, he appears as enjoyer; and though not an object, he appears as the object of the concept "I"; just as the ether because of differences defined by adjuncts such as pot, ewer, basin etc., appears as different and possessing diverse attributes. Of the self that is but of the one essence of intelligence, there is not, verily, anything unapprehended, when the element of intelligence is apprehended. Bliss, eternality, pervasiveness etc. are not, indeed, different from its nature as intelligence, such that they are not apprehended along with the apprehension of that element. While being certainly apprehended, yet, because of posited difference, they appear as if not discriminated, and hence not apprehended. Nor is the difference of the self from the intellect etc. real, so that that (difference) too is apprehended, when the intelligent self is apprehended; for, the intellect etc., being indeterminable, their difference (from the self) too is indeterminable (and unreal). Thus, it is for the intelligent self itself, which is self-manifest and undefined, that there is the condition of the *jīva*, through non-apprehension of the difference from the defined intellect etc., and the (consequent) superimposition of these. Of this, which partakes of the nature of the "not-this (non-object: the intelligent self)" and the "this (the inert object)," being the object of the concept "I" is intelligible. It is thus: the intelligent self appears, in the concept "I," as agent and enjoyer. And for that (self) which is indifferent there cannot occur the capacity either to act or to enjoy. And for that aggregate of the effect (the body) and the organs, *i.e.*, the intellect etc., to which belong the

इव अकर्तापि कर्तेव अभोक्तापि भोक्तेव अविषयोऽ-प्यस्मत्प्रत्ययविषय इव जीवभावमापन्नः अवभासते, नभ इव घटमणिकमल्लिकाद्युपाध्यवच्छेदभेदेन भिन्न-मिवानेकविधधर्मकमिवेति। न हि चिदेकरसस्यात्मनः चिदंशे गृहीते अगृहीतं किंचिदस्ति। न खलु आनन्दनित्यत्वविभुत्वादयः अस्य चिद्रूपाद्वस्तुतो भिद्यन्ते, येन तद्ग्रहे न गृह्येरन्। गृहीता एव तु कल्पितेन भेदेन न विवेचिता इत्यगृहीता इवाभान्ति। न च आत्मनो बुद्ध्यादिभ्यो भेदस्तात्त्विकः येन चिदात्मनि गृह्यमाणे सोऽपि गृहीत एव भवेत्, बुध्यादीनामनिर्वाच्यत्वेन तद्भेदस्याप्यनिर्वचनीयत्वात्। तस्माच्चिदात्मनः स्व-यंप्रकाशस्यैव अनवच्छिन्नस्य अवच्छिन्नेभ्यो बुद्ध्या-दिभ्यो भेदाग्रहात् तदध्यासेन जीवभाव इति। तस्य च अनिदमिदमात्मनः अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्व-मुपपद्यते। तथा हि—कर्ता भोक्ता चिदात्मा अहंप्रत्यये प्रत्यवभासते। न च उदासीनस्य तस्य क्रियाशक्तिर्भोगशक्तिर्वा संभवति। यस्य च बुद्ध्यादेः

कार्यकरणसंघातस्य क्रियाभोगशक्ती न तस्य चैतन्यम्। तस्माच्चिदात्मैव कार्यकरणसंघातेन ग्रथितो लब्धक्रियाभोगशक्तिः स्वयंप्रकाशोऽपि बुद्ध्यादिविषयविच्छुरणात् कथंचिदस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयः अहंकारास्पदं जीव इति च जन्तुरिति च क्षेत्रज्ञ इति च आख्यायते। न खलु जीवश्चिदात्मनो भिद्यते। तथा हि श्रुतिः—'अनेन जीवेनात्मना' इति। तस्माच्चिदात्मनोऽव्यतिरेकात् जीवः स्वयं-प्रकाशोऽपि अहंप्रत्ययेन कर्तृभोक्तृतया व्यवहार-योग्यः क्रियत इत्यहंप्रत्ययालम्बनमुच्यते। न च अध्यासे सति विषयत्वं विषयत्वे च अध्यासः इत्यन्योन्याश्रयत्वमिति सांप्रतम्, बीजाङ्कुरवदना-दित्वात्, पूर्वपूर्वाध्यासतद्वासनाविषयीकृतस्योत्तरो-त्तराध्यासविषयत्वाविरोधादित्युक्तम्—"**नैसर्गि-कोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः**" इति भाष्यग्रन्थेन। तस्मात् सुष्ठूक्तम्—**न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषय** इति। जीवो हि चिदात्मतया स्वयंप्रकाशतया अविषयोऽपि औपाधिकेन रूपेण विषय इति भावः।

capacities to act and enjoy, there is no intelligence. Hence, it is the intelligent self that, linked to the aggregate of the effect (the body) and the organs, gains the capacity to act and enjoy; though self-manifest, yet by intermixture with objects like the intellect etc., it somehow becomes the object of the concept "I," the substrate of "I-ness," and is (variously) designated *jīva*, creature (*jantu*), or knower of the field (*kṣetrajña*). The *jīva* indeed is not different from the intelligent self. For, thus runs Scripture: "in its own nature, as that *jīva*" etc.[43] Thus, the *jīva* though self-manifest, because of being non-different from the intelligent self, is yet made by the concept "I" fit for empirical usage as agent and enjoyer; hence it is said to be the basis of the concept "I". Nor is it admissible (to say) that there is reciprocal dependence in that (the *jīva*) becomes an object if there is superimposition, and there is superimposition if (he) becomes an object; for, the (process) is beginningless, like the (dependence of) seed and sprout, and there is no inconsistency in every subsequent superimposition having for its object that which has been made the content of each earlier superimposition and its impressions;[44] this has been said in the text of the commentary: "**this natural empirical usage.**" Hence it has been well-said: "**now, this is not invariably a non-object.**" The *jīva* though not an object, as (non-different from) the intelligent self and as self-manifest, is yet an object in his conditioned form: this is the idea.

Be this so. We do not deny superimposition on the ground that the *jīva* is not an object, his manifestation not being other-dependent; we maintain rather that the inner self does not shine either of itself or with the help of another, and is hence not an object. Hence on the inner self, which is never manifest, how can there be superimposition? To this he says: **"and because of the immediacy of the realisation of the inner self."** *Prathā* is the realisation of the inner self, because of the immediacy thereof. Though, in the inner self, realisation is not something other than that, yet the difference (implied in the words "realisation *of* the self") is figurative, as in "the intelligence *of* the self". This is what is said: the intelligent self should necessarily be admitted to be immediately perceived, since from the non-manifestation thereof would follow the non-manifestation of everything and the blindness of the universe; this has been already said. And there is Scripture to this effect: "That shining, all else shines after it; by its light all this shines."[45]

Having given this real answer, he states as a *prauḍhavādin*[46] another answer, assuming the mediacy of the intelligent self: **"And there is no rule"** etc. **"Only on another object present before one,"** *i.e.*, only on what is immediate (directly perceived). Why is there no such rule? To this he says: **"For, upon ether, though not perceptible"** etc. The (particle) *hi* means *for the reason that.* Ether, though a substance, is yet devoid of form and touch;

स्यादेतत्। न वयमपराधीनप्रकाशतया अविषयत्वेनाध्यासमपाकुर्मः, किं तु प्रत्यगात्मा न स्वतो नापि परतः प्रथत इत्यविषय इति ब्रूमः। तथा च सर्वथाप्रथमाने प्रत्यगात्मनि कुतोऽध्यास इत्यत आह—**अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः** इति। प्रतीच आत्मनः प्रसिद्धिः प्रथा, तस्या अपरोक्षत्वात्। यद्यपि प्रत्यगात्मनि नान्या प्रथास्ति तथापि भेदोपचारः, यथा 'पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम्' इति। एतदुक्तं भवति—अवश्यं चिदात्मा अपरोक्षोऽभ्युपेतव्यः तदप्रथायां सर्वस्याप्रथनेन जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गादित्युक्तम्। श्रुतिश्चात्र भवति—'तमेव भान्तमनु भाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' इति।

तदेवं परमार्थपरिहारमुक्त्वा अभ्युपेत्यापि चिदात्मनः परोक्षतां प्रौढवादितया परिहारान्तरमाह—**न चायमस्ति** इति। **पुरोऽवस्थित एव**, अपरोक्ष एव। कस्मादयं न नियम इत्यत आह—**अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि** इति। हिर्यस्मादर्थे। नभो हि द्रव्यं सत् रूपस्पर्शविरहान्न बाह्येन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षम्।

तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः। तत्रैवं सति यत्र

नापि मानसम्, मनसोऽसहायस्य बाह्ये अप्रवृत्तेः; तस्मादप्रत्यक्षम्। अथ च तत्र **बाला** अविवेकिनः परदर्शितदर्शिनः कदाचित्पार्थिवच्छायां श्यामतामारोप्य, कदाचित्तैजसं शुक्लत्वमारोप्य, नीलोत्पलपलाशश्याममिति वा राजहंसमालाधवलमिति वा निर्वर्णयन्ति। तत्रापि पूर्वदृष्टस्य तैजसस्य वा तामसस्य वा रूपस्य परत्र नभसि स्मृतिरूपोऽवभास इति। एवं तदेव **तलमध्यस्यन्ति** अवाङ्मुखीभूतमहेन्द्रनीलमणिमयमहाकटाहकल्पमित्यर्थः। उपसंहरति—**एवम्** उक्तेन प्रकारेण सर्वाक्षेपपरिहारात्, **अविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यप्यनात्मनाम्**—बुद्ध्यादीनाम्—**अध्यासः**।

ननु सन्ति च सहस्रमध्यासाः, तत्किमर्थमयमेवाध्यास आक्षेपसमाधानाभ्यां व्युत्पादितः नाध्यासमात्रमित्यत आह—**तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं**

This aforementioned superimposition of this character, wise men hold to be Nescience, and as distinct from that, the determination of the nature of the thing, they call knowledge. Here, such being the case, when

hence it cannot be cognised by an external sense. Nor can it be cognised by the mind, since the unaided mind does not act in respect of what is external; hence it is not perceived. Now, in respect of this, "**children**," *i.e.*, those who possess no discriminative knowledge, those who see what is shown them by others, superimpose sometimes blueness, the colour of the earth, sometimes whiteness, the property of fire, and determine it to be blue like the petals of the *nīlotpala* (blue lily) or white like a row of *rāja-haṃsas* (swans). Here too, there is, in the form of recollection, the appearance of the property of the formerly seen brightness or darkness. Thus, even thereon, they "**superimpose surface**," likening it to a huge inverted bowl made of *indranīla* gems. He concludes thus: "**Similarly**," *i.e.*, in the manner set forth above, through answering all objections, "**there is no contradiction in the superimposition of the not-self**," *i.e.*, of the intellect etc., "**even on the inner self**".

Now, there are thousands of superimpositions; why should this particular one be expounded through the statement of objection and answer? Why not the general nature alone of superimposition (be expounded)? To this he says: "**This afore-mentioned superimposition of this**

there is the superimposition of one on another, the latter is not affected, even to the extent of an atom, by the good or bad features produced by the former. It is in the wake of this aforementioned reciprocal superimposition of the self and the not-self, which is designated Nescience, that there proceed all empirical usages of the world relating to valid knowledge and the means thereof, and all the sacred teachings relating to prescription, prohibition and release.

character, wise men hold to be Nescience." It is well-known from Scripture, traditional codes, epics, *purāṇas* etc., that Nescience is the seed of all evil; it will be said later that the Vedānta sets out to remove that Nescience. The superimposition of the not-self on the inner self is alone the cause of all evil, not the delusion of silver etc.; hence that alone is Nescience; since, in the absence of the knowledge of its nature, it cannot be removed, that alone is expounded, not superimposition in general. By the words "**of this character**" there is declared its being the cause of evil, because of its being of that form. It is the cause of evil, because it makes the non-suffering inner self suffer by imposing the adverse internal organ etc., associated with appetite etc., on the inner self free from appetite etc. Nor is superimposition considered to be such by others too, in which case, there would be no need for the exposition. Hence it is said: "**wise men hold**" etc.

यदध्यासः तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते । तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिकाः प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि ।

पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते । अविद्या हि सर्वानर्थबीजमिति श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणादिषु सुप्रसिद्धम्, तदुच्छेदाय च वेदान्ताः प्रवृत्ता इति वक्ष्यति । प्रत्यगात्मन्यनात्माध्यास एव सर्वानर्थहेतुः न पुना रजतादिविभ्रमा इति स एवाविद्या, तत्स्वरूपं चाविज्ञातं न शक्यमुच्छेत्तुमिति तदेव व्युत्साद्यं नाध्यासमात्रम् । अत्र च "एवंलक्षणम्" इति एवंरूपतया अनर्थहेतुतोक्ता । यस्मात्प्रत्यगात्मन्यशास्त्रीयविरहिते अज्ञानायाद्युपेतान्तःकरणाद्यहितारोपेण प्रत्यगात्मानमतुःखं दुःखात्मकरोति, तस्मादनर्थहेतुः । न चैवं पृथग्जना अपि मन्यन्ते अध्यासम्, येन न व्युत्साद्येतेत्यत उक्तम्—"पण्डिता मन्यन्ते" इति ।

ननु इयमनादिरतिनिरूढनिबिडवासनानुबद्धा अविद्या न शक्या निरोद्धुम्, उपायाभावात्, इति यो मन्यन्ते तं प्रति तन्निरोधोपायमाह— **तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणम्**, निर्विचिकित्सं ज्ञानम्, **विद्यामाहुः** पण्डिताः। प्रत्यगात्मनि खलु अत्यन्तविविक्ते बुद्ध्यादिभ्यः बुद्ध्यादिभेदाग्रहनिमित्तो बुद्ध्याद्यात्मत्वतद्धर्माध्यासः। तत्र श्रवणमननादिभिर्यद्विवेकविज्ञानं तेन विवेकाग्रहे निवर्तिते, अध्यासापबाधात्मकं वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्या चिदात्मरूपं स्वरूपे व्यवतिष्ठत इत्यर्थः।

स्यादेतत्। अतिनिरूढनिबिढवासनानुविद्धा अविद्या विद्यया अपबाधितापि स्ववासनावशात्पुनरुद्भविष्यति प्रवर्तयिष्यति च वासनादिकार्यं स्वोचितमित्यत आह—**तत्रैवं सति**, एवंभूतवस्तुतत्त्वावधारणे सति, **यत्र यदध्यासः तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते**, अन्तःकरणादिदोषेणाशनायादिना चि-

Now, this Nescience associated with impressions, which are beginningless, deep-rooted and dense, cannot be removed, there being no means therefor; to him who thinks so, the means for removing it is declared thus: "**and, as distinct from that, the determination,**" *i.e.*, knowledge not subject to doubt "**of the nature of the thing, they,**" *i.e.*, wise men "**call knowledge**". It is verily in the inner self, which is wholly distinct from the intellect etc., that, because of the non-apprehension of the difference from the intellect etc., there is superimposition of the nature and attributes of the intellect etc. The non-apprehension of difference being removed by the cognition of difference through hearing (*i.e.*, study of the Vedānta), reflection etc., that which sublates Nescience, *viz.*, the ascertainment of the nature of things,[47] knowledge, which is of the nature of the intelligent self, stands forth in its own nature; this is the meaning.

Be this so. Nescience associated with deep-rooted and dense impressions, though sublated by knowledge, will come up again, because of its own impressions, and bring about results suitable to itself, such as (further) impressions etc. To this he says: "**Here, such being the case,**" *i.e.*, there being this kind of ascertainment of the true nature of things, "**when there is the superimposition of one on another, the latter is not, even to the extent of an atom, affected by the good or bad features produced by the**

former"; the intelligent self is not affected by the defects of the internal organ etc., such as appetite etc., nor are the internal organ etc. affected by the good features of the intelligent self—intelligence, bliss etc. This is what is said: it is of the very nature of the repetition of the ascertainment of truth that it removes illusory cognition, though beginningless and having deep-rooted and dense impressions. It is, indeed, of the nature of the intellect to be partial to truth. As even outsiders say: "Of the essential nature of things unaffected by error, there is no sublation; for, the intellect, even though making no effort, has a partiality for it." More particularly (there is the question): "Whence can there be sublation of the wholly internal (intimate) knowledge of the truth, which is of the nature of the intelligent self, by Nescience, which is indeterminable?"

In the statement "**coupling the true with the untrue, there is, through non-discrimination of each from the other, the empirical usage 'I am this,' 'this is mine,'**" empirical usage in the nature of verbal designation is expressly mentioned. Ordinary empirical usage, indicated by the word *iti* is shown in the words: "**It is in the wake of the afore-mentioned mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self, designated Nescience**" etc.; this is self-explanatory.

दात्मा, चिदात्मनो गुणेन चैतन्यानन्दादिना अन्तः-करणादि न संबध्यते। एतदुक्तं भवति— तत्त्वावधारणाभ्यासस्य हि स्वभाव एव स तादृशः, यदनादिमपि निरूढनिबिडवासनमपि मिथ्याप्रत्यय-मपनयति। तत्त्वपक्षपातो हि स्वभावो धियाम्, यथाहुर्बाह्या अपि—

निरुपद्रवभूतार्थस्वभावस्य विपर्ययैः।
न बाधोऽयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि बुद्धेस्तत्पक्षपाततः॥

इति। विशेषतस्तु चिदात्मस्वभावस्य तत्त्वज्ञानस्य अत्यन्तान्तरङ्गस्य कुतोऽनिर्वाच्यया अविद्यया बाध इति।

यदुक्तम् "**सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य, विवेका-ग्रहादध्यस्य, 'अहमिदम्' 'ममेदम्' इति लोकव्यवहारः**" इति तत्र व्यपदेशलक्षणो व्यवहारः कण्ठोक्तः। इतिशब्दसूचितं लोक-व्यवहारमादर्शयति—**तमेतमविद्याख्यम्** इति। निगदव्याख्यातम्।

कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति? उच्यते— देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंममाभिमानहीनस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः संभवति। न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यापारः संभवति। न च अनध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्क्याप्रियते। न चैतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन्नसति आत्मनोऽसङ्गस्य प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते। न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति। तस्मादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति।

आक्षिपति—कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि। तत्त्वपरिच्छेदो हि प्रमा विद्या; तत्साधनानि प्रमाणानि कथमविद्यावद्विषयाणि? नाविद्यावन्तं प्रमाणान्याश्रयन्ति, तत्कार्यस्य विद्याया अविद्याविरोधित्वात् इति भावः। सन्तु वा प्रत्यक्षादीनि संवृत्यापि

How, again, is it that perception and other means of valid knowledge and sacred teachings have reference to one characterised by Nescience? The reply is: when one devoid of the conceit of "I" and "mine" in one's body, senses etc., cannot intelligibly be a knower, the functioning of the means of valid knowledge is unintelligible. Indeed, empirical usage relating to perception etc. is not possible without the employment of the senses; and the functioning of the senses is not possible without control; nor by a body on which is not superimposed the nature of the self can anything be operated. And when none of these is present, the unattached self cannot intelligibly be a knower. And without a knower, there can be no functioning of the means of valid knowledge. Therefore, perception and other means of valid knowledge and the sacred teachings have reference to one characterised by Nescience.

An objection is raised: "**How, again, is it that perception and other means of valid knowledge have reference to one characterised by Nescience?**" Valid knowledge or *vidyā* is, verily, determination of the truth; how can the means of valid knowledge which are instruments thereto have for their locus what is characterised by Nescience? Means of valid knowledge cannot find a locus in what is characterised by Nescience, since their effect, *viz.*, knowledge, is opposed

to Nescience: this is the idea. Or let perception etc. be as you say empirically (valid); but sacred teachings, whose purport is to teach what is beneficial to man, being opposed to Nescience, cannot have reference to what is characterised by Nescience; hence he says: "**and sacred teachings.**" He answers: "**The reply is.**" "**When one devoid of the conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in the body, senses etc.,**" devoid of the superimposition of the nature and attributes of the self, "**cannot intelligibly be a knower, the functioning of the means of valid knowledge is unintelligible.**" This is the meaning: to be a knower is to be an agent in respect of knowledge; and that is independence (in respect of the cognitive act). Independence consists in inciting all causal conditions other than the knower, without being incited by them. By him, therefore, is to be incited the *pramāṇa*, the means of valid knowledge. Nor can an instrument be incited without acivity on one's part. Nor can the immutable, eternal, intelligent self, which is incapable of transformation, be active of itself. Hence, being active by the superimposition of the nature of the intellect etc., which are active, it can control the means of valid knowledge; therefore, the means of valid knowledge have reference to, *i.e.*, are located in the person characterised by Nescience.

Now, let it be that the means of valid knowledge do not function; what do we lose? To this he says: "**Indeed, empirical usage relating to perception etc. is not possible, without the employment of the senses etc.**" *Vyavahāraḥ*, empirical usage, means fruit, because there is usage on account of that; the fruit of the means of valid knowledge,

यथा तथा; शास्त्राणि तु पुरुषहितानुशासनपराणि अविद्याप्रतिपक्षतया नाविद्यावद्विषयाणि भवितुमर्हन्तीत्याह—**शास्त्राणि च** इति। समाधत्ते—**उच्यते** इति। **देहेन्द्रियादिषु अहंममाभिमानहीनस्य**, तादात्म्यतद्धर्माध्यासहीनस्य, **प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ** सत्यां **प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः**। अयमर्थः—प्रमातृत्वं हि प्रमां प्रति कर्तृत्वम्। तच्च स्वातन्त्र्यम्। स्वातन्त्र्यं च प्रमातुरितरकारकाप्रयोज्यस्य समस्तकारकप्रयोक्तृत्वम्। तदनेन प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणं प्रयोजनीयम्। न च स्वव्यापारमन्तरेण करणं प्रयोक्तुमर्हति। न च कूटस्थनित्यश्चिदात्मा अपरिणामी स्वतो व्यापारवान्। तस्मात् व्यापारवद्बुद्ध्यादितादात्म्याध्यासात् व्यापारवत्तया प्रमाणमधिष्ठातुमर्हतीति भवत्यविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयत्वमविद्यावत्पुरुषाश्रयत्वं प्रमाणानामिति।

अथ मा प्रवर्तिषत प्रमाणानि, किं नश्छिन्नमित्यत आह—**न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः संभवति**। व्यवह्रियते अनेनेति व्यवहारः फलम्, प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणानां

फलमित्यर्थः। **इन्द्रियाणि** इति इन्द्रियालङ्कारादीनीति द्रष्टव्यम्, 'दण्डिनो गच्छन्ति' इतिवत्। एवं हि **प्रत्यक्षादि** इत्युपपद्यते। व्यवहारक्रियया च व्यवहार्याक्षेपात्समानकर्तृकता। अनुपादाय यो व्यवहार इति योजना।

किमिति पुनः प्रमाता उपादत्ते प्रमाणानि? अथ स्वयमेव कस्मान्न प्रवर्तन्ते इत्यत आह—**न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेणेन्द्रियाणां व्यापारः**, प्रमाणानां व्यापारः, **संभवति**। न जातु करणान्यनधिष्ठितानि कर्त्रा स्वकार्ये व्याप्रियन्ते, मा भूत्कुविन्दरहितेभ्यो वेमादिभ्यः पटोत्पत्तिरिति। अथ देह एवाधिष्ठाता कस्मान्न भवति? कृतमत्रात्माध्यासेनेत्यत आह—**न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते**; सुषुप्तेऽपि व्यापारप्रसङ्गादिति भावः।

स्यादेतत्। यथानध्यस्तात्मभावं वेमादिकं कुविन्दो व्यापारयन्पटस्य कर्ता, एवमनध्यस्तात्मभावं देहेन्द्रियादि व्यापारयन् भविष्यति तदभिज्ञः प्रमाता इत्यत आह—**न चैतस्मिन्सर्वस्मिन्**, इतरेतरात्माध्यासे इतरेतरधर्माध्यासे च, **असति**,

like perception etc., is here meant. "**The senses**" should be taken to denote the senses, the *probans* (in inference) etc., like the word "*daṇḍin* (man with the staff)," (which) in "there go men with staves" (denotes those who possess no staves as well); thus is intelligible the expression ("etc.," in) "**perception etc.**" The verb in "**empirical usage**" implies the agent; hence a common subject (for "usage" and "without the employment"). The construction is: the empirical usage (which results) without the employment.

Why should the knower employ the means of valid knowledge? Why should they not function of themselves?[48] To this he says: "**and the functioning of the senses,**" *i.e.*, of the means of valid knowledge "**is not possible without control**". Never do instruments function in respect of their objects without being controlled by agents, lest cloth should originate from the shuttle etc., without (being controlled by) a weaver. Why, then, should not the body itself be the controller? Superimposition of the self would, then, be superfluous. To this he says: "**nor by a body, on which is not superimposed the nature of the self, can anything be operated**"; for, otherwise, functioning would result even in (dreamless) sleep; this is the idea.

Be this so. Just as a weaver is an agent in the case of the cloth, without superimposing his nature on the shuttle etc., but by operating them, even so without superimposing his nature on the body, organs etc., but by operating them, he who knows them (the body, organs etc.) may become a knower. To this he says: "**And, when none of these,**" *i.e.*, reciprocal superimposition of nature and attributes "**is present, the unattached self,**" different, in all

ways and at all times, from all attributes and substrates, "**cannot intelligibly be a knower**". It is the active weaver etc. that control the shuttle etc., and operate them, whereas for the self, whose self-hood has not been superimposed on the body etc., there can be no activity, because of its being unattached: this is the meaning. Necessarily, therefore, the means of valid knowledge are located in superimposition. Thus he says: "**And without knowership, there can be no activity of the means of valid knowledge.**" He, verily, becomes a knower, who is independent in respect of the fruit, valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is a variety of the modification of the internal organ, directed towards the object known, and is of the nature of the intelligence residing in the agent. And how could a modification of the inert internal organ be of the nature of intelligence, if the intelligent self were not superimposed thereon? How, again, could this have the intelligent self as agent, if the functioning internal organ were not superimposed on the intelligent self? Hence, from reciprocal superimposition, there results the fruit called valid knowledge, which resides in the intelligent self as agent; when that results, there results knowership. With this same valid knowledge as content, there ensues the activity of the means of valid knowledge. By the use of the word "knowership," valid knowledge is also implied.[49] If the fruit, valid knowledge, were non-existent, the means of valid knowledge would not be active; and thus the means of valid knowledge would cease to be such: this is the meaning. He concludes: "**Therefore, perception and other means of valid knowledge have reference only to what is characterised by Nescience.**"

आत्मनोऽसङ्गस्य, सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वधर्मधर्मिवियुक्तस्य, **प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते** । व्यापारवन्तो हि कुविन्दादयो वेमादीनधिष्ठाय व्यापारयन्ति, अनध्यस्तात्मभावस्य तु देहादिष्वात्मनो न व्यापारयोगोऽसङ्गत्वादित्यर्थः । *आतश्चाध्यासाश्रयाणि प्रमाणानीत्याह*—**न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति** । प्रमायां खलु फले स्वतन्त्रः प्रमाता भवति । अन्तःकरणपरिणामभेदश्च प्रमेयप्रवणः कर्तृस्थश्चित्स्वभावः प्रमा । कथं च जडस्यान्तःकरणस्य परिणामश्चिद्रूपो भवेत्, यदि चिदात्मा तत्र नाध्यस्येत? कथं चैष चिदात्मकर्तृको भवेत्, यद्यन्तःकरणं व्यापारवत् चिदात्मनि नाध्यस्येत्? तस्मादितरेतराध्यासाच्चिदात्मकर्तृस्थं प्रमाफलं सिध्यति, तत्सिद्धौ च प्रमातृत्वम् । तामेव च प्रमामुररीकृत्य प्रमाणस्य प्रवृत्तिः । प्रमातृत्वेन च प्रमा उपलक्ष्यते । प्रमायाः फलस्याभावे प्रमाणं न प्रवर्तेत । तथा च प्रमाणमप्रमाणं स्यादित्यर्थः । उपसंहरति—**तस्मादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि** ।

पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात् । यथा हि पश्वादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते ; यथा दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य 'मां हन्तुमयमिच्छति' इति पलायितुमारभन्ते, हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति ; एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान् बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान्प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते । अतः समानः पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः । पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्ध एव अविवेकपूर्वकः

स्यादेतत् । भवतु पृथग्जनानामेवम् ; आगमोपपत्तिप्रतिपन्नप्रत्यगात्मतत्त्वानां व्युत्पन्नानामपि पुंसां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा दृश्यन्त इति कथमविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रमाणानीत्यत आह—**पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात्** इति । विदन्तु नाम आगमोपपत्तिभ्यां

And because there is no distinction from beasts etc. Indeed, as beasts etc., when their sense of hearing etc. are brought into relation with sound etc., if there is produced a cognition of sound etc., that is unfavourable, recede from them, and if it is favourable, approach them; and as they, seeing a man approach with a stick held aloft in his hand, begin to run away thinking, "he desires to beat me", but seeing him with his hand filled with green grass, proceed towards him; in the same way, men too, though of cultivated minds, seeing strong men of fierce mien shouting, sword held aloft in the hand, recede from them, but approach them of an opposite character; the empirical usage relating to means and objects of valid knowledge in the case of men is similar to that of beasts. And for beasts etc., it is well

---

Be this so. Let this be the case in respect of the ignorant ones. Even for those persons, however, who have understood the true nature of the inner self propounded by Scripture and reasoning (thereon), there is seen the empirical usage relating to means of valid knowledge and objects known thereby; how, then, can means of valid knowledge have reference only to one characterised by Nescience? To this he says: "**And because there is no distinction from beasts etc.**" It may be that, through Scripture and reasoning, they know the inner self as different from the body, organs etc.;

known that empirical usage relating to perception etc. always comes in the wake of non-discrimination. And since we see a similarity to them, it is concluded that even in the case of learned men, empirical usage relating to the perception etc. is, for the time being, similar.

---

in respect, however, of the empirical usage relating to means of valid knowledge and the objects known, they do not rise above the characteristic of beings that merely bear life. The activity even of these learned ones is seen to be of the same nature as the activity of beasts and birds, whose stupidity is undisputed. Because of this similarity, characterisation by Nescience is inferred even for those (learned ones), at the time of empirical usage. The particle "**and**" has the sense of linking up (this with the reason already given). The meaning is: the aforementioned reasoning together with the above-stated answer to the objection establishes in the case of the means of valid knowledge that they have reference to persons characterised by Nescience. This itself is analysed: "**Indeed, as beasts**" etc. Here, by the words "**when their sense of hearing etc. are brought into relation with sound etc.,**" there is shown perception as the means of valid knowledge. Its fruit is mentioned in the words: "**the cognition of sound etc.**" "**If it be unfavourable**" states the fruit of inference It is thus: after cognising the nature of the sound, and remembering the unfavourable nature of that class of sound, unfavourableness is inferred

प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः । तत्सामान्यदर्शनाद्व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारस्तत्कालः समान इति निश्चीयते ।

देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो भिन्नं प्रत्यगात्मानम् ; प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारे तु प्राणभृन्मात्रधर्मत्वं नातिवर्तन्ते । यादृशो हि पशुशकुन्तादीनामविप्रतिपन्नमुग्धभावानां व्यवहारस्तादृशो व्युत्पन्नानामपि पुंसां दृश्यते । तेन तत्सामान्यात्तेषामपि व्यवहारसमये अविद्यावत्त्वमनुमेयम् । चशब्दः समुच्चये । उक्तशङ्कानिवर्तनसहिता पूर्वोक्तोपपत्तिः अविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयत्वं प्रमाणानां साधयतीत्यर्थः । एतदेव विभजते—**यथा हि पश्वादय** इति । अत्र च **शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति** इति प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं दर्शितम् । **शब्दादिविज्ञाने** इति तत्फलमुक्तम् । **प्रतिकूले** इति च अनुमानफलम् । तथा हि— शब्दादिस्वरूपमुपलभ्य तज्जातीयस्य प्रतिकूलतामनुस्मृत्य तज्जातीयतयोपलभ्यमानस्य प्रतिकूलता-

शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी नाविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोकसंबन्धमधिक्रियते, तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यमशनायाद्यतीतमपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदमसंसार्यात्मतत्त्वमधिकारेऽपेक्ष्यते, अनुपयोगात्

मनुमिमत इति। उदाहरति—**यथा दण्ड** इति। शेषमतिरोहितार्थम्।

स्यादेतत्। भवन्तु प्रत्यक्षादीन्यविद्यावद्विषयाणि। शास्त्रं तु 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादि न देहात्माध्यासेन प्रवर्तितुमर्हति। अत्र हि आमुष्मिकफलोपभोगयोग्यः अधिकारी प्रतीयते। तथा च पारमर्षं सूत्रम्—'शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि तल्लक्षणत्वात्तस्मात्स्वयं प्रयोगे स्यात्' इति। न च देहादि भस्मीभूतं पारलौकिकाय फलाय कल्पत इति देहाद्यतिरिक्तं कंचिदात्मानमधिकारिणमाक्षिपति शास्त्रम्; तदवगमश्च विद्या; इति कथमविद्यावद्विषयं शास्त्रमित्याशङ्क्याह—**शास्त्रीयेतु** इति। **तु**-शब्दः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहाराद्विनत्ति शास्त्रीयम्। अधिकार-

But in the case of empirical usage relating to the sacred teaching, although no person with forethought, unless he knows the relation of the self to the other world, will consider himself eligible for it, still, the true self that can be known only from the Vedāntas, as transcending hunger etc., divested of differentiations like brahmin, kṣatriya etc., and non-transmigrating, is not required for eligibility ; for, it (the true self) is of no

of what is perceived to belong to that class. This is exemplified: "**and, as they, seeing a man with a stick held aloft**" etc. The sense of the rest is not obscure.

Be this so. Let it be that perception etc. have reference to one characterised by Nescience. The sacred teaching, however, which teaches that one who desires Heaven should sacrifice with the jyotiṣṭoma and so on, cannot induce activity through the superimposition of the body on the self. Here, verily, the eligible person is known to be one who is fit to enjoy fruit in another world. Hence the aphorism of the great sage:[50] "The fruit of (what is enjoined in) the sacred teaching is for the person directed, since it is of that nature (*i.e.*, since it is an injunction understood through verbal testimony, in the form 'He who desires Heaven is to sacrifice with the jyotiṣṭoma') ; hence, one should oneself engage (in the act enjoined)." Bodies etc.. which become ashes, are not fit for (enjoyment) of fruit in another world ; hence the sacred teaching postulates by implication some eligible person other than the body etc. ; the understanding of it being knowledge (*vidyā*), how can the sacred teaching have reference to one characterised by Nescience? Raising this objection, he says: "**But in the case of empirical**

service and is opposed to eligibility. And any sacred teaching that functions before the realisation of the self as of such a nature does not go beyond the reference to one characterised by Nescience. It is thus: texts like, "A brahmin shall sacrifice" function, as based on the superimposition on the self of differentiations like caste, orders of life, age etc.

---

usage relating to the sacred teaching" etc. The particle but" distinguishes from empirical usage like perception etc., that which relates to the sacred teaching. Indeed, since, in the absence of a relation to another world for the person who desires Heaven, the sacred teaching relating to eligibility cannot carry on, it has to postulate that much alone by implication, not his freedom from the migratory cycle too; for, this is of no service in respect of eligibility; the person propounded in the Upaniṣads, being neither agent nor enjoyer, is, rather, opposed to eligibility. It is the person that engages in action and is, verily, the enjoyer of the enjoyments that are the fruit produced by the acts, that is the person eligible to perform the act, the lord (thereof). How can a non-agent be one who engages in activity? How can a non-enjoyer be the enjoyer of the enjoyments that are the fruit produced by the acts? Hence, the sacred teaching relating to prescriptions and prohibitions sets out in respect of that human being, who has a conceit of agency, enjoyership, brahminhood etc., acquired through beginningless Nescience. Thus, the Vedāntas too have reference only to the person characterised by Nescience; for, there is not the understanding of their sense, in the absence of the distinction of the knower etc. They, instructing the

अधिकारविरोधाच्च । प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते । तथा हि—'ब्राह्मणो यजेत' इत्यादीनि शास्त्राण्यात्मनि वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थादिविशेषाध्यासमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते ।

शास्त्रं हि स्वर्गकामस्य पुंसः परलोकसंबन्धं विना न निर्वहतीति तावन्मात्रमाक्षिपेत्, न त्वस्यासंसारित्वमपि; तस्याधिकारेऽनुपयोगात्; प्रत्युत औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्य अकर्तुरभोक्तुरधिकारविरोधात्। प्रयोक्ता हि कर्मणः कर्मजनितफलभोगभागी कर्मण्यधिकारी स्वामी भवति । तत्र कथमकर्ता प्रयोक्ता ? कथं च अभोक्ता कर्मजनितफलभोगभागी ? तस्मादनाद्यविद्यालब्धकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वब्राह्मणत्वाद्यभिमानिनं नरमधिकृत्य विधिनिषेधशास्त्रं प्रवर्तते । एवं वेदान्ता अप्यविद्यावत्पुरुषविषया एव । न हि प्रमात्रादिविभागादृते तदर्थाधिगमः । ते त्वविद्यावन्तमनुशासतो निर्मृष्टनिखिलाविद्यमनु-

शिष्टं स्वरूपे व्यवस्थापयन्तीत्येतावानेषां विशेषः। तस्मादविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयाण्येव शास्त्राणीति सिद्धम्।

स्यादेतत्। यद्यपि विरोधानुपयोगाभ्यामौपनिषदः पुरुषः अधिकारे नापेक्ष्यते तथाप्युपनिषद्भ्योऽवगम्यमानः शक्नोत्यधिकारं निरोद्धुम्। ततश्च परस्परपराहतार्थत्वेन कृत्स्न एव वेदः प्रामाण्यमपजह्यादित्यत आह—**प्राक् च तथाभूतात्म**—इति। सत्यमौपनिषदपुरुषाधिगमः अधिकारविरोधी; तस्मात्तु पुरस्तात्कर्मविधयः स्वोचितं व्यवहारमभिनिर्वर्तयन्तो नानुपजातेन ब्रह्मज्ञानेन शक्या निरोद्धुम्। न च परस्परपराहतिः, विद्याविद्यावत्पुरुषभेदेन व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। यथा—'न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानि' इति साध्यांशनिषेधेऽपि 'श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेत' इति शास्त्रं प्रवर्तमानं 'न हिंस्यात्' इत्यनेन न विरुध्यते; तत्कस्य हेतोः? पुरुषभेदादिति। अवजितक्रोधारातयः पुरुषा निषेधे अधिक्रियन्ते, क्रोधारातिवशीकृतास्तु श्येनादिशास्त्रे इति।

person characterised by Nescience, establish him in the form taught by them, from which all Nescience has been wiped out; this is their distinction (from the teaching of injunctions, which brings about nc final establishment). Hence, it is established that the sacred teachings have reference only to persons characterised by Nescience.

Be this so. Though, because of opposition and non-utility, the person propounded in the Upaniṣads is not needed in respect of eligibility, yet as learnt from the Upaniṣads (in the course of the normally prescribed study—*adhyayana*), that (person) is capable of standing in the way of eligibility. Thus, because of the sense of each (part) being destructive of that of the other, the whole of the Veda would lose its authority as a means of valid knowledge. To this he says: "**And any sacred teaching which functions before the realisation of the self as of such a nature**" etc. True, the understanding of the person propounded in the Upaniṣads is opposed to eligibility; but prior to that, the prescriptions of acts bring about suitable empirical usage, and they cannot be counteracted by Brahman-knowledge, which has not yet been generated. Nor is there reciprocal annulment, since a differentiation (of their respective spheres) is intelligible, on the basis of the difference in the persons (to whom they relate) as characterised by knowledge or Nescience. For example: though, in respect of the element of what is to be accomplished, there is the prohibition "Injure not any living being," the sacred teaching which sets forth "He who would kill his enemy (by an evil spell) should sacrifice with the *syena*" is not contradicted by "Injure not" etc.; wherefore is this?

We have already said that what is called superimposition is the cognition as something of what is not that. This is how when the son, wife etc. are unsound or sound, one superimposes on oneself the attributes of external things, as "I am myself sound or unsound"; similarly the attributes of the body in "I

Because of the difference in the persons (addressed).[51] The persons who have conquered the enemy—anger—are eligible in respect of the prohibition; those, however, who are under the power of the enemy—anger—(are eligible) in respect of the teaching about the *syena* etc.

What was said (about the sacred teaching that) it does not go beyond the reference to the person characterised by Nescience, that itself is made clear in: "**It is, thus.**" Superimposition of caste: "The king is to sacrifice with the *rājasūya*" etc.; superimposition of orders of life: "The house-holder should obtain a wife of equal status" etc.; superimposition of age: "He whose hair is black is to tend the fires" etc.; superimposition of state: "He whose malady is incurable is to give up his life by plunging into the water etc." and so on. The expression "**et cetera**" serves to include sins, major and minor, causing intermixture, unworthiness or defilement, and other such superimpositions.

Having thus expounded through objection and answer the reciprocal superimposition of the self and the not-self, and strengthened it by the discourse on the means and objects of valid knowledge, he reminds us of its already declared nature, in order to expound elaborately its being the cause of evil: "**We have already said that what is called superimposition**

अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम । तद्यथा—पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा 'अहमेव विकलः, सकलो वा' इति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति; तथा देह-

अविद्यावत्पुरुषविषयत्वं नातिवर्तत इति यदुक्तं तदेव स्फुटयति—**तथा हि** इति । वर्णाध्यासः 'राजा राजसूयेन यजेत' इत्यादिः । आश्रमाध्यासः 'गृहस्थः सदृशीं भार्यां विन्देत' इत्यादिः । वयोऽध्यासः 'कृष्णकेशोऽग्नीनादधीत' इत्यादिः । अवस्थाध्यासः 'अप्रतिसमाधेयव्याधीनां जलादिप्रवेशेन प्राणत्यागः' इत्यादिः । आदिग्रहणं पातकोपपातकसंकरीकरणापात्रीकरणमलिनीकरणाद्यध्यासोपसंग्रहार्थम् ।

तदेवमात्मानात्मनोः परस्पराध्यासमाक्षेपसमाधानाभ्यामुपपाद्य प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारप्रवर्तनेन च दृढीकृत्य तस्यानर्थहेतुत्वमुदाहरणप्रपञ्चेन प्रतिपादयन् तत्स्वरूपमुक्तं स्मारयति—**अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम** । 'स्मृतिरूपः परत्र

धर्मान् 'स्थूलोऽहम्, कृशोऽहम्, गौरोऽहम्, तिष्ठामि गच्छामि लङ्घयामि च' इति; तथेन्द्रियधर्मान् 'मूकः काणः क्लीबो बधिरोऽन्धोऽहम्' इति; तथान्तःकरणधर्मान् कामसंकल्पविचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन्। एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति।

पूर्वदृष्टावभासः' इत्यस्य संक्षेपाभिधानमेतत्। तत्र 'अहम्' इति धर्मितादात्म्याध्यासमात्रम् 'मम' इत्यनुत्पादितधर्माध्यासं नानर्थहेतुरिति धर्माध्यासमेव ममकारं साक्षादशेषानर्थसंसारकारणमुदाहरणप्रपञ्चेनाह—**तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिषु** इति। देहतादात्म्यमात्मन्यध्यस्य देहधर्मे पुत्रकलत्रादिस्वाम्यं च कृशत्वादिवदारोप्याह—**अहमेव विकलः, सकलः** इति। स्वस्य खलु साकल्येन स्वाम्यसाकल्यात् स्वामीश्वरः सकलः संपूर्णो भवति; तथा स्वस्य

am fat," "I am lean," "I am fair," "I stand," "I go," "I jump"; similarly the attributes of the senses in "I am dumb, one-eyed, impotent, deaf, blind"; similarly the attributes of the internal organ, like desire, resolve, doubt, determination. In this way after superimposing the denotation of the concept "I" on the inner self that is the witness of its entire activities, by the reverse of that, one superimposes that inner self, the witness of all, on the internal organ etc.

is the cognition as something of what is not that." This is a summary way of stating what was said earlier, that it is "**the appearance elsewhere, with a nature like to that of recollection, of what was seen before**". Here, "I," which is the superimposition of the nature of the substrate alone, cannot be the cause of evil without generating the "mine," the superimposition of attributes; hence the superimposition of attributes, the notion of "mine," is alone the direct cause of the entire evil of the migratory cycle; this is elaborately explained in: "**It is thus: when the son, wife**" etc. Superimposing identity with the body on the self, and superimposing thereon the bodily attribute of the ownership of son, wife etc., in the same way as leanness etc., one says "**I am myself unsound or sound.**" The sense of ownership being complete, when there is a fullness of wealth, the owner (in this case) becomes complete,

perfect; similarly, from the lack of wealth, ownership too becoming incomplete, the owner becomes incomplete, imperfect. The external attributes, like unsoundness which attach to the body through the channel of ownership, these one superimposes on the self: this is the meaning. When this is the case in respect of bodily attributes, like ownership, dependent on external adjuncts, what need be said about bodily attributes, like leanness etc., which do not depend on external adjuncts? In this view, he says: "**Similarly, the attributes of the body**" etc. He superimposes on the self the attributes of deafness etc., which are the attributes of the senses, which are more intimate than the body, and on which the nature of the self has been superimposed; (he also superimposes on the self) desire, resolve etc., which are attributes of the internal organ, which is even more intimate, and on which the nature of the self has been superimposed: this is the construction.

Having in this exposition stated the superimposition of attributes, he states its basis, the superimposition of the substrate: "**In this way, after superimposing the denotation of the concept 'I'**" etc. That in which the psychosis, the concept "I," occurs, *i.e.*, the internal organ, that is the denotation of the concept "I" (*ahampratyayin*); that is superimposed on the inner self, which, on account of its intelligence and indifference, is the witness of the processes of the internal organ. Thus are explained agency and enjoyership. Intelligence is explained: "**by the reverse**

वैकल्येन स्वाम्यवैकल्यात् स्वामीश्वरो विकलोऽसंपूर्णो भवति। बाह्यधर्मा ये वैकल्यादयः स्वाम्यप्रणालिकया संचारिताः शरीरे तानात्मन्यध्यस्यतीत्यर्थः। यदा च परोपाध्यपेक्षे देहधर्मे स्वाम्ये इयं गतिः, तदा कैव कथा अनौपाधिकेषु देहधर्मेषु कृशत्वादिषु इत्याशयवानाह—**तथा देहधर्मान्** इति। देहादप्यन्तरङ्गाणामिन्द्रियाणामध्यस्तात्मभावानां धर्मान् मूकत्वादीन्, ततोऽप्यन्तरङ्गस्यान्तःकरणस्य अध्यस्तात्मभावस्य धर्मान् कामसंकल्पादीन् आत्मन्यध्यस्यतीति योजना।

तदनेन प्रपञ्चेन धर्माध्यासमुक्त्वा तस्य मूलं धर्म्यध्यासमाह—**एवमहंप्रत्ययिनम्**। अहंप्रत्ययो वृत्तिर्यस्मिन्नन्तःकरणादौ, सोऽयमहंप्रत्ययी; तं **स्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि**, अन्तःकरणप्रचारसाक्षिणि, चैतन्योदासीनताभ्यां **प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य**। तदनेन कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वे उपपादिते। चैतन्यमुपपादयति—**तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेण**, अन्तःकरणादिविपर्ययेण — अन्तःकरणाद्यचेतनम्, तस्य विपर्ययः चैतन्यम्, तेन, इत्थंभूतलक्षणे तृती-

एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः । अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता

या — **अन्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति** । तदनेन अन्तःकारणाद्यवच्छिन्नः प्रत्यगात्मा इदमनिदंरूपश्चेतनः कर्ता भोक्ता कार्यकारणाविद्याद्ययाधारोऽहंकारास्पदं संसारी सर्वानर्थसंभारभाजनं जीवात्मा इतरेतराध्यासोपादानः तदुपादानश्चाध्यास इत्यनादित्वात् बीजाङ्कुरवन्नेतरेतराश्रयत्वमित्युक्तं भवति ।

प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारदृढीकृतमेव शिष्यहिताय स्वरूपाभिधानपूर्वकं सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षतया अध्यासं सुदृढीकरोति—**एवमयमनादिरनन्तः**, तत्त्वज्ञानमन्तरेणाशक्यसमुच्छेदः । अनाद्यनन्तत्वे हेतुरुक्तः—**नैसर्गिक** इति । **मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः** मिथ्याप्रत्ययानां रूपमनिर्वचनीयत्वम्; तद्यस्य स तथोक्तः ; अनिर्वचनीय इत्यर्थः ।

Thus, this beginningless and endless natural superimposition, of the nature of illusory cognition, which causes agency, enjoyership etc., is directly experienced by the entire world. It is for the removal of this cause of evil, for the attainment of the knowledge

of that," by the reverse of the internal organ etc.,—the internal organ etc. are inert, the reverse of that is intelligence; by that; the instrumental case is used to imply "in this wise"—"**one superimposes that inner self, the witness of all, on the internal organ etc.**" This is what is said hereby: the inner self defined by the internal organ etc., the intelligent being compounded of the "this" and the "not-this," is the *jīva*, the agent, the enjoyer, the support of the two kinds of Nescience—the result and the cause,—the substrate of "I-ness," the transmigrator, the vessel of the entire host of woes, the material cause of reciprocal superimposition; the material cause of that again is superimposition; hence, this being beginningless, like the seed and the sprout, there is not (the defect of) reciprocal dependence.

Superimposition, which has been confirmed by the discourse on the means and objects of valid knowledge, is yet further confirmed for the benefit of the pupil, through a declaration of its nature, this being perceived by the whole world: "**Thus, this beginningless, endless**" etc. ("**Endless**" means) not being destructible in the absence of true knowledge. The cause of the beginninglessness and endlessness is stated: "**natural.**" "**Of the nature of illusory cognition**";

of the oneness of the self, that all the Vedāntas are commenced. How this is the purport of the entire Vedānta, we shall show in this Sārīraka-mīmāṃsā.

the nature of illusory cognitions is indeterminability; that to which it belongs is stated here; that means it is indeterminable.

He concludes the topic: "**It is for the removal of this cause of evil**" etc. Whence the removal of this, in the absence of an opposed concept? To this he says: "**for the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of the self.**" *Pratipattiḥ* is attainment; for that purpose, not merely for purposes of incantation nor for engaging in rites. The oneness of the self is entire dissociation from the universe, while existing in the form of bliss. The Vedāntas, which indubitably bring about that attainment, destroy superimposition from its very root. This is what is said: if the concept "I," whose content is the self, were valid, there would be no desire to know Brahman, on the ground of its being known and (the inquiry) being unprofitable. In the absence of that (desire to know), the Vedānta would not be studied for the knowledge of Brahman, but would only serve the unintended purpose of incantation. Then, the Upaniṣadic concept of the self would not, indeed, enjoy validity. Nor would this invalid (concept), though oft repeated, avail to remove the real agency, enjoyership etc., of the self. It is, indeed, an imposed form that is removed by true knowledge, not the real

आरभ्यन्ते। यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानाम्, तथा वयमस्यां शारीरक-मीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः।

प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—**अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय**। विरोधिप्रत्ययं विना कुतोऽस्य प्रहाणमित्यत उक्तम्—**आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये**। प्रतिपत्तिः प्राप्तिः, तस्यै, न तु जपमात्राय, नापि कर्मसु प्रवृत्तये। आत्मैकत्वं विगलितनिखिलप्रपञ्चत्वम् आनन्दरूपस्य सतः। तत्प्रतिपत्तिं निर्विचिकित्सां भावयन्तो वेदान्ताः समूलघातमध्यासमुपघ्नन्ति। एतदुक्तं भवति—अस्मत्प्रत्ययस्यात्मविषयस्य समीचीनत्वे सति ब्रह्मणो ज्ञातत्वान्निष्प्रयोजनत्वाच्च न जिज्ञासा स्यात्; तदभावे च न ब्रह्मज्ञानाय वेदान्ताः पठ्येरन्; अपि तु अविवक्षितार्था जपमात्रे उपयुज्येरन्। न हि तदौपनिषदात्मप्रत्ययः प्रमाणतामश्नुते। न चासावप्रमाणमभ्यस्तोऽपि वास्तवं कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाद्यात्मनोऽपनेतुमर्हति। आरोपितं हि रूपं

तत्त्वज्ञानेनापोद्यते, न तु वास्तवमतत्त्वज्ञानेन। न हि रज्ज्वा रज्जुत्वं सहस्रमपि सर्पधाराप्रत्यया अपवदितुमुत्सहन्ते। मिथ्याज्ञानप्रसञ्जितं तु रूपं शक्यं तत्त्वज्ञानेनापवदितुम्, मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारश्च सुदृढोऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानसंस्कारेणादरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालासेवितत्त्वज्ञानाभ्यासजन्मनेति।

स्यादेतत्। प्राणाद्युपासना अपि वेदान्तेषु बहुलमुपलभ्यन्ते। तत्कथं सर्वेषां वेदान्तानामात्मैकत्वप्रतिपादनमर्थ इत्यत आह—**यथा चायमर्थः** इत्यादि। शरीरमेव शारीरकम्; तत्र निवासी शारीरको जीवात्मा। तस्य त्वंपदाभिधेयस्य तत्पदाभिधेयपरमात्मरूपतया या मीमांसा सा तथोक्ता।

एतावानत्रार्थसंक्षेपः—यद्यपि स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविधिना स्वाध्यायपदवाच्यस्य वेदराशेः फलवदर्थावबोधपरतामापादयता कर्मविधिनिषेधानामिव वेदान्तानामपि स्वाध्यायशब्दवाच्यानां फलवदर्थावबोधपरत्वमापादितम्, यद्यपि च 'अर्विा वाक्यार्थः' इति न्यायात् मन्त्राणामिव वेदान्तानामर्थपरत्वमौत्सर्गिकम्, यद्यपि च वेदान्तेभ्यः

by untrue knowledge. The rope-nature of the rope cannot be negated even by a thousand continuous apprehensions of a snake. The form occasioned by illusory cognition, however, can be negated by true knowledge, and the impression of illusory cognition, though strong, by the impression produced through the repetition of true knowledge practised with close application, unintermittently and for a long time.

Be this so. The meditations on the vital air (*prāṇa*) etc. are also largely seen (to be taught) in the Vedānta. Then, how can all the Vedānta texts have the one object of teaching the oneness of the self? To this he says: "That this is the purport of the entire Vedanta" etc. The body (*śarīra*) is itself called *śarīraka*; what resides therein is the *śārīraka*, *i.e.*, the *jīva*-self. That inquiry is mentioned here whose purpose is to show of that self denoted by the "thou" (in "That thou art"), that his nature is that of the supreme self denoted by the "that".

This is the summary of what is meant here: though (1) by the injunction to study one's own section of the Veda, which makes it follow that the entire Veda denoted by the term "one's own section of the Veda" is directed to the fruitful understanding of the sense, it is also made to follow that the Vedāntas too, like the prescriptions and prohibitions of acts denoted by the term "one's own section of the Veda," are directed to the fruitful understanding of the sense, (2) though, in accordance with the maxim "But the sense of a text is not distinguished (from that of ordinary usage"),[52] the significant nature of the Vedāntas

is universal, as in the case of the hymns (*mantras*), (3) though from the Vedāntas there comes the understanding of the one inner self unconnected with the universe, who is a mass of intelligence and bliss, and is free from agency and enjoyership, yet these Vedāntas, coming into conflict with the concept "I,"—which is free from doubt and sublation, and comprehends the self as characterised by agency, enjoyership, misery, grief and delusion,—and slipping away from their meaning, either have a figurative significance or serve only in incantations, and thus have a sense other than the one desired to be declared. Hence, the four-chaptered *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā*, directed to the inquiry into their sense, is not to be commenced.

Nor is the self, which is patent to all men in the experience of the "I" either doubtful or fruitful, in which case, from the desire to know it, an inquiry would result. This is the *prima facie* view.

The final view is this: this would be so, if the concept "I" were valid. Since, in the manner stated above, it cannot sublate Scriptural texts etc., and since its validity is not accepted by Scripture etc. and by the systems of all the preceptors, it is but superimposed. Hence the Vedāntas have a sense which is not other than the one desired to be declared or figurative, but is of the character mentioned. The inner self alone is their principal sense.[53] Since in respect of that there is, in the manner to be stated, both doubt and profit, the desire to know is appropriate. In this view, the aphorist expresses the desire to know in aphoristic form: **Then therefore the desire to know Brahman.**

चैतन्यानन्दघनः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वरहितो निष्प्रपञ्च एकः प्रत्यगात्मा अवगम्यते, तथापि कर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वदुःखशोकमोहमयमात्मानमवगाहमानेनाहंप्र-त्ययेन संदेहबाधविरहिणा विरुध्यमाना वेदान्ताः स्वार्थात्प्रच्युता उपचरितार्था वा जपमात्रोपयोगिनो वा इत्यविवक्षितस्वार्थाः। तथा च तदर्थविचा-रात्मिका चतुर्लक्षणी शारीरकमीमांसा नारब्धव्या।

न च सर्वजनीनाहमनुभवसिद्ध आत्मा संदिग्धो वा सप्रयोजनो वा, येन जिज्ञास्यः सन् विचारं प्रयुञ्जीत—इति पूर्वः पक्षः।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—भवेदेतदेवं यद्यहंप्रत्ययः प्रमा-णम्। तस्य तु उक्तेन क्रमेण श्रुत्यादिबाधकत्वा-नुपपत्तेः, श्रुत्यादिभिश्च समस्ततीर्थकरैश्च प्रामाण्या-नभ्युपगमादध्यासत्वम्। एवं च वेदान्ता नाविव-क्षितार्थाः, नापि उपचरितार्थाः, किं तु उक्तलक्षणाः। प्रत्यगात्मैव तेषां मुख्योऽर्थः। तस्य च वक्ष्यमाणेन क्रमेण संदिग्धत्वात् प्रयोजनत्वाच्च युक्ता जिज्ञासा —इत्याशयवान् सूत्रकारः तज्जिज्ञासामसूत्रयत्, **अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा** इति।

वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदमादिमं सूत्रम्—

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥१॥

जिज्ञासया च संदेहप्रयोजने सूचयति । तत्र साक्षादिच्छाव्याप्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मज्ञानं कण्ठोक्तं प्रयोजनम् । न च कर्मज्ञानात्परार्चीनमनुष्ठानमिव ब्रह्मज्ञानात्परार्चीनं किंचिदस्ति, येनैतदवान्तरप्रयोजनं भवेत् । किं तु ब्रह्ममीमांसाख्यतर्केतिकर्तव्यतानुज्ञातविषयैर्वेदान्तैराहितं निर्विचिकित्सं ब्रह्मज्ञानमेव समस्तदुःखोपशमरूपमानन्दैकरसं परमं प्रयोजनम् । तमर्थमधिकृत्य हि प्रेक्षावन्तः प्रवर्तन्तेतराम् । तच्च प्राप्तमप्यनाद्यविद्यावशादप्राप्तमिवेति प्रेप्सितं भवति ; यथा स्वग्रीवागतमपि ग्रैवेयकं कुतश्चिद्भ्रमान्नास्तीति मन्यमानः परेण प्रतिपादितमप्राप्तमिव प्राप्नोति । जिज्ञासा तु संशयस्य कार्यमिति स्वकारणं संशयं

In the sacred teaching of the Vedânta Enquiry, which is proposed to be explained, this is the first aphorism:

THEN THEREFORE THE DESIRE TO KNOW BRAHMAN

By the desire to know he indicates (the existence of) both doubt and profit. Here, Brahman-knowledge is the explicitly declared profit, since it is directly pervaded by (*i.e.*, is the object of) desire. Nor, as in the case of observances succeeding to the knowledge of ritual, is there anything succeeding to Brahman-knowledge, in view of which, that (knowledge) would be a secondary benefit. The supreme benefit, rather, is Brahman-knowledge alone, free from all doubt, this (knowledge), which is of the nature of the cessation of all misery and is of the one essence of bliss, being conveyed by the Vedântas, whose content is known through the mode of argumentation called *Brahma-mîmâṃsâ*. It is in the endeavour towards that end that, verily, the skilled inquirers would more certainly set out. That (end), though already attained, yet becomes an object of desire, as if unattained, because of beginningless Nescience; just as one, who erroneously imagines the necklace round one's own neck to be non-existent, being shown that by another, attains it, as

In this the word then (atha) is accepted as having the sense of "immediate succession," not the sense of "what is begun" (adhikāra); because the desire to know Brahman cannot be what is begun. And

---

if it had not been attained (before). The desire to know, being the result of doubt, indicates doubt as its cause. The doubt makes the commencement of the inquiry worth while. Thus, as indicating the doubt and the benefit that are the causes of the skilled inquirer setting out on this sacred teaching, it is meet that the aphorism should be at the commencement of the sacred teaching; hence, the revered commentator says: "**In the sacred teaching of the Vedanta inquiry, which is proposed to be explained**", by us "**this is the first aphorism.**" The word *mīmāṃsā* signifies an inquiry that commands respect. The inquiry commands respect, because it bears the fruit, *viz.*, the ascertainment of that extremely subtle sense, which is the cause of the supreme human goal. *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra* means the sacred teaching relating to that inquiry, and *śāstra* is so-called, because it (the inquiry) is taught or truthfully explained by that to the pupils thereof. An aphorism is such, because it indicates much meaning. As is said: "Concise, indicative of (the) senses, composed of few letters and words, replete with sense, such are what the wise ones call aphorisms."

Having thus explained the purport of the aphorism, he explains the first word of it, "**then**": "**In this, the word 'then' is accepted as having the sense of 'immediate succession'.**" The word "**then,**" occurring among the words of the aphorism, has the sense of immediate succession; this is the construction.

तत्र अथशब्दः आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते, नाधिकारार्थः, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्य-

सूचयति। संशयश्च मीमांसारम्भं प्रयोजयति। तथा च शास्त्रे प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तिहेतुसंशयप्रयोजन-सूचनात् युक्तमस्य सूत्रस्य शास्त्रादित्वम्, इत्या-ह भगवान्भाष्यकारः—**वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्य** अस्माभिः, **इदमादिमं सूत्रम्**। पूजितविचारवचनो मीमांसाशब्दः। परमपुरुषार्थहेतुभूतसूक्ष्मतमार्थनिर्णयफलतया च वि-चारस्य पूजितता। तस्या मीमांसायाः शास्त्रम्, सा ह्यनेन शिष्यते शिष्येभ्यो यथावत्प्रतिपाद्यत इति। सूत्रं च बह्वर्थसूचनात् भवति। यथाहुः—

लघूनि सूचितार्थानि स्वल्पाक्षरपदानि च।
सर्वतः सारभूतानि सूत्राण्याहुर्मनीषिणः॥ इति।

तदेवं सूत्रतात्पर्यं व्याख्याय तस्य प्रथमपदं **अथ** इति व्याचष्टे—**तत्राथशब्द आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते**। तेषु सूत्रपदेषु मध्ये योऽयं **अथशब्दः** स आनन्तर्यार्थ इति योजना।

त्वात्। मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात्। अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति। पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात्। सति च आनन्तर्यार्थत्वे, यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते, तद्वक्तव्यम्। स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं तु समानम्।

ननु अधिकारार्थोऽप्यथशब्दो दृश्यते, यथा 'अथैष ज्योतिः' इति वेदे, यथा वा लोके 'अथ शब्दानुशासनम्' इति, 'अथ योगानुशासनम्' इति च; तत्किमत्राधिकारार्थो न गृह्यत इत्यत आह—**नाधिकारार्थः**। कुतः? **ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात्**। जिज्ञासा तावदिह सूत्रे ब्रह्मणश्च तज्ज्ञानाच्च शब्दतः प्रधानं प्रतीयते। न च यथा 'दण्डी प्रैषानन्वाह' इत्यत्र अप्रधानमपि दण्डशब्दार्थो

एवमिहापि ब्रह्मतज्ज्ञाने इति युक्तम्, ब्रह्ममीमांसा-

"auspiciousness" has no syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence. Indeed, the word 'atha,' only when used in another sense, can bring about auspiciousness by the mere sound of it. And reference to what has gone before does not in effect differ from immediate succession. And when the meaning is "immediate succession," just as the desire to know Religious Duty relates invariably to the study of the Vedas that has gone before, similarly, there must be stated something which has gone before, to which the desire to know Brahman too invariably relates. Immediate succession to the study of one's own Veda is, however, common.

Now, the word "then" is also seen in the sense of what is begun, as in "Then (*i.e.*, there is begun) this jyotiṣṭoma" in the Veda, and in "Then (*i.e.*, there is begun) the treatise on śabda" or "Then (*i.e.*, there is begun) the treatise on yoga" in worldly usage; why then is it not here understood in the sense of what is begun? To this he says: "**not the sense of 'what is begun'.**" Why (not)? "**Because the desire to know Brahman cannot be what is begun.**" In this aphorism, the "desire to know" appears from the wording to be more important than "Brahman" or "knowledge thereof". Nor may it be said that, just as the meaning of the word "baton" is what is intended, though subordinate in the words "The bearer of the baton chants the permission and the reply,"[54] it may be so even here, in the case of Brahman and the knowledge thereof; for, the "desire to know" is alone intended here, as indicating the doubt and the benefit, which are subsidiary

to engaging in the sacred teaching relating to the inquiry into Brahman. If that were not intended, those (subsidiaries) would not be indicated; hence, prudent inquirers would not set out on the inquiry into Brahman any more than on the examination of the teeth of a crow. Then, verily, Brahman and the knowledge thereof could not be the theme and the benefit; for, being opposed to the concept "I," which is not (known to be) superimposed, in respect of such an object, the validity of the Vedāntas would be unintelligible; as for senses other than the one desired to be declared, such as figurative senses that may serve one's engaging in rites, or serve in incantations in the same way as (the syllable) *hum* etc., these are possible of apprehension, even in dependence on the injunction to study one's own section of the Veda. Hence, the primacy of the "desire to know," which indicates both doubt and benefit, is here intended both by the words and by the sentence (as a whole). Nor can that (word *jijñāsā*) signify what is begun, so that the word "then," which is in proximity thereto, may also be taken to mark what is begun; for, it is not that which is treated (in every section). Brahman-knowledge, which qualifies the desire to know, may, however, be what is begun. And that too does not connect with the word "then," because there is no primacy for that (Brahman-knowledge). Nor is the desire to know (*jijñāsā*) the same as inquiry (*mīmāṃsā*), so that, like the treatise on yoga, it may be what is begun; the word *mīmāṃsā*,—being derived with the termination *san*, but not in the sense of desire, according to the (aphorism)[55] *mān-badha* etc., either from the root *mān*, to measure, with the addition of an "n" or from the root *mān*, to reverence, —signifies an inquiry that commands respect; while

शास्त्रप्रवृत्त्यङ्गसंशयप्रयोजनसूचनार्थत्वेन जिज्ञासाया एव विवक्षितत्वात्। तदविवक्षायां तदसूचनेन काकदन्तपरीक्षायामिव न ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रेक्षावन्तः प्रवर्तेरन्। न हि तदानीं ब्रह्म तज्ज्ञानं च अभिधेयप्रयोजने भवितुमर्हतः, अनध्यस्ताहंप्रत्यय-विरोधेन वेदान्तानामेवंविधेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेः; कर्मप्रवृत्त्युपयोगितया उपचरितार्थानां वा जपोप-योगिनां वा 'हुम्' इत्येवमादीनामिवाविवक्षि-तार्थानामपि स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविध्यधीनग्रहणत्वस्य संभवात्। तस्मात्संदेहप्रयोजनसूचनी जिज्ञासा इह पदतो वाक्यतश्च प्रधानं विवक्षितव्या। न च तस्या अधिकार्यत्वम्, अप्रस्तूयमानत्वात्, येन तत्समभिव्याहृतोऽथशब्दोऽधिकारार्थः स्यात्। जि-ज्ञासाविशेषणं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानमधिकार्यं भवेत्। न च तदप्यथशब्देन संबध्यते, प्राधान्याभावात्। न च जिज्ञासा मीमांसा येन योगानुशासनवदधिक्रियेत; नान्तत्वं निपात्य 'माङ् माने' इत्यस्माद्वा 'मान पूजायाम्' इत्यस्माद्वा धातोः 'मान्बध—' इत्यादिना अनिच्छार्थे सनि व्युत्पादितस्य मीमांसा-

पदस्य पूजितविचारवचनत्वात्; ज्ञानेच्छावाचकत्वाज्जिज्ञासापदस्य। प्रवर्तिका हि मीमांसायां जिज्ञासा स्यात्। न च प्रवर्त्यप्रवर्तकयोरैक्यम्, एकत्वे तद्भावानुपपत्तेः। न च स्वार्थपरत्वस्योपपत्तौ सत्यां अन्यार्थपरत्वकल्पना युक्ता, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात्सुष्ठूक्तम् **'जिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात्'** इति।

अथ मङ्गलार्थोऽथशब्दः कस्मान्न भवति? तथा च मङ्गलहेतुत्वात् प्रत्यहं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति सूत्रार्थः संपद्यत इत्यत आह— **मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात्।** पदार्थ एव हि वाक्यार्थे समन्वीयते, स च वाच्यो लक्ष्यो वा। न चेह मङ्गलमथशब्दस्य वाच्यं वा लक्ष्यं वा, किं तु मृदङ्गशङ्खध्वनिवदथशब्दश्रवणमात्रकार्यम्। न च कार्यज्ञाप्ययोर्वाक्यार्थे समन्वयः शब्दव्यवहारे दृष्ट इत्यर्थः। तत्किमिदानीं मङ्गलार्थोऽथशब्दः तेषु तेषु न प्रयोक्तव्यः? तथा च

ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा।
कण्ठं भित्त्वा विनिर्यातौ तस्मान्माङ्गलिकावुभौ॥

the word "jijñāsā" signifies "desire to know". "Desire to know" is indeed what starts one on the "inquiry". Nor can that which starts be identical with that which is started, that relationship (of starter and started) being unintelligible where they are one. Nor is it proper to assume some other sense (for a word) when its own sense is intelligible, as that will be an undue extension. Hence it is well said: "**because the desire to know . . . cannot be what is begun.**"

Now, why may not the word *atha* have the sense of auspiciousness? Thus, the aphorism comes to mean that the desire to know Brahman is to be undertaken every day as causing auspiciousness. To this he says: "**and 'auspiciousness' has no syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence.**" It is the meaning of a word that, verily, has syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence; and that (former) is either expressed or implied. In this case, auspiciousness is not the sense expressed or implied of the word *atha*, but something effected on the mere hearing of that word, as on hearing the sound of the drum (*mṛdaṅga*) or the conch. And in the use of words it is not seen that what is effected or recalled (by a word) has any syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence: this is the meaning. (Objection): is not the word *atha* used here and there to signify auspiciousness? And there would also be conflict with the text of the traditional Code, which says: "The two words *Om* and *atha* burst out of yore from the throat of Brahman; hence both are auspicious." (Reply): to this he says: "**Indeed, the word 'atha,' only when used in**

another sense, can bring about auspiciousness by the (mere) sound of it." The word *atha*, used in the sense of immediate succession etc., produces auspiciousness, like the sound of the flute, the lyre etc., by the sound, *i.e.*, by the mere hearing of it, and thus helps to bring about auspiciousness, like the sight of the pitcher of water brought for a different purpose. Thus, there is no conflict with the text of the traditional Code. Therefore, the sense of immediate succession being there, the sense of auspiciousness too (is secured) by the mere hearing: this is the meaning.

Be this so. The word *atha* may depend on an antecedent factor, even without having the sense of "immediate succession". This is how: a question may be raised with reference to this very word *atha*—"Is this word *atha* (used in the sense of) 'immediate succession' or (*atha*) 'what is begun'?" Here, the word *atha* occurring in the interrogative states an alternative view after stating a preliminary view, with reference to the *atha* occurring earlier. Of that (second) word, "immediate succession" is not the sense, since it is separated from the earlier occurring word by the statement of the preliminary view. Nor is there non-dependence on the foregoing (word), for if there were no dependence on that, that (word) would not be the content of this (interrogative), and consequently the disjunction, not referring to the same content, would be unintelligible. Never does it happen (that one asks): "Is the self eternal or is the intellect non-eternal?" Hence, even without the sense of "immediate succession," why should it not be that the word *atha*

इति स्मृतिव्याकोप इत्यत आह—**अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति।** अर्थान्तरेष्वानन्तर्यादिषु प्रयुक्तः अथशब्दः श्रुत्या श्रवणमात्रेण वेणुवीणाध्वनिवन्मङ्गलं कुर्वन् मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति अन्यार्थमानीयमानोदकुम्भदर्शनवत्। तेन न स्मृतिव्याकोपः। तेन च इह आनन्तर्यार्थस्य सतः श्रवणमात्रेण मङ्गलार्थतेत्यर्थः।

स्यादेतत्। पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षोऽथशब्दो भविष्यति विनैवानन्तर्यार्थत्वम्। तद्यथा—इममेवाथशब्दं प्रकृत्य विमृश्यते 'किमयमथशब्द आनन्तर्ये अथाधिकारे' इति। अत्र विमर्शकवाक्येऽथशब्दः पूर्वप्रकृतमथशब्दमपेक्ष्य प्रथमपक्षोपन्यासपूर्वकं पक्षान्तरोपन्यासे। न चास्यानन्तर्यमर्थः, पूर्वप्रकृतस्य प्रथमपक्षोपन्यासेन व्यवायात्। न च प्रकृतानपेक्षा, तदनपेक्षस्य तद्विषयत्वाभावेन असमानविषयतया विकल्पानुपपत्तेः। न हि जातु भवति—किं नित्य आत्मा, अथ अनित्या बुद्धिरिति। तस्मादानन्तर्यं विना पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्ष इहाथशब्दः कस्मान्न भवतीत्यत आह—**पूर्व-**

प्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात्। अस्यार्थः—न वयमानन्तर्यार्थतां व्यसनितया रोचयामहे, किं तु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाहेतुभूतपूर्वप्रकृतसिद्धये। सा च पूर्वप्रकृतार्थापेक्षत्वेऽप्यथशब्दस्य सिध्यतीति व्यर्थ आनन्तर्यार्थत्वावधारणाग्रहोऽस्माकमिति। तदिदमुक्तम् 'फलतः' इति। परमार्थतस्तु कल्पान्तरोपन्यासे पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षा; न चेह कल्पान्तरोपन्यास इति पारिशेष्यादानन्तर्यार्थ एवेति युक्तम्।

भवत्वानन्तर्यार्थः, किमेवं सतीत्यत आह—**सति चानन्तर्यार्थत्व** इति। न तावद्यस्य कस्यचिदत्रानन्तर्यमिति वक्तव्यम्, तस्याभिधानमन्तरेणापि प्राप्तत्वात्। अवश्यं हि पुरुषः किंचित्कृत्वा किंचित्करोति। न चानन्तर्यमात्रस्य दृष्टमदृष्टं वा प्रयोजनं पश्यामः। तस्मात्तस्यात्रानन्तर्यं वक्तव्यं यद्विना ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा न भवति, यस्मिन्सति तु भवन्ती भवत्येव। तदिदमुक्तम्—**यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षत** इति।

depends on what goes before? To this he says: "**and reference to what has gone before does not, in effect, differ from immediate succession.**" This is the meaning: we prefer the sense of "immediate succession" not because of eagerness, but rather in order to secure some antecedent factor, which will serve as the cause of the desire to know Brahman. Since that (sense) results even on the view that the word *atha* is dependent on what goes before, any eagerness of ours to fix the sense of that word as "immediate succession" would be in vain. That is here expressed by the words: "**in effect.**" But, in reality, it is in stating another view, that there is dependence on what goes before; and since, here, there is no statement of an alternative view, by elimination, "immediate succession" alone is left as the sense; this is the correct view.

