METHODOLOGY

OF THE MAJOR BHĀṢYAS ON THE BRAHMA - SŪTRA.

By

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Preface.

The present work in its original form was submitted to the Gujarat University as a thesis for the degree of Ph. D. The same is slightly abridged, and is presented here as publication No. 2 of the Garda College, Baria Institute Research Publication Series.

This study of Methodology is based on the five main Bhāṣyas on the Brahma-sūtra. It deals with such topics as Pramāṇas etc. which form the salient features of the Vāda method as is used by the Bhāṣyas. In this, besides the Bhāṣyas, I have copiously made use of standard works on Indian Philosophy by such eminent authors as Dr. Radha-krishnan, Dr. Dasgupta, Dr Hiriyanna and others. I am indebted to these renowned scholars for the formulation of my views.

The inception of the thesis is due to the encouragement of Principal A.K. Trivedi. From the beginning to the end he took a keen interest in the progress of the work, and by his able and prompt guidance smoothened all my difficulties. His sugges-tions, pregnant with experienced insight, were so valuable that my labours were often lightened, and his encouragement led me on to the completion of the work. Thus, even though I have gone through the laborious course of studying and writing down, the real credit goes to the able guidance and sym-

pathetic encouragement of Principal A.K. Trivedi, I heartily thank him for all that he has done for me, though no measure of thanks can adequately express my gratefulness for his obligations

I have also to thank him for the favour of the facilities that he kindly gave me for using the Philosophy and the Sanskrit sections of the very well-equipped library of the S. B. Garda College and the B. P. Baria Science Institute, Navsari. This library was my main-stay, a treasure which I ransacked at my liezure with the kind permission of the Principal.

I heartily thank the President and the members of the Governing Body of the S. B. Garda College and B. P. Baria Science Institute for accepting this work for publication in the series.

Though paternal and brotherly relations brook no expression of thanks, I may be failing in my duty, if I do not express my gratefulness for the able management of Vidnyan Press, Nasik, who promptly and carefully got the thesis printed for me.

Navsari   }
14-1-1958   }   P. D. Chandratre.

Foreword.

This is a Research Publication of a high
order, having been a thesis on a study of the Me-
thodology (with special reference to the Bhāṣyas)
of the Brahmasūtras by the five great philosophers,
Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka and
Vallabha. First a synoptic history of the Sūtra and
Bhāṣya literature is given. Then the salient fea-
tures of the dialectic Method, or Vāda, as techni-
cally explained in the Nyāya are fully analysed.
All the Bhāṣyakāras follow in their discussions
this dialectic method, the fundamentals of which
the author discusses in detail. This method is de-
clared to be eminently suited for the philosophical
discussions, as it gives complete freedom for the
movement of thought, in criticising and refuting
the doctrines of the opponents, as also in expound-
ing one's own constructive philosophy. Vāda is
different from Jalpa, by which the writer means
sophistry inclusive of casuistry, and from Vitaṇḍā,
which is destructive criticism for purposes of victory.
The main purpose of Vāda is the establishment of
truth, and it is facilitated by Tarka, which helps
the critical analysis of the problem under discus-
sion by presenting the arguments in syllogistic form,
using all means of valid knowledge, known as Pra-
māṇas. Pramāṇas give purposive direction to the
conduct of investigation, and, therefore, form an
important constituent of the method. Three long

chapters are devoted to a detailed discussion about
the nature and variety of Pramāṇas. All the Bhā-
ṣyakāras accept Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda
– the last being regarded as most important. As
Śabda plays a very important part in the Episte-
mology and Metaphysics of the Bhāṣyakāras, one
separate chapter is devoted to the discussion of its
nature. The writer points out cleverly that the
Mīmāṃsā regerds Veda texts themselves as Pratya-
kṣa (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra III. vi. 34). Some Vedāntic
writers, e. g., Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha,
have carried this process further, and have called
Pancarātra Āgamas and Bhāgavata as Śruti.
Śaṅkara uses all the six Pramāṇas very success-
fully; while the other Bhāṣyalāras use the first
three mainly, and the remaining only occasionally.
The logical clinchers or Nigrahasthānas are useful
in testing the validity of the Pramāṇas adduced, and
inferences drawn. Thus a complete picture of the
dialectic method, as used in their Bhāṣyas by the
five Bhāṣyakāras, is presented by the writer with
apt illustrations. Vāda is compared by the writer
with the Platonic Dialectic, and two apt quotations
from recent Platonic scholars have been given in
this connection. In the writer's opinion Indian
dialectic differs from the Platonic dialectic by the
conspicuous absence of the dramatic element,
myths and parables, which is a peculier feature of
the latter. The dialectic method of the Bhāṣyas
is useful in keeping the philosophical discussion
on a high level.

The writer's study of the Vedānta from the view-point of methodology is quite a new one. His knowledge of Sanskrit texts is extensive and accurate. His method of the treatment of the subject is quite logical, and he clothes his ideas in a simple, lucid and unaffected style. The publication was therefore, worthy of the Ph. D. Degree, which was given to the writer by the Gujarat University. It will be useful to advanced students of Indian and Western Philosophy. It will enable readers to have a panoramic view of all the major Bhāṣyas, and it throws fresh light on long-trodden topics of Indian Philosophy.

Dr. Chandratre's efforts breathe both exhaustive study as well as originality of formulation of thoughts.

I congratulate the writer on this publication. I also congratulate the authorities of the S. B. Garda College for financing the publication.

23-12-1957.   **A. K. TRIVEDI.**

Transliteration

आ – ā
ऋ – r̥
छ – ch
थ – th
ण = ṇ
क्ष – kṣ

ई – i
ङ – ṅ
ञ – ñ
ड – ḍ
श – ś
ज्ञ – jñ

ऊ – ū
च – c
ट – ṭ
ढ – ḍh
ष = ṣ
(अनुस्वार) – ṃ

CONTENTS.

Śrī

Chapter I

Statement of the Problem

The various systems of Indian philosophy attracted the attention of the Western world quite early, and they were studied, interpreted, elucidated, and criticised from different points of view by European scholars. Especially the Vedānta, which is considered to be the most important of all these, engaged the attention of the majority and a thorough study of it was done by modern scholars. One important approach, however, seems to need special attention. It is the study of the philosophical method adopted in setting up the system. The study of the methodology of the various systems of Indian philosophy, especially that of the Vedānta, deserves critical attention. The present work is an humble attempt to present the methodology of the Vedānta system, with special reference to the major Bhāṣyas on the Brahmasūtra.

The Vedānta has its origin in the older Upaniṣads. These, the Brahmasūtra, and the Bhagavadgītā which is claimed to be a work of the Vedānta form the Prasthānatrayī or the "three basic works" of the system. Various Āchāryas presented their philosophical views by writing Bhāṣyas on these three important works. Thus the Vedānta branched off into sub-systems going in the name of the respec-

tive Ācharyas, and a vast bulk of subsidiary phi-
losophical literature grew around their works. A
comprehensive survey of all these is too extensive a
subject to enable one to do justice to the methodo-
logical specialities exhibited in them. Moreover the
three Prasthānas are different in nature and treat-
ment, though their philosophical content may be
more or less overlapping. An attempt to present the
methodology of the Bhāṣyas on all the three Pras-
thānas in a short compass is not practicable. So
the present study is restricted only to one type of
works, viz. the Bhāṣyas on the Brahmasūtra.

The main reason for preferring the Bhāṣyas
on the Brahmasūtra for a study in philosophical
method to those on the other two Prasthānas is the
systematic nature of these works. Though of the
nature of commentaries, they can be said to be the
main exponents of the systems of different Vedāntic
philosophers. The inspired sages of the Upaniṣads,
in giving expression to their noble thoughts, were
more mystics than philosophers, that is, above all
"seers" of truth. Their utterances are more intui-
tive than logical. Their appeal is through the
metaphysical grandeur of their imagination than
through the force of their arguments. In the
Upaniṣads, more stress is laid on the mystical than
the logical aspect of metaphysics. The same may
be said about the Bhagavadgītā. Though unique
as a work of great philosophical import, it is religi-
ous in spirit. Its purpose cannot be the presenta-
tion of any philosophical system like the Vedānta.
The Brahmasūtra, however, is an avowed attempt

at systematization.   Hence the Bhāṣyas on it, being the main exponents of the Vedānta in a systematic form, have a special significance in the study of philosophical method.

It cannot be argued that a study of the methodology of these Bhāṣyas is an impossibility, on account of the sharp divergence of their views about the main philosophical tenets.   Even a general study of these works reveals that the objection is not based on solid grounds.   The author of a Bhāṣya discusses divergent views, presents his own reasonings, and criticises and refutes his opponents.   All this becomes possible if there is agreement on some basic principles.   These principles, though not given as such in clear terms, are tacitly accepted and are held to be agreed upon by a majority of the preachers of different philosophical systems.   Without such agreement, discussion of divergent views, reasoning and refutation are impossible.   So a study of the philosophical method of the Bhāṣyas on the Brahmasūtra is feasible and there can be no primary objection against it.   An inquiry into these basic principles which form the planks of the reasonings of the Bhāṣyas is the main object of the present study.

The study of the methodology of the Vedānta system has a special significance in the present day environment.   Contact of Indian philosophy with Western thought had given an impetus to interpret it in Western terms, and to judge it by means of Western criteria.   It has undoubtedly benefited the

cause of Indian philosophy inasmuch as it proved its worth by standing the acid test of Western criticism. Now the time has come, when Indian philosophy is expected to make an advance on its creative side. At this juncture it is necessary to re-examine the old traditional method of studying Indian philosophy in its own terms and on its own postulates. Thus an inquiry into the methodology of this most important system may serve useful purpose in the present day context.   ı

Historical Conspectus of the Sūtra and Bhāṣya Literature

Sūtra Literature.

The word Sūtra originally means thread and then a short rule or a precept condensed into a few words. Technically a Sūtra is defined as:—

अल्पाक्षरमसंदिग्धं सारवद् विश्वतोमुखम् ।
अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥ [1]

Sūtras are intended to be as short as possible, free from doubt, able to bring out the essential meaning and put an end to many doubts; and they must not contain anything superfluous or erroneous. A larger work consisting of a number of such Sūtras strung together is also called Sūtra. Sūtra works serve purely practical purposes. They present some science systematically in concise brevity, so that the pupil can easily commit it to memory. It is the task of the author of such a work to say as much as possible in as few words as possible, even at the expense of clearness and intellegibility.

The origin of the Sūtra iiterature goes far back to the close of the Vedic period. In order to

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1 Madhva-bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra, I. i. 1.
  Also— लघूनि सूचितार्थानि स्वल्पाक्षरपदानि च ।
          सर्वतः सारभूतानि सूत्राण्याहुर्मनीषिणः ॥
  Bhāmatī on Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya I. i. 1.

understand Vedic texts, the necessity of studying certain ritualistic and excegetic sciences was felt as early as the 8th century B. C.   One by one subsidiary sciences called Vedāṅgas arose in the form of manuals written in Sūtra style, as they were intended for memorization.

Of the six Vedāṅgas, viz. Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Chandas, Jyotiṣa and Nirukta, the Kalpa or the ritual is the first Vedāṅga[1] to receiye systematic treatment in special manuals called Kalpasūtras. Kalpasūtras dealing with the Śrauta sacrifices taught in the Brāhmaṇas are called Śrautasūtras, and those dealing with domestic ceremonies and sacrifices of daily life, the Gṛhya-rites are called Gṛhyasūtras. Directly connected with the Gṛhya-sūtras, and probably originating only as a continuation of them, there are Dharmasūtras, dealing with secular as well as religious law. Other minor works as Śulvasūtras fall under the category of Kalpasūtras as they are closely connected with Śrautasūtras and are of the nature of supplementary manuals.

The Sūtra texts which deal with Śikṣā or phonetics are as old as the Kalpasūtras. Śikṣā means "instruction in reciting" i. e., in the correct pronunciation, accentuation etc. of the Saṃhitā texts. As every Śākhā or recension of a Saṃhitā had a text book of this nature, the name Prātiśākhya.

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1   Winternitz : A history of Indian literature,
     Vol. I, p. 272.

is given to it. The history of grammatical study of India commences with these Prātiśākhyas. Though they are not actually grammatical works themselves, they treat of subjects pertaining to grammar, and the quotations from many grammarians prove that the study of grammar was already flourishing at their time.

The science of grammar originated in connection with Veda exegecies, but the old Vedāṅga texts on grammar are entirely lost. The oldest and the most important text book of grammar that has come down to us is that of Pāṇini (350 B. C.).[1] The Sūtra work of Pāṇini is perfect in its style and brevity.

Of the Vedāṅgas of metrics and astronomy, only the latest offshoots of the earlier scientific literature remain. The text book of Piṅgala on metrics, though regarded as a Vedāṅga, is nevertheless the work of a later period. The Jyotiṣa Vedāṅga, a small text book in astronomy is a work of later period, and the very circumstance that it is written in verse, precludes it from the Sūtra type of work.

Though mentioned last, Nirukta of Yāska is one of the oldest Vedāṅgas. It is certain that Yāska had many predecessors, and though it is the oldest existing Veda exegetic work, it can nevertheless only be regarded as the last perhaps also

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1 P. Masson-Oursel : Comparative Philosophy, p. 72.

the most perfect production of the literature of the
Vedānga Nirukta.[1]

The importance of Nirukta lies in the fact
that it is the earliest work wherein we see the ear-
liest traces of a Sūtra cum Bhāṣya type of work.
Nirukta is based on Nighaṇṭus or "glossaries" i. e.
lists of obscure or otherwise important words in the
hymns of Ṛgveda. Veda exegecies probably began
with the compilation of such glossaries. The com-
position of commentaries to these glossaries after
the style of Nirukta with the explanation of the
difficult Veda verses interwoven was a further step
in the development, and, at a still later period,
detailed and continuous commentaries to the Vedic
texts were written.

The successful use of the Sūtra style in the
case of the early Vedāngas gave sufficient impetus
to the Vedic thinkers to systematize their philoso-
phical views in the Sūtra style. The principal
tenets of the six Darśanas, viz. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika,
Sānkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta are stated
in the form of Sūtras. The Sūtras of the six ortho-
dox systems of Indian philosophy are the outcome
of a series of past efforts and " occupy a strictly
central position summarising on the one hand, a
series of early literary essays extending over many
generations, and forming on the other hand, the
headspring of an ever broadening activity of com-
mentators as well as virtually independent writers, '

1 Winternitz : A history of Indian literature,
      Vol. I. p. 288.

which reaches down to our days and may yet have some future before itself."[1]

The systems must have evolved at a much earlier period than that in which the Sūtras were formulated. They must have originated among the sages who were attached to the Upaniṣad circles. In the assemblies of these sages and their pupils, the views of heretical circles were also probably discussed and refuted. These discussions were later on summarised and arranged in the form of a system of philosophy and recorded in the Sūtras. Thus the authors of the Sūtras are not the founders or originators of the systems but only their compilers and formulators. The evolution of the philosophical Sūtras belongs approximately to the same period. The various systems had been growing side by side with one another during the period which preceded the formation of the Sūtras, This fact accounts for the cross references in the Sūtras of the various systems. The crystalization of the different systems must have taken place during the early centuries after Buddha and before the Christian era.[2] Max Müllar assigns the gradual formation of the Sūtras to the period from Buddha to Aśoka, though he admits that, in the case of the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, a long previous development has to be allowed.

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1 Thibaut : The Vedānta-sūtras with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya, Introduction, p. xii.

2 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian philosophy, Vol. II, p. 23.

In the case of every Darśana, we have first of all a period of philosophical fermentation, which at a particular stage is reduced to Sūtras or apho- risms. This is succeeded by the writing of com- mentaries on the aphorisms, which are followed by glosses, expositions, and explanatory compendia.

The systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy found in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda (or Kaṇabhuj or Kaṇabhakṣa) appears to be the earliest Sūtra work amongst the Darśanas. Dr. Dasgupta is perfectly certain that the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras were written before Caraka (80 A. D.). He even suggests on weightier grounds that the Vai- śeṣika Sūtras were probably pre-Buddhistic.[1] As there are earlier and later strata in this work it is difficult to ascertain definitely its date.

The work is divided into ten books. They deal with the five categories of substance, quality, action, generality and particularity. Soul and mind are included among the substances and dis- cussed as such. The atomic structure of the uni- verse forms the topic of a book. Ethical problems are considered in connection with " action ". The last part of the work is logical and deals with per- ception, inference, causality etc.

As systems of philosophy the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya go hand in hand. Prof. Garbe considers Nyāya to be the latest of the six orthodox systems.

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1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 280.

It can, however, be proved that the general frame-work of the system is of much earlier date. According to Dr. Vidyābhuṣan's view the Sūtras belong to 600 B. C. Bodas points out that some of the Sūtras of Gautama are older than those of Kaṇada; and he says definitely that Gautama's text belongs to 400 B. C.[1] But such an early date cannot be accepted for the text of the Nyāya-sūtra. According to Dr. Dasgupta, at least some of the present Sūtras were written some time in the second century A. D.[2] Prof. Jacobi also puts the Sutras of Gautama later than the origin of Śūnya Vāda (i. e. end of the second century A. D.)[3]

The Nyāyasūtra of Gautama is divided into four books. Book I enunciates the categories and makes a preliminary survey of the Pramāṇas. It also deals with the objects of cognition and en-unciates the method of reasoning. Book II proceeds to examine the Pramāṇas in detail. Book III discusses the nature of the soul, body, sense organs and Buddhi. The last book deals with such topics as activity, re-birth, final release etc., examines theism and criticises antagonistic theories.

The Sāṅkhya system, though as old as any other system, does not possess an old and authori-

1 Tarkasaṅgraha, Ed. by Athalye and Bodas, Introduction, p. XXXIII.
2 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 279.
3 Gaṅgānātha Jhā : Gautama's Nyāyasūtras (Trans.), Introduction, p. v.

tative Sūtra work at its head.   Kapila is said to be
the propounder of this system; but the Sāṅkhya-
sūtra, which is commented upon by Vijñānabhikṣu,
is the work of some unknown author after the nineth
century A. D.   The earliest work of this system is
the Sāṅkhya-kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, which is dated
at about 200 A. D.

The Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali form the basis
of the Yoga system.   On the score of an Indian
tradition majority of scholars believe that this
Patañjali was perhaps the same as the author of
the famous Bhāṣya on Pāṇini's grammar. A critical
examination of the Mahābhāṣya and the Yogasūtra
shows that there is no evidence which can stand in
the way of identifying the grammarian Patañjali
with the Yoga writer.[1]

Patañjali cannot be said to be the originator
of the Yoga system.   He collected the different
forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse
ideas associated with the Yoga and grafted them
all on the Sāṅkhya metaphysics and gave them the
form in which they have been handed down to us.[2]
Patañjali is engaged in only systematizing the facts
as he had them.   The work is divided into four
books.   The first three books set forth the doctrine
of the Yoga; and from the point of view of style
and contents, they appear to be distinct from the

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1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy,
    Vol. I. p. 238.
2 Chatterjee & Dutta :   An introduction to
    Indian Philosophy, p. 336.

last one where the views of the Buddhists are criticised. So it appears that the last book is a subsequent addition by a hand other than Patañjali. The date of the Yogasūtra, at least of the first three chapters must be placed at about the second century B. C. The latest estimates about the date of the whole work cannot be later than 300 A. D.[1]

Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā-sūtras are the foundation of the system which is also known as the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā or Karmamīmāṃsā. The Mīmāṃsā undertakes to systematise the Karmakāṇḍa, i. e. the entire portion of Veda which is concerned with sacrificial action. In this respect we have to distinguish the Kalpa-sūtras from the work of Jaimini. The Kalpa-sūtras give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices enjoined in the Brāhmaṇas; while the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras establish the general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sūtra is to follow. As the main purpose of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras is to lay down principles for the interpretation of the Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas, they have very little of real philosophy in them. They touch philosophical problems only incidentally. It is only the later expounders of the Mīmāṃsā like Kumārila, who have elaborated them and thus raised it to the position of a philosophical system.

The Sūtras of Jaimini were probably written

1 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 341, n. 3.

about 200 B. C.[1]   The work consists of twelve books, each of which is divided into four chapters, except the third, the six and the tenth which are divided into eight chapters each. The most important subject for the Mīmāṃsā is to regard Śabda as a separate means of proof. The rest of this work is an amplification of this proposition and serves as a rational compendium of interpretative maxims with the help of which the Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed.

As the foundation of the Vedānta system, which is also called the Uttara-mīmāṃsā, stand the Brahma–sūtras or the Vedānta-sūtras. Tradition from Śaṅkara downwards attributes the work to Bādarāyaṇa. The fact that the name of the latter is mentioned in several places in the third person need not imply, according to ancient Indian practice, a different authorship. Indian tradition identifies Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the sutra, with Vyāsa.

The Brahmasūtra alludes the views of the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Jains and the Buddhists; so they cannot have been written very early. On the ground of the allusions in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras and Nyāya-sūtras, Bodas thinks that the Bādarāyaṇa-sūtras were not later than these.[2] Dr.

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1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 370.

2 Tarkasaṅgraha, Ed. by Athalye and Bodas, Introduction, p. XXVI.

Radhakrishnan, is of opinion that the two works were contemporaneous. Many of the names mentioned in the Brahmasūtra, such as Āśmara-thya, Bādari, Kārṣṇājini. Kāśakṛtsna and Ātreya are found in the Śrauta-sūtras and the Gṛhyasūtras. This points to the fact that the Brahma-sūtra was formulated during the period of the Śrautasūtras and the Gṛhyasūtras. Garuḍa Purāṇa, Padma Purāṇa, and Manu refer to the Vedānta-sūtra and Harivaṁśa (A. D. 200) contains clear references to it. Thus it is clear that Dr. Keith is right when he holds that Bādarāyaṇa cannot be dated later than 200 A. D. Indian scholars are of opinion that the Sūtra was composed in the period from 500 to 200 B. C.[1] Frazer assigns it to 400 B. C.; while Dr. Dasgupta thinks that they were written some time in the second century B. C.[2] The Brahma-sūtra contains at least six clear references to the Bhagavadgītā; while at least at one place the Bhagavadgītā clearly refers to the Sūtra. These cross-references make the problem of ascertaining the date of the Sūtra in relation to the Bhagavad-gītā very complicated. In this connection Max Müller remarks— " Whatever the date of Bhaga-vadgītā is, and it is a part of the Mahābhārata, the age of the Vedānta Sūtra and Bādarāyaṇa must have been earlier ".

The Brahmasūtra contains four books each

1 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 433.

2 S. Dasgupta : A history of Ihdian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 418.

of which is divided into sections. The first book, which is called Samanvayādhyāya aims at harmonizing the doubtful terms referring to Brahman. The second book called Avirodhādhyāya mainly sets itself to the refutation of antagonistic doctrines of other systems, whether orthodox or heterdox. The third book explains the various means of final realization, and thus it is called Sādhanādhyāya. The fourth named as the Phalādhyāya expounds the attainment of the final realization.

The Sūtra works mentioned above form the fountain-heads of a systematic and authoritative exposition of different philosophical schools. All the principal tenets of a system found their origin in its Śūtras and commentators laid claim only to explain and elucidate their view-point.[1]

Bhāṣya Literature.