Let "immediate succession" be the sense; what of it? To this he says: "**And when the meaning is 'immediate succession'**" etc. Immediate succession is to be declared here not to something or other, since that results even without any statement. A person does something, necessarily after doing something else. Nor do we see any benefit—seen or unseen—from immediate succession alone. Hence, there must be declared immediate succession to that, without which the desire to know Brahman would not be, and in the presence of which it would certainly be generated. That is here mentioned in the words: "**something which has gone before to which the desire to know Brahman too invariably relates.**"

Now, here, what is distinctive is immediate succession to a knowledge of ritual. No; for, even prior to a desire to know Religious Duty, desire to know

---

Be this so. Of the desire to know Brahman, as of the desire to know Religious Duty (*dharma*), there may be immediate succession to the study of one's own section of the Veda because of compatibility, since Brahman, like Religious Duty, is known on the sole authority of Scripture. That not being known, there does not arise cognition of its own content (*i.e.*, Religious Duty and Brahman); and the apprehension of it (Scripture) follows necessarily even from the rule as to study: "one should study one's own section of the Veda." Hence, immediate succession to the study of the Veda alone is the meaning of the word *atha*, even in the case of the desire to know Brahman. To this he says: "**Immediate succession to the study of one's own Veda is, however, common**" to the desire to know Religious Duty as well as to the desire to know Brahman. And here, by the words "**one's own Veda**" referring to the content, the content thereof, *viz.*, study, is implied. And this (succession) being understood even from the aphorism "Then, therefore, the desire to know Religious Duty,"[56] the present aphorism need not be begun at all; for, the word *dharma* (used in the above sūtra) implies the entire sense of the Vedas, and Brahman, like Religious Duty, being equally the sense of the Vedas, the teaching about immediate succession to the study of the Veda applies equally (to both): this is the meaning.

Now, the objection is raised: "**Now, here, what is distinctive**" of the desire to know Brahman in relation

नन्विह कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः। न, धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः। यथा च हृदयाद्यवदाना-

स्यादेतत्। धर्मजिज्ञासाया इव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अपि योग्यत्वात् स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तर्यम्, धर्मवद्ब्रह्मणोऽप्याम्नायैकप्रमाणगम्यत्वात्। तस्य चागृहीतस्य स्वविषये विज्ञानाजननात्, ग्रहणस्य च 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' इत्यध्ययनेनैव नियतत्वात्। तस्माद्वेदाध्ययनानन्तर्यमेव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अप्यथशब्दार्थ इत्यत आह—**स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं तु समानं** धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः। अत्र च **स्वाध्यायेन** विषयेण तद्विषयमध्ययनं लक्षयति। तथा च 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यनेनैव गतमिति नेदं सूत्रमारब्धव्यम्; धर्मशब्दस्य वेदार्थमात्रोपलक्षणतया धर्मवद्ब्रह्मणोऽपि वेदार्थत्वाविशेषेण वेदाध्ययनानन्तर्योपदेशसाम्यादित्यर्थः।

चोदयति—**नन्विह कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः** धर्मजिज्ञासातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः।

नामानन्तर्यनियमः, क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्त्वात्, न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः; शेषशेषित्वे अधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावात्, धर्म-ब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः ।

अस्यार्थः—'विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन' इति तृतीया-श्रुत्या यज्ञादीनामङ्गत्वेन ब्रह्मज्ञाने विनियोगात्, ज्ञानस्यैव कर्मतया इच्छां प्रति प्राधान्यात्, प्रधानसंबन्धाच्चाप्रधानानां पदार्थान्तराणाम् । तत्रापि च न वाक्यार्थज्ञानोत्पत्तावङ्गभावो यज्ञादीनाम्, वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य वाक्यादेवोत्पत्तेः । न च वाक्यं सहकारितया कर्माण्यपेक्षत इति युक्तम्; अकृत-कर्मणामपि विदितपदपदार्थसंबन्धानां समधि-गतशाब्दन्यायतत्त्वानां गुणप्रधानभूतपूर्वापरपदार्था-काङ्क्षासंनिधियोग्यतानुसंधानवतामप्रत्यूहं वाक्यार्थ-प्रत्ययोत्पत्तेः । अनुत्पत्तौ वा विधिनिषेधवाक्यार्थ-प्रत्ययाभावेन तदर्थानुष्ठानपरिवर्जनाभावप्रसङ्गः । तद्बोधतस्तु तदर्थानुष्ठानपरिवर्जने परस्पराश्रयः, तस्मिन् सति तदर्थानुष्ठानपरिवर्जनं ततश्च तद्बोध

Brahman is intelligible in respect of one who has studied the Vedânta. And there is the rule of immediate succession in respect of the cutting of the heart etc., because, there, the sequence is intended to be declared; but here no similar sequence is intended to be declared; for there is no authority for the relationship of subsidiary and principal or of eligibility of the person (already) eligible as between the desire to know Religious Duty and Brahman.

to the desire to know Religious Duty "**is immediate succession to a knowledge of ritual**". This is its meaning: through the express statement of the instrumental case "They desire to know by sacrifice" etc., sacrifice etc. are applied to the knowledge of Brahman as its subsidiaries; for, knowledge alone is primary as the object of desire, and other things which are not primary have to be related to what is primary. Even here, sacrifice etc. are not subsidiary to the production of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, since the latter is produced by the sentence itself. Nor does it stand to reason that the sentence requires ritual as an auxiliary; for, in him who knows the connection of words and their senses, comprehends the true nature of the principles regulating the use of sounds, who keeps in mind the relationships of subsidiary and principal, earlier and later, among things, and the requirements of expectancy, proximity and compatibility, there is seen the unhindered production of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, even though he has not performed any rites. Or, if it did not arise, there would be no knowledge of the meaning of prescriptive

and prohibitory texts, and there would result the failure of the observances and avoidances, which are the sense of those (texts). If from the knowledge of them arose their observance and avoidance, there would be reciprocal dependence, in that that (knowledge) being existent, there is observance and avoidance of their sense, while from them (the observance and avoidance) there is the knowledge thereof. Nor is it admissible that the Vedānta texts alone depend on ritual for the comprehension of their sense, and not other sentences; for, there is no special cause.

Now, those whose intellects are impure to start with cannot from the first understand the validity of the identity asserted by the text "That thou art" between the *jīva* denoted by the "thou," whose nature is that of agent and enjoyer, and the supreme self denoted by the "that," whose nature is eternally pure, intelligent and indifferent, because of the certainty that there is lack of compatibility (between the denotations of the two terms). But those of pure intellect, whose internal impurities have undergone attrition by means of sacrifices, gifts, austerities and fasting, and who are endowed with faith, having understood the compatibility (of "that" and "thou"), will understand their identity. If this be urged, then, of the ascertainment of compatibility, which is the cause of the valid knowledge, do you resolve to say that it comes from ritual, which is itself not a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), or that ritual too is a means of valid knowledge, in addition to perception etc.? If the ascertainment of compatibility is effected by reasoning unopposed to the Vedānta and based on it, there is no need for ritual. Hence, having apprehended the *jīva's* nature to be that of the supreme self, through knowledge of the nature of

इति। न च वेदान्तवाक्यानामेव स्वार्थप्रत्यायने कर्मापेक्षा न वाक्यान्तराणामिति सांप्रतम्, विशेषहेतोरभावात्।

ननु 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यात् त्वंपदार्थस्य कर्तृभोक्तृरूपस्य जीवात्मनो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धोदासीनस्वभावेन तत्पदार्थेन परमात्मनैक्यमशक्यं द्रागित्येव प्रतिपत्तुं आपाततोऽशुद्धसत्त्वैः, योग्यताविरहविनिश्चयात्। यज्ञदानतपोऽनाशकतनूकृतान्तर्मलास्तु विशुद्धसत्त्वाः श्रद्दधाना योग्यतावगमपुरःसरं तादात्म्यमवगमिष्यन्तीति चेत्, तत्किमिदानीं प्रमाणकारणं योग्यतावधारणमप्रमाणात्कर्मणो वक्तुमध्यवसितोऽसि, प्रत्यक्षाद्यतिरिक्तं वा कर्मापि प्रमाणम्। वेदान्ताविरुद्धतन्मूलन्यायबलेन तु योग्यतावधारणे कृतं कर्मभिः। तस्मात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादेः श्रुतमयेन ज्ञानेन जीवात्मनः परमात्मभावं गृहीत्वा, तन्मूलया चोपपत्त्या व्यवस्थाप्य, तदुपासनायां भावनापराभिधानायां दीर्घकालनैरन्तर्यवत्यां ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारफलायां

यज्ञादीनामुपयोगः । यथाहुः—'स तु दीर्घकाल-नैरन्तर्यसत्कारासेवितो दृढभूमिः' इति । ब्रह्मचर्य-तपःश्रद्धायज्ञादयश्च सत्काराः । अत एव श्रुतिः—

'तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः' । इति । विज्ञाय तर्कोपकरणेन शब्देन प्रज्ञां भावनां कुर्वीतेत्यर्थः । अत्र च यज्ञादीनां श्रेयःपरिपन्थि-कल्मषनिबर्हणद्वारेणोपयोग इति केचित् । पुरुष-संस्कारद्वारेणेत्यन्ये । यज्ञादिसंस्कृतो हि पुरुषः आदरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालैरासेवमानो ब्रह्मभावनामनाद्य-विद्यावासनां समूलकाषं कषति; ततोऽस्य प्रत्यगात्मा सुप्रसन्नः केवलो विशदीभवति । अत एव स्मृतिः—

'महायज्ञैश्च यज्ञैश्च ब्राह्मीयं क्रियते तनुः ।' इति, 'यस्यैतेऽष्टाचत्वारिंशत्संस्काराः' इति च । अपरे तु ऋणत्रयापाकरणेन ब्रह्मज्ञानोपयोगं कर्मणामाहुः । अस्ति हि स्मृतिः—

'ऋणानि त्रीण्यपाकृत्य मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत् ।' इति । अन्ये तु 'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा

hearing texts like "That thou art," and confirmed it by reasoning based thereon, there results intuition of Brahman through the contemplation—otherwise known as *bhāvanā*—of that (truth), practised for long and unintermittently; sacrifice etc. serve in this (contemplation). As is said: "But that (discipline of mental functioning) practised for long, unintermittently and with *satkāras* is the sure means (of realising the truth)"[57] Continence, austerity, faith, sacrifice etc. are the *satkāras*. Hence it is the Scripture says: "Knowing that alone, the wise brāhmin should perform contemplation (*prajñā*)."[58] Having known through testimony aided by argumentation, one is to betake oneself to contemplation. Here, some say that for sacrifice etc., there is utility through their destroying impurities that are the foes of beatitude. Others say it is through purifying the person (that they are useful). It is the person purified by sacrifice etc., who, verily, by the contemplation of Brahman practised with devotion and unintermittently for a long time, plucks out by the root all the impressions of beginningless Nescience; thence, the inner self becomes clear, pure and bright. Hence it is that the traditional Code says: "One creates the capacity to attain Brahman through the mahāyajñas (*brahma-yajña, deva-yajña, pitṛ-yajña* etc.) and through sacrifices," and "He, for whom there have been these forty and eight purificatory ceremonies". Yet others say of ritual that its service to Brahman-knowledge is through the discharge of the three obligations. There is, indeed, the traditional Code to this effect: "Having discharged the three obligations, one is to set one's mind on release."[59] Others, however, say that the various rites, though enjoined with reference to their respective results, yet, because of texts like "That the

brahmins seek to know through the study of the Vedas, through sacrifice etc.," are subsidiary to the contemplation of Brahman, through the relation of *saṃyoga-pṛthaktva* (two-in-oneness), just as the *khādira* (ebony) wood, while serving the purpose of the sacrifice (in the capacity of sacrificial stake), serves also to bring about virility (to the sacrificer); for the principle is "when one subserves two ends, (the relation is) *samyoga-pṛthaktva*".[60] Hence too the aphorism of the great sage (Bādarāyaṇa): "Because of the Scriptural text about sacrifice etc., there is need of all (in the contemplation of Brahman), as in the case of a horse."[61] (The word) "all" means sacrifice, gifts, austerities etc.; there is need of these for the contemplation of Brahman; this is the meaning. Hence, whichever be the authority, Scripture etc., or the aphorism of the great sage, in any case, it is contemplation of Brahman as united to sacrifice etc., and possessed of the three properties (devotion, length of time and non-intermission), that is efficient to bring about intuition of Brahman, otherwise known as release, through the destruction of beginningless Nescience and its impressions; for this purpose, rites ought to be observed. Nor can these be observed, in the absence of the knowledge of the many different forms of rites in respect of their consequences seen and unseen, of things in relation to them as inherent or as remote causes, of the elements which are taught directly or obtained by transfer, of the host of subsidiaries ending with sequence (*krama*), as also of the different persons eligible for the respective rites.[62] Nor does that knowledge result without a critical study of the inquiry into Religious Duty. Hence it has been well said: **'what is distinctive is immediate succession to a knowledge**

विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः तत्तत्फलाय चोदितानामपि कर्मणां संयोगपृथक्त्वेन ब्रह्मभावनां प्रत्यङ्गभावमाचक्षते, ऋत्वर्थस्येव खादिरत्वस्य वीर्यार्थताम्, 'एकस्य तूभयार्थत्वे संयोगपृथक्त्वम्' इति न्यायात्। अत एव पारमर्षं सूत्रम् 'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्' इति। यज्ञतपोदानादि सर्वम्, तदपेक्षा ब्रह्मभावनेत्यर्थः। तस्मात् यदि श्रुत्यादयः प्रमाणं यदि वा पारमर्षं सूत्रं सर्वथा यज्ञादिकर्मसमुच्चिता ब्रह्मोपासना विशेषणत्रयवती अनाद्यविद्यातद्वासनासमुच्छेदक्रमेण ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराय मोक्षापरनाम्ने कल्पत इति तदर्थं कर्माण्यनुष्ठेयानि। न चैतानि दृष्टादृष्टसामवायिकारादुपकारहेतुभूतौपदेशिकातिदेशिकक्रमपर्यन्ताङ्गग्रामसहितपरस्परविभिन्नकर्मस्वरूपतदधिकारिभेदपरिज्ञानं विना शक्यान्यनुष्ठातुम्। न च धर्ममीमांसापरिशीलनं विना तत्परिज्ञानम्। तस्मात्साधूक्तम् 'कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः' इति। कर्मावबोधेन हि कर्मानुष्ठानसाहित्यं भवति ब्रह्मोपासनाया इत्यर्थः।

तदेतन्निराकरोति—**न** इति। कुतः? कर्मावबोधात्

प्रागप्यधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः।

इदमत्राकूतम्—ब्रह्मोपासनया भावनापराभिधानया कर्माण्यपेक्ष्यन्त इत्युक्तम्। तत्र ब्रूमः—क्व पुनरस्याः कर्मापेक्षा? किं कार्ये यथाग्नेयादीनां परमापूर्वे चिरभाविफलानुकूले जनयितव्ये समिदाद्यपेक्षा? स्वरूपे वा यथा तेषामेव द्विरवत्तपुरोडाशादिद्रव्याग्निदेवताद्यपेक्षा? न तावत्कार्ये, तस्य विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथा हि—ब्रह्मोपासनाया ब्रह्मस्वरूपसाक्षात्कारः कार्यमभ्युपेयः। स चोत्पाद्यो वा स्यात् यथा संयवनस्य पिण्डः, विकार्यो वा यथावघातस्य व्रीहयः, संस्कार्यो वा यथा प्रोक्षणस्योलूखलादयः, प्राप्यो वा यथा दोहनस्य पयः। न तावदुत्पाद्यः। न खलु घटादिसाक्षात्कार इव जडस्वभावेभ्यो घटादिभ्यो भिन्न इन्द्रियाद्याधेयो ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारो भावनाधेयः संभवति, ब्रह्मणोऽपराधीनप्रकाशतया तत्साक्षात्कारस्य तत्स्वाभाव्येन नित्यतयोत्पाद्यत्वानुपपत्तेः। ततो भिन्नस्य वा भावनाधेयस्य साक्षात्कारस्य प्रतिभाप्रत्ययवत्

of ritual." It is, verily, by the knowledge of ritual that there results for the contemplation of Brahman the co-operation of ritual.

This he refutes: "**No.**" Why (not)? "**For, even prior**" to the knowledge of ritual, "**the desire to know Brahman is intelligible in respect of one who has studied the Vedanta**".

This is the underlying idea: it is said that rites are needed for the purpose of Brahman-contemplation, otherwise known as *bhāvanā*. We ask here "in what way are rites needed?" Is it for the (production of the) effect, just as for the *āgneya* and other (rites) there is need of the *samit* (a subsidiary rite) in order to produce the final unseen result (*paramā-'pūrva*), which is favourable to long-delayed fruit?[63] Or, is it in respect of its own existence, like the requirement of the material—the *puroḍāśa* cut into two, and the deity—*Agni*? Not for the effect, as that cannot stand examination. It is thus: it has to be admitted of the contemplation of Brahman that it effects intuition of the nature of Brahman. That may be a product, as the ball (of flour) is produced by mixing it into a paste; a modification, as rice from pounding; something purified, like the mortar etc. by sprinkling;[64] something attained, as milk by milking. Firstly, it is not a product. The intuition of Brahman produced by Brahman-contemplation does not, verily, result in the same way as perception of the pot etc., which are produced by the senses etc., different from the pot etc., inert by nature; for, Brahman, not being illumined in dependence on another, the intuition thereof is of its own nature, eternal, and production is not intelligible in that case. Any intuition different therefrom, brought

about by contemplation, is infected with doubt, like an imagined idea, and hence cannot be valid; for, it is seen of that kind (of idea), even with that (contemplation) as accessory, that it is often inconstant. The (apparently) direct experience of a fire with huge flames, as the result of the contemplation of a (wrongly) inferred fire, by one whose body is extremely benumbed with intense cold, does not, verily, accord with other valid knowledge, this non-accord being seen extensively. Hence, since there is not the effect characteristic of valid intuition, ritual is not needed in the generation (of any result) by contemplation. And for Brahman, who is immutably eternal and all-pervasive, modification, purification or attainment cannot result through contemplation.

Be this so. Let not the intuition of Brahman result, in the way of generation etc., from contemplation. Purification, however, may come about through the removal of the veil of the two-fold indeterminable Nescience, as the *danseuse* concealed by the curtain is manifested through the raising of the curtain by the stage-hand. Herein lies the use of ritual. But there is this much of difference: on the raising of the curtain, the *danseuse* becomes the object of immediate perception to the audience. Here, however, the bare removal of the veil of Nescience is what is generated, and nothing else, since intuition of Brahman cannot be generated, the nature of Brahman being eternal. Here, we ask: "What is this Brahman-contemplation?" Is it a succession of whatever is apprehended through verbal testimony? or a succession of indubitable cognitions gained through (valid) verbal testimony? If it be a succession of whatever is cognised

संशयाक्रान्ततया प्रामाण्यायोगात्, ताद्वयस्य तत्सामग्रीकस्यैव बहुलं व्यभिचारोपलब्धेः। न खलु अनुमानावगतं सिन्धुं वह्निं भावयतः शीतार्तस्य शिशिरभरमन्थरतरकायकाण्डस्य स्फुरज्ज्वालाजटिलानलसाक्षात्कारः प्रमाणान्तरेण संवाद्यते, विसंवादस्य बहुलमुपलम्भात्। तस्मात् प्रामाणिकसाक्षात्कारलक्षणकार्याभावान्नोपासनाया उत्पाद्ये कर्मापेक्षा। न च कूटस्थनित्यस्य सर्वव्यापिनो ब्रह्मण उपासनातो विकारसंस्कारप्राप्तयः संभवन्ति।

स्यादेतत्। मा भूद्ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार उत्पाद्यादिरूप उपासनायाः। संस्कार्यस्तु अनिर्वचनीयाविद्याद्वयपिधानापनयनेन भविष्यति, प्रतिसीरापिहिता नर्तकीव प्रतिसीरापनयद्वारा रङ्गव्यापृतेन। तत्र च कर्मणामुपयोगः। एतावांस्तु विशेषः—प्रतिसीरापनये पारिषदानां नर्तकीविषयः साक्षात्कारो भवति। इह तु अविद्यापिधानापनयमात्रमेव नापरमुत्पाद्यमस्ति, ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्य ब्रह्मस्वभावस्य नित्यत्वेन अनुत्पाद्यत्वात्। अत्रोच्यते—का पुनरियं ब्रह्मोपासना? किं शाब्दज्ञानमात्रसंततिः, आहो निर्विचिकित्स-

शाब्दज्ञानसंततिः ? यदि शाब्दज्ञानमात्रसंततिः, न तर्हीयमभ्यस्यमानाप्यविद्यां समुच्छेत्तुमर्हति । तत्त्वविनिश्चयस्तदभ्यासो वा सवासनं विपर्यासमुन्मूलयेत्, न संशयाभ्यासः, सामान्यमात्रदर्शनाभ्यासो वा । न हि स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति वा, आरोहपरिणाहवत् द्रव्यमिति वा शतशोऽपि ज्ञानमभ्यस्यमानं पुरुष एवेति निश्चयाय पर्याप्तम्, ऋते विशेषदर्शनात् ।

ननूक्तं श्रुतमयेन ज्ञानेन जीवात्मनः परमात्मभावं गृहीत्वा युक्तिमयेन च व्यवस्थाप्यत इति । तस्मान्निर्विचिकित्सशाब्दज्ञानसंततिरूपोपासना कर्मसहकारिण्यविद्याद्वयोच्छेदहेतुः । न चासावनुत्पादितब्रह्मानुभवा तदुच्छेदाय पर्याप्ता । साक्षात्काररूपो हि विपर्यासः साक्षात्काररूपेणैव तत्त्वज्ञानेनोच्छिद्यते, न तु परोक्षावभासेन, दिङ्मोहालातचक्रचलद्वृक्षमरुमरीचिसलिलादिविभ्रमेष्वपरोक्षावभासिषु अपरोक्षावभासिभिरेव दिगादितत्त्वप्रत्ययैर्निवृत्तिदर्शनात् । नो खल्वाप्तवचनलिङ्गादिनिश्चितदिगादितत्त्वानां दिङ्मोहादयो निवर्तन्ते । तस्मात् त्वंपदार्थस्य तत्पदार्थ-

through verbal testimony, then, even if practised repeatedly it cannot remove Nescience. It is the ascertainment of truth and the repetition thereof that root out error with its impressions, not the repetition of doubt, nor the repetition of the cognition of what is general. The cognition "post or man" or "a tall big object," even if repeated a hundred times, cannot lead to the certitude that it is but a man, unless there is specific cognition.

Now, it has been said that the *jīva*'s true nature as the supreme self having been apprehended through cognition of the nature of hearing, it is confirmed by (cognition) of the nature of reasoning. Hence, contemplation of the nature of a succession of indubitable cognitions based on (valid) verbal testimony is, as assisted by ritual, the cause of the destruction of the two-fold Nescience. Nor can this achieve that destruction without bringing about experience of Brahman. Error, which is of the nature of immediate experience, can be removed only by true knowledge of the nature of immediate experience, not by a mediate presentation; for, it is seen that immediate presentations like confusion of direction, the circle of fire, the moving trees (as seen when one is oneself moving), and the water in the mirage are removed only by immediate presentations in the nature of true cognitions of the directions etc. Confusion of direction etc. are not, verily, removed by the ascertainment of the directions etc. obtained through verbal testimony, inference etc. Hence, what is to be desired is the intuition of the denotation of the "thou" as of the nature of the denotation of the "that". Only thus and not

otherwise can there be cessation of the intuition of the denotation of the "thou" as subject to suffering, grief etc. This intuition does not, verily, result from verbal testimony, even though accompanied by inquiry, but from perception, that (intuition) being the invariable result of that (perception) alone, as otherwise it would follow that a banyan shoot could grow even from a *kuṭaja*-seed.[65] Hence, it stands to reason that the internal organ perfected by the contemplation of the meaning of sentences of indubitable import, manifests, of the immediately experienced denotation of the "thou," its nature as the denotation of the "that," through negating the various conditioned forms of the former. Nor is this experience itself of the nature of Brahman, in which case it could not be generated; rather, it is a particular psychosis (*vṛtti*) of the internal organ itself, having Brahman for its content. Nor with this does Brahman become other-illumined. Because Brahman is illumined by verbal testimony, it does not, verily, become non-self-illumined. Indeed, that which is free from all adjuncts is declared to be self-effulgence, not that which is conditioned too.[66] As the revered commentator, verily, says: "**now, this is not invariably a non-object.**" Nor is there freedom from all adjuncts in the intuition of Brahman, though a psychosis of the internal organ, for, it (the intuition) is known to be an adjunct opposed both to itself and to other adjuncts, being itself on the brink of destruction. Otherwise (*i.e.*, if it were not united to intelligence as an adjunct), of the psychosis of the internal organ, itself non-intelligent, self-illumination would be unintelligible, in the absence of

त्वेन साक्षात्कार एषितव्यः । एतावता हि त्वंपदार्थस्य दुःखशोकित्वादिसाक्षात्कारनिवृत्तिः, नान्यथा । न चैष साक्षात्कारो मीमांसासहितस्यापि शाब्दप्रमाणस्य फलम्, अपि तु प्रत्यक्षस्य, तस्यैव तत्फलत्व-नियमात्; अन्यथा कुटजबीजादपि वटाङ्कु-रोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्निर्विचिकित्सवाक्यार्थ-भावनापरिपाकसहितमन्तःकरणं त्वंपदार्थस्यापरोक्षस्य तत्तदुपाध्याकारनिषेधेन तत्पदार्थतामाविर्भावयतीति युक्तम् । न चायमनुभवो ब्रह्मस्वभावो येन न जन्येत, अपि तु अन्तःकरणस्यैव वृत्तिभेदो ब्रह्मविषयः । न चैतावता ब्रह्मणोऽपि पराधीन-प्रकाशता । न हि शाब्दज्ञानप्रकाश्यं ब्रह्म स्वयं प्रकाशं न भवति । सर्वोपाधिविहीनं हि स्वयंज्योतिरिति गीयते, न तूपहितमपि । यथाह स्म भगवान्भाष्यकारः—'**न तावदयमेकान्तेना-विषयः**' इति । न चान्तःकरणवृत्तावप्यस्य साक्षात्कारे सर्वोपाधिविनिर्मोकः, तस्यैव तदुपा-धेर्विनश्यदवस्थस्य स्वपरोपाधिविरोधिनो विद्यमान-त्वात् । अन्यथा चैतन्यच्छायापत्तिं विनान्तः-

करणवृत्तेः स्वयमचेतनायाः स्वप्रकाशत्वानुपपत्तौ साक्षात्कारत्वायोगात् । न चानुमितभावितवह्निसाक्षात्कारवत् प्रतिभात्वेनाख्याप्रामाण्यम्, तत्र वह्निस्वलक्षणस्य परोक्षत्वात् । इह तु ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्योपाधिकलुषितस्य जीवस्य प्रागप्यपरोक्षत्वात् । न हि शुद्धबुद्धत्वादयो वस्तुतस्ततोऽतिरिच्यन्ते । जीव एव तु तत्तदुपाधिरहितः शुद्धबुद्धत्वादिस्वभावो ब्रह्मेति गीयते । न च तत्तदुपाधिविरहोऽपि ततोऽतिरिच्यते । तस्मात् यथा गान्धर्वशास्त्रार्थज्ञानाभ्यासाहितसंस्कारसचिवः श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण षड्जादिस्वरग्राममूर्छनाभेदमध्यक्षमनुभवति, एवं वेदान्तार्थज्ञानाभ्यासाहितसंस्कारो जीवः स्वस्य ब्रह्मभावमन्तःकरणेनेति ।

अन्तःकरणवृत्तौ ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारे जनयितव्ये अस्ति तदुपासनायाः कर्मापेक्षेति चेत्, न, तस्याः कर्मानुष्ठानसहभावाभावेन तत्सहकारित्वानुपपत्तेः । न खलु 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादेर्वाक्यान्निर्विचिकित्सं शुद्धबुद्धोदासीनस्वभावं अकर्तृत्वाद्युपेतं अपेतब्राह्मणत्वादिजातिं देहाद्यतिरिक्तं एकमात्मानं प्रति-

the reflection of intelligence, and hence it could not intuite. Nor is this invalid as an imagined idea, like the intuition of the (erroneously) inferred and contemplated fire, for, there the nature of fire is mediate, whereas here, there is even from the first, immediate experience of the *jīva*, whose nature is that of Brahman made impure by adjuncts. The attributes of purity, intelligence etc. do not in truth go beyond that (*i.e.*, are not different from that). It is the *jīva* himself that, when free from adjuncts, is said to be Brahman, whose nature is purity, intelligence etc. Nor is freedom from the respective adjuncts something other than that. Therefore, just as through the sense of hearing, aided by the impressions brought about by the repetition of the knowledge gained from the science of music, one experiences directly the different notes, *ṣaḍja* etc., in their different cadences, even so the *jīva* through the internal organ, aided by the impressions brought about by the repetition of the meaning of the Vedānta texts, experiences its own nature as Brahman.

If it be said that there is need of ritual for contemplation in respect of the generation of the psychosis of the internal organ, *i.e.*, intuition of Brahman, no (we reply), for, co-operation with ritual is unintelligible, since there is no co-presence of contemplation and the observance of ritual. Nor, verily, can he, who from texts like "That thou art" indubitably understands the one self, other than the body, whose nature is purity, intelligence and indifference, who is endowed with non-agency etc., who is devoid of caste-distinctions like brāhmin etc., understand

eligibility (for himself) in respect of ritual. He who is not fit (to understand such a eligibility), how can he be an agent or (even) an eligible person ?

It may be said that though the truth is ascertained, activity conditioned by error is seen to continue; for example, though it is known for certain that sugar is sweet, yet there is the continued experience of bitter taste for him whose sense is affected by bile, for he tastes sugar, spits it out and thus abandons it. Hence, there is the observance of ritual because of the continuance of the impressions of Nescience; and its destruction by that to which knowledge is the auxiliary will therefore be intelligible. Nor may it be asked: "How can ritual, itself of the nature of Nescience, destroy Nescience? And of its destroyer, ritual, whence the destruction?" For, instances are extensively seen of entities which destroy themselves and others of the same class as themselves; for example, (goat's) milk digests itself and other milk, poison cures other poison as well as itself, the dust of the clearing-nut mixed with muddy water precipitates both itself and the mud and makes the water clear; even so, ritual, though of the nature of Nescience, drives away other Nescience and itself departs.

To this it is said: true; through frequently repeated texts beginning with "Existence alone, this was in the beginning, dear one" and ending with "That thou art," as aided by Brahman-inquiry, there is the dawn of true indubitable knowledge of the inner self, as different from the bodies etc., the material

पद्यमानः कर्मस्वधिकारमवबोद्धुमर्हति । अनर्हश्च कथं कर्ता वाधिकृतो वा ।

यद्युच्येत निश्चितेऽपि तत्त्वे विपर्यासनिबन्धनो व्यवहारोऽनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते, यथा गुडस्य माधुर्यविनिश्चयेऽपि पित्तोपहतेन्द्रियाणां तिक्ततावभासानुवृत्तिः, आस्वाद्य थूत्कृत्य त्यागात् । तस्मादविद्यासंस्कारानुवृत्त्या कर्मानुष्ठानम्, तेन च विद्यासहकारिणा तत्समुच्छेद उपपत्स्यते । न च—कर्माविद्यात्मकं कथमविद्यामुच्छिनत्ति, कर्मणो वा तदुच्छेदकस्य कुत उच्छेदः—इति वाच्यम्, सजातीयस्वपरविरोधिनां भावानां बहुलमुपलब्धेः । यथा पयः पयोऽन्तरं जरयति स्वयं च जीर्यति, यथा विषं विषान्तरं शमयति स्वयं च शाम्यति, यथा वा कतकरजो रजोऽन्तराविले पाथसि प्रक्षिप्तं रजोऽन्तराणि भिन्दत् स्वयमपि भिद्यमानमनाविलं पाथः करोति, एवं कर्माविद्यात्मकमपि अविद्यान्तराण्यपगमयत् स्वयमप्यपगच्छतीति ।

अत्रोच्यते — सत्यम् ; 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्युपक्रमात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यन्ताच्छब्दा-

ब्रह्ममीमांसोपकरणादसकृदभ्यस्तान्निर्विचिकित्सेऽना - द्यविद्योपादानदेहाद्यतिरिक्तप्रत्यगात्मतत्त्वावबोधे जाते-ऽपि अविद्यासंस्कारानुवृत्त्यानुवर्तन्ते सांसारिकाः प्रत्ययास्तद्व्यवहाराश्च, तथापि तानप्ययं व्यवहार-प्रत्ययान्मिथ्येति मन्यमानो विद्वान् न श्रद्धत्ते, पित्तोपहतेन्द्रिय इव गुडं थूत्कृत्य त्यजन्नपि तस्य तिक्तताम् । तथा चायं क्रियाकर्तृकरणेतिकर्त-व्यताफलप्रपञ्चमतात्त्विकं विनिश्चिन्वन् कथमधि-कृतो नाम ? विदुषो ह्यधिकारः । अन्यथा पशुशूद्रादीनामपि अधिकारो दुर्वारः स्यात् । क्रियाकर्त्रादिस्वरूपविभागं च विद्वरयमान इह विद्वानभिमतः कर्मकाण्डे । अत एव भगवान-विद्वद्विषयत्वं शास्त्रस्य वर्णयांबभूव भाष्यकारः । तस्माद्यथा राजजातीयाभिमानिकर्तृके राजसूये न विप्रवैश्यजातीयाभिमानिनोरधिकारः, एवं द्वि-जातिकर्तृक्रियाकरणादिविभागाभिमानिकर्तृके कर्मणि न तदनभिमानिनोऽधिकारः । न चानधिकृतेन समर्थेनापि कृतं वैदिकं कर्म फलाय कल्पते, वैश्यस्तोम इव ब्राह्मणराजन्याभ्याम् । तेन दृष्टार्थेषु

cause of which is beginningless Nescience; in spite of this, there is the continuance of notions of transmigrations and consequent empirical usage, because of the continuance of the impressions of Nescience; yet, the wise one, who holds these empirical usages and notions to be fictitious, does not have faith in them, just as he whose sense is affected by bile does not have faith in the bitterness of sugar, though he spits it out and abandons it. And thus, one who has ascertained that the totality of act, agent, means, *modus operandi* and fruit is not real, how can he be eligible to act? He who knows them (to be real), he, verily, is the eligible one. Else, it would be difficult to avoid the eligibility even of beasts, śūdras etc. In the section treating of ritual, he who knows the varieties of act, agent etc. is considered to be the man who knows. Hence it is that the revered commentator describes the sacred teaching as having reference to one characterised by Nescience. Therefore, just as in respect of the *rājasūya* to be performed by those who have the conceit of belonging to the caste of kings, there is no eligibility for those who have the conceit of belonging to the brahmin or vaiśya caste, even so in respect of ritual to be performed by those who have the conceit of distinctions like double birth, agent, act, means etc., there is no eligibility for those who have no such conceit. Nor is the Vaidic ritual, performed by one, ineligible though skilled, capable of bearing fruit, any more than the *vaiśyastoma* performed by brahmins or kṣatriyas. Therefore, in respect of rites which have a visible result, he who has capacity and engages therein

may obtain the fruit, that being seen. In respect of rites with an invisible result, however, the fruit which is known only from the sacred teaching cannot go to him who is not eligible; hence, ritual is not required in the performance of contemplation.

Be this so. Just as, in respect of prescribed acts the eligibility for which includes the conceit of being human, there is no eligibility for one devoid of that conceit, even so, in respect of prohibitions, on the ground that those who are eligible are (those that have the conceit of being) human, there would be no eligibility for those devoid of that conceit, as in the case of beasts etc. Hence, such a person observing what is prohibited would not incur sin, any more than the lower animals; thus would result the transgression of the law.[67] (To this objection we reply) not so. This one (who attains realisation even in the present life) is not wholly devoid of the conceit that he is human; rather does that conceit continue in him in slight traces, through the continuance of the impressions of Nescience.[68] It has been said that, considering what continues to be illusory, he has no faith in it (as real). What follows therefrom if this be so? This follows therefrom. He who has faith in prescriptions is eligible, not he who has no faith. Hence, he who has no faith in the conceit of being human etc., is not eligible in respect of the sacred teaching of prescriptions. Hence too the traditional Code says "The oblation or gift offered without faith"[69] etc. The sacred teaching of prohibitions, however, does not stand in need of faith; it functions, rather, only in

कर्मसु शक्तः प्रवर्तमानः प्राप्नोतु फलम्, दृष्टत्वात्। अदृष्टार्थेषु तु शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्यं फलमनधिकारिणि न युज्यत इति नोपासनाकार्ये कर्मापेक्षा।

स्यादेतत्। मनुष्याभिमानवदधिकारिके कर्मणि विहिते यथा तदभिमानरहितस्यानधिकारः, एवं निषेधविधयोऽपि मनुष्याधिकारा इति तदभिमानरहितस्तेष्वपि नाधिक्रियेत पश्वादिवत्; तथा चायं निषिद्धमनुतिष्ठन् न प्रत्यवेयात् तिर्यगादिवदिति भिन्नकर्मतापातः। मैवम्। न खल्वयं सर्वथा मनुष्याभिमानरहितः, किं त्वविद्यासंस्कारानुवृत्त्यास्य मात्रया तदभिमानोऽनुवर्तते। अनुवर्तमानं च मिथ्येति मन्यमानो न श्रद्धत्त इत्युक्तम्। किमतो यद्येवम्? एतदतो भवति—विधिषु श्राद्धोऽधिकारी नाश्राद्धः। ततश्च मनुष्याद्यभिमाने नश्रद्दधानो न विधिशास्त्रेष्वधिक्रियते। तथा च स्मृतिः—

'अश्रद्धया हुतं दत्तम्'—

इत्यादिका। निषेधशास्त्रं तु न श्रद्धामपेक्षते।

अपि तु निषिध्यमानक्रियोन्मुखो नर इत्येव प्रवर्तते । तथा च सांसारिक इव श्रद्धावगतब्रह्मतत्त्वोऽपि निषेधमतिक्रम्य प्रवर्तमानः प्रत्यवैतीति न भिन्नकर्मदर्शनाभ्युपगमः । तस्मान्नोपासनायाः कार्ये कर्मापेक्षा ।

अत एव नोपासनोत्पत्तावपि ; निर्विचिकित्स-शाब्दज्ञानोत्पत्त्युत्तरकालमनधिकारः कर्मणीत्युक्तम् । तथा च श्रुतिः—

'न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन
त्यागेनैके अमृतत्वमानशुः ।'

इति ।

तत्किमिदानीमनुपयोग एव सर्वथेह कर्मणाम् ? तथा च 'विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन' इत्याद्याः श्रुतयो विरुध्येरन् । न, आरादुपकारकत्वात्कर्मणां यज्ञा-दीनाम् । तथा हि—तमेतमात्मानं वेदानुवचनेन नित्यस्वाध्यायेन, ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति, वेदितु-मिच्छन्ति, न तु विदन्ति । वस्तुतः प्रधानस्यापि वेदनस्य प्रकृत्यर्थतया शब्दतो गुणत्वात्, इच्छायाश्च प्रत्ययार्थतया प्राधान्यात्, प्रधानेन च कार्यसंप्रत्य-

respect of a human being who directs himself to a forbidden act. Hence, even he, who has apprehended the truth about Brahman with faith, as much as he who is bound in the migratory cycle, incurs sin by acting in transgression of prohibitions; therefore, there is not the acceptance of a doctrine involving the transgression of the law. Hence, contemplation does not require ritual in respect of its effect.

Hence too (it is) not (required) even in respect of the origination of contemplation; (for), it has been said that there is no eligibility for ritual after the generation of indubitable knowledge through verbal testimony. Thus too Scripture says: "Not by ritual nor by off-spring nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone do they enjoy immortality."[70]

Are these rites then entirely without any use here? Then would texts like "They seek to know by sacrifice" be contradicted. No (we reply), for, rites like sacrifice are remote auxiliaries. It is thus: that self, by study of the Veda, *i.e.*, by constant study of one's own Veda, the brahmins seek to know, *i.e.*, they desire to know, not that they do know. Though in fact knowledge is primary (as compared with the desire therefor), yet, since in the word, it is the meaning of the stem (as compared with the suffix), it is subsidiary, while desire, being the meaning of the suffix, is primary; and activity relates to what is primary. When one says "Bring the king's man," one does not, verily, bring the king, who,

though primary in fact, is yet subsidiary in the word, as the qualification of "man," but that which is primary in the word, *i.e.*, the man himself. Thus, of sacrifice, as of the study of the Veda, there is prescription as the means to desire. So too of the austerity, which consists in not eating. Not eating as and how one desires, that alone is austerity. He who eats what is good and pure in moderation, in him indeed, there is desire to know Brahman, not in one who never eats, as the latter will but die. Nor does austerity consist in the observance of fasts like the Cāndrāyaṇa since, for that kind of person, disturbance of the equilibrium of humours will result.

The obligatory rites purify the person by destroying sins (already) incurred. Thus too Scripture says: "He, verily, is the ātmayājin (one who pleases the self) who knows 'by this is purified this part (body) of mine, by this is my body made to grow.'"[71] The words "by this" refer to the sacrifice etc. of the context. The traditional Code too says: "He for whom there have been these forty and eight purificatory ceremonies (sacrifice being included among them)." The following Ātharvaṇa text too shows the rise of knowledge, only in that ignorant person of purified intellect in whom the desire to know has arisen through the attrition of impurities by the observance of rites, obligatory and occasioned: "Being of purified intellect, he, then, sees the partless (Brahman) through contemplation."[72] The traditional Code too says: "Knowledge arises in persons from the consumption of sin through

यात्। न हि 'राजपुरुषमानय' इत्युक्ते वस्तुतः प्रधानोऽपि राजा पुरुषविशेषणतया शब्दत उपसर्जन आनीयते, अपि तु पुरुष एव, शब्दतस्तस्य प्राधान्यात्। एवं वेदानुवचनस्येव यज्ञस्यापीच्छासाधनतया विधानम्। एवं तपसोऽनाशकस्य। कामानशनमेव तपः, हितमितमेध्याशिनो हि ब्रह्मणि विविदिषा भवति, न तु सर्वथा अनश्नतः, मरणात्। नापि चान्द्रायणादि तपः, तच्छीलस्य धातुवैषम्यापत्तेः।

एतानि च नित्यानि उपात्तदुरितनिबर्हणेन पुरुषं संस्कुर्वन्ति। तथा च श्रुतिः—'स ह वा आत्मयाजी यो वेद इदं मेऽनेनाङ्गं संस्क्रियत इदं मेऽनेनाङ्गमुपधीयते' इति। अनेनेति प्रकृतं यज्ञादि परामृशति। स्मृतिश्च—'यस्यैतेऽष्टाचत्वारिंशत्संस्काराः' इति। नित्यनैमित्तिकानुष्ठानप्रक्षीणकल्मषस्य च विशुद्धसत्त्वस्याविदुष एव उत्पन्नविविदिषस्य ज्ञानोत्पत्तिं दर्शयत्याथर्वणी श्रुतिः—

'. . . . . विशुद्धसत्त्व-
स्ततस्तु तं पश्यति निष्कलं ध्यायमानः' इति।

स्मृतिश्च 'ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते पुंसां क्षयात्पापस्य कर्मणः' इत्यादिका । कृत्स्नेनैव च नित्यानां कर्मणां नित्येहितेनोपात्तदुरितनिबर्हणेन पुरुषसंस्कारेण ज्ञानोत्पत्तावङ्गभावोपपत्तौ न संयोगपृथक्त्वेन साक्षादङ्गभावो युक्तः, कल्पनागौरवापत्तेः । तथाहि— नित्यकर्मणामनुष्ठानाद्धर्मोत्पादः, ततः पाप्मा निवर्तते ; स हि अनित्याशुचिदुःखरूपे संसारे नित्यशुचिसुखख्यातिलक्षणेन विपर्यासेन चित्तसत्त्वं मलिनयति ; अतः पापनिवृत्तौ प्रत्यक्षोपपत्तिद्वारापावरणे सति प्रत्यक्षोपपत्तिभ्यां संसारस्य अनित्याशुचिदुःस्वरूपत्वमप्रत्यूहमवबुध्यते ; ततोऽस्य अस्मिन्ननभिरतिसंज्ञं वैराग्यमुपजायते ; ततस्तज्जिहासोपावर्तते ; ततो हानोपायं पर्येषते ; पर्येषमाणश्चात्मतत्त्वज्ञानमस्योपाय इत्युपश्रुत्य तज्जिज्ञासते ; ततः श्रवणादिक्रमेण तज्ज्ञानातीत्यारादुपकारकत्वं तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पादं प्रति चित्तसत्त्वशुद्धया कर्मणां युक्तम् । इममेवार्थमनुवदति भगवद्गीता—

'आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म कारणमुच्यते ।
योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शमः कारणमुच्यते' ॥ इति ।

rites" etc. It is settled that obligatory rites destroy incurred sin and thereby purify the person; when the subsidiariness of obligatory rites to the generation of knowledge is thus intelligible, it is not proper to make out direct subsidiariness by the principle of two-in-oneness, as that would lead to prolixity of assumptions. It is thus: from the observance of obligatory rites merit is generated; thence sin ceases; it is that (sin) which makes impure the *sattva*, *i.e.*, the intellect, through errors of the nature of the cognition of eternity, purity, pleasure etc., in the migratory cycle, which by nature is transient, impure and miserable; hence, on the cessation of sin, the door of perception and reasoning being opened, one knows unhindered the impermanence, impurity and misery of the migratory cycle, through perception and inference; thence arises renunciation consisting in non-attachment thereto; thence grows the desire to remove it; thence one seeks the means to remove it; hearing that knowledge of the true nature of the self is the means to be sought, one desires to know that; thence, in the order of hearing (study) etc., one knows it. Thus, it stands to reason that rites are remote auxiliaries in respect of the generation of knowledge, through the purification of *sattva*, *i.e.*, the intellect. This same sense is repeated in the *Bhagavadgītā* "For the silent one who wants to achieve *yoga*, ritual is said to be the cause; for him who has achieved *yoga*, equanimity is said to be the cause".[73]

This being so, he, who, though not performing rites, is yet of purified intellect, because of rites performed in a prior existence, and has non-attachment generated in him through the realisation of the essential worthlessness of the migratory cycle, for him there is no need for the observance of ritual which serves to bring about non-attachment, that having resulted even through the observance of ritual in a prior existence. It is with reference to such foremost among men that Scripture sets out: "Or, if otherwise, let him renounce even from the student's order of life."[74] That is here said: "**even prior**" to the knowledge of ritual "**desire to know Brahman is intelligible in respect of one who has studied the Vedanta.**" Hence it is, that for one in the student's order of life, there are no obligations for the discharge of which rites would have to be performed. In conformity with this, the statement "He who is born a brahmin is born with three obligations" should be explained as relating to those who become house-holders. Otherwise the Scripture "Or, if otherwise, from the student's order of life" would be contradicted. The discharge of obligations, even by the house-holder, is only for the purification of the intellect. The statements about what is prescribed when one dies of old age, about being reduced to ashes and about the final rite (*antyeṣṭi*)[75] relate to those ignorant ones who are inertly fixed in the observance of ritual, not to those learned ones who know the true self. Hence, the word *atha* connotes immediate succession to that, in the absence of which

एवं च अननुष्ठितकर्मापि प्राग्भवीयकर्मवशात् यो विशुद्धसत्त्वः संसारासारतादर्शनेन निष्पन्नवैराग्यः, कृतं तस्य कर्मानुष्ठानेन वैराग्योत्पादोपयोगिना, प्राग्-भवीयकर्मानुष्ठानादेव तत्सिद्धेः। इममेव च पुरुषधौरेयभेदमधिकृत्य प्रववृते श्रुतिः—'यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत्' इति। तदिदमुक्तम्, कर्मावबोधात्, **प्रागप्यधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरिति**। अत एव न ब्रह्मचारिण ऋणानि सन्ति येन तदपाकरणार्थं कर्मानुतिष्ठेत्। एतदनुरोधाच्च 'जायमानो वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणवा जायते' इति गृहस्थः संपद्यमान इति व्याख्येयम्। अन्यथा 'यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव' इति श्रुतिर्विरुध्येत। गृहस्थस्यापि च ऋणापाकरणं सत्त्वशुद्ध्यर्थमेव। जरामर्यवादो भस्मान्ततावादोऽन्त्येष्टयश्च कर्म-जडानविदुषः प्रति, न त्वात्मतत्त्वविदः पण्डितान्। तस्मात्तस्यानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थः यद्विना ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा न भवति यस्मिंस्तु सति भवन्ती भवत्येव।

न चेत्थं कर्मावबोधः। तस्मान्न कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यमत्राथशब्दार्थ इति सर्वमवदातम्।

स्यादेतत्। मा भूदग्निहोत्रयवागूपाकवदार्थः क्रमः; श्रौतस्तु भविष्यति; 'गृही भूत्वा वनी भवेत् वनी भूत्वा प्रव्रजेत्' इति जाबालश्रुतिर्गार्हस्थ्येन हि यज्ञाद्यनुष्ठानं सूचयति। स्मरन्ति च—

'अधीत्य विधिवद्वेदान्पुत्रांश्चोत्पाद्य धर्मतः।
इष्ट्वा च शक्तितो यज्ञैर्मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत्॥'

इति। निन्दन्ति च—

'अनधीत्य द्विजो वेदाननुत्पाद्य तथात्मजान्।
अनिष्ट्वा चैव यज्ञैश्च मोक्षमिच्छन्व्रजत्यधः'॥

इति; आह—**यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानामानन्तर्यनियमः**। कुतः? 'हृदयस्याग्रेऽवद्यति अथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः' इत्यथाग्रशब्दाभ्यां क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः, श्रुत्या तथैवानन्तरमनियमस्य दर्शितत्वात्, 'यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेद्गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा' इति। एतावता हि वैराग्यमुपलक्षयति।

there would be no desire to know Brahman, and in the presence of which that (desire) certainly becomes existent. Nor is knowledge of ritual of this nature. It is, therefore, clear that the word *atha* does not here signify immediate succession to the knowledge of ritual.

Be this so. Let it not be that any sequence is settled by the sense (*artha*), as in the performance of the *agnihotra* and the preparation of the barley-gruel (therefor); but there is a sequence settled by direct statement (*śruti*; here, the *-ktvā* suffix); the following *Jābāla* text "having become a house-holder, one is to become a forest-dweller; having become a forest-dweller, one is to renounce," verily, indicates the observance of sacrifice etc., by the term "house-holder". There is also the traditional Code (to this effect): "Having studied the Vedas according to rule, having procreated sons in the manner laid down by Religious Duty, having performed sacrifices to the best of one's ability, one is to set one's mind on release." There are also words of censure like: "The twice-born one who, without having studied the Vedas, procreated progeny and offered up sacrifices, desires release goes down below." (To this the commentator) says: "**And there is the rule of immediate succession in respect of the cutting of the heart**" etc. Whence (is this rule)? (The text reads): "One should cut the heart *first*, *then* the tongue, *then* the sides." Here, the sequence is intended to be declared by the words *first* and *then*. No such sequence is intended to be declared in the present case, for, the absence of a rule (of succession) is shown later, even by the same Scriptural text: "Or, if otherwise, one is to renounce even from the student's order of life or from the householder's or from the forest-dweller's." By all this,

nonattachment is indicated (as essential). Hence it is that Scripture says: "The day on which there is non-attachment, that very day one is to renounce." The words of censure have in view the person of impure intellect. He of impure intellect desiring release but not setting about the means thereto, because of laziness, verily, fails to observe even the obligatory and occasioned rites characteristic of the house-holder's life, and goes on the downward path with his (load of) sin increasing every instant; this is the sense.

Be this so. Let it be that there is no sequence either by direct statement or by sense; why should there not be a sequence authorised by the text (*pāṭha*), the position (*sthāna*) the principal (*mukhya*) or procedure (*pravṛtti*)?[76] To this he says: **"for, there is no authority for the relationship of subsidiary and principal."** Between subsidiaries, like the *samit* sacrifice, and principal rites, like the *āgneya*, which are known to contribute towards a single result,[77] which are defined by a single result, which are comprehended by a single procedural text,[78] which are to be performed by a single eligible person, and which are related to the same period—full or new moon, sequence results of necessity, because of the impossibility of their simultaneous performance; and since it is necessary to determine the particular kind of sequence, text, (position) etc. are capable of fixing the variety thereof. Where, however, there is no relationship of subsidiary and principal, nor even definition by a single eligible person, as in the case of the *saurya*, *aryamaṇa*, *prājāpatya* and other such rites, there is no need for any particular sequence; and, hence, text etc. are of no authority as fixing a particular sequence, though some (particular sequence) is

अत एव 'यदहरेव विरजेत्तदहरेव प्रव्रजेत्' इति श्रुतिः। निन्दावचनं च अविशुद्धसत्त्व-पुरुषाभिप्रायम्। अविशुद्धसत्त्वो हि मोक्ष-मिच्छन्नालस्यात्तदुपायेऽप्रवर्तमानो गृहस्थधर्ममपि नित्यनैमित्तिकमनाचरन्प्रतिक्षणमुपचीयमानपाप्मा अ-धोगतिं गच्छतीत्यर्थः।

स्यादेतत्। मा भूच्छ्रौत आर्थो वा क्रमः; पाठ-स्थानमुख्यप्रवृत्तिप्रमाणकस्तु कस्मान्न भवतीत्यत आह—**शेषशेषित्वे प्रमाणाभावात्**। शेषाणां समिदादीनां शेषिणां चाग्नेयादीनां एकफलवदुपकारो-पनिबद्धानां एकफलावच्छिन्नानाम् एकप्रयोगवचनोप-गृहीतानाम् एकाधिकारिकर्तृकाणां एकपौर्णमास्यमा-वास्याकालसंबद्धानां युगपदनुष्ठानाशक्तेः, सामर्थ्या-त्क्रमप्राप्तौ तद्विशेषापेक्षायां पाठादयस्तद्भेदनियमाय प्रभवन्ति। यत्र तु न शेषशेषिभावः नाप्येकाधिका-रावच्छेदः यथा सौर्यार्यम्णप्राजापत्यादीनाम्, तत्र क्रमभेदापेक्षाभावान्न पाठादिः क्रमविशेषनियमे प्रमाणम्, अवर्जनीयतया तस्य तत्रावगतत्वात्।

न चेह धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः शेषशेषिभावे श्रुत्यादीनामन्यतमं प्रमाणमस्तीति ।

ननु शेषशेषिभावाभावेऽपि क्रमनियमो दृष्टः यथा गोदोहनस्य पुरुषार्थस्य दार्शपौर्णमासिकैरङ्गैः सह, यथा वा 'दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिष्ट्वा सोमेन यजेत' इति दर्शपूर्णमाससोमयोरशेषशेषिणोरित्यत आह— **अधिकृताधिकारे वा** प्रमाणाभावात्—इति योजना । स्वर्गकामस्य हि दर्शपूर्णमासाधिकृतस्य पशुकामस्य सतो दर्शपूर्णमासक्रत्वर्थाप्प्रणयनाश्रिते गोदोहने अधिकारः । नो खलु गोदोहन-द्रव्यमव्याप्रियमाणं साक्षात्पशून् भावयितुमर्हति । न च व्यापारान्तराविष्टं श्रूयते यतस्तदङ्गक्रममतिपतेत्; अप्प्रणयनाश्रितं तु प्रतीयते, 'चमसेनापः प्रणयेद्गोदोहनेन पशुकामस्य' इति समभिव्याहारात्, योग्यत्वाच्चास्यापां प्रणयनं प्रति । तस्मात्क्रत्वर्थाप्प्रणयनाश्रितत्वाद्गोदोहनस्य तत्क्रमेण पुरुषार्थमपि गोदोहनं क्रमवदिति सिद्धम् । श्रुतिनिराकरणेनैव इष्टिसोमक्रमवदपि क्रमोऽपास्तो वेदितव्यः ।

unavoidably understood (because of the impossibility of pronouncing all three at the same time). Nor is there any authority such as direct statement or the like for a relationship of subsidiary and principal, as between the desire to know Religious Duty and the desire to know Brahman.

Now, there is seen a rule of sequence, even where there is no relationship of subsidiary and principal, as in the case of the milk-pail (*godohana*), which secures a human goal,[79] in relation to the subsidiaries of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, or as in the case of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* and the *soma* sacrifice mentioned in "Having performed the *darśapūrṇamāsa*, one should perform the *soma* sacrifice," which do not stand in the relationship of subsidiary and principal. To this he says: since there is no authority even for the relationship "**of eligibility of the person (already) eligible**": this is the construction. It is for the person who, as desiring heaven, is eligible for the *darśapūrṇamāsa*, that, as desiring cattle, there is eligibility for the milk-pail in connection with the water-sprinkling, a subsidiary of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* rite. The milk-pail is not, indeed, capable of producing cattle directly without operating in some way. Nor is there Scriptural mention of its entering into any other operation, in which case it would fall outside the order of subsidiaries of that (*darśapūrṇamāsa*). It does, however, appear as dependent on the water-sprinkling rite, because of its contiguity thereto in "With a cup one is to sprinkle water; with the milk-pail, one who desires cattle," and because of the suitability of that for the sprinkling of water. Hence, because of the dependence of the milk-pail on the water-sprinkling, which is a subsidiary to the sacrifice, it is

There is also difference in the fruit and the object of the desire to know. Prosperity is the fruit of the knowledge of Religious Duty, and it depends on observance; but the knowledge of Brahman has beatitude as its fruit; and it does not depend on any other

concluded that, though contributory (only) to a human goal, it belongs to a sequence, through the sequence of that (subsidiary). Such sequence as exists between the *soma* (sacrifice) and the *iṣṭi* (*darśapūrṇamāsa*) should be known to have been refuted (in its application to the present case), even by the refutation of direct statement.[80]

Even if the relationship of subsidiary and principal or the eligibility of the person eligible be absent, sequence may be intended, when defined by the same result, as among the six sacrificial rites—*āgneya* etc.,—all defined by the one end, attainment of heaven; or, if Religious Duty be a part of the Brahman desired to be known, then, just as sequence is intended among the four chapters of the *Brahma-sūtras*, each of which treats of some aspect of the Brahman taught in all the four, which are mutually related by the non-difference of that which is desired to be known, even so, here too, sequence may be intended as between the desires to know Religious Duty and Brahman, because of being objects of a single desire to know. And neither of these (conditions) is here present; thus he says: **There is also difference in the fruit and the object of the desire to know.**" He analyses the difference in the fruit: "**Prosperity is the fruit of the knowledge of Religious Duty.**" Since the desire to know is in fact dependent on knowledge (as its content), the

फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च। अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम्, तच्चानुष्ठानापेक्षम्; निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानम्, न चानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम्।

शेषशेषित्वाधिकृताधिकाराभावेऽपि क्रमो विवक्ष्येत यद्येकफलावच्छेदो भवेत्, यथाग्नेयादीनां षण्णामेकस्वर्गफलावच्छिन्नानाम्; यदि वा जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मणः अंशो धर्मः स्यात्, यथा चतुर्लक्षणीव्युत्पाद्यं ब्रह्म केनचित्केनचिदंशेनैकेन लक्षणेन व्युत्पाद्यते, तत्र चतुर्णां लक्षणानां जिज्ञास्याभेदेन परस्परसंबन्धे सति क्रमो विवक्षितः, तथेहाप्येकजिज्ञास्यतया धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः क्रमो विवक्ष्येत; न चैतदुभयमप्यस्तीत्याह—**फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च**। फलभेदं विभजते—**अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम्** इति। जिज्ञासाया वस्तुतो ज्ञानतन्त्रत्वात् ज्ञानफलं जिज्ञासाफलमिति भावः। न केवलं स्वरूपतः फलभेदः,

भव्यश्च धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञानकालेऽस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात्। इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं नित्यवृत्तत्वान्न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्। चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च। या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणम्, सा स्वविषये नियुञ्जानैव पुरुषमवबोधयति। ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलम; अवबोधस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वान्न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते। यथा अक्षार्थसंनिकर्षेणार्थावबोधे, तद्वत्।

तदुत्पादनप्रकारभेदादपि तद्भेद इत्याह—**तच्चानुष्ठानापेक्षम्**। ब्रह्मज्ञानं च नानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम्। शाब्दज्ञानाभ्यासान्नानुष्ठानान्तरमपेक्षते, नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानसहभावस्य अपास्तत्वात्—इति भावः।

जिज्ञास्यभेदमात्यन्तिकमाह—**भव्यश्च धर्म** इति। भविता भव्यः; कर्तरि कृत्यः।

observance. Religious Duty, the object of the desire to know, has to come into existence, and does not exist at the time of knowing, because it is dependent on the activity of the person. But here the object of the desire to know is the existent Brahman, which, being eternally existent, does not depend on human activity. There is also difference in the operation of the text. That text, which defines Religious Duty, instructs a person only by engaging him in an activity. The text dealing with Brahman, however, merely instructs the person; since the knowledge is to be produced from the text, the person is not directed (to activity) in respect of knowledge. As in the case of the knowledge of an object produced from the contact of the sense-organ with the object, so (is it here).

words "fruit of knowledge" mean "fruit of the desire to know": that is the idea. Nor is the difference of fruit one of nature alone; there is difference even in the way in which they are brought about; hence he says: "**and it depends on observance.**" The knowledge of Brahman does not need any other observance, except the continued repetition of knowledge from verbal testimony, for, the co-presence of rites, obligatory or occasioned, has already been refuted: this is the idea.

He states the wholesale difference in the objects desired to be known: "**Religious Duty . . . has to come into existence**" etc. *Bhavyaḥ* is "what has to come into existence"; the *kṛtya* termination signifies the agent (of the action).[81]

What comes into existence has to be brought about by the operation of an operator, is dependent on that, and is hence non-existent prior to that, *i.e.*, when it is known What exists is true; it is invariably real, not unreal at any time; this is the meaning. The difference between the objects desired to be known is not merely because of their nature, but also because of differences in the operation of the respective means which convey knowledge of them. Thus, he says: "**There is also a difference in the operation of the text.**" The term *codanā* here signifies Scriptural text (not merely an injunctive text), the general being secondarily implied by what denotes the particular. He analyses the difference in operation thus: "**That text which defines Religious Duty**" etc. In Scripture, which is of non-human origin, there is no room for commands etc., which are expressions of different forms of the human will; hence *codanā* here means teaching. Hence it is said "The means of knowing that (*dharma*) is teaching."[89] And that (teaching) relates to *bhāvanā*, *i.e.*, human operations that are taught by itself, and also to the content thereof, *i.e.*, sacrifice etc.; sacrifice etc. are the content of *bhāvanā*, since the operation consisting in effort is determined in dependence on that (sacrifice etc.), and since the word *viṣaya* (content) is derived from the root √*śiñ*, to bind (so that the content is what the effort is bound to). (Scripture) makes known Religious Duty such as sacrifice etc., only as directing a person to them as means subserving his desires, through making known that operations and, through their channel, sacrifices are instrumental to what is desired; not otherwise (does Scripture function). The teaching about Brahman, however, merely instructs the person, but does not instruct him as directing him to activity. Why?

भविता च भावकव्यापारनिर्वर्त्यतया तत्तन्त्र इति ततः प्राग्ज्ञानकाले नास्तीत्यर्थः । **भूतम्**, सत्यम् ; सदेकान्ततः, न कदाचिदसदित्यर्थः । न केवलं स्वरूपतो जिज्ञास्ययोर्भेदः, ज्ञापकप्रमाणप्रवृत्तिभेदादपि भेद इत्याह— **चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च** । चोदनेति वैदिकं शब्दमाह, विशेषेण सामान्यस्य लक्षणात् । प्रवृत्तिभेदं विभजते—**या हि चोदना धर्मस्य** इति । आज्ञादीनां पुरुषाभिप्रायभेदानामसंभवात् अपौरुषेये वेदे चोदनोपदेशः । अत एवोक्तम्— 'तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः' इति । सा च स्वसाध्ये पुरुषव्यापारे भावनायां तद्विषये च यागादौ ; स हि भावनाविषयः, तदधीननिरूपणत्वात् प्रयत्नस्य भावनायाः, 'षिञ् बन्धने' इत्यस्मात् धातोर्विषयपदव्युत्पत्तेः । भावनायारतदद्वारेण च यागादेरपेक्षितोपायतामवगमयन्ती तत्रेच्छोपहारमुखेन पुरुषं नियुञ्जानैव यागादिधर्ममवबोधयति नान्यथा । ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलं न तु

प्रवर्तयन्त्यवबोधयति । कुतः ? अवबोधस्य प्रवृत्ति-रहितस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वात् ।

ननु 'आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः' इत्येतद्विधिपरैर्वेदान्तैः तदेकवाक्यतयावबोधे प्रवर्तयद्भिरेव पुरुषो ब्रह्मावबोध्यत इति समानत्वं धर्मचोदनाभिर्ब्रह्मचोदनानामित्यत आह—**न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते ॥**

अयमभिसंधिः—न तावद्ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारे पुरुषो नियोक्तव्यः, तस्य ब्रह्मस्वाभाव्येन नित्यत्वात् अकार्यत्वात् । नाप्युपासनायाम्, तस्या अपि ज्ञानप्रकर्षे हेतुभावस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धतया प्राप्तत्वेनाविधेयत्वात् । नापि शाब्दबोधे, तस्याप्यधीतवेदस्य पुरुषस्य विदितपदतदर्थस्य समधिगतशाब्दन्यायतत्त्वस्याप्रत्यूहमुत्पत्तेः । अत्रैव दृष्टान्तमाह—**यथाक्षार्थ** इति । दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति—**तद्वत्** इति । अपि चात्मज्ञानविधिपरेषु वेदान्तेषु नात्मतत्त्वविनिश्चयः शाब्दः स्यात् । न हि तदा आत्मतत्त्वपरास्ते, किं तु तज्ज्ञानविधिपराः, यत्पराश्च ते त एव तेषामर्थाः ।

Because knowledge free from the direction to activity is produced by the teaching.

Now, it may be said: a person is taught Brahman by Vedānta texts like "The self is to be known,"[83] which purport to be injunctive, only by directing him to the knowing activity, because of syntactical unity with that (apparently injunctive text); hence, there is similarity of the teaching of Brahman to the teaching of Religious Duty. To this he says: "**the person is not directed (to activity) in respect of the knowledge.**"

This is what is intended: a person is not to be directed (to activity) in respect of the intuition of Brahman, for, that, being of the nature of Brahman, is eternal and not to be produced; nor in respect of contemplation, for, that being established, through observation of co-presence and co-absence, to be the cause of excellence in knowledge, cannot be the object of an injunction; nor in respect of knowledge through verbal testimony, since that too arises unhindered in him who has studied the Vedas, knows the words and their senses, and understands the true principles governing knowledge gained through verbal testimony. As an example of this same he says: "**as in the case of the knowledge of an object produced from the contact of the sense organ with the object.**" He links up what is illustrated, in the words: "**so (is it here).**" Further, in those Vedānta texts, whose purport is to enjoin knowledge of the self, the ascertainment of the true nature of the self cannot be knowledge gained from verbal testimony; for, their purport would then be not the true nature of the self, but injunctions to the knowledge thereof. That which is their purport, that, verily, is

Therefore, something has to be stated, in immediate succession to which the desire to know Brahman is taught. This is the statement: discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal; non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter; possession in abundance of calmness, equanimity and other such means; and desire for release. Where, indeed, these exist, even prior to a desire to know Religious Duty, and after that too, it is possible to desire to know Brahman and also to know; not in their absence. Therefore, by the word "then" is taught "immediate succession" to possession in abundance of the means stated before.

their significance. Nor does ascertainment of the true nature of what is taught result even from that, the purport of which is something else, on the ground that knowledge depends on what is known and stands in need of it; for, this (dependence) is intelligible even through superimposition (*i.e.*, the knowledge need not be of the *true* nature of what is known). Hence it is settled that the Vedānta has not for purport an injunction to knowledge.

The present topic is concluded thus: "**Therefore, something has to be stated**" etc. That in the absence of which there would be no desire to know Brahman, that in the presence of which, however, that (desire) becomes certainly existent: this is the sense. He states it thus: "**This is the statement: discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal**" etc. The eternal, *i.e.*, the inner self; the non-eternal, *i.e.*, the body, organs, objects etc. If discrimination relating to these

तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यम्, यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति। उच्यते— नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्, मुमुक्षुत्वं च। तेषु हि सत्सु, प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च; न विपर्यये। तस्मात् अथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यानन्तर्यमुपदिश्यते॥

न च बोधस्य बोध्यनिष्ठत्वादपेक्षितत्वात्, अन्यपरेभ्योऽपि बोध्यतत्त्वविनिश्चयः, समारोपेणापि तदुपपत्तेः। तस्मान्न बोधविधिपरा वेदान्ता इति सिद्धम्।

प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—**तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यम्** इति। यस्मिन्नसति ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा न भवति सति तु भवन्ती भवत्येवेत्यर्थः। तदाह— **उच्यते—नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक** इत्यादि। नित्यः प्रत्यगात्मा, अनित्याः देहेन्द्रियविषयादयः। तद्विषयश्चेद्विवेको निश्चयः, कृतमस्य

ब्रह्मजिज्ञासया, ज्ञातत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः। अथ विवेको ज्ञानमात्रम्, न निश्चयः; तथा सति एष विपर्यासादन्यः संशयः स्यात्; तथा च न वैराग्यं भावयेत्; अभावयन्कथं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा-हेतुः? तस्मादेवं व्याख्येयम्। नित्यानित्य-योर्वस्तीति नित्यानित्यवस्तु तद्धर्मः; नित्या-नित्ययोर्धर्मिणोस्तद्धर्माणां च विवेको नित्या-नित्यवस्तुविवेकः। एतदुक्तं भवति——मा भूत् इदं ऋतं नित्यम्, इदं तदनृतमनित्यमिति धर्मि-विशेषयोर्विवेकः; धर्ममात्रयोर्नित्यानित्ययोस्तद्धर्म-योश्च विवेकं निश्चिनोत्येव। नित्यत्वं सत्यत्वं तद्यस्यास्ति तन्नित्यं सत्यम्; तथा चास्थागोचरः। अनित्यत्वमसत्यत्वं तद्यस्यास्ति तदनित्यमनृतम्; तथा चानास्थागोचरः। तदेतेष्वनुभूयमानेषु युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरेषु विषयविषयिषु यद्दतं नित्यं सुखं व्यवस्थास्यते तदास्थागोचरो भविष्यति; यत्त्वनित्यमनृतं भविष्यति तापत्रयपरीतं तत्त्यक्ष्यत इति सोऽयं नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः प्राग्भवीया-दैहिकाद्वा कर्मणो विशुद्धसत्त्वस्य भवत्यनुभवोप-

be of the nature of certitude, Brahman being already known, the desire to know Brahman would be superfluous. Then, let it be that discrimination is bare knowledge, not certitude; that being so, it might be doubt, which is other than (truth and) error; that cannot bring about non-attachment; and not bringing that about, how can that be the cause of the desire to know Brahman? Hence it should be explained thus: as residing in things eternal and non-eternal, "things eternal and non-eternal" means their attributes; "discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal" means the discrimination of the substrates which are eternal and non-eternal, as also of their attributes. This is what is said: there need not be specific discriminative knowledge of different substrates, eternal and non-eternal, in the form "this is true, eternal," "this is untrue, non-eternal"; one does determine certainly the difference between substrates in general, as also between their attributes, as eternal and non-eternal. To be eternal is to be true; that in which this is, that is eternal, true; and thus, it is in the sphere of desire. To be non-eternal is to be untrue; that in which this is, that is non-eternal, untrue; and thus, it is not in the sphere of desire. Of these, which are experienced and constitute the spheres of the concepts "Thou" and "I," the object and the subject, that which is established to be true, eternal and pleasant, that comes in the sphere of desire; that, however, which becomes non-eternal, untrue, encompassed by the three-fold misery, that is to be abandoned; this discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal comes to him whose intellect has been purified by the rites performed whether in a prior existence or in this one, as shown by experience and reasoning. Nor may

it be said that there is no such thing as truth; for, in the absence of that, even untruth which has that (truth) as substrate would be unintelligible; further, even for the Nihilists, the Void itself is real. Having thus considered wisely in the light of the experience and reasoning of the foremost among men, having looked at himself, who with the rest of the animate world goes about migrating, constantly being born and dying,[84] in the worlds from Satyaloka down to Avīci, is encompassed by the three kinds of misery and is tossed about helplessly on the waves of the migratory cycle through (all divisions of time from) the instant, the *muhūrta* (about an hour), the *yāma* (three hours), the day, the night, the fortnight, the month, the season (two months), the half-year, the year, the *yuga*, the period of four *yugas*, the period of a Manu, the deluge and the great deluge (when even the primal elements are destroyed) up to the period of a principal creation and the intermediate creation, there arises (for him) a contemplation of the impermanence, impurity and miserable nature of this migratory world.