Bhāṣya is a special type of literature, having distinct features and characteristics of its own. A Bhāṣya is defined as:—

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते येन शब्दैः सूत्रानुसारिभिः ।
स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥[2]

The definition lays down that the chief aim of a Bhāṣya is to follow the general drift of the different discussions alluded to in the Sūtras, and thus explain and elucidate them. Though bound

1 cf. सूत्रेष्वेव हि तत्सर्वं यदुक्तौ यच्च वार्तिके ।
सूत्रं योनिरिहार्थानां सर्वं सूत्रे प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥
Kumārilabhaṭṭa : Tantravārtika, II. 3.
2 Jhalkikar : Nyāyakośa, p. 627.

by the literal interpretation of the Sūtras, the Bhāṣyakāra was free to supplement these explanations with his own view and explain his own statements by further exposition. Thus a Bhāṣya by its elaborations and modifications developed the system of the original Sūtras to a certain extent.

The peculiar nature of the Sūtra works has necessiated this subsidiary type of literature in the form of Bhāṣyas. The aim of the Sūtras is conciseness which they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be spared. The short and pregnant half-sentences in the form of Sūtras did not elaborate the subject in detail. It was difficult to guess from the Sūtras the extent of their significance. Their rigid concise style many times made them ambiguous and difficult to understand. So there arose the necessity of supplying explanations, and this purpose was served by elaborate commentaries in the form of Bhāṣyas.

A Sūtra work is many times divided into Adhikaraṇas or topics. An Adhikaraṇa is formed of five constituent parts, viz. the subject matter, the doubt, the prima-facie view, the real view, and the conclusion.[1] A Bhāṣya generally follows this five-

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1 विषय–संशय–पूर्वपक्ष–उत्तर–सिद्धान्त–एतत्पचाङ्गबोधकवाक्यसमुदाय –

स्यन्नायत्वमधिकरणत्वमिति मीमांसका वेदान्तिनश्चाहुः ।

Jhalkikar : Nyāyakośa, p. 13.

Also— विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तयोत्तरः ।

निर्णयश्चेति पंचाङ्गं शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं विदुः ॥

Abhyankar : Darśanāṅkura on Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, p. 261.

fold division, especially if the Sūtra work is divided into Adhikaraṇas. When the five-fold division of an Adhikaraṇa is not discovered in a clear cut way, it is left to the ingenuity of the Bhāṣya author to put the Adhikaraṇa in the right order.

The origin of Bhāṣya literature is as early as the Vedāṅgas. As said before the Nirukta was a work of Sūtra cum Bhāṣya style, and it can be said to be the beginning of Bhāṣya type of works. The necessity of Bhāṣyas was soon felt for the proper understanding of many Sūtra works and in course of time Bhāṣyas were fully in vogue.

Patañjali's famous commentary on the Sūtras of Pāṇini is the earliest Bhāṣya of great importance. It exhibits most of the salient features of the Bhāṣya style. The great extent and the importance of this work have acquired for it the epithet Mahābhāṣya. Patañjali is assigned to the middle of the second century B. C.[1], and as stated before he is traditionally identified with the author of the Yogasūtras.

Amongst the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā was the first to have a Bhāṣya on its Sūtras. The famous commentary of Śabara is the only available Bhāṣya on the Jaimini Sūtras. According to Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, Śabara lived about 57 B. C. on the evidence of a verse which speaks of king Vikramāditya as being the

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1 P. Masson–Oursel : Camparative Philoso-
phy, p. 74.

son of Śabarasvāmin by a Kṣatriya wife. The refe-
rences from standard Mīmāṃsā works show that
there were other commentators of the Jaimini-
sūtras, such as Bhartṛmitra, Bhavadāsa, Hari and
Upavarṣa, some of whom were probably prior to
Śabara; but the works of all these authors are
now lost.[1]

The Śābara-bhāṣya is very systematic in its
treatment. The Sūtras are arranged in the form
of Adhikaraṇas, and the five-fold division is meticu-
lously followed.

During the fourth century A. D. three more
philosophical systems had Bhāṣyas to propound
their Sūtras. Vātsyāyana, who lived in the begin-
ning of the 4th century A. D., wrote an elaborate
commentary on the Sūtras of Gautama. Jacobi
places Vātsyāyana in 300 A. D. From his work
it appears that there were earlier commentators
with whose opinion he did not agree. Vātsyāyana
is not content only with interpretation and expla-
nation of the Sūtras, but also supplies additional
arguments to support the Sūtra view-point.

Later on comes the Praśastapāda-bhāṣya,
which is traditionally recognised to be a commen-
tary on the Kaṇāda-sūtras. The Bhāṣya of Praśa-
stapāda can hardly be called a Bhāṣya since it does
not follow the Sūtras, but is an independent disser-

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1 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol.
II. p. 376.

tation based on their main contents. Praśastapāda himself does not claim his work to be a Bhāṣya, since he calls it to be a compendium of the pro- perties of the categories (Padārthadharmasaṅ- graha). Praśastapāda lived later than Vātsyāyana, and he may be assigned to the fourth century A. D.[1] He was influenced by the Nyāya system, and he modified the Vaiśeṣika system in many respects. In this connection Bodas remarks— " Almost all the peculiar doctrines that distinguished the later Vaiśeṣikas from the Naiyāyikas and other schools are to be found in Praśastapada's work and are conspicuously absent in Kaṇāda's Sūtras."[2]

The Vyāsa-bhāṣya on the Yoga-sūtras, which is considered to be the standard exposition of the Yoga system also belonged to the fourth century A. D.

Standard exposition of the Sāṅkhya system is supplied by the Gaudapāda-bhāṣya, which is a commentary on the Sāṅkhyakārikas of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, and not on an early Sūtra work. It is doubtful whether this Gaudapāda, can be identified with the author of the Kārikās on Māṇḍukyopaniṣad. Gau- dapāda, the Sāṅkhya Commentator may be assigned to the 8th century A. D.[3]

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1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 306.

2 Tarkasaṅgraha, Ed. by Athalye and Bodas, Introduction, p. XXXVII.

3 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 255.

· The Bhāṣyas on the Brahma-sūtra.

The earliest available Bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra is the famous Śārīrakabhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya. References from the Bhāṣya show that there was an earlier commentary, which was probably written by Bodhāyana, but the work is not extant.

Śaṅkara was born in 788 A. D. The name of his father was Śivaguru. He was a Nambudri Brahmin of the Taittirīya branch and he lived at Kāladi in Southern India. At the age of eight Śaṅkara became well-versed in Vedic lore. The name of his teacher was Govindācārya, who was the pupil of Gaudapāda, the reputed author of the Kārikās on Māṇḍukyopaniṣad. At the age of twelve Śaṅkara wrote his elaborate commentary on the Brahmasūtra.[1] In his early youth he turned a Sanyāsin, and wandered from place to place, engaging in discussions with the leaders of other schools of thought. He met many great thinkers as Kumārila, Maṇḍanamiśra and others, and defeated them in disputations, and converted some of them to his own view-point. He established four monasteries in the four quarters at Shrigeri, Puri, Dwarka and Badarinath. He died at Kedarnath in 820 A. D. at the age of thirty-two. Śaṅkara was a philosopher and a poet, a savant and a saint, a mystic and a religious reformer.[2] By writing

1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 432.
2 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 450.

elaborate commentaries on the ten principal Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā, and the Brahmasūtra, he propounded monistic philosophy called Kevalādvaita.

Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahmasūtra is a work of great originality, vigour and philosophic insight. The views expressed by Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya have attained wonderful celebrity, on account of the subtle and deep ideas it contains. In this respect Dr. Thibaut remarks— " Neither those forms of the Vedānta which diverge from the view represented by Śaṅkara nor any of the non-Vedāntic systems can be compared with the so called orthodx Vedānta in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation."[1]

After Śaṅkarācārya comes Rāmānujācārya, as an author of a Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra. Rāmānuja was born in 1017 A. D.[2] at Shriperumbudūr. The name of his father was Keśava Yajvan, who died when Rāmānuja was young. He married at the age of sixteen. About 1033 A. D. he studied Vedānta with Yādavaprakāśa of Conjeeveram, but he differed in his views with the teacher. In 1043 A. D. he went to Śriraṅgam to become the disciple of Yāmunācārya,

1 Thibaut : The Vedānta-sūtras with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya, (trans.), Introduction, p. xiv.

2 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 100.

but on account of the death of the latter he could not fulfil his desire. About 1049 A. D. he renounced wordly life and entered holy orders. He was initiated by Mahāpūrṇa, who was his maternal uncle and a disciple of Yāmunācārya. From him he learnt the secrets of Vedāntic mysticism. Rāmānuja and the prominent preachers of his sect had to suffer persecution at the hands of the Cola king Koluttuṅga I. To avoid persecution, Rāmānuja fled to the Hoysala country. In 1096 A. D. he converted the Jaina king of that country to Vaiṣṇavism. At the initiation of Rāmānuja, the Hoysala King built a great temple at Melukot. After the death of the Cola king, Rāmānuja returned to Śrīraṅgam in 1118 A. D. Then he engaged himself in writing his Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra. This famous commentary, which was completed in 1127 A. D. was named Śri-bhāṣya. He died in 1137 A. D. at the age of 120. Vedāntasāra, Vedārtha-saṅgraha, Vedāntadīpa, and an elaborate commentary on the Bhagavadgītā were the other important works of Rāmānuja. As a fervent exponent of his sect he travelled all over South India extensively and spread Vaiṣṇavism by his teaching.

It is said that Śrībhāṣya mainly follows the philosophy of Bodhāyana-vṛtti.[1] The intrisic value of Śrībhāṣya is a very high one. It strikes one throughout as a solid performance due to a

1 Rāmānuja : Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of Śankara, it not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant one [1]

Madhva was born in the year 1199 A. D. near Udipi.[2] After the study of the Veda and Vedāṅgas he turned towards the study of the Vedānta. Śaṅkarite Vedānta, which his Guru Acyutaprekṣa taught him did not satisfy him. Soon he began to formulate his own doctrina. Due to his vast learning he was promoted to be the head of his Muth. He travelled throughout India: After his southern tour he wrote his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, and in the course of his northern tour he wrote his Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣya. Besides this Bhāṣya, Mahābhārata-tātpaṛyanirṇaya is an important work of Madhva. Madhva, who was also called Ānandatīrtha, Purṇaprajña, or Madhyamandira[3] was believed to be an incarnation of Vāyu. His Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra propounds dualistic philosophy.

Amongst the writers of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣyas of major importance, the relative chronological position of Madhva and Nimbārka is difficult

1 Thibaut : The Vedānta-sūtras with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya, (trans.), Introduction, p. xvii.
2 Three Great Acāryas, p. 199.
3 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian philosophy, Vol. III, p. 399.

to be ascertained. According to Dr. Bhandarkar the date of Nimbārka's death was about 1162 A. D.[1], while Madhva died in 1276 A. D.[2] But Nimbārka is said to have written a work called Madhvamukha–mardana, which points to his being later than Madhva. The absence of any mention of Nimbārka in Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha also supports the same conclusion.

Nimbārka or Nimbāditya was a Telugu Brahmin of Nimbapura in Bellary district. His father's name was Jagannātha and his mother's name was Sarasvatī. Dasgupta is inclined to place him towards the latter quarter of the fourteenth century or the beginning of the fifteenth century.[3] Nimbārka is considered to be the incarnation of the power (Sudarśana) of Nārāyaṇa.

Nimbārka's commentary on the Brahmasūtra is very small in extent and it is called Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha. The style of Nimbārka's Bhāṣya in many places shows that it was modelled upon the style of approach adopted by Rāmānuja. Besides the Bhāṣya, Daśa-śloki and Kṛṣṇa-stavarāja are two of his important works.

1 Dr. Bhandarkar : Collected works, Vol. IV, p. 88 n. 3.

2 Sāyaṇa–mādhava : Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, p. 160.

3 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian philosophy, Vol. III, p. 400.

Vallabhācārya is the last of the authors of Brahmasūtra-bhāṣyas of major importance. Valla-bha was born in 1439 A. D.[1] He was the native of Kaṅkaravāda in the Tailaṅga country. The name of his father was Lakṣmaṇabhaṭṭa. Vallabha was educated at Benares, and he became well-versed in Vedic lore. He returned to his native place and stayed there for some time. After the death of his father, he started on a tour for pilgri-mages, in the course of which he met Bilvamaṅgala. Vallabha became the disciple of this Ācārya and followed his teachings. In the course of his tour he had discussions with many teachers of other sects, whom he defeated. He stayed for some time in Gokula and Mathura, and on the Govardhana mountain he had the divine vision of Śrīkṛṣṇa. After his tour he married a young girl named Mahālakṣmī, who was of his own caste, and settled at Adel near Allahbad. He had two sons named Gopinātha and Viṭṭhala. In the last days of his life he became a Sanyāsin and died at the age of 52. He established Muths at various places, and they are occupied by his descendants even now. Vallabha is considered to be an incarnation of Agni.

The important works of Vallabhācārya are Aṇu-bhāṣya, Tattvadīpanibandha, Nibandhaprakāśa, Śrīmadbhāgavata-subodhinī, Śrīmadbhāgavata-sūkṣmatīkā and Pūrvamīmāṃsā-bhāṣya.

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1 Pathak : Aṇu-bhāsya of Vallabhācārya, part
   II, Sanskrit Introduction, p. 40..

The Aṇu-bhāṣya, a commentary on the Brahmasūtra, seems to have been written by two persons, as we can see two different styles in the earlier and the later portions. Upto the Sūtra स्थानांविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत् । ३।२।३४, it was written by Vallabhācārya himself, and the portion after this upto the end was written by his son Viṭṭhaleśa. Moreover, even in the earlier portion, the second interpretation of आनन्दमयाधिकरण is written by Viṭṭhaleśa. As a systematic work, exhibiting the great learning and acute philosophical insight of its author, Aṇubhāṣya deserves a high place. The doctrine of Vallabhācārya is called Śuddhādvaita or Puṣṭimārga.

The Dialectical Method.

The development of different systems of Indian philosophy through the period of Bhāṣya literature followed a course which greatly facilitated the adoption of critical method, which is essentially necessary for the progress of philosophical thought. The reasons of this phenomenon were historical. Even in the days of Sūtras, leaders of philosophical schools propounded their tenets by means of dissertations in which they took into account the objections of rival philosophical schools. They anticipated the arguments of their antagonists and tried to refute them by taking recourse to reasoning. Thus the critics of the systems forced their protagonists to set forth logical defences for them. Gradually the critical side of philosophy became as important as the speculative. In this way recourse to reasoning for the establishment of a system formed an essential part of a Sūtra work, which represented a concise and authentic summary of the discussions of teachers amongst their own circles. In the West the analogue to that is in Plato's Dialogues.

A Bhāṣya being the elucidation and elaboration of a Sūtra work, discussion and argumentation i. e. the Dialectic Method seemed to be the most natural method for achieving its purpose. Whether for the correct interpretation of Sūtras or for

the search of higher philosophical truths in them, recourse to reasoning seemed to be the most convenient means. Moreover the tradition of critically discussing the tenets of a school amongst the circles of its own thinkers, as well as of debating philosophical topics with antagonistic thinkers continued right upto the end of the Bhāṣya period. There is historical evidence to show that during the Bhāṣya period thinkers of different schools often met together and defeated each other in actual debates. These discussions and debates must have moulded the methodology of the Bhāṣya works of the philosophical systems in general and particularly of the Vedānta Bhāṣyas which are chronologically the latest.

The method in which the Bhāṣyas set forth their tenets is often called the dialectical method. This term is associated with certain fundamental ideas about method, specially developed by early Western philosophers. "Socrates and Plato developed a method of mental experimentation, which Plato called the ' dialectic ' – a method well fitted for use in conversation or dialogue. It consisted in taking up any belief one of the speakers chose to present; treating it as an hypothesis, and following it ruthlessly to its extreme conclusions. If for any reason the consequences of the hypothesis were unacceptable, a new hypothesis must be tried; and the process may be continued until one is found which leads to no error. Thus the dialectic is a progressive thinking process............ The true

hypothesis would be the dialectical survivor."[1]
Even a superficial examination of the Bhāṣyas may
show that, though bound down by the literal inter-
pretation of the Sūtras, they used a method which
was analogous to that in the Platonic Dialogues.
A detailed analysis of the Bhāṣya method from the
point of view of Indian philosophy is necessary to
show its salient features.

The dialectical method is called Vāda-pad-
dhati in Indian philosophy. The word Vāda is a
technical term from the Nyāya system. According
to Vātsyāyana, Vāda consists in a number of
declarations put forward by various speakers pur-
porting to be reasons in support of several theories,
leading ultimately to the acceptance of one of
these theories as the demonstrated truth.[2]

Vāda is one of the three kinds of Kathā or a
debate.[3] Vāda consists of an academical discussion
with pupils, teachers, fellow students and persons
seeking truth for the purpose of arriving at right
conclusions.[4] The sole aim of Vāda is ascertain-
ment of truth.[5] It is to be distinguished from the

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1 W. E. Hocking : Types of Philosophy, p. 489.
2 "वाद: खलु नानाप्रवक्तृक: प्रत्यधिकरणसाधनोऽन्यतराधिकरणनिर्णयावसानो
   वाक्यसमूह: । ” Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya on Nyāya-sūtra
   of Gautama, p. 6.
3 " तिस्र: कथा भवन्ति वादो जल्पो वितण्डा चेति । " ibid. p. 57.
4 " तं शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोर्थिभिरनसूयिभिरभ्युपेयात् । ”
   Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama, IV. ii. 48.
5 " तत्त्वनिर्णयफल: कथाविशेषो वाद: । " Sarva-darśana-saṅ-
   graha, p. 239.

other two kinds of a debate viz. Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā, which are essentially different in purpose. In Jalpa the main object is the overthrow of the opponent rightly or wrongly.[1] It is a dispute which a man carries on while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other unfair means of arguments.[2] In Vitaṇḍā attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent's thesis without any attempt to offer an alternative thesis.[3]

As a technical term of the Nyāya system, Gautama defines Vāda as follows:—[4] "Vāda consists in putting forward (by two persons) of a conception and counter-conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings— neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine (or thesis) and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the Five Factors. " According to the definition, there are three features which constitute Vāda. (1) Firstly, there must be the

1 "उभयपक्षसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्प: ।" Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 100.

2 "यथोक्तोपपन्नञ्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्प: । " Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama, I. ii. 2.

3 " स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा । " Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama, I. ii. 3.
   Also—" स्वपक्षस्थापनाहीन: कथाविशेषो वितण्डा ।
   Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 239.

4 " प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भ: सिद्धान्ताविरुद्ध: पंचावयवोपपन्न: पक्षप्रतिपक्ष-परिग्रहो वाद: । " Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama, I. ii. 1.

supporting and condemning of contrary view-points by means of proofs and reasonings. (2) Secondly, neither the supporting nor the condemning must be quite opposed to the main thesis. And (3) thirdly, both of them must be in accordance to the method of reasoning through the Five Factors.

With reference to the first feature, it is to be noted that the contrary view-points, which are either supported or condemned, refer to the same topic.[1] Both the condemning and supporting must proceed hand in hand in a connected manner so that there is condemnation of that which is ultimately rejected and supporting of that which remains unshaken.[2] Moreover, both the condemning and supporting of the contrary view-points must be done by means of proofs and reasonings, and not by any unfair means of argumentation.

The Pramāṇas or proofs is a subject, which has given rise to many controversies among rival systems. They hold different theories about their general nature. The number of valid proofs also varies with different schools. The controversial topic of Pramāṇas deserves a detailed examination, which forms the subject—matter of a subsequent

1 " एकाधिकरणस्थौ विरुद्धौ धर्मौ पक्षप्रतिपक्षौ प्रत्यनीकभावात् । ".
Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya on Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra, p. 57.

2 " तौ साधनोपालम्भौ उभयोरपि पक्षयोर्व्यंतिषक्तावनुबद्धौ च यावदेको निवृत्त एकतरो व्यवस्थित इति । निवृत्तस्योपालम्भो आवस्थितस्य साधनमिति । " ibid. p. 57.

chapter in this study. At this stage it may only
be mentioned that, according to the Nyāya system,
Pramāṇa being the means of obtaining right cogni-
tion, as a matter of fact, nothing can be known
except through it.[1]   The Nyāya accepts four
Pramāṇas, viz.   Perception, Inference, Analogy
and Scripture.   It is by means of these that the
condemning and supporting of contrary view-points
should be achieved.

     The Pramāṇas are to be supported by Tarka
or reasoning.   The word Tarka is employed in
several different senses.   When loosely used, it
may mean logic or science of reasoning.   The
Vaiśeṣika system is sometimes named as Tarka.[2]
The term may also denote " an inference "[3] in
general.   As a technical word of the Nyāya system,
Tarka is defined as " a reasoning, which is put
forward for the purpose of ascertaining the real
character of a thing when it is not well known, and
which (while supporting a certain conclusion) in-
dicates the presence of proof (showing the undesi-

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1 " प्रमाणमन्तरेण नार्थप्रतिपत्ति: । " Vātsyāyana–bhāṣya on
   Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra, p. 1.

2 cf. " तर्कसंग्रह, तर्कभाषा, तर्ककौमुदी, तर्कामृत etc. where
   Tarka denotes categories of the Vaiśeṣika
   system.

3 cf. " तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति नेदेवमप्वनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गैः । "
   Brahma-sūtra. II. i. 11.
   Also:— " अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् । "
   Matsya-purāṇa, 113. 7. " नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया । "
   Kaṭhopaniṣad, I. ii. 9.

rability or absurdity of a contrary conclusion)."[1]
Thus Tarka is deliberation on an unknown thing
to discern its real nature.   It consists of seeking
*reasons in favour of some supposition to the exclu-
sion of other suppositions.*   It is not inference, but
merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a
right   conclusion.   It is a process of reasoning
carried on in one's mind before one can come to
any right conclusion.   It is the subjective weigh-
ing of different alternatives on the occasion of a
doubt before a conclusive affirmation or denial
is made.   In Vāda, this process of reasoning does
not remain mental but is formally presented as an
aid for the functioning of a Pramāṇa, which ulti-
mately brings about the right cognition.   Tarka
leads to the ascertainment of the validity or inva-
lidity of pramāṇas, and thereby helps in the attain-
ing of true knowledge.[2]

Tarka is not to be included in any of the
four Pramāṇas, nor is it a separate Pramāṇa, since
by itself it cannot serve as a means of cognition.[3]
By the help of Tarka, the reasoner simply assents
to the assertion of one of the two suspected chara-
cters, on the strength of the proof adduced.[4]   The

1 " अविज्ञाततत्त्वेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तितस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमूहस्तर्कः । " Nyāya-
    sūtra of Gautama, I. i. 40.
2 " प्रमाणानामनुग्राहकस्तत्त्वज्ञानाय कल्पते । " Vātsyāyana-bhā-
    ṣya on Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra, p. 5.
3 " तर्को न प्रमाणसङ्गृहीतो, न प्रमाणान्तरम् । " Vātsyāyana-
    bhāṣya, p. 5.
4 " अनुज्ञानात्ययमेकतरं धर्मं कारणोपपत्त्या, न निवर्त्तयति । "
    Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 54.

hypothetical reasoning serves merely a negative purpose. Its nature is permissive. The form in which Tarka appears is totally different from that of a definite fully ascertained cognition. In Tarka we start with a wrong assumption and show how it leads to absurdities. It is not by itself a source of valid knowledge, though it is valuable as suggesting hypotheses. After the reasoning is fully considered and found to be free from defects, and favouring a particular conclusion, a Pramāṇa becomes operative and brings about right knowledge.[1] In this way Tarka resuscitates Pramāṇas.