From the contemplation arising from this kind of discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal, there results for him "**non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter**". *Artha* (literally, thing) means that which is sought, that is to say, fruit. Non-attachment thereto is indifference due to the realisation of it as not worthy of enjoyment. Thence "**the possession in abundance of calmness, equanimity and other such means.**" It is, verily, the mind, which is intoxicated with the wine of passion and other impurities, that directs the organs to their respective objects, high and low, brings about various activities and their fruit in the nature of merit and demerit, and offers up the self as an oblation in the fearful fire of migration, which is a mass

पत्तिभ्याम् । न खलु सत्यं नाम न किंचिदस्तीति वाच्यम् । तदभावे तदधिष्ठानस्यानृतस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः, शून्यवादिनामपि शून्यताया एव सत्यत्वात् । अथास्य पुरुषधौरेयस्यानुभवोपपत्तिभ्यामेवं सुनिपुणं निरूपयतः आ च सत्यलोकात् आ चावीचेः जायस्व म्रियस्व इति विपरिवर्तमानं क्षणमुहूर्तयामाहोरात्रार्धमासमासर्त्वयनवत्सरयुगचतुर्युगमन्वन्तरप्रलयमहाप्रलयमहासर्गावान्तरसर्गसंसारसागरोर्मिभिरनिशमुह्यमानं तापत्रयपरीतमात्मानं जीवलोकं चावलोक्य अस्मिन्संसारमण्डले अनित्याशुचिदुःखात्मकं प्रसंख्यानमुपावर्तते ।

ततोऽस्येदृशान्नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकलक्षणात्प्रसंख्यानात् **इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः** भवति। अर्थ्यते प्रार्थ्यत इत्यर्थः, फलमिति यावत् । तस्मिन्विरागो नामानाभोगात्मिकोपेक्षाबुद्धिः । ततः **शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्** । रागादिकषायमदिरामत्तं हि मनः तेषु तेषु विषयेषूच्चावचमिन्द्रियाणि प्रवर्तयत् विविधाश्च प्रवृत्तीः पुण्यापुण्यफला भावयत् पुरुषमतिघोरे विविधदुःखज्वालाजटाले संसारहुतभुजि

जुहोति । प्रसंख्यानाभ्यासलब्धवैराग्यपरिपाकभग्न-रागादिकषायमदिरामदं तु मनः पुरुषेणावजीयते वशीक्रियते । सोऽयमस्य वैराग्यहेतुको मनोविजयः शम इति वशीकारसंज्ञ इति चाख्यायते । विजितं च मनस्तत्त्वविषयविनियोगयोग्यतां नीयते; सेयमस्य योग्यता दमः, यथा दान्तोऽयं वृषभयुवा हलशकटादिवहनयोग्यः कृत इति गम्यते । **आदि**-ग्रहणेन च विषयतितिक्षातदु-परमतत्त्वश्रद्धाः संगृह्यन्ते । अत एव श्रुतिः— 'तस्माच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः श्रद्धावित्तो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्, सर्वमात्मनि पश्यति' इति । तदेतस्य शमदमादिरूपस्य साधनस्य संपत्, प्रकर्षः, **शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्** । ततोऽस्य संसारबन्धनान्मुमुक्षा भवतीत्याह—**मुमुक्षुत्वं च** इति । तस्य च नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावब्रह्मज्ञानं मोक्षस्य कारणमित्युपश्रुत्य तज्जिज्ञासा भवति धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागूर्ध्वं च; तस्मात्तेषामेवा-नन्तर्यं न धर्मजिज्ञासाया इत्याह—**तेषु हि** इति । न केवलं जिज्ञासामात्रम्, अपि तु ज्ञान-

of the flames of manifold miseries. That mind, however, in which the intoxication due to the wine of passion etc., has been put an end to by the perfecting of non-attachment gained by the repetition of the contemplation (mentioned above), is subjugated, *i.e.*, is brought under control by the self. This subjugation of the mind occasioned by non-attachment is called calmness (*śama*) or *vaśīkāra-saṃjña*. And the subjugated mind is made fit for application in respect of truth (*i.e.*, to the investigation of truth); this its capacity is (*dama*) equanimity, just as it is understood that the calm young bull is made fit to draw a plough, a cart etc. In the "**etcetera**" (of the commentary) are included desire to abandon (*titikṣā*) objects, turning away (*uparati*) from them, and faith (*śraddhā*) in the truth. Hence it is that Scripture says: "Hence, having become possessed of calmness, equanimity, turning away (from objects), the desire to abandon (them), and faith, one, seeing the self in the self alone, sees everything in the self."[65] *Śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat* is the possession of these means, calmness, equanimity etc., in an abundant degree. Thence arises the desire in him for release from the bondage to the migratory cycle; hence he says: "**and desire for release.**" For this one, who has heard that the knowledge of the eternally pure, intelligent and free Brahman is the cause of release, there comes the desire to know that even before, and (sometimes) after, the desire to know Religious Duty; hence, the immediate succession is to them alone, not to the desire to know Religious Duty; thus, he says: "**when indeed, these**" etc. Not

The word "therefore" signifies the reason. Because in the Veda itself, texts, like "Therefore as here the enjoyment acquired by an act perishes, even so, hereafter, the enjoyment acquired through Religious Duty perishes," show that agnihotra etc., which are means to prosperity, have an impermanent fruit; and because it is shown that the supreme goal of man results from the knowledge of Brahman, by texts like "One who knows Brahman attains the supreme"; therefore, in immediate succession to the possession in abundance of the means stated above, there should be the desire to know Brahman.

merely the desire to know, he says, but knowledge itself results therefrom: "**and also to know.**" He concludes: "**Therefore**" etc.

The word "atah" which comes next in order is explained thus: "**The word 'therefore' signifies the reason.**" This same sense of the reason connoted by "therefore" he explains thus: "**Because in the Veda itself**" etc. Here, it is asked: true, there comes the desire to know Brahman after the possession in abundance of the means declared. But this itself is unintelligible, since non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter is unintelligible. Fruit, being characterised as the object of desire, is what is known to be advantageous. There cannot be for him non-attachment to that which (itself) causes attachment. If it be said that there is

अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः। यस्माद्वेद एव अग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते' इत्यादिः; तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' इत्यादिः; तस्मात् यथोक्तसाधन-संपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या।

मपीत्याह—**ज्ञातुं च**। उपसंहरति—**तस्मात्** इति।

क्रमप्राप्तमतःशब्दं व्याचष्टे—**अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः**। तमेवातःशब्दस्य हेतुरूपमर्थमाह—**यस्माद्वेद एव** इति। अत्रैवं परिचोद्यते—सत्यं यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा भवति। सैव त्वनुपपन्ना, इहामुत्रफलभोगविरागस्यानुपपत्तेः। अनुकूलवेदनीयं हि फलम्, इष्टलक्षणत्वात्फलस्य। न चानुरागहेतावस्य वैराग्यं भवितुमर्हति। दुःखानुषङ्गदर्शनात्सुखेऽपि वैराग्यमिति

चेत्, हन्त भोः सुखानुषङ्गाद्दुःखेऽप्यनुरागो न कस्मान्नवति ? तस्मात्सुखे उपादीयमाने दुःखपरिहारे प्रयतितव्यम्; अवर्जनीयतया दुःखमागतमपि परिहृत्य सुखमात्रं भोक्ष्यते। तद्यथा—मत्स्यार्थी सशल्कान्सकण्टकान्मत्स्यानुपादत्ते, स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते; यथा वा धान्यार्थी सपलालानि धान्यान्याहरति, स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते। तस्माद्दुःखभयान्नानुकूलवेदनीयमैहिकं वामुष्मिकं वा सुखं परित्यक्तुमुचितम्। न हि मृगाः सन्तीति शालयो नोप्यन्ते, भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्ते। अपि च दृष्टं सुखं चन्दनवनितादिसङ्गजन्म क्षयितालक्षणेन दुःखेनाघातत्वादतिभीरुणा त्यज्येतापि, न त्वामुष्मिकं स्वर्गादि, तस्याविनाशित्वात्। श्रूयते हि—

'अपाम सोममम्रता अभूम'

इति; तथा च 'अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतं भवति' इति। न च कृतकत्वहेतुकं विनाशित्वानुमानमत्र संभवति,

non-attachment even to pleasure, because of its association with pain, why, alas, should there not be attachment even to pain, because of its association with pleasure? Hence, one should, in accepting pleasure, endeavour to remedy pain; even if pain should come in unavoidably, it should be remedied and the pleasure alone enjoyed. This is how: he who desires fish brings up the fish along with mosses and thorns, takes what is to be taken and abandons the rest; or, he who desires grain brings the grain with the straw, takes what is to be taken and abandons the rest. Hence, it is not proper to abandon the pleasure here or hereafter which is known to be advantageous, because of the fear of pain. Verily, one does not refrain from sowing because there are beasts of the field or from putting the pot on to cook because there are beggars. Further, even though the very timid may give up visible pleasure, because the pleasure from sandal-paste or women is tainted with pain consisting in its decrease (by consumption), that cannot apply to pleasures hereafter such as (enjoyment in) heaven etc., these being imperishable. Scripture indeed says: "We have drunk *soma*, we have become immortal"; also "The merit of him who sacrifices with the *cāturmāsya* cannot, verily, diminish". Nor can there be an inference here as to destructibility on the ground of (its) being produced, since its content is sublated by revelation, like the inference about the purity

of the human skull (by analogy with conches etc.) Hence, the possession of the above-mentioned means being non-existent, it follows that there cannot be the desire to know Brahman. To meet this result, the revered aphorist uses the word "**therefore**"; and its meaning is explained by the commentator thus: "**Because in the Veda itself**" etc.

This is what is intended: true, beasts, beggars etc. can be set at nought by agriculturists, cooks etc.; pain, however, which is manifold, produced by various causes, cannot be remedied; for, in the long run, the miseries of being dependent on means (external to oneself) and of diminution are constantly and inseparably attendant on all produced happiness. Not even the best of craftsmen can remove the poison alone from food which is mixed with honey and poison, and eat (the food) in conjunction with the honey alone. In conjunction with the inference as to diminution, the texts like "Therefore, as here the enjoyment acquired by an act" etc.,[86] which declare diminution, bring about a secondary sense for texts like "We have drunk *soma*" etc., because the primary sense is impossible. As the Paurāṇikas say: "Permanence till the dissolution of the primal elements is called immortality."

And here, by the word *brahma* the valid means of knowledge thereof, *i.e.*, the Veda, is brought to mind.[87] And, because of suitability, such texts as "Therefore, as here the enjoyment acquired by an act" etc. are referred to by the

नरशिरःकपालशौचानुमानवदागमबाधितविषयत्वात् । तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यभावान्न ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति प्राप्तम् । एवं प्राप्ते आह भगवान्सूत्रकारः 'अतः' इति ; तस्यार्थं व्याचष्टे भाष्यकारः—**यस्माद्वेद एव** इति ।

अयमभिसंधिः—सत्यं मृगभिक्षुकादयः शक्याः परिहर्तुं पाचककृषीवलादिभिः ; दुःखं त्वनेकविधानेककारणसंपातजमशक्यपरिहारम् ; अन्ततः साधनपारतन्त्र्यक्षयितालक्षणयोर्दुःखयोः समस्तकृतकसुखाविनाभावनियमात् । न हि मधुविषसंपृक्तमन्नं विषं परित्यज्य मधुमिश्रं शक्यं शिल्पिवरेणापि भोक्तुम् । क्षयितानुमानोपोद्बलितं च 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितः' इत्यादिवचनं क्षयितापतिपादकम्, 'अपाम सोमम्' इत्यादिकं वचनं मुख्यासंभवे जघन्यवृत्तितामापादयति । यथाहुः पौराणिकाः—

'आभूतसंप्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते' इति ।

अत्र च ब्रह्मपदेन तत्प्रमाणं वेद उपस्थापितः । स च योग्यत्वात् 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितः' इत्यादिः

ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इति। अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यम्। ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी, न शेषे; जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाज्जिज्ञासायाः, जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशाच्च।

'अतः' इति सर्वनाम्ना परामृश्य हेतुपञ्चम्या निर्दिश्यते।

स्यादेतत्। यथा स्वर्गादेः कृतकस्य सुखस्य दुःखानुषङ्गः तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपीत्यत आह—**तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि** इति। तेनायमर्थः—अतः स्वर्गादीनां क्षयिताप्रतिपादकात् ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य च परमपुरुषार्थताप्रतिपादकात् आगमात् यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्; ततश्च जिज्ञासेति सिद्धम्।

ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापदव्याख्यानमाह—**ब्रह्मण** इति। षष्ठीसमासप्रदर्शनेन प्राचां वृत्तिकृतां ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति चतुर्थीसमासः परास्तो वेदितव्यः। 'तादर्थ्यसमासे प्रकृतिविकृतिग्रहणं

Brahma-jijñāsā is desire to know in respect of Brahman. And Brahman is that whose definition will be stated as "That whence for this what begins with origination". For this very reason, for the word "Brahman" there cannot be the doubt of any other meaning like that of caste etc. "Of Brahman" is in the sixth case in the sense of object, not in the residuary sense; because what is desired to be known is needed for the desire to know, and because of the non-designation of anything else as desired to be known.

pronoun "therefore," and indicated as the reason by the fifth case termination (the *tas* suffix in *ataḥ*).

Be this so. Just as misery is attendant on produced happiness like heaven etc., even so it may be in the case of Brahman. To this he says: "**And because it is shown that the supreme goal of man results from the knowledge of Brahman.**" This is what is meant thereby: therefore, because of revelation, which declares the diminution of (enjoyment in) heaven etc., and the knowledge of Brahman as the supreme human goal, there results the possession of the above-mentioned means in abundance; and thence it is settled there is the desire to know (Brahman).

The (compound-) word *brahma-jijñāsā* is thus explained: "**Desire to know in respect of Brahman.**" By showing the compound (to be) of the sixth case, the refutation is to be understood of the explanation of this by earlier commentators as a fourth case compound—*brahmaṇe jijñāsā*. For, by the dictum of Kātyāyana "In the dative compound, both the basic object and the modification should be

apprehended," it is a rule that there are dative compounds only in respect of a basic object and its modifications, as in the case of wood and the sacrificial stake; where the compounded elements are not related as basic object and modification, that (dative) compound is ruled out; further the possessive compound is clearly laid down in the case of "horse-fodder" etc., in the words "Horse-fodder etc. are sixth case compounds".[88] Even in the possessive compound, the primacy in fact of Brahman (as compared with the verbal primacy of "the desire to know") is intelligible.

Be this so. When it is said "desire to know in respect of Brahman," since "Brahman" is used in many senses, there is this doubt: of which Brahman is there this desire to know? The word "Brahman" is used of the brahmin caste, as in *brahmahatti* (brahminicide), of the Veda, as in *brahmojjham* (forgetting the Veda once studied), and of the supreme self, as in "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself". This doubt he removes: "**And Brahman is that whose definition will be stated**" etc. Since after premising the desire to know Brahman, he defines the supreme self, in order to bring that to mind, we understand that the desire to know mentioned here is the desire to know the supreme self alone, not the brahmin caste etc.; this is the sense.

Even accepting the compound to be of the sixth case, it is the sixth case not in the sense of object, but in a residuary sense; since the residuary sense signifies relationship in general, not merely that of being the object, when it is said "desire to know in respect of Brahman," it amounts to saying "desire to know (all) that is connected with

कर्तव्यम्' इति कात्यायनीयवचनेन यूपदार्वादिष्वेव प्रकृतिविकारभूतेषु चतुर्थीसमासनियमात् अप्रकृति-विकारभूते इत्येवमादौ तन्निषेधात्, 'अश्वघासादयः षष्ठीसमासा भविष्यन्ति' इत्यश्वघासादिषु षष्ठी-समासप्रतिविधानात्। षष्ठीसमासेऽपि च ब्रह्मणो वास्तवप्राधान्योपपत्तेरिति।

स्यादेतत्। ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासेत्युक्ते तत्रानेकार्थत्वाद्ब्रह्मशब्दस्य संशयः—कस्य ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा?—इति। अस्ति ब्रह्मशब्दो विप्रत्वजातौ, यथा—ब्रह्महत्येति; अस्ति च वेदे, यथा—ब्रह्मोज्झमिति; अस्ति च परमात्मनि, यथा—'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इति। तमिमं संशयमपाकरोति—**ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम्** इति। यतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिज्ञाय तज्ज्ञापनाय परमात्मलक्षणं प्रणयति ततोऽवगच्छामः परमात्म-जिज्ञसैवेयं न विप्रत्वजात्यादिजिज्ञासा, इत्यर्थः।

षष्ठीसमासपरिग्रहेऽपि नेयं कर्मषष्ठी, किं तु शेषलक्षणा; संबन्धमात्रं च शेष इति ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासेत्युक्ते ब्रह्मसंबन्धिनी जिज्ञासेत्युक्तं भवति।

तथा च ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रमाणयुक्तिसाधनप्रयोजन-जिज्ञासाः सर्वा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासार्था ब्रह्मजिज्ञासयावरुद्धा भवन्ति, साक्षात् पारम्पर्येण वा ब्रह्मसंबन्धात्। कर्मणि षष्ठ्यां तु ब्रह्मशब्दार्थः कर्म; स च स्वरूपमेवेति तत्प्रमाणादयो नावरुध्येरन्; तथा चाप्रतिज्ञातार्थचिन्ता प्रमाणादिषु भवेत्—इति ये मन्यन्ते तान्प्रत्याह—**ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि** इति। अत्र हेतुमाह—**जिज्ञास्य** इति। इच्छायाः प्रतिपत्त्यनुबन्धो ज्ञानम्, ज्ञानस्य च ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म। नो खलु ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं विना निरूप्यते, न च जिज्ञासा ज्ञानं विना, इति प्रतिपत्त्यनुबन्धत्वात् प्रथमं जिज्ञासा कर्मैवापेक्षते, न तु संबन्धिमात्रम्, तदन्तरेणापि सति कर्मणि तन्निरूपणात्। न हि चन्द्रमसमादित्यं वोपलभ्य कस्यायमिति संबन्ध्यन्वेषणा भवति। भवति तु ज्ञानमित्युक्ते विषयान्वेषणा किंविषयमिति। तस्मात्प्रथममपेक्षितत्वात् कर्मतयैव ब्रह्म संबध्यते, न तु संबन्धितामात्रेण, तस्य जघन्यत्वात्। तथा च

ः।

Brahman". Thus, the things that serve the desire to know Brahman, such as the nature of Brahman, the valid means of knowing it, reasoning, the means (of attainment) and the fruit, all signified by the name "desire to know Brahman," are comprehended under the name "desire to know Brahman," since they are related to Brahman directly or indirectly. In the sixth case with the sense of object, however, what is signified by "Brahman" is the object; that is only the nature (of Brahman); and the means of knowledge etc. would not be comprehended; hence, in respect of the means of knowledge etc., the inquiry would be into what was not premised. To those who think thus, he says: "**'Of Brahman' is in the sixth case in the sense of object.**" He states the reason: "**because what is desired to be known is needed for the desire to know.**" Knowledge is bound up with the attainment of the desire; and for knowledge, what is to be known is Brahman. Knowledge is not, verily, determined in the absence of what is to be known, nor the desire to know in the absence of knowledge; hence, because of being bound up with the attainment (of it), the desire to know primarily needs an object alone, not what is related in general; for, even in the absence of this (latter), that (desire) is determined, when the object exists. Verily, there is not, after seeing the sun or the moon, a search for what is related, in the form "Of what is this"? There is, however, when one says "knowledge", the search for the object, in the form "What is its object?" Hence, because of being primarily needed, Brahman is related as object alone, not as what is related in general, this (sense) being secondary. And thus, (the compound is in) the sixth case with the sense of object; this is the meaning.

Now, even on the acceptance of the sixth case in the residuary sense, Brahman's being the object of the desire to know is not contradicted; for relationship in general is based on some particular relationship. Even thus, for one who, discarding the direct objectness of Brahman, assumes indirect objectness through the channel of general relationship, the effort is in vain.

Now, it is true that the desire to know is not determined in the absence of what is desired to be known; but there may be some other object for this desire, while Brahman may be related to it as a residuary. To this he says: "**and because of the non-designation of anything else as desired to be known.**"

With some unrevealed view one asks: "**Now, even on the acceptance of the sixth case in the residuary sense**" etc.; since relationship in general is not opposed to a particular relationship, and since the determination of the desire to know is intelligible without contradicting (Brahman's) being the object: this is the sense. Himself with an unrevealed view, he criticises: "**even thus, for one who discarding the direct objectness of Brahman**" etc. Well indeed have you followed the true principles of interpretation in abandoning the relationship of expressed objectness, which is primarily needed by the desire to know, and which is fit to be related primarily, and (adopting) the relationship of what is related in general, which is needed somehow at a later stage, (thus making) the secondary primary and the primary secondary! The designation (of the relationship) as "direct" and "indirect"

ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते; संबन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्। एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमुत्सृज्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्।

ननु सत्यं न जिज्ञास्यमन्तरेण जिज्ञासा निरूप्यते; जिज्ञास्यान्तरं त्वस्या भविष्यति; ब्रह्म तु शेषतया संभन्त्स्यत इत्यत आह— **जिज्ञास्यान्तर** इति।

निगूढाभिप्रायश्चोदयति — **ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि** इति। *सामान्यसंबन्धस्य* विशेषसंबन्धाविरोधेन कर्मताया अविघातेन जिज्ञासानिरूपणोपपत्तेरित्यर्थः। निगूढाभिप्राय एव दूषयति—**एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मण** इति। वाच्यस्य कर्मत्वस्य जिज्ञासया प्रथममपेक्षितस्य प्रथमसंबन्धार्हस्य चान्वयपरित्यागेन पश्चात्कथंचिदपेक्षितस्य संबन्धिमात्रस्य संबन्धो, जघन्यः प्रथमः प्रथमश्च जघन्यः, इति सुव्याहतं

ननु न व्यर्थः, ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचार-प्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति चेत्, न, प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षितानामप्यर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्। ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनाप्तुमिष्टतमत्वात्प्रधानम्। तस्मिन्प्रधाने जिज्ञासाकर्मणि परिगृहीते, यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति, तान्यर्थाक्षिप्तान्येवेति न पृथक्सूत्रयितव्या-

determined in the ... 'गाञ्जासौ गच्छति' इत्युक्ते ... be some other ...

नि। यथा ... सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनमुक्तं भवति, तद्वत्। श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च। 'यतो वा इमानि

न्यायतत्त्वम्। प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षताभिधानं च प्राथम्याप्राथम्यस्फुटत्वास्फुटत्वाभिप्रायम्।

चोदकः स्वाभिप्रायमुद्घाटयति—**न व्यर्थः ब्रह्माश्रिताशेष** इति। व्याख्यातमेतदधस्तात्। समाधाता स्वाभिसंधिमुद्घाटयति—**न, प्रधान-परिग्रह** इति। वास्तवं प्राधान्यं ब्रह्मणः। शेषं सनिदर्शनमतिरोहितार्थम्। श्रुत्यनुगमश्चाति-रोहितः।

Now, it is not in vain, since it would have the purpose of premising inquiry into everything, without residue, that is dependent on Brahman; if this be said, no; because on the acceptance of the principal, whatever is dependent on it will be presumptively implied. Brahman, indeed, being what is most desired to be attained by knowledge, is the principal. That principal one, which is the object of the desire to know, being accepted, those things, without a desire to know which there will not be the desire to know Brahman, will certainly be presumptively implied; hence they are not to be separately stated in the aphorism. Just as when it is said, "Here goes the king," what is stated is the going of the king along with his retinue, so is it here. And it is so, also because of conformity with Scripture. The Scriptural passages beginning with

(in the commentary) is in the sense of "primary" and "non-primary," "manifest" and "non-manifest".

The objector now reveals his view: "**not in vain, since it would have the purpose of premising inquiry into everything, without residue, that is dependent on Brahman.**" This has been explained above. The respondent too reveals his own view: "**no; because on the acceptance of the principal**" etc. The principal position belongs, in fact, to Brahman (though it is not so in the sentence). The sense of the rest (of the commentary) along with the illustration is not obscure; the support of Scripture too is not obscure in sense.

"That whence these beings originate," in the passage, "Desire the knowledge of that; that is Brahman," quite explicitly show that Brahman is the object of the desire to know. And that will conform to the aphorism, if the sixth case is accepted in the sense of object. Therefore, "Of Brahman" is in the sixth case in the sense of object.

Jijñāsā is desire to know. The knowledge culminating in realisation is the object of the desire expressed by the *san*-suffix; because fruit is the content of desire. Indeed, Brahman is the object desired to be realised through valid knowledge. The realisation of Brahman is, indeed, the human goal, because it exterminates evils, Nescience etc., the seeds of all transmigration whatsoever. Therefore Brahman is what is to be desired to be known.

Having thus established the compound (as of the character) acceptable to him, he states the meaning of the word *jijñāsā*: "**jijnasa is desire to know.**" Be this so. Knowledge is not the content of desire. The attainment of happiness or the remedying of misery is, verily, the sphere of desire, or, through these, the means therefor. Knowledge of Brahman is not such. It is not, indeed, experienced as advantageous or as the cessation of what is disadvantageous. Nor is it a means to those two; for, even when that exists, no special happiness is seen, while the misery that continues does not cease. Hence, merely

भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म' इति प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति । तच्च कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेणानुगतं भवति । तस्माद्ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी ॥

ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म, फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः । ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म । ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः, निःशेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् ॥

तदेवमभिमतं समासं व्यवस्थाप्य जिज्ञासापदार्थमाह—**ज्ञातुम्** इति । स्यादेतत् । न ज्ञानमिच्छाविषयः । सुखदुःखाद्याप्तिपरिहारौ वा तदुपायो वा तदुद्धारेणेच्छागोचरः । न चैवं ब्रह्मज्ञानम् । न खल्वेतदनुकूलमिति वा प्रतिकूलनिवृत्तिरिति वानुभूयते । नापि तयोरुपायः; तस्मिन्सत्यपि सुखभेदस्यादर्शनात्, अनुवर्तमानस्य

च दुःखस्यानिवृत्तेः। तस्मान्न सूत्रकारवचनमात्रादिषिकर्मता ज्ञानस्येत्यत आह—**अवगतिपर्यन्तम्** इति। न केवलं ज्ञानमिष्यते किं त्ववगतिं साक्षात्कारं कुर्वदवगतिपर्यन्तं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म। कस्मात्? **फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः** तदुपायं फलपर्यन्तं गोचरयतीच्छेति शेषः।

ननु भवत्ववगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानम्; किमेतावतापीष्टं भवति? न ह्यनपेक्षणीयविषयमवगतिपर्यन्तमपि ज्ञानमिष्यत इत्यत आह—**ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म**। भवतु ब्रह्मविषयावगतिः, एवमपि कथमिष्टेत्यत आह—**ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः**। किमभ्युदयः? न, किं तु निःश्रेयसं विगलितनिखिलदुःखानुषङ्गपरमानन्दघनब्रह्मावगतिर्ब्रह्मणः स्वभाव इति सैव निःश्रेयसं पुरुषार्थ इति।

स्यादेतत्। न ब्रह्मावगतिः पुरुषार्थः। पुरुषव्यापारव्याप्यो हि पुरुषार्थः। न चास्या ब्रह्मस्वभावभूताया उत्पत्तिविकारसंस्कारप्राप्तयः संभवन्ति, तथा सत्यनित्यत्वेन तत्स्वाभाव्यानुपपत्तेः। न चोत्पत्त्याद्यभावे व्यापारव्याप्यता। तस्मान्न

because of the aphorist's words, being the object of desire does not result for knowledge. To this he says: "**The knowledge culminating in realisation**" etc. Not bare knowledge is desired; rather, it is the knowledge, which as bringing about realisation or intuition culminates in realisation, that is the object of the desire expressed by the *san*-suffix. Why? "**Because fruit is the content of desire**"; desire has the means for its sphere till the fruit is attained; this is the complement (to be understood).

Now, let it be that knowledge culminates in realisation; does it even then become a desired object? Knowledge of what is not required is not, verily, desired, even if it culminate in realisation. To this he says: "**Indeed, Brahman is the object desired to be realised through valid knowledge.**" Let it be that there is realisation whose content is Brahman: even thus, how is it what is desired? To this he says: "**The realisation of Brahman is, indeed, the human goal.**" Is it prosperity? No; it is, rather, beatitude, which is of the nature of Brahman, the mass of supreme bliss whence has been expelled all taint of misery; hence it is the unexcelled human goal.

Be this so. The realisation of Brahman is not the human goal. For the human goal is what is pervaded by human activity; and to this (realisation), which is of the nature of Brahman, generation, modification, purification or attainment cannot happen, as, being non-eternal in that case, it could not intelligibly be of that nature (of Brahman). And when generation etc. are absent, there is no pervasion by (human) activity. Hence, realisation of Brahman is not the human goal. To this he says:

"**because it exterminates evils, Nescience etc., the seeds of all transmigration whatsoever.**" True, in the realisation of Brahman, which is of the nature of Brahman, generation etc. do not occur; yet, under the influence of the indeterminable beginningless Nescience, the nature of Brahman, though not illumined by another and though shining, appears as if not shining and as if illumined by another; though different from the body, organs etc., it appears as if not different from them; hence, prior to the extermination of the evils, Nescience etc., the seeds of transmigration, it is unattained, as it were, and when that (extermination) exists, it becomes attained, as it were: consequently, being thus sought by men, it is appropriately the human goal.

The word "**etcetera**" after "**Nescience**" comprehends the impressions thereof. The cessation of Nescience etc., however, should be known to come from the effect of contemplation, *viz.*, intuition, which is a variety of psychosis of the internal organ. He concludes: "**Therefore, Brahman is what is to be desired to be known**" by the person who is of the character stated above and desires release. Not, verily, without that knowledge is Nescience, which with its impressions is the primal cause of manifold miseries, destroyed. Nor without its destruction is there the manifestation of the intuition of the *jīva* as of the nature of Brahman, the mass of bliss whence has been expelled all taint of misery. Hence, by those who desire (to realise) the nature of Brahman, the mass of bliss, the means thereto, *i.e.*, knowledge, should be desired. And that results from the Vedānta texts not of themselves, but as aided by the

ब्रह्मावगतिः पुरुषार्थ इत्यत आह—**निः-शेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात्**। सत्यम्, ब्रह्मावगतौ ब्रह्मस्वभावे नोत्पत्त्यादयः संभवन्ति; तथाप्यनिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्यावशाद्ब्रह्मस्वभावोऽपराधीनप्रकाशोऽपि प्रतिभानपि न प्रतिभातीव पराधीनप्रकाश इव देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो भिन्नोऽप्यभिन्न इव भासत इति संसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात्प्रागप्राप्त इव तस्मिन्सति प्राप्त इव भवतीति पुरुषेणार्थ्यमानत्वात्पुरुषार्थ इति युक्तम्।

अविद्यादीत्यादिग्रहणेन तत्संस्कारोऽवरुध्यते। अविद्यादिनिवृत्तिस्तूपासनाकार्यादन्तः करणवृत्तिभेदात् साक्षात्कारादिति द्रष्टव्यम्। उपसंहरति—**तस्माद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम्** उक्तलक्षणेन मुमुक्षुणा। न खलु तज्ज्ञानं विना सवासनविविधदुःखनिदानमविद्योच्छिद्यते। न च तदुच्छेदमन्तरेण विगलितनिखिलदुःखानुषङ्गानन्दघनब्रह्मात्मतासाक्षात्काराविर्भावो जीवस्य। तस्मादानन्दघनब्रह्मात्मतामिच्छता तदुपायो ज्ञानमेषितव्यम्। तच्च

तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्; यदि प्रसिद्धं न जिज्ञासितव्यम्; अथाप्रसिद्धं नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति।

न केवलेभ्यो वेदान्तेभ्यः अपि तु ब्रह्ममीमांसोपकरणेभ्य इति इच्छामुखेन ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रवर्त्यते, न तु वेदान्तेषु तदर्थविवक्षायां वा; तत्र फलवदर्थावबोधपरतां स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविधेः सूत्रयता 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यनेनैव प्रवर्तितत्वात्, धर्मग्रहणस्य च वेदार्थोपलक्षणत्वेनाधर्मवद्ब्रह्मणोऽप्युपलक्षणत्वात्। यद्यपि च धर्ममीमांसावत् वेदार्थमीमांसया ब्रह्ममीमांसाप्याक्षेप्तुं शक्यते, तथापि प्राच्या मीमांसया न तद्द्युत्पाद्यते, नापि ब्रह्ममीमांसाया अध्ययनमात्रानन्तर्यमिति ब्रह्ममीमांसारम्भाय नित्यानित्यविवेकाद्यानन्तर्यप्रदर्शनाय चेदं सूत्रमारम्भणीयमित्यपौनरुक्त्यम्।

स्यादेतत्। एतेन सूत्रेण ब्रह्मज्ञानं प्रत्युपायता मीमांसायाः प्रतिपाद्यत इत्युक्तम्; तदयुक्तम्, विकल्पासहत्वात्, इति चोदयति—**तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म**

That Brahman, again, should be either known or unknown. If known, it is not to be desired to be known; if not known, it cannot at all be desired to be known.

inquiry into Brahman; consequently, through desire, one is directed to the inquiry into Brahman, not to the Vedānta texts or to the intention to declare their sense. For, this (latter) is already attained by (the aphorism) "Then, therefore, the inquiry into Religious Duty," which aphoristically expresses the injunction to study one's own Veda, this (study) signifying the fruitful understanding of the sense; and the apprehension of Religious Duty, since it implies the (entire) sense of the Veda, secondarily implies Brahman too, in the same way as (it implies) what is not Religious Duty (*adharma*). Though, like the inquiry into Religious Duty, the inquiry into Brahman too may be implied by the inquiry into the sense of the Veda, yet, that is not set forth in the earlier inquiry (into *dharma*). Nor does the inquiry into Brahman follow immediately on the mere study of the Veda. Hence, in order to start the inquiry into Brahman and also to show that it follows immediately on the discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal etc., this aphorism has to be stated; thus, there is no repetition.

Be this so. By this aphorism, it has been said, instrumentality to the knowledge of Brahman is taught of inquiry; that does not stand to reason, since it cannot bear examination; thus, one asks: "**That Brahman, again**" etc. From

The reply is: There does exist Brahman who is by nature eternally pure, intelligent and free, omniscient and endowed with all powers. By him who analyses the meaning of the word Brahman, there are cognised the meanings eternal, pure etc., because of conformity with the sense of the root "Bṛh". And because of being the self of all, the existence of Brahman is well-known. Everyone, verily, cognises the existence of himself; he does not cognise "I do not exist". If indeed the existence of the self were not well-known, the entire world would cognise "I do not exist". And the self is Brahman.

---

the Vedānta texts, which as not of human origin are self-evidently valid, (Brahman) should be either known or not known. If it be known, it has been made the content of ascertained knowledge arising out of the Vedānta texts; therefore, it is not to be desired to be known; for, the means which, having produced its fruit, (yet) makes no distinction to its object, transgresses the definition of means. Or else, if it be not known from the Vedāntas, then, since the Vedāntas do not teach it, it would ever be unknown and could not be desired to be known. Desire arises for what has been experienced and liked, not for what has never been experienced before. Nor, even if it were liked, could it be known, there being no means of valid knowledge (in respect thereof). Verbal testimony should

उच्यते—अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्ध-मुक्तस्वभावं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्। ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्य-शुद्धत्वादयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते, बृहतेर्धातो-रर्थानुगमात्। सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्व-प्रसिद्धिः। सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति न 'न अहमस्मि' इति। यदि हि नात्मास्ति-त्वप्रसिद्धिः स्यात्, सर्वो लोकः 'नाह-मस्मि' इति प्रतीयात्। आत्मा च ब्रह्म॥

इति। वेदान्तेभ्योऽपौरुषेयतया स्वतःसिद्धप्रामाण्येभ्यः प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्। यदि प्रसिद्धम्, वेदान्तवाक्यसमुत्थेन निश्चयज्ञानेन विषयीकृतम्; ततो न जिज्ञासितव्यम्, निष्पादितक्रिये कर्मणि अविशेषाधायिनः साधनस्य साधनन्यायातिपातात्। अथाप्रसिद्धं वेदान्तेभ्यः, तर्हि न तद्वेदान्ताः प्रतिपादयन्तीति सर्वथाप्रसिद्धं नैव शक्यं जिज्ञा-सितुम्। अनुभूते हि प्रिये भवतीच्छा न तु सर्वथाननुभूतपूर्वे। न चेष्यमाणमपि शक्यं

ज्ञातुम्, प्रमाणाभावात्। शब्दो हि तस्य प्रमाणं वक्तव्यम्। यथा वक्ष्यति 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' इति। स चेत्तन्नावबोधयति, कुतस्तस्य तत्र प्रामाण्यम्? न च प्रमाणान्तरं ब्रह्मणि प्रक्रमते। तस्मात्प्रसिद्धस्य ज्ञातुं शक्यस्याप्यजिज्ञासनात् अप्रसिद्धस्येच्छाया अविषयत्वात् अशक्यज्ञानत्वाच्च न ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यमित्याक्षेपः। परिहरति—**उच्यते—अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावम्**। अयमर्थः—प्रागपि ब्रह्ममीमांसाया अधीतवेदस्य निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणादिपरिशीलनविदितपदतदर्थसंबन्धस्य 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्युपक्रमात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यन्तात्संदर्भात् नित्यत्वाद्युपेतब्रह्मस्वरूपावगमस्तावदापाततो विचाराद्विनाप्यस्ति। अत्र च ब्रह्मेत्यादिनावगम्येन तद्विषयमवगमं लक्षयति, तदस्तित्वस्य सति विमर्शे विचारात्प्रागनिर्णयात्। नित्येति क्षयितालक्षणं दुःखमुपक्षिपति। शुद्धेति देहाद्युपाधिकमपि दुःखमपाकरोति। बुद्धेत्यपराधीनप्रकाशमानन्दात्मानं दर्शयति, आनन्दप्रकाशयोरभेदात्।

be said to be the means of knowing it; as will be said: "**Because of the sacred-teaching-source.**" If that does not give knowledge of it, whence then its (the *śāstra's*) authoritativeness in that respect? Nor does any other means of valid knowledge apply in respect of Brahman. Hence, since in the case of what is known, though it can be known, there is no desire to know, and in the case of what is not known, it is not the object of desire and cannot be known, Brahman cannot be the object of the desire to know; this is the objection. He remedies it: "**The reply is: there does exist Brahman, who is by nature eternally pure, intelligent and free.**" This is the sense: even prior to the inquiry into Brahman, for him, who has studied the Veda, who has by a study of Etymology (*nirukta*), Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) etc., understood the relation of words and their import, there is even without the inquiry a general understanding of the nature of Brahman endowed with eternality etc. from the string of texts beginning with "Existence alone this was in the beginning, dear one" and ending with "That thou art". Here, by the words "**Brahman**" etc. (in the commentary) signifying the object of knowledge, there is indicated secondarily the knowledge whose content is Brahman, since the existence of that (Brahman) is not settled prior to inquiry, when there is a doubt. By the word "**eternal,**" misery characterised by diminution is excluded. By the word "**pure,**" misery due to adjuncts like the body etc., is excluded. The word

"**intelligent**" exhibits it as blissful and not illumined by another, since bliss and effulgence are non-different.

Be this so. If release existed, then would shine forth these, its (qualities) purity etc.; but, prior to that, there is conjunction with misery through the bodily attributes of birth, old age, death etc., due to non-difference from the body etc. To this he says: "**free**". Always free, always pure, it yet appears so (*i.e.*, non-different from the body etc.), because of delusion due to the influence of beginningless Nescience. Having thus shown the adjunctless form of Brahman, he declares its form as with the adjunct of Nescience: "**omniscient and endowed with all powers.**" By this is shown its being the cause of the universe, since being or not being the cause is dependent on the presence or absence of power and knowledge. Whence, again, the realisation of Brahman as of this nature? To this he says: "**By him who analyses the meaning of the word 'Brahman'** etc. The realisation of Brahman as of this nature comes not merely from consideration of texts like "Existence alone" etc., taken together with what goes before and after, but the word "Brahman" itself gives us this very sense through its etymology. He gives the derivation: "**because of conformity with the sense of the root 'brh'.**" The root "bṛh," meaning growth, signifies excellence. This undefined excellence permits of it (Brahman) (the attribution of) eternality, purity, intelligence etc., conveyed through other words: this is the sense.

स्यादेतत्। मुक्तौ सत्यामस्यैते शुद्धत्वादयः प्रथन्ते, ततस्तु प्राक् देहाद्यभेदेन तद्धर्मजन्मजरामरणादिदुःखयोगादित्यत उक्तम्—**मुक्त** इति। सदैव मुक्तः सदैव केवलोऽनाद्यविद्यावशात्तु भ्रान्त्या तथावभासत इत्यर्थः। तदेवमनौपाधिकं ब्रह्मणो रूपं दर्शयित्वा अविद्योपाधिकं रूपमाह—**सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्**। तदनेन जगत्कारणत्वमस्य दर्शितम्, शक्तिज्ञानभावाभावानुविधानात्कारणत्वभावाभावयोः। कुतः पुनरेवंभूतब्रह्मस्वरूपावगतिः इत्यत आह—**ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि** इति। न केवलम् 'सदेव सोम्येदम्' इत्यादीनां वाक्यानां पौर्वापर्यपर्यालोचनया इत्थंभूतब्रह्मावगतिः। अपि तु ब्रह्मपदमपि निर्वचनसामर्थ्यादिममेवार्थं स्वहस्तयति। निर्वचनमाह—**बृहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमात्**। वृद्धिकर्मा हि बृहतिरतिशायने वर्तते। तच्चेदमतिशायनमनवच्छिन्नं पदान्तरावगमितं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धत्वाद्यस्याभ्यनुजानातीत्यर्थः।

तदेवं तत्पदार्थस्य शुद्धत्वादेः प्रसिद्धिमभिधाय त्वंपदार्थस्याप्याह—**सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः** । सर्वस्य पांसुलपादकस्य हालिकस्यापि ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः; कुतः ? आत्मत्वात् । एतदेव स्फुटयति—**सर्वो हि** इति । प्रतीतिमेव अप्रतीतिनिराकरणेन द्रढयति—**न न** इति । न न प्रत्येति 'अहमस्मि' इति, किं तु प्रत्येत्येवेति योजना । ननु 'अहमस्मि' इति च ज्ञास्यति मा च ज्ञासीदात्मानमित्यत आह—**यदि** इति । अहमस्मीति न प्रतीयात् । अहंकारास्पदं हि जीवात्मानं चेन्न प्रतीयात् 'अहम्' इति न प्रतीयादित्यर्थः । ननु प्रत्येतु सर्वो जन आत्मानमहंकारास्पदम्, ब्रह्मणि तु किमायातम् इत्यत आह—**आत्मा च ब्रह्म** ; तदः त्वमा सामानाधिकरण्यात् । तस्मात्तत्पदार्थस्य शुद्धबुद्धत्वादेः शब्दतः त्वंपदार्थस्य च जीवात्मनः प्रत्यक्षतः प्रसिद्धेः, पदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकत्वाच्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य, त्वंपदार्थस्य ब्रह्मभावावगमः 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यादुपपद्यत इति भावः ।

Having thus declared that purity etc. are well-known of the denotation of the word "that," he says also of the denotation of the word "thou": "**And, because of being the self of all, the existence of Brahman is well-known.**" The existence of Brahman is well-known to all, even to the ploughman with his dust-covered feet; whence? Because it is himself. This itself is explained: "**Every one, verily**" etc. He confirms this cognition itself, by the refutation of non-cognition: "**not not**" etc.; does not fail to cognise "I exist," but certainly does (so) cognise: this is the construction. Now, one may know "I exist," but may not know the self. To this he says: "**If, indeed**" etc. He would not have the cognition "I exist". If he did not cognise the *jīva*-self, which is the substrate of "I-ness," he would not have the cognition of "I"; this is the sense. Now, let it be that all men have the cognition of the self, the substrate of "I-ness"; what of it for Brahman? To this he says: "**And the self is Brahman**"; because of the appositional relation of "that" to "thou". Hence, the purity, intelligence etc. of the denotation of the "that" being well-known from Scripture, and the *jīva* denoted by the "thou" being well-known from perception, and since the cognition of the word-significance precedes the cognition of the sentence-significance, it is intelligible that the realisation of the denotation of the "thou" as of the nature of Brahman results from the text "That thou art": this is the idea.

If, then, in the world, Brahman is well-known as the self, in that case, since it is already known, it follows again that it is not to be desired to be known. No; because there are conflicting views as to its particular nature. The ordinary man and the Lokāyatikas conceive of the self as the mere body qualified by intelligence. Others hold that the self is only the intelligent sense-organs. Yet others say that it is the mind. Some say that it is mere momentary cognition. Others say that it is the void. Still others say that there is a being different from the body, who migrates, who is agent and enjoyer. Some say that

The objector declares the defect in the first of these alternatives: "**If, then, in the world**" etc. The "**world**" means the succession of teacher and taught. If from the text "That thou art," Brahman be well-known to be the self—where one ought to say "The self (be understood) as Brahman," the statement "Brahman as the self" is to be understood (as made) in view of the intention to declare non-difference—(it would again follow that being known it cannot be the object of the desire to know). He answers this: "**No.**" Why not? "**Because there are conflicting views as to its particular nature.**" Such conflicting views are said to be the seeds of doubt, in the absence of any means of valid knowledge to confirm or confute. And because of

यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति, ततो ज्ञातमेवेत्यजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम्। न, तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः। देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लौकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः। इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनान्यात्मेत्यपरे। मन इत्यन्ये। विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके। शून्यमित्यपरे। अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तेत्यपरे। भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्ते-

आक्षेप्ता प्रथमकल्पाश्रयं दोषमाह—**यदि तर्हि लोक** इति। अध्यापकाध्येतृपरम्परा **लोकः**। तत्र 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्याद्यदि ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति। 'आत्मा ब्रह्मत्वेन' इति वक्तव्ये 'ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन' इति अभेदविवक्षया गमयितव्यम्। परिहरति—**न**; कुतः? **तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः**। तदनेन विप्रतिपत्तिः साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावे सति संशयबीजमुक्तम्। ततश्च संशयाज्जिज्ञासोपपद्यत इति

त्येके। अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचित्। आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे। एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः। तत्राविचार्य यत्किंचित्प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात्प्रतिहन्येत, अनर्थं चेयात्। तस्माद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते॥

भावः। विवादाधिकरणं धर्मी सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तसिद्धोऽभ्युपेयः; अन्यथा अनाश्रया भिन्नाश्रया वा विप्रतिपत्तयो न स्युः। विरुद्धा हि प्रतिपत्तयो विप्रतिपत्तयः; न चानाश्रयाः प्रतिपत्तयो भवन्ति, अनालम्बनत्वापत्तेः; न च भिन्नाश्रया विरुद्धाः। न हि 'अनित्या बुद्धिः' 'नित्य आत्मा' इति प्रतिपत्तिविप्रतिपत्ती। तस्मात्तत्पदार्थस्य शुद्धत्वादेर्वेदान्तेभ्यः प्रतीतिः, त्वंपदार्थस्य च जीवात्मनो लोकतः सिद्धिः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः। तदाभा-

he is enjoyer alone, not agent. There is, as different from that, the Lord, omniscient and omnipotent, say some. The self he is of the enjoyer, say others. Thus many people hold different views, basing themselves upon reasoning and texts (both sound and) fallacious. Of these, he, who without inquiry accepts any, will fall from beatitude and attain to evil. Therefore beginning with a statement of the desire to know Brahman, there is begun a respectful inquiry into the Vedānta texts, whose auxiliary is reasoning not inconsistent therewith, and whose purpose is beatitude.

that doubt the desire to know is intelligible : this is the idea. The substrate, which is the basis of dispute, should be admitted to be established by the conclusions of all systems; else, there would be no conflicting views, these having either no basis or different bases. "*Vipratipattis*" are, verily, conflicting views ; and views cannot have no basis, as then they would have nothing to rest on. Nor do those (views) conflict which have different bases. The views that the intellect is non-eternal and that the soul is eternal are not, truly, conflicting views. Hence, it is the conclusion of all systems that the purity etc. of the denotation of the "that" are known from the Vedāntas, while the *jiva* denoted by the "thou" is established by experience. The conflicting views relate merely to their manifestation or non-manifestation and to the various modes thereof. Therefore, since, in respect of the substrate known in a general way, there are conflicting views as to the

particulars (of its nature), doubt in respect of these particulars is reasonable.

Of these, he shows first the conflicting views about the denotation of the "thou," in the words beginning with "**The ordinary man**" and ending with "**enjoyer alone, not agent**". Here, on the views of intelligence as body, sense, mind or momentary cognition, the eternality etc. of the denotation of the "that" cannot relate to the denotation of the "thou," because of lack of compatibility. On the nihilist view too, how can that which is incapable of being spoken of and is not a word-sense be the sphere (of denotation) of the "that" and "thou"? Of the forms of agent and enjoyer too, there is certainly lack of consonance with the eternality etc. of the denotation of the "that," because of mutability. On the view that (the self) though not an agent is an enjoyer, there is lack of consonance with eternality etc., because of mutability. On the view that selves though not enjoyers are many, there continues the same lack of consonance with the denotation of the word "that," because of the non-eternality etc. resulting from definition as a plurality and because of the abandonment of non-duality. Through the conflicting views in respect of the denotation of the word "thou," there are shown similar views in respect of the denotation of the word "that"; that is to say, the Lokāyatikas and others who contend that the Vedas are unauthoritative, verily, hold the cognition of the denotation of the "that" to be illusory, while those who maintain the Vedas to be authoritative, hold that the denotation of the "that" is either figurative or not (primarily) intended (as the object of the teaching),

सत्वानाभासत्वतत्तद्विशेषेषु परमत्र विप्रतिपत्तयः। तस्मात्सामान्यतः प्रसिद्धे धर्मिणि विशेषतो विप्रतिपत्तौ युक्तस्तद्विशेषेषु संशयः।

तत्र त्वंपदार्थे तावद्विप्रतिपत्तीर्दर्शयति—**देहमात्रम्** इत्यादिना **भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्त्ता** इत्यन्तेन। अत्र देहेन्द्रियमनःक्षणिकविज्ञानचैतन्यपक्षे न तत्पदार्थनित्यत्वादयः त्वंपदार्थेन संबध्यन्ते, योग्यताविरहात्। शून्यपक्षेऽपि सर्वोपाख्यारहितमपदार्थः कथं तत्त्वमोर्गोचरः? कर्तृभोक्तृस्वभावस्यापि परिणामितया तत्पदार्थनित्यत्वाद्यसंगतिरेव। अकर्तृत्वेऽपि भोक्तृत्वपक्षे परिणामितया नित्यत्वाद्यसंगतिः। अभोक्तृत्वेऽपि नानात्मत्वपक्षे नानात्वेनावच्छिन्नत्वादनित्यत्वादिप्रसक्तावद्वैतहानाच्च तत्पदार्थासंगतिस्तदवस्थैव। त्वंपदार्थविप्रतिपत्त्या च तत्पदार्थेऽपि विप्रतिपत्तिर्दर्शिता—वेदाप्रामाण्यवादिनो हि लौकायतिकादयस्तत्पदार्थप्रत्ययं मिथ्येति मन्यन्ते, वेदप्रामाण्यवादिनोऽप्यौपचारिकं तत्पदार्थमविवक्षितं वा मन्यन्त इति। तदेवं त्वंपदार्थविप्रतिपत्तिद्वारा तत्पदार्थे विप्रतिपत्तिं सूचयित्वा साक्षात्तत्पदार्थेऽपि

विप्रतिपत्तिमाह—**अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचित्। तत्** इति जीवात्मनः परामृशति। न केवलं शरीरादिभ्यः जीवात्मभ्योऽपि व्यतिरिक्तः। स च सर्वैरयैव जगत ईष्टे। ऐश्वर्यसिद्ध्यर्थं स्वाभाविकमस्य रूपद्वयमुक्तम् 'सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः' इति। तस्यापि जीवात्मभ्योऽपि व्यतिरेकात् न त्वं-पदार्थेन सामानाधिकरण्यमिति स्वमतमाह—**आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे**। भोक्तुर्जीवात्मनोऽविद्योपाधिकस्य स ईश्वरः तत्पदार्थ आत्मा; तत ईश्वरादभिन्नो जीवात्मा, परमाकाशादिव घटाकाशादय इत्यर्थः।

विप्रतिपत्तीरुपसंहरन् विप्रतिपत्तिबीजमाह—**एवं बहव** इति। युक्तियुक्त्याभासवाक्यवाक्याभाससमाश्रयाः सन्त इति योजना। ननु सन्तु विप्रतिपत्तयः तन्निमित्तश्च संशयः; तथापि किमर्थं ब्रह्ममीमांसा आरभ्यते इत्यत आह—**तत्राविचार्य** इति। तत्त्वज्ञानाच्च निःश्रेयसाधिगमः, नातत्त्वज्ञानाद्भवितुमर्हति। अपि च अतत्त्व-

Thus, having, through the conflicting views about the denotation of the "thou," indicated the conflicting views about the denotation of the "that," he states the conflicting views directly relating to the denotation of the "that": "**There is, as different from that, the Lord, omniscient and omnipotent, say some.**" "That" relates to the *jiva*-selves. He is different not merely from the body etc., but also from the *jiva*-selves. And he is also the ruler of the whole universe. His two natural attributes of omniscience and omnipotence are mentioned to establish rulership. Even this (ruler), being different from the *jiva*-selves, cannot have an appositional relation with the denotation of the "thou"; hence, he states his own view thus: "**The self, he is of the enjoyer, say others.**" Of the enjoyer, *i.e.*, of the *jiva*-self conditioned by Nescience, he, the Lord, the denotation of the "that," is the self; hence, non-different from the Lord is the *jiva*-self, as the pot-ether etc. from the ether at large; this is the sense.

In finishing with the conflicting views, he states the cause of these views: "**Thus, many**" etc. They base themselves on reasoning, sound or fallacious, and on texts, soundly or unsoundly interpreted; this is the construction. Now, let there be conflicting views, and let doubt be their cause; even so, why should the inquiry into Brahman be commenced? To this he says: "**Of these, he, who without inquiry**" etc. Beatitude can come from knowledge of the truth, not of untruth. Further, if

because of untrue knowledge there is loss of faith, evil too follows, he says: "**and attain to evil**" etc. He concludes the purport of the aphorism: "**Therefore**" etc. The inquiry into the Vedāntas is but reasoning; other reasoning, which does not conflict therewith, such as is mentioned in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* and in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, in discussing the authoritativeness of the Vedas, of perception etc.; that of which these are auxiliaries is thus mentioned. Hence, it is established that the inquiry into Brahman, which brings about the knowledge of Brahman, the means to supreme beatitude, should be commenced.

ज्ञानान्नास्तिक्ये सति अनर्थप्राप्तिरपीत्याह— **अनर्थं च** इति। सूत्रतात्पर्यमुपसंहरति— **तस्मात्** इति। वेदान्तमीमांसा तावत्तर्क एव, तदविरोधिनश्च येऽन्येऽपि तर्का अध्वरमीमांसायां न्याये च वेदप्रत्यक्षादिप्रामाण्यपरिशोधनादिषूक्ताः ते उपकरणं यस्याः सा तथोक्ता। तस्मात्परमनिः-श्रेयससाधनब्रह्मज्ञानप्रयोजना ब्रह्ममीमांसा आरब्ध-व्येति सिद्धम्।

ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम्। किंलक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्म इत्यत आह भगवान्सूत्रकारः—

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥२॥

तदेवं प्रथमसूत्रेण मीमांसारम्भमुपपाद्य ब्रह्ममीमांसामारभते—**जन्माद्यस्य यतः**। एतस्य सूत्रस्य पातनिकामाह भाष्यकारः—**ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम्; किंलक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्म**। अत्र यद्यपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपज्ञानस्य प्रधानस्य प्रतिज्ञया तदङ्गान्यपि प्रमाणादीनि प्रतिज्ञातानि, तथापि स्वरूपस्य प्राधान्यात्तदेवाक्षिप्य प्रथमं समर्थ्यते। तत्र यद्यावदनुभूयते तत्सर्वं परिमितमविशुद्धमबुद्धं विध्वंसि च; न तेनोपलब्धेन तद्विरुद्धस्य नित्यशुद्धबुद्धस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपं शक्यं लक्षयितुम्। न हि जातु कश्चित्कृतकत्वेन नित्यं लक्षयति। न च तद्धर्मेण नित्यत्वादिना

Brahman, it has been said, is to be desired to be known. What is the definition, then, of this Brahman? To this the venerable aphorist says—

THAT, WHENCE FOR THIS WHAT BEGINS WITH ORIGINATION

Having thus justified in the first aphorism the commencement of the inquiry, he commences the inquiry into Brahman: **That, whence for this what begins with origination.** The commentator says by way of introduction to this aphorism: "**Brahman, it has been said, is to be desired to be known. What is the definition, then, of this Brahman?**" Here, though, from the premising of the knowledge of the nature of Brahman as the principal, its subsidiaries such as the means of valid knowledge etc. are also premised, yet since its nature is the principal, that alone is first established by objection (and answer). Whatever is experienced in any way is limited, impure, non-intelligent and destructible; by the knowledge of these cannot be defined the nature of Brahman, which is opposed to them, being of the nature of eternal purity and intelligence. No one ever defines the eternal by what is produced. Nor can it be defined by its own attributes

What begins with *janma*, *i.e.*, origination; thus it is an adjectival compound indicating its own attribute. The meaning of the compound is: origination, sustentation and destruction. And of origination the primacy depends on both statements of Scripture and the nature of things. It is thus stated in Scripture: "That whence these beings originate." In this passage the

such as eternality, since these are not already known. What is well-known is, indeed, a definition, not what is absolutely unknown. And similarly, not even verbal testimony obtains here, since Brahman being absolutely unknown is not the meaning of a word and hence cannot be the meaning of a sentence.[89] Hence, in the absence of a definition, Brahman cannot be desired to be known; this is the view of the objector.

This objection the revered aphorist answers: "That, whence" etc. Let not this experienced universe be the definition of Brahman, either as its attribute or through identity with it; but it may well be (the definition) as originated by the latter, just as the attainment of different localities is (a definition) of the motion of the sun; this is the purport.

He analyses the parts of the aphorism: "what begins with janma, i.e., origination" etc. For the sake of parsimony, the aphorist uses the neuter *janmādi*; and the commentator, in order to justify this, gives the *samāhāra-dvandva* (in the neuter): *janma-sthiti-bhaṅgam* (origination, sustentation and destruction).[90]

जन्म उत्पत्तिः आदिः अस्य—इति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः। जन्मास्थिति-भङ्गं समासार्थः। जन्मनश्चादित्वं श्रुति-निर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षं च। श्रुतिनिर्देश-स्तावत्—'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि

तल्लक्ष्यते, तस्यानुपलब्धचरत्वात्। प्रसिद्धं हि लक्षणं भवति, नात्यन्ताप्रसिद्धम्। एवं च न शब्दोऽप्यत्र प्रक्रमते, अत्यन्ताप्रसिद्धतया ब्रह्म-णोऽपदार्थस्यावाक्यार्थत्वात्। तस्माल्लक्षणाभावात् न ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्याक्षेपाभिप्रायः।

तमिममाक्षेपं भगवान् सूत्रकारः परिहरति—**'जन्माद्यस्य यतः'** इति। मा भूदनुभूयमानं जगत्तद्धर्मतया तादात्म्येन वा ब्रह्मणो लक्षणम्; तदुत्पत्त्या तु भविष्यति देशान्तरप्राप्तिरिव सवितुर्व्रज्याया इति तात्पर्यार्थः।

सूत्रावयवान् विभजते—**जन्मोत्पत्तिरादिरस्य** इति। लाघवाय सूत्रकृता जन्मादीति नपुंसक-प्रयोगः कृतः; तदुपपादनाय समाहारमाह—

जायन्ते' इति, अस्मिन्वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमदर्शनात्। वस्तुवृत्तमपि जन्मना लब्धसत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसंभवात्। अस्येति प्रत्यक्षादिसंनिधापितस्य धर्मिण इदमा निर्देशः। षष्ठी जन्मादिधर्मसंबन्धार्था। यत इति कारणनिर्देशः।

अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य म-

जन्मस्थितिभङ्गम् इति। जन्मनश्च इत्यादिः कारणनिर्देशः इत्यन्तः संदर्भो निगदव्याख्यातः।

स्यादेतत्। प्रधानकालग्रहलोकपालक्रियायदृच्छास्वभावाभावेषूपप्लवमानेषु सत्सु सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिस्वभावं ब्रह्म जगज्जन्मादिकारणमिति कुतः संभावनेत्यत आह—अस्य जगत इति। अत्र नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य इति चेतनभावकर्तृकत्वसंभावनया प्रधानाद्यचेतनकर्तृकत्वं नि-

sequence is shown among origination, sustentation and dissolution. And the nature of things is such that sustentation and dissolution occur in respect of a substrate that has become existent through origination. In the expression "for this," by "this" is designated the substrate cognised through perception etc. The sixth case has the sense of relating it to origination etc. "Whence" is the designation of the cause.

Of this universe, differentiated by name and form, containing many agents and enjoyers, the abode of what are definitely regulated in respect of place, time, cause, action and fruit, the nature of whose design cannot even

The passage beginning with **"And of origination"** and ending with **"the designation of the cause"** is self-explanatory.

Be this so. When there are so many (likely causes of the universe) floating about, such as primal nature, time, the activity of planetary deities or guardian deities (like Indra, guarding the directions), chance, the nature (of things), and non-existence, why postulate an omniscient and omnipotent Brahman as the cause of the origination etc., of the universe? To this he says: **"Of this universe differentiated by name and form"** etc. Here, by the qualification **"differentiated"** etc., causation by an intelligent being is postulated, whereby is ruled out causation by non-intelligent entities like the *pradhāna* or by what

be conceived by the mind, that omniscient and omnipotent cause whence there is the origination, sustentation and destruction—"that is Brahman" is the complement of the sentence (in the aphorism).

is non-existent. That, verily, which is differentiated by name and form, like pot etc. is seen to be caused by an intelligent being. The universe, which is under dispute, is differentiated by name and form; hence, causation by an intelligent being is postulated. The intelligent one, verily, having considered the name and form in his intellect, creates the external pot, with the name "pot," and the form of a narrow neck etc. Hence it is that the pot to be brought into being, only if it exists already in resolve, is the object-causal-condition, in the form "He makes a pot". As they say: "But what is present in the intellect, that is not non-existent." And thus, it cannot be postulated that a non-intelligent entity creates what it cannot consider in the intellect; this is the idea.

Be this so. The intelligent planetary deities or the guardian deities may create the universe, having considered names and forms in their intellects; Brahman of the nature mentioned above is unnecessary. To this he says: "**containing many agents and enjoyers.**" Some are agents like cooks, sacrificial priests (*rtviks*) etc., not

नसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद्भवति, तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः ।

रुपाख्यकर्तृकत्वं च व्यासेधति । यत्खलु नाम्ना रूपेण च व्याक्रियते तच्चेतनकर्तृकं दृष्टम्, यथा घटादि । विवादाध्यासितं च जगन्नाम्ना रूपेण च व्याकृतम्; तस्माच्चेतनकर्तृकं संभाव्यते । चेतनो हि बुद्धावालिख्य नामरूपे घट इति नाम्ना रूपेण च कम्बुग्रीवादिना बाह्यं घटं निष्पादयति । अत एव घटस्य निर्वर्त्यस्याप्यन्तः-संकल्पात्मना सिद्धस्य कर्मकारकभावः 'घटं करोति' इति । यथाहुः—'बुद्धिसिद्धं तु न तदसत्' इति । तथा चाचेतनो बुद्धावनालिखितं करोतीति न शक्यं संभावयितुमिति भावः ।

स्यादेतत् । चेतना ग्रहा लोकपाला वा नामरूपे बुद्धावालिख्य जगज्जनयिष्यन्ति, कृतम् उक्तस्वभावेन ब्रह्मणेत्यत आह—**अनेककर्तृ-भोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य** इति । केचित्कर्तारो भवन्ति, यथा

सूदर्त्विगादयः, न भोक्तारः। केचित्तु भोक्तारः, यथा श्राद्धवैश्वानरेष्ट्यादिषु पितापुत्रादयः, न कर्तारः। तस्मादुभयग्रहणम्। देशकालनिमित्त-क्रियाफलानि इतीतरेतरद्वन्द्वः। देशादीनि च तानि प्रतिनियतानि चेति विग्रहः। तदाश्रयो जगत्; तस्य। केचित्खलु प्रतिनियतदेशोत्पादाः, यथा कृष्णमृगादयः। केचित्प्रतिनियतकालोत्पादाः, यथा कोकिलारवादयः। केचित्प्रतिनियतनिमित्ताः, यथा नवाम्बुदध्वानादिनिमित्ता बलाकागर्भादयः। केचित्प्रतिनियतक्रियाः, यथा ब्राह्मणानां याज-नादयः, नेतरेषाम्। एवं केचित्प्रतिनियतफलाः, यथा केचित्सुखिनः केचिदुःखिनः, एवं य एव सुखिनस्त एव कदाचिदुदुःखिनः। सर्वमेतदा-कस्मिकापरनाम्नि यादृच्छिकत्वे च स्वाभाविकत्वे चासर्वज्ञासर्वशक्तिकर्तृकत्वे च न घटते, परिमित-ज्ञानशक्तिभिर्ग्रहलोकपालादिभिर्ज्ञातुं कर्तुं चाशक्य-त्वात्। तदिदमुक्तम्—**मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचना-रूपस्य** इति। एकस्या अपि हि शरीररचनाया रूपं मनसा न शक्यं चिन्तयितुं कदाचित्,

enjoyers. Some others, however, are enjoyers, as the fathers in the *śrāddhas*, and the sons in the *Vaiśvānareṣṭi*,—not agents.[90] Hence the mention of both. The compound—place-time-cause-act-fruit—is an *itaretara-dvandva*; and it has to be split up into: place etc., these being defined with respect to each. The abode of these is the universe; of this (universe, the cause etc.). Some, indeed, are created in definite places, *e.g.*, black antelopes etc. Some are created at definite times, *e.g.*, the warbling of the cuckoo etc. Some are occasioned by definite causes, *e.g.*, the impregnation of storks occasioned by the thunder-clap of the early clouds (of the rainy season). Some perform definite acts, *e.g.*, such acts as the performance of sacrifices (for others) belong to brāhmins alone, not to others. Similarly, some enjoy definite fruit, *e.g.*, some are happy, some are miserable, likewise those who are happy are themselves at other times miserable. All this does not fit in with creation by *yadṛcchā*, which is another name for chance, or by the nature (of things), or (even) by one who is not omniscient and omnipotent, since the planetary and guardian deities, whose knowledge and capacity are limited, cannot know and produce (the universe).[92] That is thus said: **"the nature of whose design cannot even be conceived by the mind."** The nature of the design even of a single body cannot be conceived by the mind at any time; remote indeed is (the possibility of conceiving) the design of the universe; how then to

Of all other modifications of being, there is inclusion even in the three; hence are mentioned here origination, sustentation and destruction. But if what are enumerated by Yāska, namely, "originates," "exists" etc., were taken, since they occur in the period of the world's sustentation, the origination, sustentation and destruction of the world from its primal cause would not be apprehended: this doubt may arise; lest one should doubt so, that origination from Brahman, the cause, and sustentation and dissolution even in that, these alone are apprehended.

create? This is the sense. He completes the text of the aphorism: "**'that is Brahman' is the complement of the sentence.**"

Be this so. Why should origination, sustentation and destruction alone be understood here by "**what begins with,**" not growth, transformation and decrease as well? To this he says: "**Of all other modifications of being**" *i.e.*, of growth etc., "**there is inclusion even in the three**". Growth is the increase of parts. Thereby, from that which has few parts, *e.g.*, from two threads, there arises another being, the big cloth; hence, growth is but origination. Transformation, which is of three kinds as defined by *dharma-lakṣaṇa*,

अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानामिह ग्रहणम्। यास्कपरिपठितानां तु 'जायतेऽस्ति' इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले संभाव्यमानत्वान्मूलकारणादुत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशा जगतो न गृहीताः स्युरित्याशङ्क्येत; तन्मा शङ्कि इति या उत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः कारणात्, तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च, त एव गृह्यन्ते।

प्रागेव जगद्रचनायाः; किमङ्ग पुनः कर्तुमित्यर्थः। सूत्रवाक्यं पूरयति—**तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः।**

स्यादतेत्। कस्मात्पुनर्जन्मस्थितिभङ्गमात्रमिहादिग्रहणेन गृह्यते न तु वृद्धिपरिणामापक्षया अपीत्यत आह—**अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां** वृद्ध्यादीनां **त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव** इति। वृद्धिस्तावदवयवोपचयः। तेनाल्पावयवादवयविनो द्वितन्तुकादेरन्य एव महान्पटो जायत इति जन्मैव वृद्धिः। **परिणामोऽपि त्रिविधः धर्मलक्षणावस्थालक्षणः**

उत्पत्तिरेव। धर्मिणो हि हाटकादेर्धर्मलक्षणः परिणामः कटकमुकुटादिः तस्योत्पत्तिः। एवं कटकादेरपि प्रत्युत्पन्नत्वादिलक्षणः लक्षणपरिणाम उत्पत्तिः। एवमवस्थापरिणामो नवपुराणत्वादिरुत्पत्तिः। अपक्षयस्तु अवयवह्रासो नाश एव। तस्माज्जन्मादिषु यथास्वमन्तर्भावाद्वृद्ध्यादयः पृथङ्नोक्ता इत्यर्थः। अथैते वृद्ध्यादयो न जन्मादिष्वन्तर्भवन्ति, तथाप्युत्पत्तिस्थितिभङ्गमेवोपादातव्यम्। तथा सति हि तत्प्रतिपादके 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि' इति वेदवाक्ये बुद्धिस्थीकृते जगन्मूलकारणं ब्रह्म लक्षितं भवति। अन्यथा तु जायते अस्ति वर्धते इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तत्प्रतिपादकं नैरुक्तवाक्यं बुद्धौ भवेत्; तच्च न मूलकारणप्रतिपादनपरम्, महासर्गादूर्ध्वं स्थितिकालेऽपि तद्वाक्योदितानां जन्मादीनां भावविकाराणामुपपत्तेः,—इति शङ्कानिराकरणार्थं वेदोक्तोत्पत्तिस्थितिभङ्गग्रहणमित्याह—**यास्कपरिपठितानां तु** इति।

avasthā, and *lakṣaṇa*,[93] is but origination. For, of the substrate, gold, the *dharma-lakṣaṇa* transformation into bracelet, crown etc., is the origination of these. So too, the presentness etc. of the bracelet etc. is *lakṣaṇa* transformation; that too is origination. *Avasthā* transformation lies in the distinction of newness, oldness etc. (even in what is present etc.); that (too) is origination. Decrease is the decrease of parts and is but destruction. Thus, being included under various appropriate heads, in origination etc., growth etc. are not mentioned separately; this is the sense. Now, even if these were not included in origination etc., then too origination, sustentation and destruction alone should be mentioned. For, in that case, verily, the Scriptural text teaching these, *viz.*, "That whence these beings originate"[94] etc., is brought to mind, and Brahman as the primal cause of the universe becomes defined. Else, by the comprehension of origination, existence, growth etc., there would come to mind the text of the *Nirukta* which teaches these;[95] and that (text) does not intend to teach the primal cause, since the modifications of being, such as origination, taught by that text, are intelligible even in the period of sustentation subsequent to the primal creation. In order to remove this objection, there is understood the origination, sustentation and destruction declared in the Veda; thus he says: **"But if what are enumerated by Yaska"** etc.

Of the universe with the above-mentioned qualities, origination etc. cannot be postulated from the non-sentient Pradhāna, primal atoms, non-existence, a transmigrating being, or (in fact) from anything other than a Lord with the above-mentioned qualities. Nor can it be by its own nature; because here we have to accept particular places, times and causes. This very inference, those, who uphold the causality of the Lord, regard as a proof for the existence etc. of the Lord, distinct from a transmigrating being.

Now, even thus, let origination alone be indicated; therefrom are inevitably understood sustentation and destruction. To this he says: **"that origination from Brahman, the cause"** etc. By the three, there is indicated its material causality; bare origination, being common to the efficient cause as well, cannot indicate material causality. That is thus said: **"even in that"** etc.

The purpose served by the special causes and effects mentioned above is now declared: **"Of the universe with the above-mentioned qualities,"** etc. By this (part of the) writing, the postulation has been declared of the content premised, the nature of Brahman, by way of definition (thereof). The means of knowledge thereof

न यथोक्तविशेषणस्य जगतो यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं मुक्त्वा, अन्यतः प्रधानादचेतनात् अणुभ्यो वा अभावाद्वा संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्यादि संभावयितुं शक्यम्। न च स्वभावतः, विशिष्टदेशकालनिमित्तानामिहोपादानात्। एतदेवानुमानं संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरास्तित्वादिसाधनं मन्यन्ते ईश्वरकारणवादिनः।

नन्वेवमपि उत्पत्तिमात्रं सूच्यताम्; तन्नान्तरीयकतया तु स्थितिभङ्गं गम्यत इत्यत आह—**योत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः कारणात्** इति। त्रिभिरस्योपादानत्वं सूच्यते; उत्पत्तिमात्रं तु निमित्तकारणसाधारणमिति नोपादानत्वं सूचयेत्; तदिदमुक्तम्—**तत्रैव** इति।

पूर्वोक्तानां कार्यकारणविशेषणानां प्रयोजनमाह—**न यथोक्त** इति। तदनेन प्रबन्धेन प्रतिज्ञाविषयस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य लक्षणद्वारेण संभावनोक्ता। तत्र प्रमाणं वक्तव्यम्। यथाहुर्नैयायिकाः—

नन्विहापि तदेवोपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे ; न, वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात्सूत्राणाम् । वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते । वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननि-

'संभावितः प्रतिज्ञायां पक्षः साध्येत हेतुना ।
न तस्य हेतुभिस्त्राणमुत्पतन्नेव यो हतः ॥
यथा च वन्ध्या जननी ' इत्यादिरिति ।

इत्थं नाम जन्मादि संभावनाहेतुः । यदन्ये वैशेषिकादय इत एवानुमानादीश्वरविनिश्चयमिच्छन्ति, इति संभावनाहेतुतां द्रढयितुमाह—**एतदेव** इति ।

चोदयति—**नन्विहापि** इति । एतावतैवाधिकरणार्थे समाप्ते वक्ष्यमाणाधिकरणार्थमनुवदन्सुहृद्भावेन परिहरति—**न, वेदान्त** इति । वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वमेव दर्शयति—**वेदान्त** इति । विचारस्याध्यवसानं सवासनाविद्याद्वयोच्छेदः । ततो हि ब्रह्मावगतेर्निर्वृत्तिराविर्भावः । तत्किं ब्रह्मणि

Now, here too that same thing has been premised in the aphorism, "That, whence for this what begins with origination". No; because the aphorisms have the purpose of stringing together the Vedānta texts like flowers. For, it is the Vedānta texts that are cited and considered by the aphorisms. Brahman-realisation,

---

has to be declared. As the Naiyāyikas say: "That subject which has been postulated (as possible) in the premise can be established by means of a *probans*; that which is contradicted even at the moment it arises cannot be saved by means of a *probans*, *e.g.*, 'the barren woman is a mother'" and so on. Thus, origination etc. are the grounds for postulation. Others, like the Vaiśeṣikas, desire to establish Īśvara by inference from these very grounds. This, he mentions, in order to strengthen them as grounds for postulation: **"This very inference"** etc.

He questions: **"Now, here too"** etc. The subject-matter of the section (*adhikaraṇa*) being concluded even with this, he answers the question, in the capacity of a friend, with reference to the subject-matter of the succeeding section: **"No; because the aphorisms have the purpose"** etc. This very purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedānta texts is shown: **"For, it is the Vedanta texts"** etc. The end of the inquiry is the destruction of the twofold Nescience along with the impressions. Thence, verily, the accomplishment, *i.e.* manifestation of Brahman, realisation.

indeed, is accomplished at the end of the inquiry into the meaning of the texts, and is not accomplished by other means of valid knowledge like inference. While, however, there are the Vedānta texts which declare the cause of the origination of the universe, in order to confirm the apprehension of their meaning, inference too, such as is not opposed to the Vedānta texts, becomes a means of valid knowledge, and as such it is not avoided; because argumentation is accepted as an auxiliary even by Scripture. It is thus: the Scriptural texts, "It is to be heard, to be reflected on" (*Bṛh.*, II, iv, 5), and "A learned and intelligent man reaches the Gāndhāra country; even so here, a man knows when he has a teacher" (*Chānd.*, VI, xiv, 2), show of the self that it is helped by the human intellect.

In respect of that Brahman, is no means of knowledge to be followed other than verbal testimony? Then, whence reflection? And whence the intuition which is the experience thereof? To this he says: **"While, however, there are the Vedanta texts"** etc. Inference should be understood to be of that variety which is not in conflict with the Vedānta and also dependent on it. Discrimination by reasoning, not in conflict with verbal testimony, and dependent thereon, is called reflection. Reasoning is either presumption or inference.

वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः, नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता। सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु, तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्याय अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् न निवार्यते, श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याप्यभ्युपेतत्वात्। तथा हि—'श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः' इति श्रुतिः, 'पण्डितो मेधावी गान्धारानेवोपसंपद्येतैवमेवेहाचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद' इति च पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यमात्मनो दर्शयति।

शब्दादृते न मानान्तरमनुसरणीयम्? तथा च कुतो मननम्? कुतश्च तदनुभवः साक्षात्कारः? इत्यत आह—**सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु** इति। अनुमानं वेदान्ताविरोधि तदुपजीवि चेत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्। शब्दाविरोधिन्या तदुपजीविन्या च युक्त्या विवेचनं मननम्। युक्तिश्च अर्थापत्तिरनुमानं वा।

न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्; किं तु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणम्, अनुभवावसानत्वाद्भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य। कर्तव्ये हि विषये

स्यादेतत्। यथा धर्मे न पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यम्, एवं ब्रह्मण्यपि कस्मान्न भवतीत्यत आह— **न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव** इति। **श्रुत्यादय** इति; श्रुतीतिहासपुराणस्मृतयः प्रमाणम्। अनुभवः अन्तःकरणवृत्तिभेदो ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारः; तस्याविद्यानिवृत्तिद्वारेण ब्रह्मस्वरूपाविर्भावः प्रमाणफलम्। तच्च फलमिव फलमिति गमयितव्यम्। यद्यपि धर्मजिज्ञासायामपि सामग्र्यां प्रत्यक्षादीनां व्यापारः तथापि साक्षान्नास्ति। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां तु साक्षादनुभवादीनां संभवोऽनुभवार्था च ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेत्याह—**अनुभवावसानत्वात्**। ब्रह्मानुभवो ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारः परमपुरुषार्थः, निर्मृष्टनिखिलदुःखपरमानन्दरूपत्वादिति।

Nor is it that, as in the desire to know Religious Duty, Scripture etc. alone are the authority, in the case of the desire to know Brahman; on the contrary, here Scripture etc., as also experience etc. are means of valid knowledge, as and when applicable, since the knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience

---

Be this so. As the human intellect is of no aid in the knowledge of Religious Duty, why should it not be likewise in respect of Brahman also? To this he says: "**Nor is it that, as in the desire to know Religious Duty**" etc. "**Scripture etc.**": Scripture, epics, *purāṇas* and traditional Codes are the means of valid knowledge. Experience is a particular psychosis of the internal organ, *viz.*, the intuition of Brahman; the fruit of that means of valid knowledge is the manifestation of the nature of Brahman through its removal of Nescience. It is to be understood to be the fruit, as it were (since it is not like other fruit created, purified etc.). Though even in the desire to know Religious Duty there is the functioning of the accessories of experience, like perception etc., yet it is not there directly. In the desire to know Brahman, however, experience (*i.e.*, intuition) etc. occur directly; and the desire to know Brahman has experience for its object; thus, he says: "**since the knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience**" etc. The experience of Brahman, *i.e.*, the intuition of Brahman, is the supreme human goal, being of the nature of supreme bliss whence has been wiped out all misery.

and has an existent object for content. Indeed, in respect of what is to be done, authoritativeness can belong only to Scripture etc., since there is no dependence on experience, and since what is to be done derives its existence in dependence on a person. An action, worldly or scriptural, may be done, or not done, or done in a different way; for example, one goes on horse-back, or on foot, or otherwise or does not go at all. Similarly, "In the Atirātra one should use the sixteenth cup," "In the Atirātra one should not use the sixteenth cup"; "One is to offer oblation after sun-rise," "One is to offer oblation before sun-rise." And prescriptions and prohibitions would be purportful in these cases, as options or as general rules and exceptions.

Now, let it be that the desire to know has the experience of Brahman for its object; that experience itself is not possible, since Brahman cannot be the object thereof. To this he says: "**and (since the knowledge of Brahman) has an existent object for content.**" The relationship of object and subject is an illusory form of the intuition of (the form indicated by) the absence (of the universe). Not in this way does the knowledge of Religious Duty culminate in experience, since the experience of that is not in itself a human goal, the human goal being realised by the observance of that (duty), and observance being established by mere verbal testimony, even in the absence of experience; this he says in: "**Indeed, since, in respect of what is to be done,**" etc. Nor is it capable of being the content

नानुभवापेक्षास्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्, पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य । कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म; यथा अश्वेन गच्छति, पद्भ्याम्, अन्यथा वा, न वा गच्छतीति । तथा 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति' 'नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति', 'उदिते जुहोति' 'अनुदिते जुहोति' इति । विधिप्रतिषेधाश्च अत्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः, विकल्पो-

ननु भवतु ब्रह्मानुभवार्था जिज्ञासा; तदनुभव एव त्वशक्यः, ब्रह्मणस्तद्विषयत्वायोग्यत्वात् इत्यत आह—**भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य** इति । व्यतिरेकसाक्षात्कारस्य विकल्परूपो विषयविषयिभावः । न त्वेवं धर्मज्ञानमनुभवावसानम्, तदनुभवस्य स्वयमपुरुषार्थत्वात्, तदनुष्ठानसाध्यत्वात्पुरुषार्थस्य, अनुष्ठानस्य च विनाप्यनुभवं सिद्धेः इत्याह—**कर्तव्ये**

त्सर्गापवादाश्च। न तु वस्तु 'एवम्, नैवम्', 'अस्ति, नास्ति' इति वा विकल्प्यते। विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः। न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। किं तर्हि? वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्। न हि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् 'स्थाणुर्वा, पुरुषोऽन्यो वा' इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति। तत्र 'पुरुषोऽन्यो वा' इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्; 'स्थाणुरेव' इति तत्त्वज्ञानम्, वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्। एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम्।

हि इत्यादिना। न चायं साक्षात्कारविषयतायोग्योऽपि, अवर्तमानत्वात्, अवर्तमानश्चानवस्थितत्वादित्याह—**पुरुषाधीन** इति। पुरुषाधीनत्वमेव लौकिकवैदिककार्याणामाह—**कर्तुमकर्तुं** इति। लौकिकं कार्यमनवस्थितमुदाहरति—**यथाश्येन** इति। लौकिकेनोदाहरणेन सह वैदिकमुदाहरणं समुच्चिनोति—**तथातिरात्र** इति।

But a thing does not admit of options like, "thus, not thus," "exists, does not exist". Options, however, are dependent on the human intellect. The knowledge of the true nature of a thing is not dependent on the human intellect. What then? It depends on the thing itself. Indeed, in respect of one and the same post, true cognition does not arise in the form, "It is a post, or something else, a man". In this case, "or something else, a man" is an illusory cognition; "It is certainly a post," is the true cognition, because it depends on the thing. Thus, authoritativeness of what have existent things as content depends on the thing.

of intuition, since it is non-existent in time present, and it is non-existent in time present, not being settled; thus, he says: "**and since what is to be done derives its existence in dependence on a person (who acts).**" This very dependence of acts, worldly and Vaidic, on a person, he states: **many be done or not done** etc. He exemplifies the unsettled nature of worldly acts: "**e.g., one goes on horse-back**" etc. He combines a Scriptural illustration with the one from experience: "**Similarly 'in the atiratra one should use the sixteenth cup'**" etc.[96] This illustration is cited to show that it is possible to do or not to do. He gives an illustration of doing in one way or another: "**One is to offer oblation after sunrise**" etc.

Be this so. Because of man's freedom in respect of what is to be done, there results the futility of (these) prescriptions and prohibitions, since a person's engaging in and desisting from activity are not dependent thereon. To this he says: "**And prescriptions and prohibitions would be purportful in these cases**" etc. "One should use" is the prescription; "one should not use" is the prohibition. The offering of oblation is injunctive both when mentioned before dawn and after dawn. Similarly, there is prohibition about touching human bones, as also a prescription to wear them in respect of one who has killed a brahmin. Prescriptions and prohibitions of this kind are purportful. How? To this he says: "**as options or as general rules and exceptions.**" The *ca* (at the end of the sentence, in the commentary) signifies a reason. Combination being impossible in the case of using and not-using, or of offering before and after dawn, because of their contradiction, and the relation of sublater and sublated being impossible between alternatives which are equally strong, option is inevitable. The prohibited contact of human bones and the wearing of them are opposed to each other, but are not equally strong; hence, there is no option; but of the general rule prohibiting contact, there is sublation by the special rule, the content of the prescription to wear. This is what is said: by prescriptions and prohibitions alone is that unrealised-but-to-be-created thing brought about, whereby there results human freedom even in respect of engaging in and desisting from activity dependent on prescriptions and prohibitions.[97]

कर्तुमकर्तुमित्यस्येदमुदाहरणमुक्तम् । कर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमित्यस्योदाहरणमाह—**उदित** इति ।

स्यादेतत् । पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यात् कर्तव्ये विधिप्रतिषेधानामानर्थक्यम्, अतदधीनत्वात् पुरुषप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योः इत्यत आह—**विधिप्रतिषेधाश्चात्रार्थवन्तः स्युः** । गृह्णातीति विधिः ; न गृह्णातीति प्रतिषेधः । उदितानुदितहोमयोर्विधिः । एवं नारास्थिस्पर्शननिषेधो ब्रह्मघ्नश्च तद्धारणविधिः—इत्येवंजातीयका विधिप्रतिषेधा अर्थवन्तः । कुत इत्यत आह—**विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाश्च** । चो हेतौ । यस्मादग्रहणाग्रहणयोरुदितानुदितहोमयोश्च विरोधात् समुच्चयासंभवे तुल्यबलतया च बाध्यबाधकभावाभावे सति अगत्या विकल्पः । नारास्थिस्पर्शननिषेधतद्धारणयोश्च विरुद्धयोरतुल्यबलतया न विकल्पः ; किं तु सामान्यशास्त्रस्य स्पर्शननिषेधस्य धारणविधिविषयेण विशेषशास्त्रेण बाधः । एतदुक्तं भवति—विधिप्रतिषेधैरेव स तादृशो विषयोऽनागतोत्पाद्यरूप उपनीतः येन पुरुषस्य विधिनिषेधाधीनप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरपि स्वा-

तन्त्र्यं भवतीति। भूते वस्तुनि तु नेयमस्ति विधा, इत्याह—**न तु वस्त्वेवं नैवम्** इति। तदनेन प्रकारविकल्पो निरस्तः। प्रकारिविकल्पं निषेधति—**अस्ति नास्ति** इति।

स्यादेतत्। भूतेऽपि वस्तुनि विकल्पो दृष्टः, यथा 'स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा' इति। तत्कथं न वस्तु विकल्प्यते, इत्यत आह—**विकल्पनास्तु** इति। **पुरुषबुद्धिः** अन्तःकरणं; तदपेक्षा विकल्पनाः संशयविपर्यासाः। सवासनमनोमात्रयोनयो वा यथा स्वप्ने; सवासनेन्द्रियमनोयोनयो वा यथा 'स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा' इति स्थाणौ संशयः, 'पुरुष एव' इति च विपर्यासः; **अन्य**शब्देन वस्तुतः स्थाणोरन्यस्य पुरुषस्याभिधानात्। न तु पुरुषतत्त्वं वा स्थाणुतत्त्वं वापेक्षन्ते, समानधर्मधर्मिदर्शनमात्राधीनजन्मत्वात्। तस्मादयथावस्तवो विकल्पना न वस्तु विकल्पयन्ति वा अन्यथयन्ति वेत्यर्थः। तत्त्वज्ञानं तु न बुद्धितन्त्रम्, किं तु वस्तुतन्त्रम्; अतस्ततो वस्तुविनिश्चयो युक्तः, न तु विकल्पनाभ्य इत्याह—**न वस्तुयाथात्म्य** इति।

But this is not so in the case of existent things; thus he says: "**But a thing does not admit of options like 'thus,' 'not thus'.**" By this is refuted option as to the mode (of being). Option as to the substance itself (lit. the possessor of the mode) is refuted: "'**exists,' 'does not exist'.**"

Be this so. Even among existent things, option is seen, as in "a post or a man." How, then, can it be said that a thing does not admit of option? To this he says: "**Options, however**" etc. The "**human intellect**" is the internal organ; options, *i.e.*, doubt and error, are dependent thereon. Either they originate from the mind alone with its impressions, as in dreams; or, they originate from the mind and the senses together with their impressions, as in the doubt about the post whether it is a post or a man, or in the erroneous cognition of it as certainly a man; by the words "**something else**" (in "**or, something else, a man**") there is denoted a man, who is in fact other than a post. And they (doubt and error) do not depend on the real man or the real post, since they arise in dependence merely on the perception of substrates with common attributes. Hence, options (doubt, error etc.) which are not of things as they are, do not introduce option into things or change their nature; this is the sense. As for the knowledge of the truth, that is dependent not on the intellect, but on the thing; hence, it is appropriate to ascertain the nature of things therewith, not through doubt etc.; thus, he says: "**The knowledge of the true nature of a thing is not**" etc.

Then, this being the case, the knowledge of Brahman too depends on the thing itself, because its content is an existent thing. Now, if the content be an existent thing, then Brahman is certainly the object of other means of valid knowledge; and hence a consideration of the Vedānta texts would certainly be purposeless. No, because, not being a content of the senses, the relation is not apprehended. By nature, the senses have objects as their content, and do not have Brahman as their content. Indeed, if Brahman were a content of the senses, there would be the apprehension that this effect is related to Brahman. When the effect alone is

---

Having made clear in this fashion that the validity of knowledge in respect of existent things is dependent on the things, he declares the objectivity of the knowledge of Brahman: "**Then, this being the case**" etc. Here, he asks: "**Now, if the content be an existent thing**" etc. That statement which relates to existent things is, verily, seen to be a re-statement, having an object which is within the sphere of other means of valid knowledge, *e.g.*, "there are fruit on the banks of the river". So too are the Vedānta texts. Hence, these would but re-state what is known through other means of valid knowledge, since they (the texts) refer to existent objects. It has been said that in respect of Brahman, inference with origination etc. of the universe as *probans*, is another means of valid

तत्रैवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् । ननु भूतवस्तुविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तराविषयत्वमेवेति वेदान्तवाक्यविचारणा अनर्थिकैव प्राप्ता । न, इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन संबन्धाग्रहणात् । स्वभावतो विषयविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि, न ब्रह्मविषयाणि । सति हीन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः, इदं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यमिति गृह्येत । कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणं किं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धम्, किमन्येन

एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेण भूतवस्तुविषयाणां ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यस्य वस्तुतन्त्रतां प्रसाध्य ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य वस्तुतन्त्रतामाह—**तत्रैवं सति** इति । अत्र चोदयति—**ननु भूत** इति । यत्किल भूतार्थं वाक्यं तत्प्रमाणान्तरगोचरार्थतयानुवादकं दृष्टम्, यथा—नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्तीति । तथा च वेदान्ताः । तस्मात् भूतार्थतया प्रमाणान्तरदृष्टमेवार्थमनुवदेयुः । उक्तं च ब्रह्मणि जगज्जन्मादिहेतुकमनुमानं प्रमाणान्तरम् । एवं च मौलिकं तदेव परीक्षणीयम्, न तु वेदान्त-

केनचिद्वा संबद्धम्, इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम्। तस्माज्जन्मादिसूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थम्। किं तर्हि? वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थम्। किं पुनस्तद्वेदान्तवाक्यं यत् सूत्रेणेह लिलक्षयिषितम्? 'भृगुर्वै वारुणिः वरुणं पितरमुपससार, अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति' इत्युपक्रम्याह—'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते; येन जातानि जीवन्ति; यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति; तद्विजिज्ञासस्व; तद्ब्रह्म' इति। तस्य च

वाक्यानि तदधीनसत्यत्वानीति कथं वेदान्तवाक्यग्रथनार्थता सूत्राणामित्यर्थः। परिहरति—**न, इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन** इति। कस्मात्पुनर्नेन्द्रियविषयत्वं प्रतीच इत्यत आह—**स्वभावत** इति। अत एव श्रुतिः—'पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयंभूस्तस्मात्पराङ् पश्यति नान्तरात्मन्' इति। **सति हीन्द्रिय** इति प्रत्यगात्मनस्त्वविषयत्वमुपपादितम्। यथा च सामान्यतो दृष्टमप्यनुमानं ब्रह्मणि न प्रवर्तते तथोपरिष्टान्निपुणतरमुपपाद-

apprehended, it cannot be ascertained whether it is related to Brahman or related to something else. Therefore, the aphorism, "That, whence for this what begins with origination" is not for the purpose of suggesting inference. What then? It is for the purpose of showing the Vedānta texts. What then is that Vedānta text, which is desired to be marked out by this aphorism? "Bhṛgu, the son of Varuṇa, approached his father Varuṇa, saying 'Teach me Brahman, Venerable One'"; beginning thus, it is said, "That whence these beings originate, that by which, being originated, they live, that to which they return: desire to know that; that is Brahman." And of

knowledge. Therefore, that (means of knowledge) which is basic is alone to be investigated, not the Vedānta texts, which are true as dependent thereon; how, then, can the aphorisms have the object of stringing together the Vedānta texts like flowers? This is the sense. He answers: "**No, because, not being a content of the senses**" etc. Again, why is the inner self not a content of the senses? To this he says: "**By nature**" etc. Hence it is that Scripture says: "The Creator forced the senses outwards; therefore, they see what is without, not the self within."[98] By the words, "**Indeed, if Brahman were a content of the senses**" etc., there is explained the inner self not being an object of the senses. We shall explain quite clearly later,[99] how even *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* inference[100] does not apply to Brahman.

this, this is the definitive text. "From Bliss alone, verily, these beings originate; being originated, by Bliss do they live; unto Bliss do they return." There are to be cited other texts too of this class, whose content is by nature eternally pure, intelligent and free, and is a cause omniscient in character.

And it has been explained by us extensively in the *Nyāya-kaṇikā*. We shall also explain later [101] how the texts are not restatements merely because of having existent contents. Therefore, everything is clear. And Scripture exhibits origination in "That whence" etc., life or sustentation in "that by which, being originated, they live," and absorption therein in "that to which they return" etc. "**And of this, this is the definitive text**": there being a doubt as to the content (of the text) being the *pradhāna* etc., the definitive text is: "From Bliss alone" etc.[102] This is what is said: it is established that just as the stream, which has for its material cause the rope in conjunction with the ignorance of the rope, exists if the rope exists, and is absorbed in the rope itself, even so the universe, which has for its material cause Brahman in conjunction with Nescience, exists in Brahman alone and is absorbed even in that.

निर्णयवाक्यम्—'आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते; आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति; आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति' इति। अन्यान्यप्येवंजातीयकानि वाक्यानि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावसर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि।

यिष्यामः। उपपादितं चैतदस्माभिर्विस्तरेण न्यायकणिकायाम्। न च भूतार्थतामात्रेणानुवादतेत्युपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यामः। तस्मात्सर्वमवदातम्। श्रुतिश्च 'यतो वा' इति जन्म दर्शयति, 'येन जातानि जीवन्ति' इति जीवनं स्थितिम्, 'यत्प्रयन्ति—' इति तत्रैव लयम्। **तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यम्**। अत्र च प्रधानादिविषयत्वसंशये निर्णयवाक्यम्—आनन्दाद्ध्येव इति। एतदुक्तं भवति—यथा रज्ज्वज्ञानसहितरज्जूपादाना धारा रज्ज्वां सत्यामस्ति रज्ज्वामेव च लीयते, एवमविद्यासहितब्रह्मोपादानं जगत् ब्रह्मण्येवास्ति तत्रैव च लीयत इति सिद्धम्।

जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मेत्युपक्षिप्तम् ; तदेव द्रढयन्नाह—

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

महत ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत्सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म । न हीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यतः संभवोऽस्ति । यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषात्संभवति, यथा व्याकरणादि

सूत्रान्तरमवतारयितुं पूर्वसूत्रसंगतिमाह-गत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन इति । न केवलं जगद्योनित्वादस्य भगवतः सर्वज्ञता, शास्त्रयोनित्वादपि बोद्धव्या । शास्त्रयोनित्वस्य सर्वज्ञतासाधनत्वं समर्थयते—महत ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य इति । चातु-

Through the exposition of causality in respect of the universe it has been indicated that Brahman is omniscient. To strengthen this itself, it is said :

BECAUSE OF THE SACRED-TEACHING-SOURCE

Of the great body of sacred teaching comprising the Ṛgveda etc., supplemented by innumerable disciplines, illuminating all things like a torch, resembling the omniscient, the source, *i.e.*, the cause, is Brahman. Indeed, of such sacred teaching, comprising the Ṛgveda etc., endowed with the quality of omniscience, the origin can be from nothing but an omniscient being. When a sacred teaching with an extensive theme originates from a particular person, for example, the sacred teaching of Grammar etc. from Pāṇini etc.,

---

In order to introduce the next aphorism, he states the relationship with the preceding aphorism : "**Through the exposition of causality in respect of the universe**" etc. The omniscience of the Lord follows not merely from His being the cause of the universe, but is to be understood also from His being the source of the sacred teaching (here, Scripture). He shows how being the source of

although its content be only a part of what is to be known, he possesses more extensive knowledge than that—this is well known in experience. That great being, the source from whom there is, even without effort, on the analogy of sport, like human breath, the origination of that, which is differentiated into various branches, which is the cause of such distinctions as gods, lower animals, men, castes, and orders of life, which is the ocean of all knowledge called the Ṛgveda etc.,—because of scriptural texts like "Of that great being this is the breath, which is the Ṛgveda"—is it necessary to say that for that (great being) there is unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence?

Scripture establishes omniscience: "**Of the great body of sacred teaching comprising the Rg-veda etc.**" Ṛg-veda etc. are *śāstras* (sacred teachings) inasmuch as they teach disciples the procedure in regard to all obligatory, occasioned and optional rites belonging to the four castes and four orders, from impregnation to cremation, (all acts) to be performed from the hours of dawn to those of the evening, as also the truth about Brahman; hence too, since they relate to great themes, they are great. Nor is their greatness due merely to the greatness of the themes, but also to their having many *aṅgas* and *upāṅgas* as subsidiaries; hence he says: "**supplemented by innumerable disciplines.**" *Purāṇa*, reasoning (*nyāya*), inquiry (*mīmāṃsā*) etc. are the ten disciplines; supplemented by them in their respective ways.

पाणिन्यादेः, ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि, स ततोऽप्यधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं लोके। किमु वक्तव्यम्—अनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नस्य देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यवर्णाश्रमादिप्रविभागहेतोः ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य अप्रयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिःश्वासवत् यस्मान्महतो भूतात् योनेः संभवः—'अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतत् यदृग्वेदः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः—तस्य महतो भूतस्य निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्वं चेति।

र्वर्ण्यस्य चातुराश्रम्यस्य च यथायथं निषेकादिश्मशानान्तासु ब्राह्ममुहूर्तोपक्रमप्रदोषपरिसमापनीयासु नित्यनैमित्तिककाम्यकर्मपद्धतिषु च ब्रह्मतत्त्वे च शिष्याणां शासनात् शास्त्रमृग्वेदादिः; अत एव महाविषयत्वात् महत्। न केवलं महाविषयत्वेनास्य महत्त्वम्, अपि त्वनेकाङ्गोपाङ्गोपकरणतयापीत्याह —**अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य**। पुराणन्यायमीमांसादयो दश विद्यास्थानानि; तैः तत्रा

तया द्वारोपकृतस्य । तदनेन समस्तशिष्टजनपरिग्रहेणाप्रामाण्यशङ्काप्यपाकृता । पुराणादिप्रणेतारो हि महर्षयः शिष्टाः; तैः तया तया द्वारा वेदान् व्याचक्षाणैस्तदर्थं चादरेणानुतिष्ठद्भिः परिगृहीतो वेद इति । न चायमनवबोधको नाप्यस्पष्टबोधको येनाप्रमाणं स्यादित्याह—**प्रदीपवत्सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः** । सर्वमर्थजातं सर्वथावबोधयन् नानवबोधको नाप्यस्पष्टबोधक इत्यर्थः । अत एव **सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य** सर्वज्ञसदृशस्य । सर्वज्ञस्य हि ज्ञानं सर्वविषयं शास्त्रस्याप्यभिधानं सर्वविषयमिति सादृश्यम् । तदेवमन्वयमुक्त्वा व्यतिरेकमाह—**न हीदृशस्य** इति । सर्वज्ञस्य गुणः सर्वविषयता; तदन्वितं शास्त्रम्, अस्यापि सर्वविषयत्वात् । उक्तमर्थं प्रमाणयति—**यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात्संभवति स** पुरुषविशेषः **ततोऽपि** शास्त्रात् **अधिकतरविज्ञानः** इति योजना । अद्यत्वेऽप्यस्मदादिभिर्यत्समीचीनार्थविषयं शास्त्रं विरच्यते तत्रास्माकं वक्तॄणां वाक्याज्ज्ञानमधिकविषयम् । न हि ते ते असाधारणधर्मा अनुभूय-

Thereby is removed even the doubt as to its (Scripture's) authoritativeness, because of its being recognised by all worthy men (*śiṣṭas*). Worthy men, verily, are the great sages, the authors of the *purāṇas* etc.; by them who elaborated the Vedas through their respective (teachings) and practised with devotion the sense taught therein, (the authoritativeness of) the Veda is accepted. Nor does this fail to instruct or instruct but not clearly, in which case its authoritativeness would be suspect; thus he says: "**illuminating all things like a torch.**" Illuminating all things in all ways, they are neither non-instructive nor not-clearly-instructive: this is the sense. Hence it is they are *sarvajña-kalpa*, *i.e.*, like the omniscient one. The knowledge of the omniscient one extends to all things; the subject-matter of the sacred teaching extends to all things; hence the likeness. Having thus stated the co-presence (of cause and effect) he states their co-absence: "**Indeed, of such sacred teaching**" etc. The attribute of the omniscient one is knowledge of all themes; that attribute pertains to Scripture, since all themes belong to that too. He proves the said sense: "**When a sacred teaching with an extensive theme originates from a particular person, he,**" that particular person, "**possesses more extensive knowledge than that**" sacred teaching: this is the construction. Even to-day, when those like us declare a body of sacred teaching which contains valid sense, there is knowledge of more themes in us, the speakers, than in

our expressions. The distinctive attributes of various things cannot, indeed, be declared, though experienced. The difference in the sweetness of sugar-cane, milk and jaggery cannot, verily, be given expression to even by Sarasvatī. The use of the word "**extensive**" is to indicate that though the sense of a statement may be extensive, yet its content is not equal to that of the knowledge of him who makes it. He declares the conclusion along with the application (*upanaya*): "**Is it necessary to say**" etc. That great being, from which source there is the origination of the Veda, what need be said of the unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence of that great being, Brahman? That is the construction. "**Of that which is differentiated into various branches**": the application (*upanaya*) is from "**Of that differentiated**" up to "**origination**"; the conclusions begins with "**of him, that great being**" and ends with "**omnipotence**". "**Even without effort**": *i.e.*, with very slight effort, as when one says: "The barley porridge is saltless." What divine sages too cannot compass even with great effort, He effects that with very slight effort, as if in sport; thus are declared His unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence. For His creation of the Vedas without effort there is cited Scripture: "Of this great being" etc.[lvi] Even by those who recognise the eternality of letters (the Mīmāṃsakas), the non-eternality of words and sentences should be admitted. A word is, indeed, composed of letters differentiated by sequence. A sentence is composed of words differentiated

माना अपि शक्या वक्तुम् । न खल्विक्षुक्षीर-गुडादीनां मधुररसभेदाः शक्याः सरस्वत्याप्याख्यातुम् । विस्तरार्थमपि वाक्यं न वक्तृज्ञानेन तुल्यविषयमिति कथयितुं **विस्तर**ग्रहणम् । सोपनयं निगमनमाह—**किमु वक्तव्यम्** इति । वेदस्य यस्मात् महतो भूतात् योनेः संभवः, तस्य महतो भूतस्य ब्रह्मणो निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च किमु वक्तव्यमिति योजना । **अनेकशाखा** इति । अत्र च **अनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नस्य** इत्यादिः **संभव** इत्यन्त उपनयः । **तस्य** इत्यादि **सर्वशक्तित्वं च** इत्यन्तं निगमनम् । **अप्रयत्नेनैव** इति । ईषत्प्रयत्नेन, यथा 'अलवणा यवागूः' इति । देवर्षयो हि महापरिश्रमेणापि यत्राशक्ताः तदयमीषत्प्रयत्नेन लीलयैव करोतीति निरतिशयमस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं चोक्तं भवति । अप्रयत्नेनास्य वेदकर्तृत्वे श्रुतिरुक्ता 'अस्य महतो भूतस्य' इति । येऽपि तावत् वर्णानां नित्यत्वमास्थिषत तैरपि पदवाक्यादीनामनित्यत्वमभ्युपेयम् । आनुपूर्वीभेदवन्तो हि वर्णाः पदम् । पदानि चानुपूर्वीभेदवन्ति वाक्यम् । व्यक्ति-

धर्मश्चानुपूर्वी न वर्णधर्मः, वर्णानां नित्यानां विभूनां च कालतो देशतो वा पौर्वापर्ययोगात्। व्यक्तिश्चानित्येति कथं तदुपगृहीतानां वर्णानां नित्यानामपि पदता नित्या ? पदानित्यतया च वाक्यादीनामप्यनित्यता व्याख्याता। तस्मान्नृत्तानुकरणवत् पदाद्यनुकरणमपि। यथा हि यादृशं गात्रचलनादि नर्तकः करोति तादृशमेव शिक्ष्यमाणानुकरोति नर्तकी, न तु तदेव व्यनक्ति, एवं यादृशीमानुपूर्वीं वैदिकानां वर्णपदादीनां करोत्यध्यापयिता तादृशीमेवानुकरोति माणवकः, न तु तामेवोच्चारयति, आचार्यव्यक्तिभ्यो माणवकव्यक्तीनामन्यत्वात्। तस्मान्नित्यानित्यवर्णवादिनां न लौकिकवैदिकपदवाक्यादिपौरुषेयत्वे विवादः; केवलं वेदवाक्येषु पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यास्वातन्त्र्ये विप्रतिपत्तिः। यथाहुः—'यत्नतः प्रतिषेध्या नः पुरुषाणां स्वतन्त्रता' इति। तत्र सृष्टिप्रलयमनिच्छन्तो जैमिनीया वेदाध्ययनं प्रत्यस्मादृशागुरुशिष्यपरम्परामविच्छिन्नामनादिमाचक्षते। वैयासिकं तु मतमनुवर्तमानाः श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासादिसिद्धसृष्टिप्रल-

by sequence. Sequence, which is a property of manifestation, is not a property of letters, since for letters, which are eternal and all-pervasive, there can be no relationship of before and after, in respect of time or space. Manifestation being non-eternal, how can word-ness be eternal, though the manifested letters be eternal? By the non-eternality of words, the non-eternality of sentences etc. is also explained. Hence the repetition of words etc. is like the (imitative) repetition of dancing. Just as the *danseuse*, who is instructed, performs movements and gestures like to those performed by the dancing instructor, and does not exhibit the very same gestures, even so the pupil follows the same sequence among the letters, words etc. of the Veda as that adopted by the instructor, but does not pronounce the very same (sequence); for, the manifestations (the sounds) of the pupil are different from the manifestations (sounds) of the teacher. Thus, there is no dispute between those who uphold the eternality or non-eternality of letters as to the creation of words and sentences, whether ordinary or Scriptural; there is difference of view only with reference to the (absolute) liberty of man in respect of Scriptural sentences. As they say: "With effort should we refute (only) the (absolute) liberty of man." The Jaiminīyas, who do not believe in a creation or destruction, teach a beginningless and uninterrupted study of the Veda, through a succession of teachers and pupils like ourselves. But those who follow the teaching of Vyāsa say that, though, according to the doctrine of creation and destruction established in

Scripture, the traditional Code, epics etc., the supreme self, who because of His association with beginningless Nescience is omnipotent and omniscient, is the creator of the eternal Vedas, He is not entirely free in respect of them, since He creates their sequence in such manner as to conform to the earlier ones; (this is) in the same way as sacrifice and brāhminicide, which, though illusory effects of Brahman, do not change their nature in a fresh creation, in respect of their leading respectively to good and evil. Not in any creation is brāhminicide the cause of good nor the horse-sacrifice the cause of evil, any more than fire can wet or water burn. Just as, in this creation, the study of the Veda in the settled sequence is the cause of prosperity and beatitude, and (studied) otherwise is the cause of evil even as a verbal thunder-bolt,[104] even so does it happen in another creation; hence, the creator, who, though omniscient and omnipotent, creates the Vedas in accordance with what they were in earlier creations, has not a free hand. The Jaiminīyas too prefer to understand by "not being of human origin (*apauruṣeyatva*)" the absence of entire freedom for the person (who creates). That is common to us too, with a different purpose.

Nor is it proper (to urge) that, if revealed by one person, there would be no faith (in Scripture). What is revealed even by many persons,—ignorant or wise, yet affected by some defect—is, indeed, not worthy of faith; that revelation, however, is worthy of faith which is made by him, who possesses knowledge of the truth and from whom all defects

यानुसारेण अनाद्यविद्योपधानलब्धसर्वशक्तिःसर्वज्ञानस्यापि परमात्मनो नित्यस्य वेदानां योनेरपि न तेषु स्वातन्त्र्यम्, पूर्वपूर्वसर्गानुसारेण तादृशानुपूर्वीविरचनात्; यथा हि यागादिब्रह्महत्यादयोऽर्थानर्थहेतवो ब्रह्मविवर्ता अपि न सर्गान्तरे विपरियन्ति। न हि जातु क्वचित्सर्गे ब्रह्महत्यार्थहेतुरनर्थहेतुश्चाश्वमेधो भवति, अग्निर्वा क्लेदयति, आपो वा दहन्ति, तद्वत्। यथात्र सर्गे नियतानुपूर्व्यं वेदाध्ययनमभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसहेतुः, अन्यथा तदेव वाग्वज्रतयानर्थहेतुः, एवं सर्गान्तरेष्वपीति तदनुरोधात् सर्वज्ञोऽपि सर्वशक्तिरपि पूर्वपूर्वसर्गानुसारेण वेदान्विरचयन्न स्वतन्त्रः। पुरुषास्वातन्त्र्यमात्रं चापौरुषेयत्वं रोचयन्ते जैमिनीया अपि। तच्चास्माकमपि समानम्, अन्यत्राभिनिवेशात्।

न चैकस्य प्रतिभाने अनाश्वास इति युक्तम्। न हि बहूनामप्यज्ञानां विज्ञानां वा आशयदोषवतां प्रतिभाने युक्त आश्वासः; तत्त्वज्ञानवतस्त्वपास्तसमस्तदोषस्यैकस्यापि प्रतिभाने

अथ वा यथोक्तमृग्वेदादिशास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्स्वरूपाधिगमे। शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्माधिगम्यत इत्यभिप्रायः। शास्त्रमुदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे—'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्यादि। किमर्थं तर्हीदं सूत्रम्, यावता पूर्वसूत्रेणैव एवंजातीयकं शास्त्रमुदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम्? उच्यते—तत्र सूत्राक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्यानुपादाना-

युक्त एवाश्वासः। सर्गादिभुवां च प्रजापतिदेवर्षीणां धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यसंपन्नानामुपपद्यते तत्स्वरूपावधारणम्; तत्प्रत्ययेन चार्वाचीनानामपि तत्र संप्रत्यय इत्युपपन्नं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वम्, शास्त्रस्य चापौरुषेयत्वम्, प्रामाण्यं चेति। इति प्रथमवर्णकम्।

वर्णकान्तरमारभते—**अथ वा इति**। पूर्वेणाधिकरणेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणासंभवाशङ्कां व्युदस्य

Or else, the sacred teaching comprising the Ṛgveda etc., as described above, is the source, *i.e.*, the cause or the authority for understanding correctly the nature of this Brahman. It is only from the sacred teaching as authority that Brahman is understood to be the cause of the origination etc. of the universe: this is the idea. In the previous aphorism has been cited the sacred teaching beginning with "That whence these beings originate". Then for what purpose is this aphorism, inasmuch as in the previous aphorism itself the source of Brahman was shown to be the sacred teaching, through the citation of sacred teachings of this class? The reply is: there, the sacred teaching has not been

have been banished, even though he is but one. In the case of those who existed at the first creation, like Prajāpati and the divine sages, who possess in abundance virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and lordly power, the ascertainment of His nature is intelligible; through their faith follows the faith of later ones; hence, Brahman's being the sacred-teaching-source is intelligible, as also the non-human origin and validity of the sacred teaching. This is the first explanation (of the aphorism).

He begins another explanation: "**Or else**" etc. In the previous section, the impossibility of a definition of Brahman's nature was refuted and the possibility of a definition stated. Of that same definition the doubt is removed,

explicitly stated in the words of the aphorism; so it may be doubted that in the aphorism "That, whence for this what begins with origination" mere inference was suggested; to remove such a doubt, this aphorism sets out "Because of the Sacred-Teaching-Source."

that by this may be inferred (the existence of Brahman, *e.g.*, on the analogy of products within our experience which require a creator), and it is said that in respect of Brahman taught by revelation Scripture is the (only) means of valid knowledge. The meaning of the text (of the commentary) is not obscure.

जन्मादिसूत्रेण केवलमनुमानमुपन्यस्त-मित्याशङ्क्येत ; तामाशङ्कां निवर्तयितुमिदं सूत्रं प्रवर्तते 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' इति ।

लक्षणसंभव उक्तः । तस्यैव तु लक्षणस्यानेन अनुमानत्वाशङ्कामपाकृत्य आगमोपदर्शनेन ब्रह्मणि शास्त्रं प्रमाणमुक्तम् । अक्षरार्थस्तु अतिरोहितः ।

कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते, यावता 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्' इति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य

शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुक्तं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिज्ञामात्रेण; तदनेन सूत्रेण प्रतिपादनीयम्; इत्युत्सूत्रं पूर्वपक्षमारचयति भाष्यकारः—**कथं पुनः** इति। किम् आक्षेपे — शुद्धबुद्धोदासीनस्वभावतया उपेक्षणीयं ब्रह्म भूतमभिदधतां वेदान्तानामपुरुषार्थोपदेशिनामप्रयोजनत्वापत्तेः; भूतार्थत्वेन च प्रत्यक्षादिभिः समानविषयतया लौकिकवाक्यवत्तदर्थानुवादकत्वेनाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्। न खलु लौकिकानि वाक्यानि प्रमाणान्तरविषयमर्थमवबोधयन्ति स्वतः प्रमाणम्; एवं वेदान्ता अपीत्यनपेक्षत्वलक्षणं प्रामाण्यमेषां व्याहन्येत। न च तैरप्रमाणैर्भवितुं युक्तम्। न चाप्रयोजनैः, स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविध्यापादित-

How, again, can Brahman be said to have the sacred teaching as authority, inasmuch as sacred teachings are shown to refer to rituals in "Since Scripture is for the purpose of ritual, there is futility for whatever has not that purpose"? Therefore, there is futility for

That the sacred teaching is the means of valid knowledge in respect of Brahman has been but premised (in the second explanation of the last aphorism); that is to be taught by the present aphorism; hence, the commentator prefaces the aphorism with a statement of the *prima facie* view: "**How, again**" etc. "How" signifies an objection: because there would result non-utility for the Vedāntas, which teach what is not the human goal, declaring (as they do) the existent Brahman, which, being pure, intelligent and indifferent by nature, should be treated with indifference; and because there would result non-authoritativeness for them (the Vedāntas) since, having existent objects for their content, they have the same content as perception etc., and are consequently but re-statements, like worldly statements. Worldly statements, which teach the same content as other means of valid knowledge, are not, verily, of themselves authoritative; similarly of the Vedāntas too; hence, their authoritativeness consisting in their non-dependence (on any other means of valid knowledge) would be destroyed. Nor is it meet that they should become unauthoritative. Nor unfruitful, for, it is

the Vedāntas since they are not for the purpose of ritual; or they may be subsidiaries to the injunction of rituals with the purpose of making known the agent, the deity etc., or they may have the purpose of prescribing other acts like contemplation etc. Indeed, there cannot possibly be the teaching of the nature of already existent things, because a thing already existent is the content of perception etc.; and in the teaching thereof,

settled that they have the fruit brought about by the prescription to study one's own Veda. Hence, they subserve acts, their only purport being the teaching of agent, deity etc., required by the respective prescribed rites. If, however, that purport be not accepted, because of non-proximity, then of the Vedāntas, there is at least reference to acts like contemplation etc., which are proximate. Thus, indeed, as having for its sphere what is not understood by perception etc., and hence as not dependent on those (*pramāṇas*), validity and utility result (for the Vedāntas): this is the sense intended (by the objector). The citation of the aphorism of the great sage (Jaimini) is for strengthening the *prima facie* view (and making clear the necessity to refute it, not for creating faith in it as the final view).

"**Futility**" means non-utility and non-generation of valid knowledge, being dependent (on other *pramāṇas*), because of being re-statements. From "**therefore**" up to "**or, they may have the purpose of prescribing other acts like contemplation etc.,**" is the compendious statement (of this view). The analytical commentary on this begins with "**Indeed, there cannot**" and ends with "**or is intelligible**".

प्रदर्शितम्। अतो वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यम्, अक्रियार्थत्वात्; कर्तृदेवतादिप्रकाशनार्थत्वेन वा क्रियाविधिशेषत्वम्, उपासनादिक्रियान्तरविधानार्थत्वं वा। न हि परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपादनं संभवति, प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वात्परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनः, तत्प्र-

---

प्रयोजनवत्त्वनियमात्। तस्मात्तत्तद्विहितकर्मापेक्षितकर्तृदेवतादिप्रतिपादनपरत्वेनैव क्रियार्थत्वम्। यदि त्वसंनिधानात्तत्परत्वं न रोचयन्ते, ततः संनिहितोपासनादिक्रियापरत्वं वा वेदान्तानाम्। एवं हि प्रत्यक्षाद्यनधिगतगोचरत्वेनानपेक्षतया प्रामाण्यं च प्रयोजनवत्त्वं च सिध्यतीति तात्पर्यार्थः। पारमर्षसूत्रोपन्यासस्तु पूर्वपक्षदार्ढ्याय।

आनर्थक्यं च अप्रयोजनवत्त्वम्, सापेक्षतया प्रमानुत्पादकत्वं चानुवादकत्वादिति। **अतः** इत्यादि **वान्तं** ग्रहणकवाक्यम्। अस्य विभागभाष्यं **न हि** इत्यादि **उपपन्ना वा** इत्यन्तम्।

तिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते पुरुषार्थाभावात्। अत एव 'सोऽरोदीत्' इत्येवमादीनामानर्थक्यं मा भूदिति 'विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात्स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः' इति स्तावकत्वेनार्थवत्त्वमुक्तम्। मन्त्राणां च 'इषे त्वा' इत्यादीनां क्रियातत्साधनाभिधायकत्वेन कर्मसमवायित्वमुक्तम्। न क्वचिदपि वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेणार्थवत्ता दृष्टा उपपन्ना वा। न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः संभवति, क्रियाविषयत्वाद्विधेः।

स्यादेतत्। अक्रियार्थत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपविधिपरा वेदान्ता भविष्यन्ति; तथा च 'विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात्—' इति राद्धान्तसूत्रमनुग्रहीष्यते। न खल्वप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तनमेव विधिः; उत्पत्तिविधेरज्ञातज्ञापनार्थत्वात्; वेदान्तानां चाज्ञातं ब्रह्म ज्ञापयतां तथाभावात्, इत्यत आह— **न च परिनिष्ठित** इति। अनागतोत्पाद्य-

there being nothing to be rejected or accepted, there is no human goal. For this very reason, lest there be futility in the case of "He howled" etc., they are stated to be purposeful as being praises, (in the aphorism), "But by syntactical unity with an injunction, they may have the purpose of praising the injunction". And Mantras like "Thee for food" etc. are said to be related to ritual, mentioning as they do rituals or the instruments therefor. (Therefore), nowhere has the purposefulness of the Vedic sentences without association with an injunction been seen or is intelligible. And in respect of the nature of a thing already existent there can be no injunction, because an injunction has ritual as

---

Be this so. Though not subserving acts, the Vedāntas have for purport an injunction in respect of Brahman's nature; that is favoured by the aphorism stating the final view (for the Mīmāṃsakas): "But by syntactical unity with an injunction" etc.[105] Verily, not that alone is an injunction which induces activity where there was none before; for, the originative injunction has the purpose of making known what was unknown; and the Vedāntas, which make known the unknown Brahman, have this nature. To this he says: "**And in respect of the nature of a thing already existent**" etc. All injunctions are admitted to have for content only a becoming which is not yet existent and is to be originated; for, the various forms of injunction—the qualificatory (stating the fruit), the applicatory (showing the subsidiariness of the rite to the

content. Therefore, the Vedântas are subsidiary to injunctions of rituals, illuminating as they do the nature of the agent, the deity etc. required by ritual. If now because of the fear that the context is different (from that of ritual), this be not accepted, even then they have for purport the act of contemplation present in their own sentences. Therefore for Brahman the sacred teaching cannot be the source. When this results, the reply is:

BUT THAT, BECAUSE OF THE HARMONY

fruit), the procedural, and the originative (showing the form, *i.e.*, the material and the deity for the rite)—are inseparable one from another, and they do not occur in respect of the existent. But they differ in respect of the purport of the respective statements. For example, the statement "he is to perform the *agnihotra*" is a statement which is only originative in significance, since by the statement "he who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the *agnihotra*" there are obtained the eligible person, the application, and the procedure. Nor is it that the application etc. are not present there (in "he is to sacrifice with the *agnihotra*"); though present, they are merely unintended, being otherwise obtained. Hence, an injunction, which has a volition for its content, cannot result in the case of an existent object. He concludes: "**Therefore**" etc.

तस्मात्कर्मापेक्षितकर्तृदेवतादिस्वरूपप्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिशेषत्वं वेदान्तानाम् । अथ प्रकरणान्तरभयान्नैतदभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि स्ववाक्यगतोपासनादिकर्मपरत्वम् । तस्मान्न ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वमिति प्राप्ते, उच्यते--

तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥ ४ ॥

भावविषय एव हि सर्वो विधिरुपेयः, अधिकारविनियोगप्रयोगोत्पत्तिरूपाणां परस्परमविनाभावात्, सिद्धे च तेषामसंभवात् । तद्वाक्यानां त्वैदंपर्यं भिद्यते । यथा 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकामः' इत्यादिभ्योऽधिकारविनियोगप्रयोगाणां प्रतिलम्भात्, 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति' इत्युत्पत्तिमात्रपरं वाक्यम् । न त्वत्र विनियोगादयो न सन्ति; सन्तोऽप्यन्यतो लब्धत्वात्केवलमविवक्षिताः । तस्मात् भावनाविषयो विधिर्न सिद्धे वस्तुनि भवितुमर्हतीति । उपसंहरति—**तस्मात्** इति ।

तुशब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः। तद्ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलय-कारणं वेदान्तशास्त्रादवगम्यते। कथम्? समन्वयात्। सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि

अत्रारुचिकारणमुक्त्वा पक्षान्तरमुपसंक्रमते—**अथ** इति। एवं च सति उक्तरूपे ब्रह्मणि शब्दस्यातात्पर्यात् प्रमाणान्तरेण यादृशमस्य रूपं व्यवस्थाप्यते न तच्छब्देन विरुध्यते; तस्योपासना-परत्वात्, समारोपेण चोपासनाया उपपत्तेरिति। प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—**तस्मान्न** इति।

सूत्रेण सिद्धान्तयति—**उच्यत** इति।

तदेतद्व्याचष्टे—**तुशब्द** इति। तदित्युत्तर-पक्षप्रतिज्ञां विभजते—**तद्ब्रह्म** इति। पूर्वपक्षी कर्कशाशयः पृच्छति—**कथम्** इति। कुतः प्रकारादित्यर्थः। सिद्धान्ती स्वपक्षे हेतुं प्रकार-भेदमाह—**समन्वयात्**। सम्यगन्वयः समन्वयः; तस्मात्। एतदेव विभजते—**सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु** इति। वेदान्तानामैकान्तिकीं ब्रह्म-

The word "but" is to exclude the *prima facie* view. That Brahman, omniscient and omnipotent, the cause of the creation, sustentation and dissolution of the universe, is understood from the sacred teaching, the Vedānta (alone). How? Because of the harmony. Indeed, in all the Vedāntas, the sentences run together as having for

Stating the cause of dissatisfaction with that, he ends with another view: "**If, now**" etc. This being the case, since verbal testimony has no purport in respect of Brahman of the nature declared, that form thereof which has been established by other means of valid knowledge cannot be contradicted by verbal testimony; for, that (verbal testimony) relates to contemplation, and contemplation is compatible even with superimposition. He concludes the present topic: "**Therefore, for Brahman**" etc.

Beginning with "**The reply is,**" he states the final view through the aphorism.

He explains this: "**The word 'but'**" etc. The word *tat* (in the aphorism) premises the final view; this he analyses: "**That Brahman**" etc. The upholder of the *prima facie* view, whose mind is hard (and impenetrable), asks: "**How?**" *i.e.*, "In what way?" The upholder of the final view states the ground of his own view, which is the particular way (demanded by the opponent): "**Because of the harmony.**" Right (full) relation is harmony (*samanvaya*); thereby (is the reference to Brahman established). This itself he analyses: "**Indeed, in all the Vedantas**" etc. He cites many texts, in the desire to declare that the Vedāntas refer solely to Brahman:

purport the teaching of this sense: "Existence alone, dear one, this was in the beginning" (*Chānd.*, VI, ii, 1); "One alone without a second"; "The Self, verily, existed in the beginning as one alone" (*Ait.*, II, i, 1 (i)); "Such this Brahman without an earlier and a later, without an inside and an outside" (*Bṛh.*, II, v, 19); "This Self is Brahman, the experiencer of all" (*Muṇḍ.*, II, ii, 11); "Brahman alone, the immortal in front";

"Existence alone" etc. As for the text "That, verily, whence these beings originate" etc., that was cited earlier and refers to the cause of the origination, sustentation and destruction of the universe; since it will be thus recalled here, it is not mentioned (again). Indeed, that with which a statement begins and that with which it ends, that alone is considered to be the meaning of the statement, by those who understand the nature of the knowledge resulting from verbal testimony. For example, in respect of the text about the *upāṃśu* sacrifice, it is acknowledged to be injunctive of that novel *upāṃśu* sacrifice, on the strength of the syntactical unity with the injunction of the *upāṃśu* sacrifice, preceded by the statement of the defect of apathy (occasioned by) the continuous (oblation of) *puroḍāśa*, as also with the concluding (part stating) the remedying of that (defect).;[106] even so, here too, because of the text "Existence alone, dear one, this was" etc., commencing with Brahman, and the text "That thou art" concluding with Brahman as the self of the *jīva*, the (whole) text has that alone for purport. In the same way it is to be

तात्पर्येणैतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि—'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्', 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्', 'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्', 'तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम्', 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः', 'ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात्' इत्या-

परतामाचिख्यासुर्बहूनि वाक्यान्युदाहरति—सदेवेति। 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि' इति तु वाक्यं पूर्वमुदाहृतं जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशकारणमिति चेह स्मारितमिति न पठितम्। येन हि वाक्यमुपक्रम्यते येन चो स एव वाक्यार्थ इति शाब्दाः। यथोपांशुयाजवाक्येऽनूचोः पुरोडाशयोर्जामितादोषसंकीर्तनपूर्वकोपांशुयाजविधानेन तत्प्रतिसमाधानोपसंहारेण चापूर्वोपांशुयाजकर्मविधिपरता एकवाक्यताबलादाश्रिता, एवमत्रापि 'सदेव सोम्येदम्' इति ब्रह्मोपक्रमात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इति च जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मनोपसंहारात् तत्परतैव वाक्यस्य। एवं वाक्यान्तराणामपि

दीनि। न च तद्वतानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वयेऽवगम्यमाने अर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता, श्रुतहान्यश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात्। न च तेषां कर्तृदेवतादिस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरता अवसीयते, 'तत्केन कं पश्येत्' इत्यादिक्रियाकारकफलनिराकरणश्रुतेः।

न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः, 'तत्त्वमसि' इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्रमन्तरेणान-

पौर्वापर्यालोचनया ब्रह्मपरत्वमवगन्तव्यम्। न च तत्परत्वस्य दृष्टस्य सति संभवेऽन्यपरता अदृष्टा युक्ता कल्पयितुम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न केवलं कर्तृपरता तेषामदृष्टा, अनुपपन्ना चेत्याह—**न च तेषाम्** इति।

सापेक्षत्वेनाप्रामाण्यं पूर्वपक्षबीजं स्मारयित्वा दूषयति—**न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि** इति। अयमभिसंधिः—पुंवाक्यनिदर्शनेन हि

and so on. Nor, when for the words in these texts the ascertained harmony is understood to have for content the nature of Brahman, is it proper to assume any other content; for there would result the abandonment of what is directly stated and the assumption of what is not directly stated. Nor may one conclude that their purport is to teach the nature of the agent, the deity etc.; because there are scriptural texts like, "Then by what and whom could one see?" (*Bṛh.*, II, iv, 13) which refute action, causal condition and result.

Nor is Brahman, though of the nature of an already existent thing the content of perception etc.; because, that Brahman is the self, as stated in "That thou art" (*Chānd.*, VI, viii, 7), cannot be understood

understood, through the consideration of what goes before and after, that other texts too have Brahman for purport. Nor, when there is the possibility of a seen purport in reference thereto, is it proper to posit an unseen purport in reference to something else, that being an undue extension. Their purport in reference to agents is not merely unseen, but also unintelligible; thus he says: "**Nor may one**" etc.

Recalling the cause of the *prima facie* view about unauthoritativeness due to dependence, he condemns it: "**Nor is Brahman, though of the nature of an already existent thing**" etc. This is what is intended: it is, indeed, on the analogy of human statements, that, as referring to existent things, the dependence of the Vedāntas (on other *pramāṇas*) is suspected. Here, you being questioned will

have to explain this: is the dependence of human statements because of their reference to existent things or because of their being human? If because of the reference to existent things, then would result non-authoritativeness even for perception etc., as reciprocally dependent; for, they too certainly refer to existent things. If now human statements are dependent as due to the human intellect, then, of the Vedāntas not due to that, though referring to existent things, there is no non-authoritativeness, as for perception etc., (which are valid) as generated by constant causes like the senses, the *probans* etc.

It may be said: if, indeed, non-human origin were established, then, for the Vedāntas as non-dependent, validity would result; but that itself is not established, because of the reference to existent things; for, since of an existent thing a person can have knowledge, without depending on verbal testimony, through other means of knowledge, the making (of a statement about such a thing) as due to the intellect is intelligible; and the inference as to the human origin of the Vedas can arise unhindered, the *probans* being (their being composed of) sentences etc. (which are artificial combinations of letters etc.). Hence, dependence is unavoidable, on the ground of human origin, but not on the ground of referring to an existent thing. In the case, however, of that which refers to what is to be done, since what is to be done is novel and not the sphere of any other means of knowledge, and since what has never been experienced before cannot enter the human intellect, either in its own nature or as superimposed, for the Vedāntas signifying this, there can be no creation, and consequently no human origin; hence results (for them) authoritativeness.

भूतार्थतया वेदान्तानां सापेक्षत्वमाशङ्क्यते। तत्रैवं भवान् पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम्, किं पुंवाक्यानां सापेक्षता भूतार्थत्वेन, आहो पौरुषेयत्वेन? यदि भूतार्थत्वेन ततः प्रत्यक्षादीनामपि परस्परापेक्षत्वेनाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः; तान्यपि हि भूतार्थान्येव। अथ पुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वकतया पुंवाक्यं सापेक्षम्, एवं तर्हि अतत्पूर्वकाणां वेदान्तानां भूतार्थानामपि नाप्रामाण्यं प्रत्यक्षादीनामिव नियतेन्द्रियलिङ्गादिजन्मनाम्।

यद्युच्येत—सिद्धे किलापौरुषेयत्वे वेदान्तानामनपेक्षतया प्रामाण्यं सिध्येत्; तदेव तु भूतार्थत्वेन न सिध्यति; भूतार्थस्य शब्दानपेक्षेण पुरुषेण मानान्तरतः शक्यज्ञानत्वाद्बुद्धिपूर्वं विरचनोपपत्तेः; वाक्यत्वादिलिङ्गकस्य वेदपौरुषेयत्वानुमानस्याप्रत्यूहमुत्पत्तेः। तस्मात्पौरुषेयत्वेन सापेक्षत्वं दुर्वारम्, न तु भूतार्थत्वेन। कार्यार्थत्वे तु कार्यस्यापूर्वस्य मानान्तरागोचरतया अत्यन्ताननुभूतपूर्वस्य तत्त्वेन समारोपेण वा पुरुषबुद्धाव-

समारोहात् तदर्थानां वेदान्तानामशक्यरचनतया पौरुषेयत्वाभावादनपेक्षं प्रमाणत्वं सिध्यतीति प्रामाण्याय वेदान्तानामपि कार्यपरत्वमातिष्ठामहे ।

अत्र ब्रूमः—किं पुनरिदं कार्यमभिमतमायुष्मतः यदशक्यं पुरुषेण ज्ञातुम् ? अपूर्वमिति चेत्, हन्त कुतस्त्यमस्य लिङाद्यर्थत्वम् ? तेनालौकिकेन संगतिसंवेदनविरहात् ; लोकानुसारतः क्रियाया एव लौकिक्याः कार्यतया लिङादेरवगमात् ।

'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति साध्यस्वर्गविशिष्टो नियोज्योऽवगम्यते ; स च तदेव कार्यमवगच्छति यत्स्वर्गानुकूलम् । न च क्रिया क्षणभङ्गुरा आमुष्मिकाय स्वर्गाय कल्पत इति पारिशेष्याद्वेदत एवापूर्वे कार्ये लिङादीनां संबन्धग्रह इति चेत्, हन्त चैत्यवन्दनादिवाक्येष्वपि स्वर्ग-कामादिपदसंबन्धादपूर्वकार्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ; तथा च तेषामप्यशक्यरचनत्वेनापौरुषेयत्वापातः । स्पष्टदृष्टेन पौरुषेयत्वेन वा तेषामपूर्वार्थत्वप्रतिषेधे वाक्यत्वादिना लिङ्गेन वेदान्तानामपि पौरुषेयत्वमनुमितमित्य-

without dependence; therefore, in order to secure authoritativeness, we recognise even of the Vedāntas that their purport is what is to be done.

To this we say: what, again, O long-lived one!, is this which is to be done, which cannot be known by man? If it be said to be the unseen potentiality (*apūrva*), how, alas, does it come to be the significance of the imperative suffix (*liṅ*) etc.? For, that (*apūrva*) being trans-experiential, there is no knowledge of the relation (of the word) to that; in conformity with ordinary language, from the imperative suffix etc. there are understood only acts within experience, as what is to be done.

(It may be said that) from the statement "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice," the one, who is qualified by heaven which is to be attained, is understood to be the one directed; and he understands that alone has to be done which is beneficial in securing heaven. Nor are acts, which are destroyed momentarily, capable of securing heaven hereafter; hence, by elimination, it is only from the Veda that there is understood the relation of the imperative suffix etc. to the unseen potentiality, (which is) what is to be done. If this be said, it would follow, alas, that even in texts enjoining obeisance in a *caitya* (a Buddhist shrine), there is, because of relation to such words as desire for heaven etc., the unseen potentiality (which is) to be done; and thus, creation even of these being impossible, non-human origin would result (for them too). Or, if because their human origin is clearly seen, their signifying an unseen potentiality be denied, then, since human origin may be inferred of the Vedāntas too, (their being composed of) sentences etc. being the *probans*, (for them too) there

except by sacred teaching. As for what has been said that, being devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, the teaching is futile, there is not this defect; for, even from the realisation of the self as Brahman, which is devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, there results, through the destruction of all hindrances, the attainment of the human goal. But of that which teaches the deity etc., there is no opposition even to its subserving the contemplation mentioned in its own text.

cannot be the signification of an unseen potentiality. If the inference from (being composed of) sentences etc. is shown to be fallacious on some other ground, (that ground itself will do, and) the justification (of non-human origin) on the ground of an unseen potentiality being signified is superfluous. And non-human origin has been expounded by us in the *Nyāyakaṇikā*; here, however, it is not set forth for fear of prolixity.[107]

Non-human origin being thus established, there is not for the Vedāntas, though referring to existent things, any detriment to their authoritativeness on the ground of dependence (on other means of knowledge). Nor is it that there is not the understanding of what has not been understood, in which case, there would be no authoritativeness; for, the *jīva's* being Brahman is not otherwise understood. That is thus said: "**Nor is Brahman, though of the nature of an existent thing**" etc.

Recalling the second cause of the *prima facie* view, he condemns it: "**As for what has been said that, being devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted**" etc. From the understanding of the sense of injunctions the attainment

वगम्यमानत्वात्। यत्तु हेयोपादेयरहितत्वादुपदेशानर्थक्यमिति, नैष दोषः; हेयोपादेयशून्यब्रह्मात्मतावगमादेव सर्वक्लेशप्रहाणात्पुरुषार्थसिद्धेः। देवतादिप्रतिपादनस्य तु स्ववाक्यगतोपासनार्थत्वेऽपि

पूर्वार्थता न स्यात्। अन्यतस्तु वाक्यत्वादीनामनुमानाभासत्वोपपादने कृतमपूर्वार्थत्वेनात्र तदुपपादकेन। उपपादितं चापौरुषेयत्वमस्माभिर्न्यायकणिकायाम्; इह तु विस्तरभयान्नोक्तम्।

तेनापौरुषेयत्वे सिद्धे भूतार्थानामपि वेदान्तानां न सापेक्षतया प्रामाण्यविघातः। न चानधिगतगन्तृता नास्ति येन प्रामाण्यं न स्यात्, जीवस्य ब्रह्मताया अन्यतोऽनधिगमात्। तदिदमुक्तम्—**न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि** इति।

द्वितीयं पूर्वपक्षबीजं स्मारयित्वा दूषयति—**यत्तु हेयोपादेयरहितत्वात्** इति। विध्यर्थावगमात् खलु पारम्पर्येण पुरुषार्थप्रतिलम्भः।

न कश्चिद्विरोधः। न तु तथा ब्रह्मण उपासनाविधिशेषत्वं संभवति, एकत्वे हेयोपादेयशून्यतया क्रियाकारकादिद्वैत-विज्ञानोपमर्दोपपत्तेः। न हि ब्रह्मैकत्व-विज्ञानेनोन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोऽस्ति, येनोपासनाविधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्येत।

इह तु 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यवगतिपर्यन्ताद्वाक्यार्थ-ज्ञानात् बाह्यानुष्ठानायासानपेक्षात्साक्षादेव पुरुषार्थ-प्रतिलम्भः, 'नायं सर्पो रज्जुरियम्' इति ज्ञानादिवेति। सोऽयमस्य विध्यर्थज्ञानात् प्रकर्षः।

एतदुक्तं भवति—द्विविधं हीप्सितं पुरुषस्य; किंचिदप्राप्तम्, यथा ग्रामादि; किंचित्पुनः प्राप्तमपि भ्रमवशादप्राप्तमित्यवगतम्, यथा स्वग्रीवावनद्धं यकम्। एवं जिहासितमपि द्विविधम्; चेदहीनं जिहासति, यथा वलयितचरणं फणिनम्; किंचित्पुनर्हीनमेव जिहासति, यथा चरणाभरणे नूपुरे फणिनमारोपितम्। तत्रा-

It does not, however, happen thus in the case of Brahman that it is subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation; because, being one and devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, it is intelligible that all cognition of duality such as action, causal condition etc. is quashed. And for the cognition of duality once crushed by the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, there cannot be a resurrection, in which case there may be taught for Brahman subsidiariness to the injunction of contemplation.

of the human goal is, verily, indirect. Here, however, from the understanding of texts like "That thou art" culminating in realisation, there is, without dependence on the effort of any external observance, the direct attainment of the human goal, as from the knowledge "This is not a snake, but a rope". This is its superiority to the knowledge of the sense of injunctions.

This is what is said: what is desired by man is, indeed, of two kinds—some unattained, *e.g.*, a village etc.; others, again, which, though attained, yet under the influence of delusion are understood to be unattained, *e.g.*, the necklace round one's own neck. Similarly, what would be abandoned is also two-fold—some which not already got rid of are desired to be got rid of, *e.g.*, the snake encircling one's feet; others, again, which having been already got rid of are desired to be got rid of, *e.g.*, the snake superimposed on the anklet adorning the feet. Here, since the attainment of the unattained and the

abandonment of the unabandoned result from the observance of extrinsic means, there is, subsequent to the true knowledge of these means, the need for their observance. Never does knowledge alone remove a thing. Even a thousand rope-cognitions cannot, indeed, alter the character of the really present snake. In the case, however, of those, which being superimposed are desired to be either attained or abandoned, it is possible to attain as it were or abandon as it were, by the mere intuition of the truth, without dependence on any extrinsic observances. For, they exist by the superimposition alone; and intuition of the truth plucks out the superimposed by the root and destroys it. Thus, here too, in the bliss of Brahman, which through the superimposition due to Nescience has attained the state of the *jīva*, which is in reality devoid of grief, misery etc., this state conditioned by superimposition is removed by the true knowledge of the sense of the text "That thou art" culminating in realisation. On the removal of that, the blissful nature, though (eternally) attained, becomes attained, as if not attained (already); grief, misery etc., though (eternally) abandoned, become abandoned, as if unabandoned (already). This is said thus: "**for, even from the realisation of the self as Brahman**", though the removal in an eminent degree of all the hindrances of the *jīva*, *i.e.*, of error together with its impressions,—that, verily, hinders beings; hence it is the hindrance—"**there is the attainment of the human goal**" characterised by the removal of misery and the attainment of happiness.

प्राप्तप्राप्तौ चात्यक्तत्यागे च बाह्योपायानुष्ठान-साध्यत्वात् तदुपायतत्त्वज्ञानादस्ति पराचीना-नुष्ठानापेक्षा। न जातु ज्ञानमात्रं वस्त्वपनयति। न हि सहस्रमपि रज्जुप्रत्यया वस्तुसन्तं फणिन-मन्यथयितुमीशते। समारोपिते तु प्रेप्सितजिहासिते तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारमात्रेण बाह्यानुष्ठानानपेक्षेणैव शक्येते प्राप्तुमिव हातुमिव। समारोपमात्रजीविते हि ते; समारोपितं च तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारः समूलघातमुपह-न्तीति। तथेहाप्यविद्यासमारोपितजीवभावे ब्रह्म-ण्यानन्दे वस्तुतः शोकदुःखादिरहिते समा-रोपितनिबन्धनस्तद्भावः 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यार्थ-तत्त्वज्ञानादवगतिपर्यन्तान्निवर्तते। तन्निवृत्तौ प्राप्त-मप्यानन्दरूपमप्राप्तमिव प्राप्तं भवति; त्यक्तमपि शोकदुःखाद्यत्यक्तमिव त्यक्तं भवति। तदिद-मुक्तम्—**ब्रह्मात्मावगमादेव** जीवस्य सर्वक्लेशस्य सवासनस्य विपर्यासस्य—स हि क्लिश्नाति जन्तूनतः क्लेशः—तस्य प्रकर्षेण हानात् **पुरुषार्थस्य,** दुःखनिवृत्तिसुखाप्तिलक्षणस्य **सिद्धेः** इति।

यत्तु 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत', 'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत' इत्युपासनावाक्यगतदेवतादिप्रतिपादनेनोपासनापरत्वं वेदान्तानामुक्तं तदूदूषयति—**देवतादिप्रतिपादनस्य तु** आत्मेत्येतावन्मात्रस्य **स्ववाक्यगतोपासनार्थत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्विरोधः**। यदि न विरोधः, सन्तु तर्हि वेदान्ता देवताप्रतिपादनद्वारेणोपासनाविधिपरा एवेत्यत आह—**न तु तथा ब्रह्मण** इति। उपास्योपासकोपासनादिभेदसिद्ध्यधीनोपासना न निरस्तसमस्तभेदप्रपञ्चे वेदान्तवेद्ये ब्रह्मणि संभवतीति नोपासनाविधिशेषत्वं वेदान्तानां तद्विरोधित्वात् इत्यर्थः।

स्यादेतत्। यदि विधिविरहेऽपि वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यम्, हन्त तर्हि 'सोऽरोदीत्' इत्यादीनामप्यस्तु स्वतन्त्राणामेवोपेक्षणीयार्थानां प्रामाण्यम्; न हि हानोपादानबुद्धी एव प्रमाणस्य फले, उपेक्षाबुद्धेरपि तत्फलत्वेन प्रामाणिकैरभ्युपेतत्वात्; इति कृतम् 'बर्हिषि रजतं न

As for what has been said about the Vedāntas having contemplation for purport, because of the teaching of the deity etc., in such texts about contemplation as "Contemplate as the self alone," "contemplate the self alone, as the true enjoyment" etc.,[108] he condemns it: "**But of that which teaches the deity** etc.," *i.e.*, of the word "self" alone, "**there is no opposition even to its subserving the contemplation mentioned in its own text**". If there is no conflict, let it be, then, that the Vedāntas have only injunctions to contemplation for purport, through the channel of teaching the deity. To this he says: "**It does not, however, happen thus in the case of Brahman**" etc. Contemplation, which depends on the establishment of differences of the contemplated, the contemplator, the contemplation etc., cannot occur in the case of Brahman, which is devoid of all kinds of difference and is to be known only through the Vedānta; hence, the Vedāntas cannot be subsidiary to the injunctions to contemplation, being opposed thereto; this is the sense.

Be this so. If there be authoritativeness for the Vedāntas, though not of the nature of injunctions, alas, then, even for texts like "he howled" etc.,[109] which refer of themselves (independently of linking up with any injunction) to things to which one should be indifferent, let there be authoritativeness; for, the determination to reject or accept is not alone the fruit of valid knowledge, since the determination to be indifferent is also admitted to be the fruit thereof, by those who know the means of valid knowledge; hence the reference of these (texts) to

Though in other places Vedic statements are not seen to be authoritative except in association with an injunction, yet, since the knowledge of the self culminates in the fruit, the authoritative nature of the sacred teaching with that as content cannot be denied. And not

prohibitions like "silver is not to be given (as *dakṣiṇā*) in the *barhis* (sacrifice)" is superfluous. To this he says: "**Though, in other places, Vedic statements**" etc. It is, indeed, understood that the entire Veda is a means to the human goal, because of its being apprehended in consequence of the injunction to study one's own Veda. Not a single letter of it may fail to contribute to the human goal; what, then, of such a combination of words as "he howled" etc.? And no human goal is seen to follow from the very comprehension of their sense, as from the (comprehension of the) Vedāntas. Hence, such combinations of words, desiring to generate a human goal, are certainly expectant (of something else to complete them). The prohibition too "silver is not to be given (as *dakṣiṇā*) in the *barhis* (sacrifice)" is expectant of the censure of what is prohibited by itself; for, not otherwise is it possible to turn away an intelligent being therefrom. Hence, if no (text conveying) censure be available, even at a distance (from itself), the prohibition itself would create for itself a two-fold capacity, in respect of the prohibition of silver and in respect of the censure, like (the injunction of) the *darvi-homa*.[110] Thus, of the two combinations of words "he howled" and "silver is not to be given (as *dakṣiṇā*)

यद्यप्यन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टम्, तथाप्यात्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वान्न तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम्। न

देयम्' इत्यादिनिषेधविधिपरत्वेनैतेषामित्यत आह—**यद्यपि** इति। स्वाध्यायविध्यधीनग्रहणतया हि सर्वो वेदराशिः पुरुषार्थतन्त्र इत्यवगतम्। तत्रैकेनापि वर्णेन नापुरुषार्थेन भवितुं युक्तम्; किं पुनरियता 'सोऽरोदीत्' इत्यादिना पदप्रबन्धेन। न च वेदान्तेभ्य इव तदर्थावगममात्रादेव कश्चित्पुरुषार्थ उपलभ्यते। तेनैष पदसंदर्भः साकाङ्क्ष एवास्ते पुरुषार्थमुदीक्षमाणः। 'बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम्' इत्ययमपि निषेधविधिः स्वनिषेध्यस्य निन्दामपेक्षते; न ह्यन्यथा ततश्चेतनः शक्यो निवर्तयितुम्। तद्यदि दूरतोऽपि न निन्दामवाप्स्यत्ततो निषेधविधिरेव रजतनिषेधे च निन्दायां च दर्विहोमवत्स्वस्य सामर्थ्यद्वयमकल्पयिष्यत्। तदेवमुत्तसयोः 'सोऽरोदीत्' इति

चानुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम्, येनान्यत्र दृष्टं निदर्शनमपेक्ष्येत। तस्मात्सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वम्।

च 'बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम्' इति च पदसंदर्भयोर्लक्ष्यमाणनिन्दाद्वारेण नष्टाश्वदग्धरथवत् परस्परं समन्वयः। न त्वेवं वेदान्तेषु पुरुषार्थापेक्षा, तदर्थावगमादेवानपेक्षात्परमपुरुषार्थ-लाभादित्युक्तम्।

ननु विध्यसंस्पर्शिनो वेदस्यान्यस्य न प्रामाण्यं दृष्टमिति कथं वेदान्तानां तदस्पृशां तद्भविष्यतीत्यत आह—**न चानुमानगम्यं** इति। अबाधितानधिगतासंदिग्धबोधजनकत्वं हि प्रमाणत्वं प्रमाणानाम्; तच्च स्वत इत्युपपादितम्। यद्यपि चैषामीदृग्बोधजनकत्वं कार्यार्थापत्तिसमधि-गम्यम्, तथापि तद्बोधोपजनने मानान्तरं नापेक्षन्ते नापीमामेवार्थापत्तिम्, परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गादिति स्वत इत्युक्तम्। ईदृग्बोधजनकत्वं च कार्ये इव विधीनाम्, वेदान्तानामपि ब्रह्मण्यस्तीति दृष्टान्ता-

through inference is understood the authoritative nature of the sacred teaching, in which case there would be the need for an example seen elsewhere. Therefore it is established that the authority for Brahman is the sacred teaching.

in the *barhis* (sacrifice)," which are on fire as it were (to be completed each by the other), there is, through the channel of the censure implied secondarily, mutual syntactical relation, as between the horseless (chariot) and (the horse) whose chariot has been burnt. Not thus, however, is there dependence on the human goal in the Vedāntas, since, from the very comprehension of their sense, without dependence (on any thing else), the supreme human goal is attained; this has been said.

Now, since authoritativeness is not seen for any other part of the Veda, which is not related to an injunction, how could this (authoritativeness) occur for the Vedāntas, which are not related thereto? To this he says: "**And not through inference is understood**" etc. For, the authoritativeness of the means of valid knowledge consists in their generating knowledge which is unsublated, not already understood, and indubitable; and that, it has been explained, is intrinsic (not made known by anything else, *e.g.*, inference based on practical efficiency). Though the generation of this kind of knowledge is known by presumptive implication from the nature of the effect, yet, in the generation of that knowledge, they do not depend on any other means of valid knowledge, not even this presumptive implication, as (otherwise) reciprocal dependence would result; hence it is said to be intrinsic. The generation of

Here some others confront us: even though the authority for Brahman is the sacred teaching, yet Brahman is intimated by the sacred teaching only as the content of the injunction of contemplation; just as

this kind of knowledge, like that of injunctions in respect of what is to be done, exists for the Vedāntas too in respect of Brahman; hence results their authoritativeness in respect of Brahman, without the need of an example. Otherwise, since it is not seen that colour is manifested by any other sense, (it would follow that) the sense of sight too could not manifest colour. He concludes the present topic: "**Therefore**" etc.