The form of reasoning normally found in Tarka may be exhibited by means of an illustration. Suppose a man observes smoke on the mountain and wishes to ascertain fire from it. If the concomitance of fire and smoke is not accepted by the adversary, inference cannot serve as a valid proof. Then he may begin by putting forward the alternatives, ' the mountain is either fiery or not '. Assuming the second alternative to be hypothetically true, he may proceed by putting forward the argument that if the mountain is not fiery, it cannot be smokey. This conclusion is forced upon the adversary since he is unable to deny the concomitance of the absence of fire and the absence of smoke. The conclusion is obviously false as it is directly opposed to the observed fact that there is smoke on the mountain. The assump-

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1 " अस्वज्ञानविषयांभ्यनुज्ञालक्षणादूहाद् भावितात् प्रसज्ञादनन्तरं प्रमाण-सामर्घ्यात्तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 54.

tion, therefore, from which this absurd conclusion is derived must be false. This reasoning resuscitates the inference of the contradictory alternative, viz. 'the mountain is fiery'.

Tarka is defined in several ways. In Tarkasaṅgraha it is explained as " the imposition of a more extensive thing through the assumption of the less."[1] This definition is elaborated by Nīlakaṇṭha in the words – "An obviously wrong notion as to the existence, of a more extensive thing with reference to something, derived from a similarly palpably wrong assumption of the existence of a less extensive thing in the same place, is called Tarka."[2] According to the definition of Tarkabhāṣā, " Tarka is the contingency of deducing an implausible extensive character, by the assumption of a less extensive character, when the concomitance of the two is already proved. "[3] All these definitions express the same underlying idea, and point to the process of reasoning similar to the one illustrated before.

According to the ancient Naiyāyikas, Tarka is divided into eleven kinds, of which the modern

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1 " व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 56.
　　Also:— Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, p. 238.
2 " आहार्यव्याप्यवत्ताभ्रमजन्य आहार्यव्याप्कवत्ताभ्रमस्तर्कः । "
　　Nilakaṇṭhī.
3 "अयं च सिद्धव्याप्तिकयोर्मध्येबोव्याप्याङ्गीकारेणानिष्टव्यापकप्रसञ्जनम् । "
　　Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 96.

accept only five.[1] They are:— आत्माश्रय (Ignaratio Elenchi), अन्योन्याश्रय or इतरेतराश्रय (Dilemma), चक्रक (Circle), अनवस्था (Regressus ad infinitum), प्रमाण-बाधितार्थप्रसङ्ग or तदन्यबाधितार्थप्रसङ्ग (Reductio ad absurdum). In the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas, the remaining six kinds of Tarkas, as mentioned by the older school, viz. व्याघात, लाघव, गौरव, उत्सर्ग, अपवाद and वैजात्य, cannot be classed as Tarka, since there is no attribution of a contingency. According to them they are included in Tarka, since they are similarly useful in resuscitating the Pramāṇas.

The second feature of Vāda lays down that neither the supporting nor the condemning of the contrary view-points must go against the main doctrine. The significance of this requirement, according to Vātsyāyana, is that in Vāda, even though Nigrahasthānas or clinchers are not allowed as a rule,[2] the clincher in the shape of the ' Fallacy of contradiction ' which has been defined as ' that which contradicts the accepted thesis ', may be urged.[3] The proper place for Nigrahasthānas is Jalpa or Vitaṇḍā, and not Vāda. So far allowing the urging of this particular fallacy, the

1 " स चैकादशविधः । व्याघातात्माश्रयेतरेतराश्रयचक्रकाश्रयानवस्थाप्रतिब-न्धिकल्पनालाघवकल्पनागौरवोत्सर्गादिवादवैजात्यभेदात् । " Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 238-39.

2 " जल्पे निग्रहस्थानविनियोगाद्वादे तत्प्रतिषेधः । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 57.

3 " सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः । इति हेत्वाभासस्य निग्रहस्थान-त्वानुज्ञा वादे । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 58.

qualification 'not quite opposed to the main
doctrine' is used in the definition of Vāda.

The third feature of Vāda lays down that it
should be carried on in accordance to the method
of reasoning through the Five Factors, viz.
(1) Statement of the proposition, (2) Statement of
the probans, (3) Statement of the corroborative
instance, (4) Reaffirmation, and (5) Final conclu-
sion.[1] This amounts to laying down that Vāda
should take the form of a series of syllogisms.
But this is not a necessary condition of Vāda. It
is true that Vāda proceeds by means of the free
use of syllogisms, but this does not mean that it
consists in arguing only by means of series of
syllogisms. Even without the employment of
'factors of reasoning' Pramāṇas are found to
accomplish their purpose of determining the real
nature of things.[2] So even if the Pramāṇas are
used independent of the 'Factors of reasoning'
for the condemning and supporting of contrary
view-points, it is also called Vāda.[3]

The qualification 'in accordance to the
method of reasoning through Five Factors,' has
another significance in the opinion of Vātsyāyana.

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1 " प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः । " Nyāya-sūtra of
   Gautama, I. i. 32.
2 " अन्तरेणापि ञावयवसम्बन्धं प्रमाणान्यर्थं साधयन्तीति दृष्टम् । "
   Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 58.
3 " तेनापि कल्पेन साधनोपाळम्मौ वादे भवत इति ञापयति । "
   Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 58.

Reasoning through ' Five Factors ' is liable to such faults as Nyūna or dropping essential steps of argument and Adhika or elaborating the obvious. So the clinchers Nyūna and Adhika, which consist of these faults of reasoning respectively, are allowed to be urged in Vāda.[1]

The Pariśuddhi has elaborated this topic and has explained the position of different Nigraha-sthānas according as they are permissible in Vāda or not. According to Pariśuddhi, from among the twenty-two clinchers, there are six that cannot by their nature be urged in Vāda. They are:— (1) Pratijñā-hāni or surrendering the proposition to be established, (2) Pratijñā-sanyāsa or disclaiming the proposition, (3) Nirarthaka or sense-less talking, (4) Arthāntara or shifting the topic, (5) Avijñā-tārtha or using unintelligible jargon, and (6) Apar-thaka or incoherent talk. There are seven others, which, even though possible should not be urged. They are:— (1) Pratijñāntara, or shifting the argument by importing new considerations, (2) Hetvantara or shifting the reason, (3) Ajñāna or not understanding the proposition, (4) Apratibhā or wanting in resourceful replies, (5) Vikṣepa or evading the discussion by feigning illness etc. (6) Matānujñā or admitting defeat by pointing out that it is also present in the opponent's view, and (7) Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa, or overlooking the cen-

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1 " पञ्चावयवोपपन्न इति '-हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् ' ' हेतूदाह-रणाधिकमधिकन् ' इति चैतयोरभ्यूहानार्थमिति । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 58.

surable. There are seven clinchers again which
may be urged. They are:— (1) Pratijñāvirodha
or self-contradiction, (2) Aprāptakāla or overlook-
ing the order of argumentation, (3) Nyūna or
dropping essential steps of argument, (4) Adhika
or elaborating the obvious, (5) Punarukta or re-
peating one-self, (6) Ananubhāṣaṇa or keeping
quiet, and (7) Apasiddhānta or deviating from an
accepted tenet. Lastly there are two which when
urged put an end to the controversy. They are:—
(1) Hatvābhāsa or semblance of a reason, and
(2) Niranuyojyānuyoga or censuring the non-
censurable.   ·

Vāda is quite distinct from Jalpa and
Vitaṇḍā, which are degenerated forms of a debate.
In Jalpa all the features of Vāda are present, but
the disputant mainly depends on ҫasuistry, futile
rejoinders, and clinchers[1] for the sake of gaining
a victory over his opponent. A Jalpa is called
Vitaṇḍā, when it is only a destructive criticism,
which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine with-
out seeking to establish or formulate any new
doctrine.[2] In Jalpa the disputant has at least his
own doctrine to propound, but in Vitaṇḍā he has
no theory of his own to advance. He resorts to
Vitaṇḍā solely for demolishing the doctrine of the
antagonist. Thus Vitaṇḍā aims at criticism for
its own sake. The purpose of both the degene-
rated forms of debate is victory over the opponent

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1 Vide p. 31 n. 1 and 2.
2 Vide p. 31 n. 3.

and not ascertainment of truth. In both of them
all sorts of unfair means of argumentation are
resorted to.

Gautama allows an honest debator to resort
to Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā on exceptional occasions.
According to him these serve the purpose of safe-
guarding the conception of truth, just as the
fencing of thorny boughs serves the purpose of
safe-guarding the sprouting of seeds.[1] As a
matter of fact they are to be used only for the
sake of guarding one's view by attacking or oppos-
ing the other view. When the opponent becomes
arrogant or is prejudiced against truth, picking up
a quarrel with him and proceeding to deal with
him by disputation (Jalpa) and wrangling (Vitaṇḍā)
is allowed. A debate or a treatise following the
real Vāda method is never expected to degenerate
into either a Jalpa or a Vitaṇḍā.

Of the unfair means of argumentation that
are employed in Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā, Chala means
a rejoinder in which the statement of the opponent
is wilfully misinterpreted. It consists in opposing
an assertion through the assumption of a meaning
other than the one intended.[2] Chala is of three

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1 " तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टक-
शाखावरणवत् । " Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama, IV. ii. 50.

2 " वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् । " Nyāya-sūtra of
Gautama, I. ii. 10.
Also:— " शब्दवृत्तिव्यत्ययेन प्रतिषेधहेतुरछलम् । " Sarva-dar-
śana-saṅgraha, p. 240.
Also:— " अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्य शब्दस्यार्थान्तरं प्रकल्प्य दूषणाभि-
धानं छलम् । Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 111.

kinds:— The first is Vāk-chala, which consists in
assuming a meaning other than that intended to
be conveyed, when the meaning intended is not
definitely stated.　The second is Sāmānya-chala,
which consists in the urging of an absurd significa-
tion, which is rendered possible by the use of a
too generic term.　The third is Upachāra-chala,
consisting of a statement on the basis of the secon-
dary denotation of words, if it is opposed by a
denial of the existence of what is asserted.

　　　Jātis and Nigrahasthānas are the defects of
reasoning due to the incapacity of the reasoner.
Jāti or ' futile rejoinder ' is an objection which is
taken on the basis of mere similarity and dissimi-
larity.[1]　It takes no notice of invariable concomi-
tance, which is quite essential in the case of a valid
reason.　As all cases of Jāti are not covered by
similarity and dissimilarity, modern logicians
define it simply as ' a wrong answer ', i. e. an
answer which is either incapable of shaking the
opposite view or which is vitiated by self-contra-
dictions.　There are twenty-four kinds of Jātis.
Taking into account that these arguments based
on false analogy or false distinction can easily be
reduced to Hetvābhāsas, a detailed examination of
these seems to be unnecessary.

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1 " साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः । " Nyāya-sūtra of
　　Gautama, I. ii. 18.
　2 " असदुत्तरं जातिः । " Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 111.
　　Also:— " स्वव्याघातकमुत्तरं जातिः । " Sarva-darśana-
saṁgraha, p. 240.