He sets up the view of some of the preceptors: "**Here some others confront us**" etc. It is thus: "The ascertainment of Brahman is from that whose purport is what is to be done, because of the relation (to what is signified) not being known, because of its being sacred teaching, because of its being purposeful, and because of reflection etc. being cognised (as enjoined in connection therewith)." Verily, the Vedāntas cannot have the existent Brahman for purport, their relation thereto (as the signified) not being known. That with reference to which words are not used by a worldly wise person, the relation of them thereto is not apprehended. Nor does the prudent inquirer desire to declare some form alone, which is neither to be rejected nor accepted, as that is not desired to be cognised. In conveying knowledge of that, the cognition of which is not desired, there would be detriment to his prudence. Hence, this worldly wise person, desiring to declare that which is desired to be known, would declare

अत्रापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते—यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म, तथापि प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते;

नपेक्षं तेषां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यं सिद्धं भवति। अन्यथा नेन्द्रियान्तराणां रूपप्रकाशनं दृष्टमिति चक्षुरपि न रूपं प्रकाशयेदिति। प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—**तस्मात्** इति।

आचार्यैकदेशीयानां मतमुत्थापयति—**अत्रापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते** इति। तथा हि—

अज्ञातसंगतित्वेन शास्त्रत्वेनार्थवत्तया।
मननादिप्रतीत्या च कार्यार्थाद्ब्रह्मनिश्चयः॥

न खलु वेदान्ताः सिद्धब्रह्मरूपपरा भवितुमर्हन्ति, तत्राविदितसंगतित्वात्। यत्र हि शब्दा लोकेन न प्रयुज्यन्ते न तत्र तेषां संगतिग्रहः। न चाहेयमनुपादेयं रूपमात्रं कश्चिद्विवक्षति प्रेक्षावान्, तस्याबुभुत्सितत्वात्। अबुभुत्सितावबोधने च प्रेक्षावत्ताविघातः स्यात्। तस्मात् प्रतिपित्सितं प्रतिपिपादयिषन्नयं लोकः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतुभूत-

मेवार्थं प्रतिपादयेत्, कार्यं चावगतं तद्धेतुरिति तदेव बोधयेत्। एवं च वृद्धप्रयोगात् पदानां कार्यपरतामवगच्छति। तत्र किंचित्साक्षात् कार्याभिधायकम्, किंचित्तु कार्यार्थस्वार्थाभिधायकम्; न तु भूतार्थपरता पदानाम्। अपि च नरान्तरस्य व्युत्पन्नस्यार्थप्रत्ययमनुमाय तस्य च पदशब्दभावाभावानुविधानमवगम्य शब्दस्य तद्विषयबोधकत्वं निश्चेतव्यम्। न च भूतार्थरूपमात्रप्रत्यये परनरवर्तिनि किंचिल्लिङ्गमस्ति। कार्यप्रत्यये तु नरान्तरवर्तिनि प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तीस्तो हेतू इत्यज्ञातसंगतित्वान्न ब्रह्मरूपपरा वेदान्ताः।

अपि च वेदान्तानां वेदत्वाच्छास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्धिरस्ति। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपराणां च पदसंदर्भाणां शास्त्रत्वम्। यथाहुः—

> प्रवृत्तिर्वा निवृत्तिर्वा नित्येन कृतकेन वा।
> पुंसां येनोपदिश्येत तच्छास्त्रमभिधीयते॥

इति। तस्माच्छास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्ध्या व्याहतमेषां स्वरूपपरत्वम्।

that thing alone which is the cause of engaging in or desisting from activity, and, since what is to be done when known is the cause thereof, would teach that alone. And thus, from the usage of elderly persons one understands of words that they have for purport what is to be done. Of these, some are directly expressive of what is to be done, while some, however, express their own sense as subsidiary to what is to be done ; but (in any case) words do not have for purport an existent thing. Further, it has to be ascertained in the case of a word that it conveys knowledge of a content, by inferring the cognition of the sense in another man who knows the meaning (of the word), and by understanding the concomitance of that (cognition) with the existence or non-existence of the word. And there is not any *probans* in respect of a cognition existing in another man and relating to the bare form of an existent thing. In the case, however, of the cognition of what is to be done, existing in another man there are *probans*, *viz.*, the engaging in or the cessation from activity ; hence, because of the relation (to the signified) not being known, the Vedāntas do not have the form of Brahman for purport.

Further, of the Vedāntas, as part of the Veda, it is well known that they constitute sacred teaching. And the character of sacred teaching belongs to such combinations of words as have the engaging in or cessation from activity for their purport. As is said: "Engaging in or cessation from activity in respect of the obligatory or the occasioned, that by which these are taught to men is called a sacred teaching." Therefore, their having for purport the (bare) nature (of Brahman) is annulled by their well-known character of being sacred teaching.

that thing alone which is the cause of engaging in or desisting from activity, and, since what is to be done when known is the cause thereof, would teach that alone. And thus, from the usage of elderly persons one understands of words that they have for purport what is to be done. Of these, some are directly expressive of what is to be done, while some, however, express their own sense as subsidiary to what is to be done; but (in any case) words do not have for purport an existent thing. Further, it has to be ascertained in the case of a word that it conveys knowledge of a content, by inferring the cognition of the sense in another man who knows the meaning (of the word), and by understanding the concomitance of that (cognition) with the existence or non-existence of the word. And there is not any *probans* in respect of a cognition existing in another man and relating to the bare form of an existent thing. In the case, however, of the cognition of what is to be done, existing in another man there are *probans*, *viz.*, the engaging in or the cessation from activity; hence, because of the relation (to the signified) not being known, the Vedāntas do not have the form of Brahman for purport.

Further, of the Vedāntas, as part of the Veda, it is well known that they constitute sacred teaching. And the character of sacred teaching belongs to such combinations of words as have the engaging in or cessation from activity for their purport. As is said: "Engaging in or cessation from activity in respect of the obligatory or the occasioned, that by which these are taught to men is called a sacred teaching." Therefore, their having for purport the (bare) nature (of Brahman) is annulled by their well-known character of being sacred teaching.

अपि च न ब्रह्मरूपप्रतिपादनपराणामेषामर्थवत्त्वं पश्यामः। न च 'रज्जुरियं न भुजङ्गः' इति यथाकथंचिल्लक्षणया वाक्यार्थतत्त्वनिश्चयाद्यथा भयकम्पादिनिवृत्तिः, एवम् 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यार्थावगमान्निवृत्तिर्भवति सांसारिकाणां धर्माणाम्, श्रुतवाक्यार्थस्यापि पुंसस्तेषां तादवस्थ्यात्।

अपि च यदि श्रुतब्रह्मणो भवति सांसारिकधर्मनिवृत्तिः कस्मात् पुनः श्रवणस्योपरि मननादयः श्रूयन्ते? तस्मात्तेषां वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादपि न ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरा वेदान्ताः, किं त्वात्मप्रतिपत्तिविषयकार्यपराः। तच्च कार्यं स्वात्मनि नियोज्यं नियुञ्जानं नियोग इति च मानान्तरापूर्वतयापूर्वमिति चाख्यायते। न च विषयानुष्ठानं विना तत्सिद्धिरिति स्वसिद्ध्यर्थं तदेव कार्यं स्वविषयस्य करणस्यात्मज्ञानस्यानुष्ठानमाक्षिपति। यथा च कार्यं स्वविषयाधीननिरूपणमिति ज्ञानेन विषयेण निरूप्यते, एवं ज्ञानमपि स्वविषय-

यथा यूपाहवनीयादीन्यलौकिकान्यपि विधिशेषतया शास्त्रेण समर्प्यन्ते, तद्वत्। कुत एतत्? प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयोजनपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य। तथा हि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदा-

---

मात्मानमन्तरेणाशक्यनिरूपणमिति तन्निरूपणाय तादृशमात्मानमाक्षिपति तदेव कार्यम्। यथाहुः—'यत्तु तत्सिद्ध्यर्थमुपादीयते आक्षिप्यते तदपि विधेयमिति तन्त्रे व्यवहारः' इति। विधेयता च नियोगविषयस्य ज्ञानस्य भावार्थतयानुष्ठेयता; तद्विषयस्य त्वात्मनः स्वरूपसत्ताविनिश्चितिः।

आरोपिततद्भावस्य त्वन्यस्य निरूपकत्वे तेन तन्निरूपितं न स्यात्। तस्मात्तादृगात्मप्रतिपत्तिविधिपरेभ्यो वेदान्तेभ्यः तादृगात्मविनिश्चयः। तदेतत्सर्वमाह—**यद्यपि** इति। विधिपरेभ्योऽपि वस्तुतत्त्वविनिश्चय इत्यत्र निदर्शनमुक्तम्—**यथा यूप** इति। 'यूपे पशुं बध्नाति' इति बन्धनाय

the sacrificial post, the āhavanīya fire etc., even though they are supra-mundane, are intimated by the sacred teaching (only) as subsidiary to an injunction. Whence is this? Because the sacred teaching has for purport the fruit of engaging in an activity or desisting therefrom. So indeed is the quotation from those who know the purport

to be done implies that kind of self. As is said: "But that, which is accepted, *i.e.*, implied for the establishment of that (other, which is enjoined), that too is enjoined; this is the usage of the *tantra* (the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-śāstra*)." And for knowledge, the content of the injunction, injunctiveness consists in the practice of it, in the sense of contemplation; for the self, however, as the content of that (contemplation), (injunctiveness consists in) the certitude of its own existence.

(Objection: it has been said that contemplation may be of what is superimposed; how then can there be the certitude of the existence of what is contemplated?)

(Reply): that on which the nature of that (self) has been superimposed would be the determinant of another (knowledge); hence that (knowledge of the self) would not be determined thereby. Hence, through the Vedāntas which have for purport the injunction of the contemplation of that kind of self, there is the ascertainment of that kind of self. All this he says in "**even though**" etc. In the matter of the ascertainment of the true nature of a thing, even from those which have an injunction for purport, an example is given: "**just as the sacrificial post**" etc. In

of the sacred teaching, "Its purport is indeed seen to be what is called the teaching of ritual" (*Śā.-Bh.*, I, i, 1); "An injunction is a statement which prompts to action" (*Śā.-Bh.*, I, i, 2); "Of this the knowledge comes from an injunction" (*PM.*, I, i, 5); "Of (words) denoting those (existent things), there is relation with that whose purport is ritual." (*PM.*, I, i, 25.) "Since Scripture is for the purpose of ritual, there is futility for whatever has not that purpose." (*PM.*, I, ii, 1.) Hence the sacred teaching is purposeful as prompting a man to a particular object and

respect of the stake enjoined for the tying up in "he is to tie up the beast to the stake," since it is out of the ordinary, there is the question "what is this stake (in substance and shape)?"; from the texts "*khādira* (ebony) becomes the stake," "he fashions the stake," "he is to make the stake octagonal" etc., though having for purport the injunction of acts of carpentry, it is understood that a particular kind of wood purified and fashioned in a particular shape is the stake. Similarly are to be understood the *āhavanīya* etc. The character of sacred teaching belongs to that whose purport is engaging in or cessation from activity, not to that whose purport is the nature (of an existent); the relation (of a significant word) is only to what is to be done, not to the nature; these two grounds are explained by the words of the commentary beginning with **"Because the sacred teaching has for purport"** etc., and ending with **"And because of similarity thereto, for the Vedantas too, there can be purposefulness only in the same**

मनुक्रमणम्—'दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनं नाम' इति; 'चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम्', 'तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः', 'तन्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः', 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्' इति च। अतः पुरुषं क्वचिद्विषयविशेषे प्रवर्तयत्कुताश्चिद्विषयविशेषान्निवर्तयच्चार्थव -

विनियुक्ते यूपे, तस्यालौकिकत्वात्कोऽसौ यूप इत्यपेक्षिते 'खादिरो यूपो भवति', 'यूपं तक्षति', 'यूपमष्टाश्रीकरोति' इत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैस्तक्षणादिविधिपरैरपि संस्काराविष्टं विशिष्टसंस्थानं दारु यूप इति गम्यते। एवमाहवनीयादयोऽप्यवगन्तव्याः। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपरस्य शास्त्रत्वं न स्वरूपपरस्य, कार्य एव च संबन्धो न स्वरूपे, इति हेतुद्वयं भाष्यवाक्येनोपपादितम्—**प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयोजनत्वात्** इत्यादिना **तत्सामान्याद्वेदान्तानामपि तथैवार्थवत्त्वं स्यात्** इत्यन्तेन। न च स्वतन्त्रं कार्यं नियोज्यमधिकारिण-

च्छास्त्रम् । तच्छेषतया चान्यदुपयुक्तम् । तत्सामान्याद्वेदान्तानामपि तथैवार्थवत्त्वं स्यात् । सति च विधिपरत्वे, यथा स्वर्गादिकामस्याग्निहोत्रादिसाधनं विधीयते, एवममृतत्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयत इति युक्तम् ।

मनुष्ठातारमन्तरेणेति नियोज्यभेदमाह—**सति च विधिपरत्वे** इति । 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इति सिद्धवदर्थवादादवगतस्यापि ब्रह्मभवनस्य नियोज्यविशेषाकाङ्क्षायां ब्रह्म बुभूषोर्नियोज्यविशेषस्य रात्रिसत्रन्यायेन प्रतिलम्भः । पिण्डपितृयज्ञन्यायेन तु स्वर्गकामस्य नियोज्यस्य कल्पनायामर्थवादस्यासमवेतार्थतयात्यन्तपरोक्षा वृत्तिः स्यादिति । ब्रह्मभावश्चामृतत्वमिति **अमृतत्वकामस्य** इत्युक्तम् । अमृतत्वं च अमृतत्वादेव न कृतकत्वेन शक्यमनित्यमनुमातुम्, आगमविरोधादिति भावः ।

as withholding him from a particular object. Others are useful as subsidiary thereto. And because of similarity thereto, for the Vedāntas too, there can be purposefulness only in the same way. And there being purport in respect of an injunction, just as for him, who desires heaven, agnihotra etc. are enjoined as the means, similarly for him, who desires immortality, the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined: this stands to reason.

---

way". And since what is to be done is not independent of him who is enjoined, the eligible person who is to practise, he states the particular class of the person enjoined: "**And there being purport in respect of an injunction**" etc. Becoming Brahman is present as already established in the eulogistic passage "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself"; yet, because of the expectancy of the particular class of person enjoined for this (becoming) there results, on the analogy of the *rātrisatra*,[111] the particular class of person enjoined, *viz.*, he who desires to become Brahman. For, if, on the analogy of the *piṇḍa-pitṛ-yajña*,[112] the person enjoined be assumed to be he who desires heaven, that would be the signification of the absolutely remote, as being a sense not related to the eulogistic passage. And since to become Brahman is to be immortal, it is said (in the commentary) "**For him who desires immortality**". And immortality, even because of its being immortality, cannot be inferred to be non-eternal on the ground of being effected, because of conflict with Scripture (otherwise); this is the idea.

Now, here the distinctness of what is desired to be known has been stated: in the ritual section Religious Duty, which is to come into being, is what is desired to be known; but here Brahman, which is existent, which is eternally fulfilled, is what is desired to be known. Of these, the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman should be distinct from the fruit of the knowledge of Religious Duty, which requires an observance.

It cannot possibly be thus; because Brahman is taught only as occasioned by an injunction about something to be done. "The self verily is to be seen" (*Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 5); "That self whose sins are destroyed . . . he is to be sought for, he is to be desired to be known" (*Chānd.*, VIII, vii, 1); "Contemplate as the self alone" (*Bṛh.*, I, iv, 7); "Contemplate the self alone as the true enjoyment" (*Bṛh.*, I, iv, 15); "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself" (*Muṇd.*, III, ii, 9); there being such injunctions, when there is a desire to know, "Who is this self?", "What is that Brahman?", the entire

Through the aforementioned difference in nature between the desires to know Religious Duty and Brahman, he raises the question of (the latter) not being the content of injunctions: "Now, here" etc. He answers: "It cannot possibly be thus" etc. And here, the intuition of the self is not what is enjoined. For, that, because of the verb "see," signifying cognition, should be of the nature of

नन्विह जिज्ञास्यवैलक्षण्यमुक्तम्—कर्मकाण्डे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्यः; इह तु भूतं नित्यनिर्वृत्तं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यमिति। तत्र धर्मज्ञानफलादनुष्ठानसापेक्षाद्विलक्षणं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलं भवितुमर्हति।

नार्हत्येवं भवितुम्, कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात्। 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः'; 'य आत्मापहतपाप्मा . . . . सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः'; 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत'; 'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत'; 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इत्यादिषु विधानेषु सत्सु, 'कोऽसावात्मा?', 'किं तद्ब्रह्म?'

उक्तेन धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोर्वैलक्षण्येन विध्यविषयत्वं चोदयति—**ननु** इति। परिहरति—**नार्हत्येवम्** इति। अत्र चात्मदर्शनं न विधेयम्। तद्धि दृशेरुपलब्धिवचनत्वात् श्रावणं वा स्यात् प्रत्यक्षं वा। प्रत्यक्षमपि लौकिकमहंप्रत्ययो

इत्याकाङ्क्षायां तत्स्वरूपसमर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः—नित्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतो नित्यतृप्तो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावो विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म इत्येवमादयः। तदुपासनाच्च शास्त्रदृष्टोऽदृष्टो मोक्षः फलं भविष्यति। कर्तव्यविध्यननुप्रवेशे तु वस्तुमात्रकथने हानोपादानासंभवात् 'सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती', 'राजासौ गच्छति' इत्यादि वाक्यवद्वेदान्तवाक्यानामानर्थक्यमेव स्यात्।

वा, भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तज वा। तत्र श्रावण न विधेयम्, स्वाध्यायविधिनैवास्य प्रापितत्वात्, कर्मश्रावणवत्। नापि लौकिकं प्रत्यक्षम्, तस्य नैसर्गिकत्वात्। न चौपनिषदात्मविषयं भावनाधेयवैशद्यं विधेयम्, तस्योपासनाविधानादेव वाजिनवदनुनिष्पादितत्वात्। तस्मादौपनिषदात्मोपासना अमृतत्वकामं नियोज्यं प्रति विधीयते। 'द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यादयस्तु विधिसरूपा न विधय इति। तदिदमुक्तम्—**तदुपासनाच्च** इति।

Vedânta is useful in intimating its nature—that Brahman is eternal, omniscient, all-pervasive, eternally contented, eternally pure, intelligent and free by nature, knowledge, bliss and so on. And from the contemplation thereof there will result the invisible fruit, final release, as seen from the sacred teaching. If, however, they do not enter into an injunction of something to be done, and if they be the mere statements of fact, since there can be neither rejection nor acceptance, there would only be futility for the Vedânta texts, as for the statements, "The earth has seven islands," "Here goes the king".

hearing or of perception. And perception too should be either the concept "I," found in ordinary experience, or that which is produced when contemplation attains excellence. Of these, hearing cannot be the object of an injunction, since that, like hearing in respect of rites, is established even by the injunction to study one's own Veda. Nor (can) perception found in ordinary experience (be the object of the injunction), since that is natural. Nor may the object of the injunction be that clarity brought by contemplation to its content, the self propounded in the Upaniṣads, since that (clarity) follows as a by-product even from the injunction of contemplation, like whey.[113] Therefore, the contemplation of the self propounded in the Upaniṣads is prescribed in respect of him who desires immortality, who is the person enjoined. As for the texts "is to be seen" etc., they are what have the appearance of injunctions, not (real) injunctions. This is thus said: "**And from the contemplation thereof**" etc.

Now, even in the case of a mere statement of fact, as in "This is a rope, this is not a snake" etc., purposefulness is seen through the removal of fear generated by delusion. Similarly, here too by the statement of the fact of the self not being a transmigrator, there may be purposefulness through the removal of the delusion of his being a transmigrator.

This would be so, if the delusion of his being a transmigrator could be removed by merely hearing about the nature of Brahman, like the delusion of snake by merely hearing about the nature of the rope. But it is not so removed; because even for him who has heard of Brahman there are found the attributes of a transmigrator, like happiness and misery, as before, and because there is found the injunction of reflection and contemplation subsequent to hearing, in "He is to be heard about, to be reflected on, to be contemplated." Therefore, Brahman should be acknowledged to have sacred teaching as authority only as the content of an injunction of realisation.

"Because of its being purposeful, and because of reflection etc. being cognised": the elaboration of this in the rest (of the commentary) is self-explanatory.

ननु वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि 'रज्जुरियम् नायं सर्पः' इत्यादौ भ्रान्तिजनितभीति-निवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं दृष्टम्। तथेहाप्यसंसार्या-त्मवस्तुकथनेन संसारित्वभ्रान्तिनिवर्तने-नार्थवत्त्वं स्यात्।

स्यादेतदेवम्, यदि रज्जुस्वरूपश्रवण-मात्रेणेव सर्पभ्रान्तिः, संसारित्वभ्रान्ति-र्ब्रह्मस्वरूपश्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तेत। न तु निवर्तते; श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं सुखदुः-खादिसंसारिधर्मदर्शनात्, 'श्रोतव्यो म-न्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' इति च श्रवणोत्तरकालयोर्मननिदिध्यासनयोर्विधि-दर्शनात्। तस्मात्प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति।

अर्थवत्तया मननादिप्रतीत्या चेत्यस्य शेषः प्रपञ्चो निगदव्याख्यातः।

अत्राभिधीयते—न, कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यात्। शारीरं वाचिकं मानसं च कर्म श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धं धर्माख्यम्, यद्विषया जिज्ञासा 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इति सूत्रिता। अधर्मोऽपि हिंसादिः प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणत्वाज्जिज्ञास्यः परिहाराय। तयोश्चोदनालक्षणयोरर्थानर्थयोर्धर्माधर्मयोः फले

तदेकदेशिमतं दूषयति—**अत्राभिधीयते—न** एकदेशिमतम्। कुतः? **कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यात्।** पुण्यापुण्यकर्मणोः फले सुखदुःखे। तत्र मनुष्यलोकमारभ्य आ ब्रह्मलोकात्सुखस्य तारतम्यमधिकाधिकोत्कर्षः। एवं मनुष्यलोकमारभ्य दुःखतारतम्यमा चावीचिलोकात्। तच्च सर्वं कार्यं च विनाशि च। आत्यन्तिकं त्वशरीरत्वमनतिशयं स्वभावसिद्धतया नित्यमकार्यमात्मज्ञानस्य फलम्। तद्धि फलमिव फलम्, अविद्यापनयनमात्रेणाविर्भावात्। एतदुक्तं भवति—त्वयाप्युपासनाविधिपरत्वं वेदान्तानामभ्युपगच्छता

To this it is replied: no, because of the difference in nature between ritual and Brahman, in respect of their knowledge and fruit. Ritual performed by the body, speech or mind is what is called Religious Duty, as established by Scripture and traditional Codes, and the desire to know this object is declared in the aphorism "Then therefore the desire to know Religious Duty". Vices too like killing are to be desired to be known for rejection, being defined by prohibitory injunctions. The fruit of this injunction-defined

This view of some he condemns: "**To this it is replied; no,**" the view of some (is not sound); why not? "**Because of the difference in nature between ritual and Brahman in respect of their knowledge and fruit.**" The fruits of action, meritorious or sinful, are (respectively) happiness and misery. Of these, there are gradations of happiness, rising in degrees of superiority, from the world of men up to that of Brahmā. Similarly, there are degrees of misery, from the world of men down to the hell known as Avīci. And all that is both produced and destructible. The fruit of the knowledge of the self, however, is final, unembodied, unsurpassable, and, being naturally established, it is eternal and unproduced. That, verily, is fruit, as it were, because it is manifested even with the bare removal of Nescience. This is what is said: by you too, who admit the injunction of contemplation as the purport of the Vedāntas, there is recognised what is understood from the Vedānta, *viz.*, the *jīva* naturally being of the nature of Brahman, eternally pure, intelligent etc. And that is not the fruit of an injunction whose content is contemplation,

good and evil, religious duty and vice, are perceptible happiness and misery, which are experienced through the body, speech and the mind, generated by the association of sense-organs with objects, and are well-known from Brahmā down to the immovable objects. In all corporeal beings starting from man and rising to Brahmā, the gradation of happiness is scripturally declared. And therefrom is understood the gradation of its cause, *viz.*, merit. From the gradation of merit follows the gradation of the eligible persons. And the gradation of the eligible persons brought about by desire for fruit, capacity, learning etc. is well-known. Thus, only those who perform

since it is eternal and unproduced. Nor (is the fruit of the injunction) the removal of the veil of beginningless Nescience, since that happens even with the rise of its opposite, *viz.*, knowledge.[114] Nor is the rise of knowledge (the fruit), since that too results for the mind even from its being aided by the impressions produced by contemplation preceded by hearing and reflection. Like the impression of the contemplation, the unseen result of the contemplation too is an auxiliary to the mind; it is, verily, seen that of what is enjoined there is fruit even here (not in a hereafter alone), for example, the fruitfulness even here of the injunctions to the Citrā and Kāriri sacrifices, whose fruits are respectively undefined and defined (in respect of time);[115] if this be said, no (we reply); for, like (the capacity) of the impressions of the contemplation of the meaning of the science of music to produce the intuition of the notes ṣaḍja etc., without the need for an

प्रत्यक्षे सुखदुःखे शरीरवाङ्मनोभिरेवोपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजन्ये ब्रह्मादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु प्रसिद्धे। मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यमनुश्रूयते। ततश्च तद्धेतोर्धर्मस्यापि तारतम्यं गम्यते। धर्मतारतम्यादधिकारितारतम्यम्। प्रसिद्धं चार्थित्वसामर्थ्यविद्वत्तादिकृतमधिकारितार-

नित्यशुद्धबुद्धत्वादिरूपब्रह्मात्मता जीवस्य स्वाभाविकी वेदान्तगम्यार्थीयते। सा चोपासनाविषयस्य विधेर्न फलम्, नित्यत्वादकार्यत्वात्। नाप्यनाद्यविद्यापिधानापनयः, तस्य स्वविरोधिविद्योदयादेव भावात्। नापि विद्योदयः, तस्यापि श्रवणमननपूर्वकोपासनाजनितसंस्कारसचिवादेव चेतसो भावात्। उपासनासंस्कारवदुपासनापूर्वमपि चेतःसहकारि; दृष्टं च खलु नैयोगिकं फलमैहिकमपि, यथा चित्राकारीर्यादिनियोगानामनियतनियतफलानामैहिकफलतेति चेत्, न; गान्धर्वशास्त्रार्थोपासनावासनाया इवापूर्वान-

तम्यम्। तथा च यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधिविशेषादुत्तरेण पथा गमनम्, केवलैरिष्टापूर्तदत्तसाधनैर्धूमादिक्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथा गमनम्, तत्रापि सुखतारतम्यम, तत्साधनतारतम्यं च शास्त्रात् 'यावत्संपातमुषित्वा' इत्यस्माद्गम्यते। तथा मनुष्यादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु सुखलवश्चोदनालक्षणधर्मसाध्य एवेति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः।

पेक्षायाः षड्जादिसाक्षात्कारे वेदान्तार्थोपासनावासनाया जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावसाक्षात्कारेऽनपेक्षाया एव सामर्थ्यात्। तथा चामृतीभावं प्रत्यहेतुत्वादुपासनापूर्वस्य, नामृतत्वकामस्तत्कार्यमवबोद्धुमर्हति। अन्यदिच्छत्यन्यत्करोतीति हि विप्रतिषिद्धम्। न च तत्कामः क्रियामेव कार्यमवगमिष्यति नापूर्वमिति सांप्रतम्; तस्या मानान्तरादेव तत्साधनत्वप्रतीतेर्विधेर्वैयर्थ्यात्। न चावघातादिविधितुल्यता, तत्रापि नियमापूर्वस्यान्यतोऽनवगतेः। न च ब्रह्मभूयादन्यदमृतत्वमार्थवादिकं किंचिदस्ति,

sacrifices etc., can go by the northern path on account of the excellence of knowledge and meditation; through the instrumentality afforded by mere offerings, works of public utility and alms-giving, there is passage along the southern path in the order of smoke etc. Here too the gradation of happiness and the gradation of means thereto are understood from this sacred teaching "After living there till there is consumption". Similarly it is understood that the smallest happiness is possible for beings starting from man down to the inanimate beings only from Religious Duty defined by injunctions, and that it exists in gradations. In the

---

unseen potentiality, there is, for the impressions of the contemplation of the meaning of the Vedānta, the capacity to produce the intuition of the jīva being of the nature of Brahman, even without the need (of an unseen potentiality). And thus, since, for the unseen potentiality of the contemplation, there is no causality in respect of immortality, it is not meet that he who desires immortality should learn that (*apūrva*) as what is to be done. Desiring one thing, he (yet) works for another; this is, indeed, a contradiction. Nor is it admissible to say that he who desires that will understand the act (of contemplation) itself as what is to be done, not its unseen potentiality; for, since the instrumentality of that (contemplation) thereto is cognised even through other means of knowledge, the injunction would be futile. Nor is there parallelism to the injunction to pound (the paddy) etc., since even here the unseen potentiality consequent on the restriction is not understood from any other (text). And there is not any

same way, for corporeal beings, starting either upwards or downwards, since there is found a gradation of misery, there is understood a gradation in respect of its cause, *viz.*, vice, as defined by prohibitory injunctions, and also in respect of those who practise them. Thus in the case of those who have the defect of Nescience etc., gradations of happiness and misery, which are brought about by the gradations of merit and demerit, which are generated in the wake of embodiment, and which are non-eternal and of the nature of transmigration, are well-known from Scripture, traditional Codes and reasoning. And thus the Scripture,

---

immortality taught by an eulogistic passage, other than the becoming Brahman, whereby he who desires it would be eligible for contemplation. In assuming, however, on the analogy of the *viśvajit* sacrifice,[11b] heaven (as the fruit), because of its surpassability and liability to decrease, there will be no permanent fruit of contemplation. Since, therefore, becoming Brahman is manifested even with the removal of the veil of Nescience, since the removal of Nescience occurs even with the knowledge of the sense of the Vedānta culminating in realisation, and since the causing of an impression by contemplation and the impression being an auxiliary to the mind in producing an intuition are established by other means of knowledge, the text "contemplate but as the self" is not an injunction; but it is only what has the appearance of an injunction; just as, for example, texts like "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed to with the *upāṃśu*" are what have the appearance of injunctions, but are not injunctions; this is the sense intended.

तथोर्ध्वगतेष्वधोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःखतारतम्यदर्शनात्तद्धेतोरधर्मस्य प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणस्य तदनुष्ठायिनां च तारतम्यं गम्यते। एवमविद्यादिदोषवतां धर्माधर्मतारतम्यनिमित्तं शरीरोपादानपूर्वकं सुखदुःखतारतम्यमनित्यं संसाररूपं श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम्। तथा च श्रुतिः 'न ह वै

येन तत्काम उपासनायामधिक्रियेत। विश्वजिन्न्यायेन तु स्वर्गकल्पनायां तस्य सातिशयत्वं क्षयिष्णुत्वं चेति न नित्यफलत्वमुपासनायाः। तस्माद्ब्रह्मभूयस्याविद्यापिधानापनयमात्रेणाविर्भावात्, अविद्यापनयस्य च वेदान्तार्थविज्ञानादवगतिपर्यन्तादेव संभवात्, उपासनायाः संस्कारहेतुभावस्य संस्कारस्य च साक्षात्कारोपजनने मनःसाचिव्यरय च मानान्तरसिद्धत्वात्, 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' इति न विधिः; अपि तु विधिसरूपोऽयम्; यथोपांशुयाजवाक्ये 'विष्णुरुपांशु यष्टव्यः' इत्यादयो विधिसरूपा न विधयः—इति तात्पर्यार्थः।

सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति' इति यथावर्णितं संसाररूपमनुवदति। 'अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' इति प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधाच्चोदनालक्षणधर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षाख्यस्याशरीरत्वस्य प्रतिषिध्यते इति गम्यते। धर्मकार्यत्वे हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधो नोपपद्येत। अशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यमिति चेत्, न; तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वात्—'अशरीरꣳ शरीरेषु अनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्। महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति', 'अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रः', 'असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः' इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः। अत एवानुष्ठेयकर्मफलविलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यमशरीरत्वं नित्यमिति सिद्धम्।

श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम् इत्युक्तम्। तत्र श्रुतिं दर्शयति—तथा च श्रुतिः इति। न्यायमाह—अत एव इति। यत्किल स्वाभाविकं तन्नित्यम्, यथा चैतन्यम्; स्वाभाविकं चेदम्; तस्मान्नित्यम्।

"Not verily for him who exists as embodied can there be the destruction of what is pleasing and non-pleasing," restates the nature of transmigration as described above. "Him verily who is non-embodied, what is pleasing and not pleasing do not touch" (*Chānd.*, VIII, xii, 1); since here there is the denial of the touch of what is pleasing and not pleasing, it is understood that for the non-embodiment called final release, there is denied its being the fruit of Religious Duty defined by injunctions. Indeed, if it were the fruit of Religious Duty, the denial of the touch of what is pleasing and not pleasing would be unintelligible. If it be said that non-embodiment itself is the fruit of Religious Duty, no, because it is natural, as understood from Scriptures like "The intelligent one, knowing the self as non-embodied in the body, as permanent in the transient, as great and all-pervasive, does not come to grief" (*Katha.*, II, 22); "Indeed he is without breath, without mind, pure" (*Muṇḍ.*, II, i, 2); "Indeed this self is non-attached." (*Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 15.) Hence it is that the non-embodiment called final release, which is distinct from the fruit of ritual to be observed, is established to be eternal.

It has been said: "**well known from Scripture, traditional Codes and reasoning.**" Of these, he cites Scripture: **And thus the Scripture**" etc. He states the reasoning: "**Hence it is**" etc. Verily, that which is natural is eternal, for example, intelligence; and this is natural; therefore, it is eternal.

Of these, some may be eternal in evolution, in which though subject to transformation, the cognition "This is but that" is not destroyed; for example, earth etc., for those who uphold the universe to be eternal, or, for example, the constituents (*guṇas*), for the Sāṅkhyas. This, however, is absolute, immutably eternal, all-pervasive like the ether, devoid of all modifications, eternally contented, without parts, self-luminous by nature, which merit and demerit together with their fruit do not approach, nor the three times. This is the non-embodiment called final release, because of Scriptures like, "Other than

---

Others, indeed, mention two kinds of eternality—the immutable eternality and the evolving eternality. When (immortality) is said to be eternal, lest it be taken to be eternality of the evolving kind, he says: "Of these, some" etc. For, evolving eternality is not absolute. It is thus: does it evolve as a whole or in part? If it evolve as a whole, how can there be no destruction of its nature? If it evolve in part, is that part different from it or non-different? If it be different, how can the transformation be of that (eternal entity)? Indeed, when one thing is transformed, a different thing is not also transformed, as that would be an undue extension. Or, if it be non-different, how can the transformation be not of the whole?

तत्र किंचित्परिणामिनित्यं स्यात्, यस्मिन्विक्रियमाणेऽपि तदेवेदमिति बुद्धिर्न विहन्यते; यथा पृथिव्यादि जगन्नित्यत्ववादिनाम्, यथा वा सांख्यानां गुणाः। इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनित्यं व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम्, यत्र धर्मा-

परे हि द्वयीं नित्यतामाहुः—कूटस्थनित्यतां परिणामिनित्यतां च। तत्र नित्यमित्युक्ते मा भूदस्य परिणामिनित्यतेत्याह—**तत्र किंचित्** इति। परिणामिनित्यता हि न पारमार्थिकी। तथा हि—तत्सर्वात्मना वा परिणमते एकदेशेन वा? सर्वात्मना परिणामे कथं न तत्त्वव्याहतिः? एकदेशपरिणामे वा स एकदेशस्ततो भिन्नो वा अभिन्नो वा? भिन्नश्चेत् कथं तस्य परिणामः? न ह्यन्यस्मिन् परिणममानेऽन्यः परिणमति, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। अभेदे वा कथं न सर्वात्मना परिणामः?

धर्मो सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते। तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम् 'अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात्। अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः। अतस्तद्ब्रह्म, यस्येयं जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता। तद्यदि कर्तव्यशेषत्वेनोपदिश्येत, तेन च कर्तव्येन साध्यश्चेन्मोक्षोऽभ्युपगम्येत, अनित्य एव स्यात्। तत्रैवं सति यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेष्वनित्येषु कश्चिदतिशयो मोक्ष इति प्रसज्येत। नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैर्मोक्षवादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते। अतो न कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः।

भिन्नाभिन्नं तदिति चेत्; तथा हि—तदेव कारणात्मनाभिन्नम्, भिन्नं च कार्यात्मना, कटकादय इवाभिन्ना हाटकात्मना भिन्नाश्च कटकाद्यात्मना। न च भेदाभेदयोर्विरोधान्नैकत्र समवाय इति युक्तम्। विरुद्धमिति नः क संप्रत्ययः? यत्प्रमाणविपर्ययेण

virtue, other than vice, other than this that is done and not done, other than what has been and what is to be" (*Kaṭha.*, II, 14.) Therefore such is Brahman, the desire to know which is here the context. If that be taught as subsidiary to something to be done, and if final release be acknowledged to be something to be accomplished by that which is to be done, then it would be certainly non-eternal. Then, this being the case, the result would be that final release is only an excellent stage among the graded non-eternal fruits of ritual described above. And final release is acknowledged to be eternal by all who uphold a doctrine of final release. Therefore the teaching of Brahman as subsidiary to what is to be done does not stand to reason.

It may be said to be different and non-different; it is thus: that itself, in its causal aspect is non-different, and is different in the effect-aspect, like bracelets etc., which are non-different in respect of their nature as gold, and different in respect of their nature as bracelets etc. Nor is it meet to say that, because of the opposition of difference and non-difference, there cannot be the inherence of the two in one. Where is it that we have the right cognition of opposition? (In that) which is opposed to the means of valid knowledge.[117]

But that which is understood through the means of valid knowledge, for that that nature alone (is true). In the appositional cognition "This ear-ring is gold," both difference and non-difference are clearly manifest; it is thus: if non-difference were absolute, there would result the appearance of one twice (as subject and as predicate); and if difference were absolute, there would be no apposition, any more than between cow and horse; there is no apposition, where there is a relationship of support and supported or of having the same locus; the pot is never (said to be) the cherry (therein); nor is it said of Caitra and Maitra present on one seat that "Caitra is Maitra"; and it is this unsublated, indubitable, universal appositional cognition that establishes difference and non-difference between the effect and the cause; and thus, since the effects are of the nature of the cause, and since of the cause, whose nature is existence, there is persistence everywhere, there is in the aspect of existence non-difference of the effect, the universe (from the cause); in the effect-aspect as cow, pot etc., there is difference. As is said: "In the effect-aspect, there is difference; non-difference in the causal aspect; for example, in the gold-aspect there is non-difference, in the aspect of ear-ring etc., there is difference."

To this the reply is: what, then, is this which is called difference, which should exist along with non-difference in one place? If it be said to be reciprocal non-existence, does this exist or not between effect and cause, bracelet

वर्तते। यत्तु यथा प्रमाणेनावगम्यते तस्य तथाभाव एव। 'कुण्डलमिदं सुवर्णम्' इति सामानाधिकरण्यप्रत्यये व्यक्तं भेदाभेदौ चकास्तः; तथा हि—आत्यन्तिकेऽभेदेऽन्यतरस्य द्विरवभासप्रसङ्गः; भेदे चात्यन्तिके न सामानाधिकरण्यं गवाश्ववत्; आधाराधेयभावे एकाश्रयत्वे वा न सामानाधिकरण्यम्; न हि भवति कुण्डं बदरमिति; नाप्येकासनस्थयोश्चैत्रमैत्रयोश्चैत्रो मैत्र इति; सोऽयमबाधितोऽसंदिग्धः सर्वजनीनः सामानाधिकरण्यप्रत्यय एव कार्यकारणयोर्भेदाभेदौ व्यवस्थापयति; तथा च कार्याणां कारणात्मत्वात् कारणस्य च सद्रूपस्य सर्वत्रानुगमात्, सद्रूपेणाभेदः कार्यस्य जगतः; भेदः कार्यरूपेण गोघटादिनेति; यथाहुः—

कार्यरूपेण नानात्वमभेदः कारणात्मना।
हेमात्मना यथाभेदः कुण्डलाद्यात्मना भिदा॥ इति।

अत्रोच्यते—कः पुनरयं भेदो नाम, यः सहाभेदेनैकत्र भवेत्? परस्पराभाव इति चेत्, किमयं कार्यकारणयोः कटकहाटकयोरस्ति न

वा? न चेत्, एकत्वमेवास्ति, न च भेदः। अस्ति चेत् भेद एव, नाभेदः। न च भावाभावयोरविरोधः, सहावस्थानासंभवात्। संभवे वा कटकवर्धमानयोरपि तत्त्वेनाभेदप्रसङ्गः, भेदस्याभेदाविरोधात्। अपि च कटकस्य हाटकादभेदे यथा हाटकात्मना कटकमुकुटकुण्डलादयो न भिद्यन्ते एवं कटकात्मनापि न भिद्येरन्, कटकस्य हाटकादभेदात्। तथा च हाटकमेव वस्तुसत् न कटकादयः, भेदस्याप्रतिभासनात्।

अथ हाटकत्वेनैवाभेदो न कटकत्वेन; तेन तु भेद एव कुण्डलादेः।

यदि हाटकादभिन्नः कटकः कथमयं कुण्डलादिषु नानुवर्तते? नानुवर्तते चेत् कथं हाटकादभिन्नः कटकः? ये हि यस्मिन्ननुवर्तमाने व्यावर्तन्ते ते ततो भिन्ना एव, यथा सूत्रात्कुसुमभेदाः। नानुवर्तन्ते चानुवर्तमानेऽपि हाटकत्वे कुण्डलादयः; तस्मात्तेऽपि हाटकाद्भिन्ना एवेति। सत्तानुवृत्त्या च सर्ववस्त्वनुगमे 'इदमिह नेदम्, इदमस्मान्नेदम्, इदमिदानीं नेदम्, इदमेवं नेदम्' इति विभागो

and gold? If not, there is oneness alone, not difference. If it does exist, there is difference alone, not non-difference. Nor is there no opposition between existence and non-existence, as their co-existence is impossible. Or, if it were possible, there would result non-difference as such between the bracelet and the *vardhamāna*,[118] difference not being opposed to non-difference. Further, the bracelet being non-different from gold, just as, in the gold-aspect, bracelets, crowns, ear-rings etc. are not different, so even in the bracelet-aspect they should not differ, because of the non-difference of the bracelet from gold. And thus, gold alone is real, not the bracelet etc., since of the difference there is no manifestation.

Now, (it may be said) only as gold is there non-difference, not as bracelet; as that (bracelet), however, there is but difference from ear-ring etc.

(We ask in reply) if the bracelet is non-different from gold, how is it that this (former) does not recur in ear-ring etc.? And if it does not recur, how is the bracelet non-different from gold? For, those, which are variable when something is recurrent, are certainly different from that, as the different flowers from the string. And though goldness is recurrent, ear-ring etc. are not recurrent; hence, they too are certainly different from gold. If, because of the recurrence of existentiality, all things were non-different, there would be no distinctions like "this is here, not that," "this is from this, not that," "this is now, not that," "this is so, not that" etc., because of the non-existence of any ground for discrimination of anything, in

any place, at any time, in any manner. Further, when from a distance it is understood to be gold, its particularities, as ear-ring etc., would not be desired to be known, because of their non-difference from gold, and because of the latter being known.

Now, since there is difference too of ear-ring etc. from gold, even when gold is known, they are unknown.

Now, since there is non-difference too, why are they not known? On the contrary, knowledge alone is appropriate in their case; for, the absence of the effect (knowledge), in the absence of the cause (non-difference), is the general rule; and that is set aside (here) by the existence of the cause. And since in non-difference there is the existence of the cause, when gold is known, ear-ring etc. are certainly known; hence the desire to know them and the cognitions of them would be futile. Therefore, that which on the apprehension of another is not (itself) apprehended is different from that (other); for example, when the camel is apprehended, the ass, which is not apprehended, (differs) from the camel. And when gold is apprehended from a distance, its particularities, ear-ring etc., are not apprehended; therefore they are different from gold.

How, then, is there the apposition "ear-ring (is) gold"? If this be asked, it has been said that there is no apposition, where there is a relationship of support and supported or of having the same locus. Then, how (to explain) the distinction of recurrence and variability, and the desire to know ear-ring etc., even when gold is known?

न स्यात्, कस्यचित् क्वचित् कदाचित् कथंचिद्विवेकहेतोरभावात्। अपि च दूरात्कनकमित्यवगते न तस्य कुण्डलादयो विशेषा जिज्ञास्येरन्, कनकादभेदात्तेषाम्, तस्य च ज्ञातत्वात्।

अथ भेदोऽप्यस्ति कनकात् कुण्डलादीनामिति कनकावगमेऽप्यज्ञातास्ते।

नन्वभेदोऽप्यस्तीति किं न ज्ञाताः? प्रत्युत ज्ञानमेव तेषां युक्तम्; कारणाभावे हि कार्याभाव औत्सर्गिकः; स च कारणसत्तया अपोद्यते। अस्ति चाभेदे कारणसत्तेति कनके ज्ञाते ज्ञाता एव कुण्डलादय इति तज्जिज्ञासाज्ञानानि चानर्थकानि स्युः। तेन यस्मिन् गृह्यमाणे यन्न गृह्यते तत्ततो भिद्यते; यथा करभे गृह्यमाणेऽगृह्यमाणो रासभः करभात्। गृह्यमाणे च दूरतो हेम्नि न गृह्यन्ते तस्य भेदाः कुण्डलादयः; तस्मात्ते हेम्नो भिद्यन्ते।

कथं तर्हि हेम कुण्डलमिति सामानाधिकरण्यम् इति चेत्, न ह्याधाराधेयभावे समानाश्रयत्वे वा सामानाधिकरण्यमित्युक्तम्। अथानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिव्यवस्था च हेम्नि ज्ञाते कुण्डलादिजिज्ञासा च कथम्?

न खल्वभेदे ऐकान्तिकेऽनैकान्तिके चैतदुभयमुपपद्यते इत्युक्तम्। तस्माद्भेदाभेदयोरन्यतरस्मिन्नवहेयेऽभेदोपादानैव भेदकल्पना, न भेदोपादानाभेदकल्पनेति युक्तम्। भिद्यमानतन्त्रत्वाद्भेदस्य, भिद्यमानानां च प्रत्येकमेकत्वात्, एकाभावे चानाश्रयस्य भेदस्यायोगात्, एकत्वस्य च भेदानधीनत्वात्, नायमयं इति च भेदग्रहस्य प्रतियोगिग्रहसापेक्षत्वात्, एकत्वग्रहस्य चान्यानपेक्षत्वात्, अभेदोपादानैवानिर्वचनीयभेदकल्पनेति सांप्रतम्। तथा च श्रुतिः 'मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इति। तस्मात् कूटस्थनित्यतैव पारमार्थिकी, न परिणामिनित्यतेति सिद्धम्।

व्योमवत् इति च दृष्टान्तः परसिद्धः, अस्मन्मते तस्यापि कार्यत्वेनानित्यत्वात्। अत्र च **कूटस्थनित्यम्** इति निर्वर्त्यकर्मतामपाकरोति। **सर्वव्यापि** इति प्राप्यकर्मताम्। **सर्वविक्रियारहितम्** इति विकार्यकर्मताम्। **निरवयवम्** इति संस्कार्यकर्मताम्। व्रीहीणां खलु प्रोक्षणेन संस्कार्योंऽशो यथा जन्यते, नैवं ब्रह्मणि कश्चिदंशः

It has been said that these two, verily, are not intelligible, if there be non-difference, absolute or non-absolute (*i.e.*, *cum* difference). Therefore, one of the two, difference and non-difference, having to be abandoned, it is on the basis of non-difference that there is the positing of difference; it does not stand to reason that non-difference is posited on a basis of difference. For, difference is dependent on what is differentiated; those which are differentiated are each one; if there were not one, there could be no difference because there would be no locus; and of unity there is no dependence on difference; the apprehension of difference, in the form "not this, (but) this," has need of the apprehension of the counter-correlate, while the apprehension of unity has no need of anything else: for these reasons it is admissible that only on a basis of non-difference is there the positing of indeterminable difference."[171] So too Scripture: "only as clay is this true." Hence, immutable eternity alone is absolute, not evolving eternity; this is established.

The illustration "**like the ether**" is according to the doctrine of others, since in our system that too, being produced, is non-eternal. And here, by the words "**immutably eternal**," he refutes its being an object of achievement; by the words "**all-pervasive**," its being an object of attainment; by the words "**devoid of all modifications**," its being an object of change; by the words "**without parts**," its being an object of purification. Just as, verily, for the rice-grains there is generated, by the sprinkling, an element called purification, not thus is there any element in Brahman, produced by (ritualistic) action, since it has no members (*avayavas*); that is to say, since it has no parts.

Further, there are scriptural texts which, showing final release to follow immediately on the knowledge of Brahman, exclude anything else to be done in between: "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself" (*Muṇḍ.*, III, ii, 9); "And his actions perish when he, the higher and the lower, is seen" (*Muṇḍ.*, II, ii, 8); "He who knows the bliss of Brahman has no fear from anywhere" (*Taitt.*, II, 9); "Verily thou hast, oh Janaka, reached fearlessness" (*Bṛh.*, IV, ii, 4); "Therefore, one knew only the self in the form, 'I am Brahman'; from that all this sprang" (*Vājasaneyibrāhmaṇopaniṣad*,

He states its being the human goal: "**eternally contented.**" By contentment is implied happiness devoid of misery. Contentment, indeed, is happiness conjoined with the cessation of the misery of appetite. And happiness, if not cognised, cannot be a human goal; to this he says: "**self-luminous.**"

Having thus shown through Scripture etc., that the fruit called release, in his own view, is eternal, he elaborates the non-eternality of the release achieved by action: "**If that be taught**" etc. Nor is there sublation by Scripture, since there is intelligibility of Scripture, in the manner mentioned. Further, there are numerous texts, which stand in the way of the view that release, as generated by the unseen potentiality born of knowledge, is consequent on an injunction; thus, he says: "**Further, there are Scriptural texts**" etc. The instrumentality of knowledge in respect of release consists only in the removal of the hindrance of the two kinds of Nescience, not in itself, nor

अपि च 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति', 'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे', 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्न बिभेति कुतश्चन', 'अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि', 'तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति तस्मात्त-

क्रियाधेयोऽस्ति, अनवयवत्वात; अनंशत्वादित्यर्थः। पुरुषार्थतामाह—**नित्यतृप्तम्** इति। तृप्त्या दुःख-रहितं सुखमुपलक्षयति। क्षुद्दुःखनिवृत्तिसहितं हि सुखं तृप्तिः। सुखं चाप्रतीयमानं न पुरुषार्थ इत्यत आह—**स्वयंज्योतिः** इति।

तदेवं स्वमतेन मोक्षाख्यं फलं नित्यं श्रुत्यादि-भिरुपपाद्य क्रियानिष्पाद्यस्य तु मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं प्रसञ्जयति—**तद्यदि** इति। न चागमबाधः, आग-मस्योक्तेन प्रकारेणोपपत्तेः। अपि च ज्ञानजन्या-पूर्वजनितो मोक्षो नैयोगिक इत्यस्यार्थस्य सन्ति भूयस्यः श्रुतयो निवारिका इत्याह—**अपि च ब्रह्म वेद** इति। अविद्याद्वयप्रतिबन्धापनयमात्रेण च विद्याया मोक्षसाधनत्वम्, न स्वतोऽपूर्वोत्पादेन वा

त्सर्वमभवत्', 'तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः' इत्येवमाद्याः श्रुतयो ब्रह्मविद्यानन्तरमेव मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति। तथा 'तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च' इति ब्रह्मदर्शनसर्वात्मभावयोर्मध्ये कर्तव्यान्तरवारणायोदाहार्यम्, यथा 'तिष्ठन्गायति' इति तिष्ठतिगायत्योर्मध्ये तत्कर्तृकं कार्यान्तरं नास्तीति गम्यते। 'त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकमविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि', 'श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति; सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि;

इत्यत्रापि श्रुतीरुदाहरति—त्वं हि नः पिता इति। न केवलमस्मिन्नर्थे श्रुत्यादयः, अपि त्वक्षपादाचार्यसूत्रमपि न्यायमूलमस्तीत्याह—**तथा चाचार्यप्रणीतम्** इति। आचार्यश्चोक्तलक्षणः पुराणे—

आचिनोति च शास्त्रार्थमाचारे स्थापयत्यपि।
स्वयमाचरते यस्मादाचार्यस्तेन चोच्यते॥

I, iv, 10); "Then, what delusion is there, what sorrow is there, for one who has uniformly seen this oneness?" (*Īśa.*, 7) etc. Similarly the following may be cited in order to exclude anything else which has to be done in between the sight of Brahman and becoming the self of all: "Verily, the sage Vāmadeva, seeing him, realised, 'I became Manu and the sun'" (*Bṛh.*, I, iv, 10); just as in "standing, he sings," one understands that between standing and singing there is nothing else for him to do. "Thou indeed art our father, thou who carriest us to the other shore of ignorance" (*Pr.*, VI, 8); "I have indeed heard from those like Your Reverence that one who knows the self crosses sorrow; Your Reverence, I am one in grief; this me, may Your Reverence take across sorrow" (*Chānd.*, VII, i, 3); "To him whose sins are squeezed out,

in the production of an unseen potentiality; for this too, he cites Scriptures: "**Thou indeed art our father**" etc.[120] To this effect, there are not merely Scripture etc., but also the aphorism of the preceptor, Akṣapāda, based on reasoning; thus he says: "**Similarly, there is the aphorism**" etc. And the preceptor is he who has been thus defined in the *purāṇa*: "Because he explains the meaning of the sacred teaching, confirms (his pupils) in the observances, and himself conforms to those observances, he is called preceptor." By such a one has been formulated this

the revered Sanatkumāra shows the other side of darkness" (*Chānd.*, VII, xxvi, 2); these and other scriptural passages show the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman to be merely the cessation of the obstacles to final release.

Similarly there is the aphorism written by the preceptor and supported by reasoning "Of misery, birth, activity, defect and illusory knowledge, by the destruction of each subsequent one, there is the destruction of each earlier one, and consequently final release". And the destruction of illusory knowledge results from the cognition of the oneness of Brahman and the self.

aphorism: "Of misery, birth, activity, defect and illusory knowledge, by the destruction of each subsequent one, there is the destruction of each earlier one, and consequently final release."[121] In the order of mention, the cause is the subsequent, the effect the earlier; on the destruction of the cause there is the destruction of the effect, as when phlegm is destroyed, the fever generated by phlegm is destroyed. On the destruction of birth, there is the destruction of misery; on the destruction of activity, the destruction of birth; on the destruction of defect, the destruction of activity; on the destruction of illusory knowledge, the destruction of defect. And illusory knowledge, which is Nescience, is the primal cause of transmigration, even in the visible manner of generating desire etc.

तं मा भगवाञ्छोकस्य पारं तारयतु', 'तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान्सनत्कुमारः' इति चैवमाद्याः श्रुतयो मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रमेवात्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति।

तथा च आचार्यप्रणीतं न्यायोपबृंहितं सूत्रम्—'दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः' इति। मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानाद्भवति।

इति। तेन हि प्रणीतं सूत्रम्—'दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः' इति। पाठापेक्षया कारणमुत्तरम्, कार्यं च पूर्वम्; कारणापाये कार्यापायः, कफापाये इव कफोद्भवस्य ज्वरस्यापायः। जन्मापाये दुःखापायः; प्रवृत्त्यपाये जन्मापायः; दोषापाये प्रवृत्त्यपायः; मिथ्याज्ञानापाये दोषापायः। मिथ्याज्ञानं चाविद्या रागाद्यु-

पजननक्रमेण दृष्टेनैव संसारस्य परमं निदानम् । सा च तत्त्वज्ञानेन ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेनैवावगतिपर्यन्तेन विरोधिना निवर्त्यते । ततोऽविद्यानिवृत्त्या ब्रह्मस्वरूपाविर्भावो मोक्षः; न तु विद्याकार्यस्तज्जनितापूर्वकार्यो वा—इति सूत्रार्थः। तत्त्वज्ञानान्मिथ्याज्ञानापाय इत्येतावन्मात्रेण सूत्रोपन्यासः; न त्वक्षपादसंमतं तत्त्वज्ञानमिह संमतम् । तदनेनाचार्यान्तरसंवादेनायमर्थो दृढीकृतः ।

स्यादेतत् । नैकत्वविज्ञानं यथावस्थितवस्तुविषयम्, येन मिथ्याज्ञानं भेदावभासं निवर्तयन्न विधिविषयो भवेत्; अपि तु संपदादिरूपम् । तथा च विधेः प्रागप्राप्तं पुरुषेच्छया कर्तव्यं सत् विधिगोचरो भविष्यति; यथा वृत्त्यनन्तत्वेन मनसो विश्वेदेवसाम्याद्विश्वान्देवान्मनसि संपाद्य मन आलम्बनमविद्यमानसमं कृत्वा प्राधान्येन संपाद्यानां विश्वेषामेव देवानामनुचिन्तनम्, तेन चानन्तलोकप्राप्तिः; एवं चिद्रूपसाम्याज्जीवे ब्रह्मरूपं संपाद्य जीवमालम्बनमविद्यमानसमं कृत्वा प्राधान्येन ब्रह्मानु-

And that is removed only by its opposite, *viz.*, knowledge of the truth, the cognition of the unity of Brahman and the self, culminating in realisation. Hence, release is the manifestation of the nature of Brahman, through the removal of Nescience; but it is not the effect of *vidyā* (*i.e.*, contemplation) or the effect of an unseen potentiality generated thereby; this is the meaning of the aphorism. The citation of the aphorism is only to this extent—that from knowledge of the truth there is the destruction of illusory knowledge; that, however, which is acceptable to Akṣapāda as knowledge of the truth, is not here acceptable. Hereby, *i.e.*, by the accord of another preceptor, this sense is confirmed.

Be this so. The cognition of unity does not have for content a thing as it exists, in which case, it would remove illusory knowledge, *i.e.*, the presentation of difference, and itself not be the content of an injunction; but it is of the nature of an imagined identification etc. And thus, being non-established prior to an injunction, and to be accomplished through the desire of the person, it would become the sphere of an injunction; for example, because of the likeness of the mind, through the infinity of its modifications, to the All-gods, the latter are imagined in the mind, the mind which is the support is ignored as if not cognised, and the imagined All-gods alone are principally contemplated, infinite worlds being attained thereby; similarly, because of likeness in the nature of intelligence, the nature of Brahman is imagined in the *jīva*, the *jīva* which is the

Nor is this cognition of the oneness of Brahman and the self of the nature of an imagined identification, as in the case of "Mind verily is infinite, the All-gods are infinite; therefore he conquers an infinite world". Nor is it of the nature of superimposition as in the case of "Contemplate the mind as Brahman," "The sun is Brahman: this is the teaching," where there is superimposition of the contemplation of Brahman in the mind, the sun etc. Nor is it caused by association with a distinctive mode of activity, as in the case of "The air is the devourer," "The vital air is the devourer". It is not also of the nature of purification subsidiary to a ritual like the glance at the ghee. If the cognition

support is ignored as if not cognised, and Brahman is contemplated principally, the fruit of immortality being attained thereby. In superimposition, however, the support being the principal,[122] there is contemplation of that as having the nature superimposed; for example, "Contemplate the mind as Brahman," "The sun is Brahman, this is the teaching"; similarly, in respect of the *jīva*, who is not Brahman, "Contemplate but as Brahman".

Or (the meditation may be) from the association with a distinctive mode of activity; for example "The air, verily, is *samvarga*," "The vital air, verily, is *samvarga*"; the external air-deity is, indeed, the *samvarga*; that, indeed, devours fire etc.; for, at the time of the final

न चेदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं संपद्रूपम्—यथा 'अनन्तं वै मनोऽनन्ता विश्वे देवा अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति' इति। न चाध्यासरूपम्, यथा 'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत', 'आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः' इति च मनआदित्यादिषु ब्रह्मदृष्ट्यध्यासः। नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोगनिमित्तम् 'वायुर्वाव संवर्गः', 'प्राणो वाव संवर्गः' इतिवत्। नाप्याज्यावेक्षणादिकर्मवत्कर्माङ्गसंस्काररू -

चिन्तनम्, तेन चामृतत्वफलप्राप्तिः। अध्यासे त्वालम्बनस्यैव प्राधान्येनारोपिततद्भावस्यानुचिन्तनम्; यथा 'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत', 'आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः'; एवं जीवमब्रह्म 'ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत' इति।

क्रियाविशेषयोगाद्वा, यथा 'वायुर्वाव संवर्गः', 'प्राणो वाव संवर्गः'; बाह्या खलु वायुदेवता संवर्गः; स हि वह्न्यादीन् संवृङ्क्ते; महाप्रलयसमये

हि वायुर्वह्न्यादीन्संवृत्य संहृत्यात्मनि स्थापयति। यथाह द्रविडाचार्यः—'संहरणाद्वा संवरणाद्वा स्वात्मीभावाद्वायुः संवर्गः' इति। अध्यात्मं च प्राणः संवर्ग इति; स हि सर्वाणि वागादीनि संवृङ्क्ते; प्रायणकाले हि स एव सर्वाणीन्द्रियाणि संगृह्योत्क्रामतीति। सेयं संवर्गदृष्टिर्वायौ प्राणे च दशाशागतं जगद्दर्शयति यथा, एवं जीवात्मनि बृंहणक्रियया ब्रह्मदृष्टिस्मृतत्वाय फलाय कल्पत इति। तदेतेषु त्रिष्वपि पक्षेष्वात्मदर्शनोपासनादयः प्रधानकर्माणि, अपूर्वविषयत्वात्, स्तुतशास्त्रवत्; आत्मा तु द्रव्यं कर्मणि गुण इति। संस्कारो वात्मनो दर्शनं विधीयते। यथा दर्शपूर्णमासप्रकरणे 'पत्न्यवेक्षितमाज्यं भवति' इति समाम्नातम्, प्रकरणिना च गृहीतमुपांशुयागाङ्गभूताज्यद्रव्यसंस्कारतया, अवेक्षणं गुणकर्म विधीयते, एवं कर्तृत्वेन ऋत्वङ्गभूते आत्मनि 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' इति दर्शनं गुणकर्म विधीयते, 'यैस्तु द्रव्यं चिकीर्ष्यते गुणस्तत्र प्रतीयेत' इति न्यायात्। अत आह—**न चेदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम्**

deluge, it devours fire etc., destroys them and establishes them in itself. As the Draviḍācārya says: "Because by destruction or by devouring it makes (all things) into itself, the air is *samvarga*." And the internal vital air is *samvarga*; that, indeed, devours all, speech etc.; for, at the time of death, it is that alone, which goes forth collecting together all the organs in itself. Just as the meditation on the air or the vital air as *samvarga* reveals the universe in all ten directions, even so, the meditation of the *jīva* as Brahman, because of the (former's) act of causing to grow, is capable of (producing) the fruit of immortality. On all these three views, contemplation etc. in respect of the intuition of the self, are principal acts, since they have an unseen potentiality for content, like the *stutis* and *śastras*;[123] but the self is a substance subsidiary to the act. Or, intuition may be prescribed as a purification of the self. For example, in the topic concerning the *darśapūrṇamāsa*, the glance, which is mentioned in "Ghee is that which has been glanced at by the (sacrificer's) wife", and which is required by the subject of the topic as a purification of the material, ghee, an accessory of the *upāṃśu* sacrifice, is prescribed as a subsidiary rite; even so, in respect of the self, which as agent is an accessory to the rite, intuition is enjoined as a subsidiary rite, in the words "The self, verily, is to be seen," because of the principle[124] "Those by which the principal substance is desired to be purified, in respect of that (substance), subsidiariness is cognised for them". Hence, he says: **"Nor is this cognition of the oneness of the Brahman and the self"** etc. Why not? **"If the cognition of the oneness of**

of the oneness of Brahman and the self were to be admitted to be of the form of an imagined identification etc., then in the case of statements like "That thou art", "I am Brahman," and "This self is Brahman" violence would be done to the syntactical relation of words whose purport is to declare the fact of the oneness of Brahman and the self. There would be contradiction of scriptural passages like "The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are resolved" (*Muṇḍ.*, II, ii, 8), which declare the fruit, *viz.*, the cessation of Nescience. If it were of the nature of an imagined identification etc., the statements of one becoming Brahman in "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself" (*Muṇḍ.*, III, ii, 9) would not be satisfactorily intelligible. Therefore the cognition of the oneness of Brahman and the self is not of the nature of an imagined identification etc.

Brahman and the self were admitted to be of the form of an imagined identification etc." and so on. Indeed, of the glance at the ghee mentioned in the topic of the *darśapūrṇa-māsa*, it is meet that it should be a purification of the ghee, which is an accessory thereto. And texts like "The self, verily, is to be seen" are not mentioned in any particular topic. The text "He, for whom the ladle is of *parṇa*-wood" etc., is not mentioned in the course of any particular topic; yet the word "ladle" recalls the sacrifice by the sentence, through the channel of the ladle, which has a non-inconstant connection with the sacrifice, (and thus)

पम्। संपदादिरूपे हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने, 'तत्त्वमसि', 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि', 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तुप्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीड्येत; 'भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः' इति चैवमादीन्यविद्यानिवृत्तिफलश्रवणान्युपरुध्येरन्; 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इति चैवमादीनि तद्भावापत्तिवचनानि संपदादिरूपत्वे न सामञ्जस्येनोपपद्येरन्। तस्मान्न संपदादिरूपं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम्।

इति। कुतः? **संपदादिरूपे हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञाने** इति। दर्शपूर्णमासप्रकरणे हि समाम्नातमाज्यावेक्षणं तदङ्गभूताज्यसंस्कार इति युज्यते। न च 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यादि कस्यचित्प्रकरणे समाम्नातम्। न चानारभ्याधीतमपि 'यस्य पर्णमयी जुहूर्भवति' इत्यव्यभिचरितक्रतुसंबन्धजुहूद्वारेण जुहूपदं क्रतुं स्मार-

अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या। किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवद्वस्तुतन्त्रैव। एवंभूतस्य ब्रह्मणस्तज्ज्ञानस्य च न कयाचिद्युक्त्या शक्यः कार्यानुप्रवेशः कल्पयितुम्। न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन कार्यानुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः, 'अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि' इति विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रधिषेधात्, 'येनेदं सर्वं

यद्वाक्येन यथा पर्णतायाः क्रतुशेषभावमापादयति, नैवमात्माप्यव्यभिचरितक्रतुसंबन्धः, येन तद्दर्शनं क्रत्वङ्गं सदात्मानं क्रत्वर्थं संस्कुर्यात्। तेन यद्यप्ययं विधिः, तथापि 'सुवर्णं हिरण्यं भार्यम्' इतिवत् विनियोगभङ्गेन प्रधानकर्मैव, अपूर्वविषयत्वात्, न गुणकर्मेति स्थवीयस्तयैतद्दूषणमनभिधाय सर्वपक्षसाधारणं दूषणमुक्तम्। तदतिरोहितार्थतया न व्याख्यातम्।

किं च ज्ञानक्रियाविषयत्वविधानमस्य बहुश्रुतिविरुद्धमित्याह—**न च विदिक्रिय** इति।

For this reason, the knowledge of Brahman is not dependent on human activity. What then is it? It is dependent on the thing alone, like the knowledge of things which are the content of valid cognitions like perception etc. And, of Brahman of this nature and of the cognition thereof, it is not possible by any reasoning to assume entrance into (the field of) what is to be done. Nor as the object of the act of cognition does Brahman enter into what is to be done; because there is the denial of its being the object of the act of knowing in "It is different from the known, also from the unknown" (*Kena.*, I, 3) and

---

brings about subsidiariness to the sacrifice for being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood. There is not similarly a non-inconstant connection of the self with the sacrifice, whereby the intuition thereof, being subsidiary to the sacrifice, would purify the self for the sake of the sacrifice. Therefore, though this be an injunction, yet because of the failure of the application, as in "Bright gold is to be worn,"[125] and because of having unseen potentiality as its content, this is only a principal rite, not a subsidiary rite (like purification etc.); this criticism being too patent is not stated, only the criticism common to all the positions being stated. Since its sense is not obscure, it is not commented on.

Further, its being an injunction with the act of cognition as content is opposed to numerous Scriptural texts; thus he says: "**Nor as the object of the act of**

"By whom one knows all this, how can one know him?" (*Bṛh.*, II, iv, 14). Similarly, there is also the denial of its being the object of the act of contemplation: after premising the non-objectness of Brahman in "That which is not expressed by speech, by which speech is expressed," (Scripture says), "Know then that alone to be Brahman, not this which is contemplated." (*Kena.*, I, 4). If it be said that if Brahman be not an object, the sacred teaching cannot intelligibly be the source thereof, no; for the sacred teaching has for purport the cessation of the difference posited by Nescience. Indeed, the sacred teaching does not intend to declare its content, Brahman, as "this". What then? It declares Brahman to be a non-object, as being the inner self,

cognition" etc. He objects: "**If Brahman be not an object**" etc. And thence it would be as if an evil spirit arose in the midst of a ceremony to appease (evil spirits); this is the idea. He refutes this: "**No.**" Why not? "**Since the sacred teaching has for purport the cessation of the difference posited by Nescience.**" Indeed, all sentences are not capable of making known differences among things as "this" or "this". For, the differences of sweetness among sugar-cane, milk and jaggery cannot be expressed in words. It must be seen to be similar in all other cases too. Hence, if, even in respect of worldly things established by other means of valid knowledge, this be the fate of words, what then need be said in respect of the inner self, which is transcendent? As for the predication, somehow, in a

विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्' इति च। तथोपास्तिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधोऽपि भवति, 'यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते' इत्यविषयत्वं ब्रह्मण उपन्यस्य, 'तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि, नेदं यदिदमुपासते' इति। अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, न; अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य। न हि शास्त्रमिदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति। किं तर्हि? प्रत्य-

शङ्कते—**अविषयत्वे** इति। ततश्च शान्तिकर्मणि वेतालोदय इति भावः। निराकरोति—**न**। कुतः? **अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात्** इति। सर्वमेव हि वाक्यं नेदंतया वस्तुभेदं बोधयितुमर्हति। न हीक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां मधुररसभेदः शक्य आख्यातुम्। एवमन्यत्रापि सर्वत्र द्रष्टव्यम्। तेन प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धे लौकिके एवार्थे यदा गतिरिदृशी शब्दस्य, तदा कैव कथा प्रत्यगात्मन्यलौकिके।

गात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयत् अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदमपनयति। तथा च शास्त्रम्—'यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः। अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम्', 'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येर्न श्रुतेः श्रोतारं शृणुया न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथा न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः' इति चैवमादि। अतोऽविद्याकल्पितसंसारित्वनिवर्तनेन नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूपसमर्पणान्न मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वदोषः।

अदूरविप्रकर्षेण तु कथंचित्प्रतिपादनमिहापि समानम्। त्वंपदार्थो हि प्रमाता प्रमाणाधीनया प्रमित्या प्रमेयं घटादि व्याप्नोतीत्यविद्याविलसितम्। तदस्य अविषयीभूतोदासीनतत्पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मसामानाधिकरण्येन प्रमातृत्वाभावात् तन्निवृत्तौ प्रमाणादयस्तिस्रो विधा निवर्तन्ते। न हि पक्तुरवस्तुत्वे पाक्यपाकपचनानि वस्तुसन्ति भवितुमर्हन्तीति। तथा हि—

and removes differences like the known, knower, and knowledge posited by Nescience. And thus the sacred teaching: "Conceived of by him by whom it is not conceived of; he, by whom it is conceived of, does not know it; not known to them who (say they) know; known to them who (say they) do not know." (*Kena.*, II, 3); "Thou canst not see the seer of sight, canst not hear the hearer of hearing, canst not think the thinker of the thought, canst not know the knower of the knowledge" (*Brh.*, III, iv, 2) and so on. Therefore through the cessation of migratoriness posited by Nescience, there is the restoration of the nature of the self eternally free; hence for final release there is not the defect of non-eternality.

manner not too remote, that holds equally here. That the denotation of the "thou," the cogniser, through valid knowledge dependent on the means of valid knowledge, pervades the object of knowledge, the pot etc.—this is a manifestation of Nescience. Being in apposition with the inner self, the denotation of the "that," which is not an object and is indifferent, there cannot be cogniserships for it; hence, on the cessation of that, there cease the threefold distinctions of the means of valid knowledge etc. Verily, when the cook is unreal, the object, the result and the process of cooking cannot be real.[126] It is, indeed, thus that there is a verse occurring elsewhere: "When, of the word

But, for him to whom release is something to be produced, it stands to reason, there is the need for something to be done, mental, verbal or physical. So too, if it be a modification. For these two views the non-eternality of release is a certainty. In the world, neither modifications like curd etc., nor things produced like a jar etc. are found to be eternal.

'that,' cured of its external reference, there is identity of significance with the word 'thou,' then, the word 'thou' too, getting the same significance as 'that,' *i.e.*, the pure intelligent self, abandons all the impurities, such as agency, that affect the true substance." To the same effect he cites Scriptures: "**And thus the sacred teaching: 'Conceived of by him'**" etc. He concludes the present topic: "**Therefore, through the cessation of the migratoriness posited by Nescience**" etc.

He deduces the non-eternality of release on the opponent's view: "**But, for him to whom**" etc. What is to be done, *i.e.*, the unseen potentiality, is generated by the operation in respect of sacrifice etc.; that, release needs for its origination. "**For those two views,**" *i.e.*, for the two (views) of achievement and modification. That the momentary cognition is the self, say the Bauddhas. And thus, since the origination of a pure cognition is release, release is what is achieved. For others, however, the

यस्य तूत्पाद्यो मोक्षः, तस्य मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षत इति युक्तम्। तथा विकार्यत्वे च। तयोः पक्षयोर्मोक्षस्य ध्रुवमनित्यत्वम्। न हि दध्यादि विकार्यम्, उत्पाद्यं वा घटादि नित्यं दृष्टं लोके।

विगलितपराग्वृत्त्यर्थत्वं पदस्य तदस्तदा
त्वमिति हि पदेनैकार्थत्वे त्वमित्यपि यत्पदम्।
तदपि च तदा गत्वैकार्थ्यं विशुद्धचिदात्मतां
त्यजति सकलान्कर्तृत्वादीन्पदार्थमलान्निजान्॥

इत्यान्तरश्लोकः। अत्रैवार्थे श्रुतीरुदाहरति,—**तथा च शास्त्रम्—यस्यामतम्** इति। प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—**अतोऽविद्याकल्पित** इति।

परपक्षे मोक्षस्यानित्यतामापादयति—**यस्य तु** इति। कार्यमपूर्वं यागादिव्यापारजन्यम्; तदपेक्षते मोक्षः स्वोत्पत्ताविति। **तयोः पक्षयोः** इति; निर्वर्त्यविकार्ययोः। क्षणिकं विज्ञानमात्मेति बौद्धाः। तथा च विशुद्धविज्ञानोत्पादो मोक्ष इति निर्वर्त्यो

न च आप्यत्वेनापि कार्यापेक्षा ; स्वात्मस्वरूपत्वे सत्यनाप्यत्वात् ; स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वम् ; सर्वगतत्वेन नित्याप्तस्वरूपत्वात्सर्वेण ब्रह्मण आकाशस्येव।

मोक्षः। अन्येषां तु संसाररूपावस्थामपहाय या कैवल्यावस्थावाप्तिरात्मनः स मोक्ष इति विकार्यो मोक्षः; यथा पयसः पूर्वावस्थापहानेनावस्थान्तरप्राप्तिर्विकारो दधीति। तदेतयोः पक्षयोर्न नित्यता मोक्षस्य, कार्यत्वात्, दधिघटादिवत्।

'अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते' इति श्रुतेर्ब्रह्मणो विकृताविकृतदेशभेदावगमादविकृतदेशब्रह्मप्राप्तिरुपासनादिविधिकार्या भविष्यति ; तथा च प्राप्यकर्मता ब्रह्मण इत्यत आह—**न चाप्यत्वेनापि** इति। अन्यदन्येन विकृतदेशपरिहाण्याविकृतदेशं प्राप्यते। तद्यथोपवेलं जलधिरतिबहलचपलकल्लोलमालापरस्परास्फालनसमुल्लसत्फेनपुञ्जस्तबकतया विकृतः, मध्ये तु प्रशान्तसकलकल्लोलोपसर्गः स्वच्छः स्थिरतयाविकृतः, तस्य मध्यमविकृतं

Nor even as what is to be attained is there the need for something to be done; for if it be of the nature of one's own self, it is not what is to be attained; even if different from one's own nature, Brahman is not what is to be attained; because, being all-pervasive, Brahman by nature is eternally attained by all, like the ether.

self's attainment of the state of isolation, after getting rid of the state of transmigration, is release; hence, release is a modification; for example, for milk, the attainment of another state by the abandonment of the former state, is the modification, curd. On these two views, there is no eternality for release, because of (its) being produced, like curd, pot etc.