Nigrahasthāna or a clincher is a case of mis-apprehension or incomprehension of one of the parties. In a controversy, any action that is in-dicative of either party's ignorance constitutes a clincher.[1] When it is successfully urged against a party, no further disscusion can proceed. Thus a clincher puts an end to all controversy, because it signifies a point where an adversary is caught and defeated.[2] The Nigrahasthānas are divided into twenty-two kinds, which are referred to before. Of these some like Arthāntara, Punarukta and Nirarthaka are merely tricks usually resorted to by a disputant in order to confound his rival. Others like Avijñātārtha, Ananubhāṣaṇa, Apratibhā and Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa are only possible in long-continued controversies, and they are of the nature of dialectical lapses rather than fallacies of a particular argument. Only seven of these twenty-two clinchers, viz. Pratijñā-sanyāsa, Het-vantara, Apasiddhānta, and Hetvābhāsa, can have any pretensions to be called logical fallacies.

The foregoing outline of Vāda-paddhati gives theoretical picture of the dialectical method, resorted to in the philosophical discussions, dis-sertations and treatises of India, right upto the eighteenth century.

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1 " विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् । " Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama, I. ii. 19.

2 "पराजयनिमित्तं निग्रहस्थानम् । " Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 242. Also:— " निग्रहस्थानं खलु पराजयप्राप्ति: । " Vātsyā-yana-bhāṣya, p. 72.

The Pramāṇas.

In Vāda Pramāṇas play a very important part, since logical discussions are mainly based on them. The oft-quoted maxim, 'Knowledge of the thing to be measured depends on the knowledge of the measure',[1] precisely shows their basic importance. Pramāṇas form the corner stone of the science of logic, which is named as Pramāṇa-śāstra, and its purpose is defined as 'the scrutiny of an object by means of proofs.'[2] They are the sole means of obtaining knowledge, and valid conclusions are necessarily based on them. So when the nature and limits of Pramāṇas or valid proofs are determined, it is easy to arrive at true knowledge by employing those proofs properly. As the term Vāda is from the Nyāya system, it is proper to begin the examination of Pramāṇas according to that system.

In the Nyāya system, Pramāṇa is defined as "the means by which a person obtains the right cognition of a thing."[3] The same is more pre-

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1 " मानाधीना मेयसिद्धि: । " Chitsukhī, II. 18.

2 " प्रमाणैरर्थंपरीक्षणं न्याय: । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 3.

3 " स येनार्थं प्रमिणोति तत्प्रमाणम् । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya p. 1.

Also– "प्रमाया: करणं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् । " Tarka-saṅgraha-dīpikā, p. 24.

cisely expressed by the definition – " Pramāṇa is
that which is always followed by right apprehen-
sion. "[1] Pramāṇa consists in the collocation
(Sāmagrī) of instruments by which unerring and
indubitable knowledge comes into being. That
collocation involves non-intelligent as well as in-
telligent elements and through their conjoint
action uncontradicted and determinate knowledge
is produced.

The means of right cognition do not require
other sets of means for revealing them.[2] In reveal-
ing the objects of right cognition, they reveal
themselves as well. They are similar to the light
of a lamp, which reveals itself in revealing the
objects.[3]

Though Pramāṇas are regarded as instru-
ments of right knowledge with reference to the
right cognition of other things, they may them-
selves be the objects of right knowledge.[4] There
are no hard and fast limits that those which are
instruments of knowledge should always be treated
as mere instruments. Thus Pramāṇas not only
help us to a right apprehension of objects, but also
enable us to test the validity of knowledge. A
Pramāṇa has a double function; it is not Pramā-

1 " साधनाश्रयाव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति प्रमाव्याप्यत्वम् । " Sarva-darśana-
sangraha, p. 235.

2 " सेयं प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेव प्रत्यक्षादीनां यथादर्शनमुपलब्धिनं प्रमाणान्तरतः । "
Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 87.

3 " प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः । " Nyāya-sūtra, II. i. 19.

4 " प्रमेया च तुला प्रामाण्यवत् । " Nyāya-sūtra, II. i. 16.

karaṇa only, but Pramātva-jñāpaka also.

Objections have been raised against the validity of the Pramāṇa in general. The Nyāya reply for such objectors is, that if there were no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any means of valid knowledge, then he cannot say that there are no means of valid knowledge at all.[1]

The Naiyāyikas hold that the validity of a cognition is proved not by itself, but by some other extraneous means. They accept the doctrine of 'Parataḥ-prāmāṇya'.

According to the Nyāya system, the Pramāṇas are of four kinds:– (1) Pratyakṣa (perception), (2) Anumāna (inference), (3) Upamāna (analogy), and (4) Śabda (scriptural testimony). These four Pramāṇas are considered to be quite sufficient, and it is needless to accept Arthāpatti (implication), Aitihya (tradition), Sambhava (inclusion) and Abhāva (non-existence) as separate Pramāṇas. The validity of these is recognised, but they are included in the four Pramāṇas mentioned before. Tradition is included in scriptural testimony, and Arthāpatti, Sambhava and Abhāva are included within inference.[2]

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1 " सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाञ्च प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रमाणवि-
प्रतिषेध: । ' Nyāya-sūtra, II. i. 13-14.

2 " शब्द   ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरमावादनुमानेऽर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तरभावा-
च्चाप्रतिषेध: । " Nyāya-sūtra, II. ii. 2.

The Vaiśeṣika system is allied to Nyāya, and the logical tenets of the latter are generally accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas without any modification. Thus later on both the systems came to be recognised as a combined system, in which the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics and the Nyāya epistemology were harmonised. The Kaṇāda-sūtra, however, reveals that the Vaiśeṣika system is slightly different from Nyāya in the treatment of Pramāṇas. The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras do not count scripture as a separate Pramāṇa, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. Upamāna, which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyāya is not even referred to in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. The Nyāya-sūtra refers to other Pramāṇas, such as Arthāpatti, Sambhava and Aitihya, but the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras do not know them at all. Thus the Vaiśeṣikas accept only two Pramāṇas viz. perception and inference. They do not accept scriptural testimony as a separate Pramāṇa, but consider it as inference from the authoritative character of the speakers, since the Vedas, as collections of sentences presuppose intelligent authors.[1] Analogy, tradition, implication, inclusion and non-existence are all brought under inference.

According to the Sāṅkhya system, Pramāṇa is of the nature of a modification of Buddhi (intelligence). Through the sense-organs Buddhi

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1 " तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम् । " Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, I. i. 3.

Also:— " बुद्धिपूर्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे । " Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, VI. i. 1.

comes into contact with the external object, is
affected by it, and assumes the form of that object.
This modification is connected with consciousness
in the form of reflection, and thus knowledge
ensues. The validity or invalidity of these modifi-
cations can be tested by the later modifications,
and not by any reference to external objects. Thus
the Sāṅkhyas accept the doctrine of Svatah-
prāmāṇya with reference to both the validity or
invalidity of Pramāṇas.[1]

The Sāṅkhyas accept the three Pramāṇas of
perception inference and scriptutal testimony.[2]

In the Yoga system, Pramāṇa is of the
nature of a modification or process of mind (Citta-
vṛtti). It is the cognitive state which is generated
by perception, inference and scriptural testimony.

The Mīmāṃsakas define Pramāṇa as ''that
which apprehends an object not known before.''
This definition is objected to on the ground that
in a long series of sensations of the same object,
the first only becomes right cognition, while the
succeeding sensations will not be right cognitions,
since their object is already cognised. This objec-
tion is refuted by Mīmāṃsakas by arguing that
each individual sensation is different 'from its pre-
decessor, inasmuch as it was produced at a diffe-
rent moment.

1 " प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः संख्याः समाश्रिता: । " Sarva-dar-
    śana-saṅgraha, p. 279.

2 " दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
    त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धि: प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ " Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 4.

According to Mīmāṃsā, the self is directly and immediately perceived in all knowledge. So all knewledge may be regarded as perception from the point of view of the self. The division of Pramāṇas as perception, inference etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with reference to the various modes in which they are brought within the purview of knowledge.

Mīmāṃsakas accept the self–validity of knowledge. In fact this doctrine forms the corner-stone on which the whole structure of the Mī nāmsā philosophy is based. According to Mī nāmsā the rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts are dependent on it for their revelation. Whenever there is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is certain and valid. Know-ledge attained is proved invalid only when later on a contradictory experince comes in, or when the instruments of knowledge are known to be faulty. Validity of knowledge rises immediately with its rise, though its invalidity may be derived form later experience or some other data.[1]

By establishing the self-validity of all know-ledge, Mīmāṃsakas were able to prove that the Veda was self-valid, that it did not derive its validity from God, and that it was not necessary to test its validity by any other means.

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1. "•••••••• वेदवादिनः । प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणताम् ॥
Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 279.

Jaimini accepts the three Pramāṇas of perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Prabhākara admits analogy and implication.[1] Kumārila adds Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension), to the five Pramāṇas accepted by Prabhākara.

The Vedānta follows the Mīmāṃsā system in its treatment of the nature of Pramāṇas in general. According to the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkarācārya, Pramā or right cognition is that which has not been already acquired and which remains uncontradicted.[2] Pramāṇa is the means of such a cognition. Vedāntins accept that the real is known to us as that which is proved by the Pramāṇas and will never again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof. So validity means correctness to facts and want of contradiction.

In this system, Pramāṇa consists of pure consciousness manifested through a part of the internal organ as cognitive operation. Pramāṇa is the cognitive consciousness determined by the Vṛtti or the modification of the internal organ. Though pure consciousness is one, yet it manifests in three different ways, as cognizer (Pramātā), cognitive operation (Pramāṇa) and the cognition or the percept (Pramiti). In the operation of Pramāṇas, Ātman is the illuminator and by means

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1 " प्राभाकरमतानुसारिभि: प्रमाणपारायणे प्रत्यक्षादीनि पंचैव प्रमाणानि प्रपंचितानि । " Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 431.

2 " अनधिगतावाधितार्थविषयज्ञानत्वं प्रमात्वम् । " Vedānta-paribhāṣā, I.

of it the internal organ perceives

Like Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta accepts the
self-validity of knowledge. Knowledge, as is not
vitiated by any Doṣa (or cause of error) can have
self-validity. Śaṅkarācārya believes that knowledge
springs up in the mind of a person of itself, accord-
ing to the object of knowledge and according to
the means of knowledge employed.[1] True know-
ledge, which is produced by the means of true
knowledge and which is conformable to its objects,
can neither be brought about by hundreds of in-
junctions nor be checked by hundreds of prohibi-
tions. It does not depend on the will of man, but
merely on what really and unalterably exists.[2]
Vedānta found a great supporter in Mīmāṃsā with
its doctrine of self-validity and self-manifesting
power of knowledge, since the central doctrine of
Vedānta is the self-luminous nature of Brahman,
which is nothing but pure knowledge.

Śaṅkarācārya refers to only three Pramāṇas,
perception, inference and scriptural testimony, but
later writers accept all the six Pramāṇas of Kuma-
rila. They also agreed with Mīmāṃsā generally as
regards the Pramāṇas of inference, scriptural testi-
mony, analogy, implication, and non-apprehension.

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1 " तस्मिन्दर्शिते स्वयमेव यथाविषयं यथाप्रमाणं च ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । "
    Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, III. ii. 21.

2 " ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यं यथाभूतविषयं च न तन्नियोगशतेनापि कारयितुं
   शक्यते । न च प्रतिषेधशतेनापि वारयितुं शक्यते । न हि तत्पुरुषतन्त्रं वस्तु-
   तन्त्रमेव हि तत् । " Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
   III. ii. 21.