From the scriptural text "Then, the light which shines beyond the heavens" etc., there are understood of Brahman differences of place, where it is modified and where it is unmodified; hence, the reaching to that place where Brahman is unmodified might become what is to be done by the injunction of contemplation etc.; and thus, there is for Brahman object-ness in respect of attainment. To this he says: "**Nor even as what is to be attained**" etc. By means different from oneself, one abandons the place where there is modification and reaches that where there is none. Thus, for example, the sailor in his boat (leaving behind him) the shores of the sea, which are subject to modification, being characterised by groups of foam produced by the

Nor is final release the purified, in which case there would be the need for an activity. Indeed what is called purification may be either by the addition of merits to what is to be purified, or by the removal of defects. Now, it cannot be by the addition of merits, since final release is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added ; nor by the removal of defects, since final release is of the nature of Brahman eternally pure.

dashing of countless waves, reaches the central portion, which, untroubled by any waves, is calm, pure, steady and consequently unmodified. Since, however, the *jīva* is but Brahman, what is to be attained and by what means ? For, attainment is based on difference ; this is the meaning.

If, now, the *jīva* be different from Brahman, even then, Brahman is not attained, since Brahman, because of his pervasiveness, is eternally attained ; thus he says : "**even if different from one's own nature**" etc.

He refutes the object-ness in respect of purification : "**Nor is final release the purified**" etc. Purifiedness is, indeed, of two kinds : (i) either by the addition of merits ; for example, the colouring of the citron flower with the juice of the lac ; the flower being purified thereby gives rise to fruit of the same colour as lac ; (ii) or by the removal of defects ; for example, the impure surface of a mirror becomes purified and bright through being rubbed with powdered brick. Of these (ways), there cannot be any addition of merits to Brahman. For, is this

नापि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः, येन व्यापारमपेक्षेत। संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कार्यस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्यात्, दोषापनयनेन वा। न तावद्गुणाधानेन संभवति, अनाधेयातिशयब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य; नापि दोषापनयनेन, नित्यशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य।

पौतिकः पोतेन प्राप्नोति। जीवस्तु ब्रह्मैवेति किं केन प्राप्यताम्? भेदाश्रयत्वात्प्राप्तेरित्यर्थः।

अथ जीवो ब्रह्मणो भिन्नस्तथापि न तेन ब्रह्माप्यते, ब्रह्मणो विभुत्वेन नित्यप्राप्तत्वादित्याह— **स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि** इति।

संस्कारकर्मतामपाकरोति — **नापि संस्कार्य** इति। द्वयी हि संस्कार्यता, गुणाधानेन वा, यथा बीजपूरकुसुमस्य लाक्षारसावसेकः; तेन हि तत्कुसुमं संस्कृतं लाक्षारससवर्णं फलं प्रसूते; दोषापनयेन वा; यथा मलिनमादर्शतलं निघृष्टमिष्टकाचूर्णेनोद्भासितभास्वरत्वं संस्कृतं भवति। तत्र न तावद्ब्रह्मणि गुणाधानं संभवति। गुणो हि ब्रह्मणः स्वभावो

स्वात्मधर्म एव सन् तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रिययात्मनि संस्क्रियमाणेऽभिव्यज्यते, यथा आदर्शे निघर्षणक्रियया संस्क्रियमाणे भास्वरत्वं धर्म इति चेत्, न; क्रियाश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेरात्मनः। यदाश्रया क्रिया, तमविकुर्वती नैवात्मानं लभते। यद्यात्मा

वा भिन्नो वा? स्वभावश्चेत् कथमाधेयः, तस्य नित्यवात्। भिन्नत्वे तु कार्यत्वेन मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। न च भेदे धर्मधर्मिभावः, गवाश्ववत्। भेदाभेदश्च व्युदस्तः, विरोधात्। तदनेनाभिसंधिनोक्तम्—**अनाधेयातिशयब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य** इति। द्वितीयं पक्षं प्रतिक्षिपति—**नापि दोषापनयनेन** इति। अशुद्धिः सती दर्पणे निवर्तते; न तु ब्रह्मणि असती निवर्तनीया, नित्यनिवृत्तत्वादित्यर्थः।

शङ्कते—**स्वात्मधर्म एव** इति। ब्रह्मस्वभाव एव मोक्षोऽनाद्यविद्यामलावृत उपासनादिक्रिययात्मनि संस्क्रियमाणेऽभिव्यज्यते, न तु क्रियते। एतदुक्तं

If it be said, "Final release, being of one's own nature, yet having been obscured, becomes manifest on the purification of the self through acts, as, for example, when a mirror is purified through the act of rubbing, its attribute of lustre (becomes manifest)," no; because of the unintelligibility of the self being the locus of an act. That which is the locus of an act, not without modifying it, does that act get its being. If the self were

merit of the nature of Brahman or different? If it be of its nature, how can it be added, that being eternal? If, however, they be different, then, because of being produced, there would result non-eternality for release. Nor can there be the relation of attribute and substrate between differents, like cow and horse. And difference *cum* non-difference has been refuted as contradictory. Because of these considerations, it is said: "**since final release is of the nature of Brahman to which no excellence can be added.**" He refutes the second alternative: "**Nor by the removal of defects**" etc. Impurity, being present in the mirror, is removed; but not being present in Brahman, it cannot be removed, being eternally removed (therefrom): this is the sense.

He objects: "**final release, being of one's own nature**" etc. Release, which is of the very nature of Brahman, being enveloped by beginningless impurity, Nescience, is manifested when the self is purified by acts of contemplation

to be transformed through any act having that as the locus, non-eternality of the self would result. Statements like "This is spoken of as non-transformable" would be sublated. And that is unacceptable. Therefore for the self, there cannot be an act having that as the locus. And since the self is not the object of an act having some other locus, it is not purified thereby.

etc.; but it is not produced. This is what is said: eternal purity is not established of the (individual) self, that being defiled by Nescience in the state of transmigration. He refutes the objection: "**no.**" Why not? "**Because of the unintelligibility of the self being the locus of an act.**" Nescience is located not in Brahman, but in the *jīva*; but that has been said to be indeterminable; hence, Brahman is certainly eternally pure. Admitting impurity, however, he condemns (the view of) its being purified by an act. Indeed, an act may purify Brahman either as inherent in Brahman, just as the rubbing (consisting in) the extensive conjunction and disjunction of brick powder is always inherent in the surface of the mirror; or, as inherent in another. The act is not an attribute of Brahman, since, that (act) being the cause of modification in its locus, there would be destruction of Brahman's eternality. As for what is inherent in another, how can that be of service to something else, since there

स्वाश्रयक्रियया विक्रियेत, अनित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत । 'अविकार्योऽयमुच्यते' इति चैवमादीनि वाक्यानि बाध्येरन् । तच्चानिष्टम् । तस्मान्न स्वाश्रया क्रिया आत्मनः संभवति । अन्याश्रयायास्तु क्रियाया अविषयत्वान्न तयात्मा संस्क्रियते ।

भवति — नित्यशुद्धत्वमात्मनोऽसिद्धम्, संसारावस्थायामविद्यामलिनत्वादिति । शङ्कां निराकरोति— **न** । कुतः? **क्रियाश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेः** । नाविद्या ब्रह्माश्रया, किं तु जीवे; सा त्वनिर्वचनीयेत्युक्तम्; तेन नित्यशुद्धमेव ब्रह्म । अभ्युपेत्य त्वशुद्धिं क्रियासंस्कार्यत्वं दूष्यते । क्रिया हि ब्रह्मसमवेता वा ब्रह्म संस्कुर्यात्, यथा निघर्षणमिष्टकाचूर्णसंयोगविभागप्रचयो निरन्तर आदर्शतलसमवेतः; अन्यसमवेता वा । न तावद्ब्रह्मधर्मः क्रिया, तस्याः स्वाश्रयविकारहेतुत्वेन ब्रह्मणो नित्यत्वव्याघातात् । अन्याश्रया तु कथमन्यस्योपकरोति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न

ननु देहाश्रयया स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतधारणादिकया क्रियया देही संस्क्रियमाणो दृष्टः। न; देहादिसंहतस्यैवाविद्यागृहीतस्यात्मनः संस्क्रियमाणत्वात्। प्रत्यक्षं हि स्नानाचमनादेर्देहसमवायित्वम्। तया देहाश्रयया तत्संहत एव कश्चिदविद्यायात्मत्वेन परिगृहीतः संस्क्रियत इति युक्तम्। यथा देहाश्रयचिकित्सानिमित्तेन धातुसाम्येन तत्संहतस्य तदभिमानिन आरोग्यफलम्, 'अहमरोगः' इति यत्र

हि दर्पणे निघृष्यमाणे मणिर्विशुद्धो दृष्टः। **तच्चानिष्टम्** इति। तदा बाधनं परामृशति।

अत्र व्यभिचारं चोदयति—**ननु देहाश्रयया** इति।

परिहरति—**न देहसंहतस्य** इति। अनाद्यनिर्वाच्याविद्योपधानमेव ब्रह्मणो जीव इति च क्षेत्रज्ञ इति चाचक्षते। स च स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरेन्द्रियादि-

Now, by acts having the body as their locus, such as bathing, sipping, wearing of the sacred thread etc., the embodied is seen to be purified. No; because what is purified is only that self which is associated with the body etc., which is caught hold of by Nescience. Indeed, it is a matter of perception that bathing, sipping etc. inhere in the body. It stands to reason that what is purified by the act having the body as its locus is something which is associated with that (body), and is apprehended as the self through Nescience. Just as through the equilibrium of the humours brought about by treatment having the body as the locus, there is the fruit of health for that which is associated with that body, and has the conceit (in itself) of that (body), where there arises the cognition "I am free from

would be undue extension? When the mirror is rubbed, the gem is not, indeed, seen to be purified. "**And that is unacceptable**": by the "**that**" he refers to the sublation.

He raises the question of an inconstancy here: "**Now, by acts having the body as their locus**" etc.

He answers: "**No.**" It is only the conditioning of Brahman by beginningless indeterminable Nescience that is called the *jīva* or the knower of the field (*kṣetrajña*). And that

disease," similarly, that wherein, through bathing, sipping, wearing of the sacred thread etc,, there arises the cognition "I am clean, purified," that (alone) is purified. And that is certainly associated with the body. It is only by him who has the conceit "I," who is the object of the concept "I," who is the knower, that all the actions are fulfilled. And their fruit he alone enjoys, because there is the Mantra passage, "One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other, not eating, looks on" (*Rv.*, I, 164, 20—*Muṇḍ.*, III, i, 1),

is associated with bodies, subtle and gross, with organs etc.; it is placed in the midst of their aggregate; through non-difference therewith, it is made the content of the concept "I"; therefore, the purification of the body etc., though the attribute of the body etc., may apply to the self, because of the determination of non-difference therefrom; just as the fragrance of the cosmetics is predicated of the damsel. Therefore, here too, the purification is of that alone which is made the content of empirically valid means of knowledge, not of anything else; hence there is no inconstancy. In truth, however, there is neither act nor purification. Since the rest (of the commentary) along with the illustration has been explained even in (explaining) the commentary on superimposition, it is not explained here. "**One of them eats the sweet fruit**": one

बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते, एवं स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीत-धारणादिकया 'अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः' इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते, स संस्क्रियते। स च देहेन संहत एव। तेनैव अहंकर्त्रा अहं-प्रत्ययविषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रिया निर्वर्त्यन्ते। तत्फलं च स एवाश्नाति, 'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्नन्यो-ऽभिचाकशीति' इति मन्त्रवर्णात्; 'आ-

संहतस्तत्संघातमध्यपतितस्तदभेदेनाहमितिप्रत्ययविष-यीभूतः; अतः शरीरादिसंस्कारः शरीरादिधर्मो-ऽप्यात्मनो भवति, तदभेदाध्यवसायात्; यथा अङ्गरागधर्मः सुगन्धिता कामिनीनां व्यपदिश्यते। तेनात्रापि यदाश्रिता क्रिया सांव्यवहारिकप्रमाण-विषयीकृता तस्यैव संस्कारो नान्यस्येति न व्यभि-चारः। तत्त्वतस्तु न क्रिया न संस्कार इति। सनिदर्शनं तु शेषमध्यासभाष्ये एव कृतव्याख्यान-मिति नेह व्याख्यातम्। **तयोरन्यः पिप्पलम्**

त्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः' इति च। तथा 'एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा। कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च' इति, 'स पर्यगाच्छुक्रमकायमव्रणमस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम्' इति च; एतौ मन्त्रावनाधेयातिशयतां नित्यशुद्धतां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयतः। ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः। तस्मान्न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः।

इति। अन्यो जीवात्मा। पिप्पलं कर्मफलम्। **अनश्नन्नन्य** इति। परमात्मा। संहतस्यैव भोक्तृत्वमाह मन्त्रवर्णः—**आत्मेन्द्रिय** इति। अनुपहितशुद्धस्वभावब्रह्मप्रदर्शनपरौ मन्त्रौ पठति—**एको देव** इति। शुक्रं दीप्तिमत्; अव्रणं दुःखरहितम्; अस्नाविरं अविगलितम्, अविनाशीति यावत्। उपसंहरति—**तस्मात्** इति।

also "(The self) as associated with the body, the organs, and the mind, the wise men call the enjoyer". (*Kaṭha.*, I, iii, 4). Similary, "The one God, concealed in all beings, pervading all, the inner self of all beings, the watcher of acts, living in all beings, the witness, the intelligent, alone and free from attributes" (*Śvet.*, VI, 11), "He pervaded all, he who is effulgent, non-embodied, free from misery, indestructible, pure and non-afflicted by sin" (*Īsa.*, 8): these two Mantras show that Brahman cannot have any excellence added to it and that it is eternally pure. And becoming Brahman is final release. Therefore, final release is not also the purified.

is the *jīva*-self; "fruit" is the fruit of karma. "**The other not eating**" etc.; the supreme self. The words of the hymn (*mantra*) declare enjoyership only of what is associated (with the body etc.): "**The self, as associated with the organs, the mind**" etc. He cites two hymns which have the object of showing the unassociated Brahman of pure nature: "**The one god**" etc. *Śukram* means effulgent; *avraṇam* means free from misery; *asnāviram* means undissolved, that is to say, indestructible. He concludes: "**Therefore**" etc.

Other than these, no one can point out any channel through which an act may enter into final release. Therefore, apart from the one (means) knowledge, there cannot intelligibly be any entrance here even for the shadow of an act.

Now, what is called knowledge is a mental act. No; because of difference. Indeed that is what is called an act, wherein there is an injunction even without regard to the nature of the thing, and in dependence

Now, let there not be one of the four forms of object-ness like being achieved etc.; there may be some fifth way in which the object-ness of release may be explained. To this he says: "**Other than these**" etc. Other than these modes, there is no mode, whereby action may come in to (secure) release. This is what is said: being the fruit of action is pervaded by one among the four forms; and this (pervasion), being excluded from release because of the pervader not being seen, excludes (the possibility of) release being the fruit of action. Is there, then, in release no action at all? In that case, all sacred teaching for that purpose and all engaging in activity for that purpose would be futile. To this he says by way of conclusion: "**Therefore, apart from the one (means), knowledge**" etc.

अतोऽन्यन्मोक्षं प्रति क्रियानुप्रवेशद्वारं न शक्यं केनचिद्दर्शयितुम्। तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते।

ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया। न; वैलक्षण्यात्। क्रिया हि नाम सा, यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते, पुरुषचित्त-

---

ननु मा भून्निर्वर्त्यादिकर्मताचतुष्टयी; पञ्चमी तु काचित् विधा भविष्यति, यया मोक्षस्य कर्मता घटिष्यत इत्यत आह—**अतोऽन्यत्** इति। एभ्यः प्रकारेभ्यो न प्रकारान्तरमन्यदस्ति, यतो मोक्षस्य क्रियानुप्रवेशो भविष्यति। एतदुक्तं भवति—चतसृणां विधानां मध्येऽन्यतमतया क्रियाफलत्वं व्याप्तम्; सा च मोक्षाद्व्यावर्तमाना व्यापकानुपलब्ध्या मोक्षस्य क्रियाफलत्वं व्यावर्तयतीति। तर्हि मोक्षे क्रियैव नास्ति? तथा च तदर्थानि शास्त्राणि तदर्थाश्च प्रवृत्तयोऽनर्थकानीत्यत उपसंहारव्याजेनाह—**तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकम्** इति।

व्यापाराधीना च। यथा 'यस्यै देवतायै हविर्गृहीतं स्यात्तां मनसा ध्यायेद्वषट्करिष्यन्' इति, 'संध्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्' इति चैवमादिषु। ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसम्, तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यम्, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात्।

अथ ज्ञानं क्रिया मानसी कस्मान्न विधिगोचरः? कस्माच्च तस्याः फलं निर्वर्त्यादिष्वन्यतमं न मोक्षः? इति चोदयति—**ननु ज्ञानम्** इति। परिहरति—**न**। कुतः? **वैलक्षण्यात्**। अयमर्थः—सत्यम्, ज्ञानं मानसी क्रिया; न त्वियं ब्रह्मणि फलं जनयितुमर्हति, तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशतया विदिक्रियाकर्मभावानुपपत्तेरित्युक्तम्। तदेतस्मिन्वैलक्षण्ये स्थिते एव वैलक्षण्यान्तरमाह—**क्रिया हि नाम सा** इति। **यत्र** विषये **वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते**—यथा देवतासंप्रदानकहविर्ग्रहणे देवतावस्तुस्वरूपानपेक्षा देवताध्यानक्रिया; यथा वा योषिति अग्निवस्त्वनपेक्षाग्निबुद्धिः—**या सा क्रिया हि नाम**

on the mental activity of a person. For example, in cases like "That deity for whom there should be taken up the oblation, that one should contemplate in mind, uttering the word, '*vaṣaṭ*'" (*Ait. Brāh.*, III, viii, 1), "The Evening (deity), one should contemplate in mind" and so on. Contemplation, *i.e.*, thinking about, even though this is mental, still since it is dependent on a person, it may be effected, or not effected, or effected in a different way, by the person. Knowledge, however, is

Now, how can it be that knowledge, which is a mental act, is not the sphere of an injunction? And how can it be that its fruit, release, is not one of those achieved etc.? Thus he asks: "**Now, what is called knowledge**" etc. He answers: "**No.**" Why not? "**Because of difference.**" This is the sense: true, knowledge is a mental act; but this cannot generate fruit in (the nature of) Brahman, since, being self-luminous, that (Brahman) cannot intelligibly be in the relation of an object to an act of cognition; this has been said before. Even when there is this difference, he mentions another difference: "**Indeed, that is what is called an act**" etc. "**Wherein,**" in respect of a content, "**there is an injunction even without regard to the nature of the thing**"—for example, while taking up the oblation intended for the deity who is to receive it, there is no regard for the true nature of the deity in the act of contemplating it; or, in the meditation of fire in (relation to) woman, there is no regard for the real fire—"**indeed that is what is called an act**"; this is

generated by a means of valid knowledge. And a means of valid knowledge has for its content the thing as it exists. Therefore, knowledge cannot be effected or not effected or effected in a different way; it is dependent purely on the thing; it is not dependent on an injunction, nor is it dependent on a person. Therefore, for knowledge, though mental, there is great difference in nature (from an act). In cases like "Man verily is fire, Gautama", "The woman verily is fire Gautama" (*Chānd.*, V, vii, and viii, 1), there arises the cognition, which is mental, of fire in respect of man

---

the construction. The meditation on the deity is not, verily, established prior to the injunction "To whichever deity the offering is made, let him meditate on that, when he is about to say *vaṣaṭ*".[127] But, for him who has studied the Vedānta, who knows words, their sense and the relation (between the two), and understands the true principles relating to verbal testimony, there does result a knowledge of Brahman as the self, from the discourse beginning with "Existence alone" etc., and ending with "That thou art," because of the capacity of testimony to convey valid knowledge, just as from the capacity of the contact between sense and object, there is for the man of attentive mind the experience of the jar present in bright light. This, which is generated by the capacity of its own (causal) aggregate, cannot, verily, be effected in a different way or not effected, at the will of man, like the meditation on the deity, in which case an injunction would be

ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम्। प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम्। अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं न शक्यम्; केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्; न चोदनातन्त्रम्, नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम्। तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षन्यम्। यथा च 'पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः', 'योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः' इत्यत्र योषित्पुरुषयोरग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी भवति।

इति योजना। न हि 'यस्यै देवतायै हविर्गृहीतं स्यात्तां ध्यायेद्वषट्करिष्यन्' इत्यस्माद्विधेः प्राग्देवताध्यानं प्राप्तम्। प्राप्तं त्वधीतवेदान्तस्य विदितपदतदर्थसंबन्धस्याधिगतशब्दन्यायतत्त्वस्य 'सदेव सोम्येदम्' इत्यादेः 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यन्तात्संदर्भात् ब्रह्मात्मभावज्ञानम्, शब्दप्रमाणसामर्थ्यात्, इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षसामर्थ्यादिव प्रणिहितमनसः स्फीतालोकमध्यवर्तिकुम्भानुभवः। न ह्यसौ स्वसामग्रीबललब्धजन्मा मनुजेच्छयान्यथाकर्तुमकर्तुं वा शक्यः, देवताध्यानवत्, येनार्थवानत्र विधिः स्यात्। न

केवलचोदनाजन्यत्वात्तु क्रियैव सा पुरुषतन्त्रा च। या तु प्रसिद्धेऽप्यावम्भिबुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा; नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा। किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तुतन्त्रैवेति ज्ञानमेवैतत्; न क्रिया। एवं सर्वप्रमाणविषयवस्तुषु वेदितव्यम्।

चोपासना वानुभवपर्यन्तता वास्य विधेर्गोचरः, तयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकावधृतसामर्थ्ययोः साक्षात्कारे वा अनाद्यविद्यापनये वा विधिमन्तरेण प्राप्तत्वेन पुरुषेच्छयान्यथाकर्तुमकर्तुं वा अशक्यत्वात्। तस्माद्ब्रह्मज्ञानं मानसी क्रियापि न विधिगोचरः। पुरुषचित्तव्यापाराधीनायास्तु क्रियाया वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षिता क्वचिदविरोधिनी, यथा देवताध्यानक्रियायाः; न ह्यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपेण कश्चिद्विरोधः; क्वचिद्वस्तुस्वरूपविरोधिनी, यथा योषित्पुरुषयोरम्भिबुद्धिः—इत्येतावता भेदेन निदर्शनमिथुनद्वयोपन्यासः। **क्रियैव** इत्येवकारेण वस्तुतन्त्रत्वमपाकरोति।

and woman. This, however, is only an act, dependent on a person, because it is generated solely by an injunction. But the cognition of fire in respect of the well-known fire, that is not dependent on an injunction, nor is it dependent on a person. What then? Being dependent only on the thing which is the content of perception, it is certainly knowledge; it is not an act. One should understand the same in respect of things which are the contents of all means of valid knowledge.

---

purportful here. Nor is contemplation nor its culmination in experience the sphere of the injunction, since intuition or the removal of beginningless Nescience is established through the capacity of these two (contemplation and culmination in experience) as ascertained by co-presence and co-absence, even in the absence of an injunction, and consequently they cannot be effected in a different way or not effected, at the will of man. Hence, the knowledge of Brahman, though a mental act, is not the sphere of an injunction. Of acts dependent on the functioning of the mind of man, the non-regard for the nature of things, is sometimes not opposed (to that nature), as in the case of the meditation on the deity; there is not, indeed, any opposition here to the nature of the thing; sometimes it is opposed to the nature of the thing, like the meditation of fire in man and woman. Because of this much of difference, there are cited the two pairs

This being the case, even the knowledge, whose content is Brahman and the self as they really are, is not dependent on an injunction. Although, in respect of that content, imperatives etc. are found used, yet as having for content that which cannot be enjoined, they become blunt like the edge of a razor etc. applied to a stone etc.; because the content is a thing which cannot be rejected or accepted. For what purpose then are there such passages like, "The self verily, should be seen, heard about," etc., which are shadows of injunctions? We say that they are for the purpose of turning one away from the objects of natural

of illustrations. By the word "**only**" in "**this is only an act**" he denies dependence on the thing.

Now, there are declared injunctions like "Contemplate but as the self". They are not deluded declarations; for, whatever is handed down by successive tradition is alike (in authority); hence, they must be injunctive. To this he says: "**Although in respect of that content imperatives etc.**" and so on. True, imperatives etc. are used; they are not, however, those whose content is the enjoined (*vidhi-viṣayāḥ*),[125] as, if they referred to those, there would result non-authoritativeness. An injunction is, indeed, that whose content is what is to be rejected or accepted. And that alone is what is to be rejected or accepted, which a person can effect or not effect or effect in a different way. And it is he, who is capable in respect of that, that becomes

तत्रैवं सति यथाभूतब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम् । तद्विषये लिङादयः श्रूयमाणा अपि अनियोज्यविषयत्वात्कुण्ठीभवन्ति उपलादिषु प्रयुक्तक्षुरतैक्ष्ण्यादिवत्, अहेयानुपादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात् । किमर्थानि तर्हि 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः' इत्यादीनि विधिच्छायानि वचनानि ? स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिविषयविमुखीकरणार्थानि इति

ननु 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' इत्यादयो विधयः श्रूयन्ते। न च ते प्रमत्तगीताः ; तुल्यं हि सांप्रदायिकम् ; तस्माद्विधेयेनात्र भवितव्यमित्यत आह—— **तद्विषये लिङादय** इति। सत्यं श्रूयन्ते लिङादयः ; न त्वमी विधिविषयाः, तद्विषयत्वेऽप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्। हेयोपादेयविषयो हि विधिः। स एव च हेय उपादेयो वा, यं पुरुषः कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्नोति। तत्रैव च समर्थः कर्ताधिकृतो

ब्रूमः । यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः 'इष्टं मे भूयात्, अनिष्टं मा भूत्, इति, न च तत्रात्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तमात्यन्तिक-पुरुषार्थवाञ्छिनं स्वाभाविककार्यकरणसंघा-तप्रवृत्तिगोचराद्विमुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्रो-तस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यादीनि। तस्यात्मान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तस्याहेयमनुपादेयं चात्मतत्त्वमुपदि-श्यते 'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा', 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत् . . . केन कं विजानीयात् . . . 'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्','अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' इत्यादिभिः।

नियोज्यो भवति । न चैवंभूतान्यात्मश्रवणमननो-पासनदर्शनानीति विषयतदनुष्ठात्रोर्विधिव्यापकयोर-भावाद्विधेरभाव इति प्रयुक्ता अपि लिङादयः प्रवर्तनायामसमर्था उपल इव क्षुरतैक्ष्ण्यं कुण्ठम-

activity. That extrovert, the person who engages in activity saying, "Let me have pleasant things, let me have no unpleasant things," and does not attain therewith the final human goal, him, who desires the final goal, passages like "The self verily is to be seen," turn away from the objects of natural activity, namely the assemblage of effect and cause (*i.e.*, objects and sense-organs) and make him active along the current of the inner self. And for him who engages in the activity of the quest of the self, there is taught by the following passages the true nature of the self, as what cannot be rejected or accepted: "All this, which is that self" (*Bṛh.*, II, iv, 6), "But when all of this is only the self, then by what and whom shall one see . . . by what and whom shall one know? . . . The knower, by what shall one know?" (*Bṛh.*, IV, v, 15), "This self is Brahman" (*Bṛh.*, II, v, 19) etc.

the agent, the eligible person, the person enjoined. And since the hearing, reflection, contemplation and intuition of the self are not of this nature, there is non-existence of the content and the person who observes, which are the pervaders of an injunction; hence, there is the non-existence of the injunction; hence, the imperative suffix etc., though used, are not capable of impelling to activity, and become non-authoritative, as the edge of a

razor (applied) to a stone becomes blunt. **"As having for content that which cannot be enjoined"**; he, indeed, who is capable, is the agent, the eligible person, the person enjoined; but where there is no capacity, there is no agency; hence, he is not eligible, and consequently not the person enjoined; this is the sense.

If, because of the non-existence of an injunction, these are not injunctive statements, for what purpose, then, are these statements, which are the shadows of injunctions? Thus he asks: **"For what purpose, then"** etc. Nor is it meet that they should be futile, as their purport being apprehended in consequence of the injunction to study one's own Veda would, then, be unintelligible; this is the idea. The reply is: **"We say"** etc. It is, indeed, the otherwise established hearing etc., that are re-stated by texts which have the appearance of injunctions. Nor is it, though a re-statement, fruitless, since it produces excellence of activity. It is thus: he, whose heart is distracted by the desire to obtain or avoid what is pleasant or unpleasant, and who is (thus) an extrovert, cannot fix his mind calmly on the inner self. Damming up the current of the mind towards objects by the texts about hearing of the self etc., which have the appearance of injunctions, he opens up the current towards the inner self; hence, for re-statements there is the production of excellence of activity; they being consequently fruitful, their being apprehended in consequence of the injunction to study one's own Veda is certainly intelligible.

प्रमाणीभवन्तीति। **अनियोज्यविषयत्वात्** इति; समर्थो हि कर्ताधिकारी नियोज्यः; असामर्थ्ये तु न कर्तृता; ततो नाधिकृतः, अतो न नियोज्य इत्यर्थः।

यदि विधेरभावान्न विधिवचनानि, किमर्थानि तर्हि वचनान्येतानि विधिच्छायानीति पृच्छति—**किमर्थानि** इति। न चानर्थकानि युक्तानि, स्वाध्यायविध्यधीनग्रहणत्वानुपपत्तेरिति भावः। उत्तरम्—**स्वाभाविक** इति। अन्यतः प्राप्ता एव हि श्रवणादयो विधिसरूपैर्वाक्यैरनूद्यन्ते। न चानुवादोऽप्यप्रयोजनः, प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरत्वात्। तथाहि—तत्तदिष्टानिष्टविषयेप्साजिहासापहृतहृदयतया बहिर्मुखो न प्रत्यगात्मनि मनः समाधातुमर्हति। आत्मश्रवणादिविधिसरूपैस्तु वचनैर्मनसो विषयस्रोतः खिलीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्रोत उद्घाट्यत इति प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरता अनुवादानामस्तीति सप्रयोजनतया स्वाध्यायविध्यधीनग्रहणत्वमुपपद्यत इति।

यदप्यकर्तव्यप्रधानमात्मज्ञानं हानायोपादानाय वा न भवतीति, तत्तथैवेत्यभ्युपगम्यते । अलंकारो ह्ययमस्माकम्, यद्ब्रह्मात्मावगतौ सत्यां सर्वकर्तव्यताहानिः कृतकृत्यता चेति । तथा च श्रुतिः 'आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः । किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्' इति । 'एतद्बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान् स्यात्कृतकृत्यश्च भारत' इति च स्मृतिः । तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिशेषतया ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम् ।

यच्च चोदितमात्मज्ञानमनुष्ठानानङ्गत्वादपुरुषार्थ इति तदयुक्तम्; स्वतोऽस्य पुरुषार्थत्वे सिद्धे यदनुष्ठानानङ्गत्वं तद्दूषणं न दूषणमित्याह—**यदपि** इति । **अनुसंज्वरेत्** शरीरं तप्यमानमनुतप्येत । सुगममन्यत् । प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—**तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्ति** इति ।

Again, as for the statement that the knowledge of the self, not relating primarily to what is to be done, serves neither for acceptance nor rejection, this is acknowledged to be even so. This is indeed an ornament to us, that, when there is the realisation of Brahman, there is the destruction of all obligations and the accomplishment of everything that is to be accomplished. So too says Scripture: "If a person should know the self as 'I am that,' desiring what, for the sake of what, should he suffer in sympathy with the body (that suffers)?" (*Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 12). And there is the traditional Code: "Knowing that, one can become the knower and one who has accomplished all that is to be accomplished, Oh Bhārata." (*Gītā*, XV, 20.) Therefore, not as subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation is there the intimation of Brahman.

As for what was objected that the knowledge of the self, not being subsidiary to an observance, is not a human goal, that does not stand to reason; its being a human a goal being established in its own right, its not being subsidiary to an injunction is a merit, not a defect; thus he says: "**Again, as for**" etc. *Anusañjvaret*, will suffer in sympathy with the body that suffers. The rest is easily understood. He concludes the present topic: "**Therefore, not as subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation**" etc.

That too which some say, "There is no portion of the Veda, which deals with bare things, other than injunctions for engaging in and desisting from activity and what is subsidiary thereto," that is not so; for the self propounded in the Upaniṣads is not subsidiary to anything else. Of that self, understood from the Upaniṣads alone, who does not transmigrate, who is of the nature of Brahman, who is distinct from the four kinds of substances, *i.e.*, the produced etc., who occurs in a topic of his own, who is not subsidiary to any other, it cannot be said that such a one does not exist or that he is not known; because there is the word "self" in "That self is not this, not that," (*Bṛh.*, III ix, 26), and because it is not possible to deny the self; for, even he who denies, even for him there is self-hood.

In order to establish the subject of the topic (*i.e.*, the authoritativeness of the Vedānta in respect of what is existent), he restates the view of some to condemn it: "**That too which some say**" etc. He condemns it: "**that is not so.**" This is the underlying idea: "Just as activity is the *probans* in the knowledge of what is to be done, even so are pleasure etc. in the knowledge of what is existent; thus is purportfulness (for the Vedānta); there is the character of sacred teaching since it teaches what is beneficial." If the capacity of words in respect of the expression of what is to be done or the expression of their own

यदपि केचिदाहुः, प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधितच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण केवलवस्तुवादी वेदभागो नास्तीति, तन्न ; औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वात् । योऽसावुपनिषत्स्वेवाधिगतः पुरुषोऽसंसारी ब्रह्मस्वरूपः उत्पाद्यादिचतुर्विधद्रव्यविलक्षणः स्वप्रकरणस्थोऽनन्यशेषः, नासौ नास्तीति नाधिगम्यत इति वा शक्यं वदितुम् ; 'स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा' इत्यात्मशब्दात् , आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात् ; य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात् ।

प्रकृतसिद्ध्यर्थमेकदेशिमतं दूषयितुमनुभाषते—यदपि केचिदाहुः इति । दूषयति—तन्न इति । इदमत्राकूतम्—

कार्यबोधे यथा चेष्टा लिङ्गं हर्षादयस्तथा ।
सिद्धबोधेऽर्थवत्त्वेवं शास्त्रत्वं हितशासनात् ॥

यदि हि पदानां कार्याभिधाने तदर्थस्वार्थाभिधाने वा नियमेन वृद्धव्यवहारे सामर्थ्यमवधृतं

भवेत्, न भवेदहेयानुपादेयभूतब्रह्मात्मतापरत्वमुपनिषदाम्; तत्राविदितसामर्थ्यत्वात्पदानां लोके, तत्पूर्वकत्वाच्च वैदिकार्थप्रतीतेः। अथ तु भूतेऽप्यर्थे पदानां लोके शक्यः संगतिग्रहः, तत उपनिषदां तत्परत्वं पौर्वापर्यपर्यालोचनयावगम्यमानमपह्नुत्य न कार्यपरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम्, श्रुतहान्यश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात्। तत्र तावदेवमकार्येऽर्थे न संगतिग्रहः, यदि तत्परः प्रयोगो न लोके दृश्येत, तत्प्रत्ययो वा व्युत्पन्नस्योन्नेतुं न शक्येत। न तावत्तत्परः प्रयोगो न दृश्यते लोके, कुतूहलभयादिनिवृत्त्यर्थानामकार्यपराणां पदसंदर्भाणां प्रयोगस्य लोके बहुलमुपलब्धेः। तद्यथा—आखण्डलादिलोकपालचक्रवालाधिवसतिः सिद्धविद्याधरगन्धर्वाप्सरःपरिवारो ब्रह्मलोकावतीर्णमन्दाकिनीपाथःप्रवाहप्रपातधौतकलधौतमयशिलातलो नन्दनादिप्रमदावनविहारिमणिमयशकुन्तकमनीयनिनदमनोहरः पर्वतराजः सुमेरुरिति; नैष भुजङ्गो रज्जुरियमित्यादिः। नापि भूतार्थबुद्धिर्व्युत्पन्नपुरुषवर्तिनी न शक्या समुन्नेतुम्, हर्षादेरुन्नयनहेतोः संभवात्। तथा हि—अविदितार्थ-

subsidiary to that (which is to be done) were settled as a rule in the usage of elderly persons, then, the Upaniṣads would not have for purport Brahman as the self, which is not what is to be rejected or accepted; for such capacity is not known of words in experience, and the cognition of Vaidic sense is preceded by that (*i.e.*, the cognition of their sense in experience). If, however, there can be in experience the apprehension of the relation of words even to existent things, then, in the case of the Upaniṣads, it will not be possible to conceal their having for purport that (existent) as understood from the consideration of what goes before and after, and assume for purport what is to be done; for, thence would result the abandonment of what is directly declared and the assumption of what is not so declared. First, then, there would be no apprehension of a relationship in respect of a sense which is not to be done, (only) if there were not seen in experience any usage with that purport, and if it were not possible to infer the cognition of that in the case of him who knows (the meaning of words).[129] It is not the case that the usage with that as purport is not seen in experience, since there is extensively seen in experience the usage of combinations of words, which have the purpose of (creating) joy or the cessation of fear etc., but have not for purport what is to be done. This is how: the king of mountains, Sumeru, is the abode of the host of guardians of the world, beginning with Indra, together with the retinue of *siddhas*, *vidyādharas*, *gandharvas* and *apsaras*, is composed of rocks of gold washed by the torrent of waters of the Mandākinī falling down from Brahmaloka, and is attractive with the notes of crystalline birds playing in the pleasure gardens like Nandana; (or) this is not a snake, this is a rope; and so on. Nor is it that

there cannot be inferred in the person who knows (the meaning of words) the cognition of an existent thing, since there do occur joy etc., the grounds of inference. It is thus: a Dravidian ignorant of the meaning of the Āryan language, and intent on going to the city, is seated in the house of Devadatta, near the highway; he knows the birth of a son which is a cause of delight to the father; he goes with the herald to Devadatta in the city; he hears the herald say "May thy prosperity increase, Devadatta, a son is born to thee," after making the offering of the *paṭa-vāsa* (a cloth dipped in saffron water in which the infant's feet have been washed); he sees at once the hairs (of Devadatta) stand on end, the eyes and the face bloom like the fully blown lotus; he infers the joy generated in Devadatta and also (infers) of the joy, which was non-existent earlier but arises immediately after hearing these words, that it is caused thereby; he understands that a sense has been stated which is the cause of joy, since this (statement) is not capable of creating joy without teaching a sense which is the cause of joy; and since no other cause of joy is cognised, while the birth of a son as a cause thereof is understood, he determines that that alone was declared by the herald. Similarly are to be exemplified fear, grief etc. And thus because of its being fruitful, the usage of that which expresses the existent thing even by the prudent inquirer is intelligible. This being so, because the knowledge of the nature of Brahman is the cause of the supreme human goal, and because, though not teaching a person's engaging in or desisting from activity, the Vedāntas do teach what is beneficial to man, the character of being sacred teaching is established (for them). Thereby is this established: the texts about which there is dispute have for content what

जनभाषार्थो द्रविडो नगरगमनोद्यतो राजमार्गाभ्यर्णं देवदत्तमन्दिरमध्यासीनः प्रतिपन्नजनकानन्दनिबन्धन-पुत्रजन्मा वार्त्ताहारेण सह नगरस्थदेवदत्ताभ्याशमागतः पटवासोपायनार्पणपुरःसरं 'दिष्ट्या वर्धसे देवदत्त पुत्रस्ते जातः' इति वार्त्ताहारव्याहारश्रवणसमनन्तरमुपजातरोमाञ्चकञ्चुकं विकसितनयनोत्पलमतिस्मेरमुखमहोत्पलमवलोक्य देवदत्तमुत्पन्नप्रमोदमनुमिमीते; प्रमोदस्य च प्रागभूतस्य तद्वचाहारश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रभवतस्तद्धेतुताम्; न चायमप्रतिपादयन् हर्षहेतुमर्थं हर्षाय कल्पत इत्यनेन हर्षहेतुरर्थ उक्त इति प्रतिपद्यते; हर्षहेत्वन्तरस्य चाप्रतीतेः पुत्रजन्मनश्च तद्धेतोरवगमात्तदेव वार्त्ताहारेणाभ्यधायीति निश्चिनोति। एवं भयशोकादयोऽप्युदाहार्याः। तथा च प्रयोजनवत्तया भूतार्थाभिधानस्य प्रेक्षावत्प्रयोगोऽप्युपपन्नः। एवं च ब्रह्मस्वरूपज्ञानस्य परमपुरुषार्थहेतुभावादनुपदिशतामपि पुरुषप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती वेदान्तानां पुरुषहितानुशासनाच्छास्त्रत्वं सिद्धं भवति। तत्सिद्धमेतत्—विवादाध्यासितानि वचनानि भूतार्थविषयाणि, भूतार्थविषयप्रमाजनकत्वात्; यद्य-

द्विषयप्रमाजनकं तत्तद्विषयं, यथा रूपादिविषयं चक्षुरादि ; तथा चैतानि ; तस्मात्तथेति । तस्मात्सुष्ठूक्तम्—**तन्न ; औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वात्** इति । उपनिपूर्वात्सदेर्विशरणार्थात्क्विप्युपनिषत्पदं व्युत्पादितम्, उपनीय अद्वयं ब्रह्म सवासनामविद्यां हिनस्तीति ब्रह्मविद्यामाह ; तद्धेतुत्वाद्वेदान्ता अप्युपनिषदः ; ततो विदितः औपनिषदः पुरुषः ।

एतदेव विभजते—**योऽसावुपनिषत्स्वेव** इति । अहंप्रत्ययविषयाद्भिनत्ति—**असंसारी** इति । अत एव क्रियारहितत्वाच्चतुर्विधद्रव्यविलक्षणः । अतश्च चतुर्विधद्रव्यविलक्षणो यदनन्यशेषः । अन्यशेषं हि भूतं द्रव्यं चिकीर्षितं सदुत्पत्त्याद्याप्यं संभवति, यथा 'यूपं तक्षति' इत्यादि । यत्पुनरनन्यशेषं भूतभाव्युपयोगरहितम्, यथा 'सुवर्णं भार्यम्', 'सक्तून् जुहोति' इत्यादि, न तस्योत्पत्त्याद्याप्यता ।

कस्मात्पुनरस्यानन्यशेषतेत्यत आह — यतः **स्वप्रकरणस्थः** । उपनिषदामनारभ्याधीतानां पौर्वापर्यपर्यालोचनया पुरुषप्रतिपादनपरत्वेन पुरुषस्यैव

is existent, because of their generating valid knowledge about existent things; that which generates valid knowledge about an object has that (object) for its content, for example, the sense of sight etc., having colour etc. for content; so too are these (texts); hence they are so. Therefore, it has been well said: **" that is not so, since the self propounded in the Upanisads is not subsidiary to anything else."** The word " Upaniṣad " is derived from *sat*, with *upa* and *ni* as prefixes meaning destruction and a *kvip* suffix; it declares the knowledge of Brahman, since, taking the non-dual Brahman near (one), it destroys Nescience together with its impressions; because of being the cause thereof, the Vedāntas too are Upaniṣads; he who is known therefrom is the person propounded in the Upaniṣads.

This itself he analyses: **" of that self, understood from the Upanisads alone "** etc. He distinguishes it from the content of the concept " I ": **" who does not transmigrate."** For that very reason, being devoid of activity, he is distinct from the four kinds of substances (the generated, the modified etc.). And therefore, that which is distinct from the four kinds of substances is not subsidiary to anything else. For, it is the existent substance that is subsidiary to another, which, being desired to be done, may be what can be attained (*i.e.*, accomplished) by generation etc., for example, " He fashions the stake " etc. That, again, which is not subsidiary to another, is of the nature of the existent, and devoid of use, for example, " Gold is to be worn," " He is to offer flour (as an oblation) " [180] etc., for that there is no attainment (*i.e.*, accomplishment) by generation etc.

For what other reason, (again), is it not a subsidiary to another? To this he says: For the reason that he **" occurs in a topic of his own "**. Of the Upaniṣads which occur

not in the course of any particular topic (other than their own), (it being seen) through the consideration of what goes before and after that the purport is propounding the person, this topic is principally that of the person alone. And it has been explained that there is not for the person, as in the case of the ladle, a non-inconstant relation with sacrifice. Therefore, it is not possible to say of this one, who occurs in his own topic, who is of that nature (non-transmigrating etc.), who is cognised through Upaniṣads, that he does not exist; this is the sense.

Be this so. Of Brahman, as not the sphere of other means of knowledge, the relation (to words) is not apprehended; hence it is not the meaning of a word; hence, it cannot intelligibly be the meaning of a sentence; how, then, can it be the significance of the Upaniṣad? To this he says: "**because there is the word 'self' in 'that self is not this, not that'.**" Though for the self there is not, as for cow etc., being the sphere of other means of knowledge, yet, being, as it is, the luminous self, it is possible to indicate it as the significance of the sentence, through the destruction of the respective adjuncts, in the same way as gold through the destruction of bracelets, ear-rings etc. It is not, verily, that the luminous self-consciousness does not shine; nor is it that even the aggregate of body and organs which is the defining condition (does not shine). Hence, through the destruction of the respective adjuncts, because of the text "that self is not this, not that," this self-luminous one, because of its greatness and pervasiveness, can be indicated by the sentence as Brahman and the self (Ātmā); this is the sense.

Now, like the refutation of the adjunct, why is there not also refuted the existence of the self that gets conditioned?

प्राधान्येनेदं प्रकरणम्। न च जुह्वादिवदव्यभिचरितक्रतुसंबन्धः पुरुष इत्युपपादितम्। अतः स्वप्रकरणस्थः सोऽयं तथाविध उपनिषद्भ्यः प्रतीयमानो न नास्तीति शक्यो वक्तुमित्यर्थः।

स्यादेतत्। मानान्तरागोचरत्वेनागृहीतसंगतितया अपदार्थस्य ब्रह्मणो वाक्यार्थत्वानुपपत्तेः कथमुपनिषदर्थतेत्यत आह—**स एष नेति नेत्यात्मेत्यात्मशब्दात्**। यद्यपि गवादिवन्मानान्तरगोचरत्वमात्मनो नास्ति, तथापि प्रकाशात्मन एव सतस्तत्तदुपाधिपरिहाण्या शक्यं वाक्यार्थत्वेन निरूपणम्, हाटकस्येव कटककुण्डलादिपरिहाण्या। न हि प्रकाशः स्वसंवेदनो न भासते; नापि तदवच्छेदकः कार्यकरणसंघातः। तेन 'स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा' इति तत्तदवच्छेदपरिहाण्या बृहत्त्वादापनाच्च स्वयंप्रकाशः शक्यो वाक्यात् ब्रह्मेति चात्मेति च निरूपयितुमित्यर्थः।

अथोपाधिनिरासवदुपहितमप्यात्मरूपं कस्मान्न निरस्यत इत्यत आह—**आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात्**। प्रकाशो हि सर्वस्यात्मा

नन्वात्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वादुपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञायत इत्यनुपपन्नम् । न, तत्साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात् । न ह्यहंप्रत्ययविषयकर्तृव्यतिरेकेण तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः सम एकः कूटस्थनित्यः पुरुषो विधिकाण्डे तर्कसमये वा केनचिदधिगतः सर्वस्यात्मा । अतः स

तदधिष्ठानत्वाच्च प्रपञ्चविभ्रमस्य । न चाधिष्ठानाभावे विभ्रमो भवितुमर्हति ; न हि जातु रज्ज्वभावे रज्ज्वां भुजङ्ग इति वा धारेति वा विभ्रमो दृष्टपूर्वः । अपि चात्मनः प्रकाशस्य भासा प्रपञ्चस्य प्रभा । तथा च श्रुतिः 'तमेव भान्तमनु भाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' इति । न चात्मनः प्रकाशस्य प्रत्याख्याने प्रपञ्चप्रथा युक्ता । तस्मादात्मनः प्रत्याख्यानायोगाद्वेदान्तेभ्यः प्रमाणान्तरागोचरसर्वोपाधिरहितब्रह्मस्वरूपावगतिसिद्धिरित्यर्थः ।

उपनिषत्स्वेवावगत इत्यवधारणममृष्यमाण आक्षिपति—**नन्वात्मा** इति । सर्वजनीनाहंप्रत्ययह्यात्मा कर्ता भोक्ता च संसारी, तत्रैव

Now, since the self is the content of the concept "I," it is unintelligible that he can be understood from the Upaniṣads alone. No, because, as the witness thereof, this has been refuted. Indeed, as distinct from the agent who is the content of the concept "I," the witness thereof, that self which is present in all, equal, one, immutably eternal, which is the self of all, has not been understood by anyone either through the liturgical portion (of the Veda) or through ratiocination.

To this he says: "**and because it is not possible to deny the self.**" Luminosity is, indeed, the self of all, since the world-delusion has that for its substrate. Nor can there be a delusion when the substrate is non-existent; never when the rope is non-existent is there seen the delusion as to the rope that it is a snake or a stream. Further, by the light of the self's luminosity is there light for the world. And thus says Scripture: "That shining, all else shines after it; by its light all this shines." Nor when the luminosity of the self is denied, is the manifestation of the world appropriate. Therefore, because of the impossibility of denying the self, there results from the Vedāntas the realisation of the nature of Brahman, which is not the sphere of other means of valid knowledge and is devoid of all adjuncts; this is the sense.

He who cannot put up with the restriction that it is understood from the Upaniṣads alone objects: "**Now, since the self**" etc. The self is, indeed, the content of the

Therefore, him it is not possible for anyone to refute, nor to link up as subsidiary to an injunction. And even because of being the self of all, he is not what is to be rejected or accepted. The entire host of perishable modifications, up to the self, does indeed perish. The self, indeed, because of the non-existence of a cause for perishing, is imperishable; and because of the non-existence of any cause for modification, it is immutably eternal; for this very reason, it is by nature eternally pure, intelligent, free; therefore in (texts like) "There is nothing higher than the self, that is the limit, that is the highest goal", (*Kaṭha*, I, iii, 11), "But I ask about that self propounded in the Upaniṣads" (*Bṛh.*, III, ix, 26), the qualification "propounded in the Upaniṣads" is intelligible (only) when the self is what is revealed principally in the Upaniṣads. Therefore, the statement that there is no part of the Veda which deals with existent things is mere rashness.

concept "I" common to all people; it is agent, enjoyer and transmigrator; for, it is only in this (sense) that the word "self" is used both by the man in the street and by inquirers. The words which are used in experience, the same are used in the Veda too, and the meanings are the same (in both cases); hence, the word "self" in the Upaniṣads too should apply in that (sense) alone, not in any other sense opposed to it; this is the sense.

न केनचित्प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यः, विधिशेषत्वं वा नेतुम्। आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषाम्, न हेयो नाप्युपादेयः। सर्वं हि विनश्यद्विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति। पुरुषो हि विनाशहेत्वभावादविनाशी; विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः; अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः; तस्मात् 'पुरुषान्न परं किंचित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः', 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' इति चौपनिषदत्वविशेषणं पुरुषस्योपनिषत्सु प्राधान्येन प्रकाश्यमानत्वे उपपद्यते। अतो भूतवस्तुपरो वेदभागो नास्तीति वचनं साहसमात्रम्।

च लौकिकपरीक्षकाणामात्मपदप्रयोगात्। य एव लौकिकाः शब्दाः, ते एव वैदिकाः, ते एव च तेषामर्था इत्यौपनिषदमप्यात्मपदं तत्रैव प्रवर्तितुमर्हति, नार्थान्तरे तद्विपरीते इत्यर्थः।

समाधत्ते—**न** अहंप्रत्ययविषय औपनिषदः पुरुषः । कुतः ? **तत्साक्षित्वेन**—अहंप्रत्ययविषयो यः कर्ता कार्यकरणसंघातोपहितो जीवात्मा—तत् साक्षित्वेन, परमात्मनोऽहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वस्य **प्रत्युक्त-त्वात्** । एतदुक्तं भवति—यद्यपि 'अनेन जीवे-नात्मना' इति जीवपरमात्मनोः पारमार्थिकमैक्यम्, तथापि तस्योपहितं रूपं जीवः; शुद्धं तु रूपं तस्य साक्षि; तच्च मानान्तरानधिगतमुपनिषद्गोचर इति । एतदेव प्रपञ्चयति—**न ह्यहंप्रत्ययविषय** इति ।

विधिशेषत्वं वा नेतुं न शक्यः । कुतः ? **आत्मत्वादेव** । न ह्यात्मा अन्यार्थः, अन्यत्तु सर्वमात्मार्थम् । तथा च श्रुतिः 'न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति' इति । अपि चातः सर्वेषामात्म-त्वादेव न हेयो नाप्युपादेयः । सर्वस्य हि प्रपञ्चजा-तस्य ब्रह्मैव तत्त्वमात्मा; न च स्वभावो हेयः, अशक्यहानत्वात्; न चोपादेयः, उपात्तत्वात् । तस्माद्धेयोपादेयविषयौ विधिनिषेधौ न तद्विपरीत-मात्मतत्त्वं विषयीकुरुत इति सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चजात-

He answers: "**No**"; the Person of the Upaniṣads is not the content of the concept "I". Why not? "**Because as the witness thereof**"—he who is the content of the concept "I," the agent, he who is conditioned by the aggregate of body and organs, the *jīva*-self,—as the witness of this, the supreme self's "**this**," being the content of the concept "I", **has been refuted.** This is what is said: though in the words of the text "Having entered in its true nature as the *jīva*, the self" etc., the identity of the *jīva* and the supreme selves is absolute, yet its conditioned form is the *jīva*; but the pure form is its witness; and this, not being understood through other means of knowledge, is the sphere of the Upaniṣad. This itself he elaborates: "**Indeed, as distinct from the agent who is the content of the concept 'I'**" etc.

It is not possible "**to link (it) up as subsidiary to an injunction**". Why not? "**Even because of being the self.**" The self, indeed, is not for the sake of another, but all others are for the sake of the self. And thus says Scripture: "Verily, not for the love of everything is everything dear, but for the love of the self is everything dear." Further, for that very reason of being the self of all, it is not what is to be rejected or accepted. Indeed, of the entire universe, Brahman alone is the true self; nor is one's nature what is to be rejected, since it cannot be rejected; nor is it what is to be accepted, being already attained. Hence, prescriptions and prohibitions, whose contents are what are to be rejected or accepted, do not have the true nature of the self, which is opposed to that,

as their content; consequently, of the entire universe, the self alone is the truth. This he explains: **"The entire host of perishable modifications up to the self does, indeed, perish."** This is the sense: the self, indeed, is absolutely real, being established by Scripture, traditional Code, epics, *purāṇas* and reasoning not opposed to these; the world, however, which is exhibited by beginningless Nescience, is not absolutely real. And that which is absolutely real is the material cause of this, as the real rope is of the modification, *viz.*, the delusion of the snake. Hence it is that there is the perishing of this, which, as indeterminable, is of unstable nature. The self, however, is absolutely real; nor can this be made unreal even by a thousand causes. Not even a thousand craftsmen can make a cloth of a pot; this has been said. Therefore, there is the perishing of all modifications stopping the imperishable self, just as there is the perishing of the silver and the snake stopping at the real nacre and rope. The self, indeed, is the sole truth of the entire host of modifications in the universe. Nor for the self is there perishability, for the reason that it is infinite. To him who says that there may be destruction, he says: **"The self, indeed, because of the non-existence of a cause for perishing"** etc. Indeed, even a thousand causes are not capable of turning one thing into another; this has been said. Now, let not the self in its own nature be what is to be rejected or accepted; but some attribute thereof may be rejected, and some may be accepted; to this he says: **"And because of the non-existence of any cause for modification, it is immutably eternal."** It has been said that not one

स्यात्मैव तत्त्वमिति। एतदुपपादयति—**सर्वं हि विनश्यद्विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति।** अयमर्थः—पुरुषो हि श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणतद्विरुद्धन्यायव्यवस्थापितत्वात्परमार्थसन्; प्रपञ्चस्त्वनाद्यविद्योपदर्शितोऽपरमार्थसन्। यश्च परमार्थसन् असौ प्रकृतिः रज्जुतत्त्वमिव सर्पविभ्रमस्य विकारस्य। अत एवास्यानिर्वाच्यत्वेनादृढस्वभावस्य विनाशः। पुरुषस्तु परमार्थसन्; नासौ कारणसहस्रेणाप्यसन् शक्यः कर्तुम्। न हि सहस्रमपि शिल्पिनो घटं पटयितुमीशत इत्युक्तम्। तस्मादविनाशिपुरुषान्तो विकारविनाशः शुक्तिरज्जुतत्त्वान्त इव रजतभुजङ्गविनाशः। पुरुष एव हि सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चविकारजातस्य तत्त्वम्। न च पुरुषस्यास्ति विनाशो यतोऽनन्तः। विनाशः स्यादित्यत आह—**पुरुषो हि विनाशहेत्वभावात्** इति। न हि कारणानि सहस्रमप्यन्यदन्यथयितुमीशत इत्युक्तम्। अथ मा भूत्स्वरूपेण पुरुषो हेय उपादेयो वा; तदीयस्तु कश्चिद्धर्मो हास्यते, कश्चिच्चोपादास्यत इत्यत आह—**विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः।** त्रिविधोऽपि

यदपि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदामनुक्रमणम्, 'दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्' इत्येवमादि, तत् धर्मजिज्ञासाविषयत्वाद्विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्राभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्। अपि च 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्' इत्येतदेकान्तेनाभ्युपगच्छतां भूतोपदेशानामानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेद्वस्तूपदिशति भव्यार्थत्वेन, कूटस्थनित्यं भूतं नोपदिशतीति को हेतुः? न हि भूतमुपदिश्यमानं क्रिया भवति।

धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामलक्षणो विकारो नास्तीत्युक्तम्। अपि चात्मनः परमार्थसतो धर्मोऽपि परमार्थसन्निति न तस्यात्मवदन्यथात्वं कारणैः शक्यं कर्तुम्। न च धर्मान्यथात्वादन्यो विकारः। तदिदमुक्तम्—**विक्रियाहेत्वभावात्** इति। सुगममन्यत्।

यत्पुनरेकदेशिना शास्त्रविद्वचनं साक्षित्वेनानुक्रान्तं तदन्यथोपपादयति—**यदपि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदामनुक्रमणम्** इति। **'दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः**

That quotation too from those who know the purport of the sacred teaching, "Its purport is indeed seen to be the teaching of rituals" and so on, that has to be understood to refer to sacred teachings of prescriptions and prohibitions, since the content is the desire to know Religious Duty. Further, for those who accept invariably the text, "Since the purpose of the Scripture" etc., there would result the futility of the teaching about existents. If, besides the engaging in and desisting from activity, it teaches existent things, as for the sake of what is to come into being, what is the cause for saying that it does not teach the immutably eternal existent? Indeed the existent that is taught does not turn out to be an act. If it be said that

of the three kinds of modification—consisting of *dharma*, *lakṣaṇa*, and *avasthā*—exists here. Further, since of the absolutely real self the attribute too is absolutely real, the alteration of that, as in the case of the self, cannot be effected by any cause. Nor is there any modification other than the alteration of the attribute. Hence, this is said: **"because of the non-existence of any cause for modification."** The rest is easily understood.

That statement, again, of those who know the sacred teaching, which was cited by some as evidence (of their position), that he explains otherwise: **"That quotation too from those who know the purport of the sacred teaching."** Where it ought to be said "Its purport is, indeed, seen to be the fruitful teaching of the sense," since

since, though not an act, the existent is instrumental to an act, the teaching about an existent is only for the sake of an act, this is not a difficulty; even though for the sake of an act, there is certainly taught the thing which has the capacity to accomplish an act; that it is for the sake of an act is, however, its purpose; with this much alone, the thing does not turn out to be untaught. If it be said to be taught, what (good) will that be to you? The reply is: the teaching about the unknown self-substance too certainly deserves to be of that kind. By the knowledge thereof there results the profit, the cessation of illusory knowledge which is the cause of transmigration; hence there is no difference, from the teaching of objects that are instrumental to an act, in respect of purposefulness.

the desire to know Religious Duty constitutes the topic, and since Religious Duty is of the nature of rites, it is said "the teaching of rites". But it (the statement cited) does not stand in the way of the function of teaching the existent Brahman. Indeed, when Soma Śarman constitutes the topic, the expression of his good qualities does not exclude Viṣṇu Śarman's possession of good qualities. The sacred teaching of prescription has for content the rites prescribed, and the sacred teaching of prohibition has for content the rites prohibited; thus, both have for purport the teaching of rites. Further, there is the statement of the author of the sacred teaching (Jaimini) that "Since

अक्रियात्वेऽपि भूतस्य क्रियासाधनत्वात्क्रियार्थ एव भूतोपदेश इति चेत्, नैष दोषः; क्रियार्थत्वेऽपि क्रियानिर्वर्तनशक्तिमद्वस्तूपदिष्टमेव; क्रियार्थत्वं तु प्रयोजनं तस्य; न चैतावता वस्त्वनुपदिष्टं भवति। यदि नामोपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्यादिति। उच्यते—अनवगतात्मवस्तूपदेशश्च तथैव भवितुमर्हति; तदवगत्या मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारहेतोर्निवृत्तिः प्रयोजनं क्रियत इत्यविशिष्टमर्थवत्त्वं क्रियासाधनवस्तूपदेशेन।

प्रयोजनवदर्थावबोधनम्' इति वक्तव्ये, धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रकृतत्वाद्धर्मस्य च कर्मत्वात् 'कर्मावबोधनम्' इत्युक्तम्। न तु सिद्धरूपब्रह्मावबोधनव्यापारं वेदस्य वारयति। न हि सोमशर्मणि प्रकृते तद्गुणाभिधानं परिसंचष्टे विष्णुशर्मणो गुणवत्ताम्। विधिशास्त्रं विधीयमानकर्मविषयम्; प्रतिषेधशास्त्रं च प्रतिषिध्यमानकर्मविषयमित्युभयमपि कर्मावबोधनपरम्। अपि च 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थ-

त्वात्' इति शास्त्रकृद्वचनम्। तत्रार्थग्रहणं यद्यभिधेयवाचि ततो भूतार्थानां द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामानर्थक्यमनभिधेयत्वं प्रसज्येत; न हि ते क्रियार्था इत्यत आह—**अपि चाम्नायस्य** इति। यद्युच्येत—न हि क्रियार्थत्वं क्रियाभिधेयत्वम्, अपि तु क्रियाप्रयोजनत्वम्; द्रव्यगुणशब्दानां च क्रियार्थत्वेनैव भूतद्रव्यगुणाभिधानम्, न स्वनिष्ठतया। यथाहुः शास्त्रविदः 'चोदना हि भूतं भवन्तम्' इत्यादि। एतदुक्तं भवति, कार्यमर्थमवगमयन्ती चोदना तदर्थं भूतादिकमप्यर्थं गमयतीति—तत्राह—**प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेत्** इति। अयमभिसंधिः—न तावत्कार्यार्थ एव स्वार्थे पदानां संगतिग्रहो नान्यार्थ इत्युपपादितं भूतेऽप्यर्थे व्युत्पत्तिं दर्शयद्भिः। नापि स्वार्थमात्रपरतैव पदानाम्। तथा सति न वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययः स्यात्। न हि प्रत्येकं स्वप्रधानतया गुणप्रधानभावरहितानामेकवाक्यता दृष्टा। तस्मात्पदानां स्वार्थमभिदधतामेकप्रयोजनवत्पदार्थपरतयैकवाक्यता। तथा च तत्तदर्थान्तरविशिष्टैकवाक्यार्थप्रत्यय उपपन्नो भवति।

Scripture signifies rites" etc. Here, if the use of the word "signification (*artha*)" expressed what is denoted, thence would result for substance, quality and action (the defect of) meaninglessness consisting in not being denoted; for, they do not signify what is to be done. To this he says: **"Further, for those who accept invariably the text"** etc. It may be said: to be significant in relation to what is to be done is not to denote what is to be done, but to be of service to that which is to be done; and words relating to substances and qualities denote existent substances and qualities only as subsidiary to what is to be done, not as abiding in themselves. So those who know the sacred teaching say: "An injunctive statement can, indeed, make known the already existent, that which exists, that which will come into being and others of this class." [131] This is what is said (thereby): an injunctive statement, while making known the thing that is to be done, makes known for the sake of that even objects already existent etc. To this he says: **"If, besides the engaging in and desisting from activity, it teaches existent things"** etc. This is what is intended: it has been taught by those who have shown the meaning of words even with reference to existent things that the apprehension of relation (of word to sense) is not in respect of that sense alone of its own which subserves what is to be done, and not in any other sense. Nor is the purport of words only in respect of their own sense (unrelated to that of other words). [132] If that were so, there would be no cognition of the sense of a sentence. For, syntactical unity is not seen among those which are each independently primary and are devoid of the relation of primary and secondary (among themselves). Hence, there is syntactical unity for words, which express their own

sense, through their having for purport a common fruitful word-significance. And thus becomes intelligible the cognition of the single sentence-significance, which is qualified by each respective significance (of the words). As is said by those who know the sacred teaching: "Though the letters directly effect the teaching of the word-significance, yet they do not terminate there fruitlessly; in their activity towards valid knowledge of the sentence-significance, the teaching of the word-significance is an inevitable (intermediary), like the flame of the fuel in cooking." [133] And thus, the cognition of the sentence-significance being intelligible even with words having for purport the conjunction with other significances, there is no rule as to their having for purport the conjunction with what is to be done. And this being the case, there is no defect even in having for purport the nature of the immutably eternal Brahman.

Bhavyam (what is to come into being) is what is to be done. Now, that existent which is taught for the sake of what is to come into being, that is not an existent, since, in the form of what is conjoined to what is to come into being, that is also what is to come into being. To this he says: "**Indeed, the existent that is taught**" etc. Conjunction does not consist in identity; it is, rather, a relation with what is to be done, in the form of what is brought about (the fruit) and that which brings it about. With the process of becoming, however, which has that (relation) for content, (the relation) of existent things is of the form of (that between) activity and causal agent; hence, for existent things there is not the nature of activity; this is the sense.

He objects: "**though not an act**" etc. And thus there is the unintelligibility of the teaching of Brahman, which does not subserve activity and is immutably eternal; this

यथाहुः शास्त्रविदः—

साक्षाद्यद्यपि कुर्वन्ति पदार्थप्रतिपादनम् ।
वर्णास्तथापि नैतस्मिन्पर्यवस्यन्ति निष्फले ॥
वाक्यार्थमितये तेषां प्रवृत्तौ नान्तरीयकम् ।
पाके ज्वालेव काष्ठानां पदार्थप्रतिपादनम् ॥

इति । तथा चार्थान्तरसंसर्गपरतामात्रेण वाक्यार्थ-प्रत्ययोपपत्तौ न कार्यसंसर्गपरत्वनियमः पदानाम् । एवं च सति कूटस्थनित्यब्रह्मरूपपरत्वेऽप्यदोष इति ।

भव्यं कार्यम् । ननु यज्ज्ञेयार्थं भूतमुपदिश्यते न तद्भूतम्, भव्यसंसर्गिणा रूपेण तस्यापि भव्यत्वादित्यत आह—**न हि भूतमुपदिश्यमानम्** इति । न तादात्म्यलक्षणः संसर्गः; किं तु कार्येण सह प्रयोजनप्रयोजनिलक्षणोऽन्वयः । तद्विषयेण तु भावार्थेन भूतार्थानां क्रियाकारकलक्षण इति न भूतार्थानां क्रियात्मत्वमित्यर्थः ।

शङ्कते—**अक्रियात्वेऽपि** इति । एवं चाक्रियार्थकूटस्थनित्यब्रह्मोपदेशानुपपत्तिरिति भावः । परिहरति—**नैष दोषः; क्रियार्थत्वेऽपि** इति । न हि क्रियार्थं भूतमुपदिश्यमानमभूतं भवति, अपि तु

क्रियानिर्वर्तनयोग्यं भूतमेव तत्। तथा च भूतेऽर्थेऽवधृतशक्तयः शब्दाः क्वचित्स्वनिष्ठभूतविषया दृश्यमाना मृत्वा शीर्त्वा वा न कथंचित्क्रियानिष्ठतां गमयितुमुचिताः। न ह्युपहितं शतशो दृष्टमप्यनुपहितं क्वचिद्दृष्टमदृष्टं भवति। तथा च वर्तमानापदेशा अस्तिक्रियोपहिता अकार्यार्था अप्यटवीवर्णकादयो लोके बहुलमुपलभ्यन्ते। एवं क्रियानिष्ठा अपि संबन्धमात्रपर्यवसायिनः; यथा "कस्यैष पुरुषः" इति प्रश्ने उत्तरं "राज्ञः" इति। तथा प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रनिष्ठाः; यथा "कीदृशास्तरवः" इति प्रश्ने उत्तरं "फलिनः" इति। न हि पृच्छता पुरुषस्य वा तरूणां वास्तित्वनास्तित्वे प्रतिपित्सिते; किं तु पुरुषस्य स्वामिभेदस्तरूणां च प्रकारभेदः। प्रष्टुरपेक्षितं चाचक्षाणः स्वामिभेदमेव प्रकारभेदमेव च प्रतिवक्ति, न पुनरस्तित्वम्, तस्य तेनाप्रतिपित्सितत्वात्। उपपादिता च भूतेऽप्यर्थे व्युत्पत्तिः प्रयोजनवति पदानाम्।

चोदयति—**यदि नामोपदिष्टं भूतं किं तव**, उपदेष्टुः श्रोतुर्वा प्रयोजनं **स्यात्**? तस्मा-

is the idea. He answers: "**this is not a difficulty; even though for the sake of an act**" etc. Indeed, the existent, taught as for the sake of activity, does not become other than existent; rather is this, which is capable of achieving the activity, certainly existent. And thus, words, which have been determined to signify existent things, which are seen in some cases to have for content the existent abiding in itself (*i.e.*, without syntactical relation to an act), cannot properly be tortured to signify somehow relation to activity. Verily, though the conditioned be seen a hundred times, the unconditioned seen somewhere does not become unseen (as it were). And thus are extensively seen in experience statements of what is existent, conditioned by the activity (only) of being, though not subservient to activity, such as descriptions of forests etc. Thus, even those which are related to activity terminate with (signifying) a relation alone; for example, to the question "Whose is this man?" the reply is "The king's." Similarly, there are those which are related to the significance of the stem alone; for example, to the question "Of what kind are these trees?" the reply is "Fruit-bearing".[134] Indeed, the existence or non-existence of the man or the trees is not desired to be known by the questioner; rather is it the particular master of the man and the particular kind of the trees. And he who knows what is desired by the questioner replies only as to the particular master or the particular kind, not as to existence, that not being desired to be known by him. And it has been explained that for words there is significance even in respect of fruitful existent things.

He questions: "**If it**" the existent "**be said to be taught, what**" good "**will that be to you**" whether teacher or

listener? Therefore, only that existent which is fruitful should be taught, not that which is fruitless; and Brahman is fruitless, since to that which is indifferent, as devoid of all activity, no serviceability can belong; this is the idea. He answers: "**The reply is: the teaching of the unknown self-substance too certainly deserves to be of that kind,**" *i.e.*, certainly fruitful. The word "and (*ca*)" has the sense of "too (*api*)". This is what is said: though Brahman is indifferent, yet knowledge from verbal testimony relating to that content, such knowledge culminating in realisation, cuts away its opposite, Nescience, the primal cause of transmigration, and is thus fruitful; this is the sense.

Further, even by those who recognise in the case of all words that their purport is what is to be done, it is not possible to recognise in the case of (statements like) "A brahmin is not to be killed," "Liquor is not to be drunk" etc., that they have for purport what is to be done. That which is to be done, having its limits defined by volition, is pervaded by volition, and ceases on the cessation of that, like *śiṃśapa*-ness on the cessation of tree-ness. Volition, indeed, is human effort; and that is determined in dependence on the content. And its content, being of the nature of something to be accomplished, must be a process of becoming, which has an earlier and a later, and helps to bring about something else; (it can be) neither a substance nor a quality. For, the content of volition is that which is directly pervaded by volition; and of substance and quality, which are existent, there is no pervasion by volition. Therefore it is that the author of the sacred teaching says: "Verbs have the sense of becoming; through them is activity to be known."[135] Though for words signifying substance and

द्भूतमपि प्रयोजनवदेवोपदेष्टव्यं नाप्रयोजनम्; अप्रयोजनं च ब्रह्म, तस्योदासीनस्य सर्वक्रियारहितत्वेनानुपकारकत्वात् इति भावः। परिहरति—**उच्यत** इति। **अनवगतात्मवस्तूपदेशश्च तथैव** प्रयोजनवानेव **भवितुमर्हति**। अप्यर्थश्चकारः। एतदुक्तं भवति—यद्यपि ब्रह्मोदासीनम्, तथापि तद्विषयं शाब्दज्ञानमवगतिपर्यन्तं विद्या स्वविरोधिनीं संसारमूलनिदानमविद्यामुच्छिन्दत्प्रयोजनवदित्यर्थः।

अपि च येऽपि कार्यपरत्वं सर्वेषां पदानामास्थिषत, तैरपि 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः', 'न सुरा पातव्या' इत्यादीनां न कार्यपरता शक्या आस्थातुम्। कृत्युपहितमर्यादं हि कार्यं कृत्या व्याप्तं तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तते, शिंशपात्वमिव वृक्षत्वनिवृत्तौ। कृतिर्हि पुरुषप्रयत्नः; स च विषयाधीननिरूपणः। विषयश्चास्य साध्यस्वभावतया भावार्थ एव पूर्वापरीभूतोऽन्योत्पादानुकूलो भवितुमर्हति, न द्रव्यगुणौ। साक्षात्कृतिव्याप्यो हि कृतेर्विषयः; न च द्रव्यगुणयोः सिद्धयोरस्ति कृतिव्याप्यता। अत एव शास्त्रकृद्वचः—'भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दास्तेभ्यः क्रिया

प्रतीयेत' इति। द्रव्यगुणशब्दानां नैमित्तिकावस्थायां कार्यावमर्शेऽपि, भावस्य स्वतः द्रव्यगुणशब्दानां तु भावयोगात्कार्यावमर्श इति भावार्थेभ्य एवापूर्वावगतिः, न द्रव्यगुणशब्देभ्य इति। न च 'दध्ना जुहोति', 'संततमाघारयति' इत्यादिषु दध्यादीनां कार्यविषयता; तत्रापि हि होमाघारभावार्थविषयमेव कार्यम्। न चैतावता 'सोमेन यजेत' इतिवत् दधिसांतत्यादिविशिष्टहोमाघारविधानात्, 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति','आघारमाघारयति' इति तदनुवादः। यद्यप्यत्रापि भावार्थविषयमेव कार्यम्, तथापि भावार्थानुबन्धतया द्रव्यगुणावविषयावपि विधीयेते। भावार्थो हि कारकव्यापारमात्रतयाविशिष्टः कारकविशेषेण द्रव्यादिना विशेष्यत इति द्रव्यादिस्तदनुबन्धः। तथा च भावार्थे विधीयमाने स एव सानुबन्धो विधीयत इति द्रव्यगुणावविषयावपि तदनुबन्धतया विहितौ भवतः। एवं च भावार्थप्रणालिकया द्रव्यादिसंक्रान्तो विधिर्गौरवाद्बिभ्यत्स्वविषयस्य चान्यतः प्राप्ततया तदनुवादेन तदनुबन्धीभूत-

quality there is relation to what is to be done in the stage when they are occasioned, yet, since there is for becoming, of itself, the relation to what is to be done, while for words signifying substance and quality that is only through their conjunction with becoming, the understanding of the novel (rite etc.) is only through words signifying becoming, not through words signifying substance or quality. Nor is it that curds etc. are the contents of what is to be done in (statements like) "He is to offer oblation with curds," "He is to sprinkle continuously"; for, even there, what is to be done has for its content only the process of becoming—the offering of oblation or the sprinkling. Nor with this does it follow that, because of the prescription of the oblation as qualified by curds and the sprinkling as qualified by continuity, as in "He is to sacrifice with *soma* (-juice)," the statements "He is to offer the *agnihotra* oblation," "He is to sprinkle with ghee" become re-statements thereof. Though here too what is to be done has certainly for content the process of becoming, yet substance and quality, even though not contents, are prescribed as complementary to the process of becoming. Indeed, the process of becoming, uncharacterised as being the bare operation of a causal condition (*kāraka*), is characterised (*i.e.*, defined) by particular causal conditions, such as substance etc.; hence, substance etc. are complementary to that. And thus, when the process of becoming is prescribed, that itself is prescribed together with its complements; hence, substance and quality, though not contents, get prescribed as complements thereto. And thus, the prescription attaches to substance and quality through the channel of the process of becoming; and because of the fear of

prolixity, its own content being otherwise established, through a re-statement thereof it comes to have for purport substance etc., which are complements thereto; consequently, in all cases, prescription has for content the process of becoming alone.

Hereby is refuted the view that in "That *āgneya* (rite) which is on eight potsherds" etc., the prescription has for content the connection (of the rite with its material and deity). Now, the object of prescription cannot be the process of becoming; for, if the agent of the becoming is existent, then, that which has its existence accomplished cannot be an agent in respect of the becoming; verily, the sky does not *become;* nor, if (the agent is) non-existent, since an injunction cannot be laid on what is non-existent, like a sky-flower; therefore the object of the prescription is the operation of the productive agent, that which brings about, this (operation) being implied by the becoming, the operation of what is brought about; and this operation is productive force (*bhāvanā*), volition, effort; of this, if contentless, there can be no cognition; hence, because of the need for a content, it is only the connection with material and deity brought to mind by the word *āgneya* that is its content. Now, how can human effort which has an operation for content have for its sphere a connection not of the nature of an operation? Indeed, even in "Make a pot," human effort has not for its sphere the pot which is the direct significance of the noun; rather does it operate the staff etc. through the hand etc. Therefore, that (sentence) declares only that volition which has for content the operation and is for the sake of the pot, but not that which has directly the pot as content. The pot is there (in the volition) as

द्रव्यादिपरो भवतीति सर्वत्र भावार्थविषय एव विधिः ।

एतेन 'यदाग्नेयोऽष्टाकपालो भवति' इत्यत्र संबन्धविषयो विधिरिति परास्तम् । ननु न भवत्यर्थो विधेयः ; सिद्धे भवितरि लब्धरूपस्य भवनं प्रत्यकर्तृत्वात् ; न खलु गगनं भवति ; नाप्यसिद्धे, असिद्धस्यानियोज्यत्वात्, गगनकुसुमवत् ; तस्माद्भवनेन प्रयोज्यव्यापारेणाक्षिप्तः प्रयोजकस्य भावयितुर्व्यापारो विधेयः ; स च व्यापारो भावना, कृतिः, प्रयत्न इति ; निर्विषयश्चासावशक्यप्रतिपत्तिः ; अतो विषयापेक्षायामाग्नेयशब्दोपस्थापितो द्रव्यदेवतासंबन्ध एवास्य विषयः । ननु व्यापारविषयः पुरुषप्रयत्नः कथमव्यापाररूपं संबन्धं गोचरयेत् ? न हि 'घटं कुरु' इत्यत्रापि साक्षान्नामार्थं घटं पुरुषप्रयत्नो गोचरयति ; अपि तु दण्डादि हस्तादिना व्यापारयति । तस्माद्घटार्थी कृतिं व्यापारविषयामेव प्रतिपद्यते, न तु स्वरूपतो घटविषयाम् । उद्देश्यतया त्वस्यामस्ति घटो न तु विषयतया । विषयतया तु हस्तादिव्यापार एव । अत एव 'आग्नेयः' इत्यत्रापि

द्रव्यदेवतासंबन्धाक्षिप्तो यजिरेव कार्यविषयो विधेयः। किमुक्तं भवति "आग्नेयो भवति" इति ? आग्नेयेन यागेन भावयेदिति। अत एव 'य एवं विद्वान् पौर्णमास्यां यजते', 'य एवं विद्वानमावास्यां यजते' इत्यनुवादो भवति 'यदाग्नेयः' इत्यादिविहितस्य यागषट्कस्य। अत एव च विहितानूदितस्य तस्यैव 'दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यधिकार-संबन्धः।

तस्मात्सर्वत्र कृतिप्रणालिकया भावार्थविषय एव विधिरित्येकान्तः। तथा च 'न हन्यात्', 'न पिबेत्' इत्यादिषु यदि कार्यमभ्युपेयेत, ततस्तद्व्यापिका कृतिरभ्युपेतव्या, तद्व्यापकश्च भावार्थो विषयः। एवं च प्रजापतिव्रतन्यायेन पर्युदासवृत्त्याहननापानसंकल्पलक्षणया तद्विषयो विधिः स्यात्। तथा च प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधो दत्त-जलाञ्जलिः प्रसज्येत। न च सति संभवे लक्षणा न्याय्या। 'नेक्षेतोद्यन्तम्' इत्यादौ तु 'तस्य व्रतम्' इत्यधिकारात्प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधासंभवेन पर्युदास-वृत्त्यानीक्षणसंकल्पलक्षणा युक्ता। तस्मात् 'न

what is intended, but not as the content. As content, however, there is only the operation of the hand etc. Hence it is that even in "That *āgneya*" etc., what is enjoined is only the thing to be done, *viz.*, the sacrifice implied by the connection with material and deity. What is it that is said in "That *āgneya* which is offered" etc.? (What is said is) "One should bring about (what is desired) through the *āgneya* sacrifice". Hence it is that the statements "He who, knowing thus, performs the full moon sacrifice," "He who, knowing thus, performs the new moon sacrifice" become re-statements of the six sacrifices prescribed in "That *āgneya*" etc. Hence it is that only for this re-statement of what is enjoined is there the connection with the fruit in "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the new moon and full moon sacrifices".

Hence it is invariable that in every case the injunction has for content the operation alone, through the channel of volition. And thus in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., if there be admitted something to be done, then, its pervader, volition, would have to be admitted, as also the becoming which pervades that (volition) as content. And thus, on the analogy of the *Prajāpati-vrata*,[136] the injunction would, as signifying exclusion through the implication of the resolve not to kill or not to drink, have that (resolve) as content. And thus it would follow that the final obsequies have been performed for (that function of negation which consists in) the denial of that for which there is an occasion. Nor when there is a possibility (of direct significance) is implication proper. In the case, however, of "See not the rising sun" etc., since they commence with "His vow," there is not the possibility of the denial of that for which

Further by statements like "A brahmin is not to be killed," desisting from activity is taught. Nor is that an act, nor even a means to an act. If the teaching of those which are not for the sake of an act be purposeless, there would result the futility of teachings of desisting from activity like "A brahmin is not to be killed". And that is not acceptable. Nor is it possible to assume for the negative particle the signification of a non-established act, as distinct from the indifference consisting in desisting from the act of killing, because of the connection with the sense of killing that is established through one's own nature. And this is the

there is an occasion; hence, it is proper, through the signification of exclusion, to imply the resolve not to see. Therefore, in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., which are denials of what there is an occasion for, since the process of becoming is non-existent, volition pervaded thereby is non-existent; and that being non-existent, there is non-existence of what is pervaded thereby, *viz.*, what is to be done; hence there is no rule that all statements have for purport what is to be done; thus he says: **"by statements like 'A brahmin is not to be killed'"** etc.

Now, why does not cessation itself become what is to be done, or the means to that (cessation)? To this he says: **"Nor is that an act."** The word "act" expresses what is to be done. This itself he analyses: **"If the teaching of those which are not for the sake of an act"** etc.

अपि च 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्येवमाद्या निवृत्तिरुपदिश्यते। न च सा क्रिया, नापि क्रियासाधनम्। अक्रियार्थानामुपदेशोऽनर्थकश्चेत्, 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्यादिनिवृत्त्युपदेशानामानर्थक्यं प्राप्तम्। तच्चानिष्टम्। न च स्वभावप्राप्तहन्त्यर्थानुरागेण नञः शक्यमप्राप्तक्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुं हननक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यव्यतिरेकेण। नञश्चैष स्वभावः, यत्स्वसंबन्धि-

हन्यात्', 'न पिबेत्' इत्यादिषु प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधेषु भावार्थाभावात्तद्व्याप्तायाः कृतेरभावः; तदभावे च तद्व्याप्तस्य कार्यस्याभाव इति न कार्यपरत्वनियमः सर्वत्र वाक्ये इत्याह—**ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्य इत्येवमाद्या** इति।

ननु कस्मान्निवृत्तिरेव कार्यं न भवति, तत्साधनं वेत्यत आह—**न च सा क्रिया** इति। क्रियाशब्दः कार्यवचनः। एतदेव विभजते—**अक्रियार्थानाम्** इति।

नोऽभावं बोधयतीति। अभावबुद्धिश्चौदासीन्ये कारणम्। सा च दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत्स्वयमेवोपशाम्यति। तस्मात्प्रसक्तक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यमेव 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्यादिषु प्रतिषेधार्थं मन्यामहे, अन्यत्र प्रजापतिव्रतादिभ्यः। तस्मात्पुरुषार्थानुपयोग्युपाख्यानादिभूतार्थवादविषयमानर्थक्याभिधानं द्रष्टव्यम्।

स्यादेतत्। विधिविभक्तिश्रवणात्कार्यं तावदत्र प्रतीयते; तच्च न भावार्थमन्तरेण; न च रागतः प्रवृत्तस्य हननपानादावकस्मादौदासीन्यमुपपद्यते विना विधारकप्रयत्नम्; तस्मात्स एव प्रवृत्त्युन्मुखानां मनोवाग्देहानां विधारकः प्रयत्नो निषेधविधिगोचरः क्रियेति नाक्रियापरमस्ति वाक्यं किंचिदपीति आह—**न च हननक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यव्यतिरेकेण नञः शक्यमप्राप्तक्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुम्।** केन हेतुना न शक्यमित्यत आह—**स्वभावप्राप्तहन्त्यर्थानुरागेण** नञः। अयमर्थः—हननपानपरो

nature of the negative particle, that it makes known the non-existence of that to which it is related. And the cognition of non-existence is the cause of indifference. And that subsides of its own accord like the fire whose fuel has been consumed. Therefore, it is but the indifference consisting in the desisting from activity for which there is occasion, which we consider to be the meaning of the prohibition, "A brahmin is not to be killed" etc., in all cases other than the Prajāpati-vow etc. Therefore, the declaration of futility is to be understood to have for content such praises of the existent, in the form of narratives etc., as do not serve the human goal.

Be this so. Because of the injunctive suffix being heard, there is cognised here what is to be done; and that cannot be without a process of becoming; nor in the case of him who because of passion engages in killing, drinking etc., is indifference intelligible by chance, without voluntary effort; therefore, that voluntary effort of the mind, speech and body intent on engaging in activity is the act which is the sphere of the prohibitory injunction; hence, there is no statement whatsoever which does not have an act for purport. (To this) he says: "**Nor is it possible to assume for the negative particle the signification of a non-established act, as distinct from the indifference consisting in desisting from the act of killing.**" For what reason is it not possible? To this he says: "**because of the connection**" of the negative particle "**with the sense of killing that is established through one's own nature**". This is the sense: indeed, the injunctive suffix cognised as having

for purport killing and drinking prescribes them alone; this is the general rule. And these cannot be prescribed, since they result (even) from passion. Nor is there enjoined the denial, by the negative particle, of that for which there is occasion, since of that too, whose nature is indifference, there is establishment as already existent (in the form of antecedent non-existence, *prāg-abhāva*). Nor is voluntary effort (what is to be enjoined), since that, not being expressly mentioned, would have to be implied, since where there is a possibility (of direct signification) implication is not proper, and since that (effort) cannot be the content of the injunction, because of the injunctive suffix being a re-statement of the activity that results from passion. Therefore, what is restated as "one might drink or kill," and is prohibited in the form "that is not (to be done)", its non-existence (*i.e.*, unprofitable nature) is brought to mind; but the sense of the negative particle is not prescribed. And since non-existence is determined by the existent that is opposed to itself, and takes on the colour of the existent, it appears as if existent in the case of the existent, and as if to be accomplished in the case of what is to be accomplished; hence, the sense of the negative particle, whose content is what is to be accomplished, appears as if itself to be accomplished; hence the delusion that the sense of the negative particle is something to be done. This he says thus: **"And this is the nature of the negative particle"** etc.

Now, let the negative particle make known the non-existence of what is related to itself (as counter-correlate); but, for the mind, speech and the body intent on activity, how can there be the desisting therefrom by chance?

हि विधिप्रत्ययः प्रतीयमानस्ते एव विधत्ते इत्युत्सर्गः। न चैते शक्ये विधातुम्, रागतः प्राप्तत्वात्। न चात्र नञः प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधो विधेयः, तस्याप्यौदासीन्यरूपस्य सिद्धतया प्राप्तत्वात्। न च विधारकः प्रयत्नः, तस्याश्रुतत्वेन लक्ष्यमाणत्वात्, सति संभवे च लक्षणाया अन्याय्यत्वात्, विधिविभक्तेश्च रागतः प्राप्तप्रवृत्त्यनुवादकत्वेन विधिविषयत्वायोगात्। तस्माद्यत्पिबेद्धन्याद्वेत्यनूद्य तन्नेति निषिध्यते, तदभावो ज्ञाप्यते; न तु नञर्थो विधीयते। अभावश्च स्वविरोधिभावनिरूपणतया भावच्छायानुपातीति सिद्धे सिद्धवत्, साध्ये च साध्यवद्भासत इति साध्यविषयो नञर्थः साध्यवद्भासत इति नञर्थः कार्य इति भ्रमः। तदिदमाह—**नञश्चैष स्वभाव** इति।

ननु बोधयतु स्वसंबन्धिनोऽभावं नञ्; प्रवृत्त्युन्मुखानां तु मनोवाग्देहानां कुतोऽकस्मान्निवृत्तिरित्यत आह — **अभावबुद्धिश्चौदासीन्य**-परिपालन -

कारणम् । अयमभिप्रायः—'ज्वरितः पथ्यमश्नीयात्', 'न सर्पायाङ्गुलिं दद्यात्' इत्यादिवचनश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य पथ्याशने प्रवृत्तिं भुजगाङ्गुलिदानोन्मुखस्य च ततो निवृत्तिमुपलभ्य बालो व्युत्पित्सुः प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतू इच्छाद्वेषावनुमिमीते । तथा हि—इच्छाद्वेषहेतुके वृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती, स्वतन्त्रप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तित्वात्, मदीयस्वतन्त्रप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिवत् । कर्तव्यतैकार्थसमवेतेष्टानिष्टसाधनभावावगमपूर्वकौ चास्येच्छाद्वेषौ, प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतुभूतेच्छाद्वेषत्वात्, मत्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतुभूतेच्छाद्वेषवत् । न जातु मम शब्दतद्व्यापारपुरुषाशयतैकाल्यानविच्छिन्नभावनापूर्वप्रत्ययपूर्वाविच्छाद्वेषावभूताम्; अपि तु भूयो भूयः स्वगतमालोचयत उक्तकारणपूर्वावेव प्रत्यवभासेते । तस्माद्वृद्धस्य स्वतन्त्रप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती इच्छाद्वेषभेदौ च कर्तव्यतैकार्थसमवेतेष्टानिष्टसाधनभावावगमपूर्वावित्यानुपूर्व्या सिद्धः कार्यकारणभाव इतीष्टानिष्टसाधन-

To this he says: "**And the cognition of non-existence is the cause**" of the perpetuation "**of indifference**". This is the idea: on hearing the words "Diet yourself when there is fever," "Offer not your finger to the serpent," the elderly person so addressed starts to put himself on diet, or, if intent on offering his finger to the serpent, desists therefrom; the infant, *i.e.*, the learner, on seeing this, infers for the elderly person addressed the causes of engaging in and desisting from activity, *viz.*, desire and aversion. It is thus: the elderly person's engaging in and desisting from activity have desire and aversion for cause, since they are independent acts of engaging in and desisting from activity, like my own independent acts of engaging in and desisting from activity. And his desire and aversion are preceded by the understanding of the instrumentality to what is desired or not desired inherent in the same thing as the obligation, since they are desire and aversion which are causes of engaging in and desisting from activity, like the desire and aversion which are causes of my own engaging in and desisting from activity. Never do desire and aversion result for me as preceded (only) by the cognitions of the word, its operation, the intention of the person (who speaks), and the unseen potentiality of an injunction, as undefined by the three times; rather do they appear on repeated introspection as preceded by the above-mentioned causes alone. Therefore, the elderly person's independent engaging in and desisting from activity, as also his desire and aversion, are pervaded by the understanding of the instrumentality to what is desired or not desired, inherent in the same thing as the obligation; because of this sequence, the relation of cause and effect is established; hence, it is established that the elderly person's engaging

in and desisting from activity are from the understanding of the instrumentality to what is desired or not desired. And this understanding, which was non-existent earlier and is generated immediately after the hearing of the word, has the hearing of the word for its cause; hence in statements like "He is to sacrifice," which prompt to activity, it is the word itself, which, making known the operation that is to be done and that is instrumental to what is desired, also makes known its instrumentality to what is desired and the obligation to do it; for, these two are not otherwise obtained, and what is not otherwise obtained is the sense of the word. Where, however, the obligatoriness is obtained even otherwise, as in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., since engaging in killing and drinking are obtained even from passion, there, the imperative suffix etc., associated with the negative particle, re-state this and make known only the causality of the two in respect of evil, which (causality) is not otherwise established. Indeed, their instrumentality to what is desired, is directly known, as otherwise they could not be objects of desire. Therefore, statements like "Kill not," "Drink not", have for purport the making known of the instrumentality to evil, through re-stating the obligatoriness established by passion etc., but they do not have obligatoriness for purport; hence it has been well said that prohibitions are not related to what is to be done. It is the cognition of the instrumentality to evil in the case of what are prohibited that is the cognition of the non-existence of what are prohibited. Thus, indeed, this intelligent being, though seeing what is superficially attractive, yet considers the future, cognises the

तावगमात्प्रयोज्यवृद्धप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती इति सिद्धम्। स चावगमः प्रागभूतः शब्दश्रवणानन्तरमुपजायमानः शब्दश्रवणहेतुक इति प्रवर्तकेषु वाक्येषु 'यजेत' इत्यादिषु शब्द एव कर्तव्यमिष्टसाधनं व्यापारमवगमयंस्तस्येष्टसाधनतां कर्तव्यतां चावगमयति; अनन्यलभ्यत्वादुभयोः, अनन्यलभ्यस्य च शब्दार्थत्वात्। यत्र तु कर्तव्यतान्यत एव लभ्यते, यथा 'न हन्यात्', 'न पिबेत्' इत्यादिषु, हननपानप्रवृत्त्यो रागतः प्रतिलम्भात्, तत्र तदनुवादेन नञ्समभिव्याहृता लिङादिविभक्तिरन्यतोऽप्राप्तमनयोरनर्थहेतुभावमात्रमवगमयति। प्रत्यक्षं हि तयोरिष्टसाधनभावोऽवगम्यते, अन्यथा रागविषयत्वायोगात्। तस्माद्रागादिप्राप्तकर्तव्यतानुवादेनानर्थसाधनताप्रज्ञापनपरम् 'न हन्यात्', 'न पिबेत्' इत्यादिवाक्यम्, न तु कर्तव्यतापरमिति सुष्ठूक्तमकार्यनिष्ठत्वं निषेधानाम्। निषेध्यानां चानर्थसाधनताबुद्धिरेव निषेध्याभावबुद्धिः। तया खल्वयं चेतन आपाततो रमणीयतां पश्यन्नप्यायतिमालोच्य

प्रवृत्त्यभावं निवृत्तिमवबुध्य निवर्तते। औदासीन्यमात्मनोऽवस्थापयतीति यावत्।

स्यादेतत्। अभावबुद्धिश्चेदौदासीन्यस्थापनकारणम्, यावदौदासीन्यमनुवर्तेत; न चानुवर्तते; न ह्युदासीनोऽपि विषयान्तरव्यासक्तचित्तस्तदभावबुद्धिमान्; न चावस्थापककारणाभावे कार्यावस्थानं दृष्टम्; न हि स्तम्भावपाते प्रासादोऽवतिष्ठते। अत आह—**सा च दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत्स्वयमेवोपशाम्यति**। तावदेव खल्वयं प्रवृत्त्युन्मुखो न यावदस्यानर्थहेतुभावमधिगच्छति। अनर्थहेतुत्वाधिगमोऽस्य समूलोद्धारं प्रवृत्तिमुद्धृत्य दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत्स्वयमेवोपशाम्यति। एतदुक्तं भवति—यथा प्रासादावस्थानकारणं स्तम्भो नैवमौदासीन्यावस्थानकारणमभावबुद्धिः; अपि त्वागन्तुकाद्विनाशहेतोस्त्राणेनावस्थानकारणम्, यथा कमठपृष्ठनिष्ठुरः कवचः शस्त्रप्रहारत्राणेन राजन्यजीवावस्थानहेतुः। न च कवचापगमे च असति च शस्त्रप्रहारे, राजन्यजीवनाश इति। उपसंहरति—**तस्मात्प्रसक्तक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यमेव** इति।

non-existence of activity, which is desisting from activity, and desists; that is to say, he establishes himself in an attitude of indifference.

Be this so. If cognition of non-existence be the cause of establishment in indifference, that should persist so long as there is indifference; but that does not persist; for, he who, though indifferent, has a mind strongly attached to other objects, is not one who cognises their non-existence; nor, in the absence of the cause which establishes, is there seen the establishment of the effect; not, verily, when the pillar has fallen does the top floor stand. Therefore he says: "**And that subsides of its own accord, like the fire whose fuel has been consumed.**" This being is intent on activity only so long as he does not understand its instrumentality to evil. The understanding of its instrumentality to evil plucks out activity by the root, and itself subsides like the fire whose fuel has been consumed. This is what is said: the cognition of non-existence is the cause of the establishment in indifference not in the same way as the pillar (is the cause) of the stability of the top floor; rather is it the cause of establishment, as protecting from adventitious causes of destruction, just as the armour impenetrable as tortoise-shell is the cause of the stability of the warrior's life by protecting him from the attack of missiles. And it is not that there is loss of the warrior's life, when the armour is removed and there is no attack of missiles. He concludes: "**Therefore, it is but indifference consisting in the desisting from activity for which there is occasion**" etc. Since indifference exists even in the absence of knowledge (of instrumentality to evil), it is distinguished by the *upalakṣaṇa*,[137] *viz.*,

As for that too which has been said, that the bare thing mentioned without entry into an injunction of what is to be done would be futile, like the statement "The Earth has seven islands" etc., that has been refuted; because profit is seen even in the statement about a bare object "This is a rope, this is not a snake". Now, it has been said that since, even for him who has heard (the texts relating to) Brahman, transmigratoriness is seen as before, there is not purposefulness as in the case of the statement about the nature of the rope. To this the reply is: not in the case of him who has realised Brahman as the self is it possible to show transmigratoriness

desisting from an activity for which there is occasion. Is the view then of the Jaiminiyas wholly absurd, (the view) which suspects futility because of non-subsidiariness to what is to be done and makes out (the existence of) subsidiariness to what is to be done? (Raising this question), he answers it by way of conclusion: "**Therefore, the declaration of futility is to be understood**" etc. The *prima facie* and final views based on non-subsidiariness and subsidiariness to what is to be done have for content narratives etc., which do not serve the human goal; but they do not have the Upaniṣads for content, since the Upaniṣads lead up to the realisation of Brahman, which is of itself the human goal; this is the sense.

"**As for that too which has been said**" by those who think the knowledge of the self propounded in the Upaniṣads not to be the human goal, (in the words) "**the bare thing mentioned without entry into an injunction of what is to be**

यदप्युक्तम्—कर्तव्यविध्यनुप्रवेशमन्त-रेण वस्तुमात्रमुच्यमानमनर्थकं स्यात्, 'सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती' इत्यादिवदिति, तत्परिहृतम्; 'रज्जुरियम्, नायं सर्पः' इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्ट-त्वात्। ननु श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्शनान्न रज्जुस्वरूपकथनवदर्थ-वत्त्वमित्युक्तम्। अत्रोच्यते—नावगतब्रह्मा-त्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं

औदासीन्यमजानतोऽप्यस्तीति प्रसक्तक्रियानिवृत्त्यो-पलक्ष्य विशिनष्टि। तत्किमक्रियार्थत्वेनानर्थक्य-माशङ्क्य क्रियार्थत्वोपवर्णनं जैमिनीयमसमञ्जसमेवे-त्युपसंहारव्याजेन परिहरति—**तस्मात्पुरुषार्थ** इति। पुरुषार्थानुपयोग्युपाख्यानादिविषयावक्रियार्थतया क्रिया-र्थतया च पूर्वोत्तरपक्षौ; न तूपनिषद्विषयौ, उपनिषदां स्वयं पुरुषार्थरूपब्रह्मावगमपर्यवसानादित्यर्थः।

यदपि औपनिषदात्मज्ञानमपुरुषार्थं मन्यमानेन **उक्तम्—कर्तव्यविध्यनुप्रवेशमन्तरेण** इति,

दर्शयितुम्, वेदप्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मभाव-विरोधात्। न हि शरीराद्यात्माभिमानिनो दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव वेद-प्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मावगमे तदभिमाननि-वृत्तौ तदेव मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं दुःख-भयादिमत्त्वं भवतीति शक्यं कल्पयितुम्। न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनो धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव प्रव्राजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति। न च

अत्र निगूढाभिसंधिः पूर्वोक्तं परिहारं स्मारयति—**तत्परिहृतम्** इति। अत्राक्षेप्ता स्वोक्तमर्थं स्मारयति—**ननु श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि** इति। निगूढ-मभिसंधिं समाधातोद्घाटयति—**अत्रोच्यते—नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य** इति। सत्यं न ब्रह्म-ज्ञानमात्रं सांसारिकधर्मनिवृत्तिकारणम्, अपि तु साक्षात्कारपर्यन्तम्। ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारश्चान्तःकरण-वृत्तिभेदः श्रवणमननादिजनितसंस्कारसचिवमनो-

as before; because it is opposed to (the knowledge of) Brahman-as-the-self generated by the Veda as the means of valid knowledge. Indeed, because in respect of a man, who has the conceit of self in his body etc., there is found possession by misery, fear etc., it is not possible to assume that, in respect of the same man, when, in consequence of the realisation of Brahman as self produced by the Veda as the means of valid knowledge, there is the cessation of such a conceit, there continues the same possession by misery, fear etc., caused by illusory knowledge. Verily, because for the rich householder, having the conceit of wealth, there is found fear caused by the (possible) theft of the wealth, there does not continue for the same man, when he renounces and becomes freed from the conceit of wealth, the same fear caused by the (possible) theft of the wealth. Nor,

done" etc., here, with a concealed view, he recalls the answer mentioned earlier: "**that has been refuted.**" Here, the objector recalls the sense mentioned by himself: "**Now, it has been said that since even for him who has heard (the texts relating to) Brahman**" etc. The respondent reveals the concealed view: "**To this the reply is: not in the case of him who has understood Brahman as the self**" etc. True, not the knowledge alone of Brahman is the cause of the cessation of the attributes of transmigration, but rather its culmination in intuition. And the intuition of Brahman is a

because for a man having ear-rings there is seen happiness in the conceit of having ear-rings, is there for the same man, when he gives up the ear-rings and is freed from the conceit of having ear-rings, happiness in having ear-rings. This is declared by Scripture, " Him, verily, who is non-embodied, pleasure and pain do not touch." (*Chānd.*, VIII, xii, 1). If it be said that when the body is destroyed, there may be non-embodiment, not when

particular psychosis of the internal organ, generated in the mind as aided by the impressions produced by hearing, reflection etc., like the intuition of the different notes, *ṣadja* etc., whose source is the mind purified by the hearing and practice of the science of music. And this, while rooting out the perception of the stupendous magical presentation of the entire universe, roots itself out as well, not being distinct from that universe; this has been explained above. Hence, it is established that there is but similarity to the declaration of the true nature of the rope (as rope, not snake). And here, being based on the Veda as the means of valid knowledge, it is spoken of as "**generated by the Veda as the means of valid knowledge**". In this very matter, he mentions two examples, divided into the non-origination of happiness and of misery: "**Verily, because for the rich house-holder**" etc. He cites Scripture to this effect: "**This is declared by Scripture**" etc.

He asks: "**when the body is destroyed**" etc. He answers: "**no; because being embodied is caused**" etc. If

कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव कुण्डलवियुक्तस्य कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति। तदुक्तं श्रुत्या 'अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' इति। शरीरे पतितेऽशरीरत्वं स्यात्, न जीवत इति चेत्, न;

जन्मा, षड्जादिभेदसाक्षात्कार इव गान्धर्वशास्त्रश्रवणाभ्याससंस्कृतमनोयोनिः। स च निखिलप्रपञ्चमहेन्द्रजालसाक्षात्कारं समूलमुन्मूलयन्नात्मानमपि प्रपञ्चत्वाविशेषादुन्मूलयतीत्युपपादितमधस्तात्। तस्माद्रज्जुस्वरूपकथनतुल्यतैवात्रेति सिद्धम्। अत्र च वेदप्रमाणमूलतया **वेदप्रमाणजनित** इत्युक्तम्। अत्रैव सुखदुःखानुत्पादभेदेन निदर्शनद्वयमाह— **न हि धनिन** इति। श्रुतिमत्रोदाहरति— **तदुक्तम्** इति।

चोदयति—**शरीरे पतिते** इति। परिहरति— **न; सशरीरत्वस्य** इति। यदि वास्तवं

सशरीरत्वस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्। न ह्यात्मनः शरीरात्माभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः सशरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम्। नित्यमशरीरत्वम्, अकर्मनिमित्तत्वात् इत्यवोचाम। तत्कृतधर्माधर्मनिमित्तं सशरीरत्वमिति चेत्, न; शरीरसंबन्धस्यासिद्धत्वात्, धर्माधर्मयोरात्मकृतत्वासिद्धेः, शरीरसंबन्धस्य धर्माधर्मयोस्तत्कृतत्वस्य चेतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अन्धपरम्परै-

सशरीरत्वं भवेत्, न जीवतस्तन्निवर्तेत; मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं तु तत्; तच्चोत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानेन जीवतापि शक्यं निवर्तयितुम्। यत्पुनरशरीरत्वं तदस्य स्वभाव इति न शक्यं निवर्तयितुम्, स्वभावहानेन भावविनाशप्रसङ्गादित्याह—**नित्यमशरीरत्वम्** इति।

स्यादेतत्। न मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं सशरीरत्वम् अपि तु धर्माधर्मनिमित्तम्; तच्च स्वकारणधर्माधर्मनिवृत्तिमन्तरेण न निवर्तते; तन्निवृत्तौ च प्रायणमेवेति न जीवतोऽशरीरत्वमिति शङ्कते—

alive, no; because being embodied is caused by illusory knowledge. Indeed, in respect of the self, it is not possible to assume its being embodied in any other way than through illusory knowledge, consisting in the conceit of self in the body. Non-embodiment is eternal, because it is not caused by an act: so we have said. If it be said that being embodied is caused by the merit and demerit acquired by that, no; because relation (of that) to a body is not established, because it is not established that merit and demerit are acquired by the self, and because there would result reciprocal dependence between the relation to a body and the acquisition of merit and demerit by that. The assumption of beginninglessness in this is (like) a chain of the

being embodied were real, that would not cease during life; it is, however, caused by illusory knowledge; and that can be removed even during life by the rise of true knowledge. As for non-embodiment, since that is of his nature, it cannot be removed, as by destruction of nature there would result destruction of existence; thus he says: "**Non-embodiment is eternal**" etc.

Be this so. Being embodied is not caused by illusory knowledge, but caused by merit and demerit; and it cannot cease except with the cessation of its causes, merit and demerit; and on the cessation of these, there is but death;

blind. And because there is no inherence of activity in the self, agency is unintelligible. If it be said that by mere proximity there is agency for kings and others, no; because their agency is intelligible through the relationship to servants procured through payment of money etc. Not for the self, however, is it possible to assume anything like the payment of money etc. as the cause of the relationship of master and servant with reference to the body etc. Illusory conceit, however, is the perceived cause of the relation. By this is explained the self being the sacrificer.

---

hence there is no non-embodiment during life; thus he objects: "**If it be said that being embodied is caused by the merit and demerit acquired by that**" etc. "**That**" relates to the self. He refutes this: "**no, because relation to a body**" etc. Not directly can the self acquire merit and demerit, for, those two, which arise from the exertion of speech, the intellect and the body, do not occur when there is no relation to a body; he who desires (to establish) being embodied (as resulting) from them lands clearly in the defect of reciprocal dependence; that is thus said: "**because there would result reciprocal dependence between the relation to a body**" etc. It may be said: "True, there is reciprocal dependence, but it is not a defect, because of beginninglessness, as between seed and sprout." To this he says: "**The assumption of beginninglessness in this is (like)**

षा अनादित्वकल्पना। क्रियासमवायाभावाच्चात्मनः कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः। संनिधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वमिति चेत्, न; धनदानाद्युपार्जितभृत्यसंबन्धित्वात्तेषां कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः; न त्वात्मनो धनदानादिवच्छरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धनिमित्तं किंचिच्छक्यं कल्पयितुम्। मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः संबन्धहेतुः। एतेन यजमानत्वमात्मनो व्याख्यातम्।

तत्कृत इति। तत् इत्यात्मानं परामृशति। निराकरोति—**न; शरीरसंबन्धस्य** इति। न तावदात्मा साक्षाद्धर्माधर्मौ कर्तुमर्हति, वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भजनितौ हि तौ नासति शरीरसंबन्धे भवतः; ताभ्यां तु शरीरसंबन्धं रोचयमानो व्यक्तं परस्पराश्रयत्वं दोषमावहति; तदिदमाह—**शरीरसंबन्धस्य** इति। यद्युच्येत सत्यमस्ति परस्पराश्रयत्वम्, न त्वेष दोषः, अनादित्वात्, बीजाङ्कुरवत् इत्यत आह—**अन्धपरम्परैषानादित्व-**

अत्राहुः — देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनः आत्मीये देहादावहमभिमानो गौणः, न मिथ्येति चेत्, न; प्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य गौणत्वमुख्यत्वप्रसिद्धेः। यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो

कल्पना। यस्तु मन्यते—नेयमन्धपरम्परातुल्या अनादिता; न हि यतो धर्माधर्मभेदाद्य आत्मशरीरसंबन्धभेदस्तत एव शरीरसंबन्धात् स धर्माधर्मभेदः; किं त्वेष पूर्वस्मादात्मशरीरसंबन्धात्पूर्वधर्माधर्मभेदजन्मनः; एव त्वात्मशरीरसंबन्धोऽन्यस्माद्धर्माधर्मभेदात्—इति, तं प्रत्याह—**क्रियासमवायाभावात्** इति। शङ्कते—**संनिधानमात्रेण** इति। परिहरति—**न** इति। **उपार्जनं** स्वीकरणम्। न त्वियं विधात्मनीत्याह—**न त्वात्मन** इति।

ये तु देहादावात्माभिमानो न मिथ्या, अपि तु गौणः, माणवकादाविव सिंहाभिमान इति मन्यन्ते, तन्मतमुपन्यस्य दूषयति—**अत्राहुः** इति। प्रसिद्धो वस्तुभेदो यस्य पुरुषस्य स तथोक्तः। उपपादितं चैतदस्माभिरध्यासभाष्य इति नेहोपपाद्यते। यथा

Here they say: in respect of the self that is distinct from the body etc., the conceit of "I" in its own body etc., is secondary, not illusory; if this be said, no; for, secondariness and primariness are well-known to him to whom the difference between the things is well-known. For him to whom the difference between the things is

---

a chain of the blind." One may think thus: "This beginninglessness is not like a chain of the blind; when from a particular merit and demerit, there is a particular relation between a self and a body, it is not, indeed, from that same relation to a body that there result that particular merit and demerit; rather do these (merit and demerit) result from a prior relation of the self to the body, which had its rise from earlier merit and demerit; while this relation of the self to the body results from another merit and demerit"; to this one he says: "**because there is no inherence of activity**" etc. He objects: "**If it be said that by mere proximity**" etc. He answers "**no.**" "**Procuring**" is making one's own. That is not the case, he says, with the self: "**Not for the self, however**" etc.

As for those who think that the conceit of the self in the body etc. is not illusory, but is secondary, like the conceit of the lion in the pupil etc., he introduces their view and condemns it: "**Here they say**" etc. That person to whom differences between things are well-known, he is thus mentioned (in the words: *prasiddha—vastu-bhedaḥ*). And since this has been explained by us under the commentary on superimposition, it is not explained here. In the twilight, in respect of a thing not apprehended

well-known—for example, if a certain thing possessing a mane etc., and having a particular configuration is established through co-presence and co-absence as the principal signification of the word and concept "lion," and another, a man, established as possessing cruelty, courage etc., which are the ordinary qualities of a lion—for that one, the word and concept "lion" have secondary signification in respect of that man, not for him to whom the difference between the things is not well-known. For this (latter) one, however, (the use of) one word and concept in the place of another can be caused only delusively, not secondarily; for example, in respect of that whose particularity has not been apprehended in twilight, in the form "This is a post," the word and concept of "man" have the post as content; or for example, in the nacre, the word and concept which for some unknown reason are determined in the form "This is silver". In the same way, how can the word

---

as distinct from a man in the form "this is a post," the word and the concept of a man due to doubt have the post for content; there, indeed, the attribute of being a man, though not certain, is but superimposed. Having thus illustrated the superimposition of the uncertain in cases of doubt, he illustrates (the superimposition of) the certain in cases of erroneous cognition: "**or, for example, in the nacre**" etc. When for the white shining substance in front, there is similarity to nacre and silver, while there is the ascertainment of silver, why is there not the

वस्तुभेदः—यथा केसरादिमानाकृतिविशेषोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययभाङ्मुख्योऽन्यः सिद्धः; ततश्चान्यः पुरुषः प्रायिकैः क्रौर्यशौर्यादिभिः सिंहगुणैः संपन्नः सिद्धः—तस्य तस्मिन्पुरुषे सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययौ गौणौ भवतः, नाप्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य। तस्य त्वन्यत्रान्यशब्दप्रत्ययौ भ्रान्तिनिमित्तावेव भवतः, न गौणौ; यथा मन्दान्धकारे स्थाणुरयमित्यगृह्यमाणविशेषे पुरुषशब्दप्रत्ययौ स्थाणुविषयौ; यथा वा शुक्तिकायामकस्माद्रजतमिदमिति निश्चितौ

मन्दान्धकारे स्थाणुरयमित्यगृह्यमाणविशेषे वस्तुनि पुरुषात् सांशयिकौ पुरुषशब्दप्रत्ययौ स्थाणुविषयौ; तत्र हि पुरुषत्वमनियतमपि समारोपितमेव। एवं संशये समारोपितमनिश्चितमुदाहृत्य विपर्ययज्ञाने निश्चितमुदाहरति—**यथा वा शुक्तिकायाम्** इति। शुक्लभास्वरस्य द्रव्यस्य पुरःस्थितस्य सति शुक्तिकारजतसाधारण्ये यावदत्र रजतविनिश्चयो

शब्दप्रत्ययौ, तद्वद्देहादिसंघाते अहं इति निरुपचारेण शब्दप्रत्ययावात्मानात्माविवेकेनोत्पद्यमानौ कथं गौणौ शक्यौ वदितुम्? आत्मानात्मविवेकिनामपि पण्डितानामजाविपालानामिवाविविक्तौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ भवतः। तस्माद्देहादिव्यतिरिक्तात्माऽस्तित्ववादिनां देहादावहंप्रत्ययो मि-

भवति तावत्कस्माच्छुक्तिविनिश्चय एव न भवति? संशयो वा द्वेधा युक्तः; समानधर्मधर्मिणो दर्शनात् उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातः; विशेषदृयस्मृतेश्च संस्कारोन्मेषहेतोः सादृश्यस्य द्विष्ठत्वेनोभयत्र तुल्यमेतदिति। अत उक्तम्—**अकस्मात्** इति। अनेन दृष्टस्य हेतोः समानत्वेऽप्यदृष्टं हेतुरुक्तम्; तच्च कार्यदर्शनोन्नेयत्वेनासाधारणमिति भावः। **आत्मानात्मविवेकिनाम्** इति। श्रवणमननकुशलतामात्रेण पण्डितानाम्; अनुत्पन्नतत्त्वसाक्षात्काराणामिति यावत्। तदुक्तम्—**पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात्** इति। शेषमतिरोहितार्थम्।

and concept of " I," which arise in respect of the assemblage of the body etc., non-figuratively through the non-discrimination of the self and the not-self, be said to be secondary? Even by the learned men who have discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self, the word and the concept fail to be discriminated, just as by shepherds and goatherds. Therefore for those who maintain that there is a self distinct from the body etc., the concept of " I " in respect of the body is but illusory,

ascertainment of nacre itself? Or there may be doubt, which is appropriate in two ways; for, there is seen a substrate with common attributes, while there is absence of cognition or non-cognition (*i.e.*, of any means of valid knowledge, favourable or unfavourable); also because there is memory of both particulars, since similarity, which arouses the impressions, being located in both, is common to both. Therefore it is said: "**for some unknown reason.**" Though the seen cause is common, there is hereby mentioned an unseen cause; and since that has to be inferred from the perception of its effect, it is not common (to both): this is the idea. "**Even by the learned men who have discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self**"; for those who are learned, merely in respect of their proficiency in hearing and reflection; that is to say, for those in whom the intuition of the truth has not risen. That has been said: "**And because there is no distinction from beasts**" etc. The sense of the rest is not obscure.

not secondary. Hence, since "being embodied" is caused by illusory knowledge, it is established that for the wise one, even while alive, there is non-embodiment. And thus there is Scripture whose content is the Brahman-knower: "Therefore, as the slough of a snake lies dead and cast off on the ant-hill, in the very same way lies this body; then that non-embodied, immortal life, is Brahman alone, light alone" (*Brh.*, IV, iv, 7); "Having eyes but without eyes as it were, having ears but without ears as it were, having speech but without speech as it were, having mind but without mind as it were, having breath, but without breath as it were." There is the traditional Code also, "What is the language of him who is firm in knowledge?" (*Gita*, II) etc., which, while declaring the distinctive marks of one firm in knowledge, shows that for the wise one there is no relation with engaging in any activity. Therefore, not in the case of him who has realised Brahman as the self, is there transmigratoriness as before; he, however, who has transmigratoriness as before, has not realised Brahman as the self; this is faultless.

And in the matter of non-embodiment during life for the wise one, he cites Scripture and traditional Code: "**And thus**" etc. This is easily understood. He concludes the present topic: "**Therefore, not in the case of him who has realised Brahman as the self**" etc.

थ्यैव, न गौणः। तस्मान्मिथ्याप्रत्यय-निमित्तत्वात्सशरीरत्वस्य सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषोऽशरीरत्वम्। तथा च ब्रह्मविद्विषया श्रुतिः 'तद्यथाहिनिर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेद ँ शरीरं शेते अथा-यमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव' इति; 'सचक्षुरचक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव सवागवागिव समना अमना इव स-प्राणोऽप्राण इव' इति च। स्मृतिरपि 'स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा' इत्याद्या स्थित-प्रज्ञस्य लक्षणान्याचक्षाणा विदुषः सर्व-प्रवृत्त्यसंबन्धं दर्शयति। तस्मान्नावगत-ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम्; यस्य तु यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं नासाववगत-ब्रह्मात्मभाव इत्यनवद्यम्।

जीवतो विदुषोऽशरीरत्वे च श्रुतिस्मृती उदा-हरति—**तथा च** इति। सुबोधम्। प्रकृतमुप-संहरति—**तस्मान्नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य** इति।

यत्पुनरुक्तं श्रवणात्परावीनयोर्मननानिदिध्यासनयोर्दर्शनाद्विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः, न स्वरूपपर्यवसायित्वमिति, तन्न; श्रवणवदवगत्यर्थत्वान्मननानिदिध्यासनयोः। यदि ह्यवगतं ब्रह्मान्यत्र विनियुज्येत, भवेत्तदा विधिशेषत्वम्; न तु तदस्ति, मननानिदिध्यासनयोरपि श्रवणवदवगत्य-

---

ननूक्तं यदि जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वावगतिरेव सांसारिकधर्मनिवृत्तिहेतुः, हन्त मननादिविधानानर्थक्यम्; तस्मात्प्रतिपत्तिविधिपरा वेदान्ता इति, तदनुभाष्य दूषयति—**यत्पुनरुक्तं श्रवणात्परावीनयोः** इति। मननानिदिध्यासनयोरपि न विधिः, तयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धसाक्षात्कारफलयोर्विधिसरूपैर्वचनैरनुवादात्; तदिदमुक्तम्—**अवगत्यर्थत्वात्** इति। ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारोऽवगतिः; तदर्थत्वं मननानिदिध्यासनयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धमित्यर्थः। अथ कस्मान्मननादिविधिरेव न भवतीत्यत आह—**यदि ह्यवगतम्** इति। न तावन्मननानिदिध्यासने

Again, as for the statement that since reflection and contemplation are seen subsequent to hearing, Brahman is subsidiary to an injunction and does not stop with its own existence, that is not so ; because, like hearing, reflection and contemplation are for the purpose of realisation. If the realised Brahman were employed elsewhere, then there would be subsidiariness to an injunction ; but it is not so ; because reflection and contemplation too are, like hearing, for the purpose

Now, it has been said " If the *jīva's* realisation of Brahman as the self were alone the cause of the cessation of the attribute of transmigration, there would be, alas ! the futility of the prescription of reflection etc. ; hence, the Vedāntas have for purport the injunction of contemplation " ; restating this, he condemns it : **" Again, as for the statement "** etc. Even of reflection and contemplation there is no prescription, since of these two which are established by co-presence and co-absence to have the fruit of intuition, there is (but) re-statement by sentences which have the appearance of injunctions ; that is thus said : **" because they are for the purpose of realisation."** Intuition of Brahman is realisation ; the subsidiariness thereto of reflection and contemplation is established by co-presence and co-absence ; this is the sense. Why, then, should it not be an injunction alone in respect of reflection etc. ? To this he says : **" If the realised Brahman "** etc. That reflection and contemplation are not principal rites with an unseen content, *viz.*, the fruit of immortality, has been stated above.

of realisation. Therefore Brahman does not come to have the sacred teachings as the means of valid knowledge in virtue of being the content of an injunction of contemplation; and for this reason it is established that Brahman even independently has sacred teaching as the means of valid knowledge, because of the harmony of the Vedānta texts. And this being the case, the commencement of a distinct sacred teaching dealing with that, in the form "Then therefore the desire to know Brahman," is intelligible. If it had for purport an

Therefore, there remains for them the character of subsidiary rites, like pounding, sprinkling etc.; that too is unsuitable, since to the self does not belong (the attribute of) having been used or being about to be used elsewhere; for (the self propounded in) the Upaniṣad, in particular, there is opposition to the observance of rites: this is the sense. He concludes the present topic: "**Therefore**" etc.

And thus, the Upaniṣads having for purport the existent Brahman, since Brahman, the object of the sacred teaching, is other than Religious Duty, and since through difference of content there is difference in the sacred teaching, the commencement of the sacred teaching "Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman" is intelligible; thus he says: "**And this being the case**" etc. If, however, it were otherwise, it would be but the desire to know Religious Duty, not another sacred teaching; consequently, there would not be the commencement of another sacred teaching; thus he says: "**If it had for purport an injunction**

र्थत्वात्। तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः संभवतीत्यतः स्वतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकम्, वेदान्त-वाक्यसमन्वयादिति सिद्धम्। एवं च सति 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति तद्विषयः पृथक् शास्त्रारम्भ उपपद्यते।

प्रधानकर्मणी अपूर्वविषये अमृतत्वफले इत्युक्त-मधस्तात्। अतो गुणकर्मत्वमनयोरवघातप्रोक्षणादि-वत्परिशिष्यते; तदप्ययुक्तम्, अन्यत्रोपयुक्तोपयो-क्ष्यमाणत्वाभावादात्मनः; विशेषतस्त्वौपनिषदस्य कर्मानुष्ठानविरोधात्—इत्यर्थः। प्रकृतमुपसंहरति—**तस्मात् इति।**

एवं च सिद्धरूपब्रह्मपरत्वे उपनिषदाम्, ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रार्थस्य धर्मादन्यत्वात्, भिन्नविषयत्वेन शास्त्र-भेदात्, 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यस्य शास्त्रारम्भ-त्वमुपपद्यत इत्याह—**एवं च सति** इति। इतरथा तु धर्मजिज्ञासैवेति न शास्त्रान्तरमिति न शास्त्रा-न्तरारम्भत्वं स्यादित्याह—**प्रतिपत्तिविधिपरत्व**

प्रतिपत्तिविधिपरत्वे हि 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्येवारब्धत्वान्न पृथक् शास्त्रमारभ्येत। आरभ्यमाणं चैवमारभ्येत 'अथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासा' इति 'अथातः क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थयोर्जिज्ञासा' इतिवत्। ब्रह्मात्मैक्यावगतिस्त्वप्रतिज्ञातेति तदर्थो युक्तः शास्त्रारम्भः 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति। तस्मात् 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' इत्येतदवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि चेतराणि प्रमाणानि। न ह्यहेयानुपादे-

---

इति। न केवलं सिद्धरूपत्वाद्ब्रह्मात्मैक्यस्य धर्मादन्यत्वम्, अपि तु तद्विरोधादपीत्युपसंहारव्याजेनाह—**तस्मादहं ब्रह्मास्मि** इति। इतिकरणेन ज्ञानं परामृशति। विधयो हि धर्मे प्रमाणम्। ते च साध्यसाधनेतिकर्तव्यताभेदाधिष्ठाना धर्मोत्पादिनश्च तदधिष्ठाना न ब्रह्मात्मैक्ये सति प्रभवन्ति, विरोधात् इत्यर्थः। न केवलं धर्मप्रमाणस्य शास्त्रस्येयं गतिः, अपि तु सर्वेषां प्रमाणानामि-

injunction of contemplation, a distinct sacred teaching would not be commenced, that (study) having been commenced even with "Then therefore the desire to know Religious Duty". And if it had to be begun, it would have been begun thus: "Then therefore the desire to know the rest of the Religious Duty," like "Then therefore the desire to know what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice and what subserves the goal of man". (*PM*, IV, i, 1.) The realisation of the unity of Brahman and the self is not premised (in that sacred teaching); hence it stands to reason that (another) sacred teaching is begun for that purpose in the form "Then therefore the desire to know Brahman". Therefore, "I am Brahman": in this alone terminate all

of contemplation" etc. Not merely because of being of the nature of an existent is the oneness of Brahman and the self other than Religious Duty, but also because of opposition thereto; thus he says by way of conclusion: "**Therefore, 'I am Brahman': in this alone**" etc. By the word "**this**" he refers to the knowledge. Injunctions, indeed, are the means of valid knowledge in respect of Religious Duty. And these, which are based on (*i.e.*, have as content) differences of end, means, and *modus operandi*, and give rise to Religious Duty (through teaching it), cannot, when there is oneness of Brahman and the self, be based on those (differences), because of opposition; this is the sense. This is the fate not alone of the sacred teaching that is the

injunctions and all other means of valid knowledge. Not, indeed, when there is the realisation of the non-dual self, which is to be neither rejected nor accepted, can those which are contentless and are devoid of a knower be fit to be means of valid knowledge.

Further, they say: When the secondary and the illusory selves are non-existent, then, because of the sublation of son, body etc., how can the thing to be done, the enlightenment that I am of the nature of the real Brahman, come about? Prior to the cognition of the self that is to be sought, there is knowership for the self. What is to be sought is the knower alone, as free from sin, defect etc. As the cognition of the self in the body is assumed to be valid knowledge, even so is this empirically valid knowledge (assumed to be valid) up to the ascertainment of the self.

means of valid knowledge in respect of Religious Duty, but of all means of valid knowledge; thus he says; "**and all other means of valid knowledge.**" Why? "**Not, indeed, when there is the realisation**" etc. In non-duality, indeed, there is not the relationship of object and subject; nor agency, since there is nothing to be done; nor instrumentality, for the same reason. That is thus stated by the "**and**" in "**and which are devoid of a knower**".

To this very effect he cites the verses of a Brahman-knower:[138] "**Further, they say**" etc. The conceit of the self in son, wife etc., is secondary. As one feels miserable by

याद्वैतात्मावगतौ सत्याम्, निर्विषयाण्य-
प्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितु-
मर्हन्तीति ।

अपि चाहुः—

'गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात् ।
सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधि कार्यं कथं भवेत् ॥
अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात्प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः ।
अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ॥
देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥'

इति ।

त्याह—**सर्वाणि चेतराणि प्रमाणानि** इति । कुतः? **न हि** इति । अद्वैते हि विषयविषयि-भावो नास्ति; न च कर्तृत्वम्, कार्याभावात्; न च करणत्वम्, अत एव । तदिदमुक्तम्—**अप्रमातृकाणि च** इति चकारेण ।

अत्रैव ब्रह्मविदां गाथा उदाहरति—**अपि चाहुः** इति । पुत्रदारादिष्वात्माभिमानो गौणः । यथा

स्वदुःखेन दुःखी, यथा स्वसुखेन सुखी, तथा पुत्रादिगतेनापीति सोऽयं गौणः। न त्वेकत्वाभिमानः, भेदस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात्। तस्मात् 'गौर्वाहीकः' इतिवद्गौणः। देहेन्द्रियादिषु त्वभेदानुभवान्न गौण आत्माभिमानः; किं तु शुक्तौ रजतज्ञानवन्मिथ्या। तदेवं द्विविधोऽयमात्माभिमानो लोकयात्रां वहति। तदसत्त्वे तु न लोकयात्रा, नापि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वानुभवः, तदुपायस्य श्रवणमननादेरभावात्। तदिदमाह—**पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात्**। गौणात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रकलत्रादिबाधनम्; ममकाराभाव इति यावत्। मिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे देहेन्द्रियादिबाधनं श्रवणादिबाधनं च। ततश्च न केवलं लोकयात्रासमुच्छेदः; **सद्ब्रह्माहमित्येवं बोधि** बोधशीलं यत् **कार्यम्**, अद्वैतसाक्षात्कार इति यावत्, तदपि **कथं भवेत्**? कुतस्तदसंभव इत्यत आह—**अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात्प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः**। उपलक्षणं चैतत्; प्रमाप्रमेयप्रमाणविभाग इत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्। एतदुक्तं भवति—एष हि विभागोऽद्वैत-

one's own misery, and happy by one's own happiness, so too does one (feel) by what is present in the son etc.; hence it is secondary. But there is not the conceit of oneness, since difference is established in experience. Hence, it is secondary (figurative) as in "The Vāhika (the inhabitant of a country of that name) is an ox". But the conceit of the self in the body, organs etc., is not secondary, because of the experience of non-difference (from them); it is an illusion, rather, like the cognition of silver in nacre. Thus, it is this twofold conceit of the self that sustains the march of the world. If that, however, were non-existent, there would be no march of the world, nor even the experience of the oneness of Brahman and the self, because of the non-existence of the means thereto, *viz.*, hearing, reflection etc. That is thus said: "**because of the sublation of son, body** etc." When the secondary self is non-existent, there is sublation of son, wife etc.; that is to say, the non-existence of the sense of "mine". When the illusory self is non-existent, there is the sublation of body, organ etc., as also the sublation of hearing etc. And thence, there is not alone the destruction of the march of the world; "**the enlightenment that I am of the nature of the real Brahman, this thing to be done**" which is of the nature of an awakening, that is to say, the intuition of non-duality, that too, "**how can (it) come about**"? Whence its impossibility? To this he says: "**Prior to the cognition of the self that is to be sought, there is knowership for the self.**" This (knowership) is a synecdoche; the distinction

of valid knowledge, object of valid knowledge and means of valid knowledge is also to be understood. This is what is said: this distinction, indeed, is the cause of the intuition of non-duality, since it invariably precedes it; therefore, when that is non-existent, the effect is not produced. Nor is the self to be sought other than the knowing self; thus he says: "**What is to be sought is the knower alone, as free from sin, defect etc.**" The illustration of the necklet round one's neck has, indeed, been stated.

Be this so. From what is non-valid, how can there be the origination of the absolutely real experience of non-duality? To this he says: "**As the cognition of the self in the body is assumed to be valid knowledge, even so is this empirically valid knowledge (assumed to be valid).**" The terminus of this he states: "**up to the ascertainment of the self**"; up to the intuition of the nature of Brahman; this is the sense. This is what is said; even by those who maintain the absolute reality of the world, it must be said that the conceit of the self in the body etc. is illusory, since it is sublated by valid knowledge. And of this it should be admitted that it is the cause of all valid knowledge, and that it sustains the real march of the world. This is the mode for us too in respect of the intuition of non-duality. Nor is this intuition of non-duality, a particular psychosis of the internal organ, absolutely and invariably real.[139] As for that intuition which is real, that is not something to be done, since it is of the nature of Brahman. As for Nescience,

साक्षात्कारकारणम्, ततो नियमेन प्राग्भावात्; तेन तदभावे कार्यं नोत्पद्यत इति। न च प्रमातुरात्मनोऽन्वेष्टव्य आत्मान्य इत्याह—**अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः**। उक्तं हि ग्रीवास्थग्रैवेयकनिदर्शनम्।

स्यादेतत्। अप्रमाणात्कथं पारमार्थिकाद्वैतानुभवोत्पत्तिरित्यत आह—**देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः। लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं तु**। अस्यावधिमाह—**आ आत्मनिश्चयात्**; आ ब्रह्मस्वरूपसाक्षात्कारादित्यर्थः। एतदुक्तं भवति—पारमार्थिकप्रपञ्चवादिभिरपि देहादिष्वात्माभिमानो मिथ्येति वक्तव्यम्, प्रमाणबाधितत्वात्। तस्य च समस्तप्रमाणकारणत्वं भाविकलोकयात्रावाहित्वं चाभ्युपेयम्। सेयमस्माकमप्यद्वैतसाक्षात्कारे विधा भविष्यति। न चायमद्वैतसाक्षात्कारोऽप्यन्तःकरणवृत्तिभेद एकान्ततः परमार्थः। यस्तु साक्षात्कारो भाविकः, नासौ कार्यः, तस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वात्। अविद्या तु

यद्यविद्यामुच्छिन्द्याज्जनयेद्वा, न तत्र काचिदनुपपत्तिः । तथा च श्रुतिः—

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।
अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥

इति । तस्मात्सर्वमवदातम् ॥

इति चतुःसूत्री समाप्ता ।

whether it destroy or generate (other) Nescience, there is no unintelligibility whatever. So too says Scripture: "Knowledge and Nescience, he, who knows both together, passing byond death by Nescience, enjoys immortality through Knowledge." [140] Therefore, everything is clear.

HERE ENDS THE CATUḤ-SŪTRĪ-BHĀMATĪ

NOTES

PAGE 2

1. Vācaspati, like Padmapāda, the author of the *Pañcapādikā*, recognises two kinds of Nescience. These are the kāraṇā-'vidyā and the kāryā-'vidyās. The former is beginningless; the latter too are beginningless, but in the same sense as a continuous stream. Kāraṇā-'vidyā is one, on the view of some, but not according to Vācaspati. Another name for it is mūlā-'vidyā. As contrasted with it, the others are called tūlā-'vidyās or avasthā-'jñānas, modal ignorances. See further, Introduction, section V.

2. The world, movable and immovable, has to be created through Hiraṇyagarbha, and thus requires greater effort than the elements; hence their comparison to the smile, which requires greater effort than a mere glance: so says the *Kalpataru*.

3. This is a joint salutation to the Vedas and to Paramaśiva, whom Vācaspati would appear to identify with the Saguṇa-Brahman, possibly following the lead of Śaṅkara; see the *Śivādvaitanirṇaya*, para 3. 233, and the paras immediately preceding. The six aṅgas of the Veda are phonetics, prosody, etymology, grammar, astrology and ritual; the avyayas (indeclinables) like the particle *ca* (meaning 'and') are innumerable. The six aṅgas of Paramaśiva (Bhava) are omniscience,

contentment, eternal wisdom, independence, eternal illimitable resources, and unimaginable power; the *avyayas* (imperishable properties) are ten: knowledge, non-attachment, lordly power, austerity, truth, mercy, firmness, creatorship, self-knowledge and controllership: thus the *Kalpataru.*

4. Amalānanda takes this expression to refer to a deity fond of sesamum. From a verse quoted in the *Kalpataru* the word "Mārtaṇḍa" would seem to refer to the Sun. Das Gupta says Tilakasvāmin is another name for Kārttikeya or Skanda (see *HIP*, II, 107); in this identification, he has also the support of the *Ṛjuprakāśikā.*

5. Secondary Creator (apara-vedhas). Vyāsa is said to be so, because of a boon granted to him, in common with Dakṣa and others, in virtue of which they are known as Prajāpatis (creators). The *Ṛjuprakāśikā* justifies the attribution of creatorship to Vyāsa on the ground of his being an incarnation of Viṣṇu's cognitive energy, as stated in the Purāṇas; the second line of the verse would thus be a justification of the second half of the first line.

6. The bhāṣya of Śaṅkara is clear to outward appearance; but the depth of thought revealed on analysis shows its might and majesty.

PAGE 3

7. *I.e.*, condition or cause; fire is the pervader and smoke the pervaded (vyāpya). That which is more extensive (adhika-deśa-vṛtti) is the pervader, and that which is less extensive (nyūna-deśa-vṛtti) is the pervaded. They are, of course, co-extensive, where the relation is reciprocal. The pervader in the present case is the

condition of the inquiry, *i.e.*, lack of knowledge *plus* the existence of profit from the knowledge.

8. That is to say, the body whereon the attributes of the self have been superimposed.

PAGE 4

9. The intellect is the determinative faculty; certitude belongs to it, while doubt belongs to the mind (manas). It is essential to remember that all these psychical factors are in their own nature unconscious.

PAGE 5

10. The usage "You are myself" does exist, but it is very rare; hence the word "extensive" is used advisedly.

PAGE 6

11. That is to say, present it (avabhāsayanti) as of the same nature as themselves: *Ṛjuprakāśikā*.

12. What is here meant is the *cognition* of the one being of the nature of the other (itaretaratva-pratītiḥ), not the actual identity of the one with the other. The latter is never doubted and its non-existence needs no proof.

PAGE 7

13. For the superimposition of attributes there must be either superimposition of their substrates or such a relationship between the latter that one may reflect the other. Neither of these being possible as between subject and object, whence the superimposition of attributes? The quotation is from the *Ślokavārttika*, V, 39 (p. 280).

PAGE 8

14. Knowledge through perception necessarily comes before knowledge through any other means, such as

inference etc., and certainly long before knowledge through verbal testimony. Herein consists the priority (jyeṣṭatva) of perception. Further, words can convey knowledge only when they are perceived. For his arguments in meeting this contention, Vācaspati is indebted to Maṇḍana Miśra; see the *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 39-41, esp. p. 41. The example given for the origination of valid knowledge from what is empirically, but not absolutely, real may be paralleled by the difference of significance brought about by emphasis. Emphasis does not belong to the nature of the words; but when imposed on different words in a sentence, the sense of the sentence differs; the difference in sense is validly apprehended, though resulting from what is superimposed.

PAGE 9

15. This is a statement of Śabarasvāmin. The "other" is the implied sense (lakṣyārtha).

16. *PM*, VI, v, 54. The archetypal rite is that all of whose subsidiaries have been explicitly laid down by Scripture. There are other rites modelled on these; they are called vikṛtis; their subsidiaries are as a rule taken over from the injunctions as to the prakṛti rite. Where, however, a particular subsidiary has been laid down for the vikṛti, the corresponding subsidiary from the prakṛti will not be taken over; the subsequent prescription in the vikṛti sublates the earlier injunction in the prakṛti. Thus, the prescription of kuśa grass as an auxiliary in the prakṛti is sublated when there is an express prescription of śara in the vikṛti.

17. *Tantravārttika*, p. 819.

PAGE 10

18. The word "agnihotra" is the name of a particular rite, an obligatory rite. There is another rite called the

"kuṇḍapāyinām ayana" which is not obligatory, though the injunction in that regard uses the word "agnihotra". The object of using this word is to indicate not the identity of the rites, but the need for transferring from the obligatory rite all such subsidiaries as are not expressly laid down for the other. On the whole topic see *PM*, I, iv, 4; II, iii, 24; and VII, iii, 1-4.

PAGE 11

19. That is, in the cognition "I am in this very abode, but cognising".

PAGE 13

20. There is no cognition of the form "I am the body"; but the cognition "I" is none the less due to the erroneous identification of the self with the non-self; that is why it is said that the identification is a fact, though not present in cognition.

21. The Sanskrit "adhyasya vyavahāraḥ" involves the use of the participial suffix (-ktvā) in "adhyasya" (superimposing). This is justifiable only where there is a common agent for both activities. See Pāṇini: 3.4.21. Vācaspati says there is this justification.

22. While Vācaspati identifies mithyājñāna with adhyāsa, treating prior superimpositions as the causes of subsequent ones, Padmapāda sees here a reference to the primal cosmic ignorance. He splits up the compound into mithyā and ajñāna. There are undoubtedly difficulties in treating Primal Nescience as a cause; see the Introduction. The author of the *Vivaraṇa*, a commentary on the *Pañcapādikā*, justifies Padmapāda's explanation on the ground that to allege superimposition as the cause

of superimposition would be to commit the fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāśraya). But as Maṇḍana and Vācaspati are never tired of pointing out, full intelligibility is just what one may not expect in the case of Nescience; non-intelligibility is constitutive of its very nature.

PAGE 15

23. The bhāṣya says that the empirical usage (vyavahāraḥ) is natural and beginningless. But if that were so, it could not have a cause. Hence, the beginninglessness should be taken really to qualify the cause, *viz.* superimposition. But this is itself an effect of prior superimpositions. How, then, can that be said to have no beginning? The reply is that what is here intended is not the absence of any beginning, but the absence of any beginning that may be said to be the *first*; in other words, we have a continuous process like that of a perennial stream. Such beginninglessness is called kāryā-'nāditva or pravāhā-'nāditva, as contrasted with svarūpā-'nāditva, such as belongs to the jīva, Īśvara, Pure Intelligence, the difference between the jīva and Īśvara, Nescience, and its relation to Intelligence.

24. According to Vācaspati, sattā (reality) consists in unsublated self-luminosity. The other views, *e.g.* the inherence of reality as a genus, and practical efficiency, are maintained by the Naiyāyikas and cannot appeal to the advaitin for the reasons mentioned, *viz.* the introduction of duality and the infinite regress involved.

PAGE 18

25. This view (or something very much like it) comes in for criticism at the hands of Kavitārkika

Cakravarti Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, of whom we know nothing beyond the summary given of his views in the first chapter of the *Siddhāntalesasaṅgraha*. The point of the criticism is this: does the yellow, which goes forth with the rays of light, pervade the object? If it does not, there is no possibility of its superimposition; if it does, then, even others who are near by should perceive the shell to be yellow, as if it were gilded. What the Cakravarti is criticising is the notion of two psychoses in an illusion, one cognising the "this" and the other the "yellow" or the "silver"; neither the existence nor the functioning of two such psychoses is intelligible, according to him. It is not clear from the *Bhāmatī* whether Vācaspati recognises two psychoses, though his language suggests such recognition; but Appayya Dīkṣita who briefly refers in the *Parimala* to the Cakravartin's criticism, makes out that it applies only to the Tārkikas.

26. An interesting question in relation to this experience is "whence the previous experience of bitterness for an infant, who has not yet tasted anything bitter, but turns away from the mother's milk, because of the delusion caused by biliousness that it is bitter?" One explanation is that the bitterness is imported from the experiences of a prior life. *Cf. SLS.*, pp. 204-205 (Kumbakonam edition).

27. There has been more than one theory of reflection in advaita philosophy. Vācaspati seems to hold in common with Padmapāda and the Vivaraṇācārya that the image which appears to be apprehended is but the original face. There is a difference of opinion as to whether the original itself is apprehended but in a

different place or the original that is present in its own proper place. Padmapāda holds the former view and says that those who maintain the latter are patently contradicted by experience (see the *Pañcapādikā*, p. 23). The latter view is that maintained by Vācaspati, and must be part of his inheritance from another, possibly Maṇḍana, as otherwise it could not have come in for criticism even in Padmapāda's days. The *Bhāmatī* view is that the reflected rays go back to the original image where it is and apprehend it, but *not as where it is*. In support of the view that what is apprehended is the original image itself, the Vivaraṇācārya points to the form of the sublating cognition "The face is *not there*" not "The face is not". As regards Vācaspati's own exposition, Appayya Dīkṣita rightly remarks in the *Parimala* that the element of "non-apprehension of the location of the original" is not essential to all reflection, since it is absent from the cognition of the reflection of a tree, for instance, which may co-exist with the cognition of the tree where it is really located. The doctrine that the rays from the sense of sight are turned back by the stronger rays of the sun does not seem to be shared by the Vivaraṇācārya, who says they are turned back by the reflecting medium, the mirror etc. Neither version of the theory, of course, corresponds to the modern physicist's notion of reflection, according to which the rays of the sun or other illuminant are reflected, not rays from the sense of sight. The most powerful criticism of the theory that the reflected image is identical with the original comes from the Advaita-vidyācārya (probably Raṅgarāja Dīkṣita, Appayya's father) who holds that the reflected image is a fictitious

creation of Nescience, like the water of the mirage. These are some of the points urged by him. (i) It is not true that there is no notion of an independent face in the mirror. Children and other unsophisticated persons take the reflection to be an independent entity. (ii) The reflection does not have the properties of the original. The reflection of the sun does not burn, nor does the reflection of the moon cool. (iii) When we look at a calm sheet of water, we see not merely the reflections of our faces, but also the sandy bed. The only possible explanation is that some rays from the sense of sight pass through the reflecting medium while others are turned back. Whence this difference in the strength of the rays? Again, the rays which are admittedly weaker than water and are consequently turned back therefrom, are yet said to be stronger than the much stronger rays of the sun, so that they go up to the solar orb and enable us to see its reflection in the water! See further *SLS.*, pp. 268-280 (Kumbakonam edition).

PAGE 19

28. "gandharva-nagara" is a delusion of cities, buildings etc., seen in the clouds.

29. It is said that the eye treated with the vasa (a bilious substance) from a frog, sees a bamboo as a snake and the colour of a snake in the colour of the bamboo. See the relevant portion of the *Kalpataru* and the *Parimala* thereon.

30. "maruṣu marīcikā-nicayam" is literally a body of son's rays (shining) over a desert (and giving the appearance of water); it is therefore rendered here as "mirage". The *Ṛjuprakāśikā* takes "uccāvacam"

(understood in our translation to mean "high and low" as qualifying "waves") along with "marīcikā-nicayam," the whole compound meaning "the unspeakably intense rays of the sun shining over a desert"; according to this commentary "uccāvacam" means "vācām agocaram" or "atyadhikam".

PAGE 20

31. "bhāvā-'ntaram abhāvo hi." This part of the line occurs in the *Ślokavārttika*, p. 566, where, however, it is followed by "purastāt pratipāditaḥ" not by "kayācit tu vyapekṣayā". The whole line as here quoted occurs in the *Vibhramaviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra (see v. 129, p. 14, Madras edition). It is not unlikely that Vācaspati's own quotation is from Maṇḍana.

PAGE 21

32. Cp. kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt
avinābhāva-niyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt.

33. The verse is from the *Ślokavārttika*, p. 476. This view of Kumārila, which treats existence and non-existence as co-existent aspects of everything, is to be distinguished from the view of Prabhākara, which denies any kind of reality to non-existence, since the non-existence of anything, say a pot, is nothing more than the bare locus, *i.e.*, the ground itself. The line "bhāvā-'ntaram abhāvo 'nyo na kaścid anirūpaṇāt" seems to some extent to be reminiscent of this view; and it is not infrequently mistaken for an expression of the Prābhākara view; see, for instance, D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 160 and the foot-note. The ascription,

however, is erroneous, since that line is Kumārila's description of his own position. See the *Ślokavārttika*, p. 245; also the *Vibhramaviveka*, v. 127, p. 14, where this line is cited in the exposition of the Vārttika-kāra's own position.

PAGE 22

34. See Note 33.

PAGE 25

35. Expressions like "long-lived one" and "beloved of the Gods" are applied to the opponent, more particularly to the Buddhist, sarcastically, to indicate his folly.

PAGE 27

36. "True," that is, literally, "correspond to their objects." Correspondence for the Naiyāyikas and for the Prābhākaras (whose view is set forth in the present passage) seems to have meant nothing more than "practical efficiency". It is difficult to determine whether the Naiyāyikas ever understood it to mean "resemblance" and could be characterised as representationists.

PAGE 30

37. For the criticism of akhyāti-vāda *Cp.* the *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 136-147, esp. p. 137.

PAGE 31

38. *Bhasmaka*, morbid appetite due to over-digestion; seems to have been known as *Yānaittī* in Tamil; *Cp. Maṇimēkalai*, patikam, line 66.

PAGE 32

39. The *Nyāyakaṇikā* is Vācaspati's Commentary on Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka*. Amalānanda in the relevant part

of the *Kalpataru* gives a summary of Vācaspati's arguments in the *Nyāyakaṇikā*. The main argument is this. Truth is self-evident, not made known by constancy of the cognition to its object. If cognition does require constancy, for what purpose does it need it—for the presentation of the object cognised or for successful practical activity? Not the first, since cognition does not arise first and then present the object; rather does it arise as the presentation of an object. Nor the second; for, in order to apprehend constancy, practical officiency etc. should be first apprehended. Is this effected by another cognition? Then the constancy of that cognition comes in question and we have an infinite regress. If another cognition be not needed for the second cognition, validity would be ascertained neither for that cognition nor for the first cognition, dependent thereon for its validity. And if the validity of the second cognition be self-evident, why not that of the first as well?

The *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā* referred to three lines later is Vācaspati's commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana.