Śaṅkarācārya admits the distinction between absolute truth (Paramārtha) and empirical truth (Vyavahāra). The former consists of the right knowledge of Brahman, which is the only absolute truth in the world of appearances. The latter consists of the sphere of relative validity of appearances due to Nescience. In the opinion of Śaṅkarācārya, the Pramāṇas including even the scriptures are valid only with reference to objects dependent on Nescience. The operation of all the Pramāṇas including the scriptural texts whether they are concerned with injunctions or prohibitions or with final release is dependent on the mutual superimposition of Self and non-self, which is termed Nescience.[1] Even though the function of the means of right knowledge is to determine truth or reality, Śaṅkarācārya restricts this truth or reality to the practical sphere of 'Nescience. He argues, that the means of right knowledge are dependent on the knowing personality; and the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses etc. are identical with the Self.[2] As the erroneous superimposition forms the basis of the operation of Pramāṇas, their validity is vouchsafed only with reference to objects that fall

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1 " तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेय-
व्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ता: । सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिनिषेध-
मोक्षपराणि । " Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, In-
troduction.

2 " देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंममाभिमानरहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुप-
पत्ते: । " Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya, In-
troduction.

within the purview of Nescience. Śaṅkarācārya
supports this view by comparing the cognitional
activity of human beings with that of animals, and
thereby he illustrates that the operation of such
Pramāṇas as perception etc. in the case of human
beings is somewhat on the same level as the
animals.[1] Even in the operation of the Pramāṇa
of scriptural testimony, the limits of Nescience are
not crossed, as we see in the activities such as
sacrifices etc., which are based purely on Vedic
injunctions. These Vedic injunctions are appli-
cable only to those who have the erroneous notion
about the false superimposition of the Self and the
non-self. So before true knowledge of Ātman,
Vedic texts continue to operate with reference to
objects dependent on Nescience.[2] Though not
useful in the sphere of supreme reality, there is
room for the scriptural passages which set forth
the distinction of knower and object of knowledge,
for perception and other means of proof, for the
intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for
that part of the scripture which contains injunc-
tions and prohibitions, when they are employed in
the sphere of Nescience.[3] Before true knowledge
springs up, the soul is implicated in the transmi-

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1 " पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात् । " Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-
bhāṣya, Introduction.

2 " प्राक्तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात्प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते । "
Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, Introduction.

3 " ततश्च ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिभेदश्रुतयः प्रत्यक्षादीनि च प्रमाणानि संसारानुभवो
विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रं चेति सर्वमेतदुपपद्यते । " Brahma-sūtra,
Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. ii. 20.

gratory state, and this state constitutes the sphere
of operation of perception and so on.[1] Śankarā-
cārya claims that his view in respect of Pramāṇas
is supported by scriptures which say that percep-
tion and the rest are operative in the sphere of
those who have not reached true knowledge.

In the system of Advaita Vedānta, Pramāṇas
occupy a peculiar position with reference to the
absolute reality. In the realisation of Ātman,
Pramāṇas are only indirectly helpful. According
to Śankarācārya, the function of Pramāṇas which
are all mere processes of ignorance, consists only
in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumina-
tion of Ātman. When the obstructions are re-
moved, Ātman, the Self-luminous consciousness,
becomes manifest by itself.[2] The Pramāṇas have
no function of manifesting the self-luminous con-
sciousness. In the same way, Pramāṇas or means
of knowledge are not necessary for proving the
existence of Self. All means of knowledge exist
only as dependent on self-experience, and such
experience is its own proof.[3] Ātman cannot be
doubted, for it is the essential nature of him who

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1 " प्राक्प्रबोधात्संसारित्वाभ्युपगमात् । तद्विषयत्वाच्च प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहा-
रस्य । " Brahma-sūtra, Śānkara-bhāṣya, IV. i. 3.

2 " न प्रकाश्यं प्रमाणेन प्रकाशो ब्रह्मणः स्वयम् । तज्जन्यावृतिभङ्गत्वात्मने-
वमिति गीयते ॥ " Sarva–darśana-saṅgraha, p. 415.

3 " आत्मा तु प्रमाणादिव्यवहाराश्रयत्वात्प्रागेव प्रमाणादिव्यवहारात्सिध्यति ।
न च ईदृशस्य निराकरणं संभवति । आगन्तुकं हि वस्तु निराक्रियते न
स्वरूपम् । य एव हि निराकर्ता तदेव तस्य स्वरूपम् । " Brahma-
sūtra, Śānkara bhāṣya, II. iii. 7.

denies it:[1] Self is not established through the means of right knowledge, it is self-established.

In the same way it is argued that the Pramāṇas are equally futile in establishing the nature of Nescience. The nature of Nescience cannot be proved by any of the Pramāṇas, for it is like dark-ness and the Pramāṇas are like light and it is impossible to perceive darkness by light.

In the Viśiṣṭādvaita system of Rāmānuja, a Pramāṇa is defined as that by which one can have right knowledge. The ultimate determination of Pramāṇa is through Pramā or right knowledge.

This definition of Pramāṇa is the same as that accepted in the Nyāya system. The followers of Rāmānuja, however, consider that the different members of the collocation of instruments are not equally important in producing the effect, and to this extent they differ from the followers of the Nyāya system. According to Vātsya Śrīnivāsa, a Pramāṇa is the most efficient instrument amongst the collocation of causes forming the immediate, invariable and unconditional antecedents of any right knowledge (Pramā).[2] Thus in the case of perception, for example, the visual organ is a Pramāṇa. The difference between the Nyāya view

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1 " स्वयंसिद्धस्य च साक्षिणोऽप्रत्याख्येयत्वात् । " Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II, ii. 28.

2. S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philoso-phy, Vol. III. p. 203.

and the Rāmānuja view consists in this, that, while Nyāya gives equal importance to all the members of the collocation, the Rāmānuja view distinguishes that only as the instrumental cause, which is directly associated with the active operation (Vyāpāra). Some followers of Śaṅkarācārya like Dharmarājādhvarīndra accept a view very much similar to that of the Rāmānuja school.

The word Pramāṇa can be used in two senses. Firstly it means an instrument by which valid knowledge is produced and secondly it means valid knowledge itself. Pramāṇa as valid knowledge is defined as the knowledge which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are.[1]

Rāmānuja accepts perception, inference and scripture as valid sources of knowledge, and is indifferent about the rest.[2] In the refutation of the Śaṅkarite view of, Māyā, he employs only three Pramāṇas, viz. perception, inference and scriptures.[3] Veṅkaṭanātha, following Rāmānuja, admits only the above three Pramāṇas. Viṣṇumitra also, in his Prameyasaṅgraha, holds that Rāmānuja admitted only three Pramāṇas.[4] Meghanādāri

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1 " यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणम् । " Veṅkaṭanātha : Nyāya-pariśuddhi, p. 36.

2 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 672.

3 Vide Pramāṇānupapatti section of Śrībhāṣya, I.i.1.

4 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III. p. 214, n. 3.

however, holds that Rāmānuja admitted five Pra-
māṇas, viz. perception, inference, analogy, scrip-
ture and implication.

Smṛti or remembrance bears a peculiar posi-
tion in the treatment of Pramāṇas in Rāmānuja's
system. It is not brought under perception. It is
regarded as valid and given a separate place.[1]
Memory satisfies the indispensable condition of
Pramāṇa that it must not depend upon anything
else for its self-manifestation. The definition of
Pramāṇa as knowledge leading to a behaviour
tallying with facts naturally means the inclusion of
valid memory with it. An uncondradicted memory
is thus regarded as valid means of knowledge
according to the Rāmānuja system.[2] In the opinion
of Veṅkaṭnātha, however, memory should not be
classed as an independent source of knowledge,
but it is to be included with the Pramāṇa which is
responsible for memory (i. e. perception).[3]

Rāmānuja believes in the self-validity of
knowledge. According to him, the character of
an experience, indeed, consists in the fact that,
while it lasts, it is luminous solely by means of its

1 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol.
II. p. 673.
2 " स्मृतिमानात्रमाणत्वं न युक्तमिति वक्ष्यते । अबाधिता स्मृतिर्लोके प्रमाण-
स्वपरिजहात् ॥ " Veṅkaṭanātha: Nyāya-pariśuddhi,
p. 38.
3 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philoso-
phy, Vol. III. p. 214.

own existence, to that which constitutes its basis
(i. e. to the Self); or it consists in the fact of its
being the means of proving (the existence of) its
object solely by means of its own existence.[1] Thus
Rāmānuja distinguishes between the two aspects
of knowledge, viz. the one constituting the sub-
stratum, and the other functioning as an attribute.[2]
The first aspect constitutes the nature of the Self
and is called the knower, while the second illumines
the objects in the operation of Pramāṇas. Know-
ledge, in both these aspects, has self—validity,
meaning thereby the manifestation of content not
awaitng the confirmation by any other means of
knowledge. Conviction of validity is manifested
along with the cognition itself. So in the opera-
tion of a Pramāṇa, what constitutes a Pramāṇa
constitutes also its validity. The cognition of a
Pramāṇa involves with it its validity. Thus validity
cannot be dissociated from the cognition of
the objects.

Rāmānuja asserts that all Pramāṇas deal
only with such objects as possess attributes.
According to him, the essential feature of consci-
ousness, is discrimination, and we cannot apprehend
an object without apprehending some special fea-
tures of it. All knowledge consists in the appre-
hension of an object qualified by some specific

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1 " अनुभूतिलं नाम वर्तमानतादशायां स्वसत्तयैव स्वाश्रयं प्रति प्रकाशमान-
त्वम् । स्वसत्तयैव स्वविषयसाधनलं वा । " Rāmānuja : Śrī-
bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

2 Abhyankar : Viśiṣṭādvaitamata (Marathi), p. 12

*quality. So in the opinion of Rāmānuja, those
who maintain the view that there is a thing which
is devoid of attributes, cannot advance any means
to prove such a thing.[1]

The viewpoints of other Bhāṣyakāras about
the nature of Pramāṇas are comparatively simpler
and philosophically less important. Nevertheless
each of them has a special view of his own in
this connection.

Madhva accepts only three means to valid
knowledge (Pramāṇas), viz. perception, inference
and verbal testimony. But over and above these,
he regards valid knowledge itself as being a Pra-
māṇa in the sense that it points directly to a fact
and not in the sense that it is a means to valid
knowledge. He thus makes a distinction between
primary (Kavala-pramāṇa) and secondary (Anu-
pramāṇa) means to the knowing of objects. It is
the latter that are divided in a triple way as per-
ception, inference and verbal testimony.

In philosophical matters Madhva gives no
importance to inference. According to Madhva,
by means of inference one can arrive at conclusions
as one pleases; and thus being indefinite, inference
cannot be accepted as an independent means for

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1 " निर्विशेषवस्तुवादिभिर्निर्विशेषे वस्तुनीदं प्रमाणमिति न शक्यते वक्तुम् ।
सविशेषवस्तुविषयत्वात्सर्वप्रमाणानाम् । "   Rāmānuja : Srī-
bhāṣya, I. i. 1.
Also:— " किञ्च सर्वप्रमाणस्य सविशेषविषयतया निर्विशेषवस्तुनि न
किमपि प्रमाणं समस्ति । " Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 107

the ascertainment of truth.[1]   Its validity is vouch-
safed only when it corroborates the thing conveyed
by scripture.   To support his view Madhva quotes
many texts from authoritative scriptures such as
Kūrma-purāṇa,   Varāha-purāṇa,   Skanda-purāṇa,
Puruṣottama-tantra,   Bṛhatsaṃhitā etc.   The text
from Kūrma- purāṇa states that inference is not an
independent Pramāṇa, since when not supported
by scriptural texts, it is capable of determining
nothing decisively.[2]   The quotation from Varāha-
purāṇa states that without the support of Śruti all
sorts of inferences are possible; but none of them
is capable to grasp the truth without the help of
the former.[3]   The text from Skanda-purāṇa states
that inference may be employed to arrive at con-
clusions as one pleases; so it has no scope outside
the purview of scripture.   Inference may be em-
ployed for reconciling Vedic texts occuring at

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1 " यथाकामं ह्यनुमातुं शक्यते । अतो न तत्त्वे पृथगनुमानमपेक्ष्यते । "
  Brahma-sūtra, Madhva-bhāṣya, I. i. 18.