PAGE 34

40. The *Ṛjuprakāśikā* reads "ātmā 'jaḍo" taking the two words "self" and "non-inert" in apposition, so that the sentence means: "If it is manifest, it stands to reason that the self, which is non-inert, is not, like pot etc., manifested in dependence on another."

PAGE 36

41. That is to say, we are left only with the fact of the relatedness of consciousness to objects and the self;

and with this we got no further forward, as the analogy of the ignorant father and the scholarly son still applies.

PAGE 38

42. For, then, the plurality of reflections of the sun would introduce difference into the sun. It is to be noted that this demonstration of self-luminosity is offered by the objector, with a view to show the impossibility of superimposition.

PAGE 41

43. *Chānd.*, VI, iii, 2.

44. There is a continuous stream of superimposition, wherein jīva-hood and object-ness (viṣayatva) alternate, without the defect of reciprocal dependence. The content of an earlier superimposition may be jīva-hood; and this jīva may become the object of the next superimposition.

PAGE 42

45. *Śvet.*, VI, 14.

46. "Prauḍhi-vāda" is sometimes rendered as "an extravagant argument". It is in the nature of a supplementary argument, which proceeds by conceding the opponent's assumptions though really untenable as suggested by its synonym. It has no strict relevance to the main thesis as its establishment. Thus the denial of God in the *Sāṁkhya Sūtras* is said by Vijñāna Bhikṣu to be a "prauḍhi-vāda".

PAGE 45

47. That the inner self, which is pure intelligence, is different from intellect etc., this is what is to be

apprehended ; this apprehension constitutes the final cognition, which is of the same class of reality as what is removed thereby, though it is of a higher degree in that it requires nothing else for its own removal. The rise of this cognition is of itself the removal of Nescience, since nothing else remains to be acquired or done for this removal. But even the final cognition is other than the knowledge which is the self; it only helps to reveal the latter, through removing the obscuration caused by Nescience; hence that cognition may be spoken of as "knowledge" only derivatively or secondarily.

PAGE 49

48. The reading in all printed texts is "pravartate," though "pravartante" seems obviously to be called for. As the text stands, the meaning would seem to be "why should he (the knower) not function of himself"? But it is evident both from what follows and from the commentaries that it is the functioning of the senses and of the pramāṇas generally which is here in question. The reading "pravartante" has been adopted in the present text on the strength of two MSS. in the Adyar Library: 30 L 22 (Grantha script) and 40 B 19 (Malayalam script). It is interesting to note that the *Kalpataru* takes the second question to relate to a different objector and not to be merely explanatory of the first question. The first question is "why should the knower utilise the pramāṇas?" The ātmanepada in "upādatte" implies that the utilisation is for his own benefit. The obvious complement of that question is "why should not the pramāṇas function for his benefit without being utilised by him?" This would be the question of a follower of the Sāṅkhya, according to which, primal

nature functions of itself in the presence of Spirit, for the benefit of Spirit. But there is another possibility—that prakṛti and its evolutes may function, not for any one's benefit, but just because it is their nature. The second question is based on this possibility. This interpretation, says the author of the *Ābhoga*, is justified, nay demanded, by the force of "eva" in "svayam eva kasmāt" etc. One may also note in this connection that, while for Vācaspati *adhiṣṭhānam* (in the Bhāṣya) means "controller" Padmapāda, Ānandagiri and Govindānanda take it to mean "locus". The sentence in the Bhāṣya would thus mean: "and without the locus of the senses (that is to say, the body) there is no functioning."

PAGE 50

49. The words of the Bhāṣya "And without a knower" etc. imply also "and without valid knowledge". The need for a knower who can control the pramāṇas has been already explained, and there is no need to repeat it. What is shown here is the need for superimposition, because of the nature of valid knowledge, *viz.*, the combination of intelligence and non-intelligence (cid-acid-rūpa-garbhiṇi).

PAGE 53

50. *PM*, III, vii, 18. The question is whether the sacrificer (yajamāna) should personally engage in each act of sacrificial ritual, including all subsidiaries or whether it will suffice if he makes the dedication of the sacrificial material. The *prima facie* view is that the sacrificer should himself engage in all the rites, since the fruit is declared to go to him; and the

fruit necessarily goes to that agent who is implied by the activity of engaging in the rites. The final view is that the services of the officiating priests (ṛtviks) have been formally purchased by the yajamāna and that this purchase would be futile if the yajamāna had to perform all the rites himself. The aphorism cited here is the statement of the *prima facie* view; but in both views, the fruit is understood to go to him who engages in activity for its sake; and this is all that is intended to be illustrated here.

PAGE 56

51. Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 43. There are three expectancies for every operation prompted by an injunction: what is to be accomplished? wherewith? and how? In the case of the śyena or hawk sacrifice (so called because it injures the enemy even as quickly as a hawk would pluck out the enemy's eyes) injury to the enemy is what is to be accomplished. But this cannot be in the last resort a Scripture-ordained end, since it conflicts with the prohibition of injury to all beings. It is at best a Scripture-permitted end. One of the expectancies, therefore, is not fulfilled from an absolute point of view. Despite this, the injunction of the hawk sacrifice is observed by those who are eligible for it, *i.e.* those who have not conquered anger.

PAGE 61

52. *PM*, I, ii, 40.

PAGE 62

53. "The inner self alone is their principal sense." The word *mukhyā-'rthaḥ* would ordinarily mean "primary"

or "expressed" as opposed to "secondary" or "implied sense". The inner self, however, is not the primary or expressed sense of the words "That" and "thou" in "That thou art". Hence, the word *mukhya* here means nothing more than "non-figurative"; see the *Ṛjuprakāśikā*.

PAGE 65

54. "daṇḍī preṣān anvāha." Scripture says "maitrā-varuṇaḥ preṣati cā 'nvāha ca." While the adhvaryu actually offers the oblations, the maitrā-varuṇa has the task of preparing them and the hotṛ priests have the function of calling on the deities to come up as soon as the offerings are ready. On the adhvaryu satisfying himself from the maitrā-varuṇa that the offerings are ready, the latter, with the former's consent, gives permission to the hotṛ priests, in the formula "āśrāvaya," to call the deities. When the invitation has been made, that fact is communicated to the adhvaryu by the maitrā-varuṇa in the formula "astu śrauṣaṭ". The first of these formulæ is called the praiṣa and the second the anuvacana. That the uttering of both of these belongs to the maitrā-varuṇa results from the text already mentioned. When, therefore, it is said later "daṇḍī preṣān anvāha (the priest with the baton chants the permission and the reply)," this should be taken to be a restatement in respect of the chanter and the chanting, being injunctive only in respect of the qualification of having a baton. If the emphasis were not on the baton, the statement would be wholly futile. Hence the importance of what is not primary in the sentence. But this is not so in the case of "brahma-jijñāsā".

PAGE 66

55. "mān-badha" etc.; see Pāṇini, III, i, 6. This aphorism says that the stems mentioned, *viz.*, *mān*, *badha* etc., undergo a duplication and a lengthening of the initial consonant. Thus, from *mān* we get *māmān*; this, in accordance with another rule, becomes *mīmān*; and this with *san*-suffix, which, however, does not mean "desire" in the present case, becomes *mīmāṃsā*.

PAGE 70

56. *PM*, I, i, 1.

PAGE 73

57. *YS*,, I, 14.

58. *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 21.

59. *Manusmṛti*, VI, 35. The three obligations are (1) to the Gods, (discharged by sacrifices), (2) to the fathers, (discharged by the creation of progeny), and (3) to the sages, (discharged by study of the Veda and observance of brahmacharya). The two smṛtis cited a few lines earlier are respectively *Manu*, II, 28 and *Gautama*, VIII, 22. On the whole subject of the relation of karma to jñāna Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 27-37.

PAGE 74

60. "saṃyoga-pṛthaktva" is literally a two-foldness (*i.e.*, a difference) of relation. The subsidiary happens to be in two relations, one with the rite of which it is a necessary part, and the other with the fruit specifically enjoined. *E.g.*, there are two texts "khādire paśum badhnāti (he is to tie the beast to the ebony stake)" and "khādiram vīryakāmasya yūpam karoti (he who

desires virility is to make the stake of ebony)". As subserving the sacrifice, ebony would be a constant factor thereof; but, as subserving the desire for virility, it would be a variable factor. There is no inconsistency in the same subsidiary having this twofold relation (saṃyoga-pṛthaktva).

61. *Ved. Sū.*, III, iv, 32. It is worth noting that Maṇḍana's interpretation of the horse-analogy is both distinctive and interesting. He who wants to go quickly gets hold of a horse, though he can otherwise foot the distance. The use of ritual is analogous to the service rendered by a horse; see *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 36-37.

62. Proximate and remote contributories" are the results of two varieties of auxiliaries, which are distinguished as they subserve the rite and indirectly the fruit, or the fruit alone directly, not the rite; the fruit being distant in time, what subserves that alone is said to be a remote auxiliary (ārādupakāraka); what subserves the rite directly, *e.g.*, the material used or to be used, is a proximate contributory (sannipatya- or sāmavāyika-upakāraka). Where the subsidiaries of a rite are expressly mentioned by Scripture, they are said to be obtained by direct teaching (upadeśa); where, however, they have to be derived from another rite which is its model, they are said to be obtained by transfer (atideśa). For a full list of subsidiaries (aṅgāni) see *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa*, (Edgerton): sections 182-191. See list of corrections.

PAGE 75

63. The āgneya and two other rites constitute the darśeṣṭi; similarly the āgneya with still two other rites constitutes the paurṇamāseṣṭi. The two groups of three

bring about heaven as the ultimate fruit. But since this fruit comes after much delay, while the rites perish as soon as they are performed, an unseen potency (apūrva) has to be assumed; this is produced by the rites and it in turn produces heaven. But each rite does not produce heaven; it is only the six rites together with their subsidiaries that produce that result; each of these perishable rites, however, should produce an apūrva, while the ultimate result, heaven, is the result of an apūrva which is final (paramā-'pūrva) and to which all the other apūrvas (known as utpatty-apūrvas) contribute. Now, the samit is the name of one of the rites subsidiary to the three main rites of the darśa or paurṇamāseṣṭi; it produces its own apūrva which is contributory to the paramā-'pūrva generated by the āgneya etc. It is only in order that the āgneya etc. may produce their fruit, that the due performance of the samit etc. and the generation of their appropriate apūrvas are necessary. But it is possible to perform the āgneya etc. even without performing the samit etc. In the case of the puroḍāśa, the sacrificial cake made of rice flour, we have a different relationship; in the absence of puroḍāśa, the āgneya etc. could not be performed; these depend on the puroḍāśa for their very existence, not merely for their fruitfulness.

64. The mortar in which the rice-grains for the sacrificial cake are pounded is purified by sprinkling.

PAGE 78

65. For the school of Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, verbal testimony is not of itself a means of immediate knowledge. The internal organ (which, according to them, is a

sense-organ) intuites the real, as aided by knowledge gained through testimony, reasoning thereon and so on. As against this, the *Vivaraṇa* school holds that knowledge through verbal testimony may of itself be immediate. An example given of this is the statement "Thou art the tenth" addressed to the proverbial party of ten fools who, on crossing a river, reckoned up their total number as nine, each enumerator leaving himself out of the counting. When the enumerator is pointed to by an outsider with the words "Thou art the tenth" there arises the full and immediate certitude of his being the tenth man and of the whole party being safe. Verbal testimony would thus seem to be a cause of immediate knowledge. The following free rendering of a passage from the *Kalpataru* will be of interest in this connection: "This is the idea. Of Brahman, though of itself immediate, mediacy is apprehended because of delusion. Hence, the intuition thereof can be only through a means of valid immediate cognition. And since the internal organ generates in the conditioned self the immediate psychosis of 'I,' that (organ) is established to be the cause of immediate cognition in the self. That (organ), however, as aided by the succession of cognitions of the unity of Brahman and the self, intuites in the case of the jīva its being of the nature of Brahman, which is secondarily implied by the word 'That,' in the same way as the sense of sight aided by the retenta of prior experience is the cause of the recognition of the oneness implied by 'that-ness' and 'this-ness' (in the recognition 'This is that Devadatta'). But verbal testimony is not settled to be the cause of valid immediate cognition. If cognition were intuitive because of the object cognised being capable of immediacy (as is maintained by some

advaitins, *e.g.*, the author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*), that (immediacy) would result even for the inference whose content is the difference between the body and the self. Even in the case of 'Thou art the tenth,' the intuition results only from the sense-organ as aided by that (statement). Further, the immediate cognition generated by contemplation of the knowledge resulting from the Vedāntas cannot be delusive, because of the strength of the basic means of knowledge (*i.e.*, Scripture). Nor does it follow that validity is extrinsic; for, confirmation by the basic means of knowledge is sought (only) to remove the suspicion of invalidity. This has to be admitted because of such texts supported by reasoning as 'But it is seen by the concentrated intellect'. Cognition from verbal testimony arises only in the form 'that which is directly immediate,' not in the form 'Brahman is mediate'; yet, the cognition remains mediate, because of the nature of the instrument (verbal testimony), and is not delusive; thus, everything is clear." Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 134. One is tempted to think that between the two rival views, there is but a distinction without a difference. Even where verbal testimony is held to cause immediate cognition, the object, it is said, should be proximate or immediate. May not this proximity mean proximity to a sense-organ, *i.e.*, the mind?

66. According to Vācaspati, what is veiled by Nescience is the conditioned Brahman; for, the unconditioned is flawless; it can be neither veiled nor revealed. What is revealed by the final intuition must, therefore, also be the conditioned Brahman. In veiling and in manifestation there is the relation of content and container, and what enters into any relation cannot be the unconditioned. But at the stage of the final cognition

the conditioning is such that the condition does not appear; the pure Brahman itself seems to appear; the condition is the psychosis, which, as has been said, is itself on the brink of destruction. This condition operates by its very existence, constituting an exception to the general rule that a condition operates as such only when known to be such. See further the *Kalpataru* on this topic. Here, again, the difference between the *Bhāmati* and *Vivaraṇa* schools tends to be verbal rather than material; for, the distinction is difficult to make out between what is said to be the intuition of pure Brahman and what is said to be the intuition of the conditioned Brahman, but without any awareness of the condition or the conditioning.

PAGE 82

67. The expression "bhinna-karmatā" means the performance of action suited to those who are different, *i.e.*, who have not the conceit of being human beings; actions, in other words, which are suitable to beasts etc. It has been translated rather freely as "transgression of the law".

68. Vācaspati's account of release while embodied (jīvan-mukti) is not very satisfactory. In the present exposition he seems to hold to the view of Maṇḍana (Cp. the *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 130), that the so-called perfected saint is not wholly perfect; he is only a sādhaka, not a siddha. But later on, in commenting on IV, i, 15, Vācaspati echoes Śaṅkara and maintains expressly that the jīvan-mukta is a siddha, not a sādhaka. He also stands there for the continuance of a part of Nescience, in the form of prārabdha-karma, while in the present context, he postulates, like Maṇḍana, the continuance of

impressions alone. As noted in the Introduction, to postulate the continuance of a body is not the same as to postulate continuance of the conceit of identity with the body. If the latter be a necessary element of jīvan-mukti, it would indeed be difficult to avoid Rāmānuja's criticism that the assertion of jīvan-mukti is like the son's assertion of his mother's barrenness. Vācaspati's ingenious explanation of how prohibitions, though not prescriptions, hold good in the case of the jīvan-mukta has obvious leanings towards Maṇḍana's doctrine that jīvan-mukti is at best figurative, a predication based on the close proximity of final release. The more usual explanation is that the psycho-physical mechanism of the released self is so attuned that it cannot possibly go wrong. This is simpler and perhaps more satisfactory. That Vācaspati is far from consistent will be apparent from what he says under II, iii, 48 (p. 626): "For him, however, who knows the difference from everything beginning with the intellect, for him who is devoid of the conceit of the enjoyership of karma, there is no eligibility in respect of karma. And thus, there is not (for him) acting as he likes, since, for him who is devoid of conceit, there is not even that." This is very different from the position that prohibitions are binding, because they do not call for an act of faith in the same manner as prescriptions.

69. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XVII, 28.

PAGE 83

70. *Kaivalya Upa.*, I, 3; *Mahānārāyaṇa*, XII, 28.

PAGE 84

71. *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* XI, ii, 6, 13.

72. *Muṇḍ.*, III, i, 8.

PAGE 85

73. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VI, 3.

PAGE 86

74. *Jābāla.*, 4.

75. Jarā-marya-vāda etc. When one is about to die of old age (or illness for the matter of that), an expiatory ceremony (prāyaścitta) is prescribed; this is what is meant by the prescription about jarā-maraṇa. The cremation of dead bodies is also a prescribed rite; this is what is referred to in the words "being reduced to ashes". In the case of those who have performed sacrifices during their life-time, the son is enjoined to perform a final sacrifice (antyeṣṭi). Jarā (old age) is synecdochic for illness and the like as well. There seems to have been a reading "jarā-maryā-'rthavāda," which is explained by the *Ṛjuprakāśikā* to mean that which is enjoined (vādhyate=vidhīyate) in the case of (=arthe) death due to old age etc.

PAGE 88

76. Sequence may be settled by direct *statement* (śruti), *sense* (artha), the order of *mention* in the texts (pāṭha), the *position* of that whose sequence is to be settled (sthāna), the sequence adopted in the *principal* (mukhya), or the sequence adopted in the first *procedure* (pravṛtti). The first of these is, of course, the clearest indication. Direct statement may be by the participial *-ktvā* suffix, as in "Having become a householder (gṛhī bhūtvā), he is to become a forest-dweller" etc. It has been said in the text (of the *Bhāmatī*) that such sequence

is sublated by the disregard of sequence in "Or, if otherwise, let him renounce from the student's order of life" and so on.

The next determinant of sequence is artha. The text about the preparation of barley gruel occurs after that about the performance of agnihotra. Since the latter requires some material, and barley gruel appears to be the material, it would be natural to prepare this before performing the oblation. Those who stick to the order of *mention* would, however, maintain that the oblation should come first, some other material being assumed therefor and that the preparation of the gruel should be assumed to have some other unseen result. This involves the abandonment of the visible material and the visible result and the assumption of something invisible in both cases. Rather than incur this defect of prolixity (gaurava), it is preferable to recognise the sequence warranted by the *sense* (artha) and prepare the gruel first so that it may be offered in the agnihotra.

The next determinant is the order of *mention* (pāṭha). The darśa-pūrṇamāsa consists of six rites, three to be performed at the fullmoon and three at the new moon. They are (1) the āgneya, the agnīṣomīya, and the ānubandhya, and (2) the āgneya, the aindram dadhi and the aindram payaḥ. For either set of three, there is a set of subsidiaries called fore-sacrifices (prayāja). These are mentioned in the following order: "samido yajati, tanūnapātam yajati, iḍo yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāram yajati." Should they be performed in this order alone or in any other? The answer is that since the names of these rites occur to the mind in the order of mention, they should be performed in that order.

They are learnt in that order, in accordance with the injunction to study one's Veda; and the texts serve the purpose not only of making known the rites, but also of recalling them to mind for the sake of their observance.

Of the Jyotiṣṭoma as archetypal rite, there is a modification called the sādhyaskra, in which all the three animals,—the agnīṣomīya, the savanīya and the ānubandhya—have to be offered up on the same day, not on three different days, as in the archetype. On which day, then, are they all to be offered? On the second day—the day to which the savanīya animal belongs in the archetype—after collecting the soma in the cup dedicated to the Aśvins. For, in this way, each of the other animals is moved out of its place by one day alone; whereas in any other way, there would be a disturbance of two days for one or other of the animals. And on the second day, the savanīya animal is to be approached first, because the offering of that animal belongs eminently to that day; and from the originative injunction in the archetype, it is understood to follow immediately on the filling of the cup dedicated to the Aśvins. The other two animals may be approached either in the order belonging to them in the archetype, or without regard for any special sequence. Thus is sequence settled by *position* (sthāna).

Sequence among the subsidiaries may be settled in conformity with that in the *principal* rite (mukhya). When such an order is adopted, the intervals between the subsidiaries and their respective principals would be equal; otherwise, there would be a larger interval in some cases, and in others none at all. The offerings in the āgneya etc. have to be sprinkled with

the ghee left over from the fore-sacrifices. The āgneya comes first and the aindram dadhi comes next; the sprinkling of the respective materials should follow the same order. If the latter were sprinkled first and then the former, since the āgneya has to be offered up first, between the sprinkling of it and its offering there would be no interval at all, while there would be too long an interval in the case of the aindram dadhi.

In the Vājapeya, seventeen animals are to be offered up on the same day. These have to be approached, sprinkled, tied up and so on. It is a matter of indifference which animal is approached first. But the whole series of operations should not be finished in the case of one animal before the next one is approached; for, then, it would not constitute the offering of the seventeen *together*. What interval there is should be only such as is unavoidable. Hence, each stage of each operation should be gone through with all the animals. Now, when the first stage (sprinkling) is over, is there any order to be observed for the next stage? The *prima facie* view is that it is an unnecessary tax on the mind to remember the original order and that the second stage may begin with any animal ready to hand. The final view is that the sequence adopted in the first operation should be preserved throughout the series of operations. When simultaneity is enjoined and succession is adopted only because it is inevitable, delay in each operation should be reduced to a minimum; for each animal there may be only sixteen intervals between one operation and the next; and this can be secured only by adhering to the original order. This is sequence settled by pravṛtti.

It is, of course, understood that these determinants have been mentioned in the order of superiority and that

each subsequent one is less conclusive than the preceding one.

77. The single result is the final supreme unseen result, the paramā-'pūrva, to which the fruit of subsidiary rites, the utpatty-apūrvas as they are called, are contributory.

78. *E.g.*, "He who desires heaven should sacrifice with the darśa and pūrṇamāsa," wherefrom it is understood that all the six sacrifices comprised under darśa and pūrṇamāsa are contributory to heaven.

PAGE 89

79. *I.e.*, a specific human object, say, the securing of cattle in plenty; this is distinguished from what is kratv-artha, subsidiary to the rite itself as serving its due accomplishment. When the same subsidiary fulfils both ends, we have two-in-one-ness (samyoga-pṛthaktva). As part of the darśa-pūrṇamāsa there is a water-sprinkling ceremony called ap-praṇayana; this ceremony is by itself merely kratv-artha. But he who desires cattle is to sprinkle from a godohana (milking) vessel; in this case, the sprinkling becomes puruṣā-'rtha. See *PM*, IV, i, 2.

PAGE 90

80. It has been shown that even where is explicit use of the participial (-ktvā) suffix, indicative of sequence, no sequence is intended, as shown for instance in the case of the *Jābāla Upaniṣad*. In the case of the desire to know Brahman there is not even such a suffix to be explained away. Therefore, the existence of sequence as between the soma sacrifice and the darśapūrṇamāsa-iṣṭi has no application here, that being a case of the explicit use of the

participial suffix: "Having performed the darśapūrṇamāsa-iṣṭi" etc.

PAGE 91

81. Kartari kṛtyaḥ. The *-ya* suffix generally signifies the object of an act. But "become" is an intransitive verb and no object thereof can be signified. To this objection it is said that the suffix in bhavyaḥ is really a kṛtya suffix, which signifies the agent (kartṛ) of an act, not its object.

PAGE 92

82. *PM.* I, i, 5.

PAGE 93

83. *Bṛh.*, II, iv, 5.

PAGE 96

84. "Jāyasva mriyasva" is apparently in the imperative mood meaning "be born and die". Here, however, the *sva*-suffix is used to signify mere repetition. They are repeatedly born and they repeatedly die: this is the sense. This is illustrated by Appayya Dīkṣita through the Sanskrit equivalent of the common Tamil expression veṭṭu vettenru veṭṭinān which apparently means "He cut saying 'cut, cut,'" but really means "He cut in the 'cut, cut' manner (*i.e.*, repeatedly)".

PAGE 97

85. *Bṛh.*. IV, iv, 23.

PAGE 100

86. *Chānd.*, VIII, i, 6.

87. This paragraph is commenced, says the *Kalpataru*, as a reply to Bhāskara, who holds that though the

reason given for the desire to know Brahman may be good enough in itself, there is yet no indication in the aphorism that this is what was present to the aphorist's mind. The reply makes out that the word *brahma* itself brings to mind the Veda, and not the whole of it, but those parts of it (*i.e.*, the Upaniṣads) which may suitably come after the preliminaries understood by the word "then (*atha*)".

PAGE 102

88. This is in answer to the objection that "horse-fodder" is a dative compound, meaning "fodder for the horse," though the compounded elements are not related as basic object (prakṛti) and its modification. The answer is that Kātyāyana himself declares "horse-fodder" and the like to be possessive compounds, in spite of their dative sense.

PAGE 120

89. This is the idea: a thing may be defined if it is known in experience or if its attributes at least are known; or verbal testimony may apply to it; but in none of these ways is Brahman susceptible of being defined.

90. The terms "samāhāra-dvandva" and "itaretara-dvandva" are difficult to render adequately into English. "Collective compound" and "distributive compound" may serve as a near approximation: that is to say, in the case of the "samāhāra-dvandva," any predication made would apply to the collection as a whole, the collection being the principal (viśeṣya) in that compound; in the "itaretara-dvandva," however, the predication would apply to each member of the whole, the collection here being but an attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of each member of the aggregate. The latter compound is well exemplified in the text, where the

predicate, "niyata," applies to each member of the compound—time, place, fruit etc. A "samāhāra-dvandva" is always in the neuter.

PAGE 123

91. The son performs the annual ceremonies (śrāddha) for his departed ancestors. Here, the son is agent alone, not enjoyer, while the fathers are enjoyers alone, not agents. Similarly, the vaiśvānara-iṣṭi, offered on twelve potsherds, by the father on the birth of a son, is for the welfare of the son; here, the son is not agent, but enjoyer alone; the father is agent, but enjoyer only remotely, through the welfare of his son; see *PM*, IV, iii, 38-39.

92. *Planetary and guardian deities.* The reason urged for their non-creatorship is the fact that the world contains many agents, enjoyers etc. It is not the plurality that is important here, but the diversity. If the world were at least of a uniform nature, its creation by those of limited knowledge and power might be intelligible; what precludes their creatorship is the diversity of the world and the finitude of the capacity of these deities. Being themselves jīvas, says the *Kalpataru*, they cannot create a world full of jīvas like themselves; here too the essential defect is finitude. One may also expect the cause to differ in some way from the effect; there would be no such difference, if these deities were the cause.

PAGE 125

93. On the three varieties of pariṇāma, see *Yoga Sūtras*, III, 13. Dharma-pariṇāma is exemplified by clay ceasing to be a lump and becoming a pot. Lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma belongs to the dharmas: *e.g.*, the lump of clay ceases to be present and comes to belong to the past; the

pot ceases to be of the future and comes to belong to the present. Avasthā-pariṇāma belongs to the lakṣaṇas: *e.g.*, even the pot that is present attains each moment different states as new or old. By lakṣaṇa is understood temporal characteristic or, as Woods renders it, time-variation; avasthā is a mode. Prof. Keith following Prof. Jacobi suggests that the treatment of these three varieties in the *Yogabhāṣya* gives clear indications of indebtedness to Vasubandhu. See *Some Problems of Indian Philosophy*, IHQ, VIII, pp. 431-432. The word *lakṣaṇa* in *dharma-lakṣaṇa* is used in the sense of *rūpa*, "consisting in".

94. *Taitt.*, III, 1.

95. *Nirukta*, I, 2 (p. 29, Sarūp's edition).

PAGE 131

96. The soma juice is collected and kept in cups called "grahas". In a particular sacrifice called the "atirātra," the use of sixteen cups is prescribed; but elsewhere in Scripture, there is also the prohibition of the use of the sixteenth cup in the atirātra sacrifice. In the face of such contradiction, it is understood that there is option for the sacrificer to use or not to use the sixteenth cup.

PAGE 132

97. The Śrīraṅgam edition reads "svātantryam iva bhavati," meaning that human activity and non-activity, though dependent on prescriptions and prohibitions, *seem* to be free. This discrediting of freedom is not required or supported by the text. The *Kalpataru* too seeks not to deny freedom, but to show and justify the dependence on prescriptions etc.: "Though capable of acting of his own free will, yet, because of his not knowing the

instrumentality (of particular acts) to what is beneficial or harmful, there is need of the prescriptions and prohibitions that give that knowledge."

PAGE 135

98. *Kaṭha.*, IV, 1.

99. In the tarkapāda (II, ii).

100. Inference sāmāṇyato dṛṣṭa is the third of the traditionally recognised three classes of inference. It is essentially inference by analogy. Thus, the sun is inferred to move, on the analogy of Caitra, for the sun changes its position and similar change of position for Caitra is accounted for by motion. Its special value lies in dealing with a *probandum* which is beyond the reach of the senses (atīndriya). That Brahman is not in the sphere of the senses has been already stated. Now, Vācaspati goes on to say that it is not even in the sphere of inference, even that variety of it which is applicable to what is super-sensuous. The argument of the *Nyāya-kaṇikā* is explained at some length by the *Kalpataru*. The inference of a creator may establish at best a human creator; for, in the case of some human beings extra-ordinary powers of creation have been observed, as in Viśvāmitra who created a whole universe. It is possible for one or more human beings, therefore, to create a world, acting simultaneously or in succession. If you say that you argue to a creator with knowledge of the means employed, do you mean *some* knowledge of them? If so, omniscience is not established and your inference of the Lord fails. If, however, you claim omniscience to be your *probandum*, again the inference fails, since the *probandum* is not present in any co-subject (sapakṣa).

You may say that the potter knows everything in connection with the pot he makes and that, similarly, God knows everything in connection with the world he makes. But the potter knows not who will buy his pot nor what uses it will be put to; and if God's knowledge were similar, it would fall far short of omniscience. Further, God, who has no mind, can have no knowledge. If you say that, because of his lordship, he has knowledge even without a mind, you may as well say that, because of his lordship, he creates the universe, though he has no knowledge; and thus, like the moneylender who in his greed for interest loses the principal, you cut at the very root of the argument for an intelligent creator.

PAGE 136

101. Under I, i, 4.

102. *Taitt.*, III, 6.

PAGE 140

103. *Bṛh.*, II, iv, 10.

PAGE 142

104. Recitation of the Veda, if defective in respect of the hymns, words or due inflection of the voice (svara) is said to be productive of evil, even as if the words were a thunder-bolt. The legendary instance of this is that of Tvaṣṭhā who performed a sacrifice to obtain a son who would vanquish Indra. But since he misplaced the stress in the compound "Indra-śatruḥ," what he actually said amounted to a prayer for a son of whom Indra would be the vanquisher; thus was born Vṛtra, who was slain in due course by Indra.

PAGE 147

105. *PM.*, I, ii, 7.

PAGE 150

106. In respect of the upāṃśu sacrifice, scripture says "He is to perform the upāṃśu sacrifice at intervals," and goes on to say "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed to with the upāṃśu, for the avoidance of jāmitā (monotony)" etc. Two other deities are also mentioned as to be sacrificed to with the upāṃśu. The deity and the material constitute the form of the rite. The latter set of texts "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed to" etc. mentions the deities; another text says that where the material is not specifically mentioned, the ghee in the darvī is the material. Thus, the latter set of texts would seem to be really injunctive, the first being merely a collective restatement; further, the imperative suffix is to be found only in the second set. Nevertheless, the final view is that the first text alone is injunctive. If the second set were injunctive, then, for the same purpose and with the same material, there would be the prescription of three rites to three deities, though the unity of purpose would suggest a single rite. If the first text is injunctive, the second set may be taken to contain restatements thereof combined with eulogistic passages mentioning the fruit. There can be no syntactical unity, if several rites be taken to be enjoined. Further, in "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed to" etc., Viṣṇu etc. appear to be the principals, while the rite is secondary, whereas the rite is primary in the first text, its mention there being novel (apūrva). In the second set of texts, we have to construe Viṣṇu etc. as secondary and relate them as deities to the rite which is really primary. Rather

than do this, it is simpler to take the first text as injunctive. Though the verb there is in the present indicative mood, it may be interpreted as an imperative. As for the form of the rite, even the second set is not self-contained; and the co-operation of the general text declaring the material is available for the first text too, which text has the further advantages of parsimony and novelty. For such reasons, the second set is treated as containing restatements, having the force "so great is the upāṃśu that Viṣṇu etc. are the deities thereof". The governing principle is that of syntactical unity for the whole passage beginning with "jāmi vā etad yajñasya kriyate" up to "agnīṣomāv upāṃśu yaṣṭavyā 'jāmitvāya". The same principle is applied to the Vedānta texts beginning with "Existence alone, dear one, this was in the beginning" etc.

PAGE 154

107. The following is the *Kalpataru* summary of the arguments of the *Nyāyakaṇikā*: (1) Religious duty, which is what *is to be* done, cannot be the sphere of perception, which is born of the contact of sense with what *is*. (2) Even the perception of Yogins can claim excellence only in respect of sense-objects; hence perception is inapplicable to dharma, the content of the Veda. (3) And since it has no *probans* etc., it cannot be the sphere of inference etc. (4) And no person can utter intelligible statements when he is ignorant of what he is to speak about. Hence the Vedas are not of human origin. It should be remembered that the word "human" in this context applies to all beings short of the omniscient one, and not to men alone.

PAGE 157

108. The reference is to *Bṛh-Upa.*, I, iv, 15; the immediately preceding text is from the same Upaniṣad I, iv, 7. The word "lokam" is translated by some as "state" or "true state". But the word "enjoyment" seems to accord better with Śaṅkara's understanding of the passage in his bhāṣya on that Upaniṣad.

109. The reference is to *TS*, I, v, 1. The story goes that the devas handed over their wealth for safe-keeping to Agni, who in a fit of greed ran away with it and hid himself in the waters. When he was caught by the other devas, he howled and his tears became silver. The statement is good as a fairy tale but is of no practical value. It is therefore explained to be subsidiary to the prohibition of the offering of silver as dakṣiṇā, a prohibition which occurs later in the same Śruti.

PAGE 158

110. Darvihoma (*PM*, VIII, iv, 1-9) is the name of a rite; it is not the injunction of an accessory, in which case it would mean an injunction of a sacrifice with the darvī. It is not a sacrifice (yajña) but an oblation (homa). No special accessories are prescribed, the same accessories—spoon etc.—being used as are prescribed for other enjoined rites. It has no archetype. Besides the text enjoining its performance, there are no other texts laying down the fruit or praising it and so on. Hence that one text is to be taken to perform all the functions, particularly those of praising and prescribing the homa.

PAGE 165

111. The text is "well established (long-lived) are they who meditate on the rātrī". The fruit of long life,

being mentioned only in an eulogistic passage, is not really its fruit; that fruit is understood to be heaven, on the analogy of the Viśvajit sacrifice. But the final view is that the fruit is whatever is mentioned nearest, in the order of express statement, eulogistic passage, what is carried over from another and so on. In the case of the Rātrisattra, no fruit is expressly stated; but the eulogistic passage mentioning long life as the fruit is only next in authority; hence, this is the fruit, not heaven, which, even in the case of the Viśvajit, is not expressed, but is assumed; see *PM*, IV, iii, 17-19.

112. Piṇḍa-pitṛ-yajña is an offering to the manes, to be made on the afternoon of the new moon day. This is an independent, not a subsidiary, rite, since a particular time is prescribed and that time is also seen to be prohibited for other rites; further, it is enumerated along with other principal rites. This being the case, it ought to have a fruit of its own; no fruit, however, is mentioned; hence, on the analogy of the Viśvajit, its fruit is taken to be heaven. That the fruit is heaven, in such cases, is ascertained in *PM*, IV, iii, 15-16, in connection with the Viśvajit sacrifice; yet the analogy of the Piṇḍa-pitṛ-yajña is mentioned here, since in fact the Viśvajit has another fruit; for, it is prescribed as an expiatory rite for him who undertakes a sattra sacrifice, performs the saṅkalpa, but fails to go through with the sacrifice.

PAGE 167

113. *PM*, IV, i, 22-24. It is enjoined that curds should be poured into hot milk. The object of the pouring is the production of cream (āmikṣā). Whey too results, however, as a by-product.

PAGE 170

114. The removal of Nescience is not something over and above knowledge; Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 32: vidyo-'daya evā 'vidyā-nivṛttiḥ.

115. If a sacrifice is enjoined, it does not follow that it should bear fruit either here alone or only in a hereafter. Thus, the Kārīri is performed to secure rain, so that the crops may be luxuriant; if that is fruitful at all (and not obstructed by some unknown cause), it should bring its fruit in this life, almost immediately after the sacrifice. The Citrā is performed for obtaining cattle; there is no restriction as to when this should bear fruit; a man may become prosperous as the result of that sacrifice, whether in this life or the next.

PAGE 172

116. See note 112 on Piṇḍa-pitṛ-yajña.

PAGE 175

117. Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 63 ff.

PAGE 177

118. Vardhamāna would appear to have been a gold ornament in the form of a svastikā.

PAGE 179

119. "Difference is dependent" etc. This one sentence seeks to summarise a good part of the interesting and rather stiff dialectic of the second chapter of the *Brahmasiddhi*. Interested readers should turn to that for fuller information. A slight expansion of the argument of the *Bhāmatī* is, however, attempted here. Our knowledge of difference is necessarily bound up with that of the correlates

which are different. The cognition is of the form "A is different from B"; and this would not be possible, if there were no prior knowledge of A and B; and this cognition of A and B cannot be of them as non-different, as otherwise the subsequent cognition of their difference could not arise; therefore, the cognition of difference, which we seek to explain, is based on a cognition of differents, which would not be cognised as such but for a cognition of their difference; thus we have reciprocal dependence. Further, the cognition relates to several units, each of which is different from the others. Now, if there were no units, there would be no difference either. But your contention that difference is real tends to abolish the unit. For, difference is either an attribute of the units or it is of their very constitution (svabhāva). If it be an attribute, is it identical with the differents or not identical? Obviously, an attribute cannot be identical with that which is said to possess it; else, it would be of the very constitution of that which possesses it. If the attribute is not identical, is, in other words, different, what is the nature of this second difference? Is that too an attribute, as it obviously should be? Is it, then, different from the elements it differentiates? The answer must be in the affirmative; and thus, we get an infinite regress of differences, each resting on the next without any finality. Let us say, then, that difference is of the very constitution of things. Two difficulties present themselves: (1) A and B are the alleged differents. They agree in this, that what is called "difference" is of the very constitution of both. Now, if two things agree in some particular aspect, so far forth they are identical. Because "difference" is of the constitution of both A and B, the two are so far identical. But this

was just the reason alleged for their non-identity. Thus, if difference be of the nature of things, it abolishes itself. (2) We must have A and B before we can say that they are different. But we cannot have these or any other units; for, of each alleged unit, difference is the very nature. Hence, whatever may be set up as a unit, down to the primal atom, tends to break down indefinitely. There is nothing which can be called one. A single thing is not single either in itself or as a combination of simpler elements, since there can be no units to combine. These objections apply not merely to the cognition of difference, but to its very existence. Unity, on the other hand, cannot be shown to be thus dependent on difference for its existence. True, in respect of cognition, there does seem to be such dependence. But this may be explained on the basis of a posited difference. A phenomenon need not be explained by external causes in every case, since internal defects like those of a sense-organ (jaundice, joy, fear etc.) may be the causes in many cases. Since difference and non-difference cannot both be real, one of them must be treated as posited. For the reasons here stated and on grounds of parsimony (Occam's razor), it is proper to assume difference to be posited on non-difference.

PAGE 181

120. *Pr.*, VI, 8.

PAGE 182

121. *Nyāya Sūtras*, I, i, 2.

PAGE 184

122. In the imagined identification (sampat), primacy belongs to what is imagined, not to that on which

it is imposed; it is āropyapradhāna, not ālambanā or adhiṣṭhānapradhāna, like superimposition (adhyāsa); the distinction is stated almost in the same terms in the *Pañcapādikā*. For the identification of the Draviḍācārya mentioned on page 185, see Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri in *Proceedings of the Oriental Conference*, Madras, pp. 468-473, where a plausible case is made out for the equation with Tirumaliśai Ālvār.

PAGE 185

123. *Stuta-śastravat.* The mention of the deities in a musical chant is a stuti; where the mention is not in a musical chant, it is called a śastra. Since both of these serve to make clear the relation of subsidiaries (the deities) to the principal (the sacrifice), and since they have the visible result of mentioning the nature of the deities, they are but subsidiary rites; this is the *prima facie* view. The final view holds that they are principal rites with an unseen potentiality as their fruit, as otherwise the expressly stated injunction "stauti," "śaṃsati" etc. would be futile. Further, a stuti, *e.g.*, "this kṣatriya youth has large eyes" is intended to be a praise, not a description; hence, description, denotation etc. of the deities may not be said to be the visible result of stuti etc. Similarly, here too, the contemplation of the self may be the principal; this is the sense. On stuti and śastra as principals, see *PM*, II, i, 13-29. For the punctuation of this sentence, we have relied on the *Kalpataru* and the Nirnayasagar edition of the *Bhāmatī* with the *Ratnaprabhā*. The punctuation in other editions is clearly erroneous. See also additional notes.

124. *PM*, II, i, 8.

PAGE 187

125. "Bright gold is to be worn." This is one of the stray sayings which occur without being related to any particular sacrificial rite. It is contended as a *prima facie* view that since the material and the deity for an independent rite are not mentioned, since it is mentioned in the Ādhvaryavạ Veda presumably as something to be done by the adhvaryu, since the wearing must be intended as a purification of the wearer or the gold or both, and since the purification must be intended for the sake of some other rite, the injunction to wear gold should be subsidiary to the agnihotra and other such rites. The final view is that since an independent result is declared—disfiguring the enemy, and since there is no application (niyoga) of the wearing in the context of any other rite, it is an independent duty. The second of these reasons is more important, since the declaration of fruit may be discounted on the ground of the absence of the usual formula "He who desires this is to do such and such". Hence it is that the *Bhāmatī* has the words "viniyoga-bhaṅgena, because of failure of the application". Nor may subsidiariness be established on the analogy of the ladle made of parṇa wood, for, unlike the ladle, this wearing is not invariably related to a sacrifice, gold being worn even for purposes other than sacrificial. See *PM*, III, iv, 20—24.

PAGE 189

126. The Śrīraṅgam edition reads vaktṛ, vākya, vācaka and vacanāni, instead of paktṛ, pākya, pāka and pacanāni. What is intended in either case is the denial of agency, whether as a speaker or as a cook, though the latter is, perhaps, the more forceful illustration. The

Ṛjuprakāśikā would appear to support the Śrīraṅgam reading.

PAGE 200

127. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, III, viii, 1.

PAGE 202

128. The compound might mean "those which are the contents of injunctions"; in the present context, however, the meaning is "those whose content is an injunction, *i.e.* something to be done"; see the *Kalpataru*.

PAGE 207

129. The process of learning assumed by the Prābhākaras is rather elaborate. They say that when A asks B to bring the cow, and B brings it, C, who hears A's words and sees B's action, infers B's understanding of the sense of the words, and thus comes to know that those words mean that action. But how does C know that the understanding of the sense of the words should have preceded B's actions? The relation of words to sense in this case he comes to know only later. If it be said that he knows from prior conditioning of action by knowledge of the word-sense, since the process of learning is the same there too, the question is but pushed one stage back, and we have an infinite regress. The only way to get out of the difficulty is to hold that the meaning of words is original and natural, and that the meaning is conveyed even independently of relation to what is to be done.

PAGE 209

130. "He is to offer flour (as an oblation)." Flour, here, has not been used in the rite up to this stage; therefore, it has not been purified; nor after the oblation does it

survive, since it is reduced to ashes; hence, then too, it cannot be treated as purified by the rite; it must therefore be understood that what is primary in this injunction is the oblation, not the flour, and that the latter, though in the accusative case, should be interpreted in the instrumental case (śaktunā juhoti); there is viniyoga-bhaṅga in the case of flour, in the same way as in the gold that is to be worn.

PAGE 217

131. This is from Śabarasvāmin's bhāṣya on *PM*, I, i, 2.

132. Vācaspati follows Kumārila in his view of the relation of language to meaning. He rejects the sphoṭa doctrine of the grammarians and Maṇḍana Miśra, holding to the possibility of an ordered recollection of the audible sounds which manifest the different letters; from such a recollection may arise word-sense. The word-senses which rise thus are, however, not independent. They are fundamentally parts of a sentence-sense; this latter is their purport. Hence each word, while expressing its own sense, reaches forward to the sentence-sense, which is secondarily implied (lakṣita) by all the words together. While thus the integrity of the sentence is recognised, it is not exalted at the expense of the independence of the words. It would appear that while some form of associationism is held to in the explanation of how different audible sounds come to constitute a word, this view-point is transcended in considering the relation of word senses to the sentence-sense. One wonders why advaitins like Śaṅkara and Vācaspati did not favour the doctrine of pada-sphoṭa and vākya-sphoṭa, based as

it is on a psychology which is truer and has more in common with advaita principles. See further the *Bhāmatī*, I, iii, 28, Vācaspati's *Tattvabindu* and an article on "Vācaspati's criticism of the Sphoṭa-vāda," *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, VI, 311.

PAGE 218

133. *Ślokavārttika*, VII, vv. 342, 343 ; p. 943.

PAGE 219

134. Cp. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 99 ; *Pañcapādikā*, p. 97.

PAGE 220

135. *PM*, II, i, 1.

PAGE 223

136. Ordinarily, the negative particle should be construed with the verb-ending, to signify a prohibition. There are, however, two exceptions : (1) when the sentence is introduced with words relating to something positive, such as "His vows are" etc. ; and (2) when otherwise an option would result. (1) An example of the former is the Prajāpati-vrata, where it is said to be part of a vow not to look on the rising nor on the setting sun. The premising of a vow raises the expectation of something to be done ; not looking at the sun must be understood to mean something to be done, not merely something to be avoided. Hence, the negative statement is taken to enjoin the formation of a resolve not to see the rising or the setting sun. The negative particle is detached from the optative verb-ending and attached to the root of the verb, so that it may signify not-seeing, *i.e.*, the resolve not to see. When combined thus with verbal roots or with nouns, the negative indicates not prohibition, but exclusion,

e.g. non-brahmin. (2) It is said in Scripture "Not in the after sacrifice (anūyāja) shall he say ye-yajāmahe". If this be taken to be a prohibition, it would imply the prior establishment of the saying of ye-yajāmahe in all sacrifices; for, only of the contingent can there be any denial, as otherwise negation would be futile. No such rule is established as to saying ye-yajāmahe; and if it be assumed, option would result, just as there is, for instance, between "He is to offer oblation before sun-rise" and "He is to offer oblation after sun-rise". Nor can the negation wholly annul the assumed rule so that option may not result; for, such wholesale annulment is possible only between independent statements, but not between statements one of which is presupposed by the other; here, the rule is presupposed by the negation. Because of this contingence of option, the negation is related not to the word "say," but to "after-sacrifice," so that the meaning is "He shall say ye-yajāmahe not at the after-sacrifice". See the *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa*, (Edgerton), pp. 168—174. Students of Western Logic will note the insistence on relevance to the context in both prohibition and exclusion. Denial can be only of that which is possible; exclusion is only of that which is similar and falls into the universe of discourse (nañ iva yuktam anya-sadṛśā-'dhikaraṇe).

PAGE 229

137. "Upalakṣaṇa" may be rendered as a "qualification *per accidens*". It is difficult to render into English so as to bring out its difference from viśeṣaṇa (proprium) on the one hand and upādhi (conditioning adjunct) on the other. The distinction is well explained in the

Kalpataru, p. 420 (under I, iv, 22). That which inheres in the product and serves to distinguish it, like the blueness of the nīlotpala, is a viśeṣaṇa. What is not inherent may be either an upādhi or an upalakṣaṇa. Of these, that which lasts as long as the product and serves to distinguish it is an upādhi; that which is occasional and causes the cognition of difference is an upalakṣaṇa. The distinction between these two corresponds to that between inseparable *accidens* and separable *accidens*. Redness is not inherent in the crystal nor the crow in the house. But when one is asked to fetch the red crystal, the redness is present in the crystal till it is brought; but when a house is pointed to Caitra as that which has a crow perched on it, the crow does not necessarily remain there till Caitra reaches the house; redness is an upādhi, the crow is an upalakṣaṇa.

PAGE 242

138. This Brahman-knower has been identified as one Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya, on the strength of references in Ātmasvarūpa's *Prabodhapariśodhinī*, (R. No. 3225 of the Govt. MSS. Library, Egmore), an unpublished Commentary on the *Pañcapādikā*, and in Mādhavamantrin's *Tātparya-dīpikā*, a Commentary on the *Śātasaṃhitā*; see Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri in the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, I, p. 5 ff. The learned author of this paper suggests the identification of Sundara Pāṇḍya with (1) Kūn Pāṇḍya, reputed to have been a learned king, who was cured of his illness and reconverted to Śaivism by the famous Śaiva Saint, Tirujñānasambandha, *or* (ii) Tirujñānasambandha himself, *or* (iii) some other pre-Kumārila scholar of the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās. The first two of these

suggestions suffer from the difficulty of having to reconcile the advaita taught in these verses with the Śaivism of the reputed author; the characterisation of the latter as Śivādvaita is of little help, for, between Śivādvaita and what we may for convenience call Śaṅkarādvaita, there is a wide enough gap to bridge. And while there is a tradition that Kūn Pāṇḍya was a Jaina before his reconversion, there is no tradition that he was an advaitin, either earlier or later; and the difference between the positions ascribed to him is not so slight as to be glossed over. The same difficulty applies to the second identification. The third is too vague to need acceptance or rejection. Whether the ascription of the verses to an Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya is itself correct is a question that merits further consideration, since the ascription seems to appear only in comparatively late works. It is within the bounds of possibility that a quotation is mistaken for one's own composition; thus, verses quoted by a comparatively obscure and late Sundara Pāṇḍya may have been wrongly ascribed to him by Ātmasvarūpa and Mādhavamantrin; but in the absence of any knowledge of a later Sundara Pāṇḍya or about the trustworthiness of Ātmasvarūpa, this is nothing more than a bare possibility. An attempt has been made in the *Jignyasa*, I, ii, 1-6 to traverse the arguments of Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar; but most of the contentions are rather puerile and unconvincing.

PAGE 244

139. The advaitin cannot insist too strongly that the cognition which destroys Nescience is also a psychosis and that it possesses only the same class of reality as what it destroys; it is not absolutely real. Though in a

sense the product of Nescience, (for it is based on distinctions of pramātṛ, pramāṇa and prameya, which distinctions are products of Nescience) it has yet the capacity to destroy its generatrix and itself at the same time. The fire born of the friction of bamboos in a forest does not spare the bamboos which generated it; and, when the whole forest is consumed, it dies out of itself. Nor is it true that what is not absolutaly real has no practical efficiency. Even a dream, though unreal, causes effects physical and psychical, besides serving as an indicator of future events, auspicious or otherwise. Indeed, the advaitin maintains that practical efficiency belongs only to the empirically valid, neither to the wholly real nor to the wholly unreal. The latter cannot be efficient, since it itself is not; the former, being eternally accomplished, has no activity and hence cannot be efficient. That is why Vācaspati says "As for that intuition which is real, that is not something to be done, since it is of the nature of Brahman."

PAGE 245

140. *Īśa.*, 11.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

[The following additional notes relate to pages: 10, 20, 27, 46, 49, 71, 95, 122, 147, 153, 162-165 and 220-223, 227-228, 237, 239.]

PAGE 10

"**prakaraṇā-'ntara**" is difference of context (see the list of corrections). This is the last of the six pramāṇas given by Jaimini (*PM* II, iii, 24) for differentiating rituals.

It is defined thus: anupādeya-guṇa-sahakṛtā-'nupasthitiḥ prakaraṇā-'ntaram. In essence it consists in non-proximity to the intellect. The term occurs again on page 148, and the same idea is expressed by Vācaspati as "asannidhāna" on page 146

PAGE 20

"tadguṇa-saṃvijñāno bahuvrīhiḥ." Adjectival compounds are of two kinds—the inclusive and the non-inclusive. In the present case the denotation of the compound "janmādi" is "origination, sustentation and destruction"; this denotation includes that of the component parts "janma and ādi"; thus this compound is of the inclusive type. In a compound, however, like "citragu" in sentences like "citragum ānaya (bring the man with spotted cows)" the spotted cows which are signified by the component parts are not included in the signification of the compound; for what is intended is the arrival of the owner of the cows, not his arrival *with the cows*; hence this compound is of the non-inclusive type.

PAGE 27

"abheda-vyavahāraḥ sāmānādhikaranya-vyapadeśaś ca" has been rendered as "empirical usage as non-different and appositional designation". Vyavahāra (usage) ordinarily includes vyapadeśa (verbal designation) too; here, however, they are distinguished, "vyavahāra" signifying practical activity alone. Hence the denotation of "empirical usage" is narrower in the present context, excluding what is mentioned in "appositional designation;" it is, in other words, equivalent to "pravṛtti (activity)," which is the word used by Vācaspati in the middle of p. 28.

PAGE 46

"nirupadrava-bhūtārtha-svarūpasya" etc. The outsiders here cited are the Bauddhas, who teach the doctrine of nairātmya. The apprehension of this truth costs some effort. But once there is the apprehension and contemplation thereof, there is increasing clarity, which, however, does not call for increased effort, in the same way as each increased success in jumping calls for a bigger effort than before. Nor is there subsequent sublation by error, the impressions of which too persist; for knowledge has a bias for truth, and disturbances due to error exist only till truth is attained, not thereafter. This is a favourite verse with Vācaspati; see, for instance, the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* on verse 64. The word "intellect" in the translation has to be understood as synonymous with knowledge; see also list of corrections.

PAGE 49

The reading "pravartante" adopted by us seems to have the support of the *Bhāmatītilaka* and the *Ṛjuprakāśikā*. The *Parimala*, which uses the analogy "yathā pradhānam pravartate" etc., may possibly prefer the reading "pravartate". On either reading, the subject of the sentence "atha svayam eva kasmāt" etc. has to be supplied from without; but on the reading "pravartate" it is possible to understand that the subject is neither the self (which does not fit in) nor pramāṇas (which requires the plural), but "yat pravartate tat (that which is active)". Such usage may be taken to be idiomatic, and it agrees with what comes before and after. But we prefer the reading "pravartante" since it has the support of two commentaries besides that of the MSS. mentioned in Note 48.

PAGE 71

"adhikṛtā-'dhikāra" is rendered as "eligibility of the person already eligible". Two components enter into adhikāra—the possession of certain qualities, connate, acquired or both (this alone is what is understood by fitness or eligibility ordinarily), and the possession of interest in the fruit to be attained. The former is more in the foreground when, for instance, a Brahmin is said to be the adhikārin for a particular rite. In adhikṛtā-'dhikāra, interestedness is more to fore; it is a person, interested in a particular result, that is further interested in another result accruing from a further subsidiary.

PAGE 95

"nityā-'nitya-vastu-vivekaḥ." Vācaspati's position is this. What is eternal is not already known as distinct from what is non-eternal, as then there can be no further inquiry; nor can indefinite knowledge, of the nature of doubt, avail to generate non-attachment. What does exist is the distinction of eternality from non-eternality, the discrimination of the attributes (which are called *vastu*, since they dwell therein, *vasati 'ti*). This knowledge of eternality and non-eternality is linked up with the knowledge of desirability and non-desirability. And thus he knows that among the denotations of the "Thou" and the "I," that which will be established as eternal will be that which turns out to be desirable and the non-eternal that which turns out not to be desirable. This much of knowledge can account for both non-attachment and the desire to know Brahman.

PAGE 122

"yathā 'huḥ: buddhi-siddham tu na tad asat." This quotation has been traced by Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar to the *Nyāya Sūtras* (IV, i, 50), where, however, the

reading is "buddhi-siddham tu tad asat". Vācaspati himself interprets this aphorism thus in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*: tad asad bhāvi kāryam anenai 'va kāraṇena janyate nā 'nyene 'ty anumānād buddhi-siddham eve 'ty arthaḥ. The aphorism thus interpreted fits in naturally with the rest of the *Bhāmatī* context. And the comment of the *Kalpataru* is almost a paraphrase of the words of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*: yad asad iti prasiddham tad buddhy-ārūḍhena rūpeṇa sad eva, anyathā turaṅga-śṛṅgavat karmatva-nirdeśā-'yogāt. In the light of this, therefore, it seems necessary to amend the text by leaving out the "na" and correct the translation thus: "That, however, which is non-existent (*i.e.*, to be produced), is (certainly) existent in the intellect." In regard to this suggestion of the learned Professor, certain difficulties have to be pointed out. The *Kalpataru*, at the end of the sentence quoted above, goes on to say: iti sat-kārya-vādina āhuḥ. The aphorism, as it occurs in the *Nyāya Sūtras*, is the statement of the final view of asat-kārya-vāda held by the Naiyāyika. The words of the *Kalpataru* would, therefore, suggest that the citation here is not of a Nyāya aphorism, but of the aphorism of some school professing sat-kārya-vāda. The suggestion is reinforced by the *Bhāmatītilaka*, which says: atra sat-kārya-vādi-sammatim āha. Once this possibility is conceded, there is the further possibility that the aphorism here cited by Vācaspati has a "na" in it. That this is more than a bare possibility seems made out by the *Ṛjuprakāśikā*, which implies the presence of a "na" in the aphorism: na hy asan nara-śṛṅgādi buddhāv ālikhya vyākriyate; buddhi-sattve 'sattvā-'yogāc ca; tatra vṛddha-sammatim āha—yathā 'hur iti. The words of the *Kalpataru* too do

not rule out the reading with a "na". The least that is necessary to support the suggested correction is the further correction of the *Kalpataru* and the *Bhāmatītilaka* so as to make them read "asat-kārya-vādina āhuḥ" and "asat-kārya-vādi-sammatim āha". Such procedure involving a double correction may seem condemned by the law of parsimony. But there are at least two counter-vailing considerations of some weight. The first is that no other source has been traced, while the Nyāya aphorism as interpeted by Vācaspati fits into the present context. The other is that there is comparatively little point in the advaitin appealing for support to the sat-kārya-vādin, as he himself is of that persuasion; on the contrary, his reliance even on the asat-kārya-vādin would be just and purportful. As against this it must be noted that the point at issue in the *Bhāmatī* is the possibility of creation by a non-intelligent being. The pūrvapakṣin in this case is not the follower of the Nyāya (which admits an intelligent creator), but the follower of the Sāṅkhya (well known as sat-kārya-vāda), according to whom the world is not before creation buddhi-siddha for an Īśvara. Thus, though the suggested source and corrections are extremely plausible, it is difficult to accept them outright at the present stage; further, neither the printed editions of either book nor the MSS. that we have been able to consult warrant the correction. The MSS. consulted for the *Kalpataru* are 20 H 14 and 20 H 19 of the Adyar Library; for the *Bhāmatī*, MSS. mentioned in Note 48 were consulted, and for the *Bhāmatītilaka*. MS. No. 39 C 14 of the same Library. Of course, scribal errors leading to the perpetuation of wrong readings are not uncommon.

PAGE 147

The expressions "heya" and "upādeya," which occur very frequently in the *Bhāṣya* and the *Bhāmatī*, have been rendered uniformly as "to be rejected" and "to be accepted". It should be noted, however, that, except in a few cases (as in the present one), what is meant is avoidance and seeking, not mere intellectual rejection or acceptance. When, for instance, it is said that Brahman, being one's own self, is neither "heya" nor "upādeya," it means that it is neither to be avoided nor sought.

PAGE 153

"caitya-vandanādi-vākya." It would appear from the *Ṛjuprakāśikā* that the "statement" is "caityam vandeta," not "caitye vandeta," so that the obeisance is *to* the caitya, not *in* the caitya. Conformably to this, caitya would mean not a shrine, but the consecrated fig-tree to which Buddhists offer worship.

PAGES 162-165 and 220-223

These pages contain statements of the Prābhākara position based on the doctrine of anvitābhidhāna. Certain terms, though common to the Bhāṭṭa school, are used in special senses. The equivalents used in the translation are such as would apply throughout the book; the peculiarities of Prābhākara usage will, therefore, not be clear therefrom. In the following translation, terms distinctively suitable to Prabhākara's system are employed; it may be used along with or in the place of the translation on the above-mentioned pages. For this school, kārya, niyoga and apūrva are synonyms. What is to be done (kārya) is that which prompts (niyoga), and this is

the trans-experiential potency (apūrva) which secures heaven. The determinant of kārya is volition (kṛti), and of this the determinant is the particular act (kriyā). The fruit (bhāvya or phala, *e.g.*, heaven) is emphatically not what prompts nor the determinant. The person prompted is called the niyojya; he is not the person enjoined, since niyoga means apūrva, not an injunction, as in the Bhāṭṭa school.

TRANSLATION

[P. 162] Further, if for him who has heard (studied) about Brahman there occurs the cessation of the attributes of transmigration, why is it, then, that, on top of hearing, reflection etc. are found declared? Therefore, even because of the contingence of the futility of these, the Vedāntas do not have for purport the nature of Brahman, but have for purport what is to be done, whose determinant is the contemplation of the self. And this, which is to be done, as prompting him who is to be prompted in respect of itself is called *niyoga* (the prompter), and as not previously experienced through other means of knowledge, it is called the trans-experiential. And since there is not the establishment of this without the observance of its determinant (contemplation), that itself, which is to be done, implies for its own establishment the observance of the contemplation of the self, (this being) the determinant and instrument of that. And what is to be done, since its definitive knowledge depends on (that which defines) its own determinant [its own determinant is volition, and the determinant of that is the particular act, contemplation in the present instance], is defined by

the determinant, contemplation; similarly, since of contemplation too there cannot be definitive knowledge in the absence of its determinant, the self, [P. 163] that itself, which is to be done, implies, for the sake of the determination of that (contemplation), the self as that (determinant). As they say: "That, however, which is introduced, *i.e.*, implied, for the establishment of that (which is to be done), that too falls within the scope of the injunction; this is the usage of the *Tantra* (the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā)." And, in the case of contemplation, the determinant of the prompter (niyoga), its falling within the scope of the injunction consists in the observance of it as an act; for the self, however, which is the determinant of that (contemplation), (falling within the scope of the injunction consists in) the certitude of its own existence.

[P. 165] And, since what is to be done is not independent of him who is prompted, the eligible (interested) person who is to practise, he states the particular class of person prompted: "And there being purport in respect of an injunction" etc. Becoming Brahman is present as already established in the eulogistic passage "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself"; yet (because of this statement of the existent being changed into a statement of what is to be accomplished), there being the expectancy of the particular class of person prompted, on the analogy of the rātrisatra, he who desires to become Brahman comes to be understood as the particular person prompted. For, if on the analogy of the piṇḍa-pitṛ-yajña, the person prompted be assumed to be he who desires heaven, that would be the signification of the absolutely remote by the

eulogistic passage, which would then have a sense wholly unrelated to itself. And, since to become Brahman is to be immortal, it is said (in the commentary) "For him who desires immortality." * * * * * * * * * *

[P. 220] Further, even by those who recognise the purport of all words to be what is to be done, it is not possible in the case of (texts like) "A brahmin is not to be killed," "Liquor is not to be drunk," to recognise what is to be done as purport. For, what is to be done, having its limits defined by volition, is pervaded by volition, and ceases with the cessation of that, like Śiṃśapā-ness on the cessation of tree-ness [śiṃśapā being the name of a particular kind of tree]. Volition, indeed, is human effort; and its definitive knowledge depends on its determinant. And its determinant, being of the nature of what is to be accomplished, can be only a doing, which has a before and an after, and helps to bring about something else; (it can be) neither a substance nor a quality. It is, indeed, what is directly pervaded by volition that is the determinant of volition; and, in the case of substance and quality, which are already existent, there is no pervasion by volition. Therefore it is there is the statement of the author of the sacred teaching: "Verbs signify doing; through their instrumentality can be known what is to be done (kriyā)." [P. 221] Though for words signifying substance and quality there is relation to what is to be done, in their effect-stage [*i.e.*, in the stage when complete sentence-sense arises, with what is to be done as the main element], yet, since relation to what is to be done is direct in the case of (words signifying) doing, while for words signifying substance and quality it is

through their conjunction with doing, the understanding of the trans-experiential (apūrva) is only from those which signify doing, not from words signifying substance or quality. Nor is it that in statements like "He is to offer oblation with curds," "He is to pour diagonally and continuously," curds etc. are the determinants of what is to be done; for, even there, what is to be done has as its determinant the doing alone—the offering of oblation or the diagonal pouring. Nor on this score, because of the injunction (being) of the oblation and the diagonal pouring as qualified by curds and continuity, as in (the injunction of the qualified in) "He is to sacrifice with the soma (-juice)," do (the texts) "He is to offer the agnihotra oblation," "He is to pour ghee diagonally" become restatements of that (injunction of the qualified). Though here too what is to be done has for determinant doing alone, yet, substance and quality, as complements of the doing, though not determinants, fall within the scope of the injunction. The doing, indeed, being undefined, as the bare functioning of a kāraka (causal correlate of doing), is defined by the particular causal correlate —substance etc.; hence, substance etc. are complements thereto. And thus, when doing falls within the scope of the injunction, that falls within the scope of the injunction certainly together with its complements; hence, substance and quality, though not determinants, yet as complements thereto, come to be within the scope of the injunction. And thus, the injunction which goes over to substance and quality through the channel of doing, because of the fear of prolixity and because its own content is otherwise established, comes, through a restatement thereof, to have for purport substance etc., which are complements thereto;

[P. 222] hence, in all cases, what is enjoined (*i.e.*, what is to be done) has doing alone for its determinant.

Hereby is refuted the view that in "There is that āgneya (cake) which is prepared on eight (earthen) plates" what is enjoined has for determinant the connection of the material and the deity. Now, (it may be said), the meaning of the root "bhū (to become)," (in "bhavati" of the text) cannot fall within the scope of an injunction; for, if what becomes be already existent, then that which has its existence (already) accomplished cannot be that which *becomes*; ether, indeed, does not become; nor, if non-existent, since what is non-existent cannot be what is prompted, like a sky-flower; therefore, what falls within the scope of the injunction is the operation which belongs to him who brings about, the producer, and which is implied by the becoming, the operation to be brought about; and, since this operation is activation, volition, effort, it cannot be cognised without a determinant; therefore, there being the need for a determinant, its determinant is only the connection of material and deity brought to mind by the word "āgneya". (To this the Prābhākaras say) now, how can human effort, which has an operation for its determinant, refer to a connection, which is not of the nature of an operation? Truly, even in "Make a pot," human effort does not directly refer to the meaning of the noun, pot; rather does it cause the hand etc. to manipulate the staff etc. Therefrom one understands that volition alone, which is for the sake of the pot and has a manipulation for determinant, but not that (volition) whose determinant is directly the pot. The pot comes within the scope of that (volition) as what is desired, not as a determinant. [P. 223] As determinant, however, there is only the manipulation

by the hand etc. For the same reason, even in "There is that āgneya" etc., what falls within the scope of the injunction is only the sacrificial act, which is implied by the connection of material and deity, and which is the determinant of what is to be done. What is it that is said in "There is that āgneya (cake)" etc.? (It is said) "One should bring about (what is to be done) through the sacrifice with agni as deity." Hence it is that the texts "He who, knowing thus, performs the full moon sacrifice," "He who, knowing thus, performs the new moon sacrifice" become restatements of the six sacrifices prescribed in "There is that āgneya" etc. Hence too for that (group of sacrifices) itself, which falls within the scope of the injunction and is restated, there is the relation to fruit, in "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the new and full moon sacrifices".

Hence it is an invariable rule that in every case what is enjoined has for determinant doing alone, through the channel of volition. And thus, in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., if there be admitted something to be done, then, its pervader, volition, would have to be admitted, as also the doing which pervades that (volition) as determinant. And thus, on the analogy of the Prajāpati-vrata, what is enjoined would, as signifying exclusion through the implication of the resolve not to kill or not drink, have that (resolve) as determinant. And thus it would follow that (that function of negation which consists in) the denial of what there is occasion for is wholly abandoned. Nor when there is a possibility (of direct significance) is implication proper. In the case, however, of "See not the rising sun" etc., since they commence with "His vow," there is not the possibility of the denial of that for which

there is an occasion; [P. 224] hence it is proper through the signification of exclusion, to imply the resolve not to see. Therefore, in "Kill not," "Drink not" etc., which are denials of what there is an occasion for, since doing is non-existent, volition pervaded thereby is non-existent; and that being non-existent, there is non-existence of what is pervaded thereby, *viz.*, what is to be done; hence there is no rule that all statements have for purport what is to be done; thus he says ....

PAGE 165

"'brahma veda brahmai 'va bhavati' iti" etc. The sentence as it stands may imply that the fruit "brahma-bhavana (becoming Brahman)" has a need for the particular person prompted (niyojya-viśeṣa). This, however, does not fit in with the Prābhākara doctrine, which acknowledges efficiency for the apūrva alone, not for the fruit. Becoming Brahman, though stated as siddha, has to be understood as sādhya (what is to be accomplished); and for this change (viparināma) there is an expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), which is satisfied by the statement of the particular class of person prompted. The genitive in "brahma-bhavanasya" would be thus a case of anādare ṣaṣṭhī, this being indicated in the translation by "yet"; this construction is mentioned in the *Bhāmatītilaka* too. See also list of corrections.

PAGES 227 and 228

The word "kartavyatā" has been translated as "obligation" or as "obligatoriness". There is, of course, no question of moral obligation here; what is present is, at best, a mechanical urge or impulsion consequent on a person's natural desires and passions. Because of these a

person is tempted to drink or kill; it is this temptation or impulsion which is restated by the prohibition and negatived. The object of the negation is to make it known that what is restated, the tempting act, is instrumental to evil. Throughout *this context* the reader is requested to remember that no ethical significance attaches to the words "obligation" and "obligatoriness".

PAGE 237

The punctuation of lines 8-12 of the text is unsatisfactory in all the printed editions; the present punctuation is based on the explanation given in the *Kalpataru*. "dvedhā" in "saṃśayo vā dvedhā yuktaḥ" means "as between two possibilities"; this qualification is purportful, as, in other cases, the doubt may be among more than two possibilities. The translation has therefore to be corrected; see the list of corrections.

PAGE 239

"That contemplation and reflection are not principal rites" etc. The word "principal" here is not to be contrasted with "subsidiary"; it means rather that which has an apūrva result; even subsidiaries, like stutis and śastras (mentioned on p. 185), have apūrva results, and should, therefore, be classed as "principal" in this sense; in this context, therefore, a guṇa-karma is not what is subsidiary in general, but what is proximately subsidiary, subserving the rite itself, not the apūrva generated; it is, in other words, a sannipatyo-'pakāraka.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ait.,	Aitareya Upaniṣad.
Ait. Brāh.,	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.
Bṛh.,	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Chānd.,	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
Gītā,	Bhagavad Gītā.
HIP.,	History of Indian Philosophy by S. N. Das Gupta (Cambridge University Press).
IHQ.,	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.
Īśa.,	Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad.
Jābāla.,	Jābalopaniṣad.
Kaṭha.,	Kaṭhopaniṣad.
Kena.,	Kenopaniṣad.
Muṇḍ.,	Muṇḍakopaniṣad.
PM.,	Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtras.
Pr.,	Praśnopaniṣad.
Rv.,	Ṛgveda.
Śā-Bh.,	Śābara-bhāṣya.
Śvet.,	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
SLS.,	Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha by Appayya Dīkṣita.
Taitt.,	Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
TS.,	Taittirīya Saṃhitā.
Upa.,	Upaniṣad.
Ved. Sū.,	Vedānta Sūtras.
YS.,	Yoga Sūtras.

CORRECTIONS

PAGE	LINE	FOR	READ
२५	12, 13	भवति । प्रतिपत्तुरत्यन्त	भवति प्रतिपत्तुः । अत्यन्त
३७	10	अन्त-	आन्त-
४५	3	मन्यन्ते	मन्यते
८५	11	दुःखरूप	दुःखरूप
१८५	8	ब्रह्मदृष्टिस्मृतत्वाय	ब्रह्मदृष्टिरमृतत्वाय
१८७	18	विदिक्रिय	विदिक्रिया
१९१	16	परस्पर	परम्पर
१९३	8	नित्यवात्	नित्यत्वात्
२००	6	लक्षन्यम्	लक्षण्यम्
२२२	10	इति ; निर्विषयः	इति निर्विषयः
२२३	4	पौर्णमास्याम्	पौर्णमासीम्
7	2, 3	take on the reflection of	be reflected in
7	14	concealment	condemnation
8	23, 24	its origination (by perception)	(perception so far as it is) what originates
10	13, 14	in another context ascertained	ascertained through difference of context

PAGE	LINE	FOR	READ
14	7, 8	**of the attributes . . . distinct**	**of attributes absolutely distinct (among themselves) as also of substrates (similarly distinct)**
25	23, 24	non-proximate . . . the cogniser	non-proximate to the cogniser ; whence then the extreme proximity (to the cogniser)
28	9-11	And . . . apprehension	And, for memory and apprehension, delusiveness consists in the appositional designation
46	11	sublation	sublation by error
„	„	no effort	no (further) effort
„	12	it	the truth
56	2	as something	as that
„	3	This is how when	This is how : when
57	10	as something	as that
61	13	**That**	**How**
64	9	skilled	prudent
„	13	**explained** ; by us	**explained** by us
63	19	skilled	prudent
74	4	*khādira*	being made of *khadira*
„	24-28	in respect of . . . *krama*	together with the host of subsidiaries ending with sequence

PAGE	LINE	FOR	READ
			(*krama*), which are taught directly or obtained by transfer, and which bring about proximate or remote contributories, seen or unseen,
82	25	in the conceit	under the conceit
95	„	is established	will be established
„	26	comes	will be
„	27	becomes	turns out to be
120	2	indicating its own attribute	of the type which signifies (the inclusion of the sense of the parts) as components of that (*i.e.*, the sense of the compound).
127	7	That subject	That
131	19	many	may
137	4	The Sacred Teaching-Source	Being-Sacred-Teaching-Source
150	22	apathy	monotony
156	24	though	through
164	14	*khādira*	what is made of *khadira*
„	25	nature	existent
165	16	enjoined for this (becoming)	enjoined,

PAGE	LINE	FOR	READ
165	22	as . . . passage	by the eulogistic passage, since it has a sense wholly unrelated to it.
193	11	they	that
206	26	their own	their own sense as
209	20-22	And therefore . . . anything else	And for this reason too, that it is not subsidiary to anything else, it is distinct from the four kinds of substances.
225	16	process of becoming	doing
237	10, 11	Or there may be . . . two ways	Or, doubt may be appropriate, as between the two
239	28	*viz.*, the fruit	and with the (ultimate) fruit

Printed by A. K. Sitarama Shastri, at the Vasanta Press, Adyar, Madras.

लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी, पुस्तकालय
L.B.S. National Academy of Administration, Library
मसूरी
MUSSOORIE 100674
यह पुस्तक निम्नाँकित तारीख तक वापिस करनी है।
This book is to be returned on the date last stamped

दिनांक Date	उधारकर्त्ता की संख्या Borrower's No.	दिनांक Date	उधारकर्ता की संख्या Borrower's No.

GL 181.4
VAC

181.4
Vac

100674

अवाप्ति सं०
ACC. No. 12134

वर्ग सं.
Class No.

पुस्तक सं.
Book No.

लेखक
Author....Vacaspati

शीर्षक
Title....Bhamati of Vacaspati

181.4
Vac

LIBRARY
LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI
National Academy of Administration
MUSSOORIE

Accession No. 100674

1. Books are issued for 15 days only but may have to be recalled earlier if urgently required.
2. An over-due charge of 25 Paise per day per volume will be charged.
3. Books may be renewed on request, at the discretion of the Librarian.
4. Periodicals, Rare and Reference books may not be issued and may be consulted only in the Library.
5. Books lost, defaced or injured in any way shall have to be replaced or its double price shall be paid by the borrower.