   Also :—" न चानुमानस्य नियतप्रामाण्यम् । " Brahma-sūtra,
   Madhva-bhāṣya, I. i. 2.
   " न चानुमानस्य स्वातंत्र्येण प्रामाण्यम् । " Sarva-darśana-
   saṅgraha, p. 157.

2 " श्रुतिसाहाय्यरहितमनुमानं न कुत्रचित् ।
   निश्चयात्साधयेदर्थं प्रमाणान्तरमेव च ॥ "   Brahma-sūtra,
   Madhva-bhāṣya, I. i. 2.

3 " सर्वत्र शक्यते कर्तुमागमं तु विनानुमा । तस्मात्स सा शक्तिमती विनाग-
   मनुदीक्षितुम् ॥ इति वाराहे । " Brahma-sūtra, Madhva-
   bhāṣya, I. i 2.

different places; it has very little scope elsewhere.[1] As is quoted from Puruṣottama-tantra, logical reasoning is never accepted as superceding the statement of scripture; it can, however, be of some help if the scriptural texts appear to be contradictory.[2] So logical reasonings cease to be logical if they come in conflict with scriptural texts, as is quoted from Bṛhatsaṃhitā.[3]

• For the realisation of Brahman, however, scripture is the only means. Perception has no scope in that respect.

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As regards the self-validity of knowledge, the views of Madhva are similar to those of Rāmānuja.[4]

The followers of Nimbārka admit only three, viz. perception, inference, and scripture out of the eight Pramāṇas. Of these only scripture is the means to attain the knowledge of Brahman; and it should not be considered that Brahman is incapable of being the object of knowledge through

1 " उक्तं च स्कान्दे– यथाकामानुमा यस्मात्तस्मात् सानपगा श्रुते: । पूर्वापरा-विरोधाय चेष्यते नान्यथा क्वचित् ॥ " Brahma-sūtra, Madhva-bhāṣya, I. i. 18.

2 " यद्वाक्योक्तं न तद् युक्तिविरोद्धं धाक्नुयात्क्वचित् । विरोधे वाक्ययो: क्वापि किंचित्साहाय्यकारणम् ॥ – इति पुरुषोत्तमतन्त्रे । " Brahma-sūtra, Madhva-bhāṣya, II. i. 27.

3 " विरोध एव वाक्यानां युक्तयो न तु युक्तय: । इति बृहत्संहितायाम् । " Brahma-sūtra, Madhva-bhāṣya, II. i. 25.

4 Vide — Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 128.

scriptural texts as the means.[1] Brahman cannot
be apprehended by perception, since ordinary
organs of sense are incapable of grasping it.[2]
Inference etc. as a means for the apprehension of
Brahman are incapable of being even thought of,
since Brahman is too subtle.[3]

Right knowledge is regarded by Nimbārka
as a characteristic quality of the Self and the pro-
duction of knowledge does not need the interven-
tion of Vṛtti.[4] The Self is of the nature of pure
consciousness, yet it is regarded as the real
knower.[5] The followers of Nimbārka admit the
self–validity of the Pramāṇas in the manner of the
Śaṅkarites.[6]

Vallabha admits all Pramāṇas. According

1 " ननु प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविषयत्ववच्छब्दप्रमाणाविषयत्वस्यापि श्रुतिसिद्धत्वाश्च
शास्त्रैकप्रमेयं ब्रह्मेति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः । जिज्ञास्यं ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकमेव नान्य-
प्रमाणकम्। " Brahma-sūtra, Nimbārka-bhāṣya,I i. 4.
Also:— " वेदैकप्रमाणमेव ब्रह्मेति सिद्धान्तः । " Śrīnivāsa :
Vedānta-kaustubha, I. i. 3.

2 " न च प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणगम्यं ब्रह्म, तद्ग्रहणे हि साधारणानामिन्द्रियाणाम-
सामर्थ्यात् । " Śrīnivāsa : Vedānta-kaustubha, I. i. 3.

3 " किंच सर्वज्ञैर्मन्नैः ऋषिभिश्च साकल्येन सर्वथाऽगम्यं दुर्बोधमचिन्त्यानन्त-
गुणशक्त्यादिमज्जगत्कारण ब्रह्मानुमानादिवेद्यमिति कोऽनुन्मत्तो ब्रूयात् । "
Śrīnivāsa : Vedānta-kaustubha, I. i. 3.

4 " जीवतज्ज्ञानयोर्ज्ञानत्वाविशेषेऽपि धर्मधर्मिभावो युक्त एव ⌈ "
Brahma-sūtra, Nimbārka-bhāṣya, II. iii. 27.

5 " अहमर्थभूत आत्मा ज्ञाता भवति । " Brahma–sūtra, Nim-
bārka–bhāṣya, II. iii. 18.

6 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philoso-
phy, Vol. III. p. 428.

to him, however, scripture is the main Pramāṇa.
Others are admitted so long as they do not come
in conflict with scripture. Veda is the only Pra-
māṇa, which is self-valid.[1] Other means of know-
ledge such as perception etc. are dependent on
others for their validity; they are not independently
valid.[2] Vallabha believes that every letter of the
Veda is authoritative. In this respet he surpasses
even the staunch followers of the Mīmāṃsā. In
the Mīmāṃsā some portions of the Veda are con-
sidered to possess metaphorical sense. But Valla-
bha does not subscribe to the view.[3] According to
him whatever is conveyed by the Veda must be
considered to be literally true, lest the faith in all
the portions of the scripture might be undermined.[4]
Especially in grasping a subtle thing like the
nature of Brahman etc. scripture is the only means.

In scripture Vallabha includes Bhagavad-
gītā, Brahma-sūtra and Bhāgavata along with
the Vedas.[5]

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1 " अतो निरपेक्षा एव भगवन्निःश्वासरूपवेदा एव प्रमाणम् । "
   Vallabha : Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.
2 " चक्षुरादीनां प्रामाण्यमन्यमुखनिरिक्षकत्वेन । न स्वतः । "
   Vallabha : Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.
3 Aṇu-bhāṣya of Vallabhācārya with Bālabodhinī,
   Part II, Sanskrit Introduction by Pathak, p. 49.
4 " वेदश्च परमाप्तोऽक्षरमात्रमपि अन्यथा न वदति । अन्यथा सर्वत्रैव तद-
   विश्वासप्रसङ्गात् । " Vallabha: Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 2.
5 " वेदाः श्रीकृष्णवाक्यानि व्याससूत्राणि चैव हि । समाधिभाषा व्यासस्य
   प्रमाणं तच्चतुष्टयम् । " Vallabha : Tattvadīpa-
   nibandha I. 7.

The Pratyakṣa.

Of the Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣi is the first. Most of the systems of Indian philosophy have spared no pains to analyse its nature in detail.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, Pratyakṣa generally means sense-perception, which is the etymological meaning of the word. Gautama defines Pratyakṣa as the knowledge which arises from the contact of sense-organ with its object inexpressible by words, unerring and well-defined.[1] Annambhaṭṭa defines it as the knowledge born of the contact of the organ with an external object. The means of such a knowledge is Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa.[2] Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable condition of all perceptions. Not only can the senses be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals associated with them but also with negation. The definition of perception assumes the contact of the Self and the mind, which is present in all cognitions and the contact of the mind and the senses. So the distinguishing feature of the Pratyakṣa is sense-object contact, which is specified in the

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1 " इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् । " Nyāya-sūtra, I. i. 4.

2 " प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 29.

definition. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the contact of the senses with the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual.

The operation of the mind is necessary in every act of perception. It is a pre-condition of perception. The mind mediates between the Self and the senses. The actual process of perception is usually described as follows:—

The Self comes in contact with the mind; the mind with the senses; and the senses with the object, when, if certain external conditions like the presence of sufficient light are satisfied, perception takes place.[1] As soon as the sense is in contact with the object, the mind comes with lightning speed to reach the sense. The mind being atomic can come in contact with only one sense, and this accounts for the non-simultaneity of different perceptions.

The manas or mind is a sense-organ. It is called internal organ (Antaḥ-karaṇa). The five external organs are physical in nature and each can apprehend the physical quality with which it is constituted. Manas, the internal organ, however, perceives such qualities of the soul as desire, aversion, striving, pleasure, pain and cognition.

Perception is divided into two kinds, viz.

1 " तदुत्पत्तिप्रकारस्तु आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेन । ततः प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya I. i. 4. Also— Tarkabhāṣā, p. 27.

Nirvīkalpa or the indeterminate and Savikalpa or
the determinate. These two are really the modes
of perception. Indeterminate perception is the
cognition of an object without its qualifications,
while determinate perception comprehends the
relation of the qualified and the qualifications such
as name and class.[1] The distinct knowledge
of the genus, the differentia, and their union is
absent in indeterminate perception, while the deter-
minate perception implies a knowledge of the
genus to which the perceived object belongs, of the
specific qualities which distinguish the individual
object from the other members of the same class
and the union of the two. Thus indeterminate
perception is simple apprehension while the deter-
minate is perceptual judgment.[2] Indeterminate
perception is the first stage in the process of per-
ception. After the indeterminate stage is just
passed, determinate perception takes place. There
cannot be any Savikalpa perception of an object
without a previous Nirvikalpa perception of it.

Along with the Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa
perception, Pratyabhijñā or recognition is accepted
as the third mode of perception.

The definition of perception as a cognition

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1 " तत्र निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं यथेदं किंचित् । सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सवि-
कल्पकं यथा डित्थोऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं श्यामोऽयमिति । " Tarka-
saṅgraha, p. 29.

2 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol.
II. p. 58.

due to the stimulation of the sense-organs by the
perceived object was accepted in the older Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika system. The later Naiyāyikas, however,
objected to this definition of Pratyakṣa, which
restricted it to sense-perception. Their objection
was chiefly based on the perception of God, which
takes place without the help of senses, and the
mental states like the feelings of pleasure and pain
which are cognised without the help of senses. So
they extended the application of the word Pra-
tyakṣa to cover all immediate apprehension whe-
ther through the aid of the senses or not. So
Pratyakṣa is defined as knowledge which does not
presuppose other knowledge.[1] It is knowledge
whose instrumental cause is not knowledge. As in
all Pratyakṣa cognitions the feeling of directness or
immediacy is present, it is also defined as direct
apprehension.[2] Pratyakṣa is thus synonymous
with intuition.

Another classification divides perception
into two kinds, viz. Laukika or ordinary and
Alaukika or extraordinary. Ordinary perception
is the sense-perception as described. The extra-
ordinary perception is subdivided into three kinds,
viz. Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa or perception of classes,
Jñāna-lakṣaṇa or synthesis of sense data technically
called 'complication', and Yogaja or intuitive per-
ception of Yogins. Since all the individuals of a

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1 " ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षसाधारणं लक्षणं तु ज्ञानाकरणम् । "   Nyāya-
  bodhini on Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 30.

2 " साक्षात्कारिप्रमाकरणम् । " Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 27.

class cannot be present to our senses the know-
ledge of the whole class is said to be given by the
extraordinary perception called Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa.
Jñāna-lakṣaṇa perception is a process by which
perceptions of different senses become so closely
associated as to become integral parts of a single
perception. The third kind is the intuitive per-
ception of all objects by one who possesses super-
natural power generated by devout meditation.

The general structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
theory of perception finds place in other systems of
Indian philosophy, though with certain modifica-
tions to suit their principal tenets.

The Sāṅkhya system has its special theory
as regards the operation of this means of know-
ledge. In Pratyakṣa, Buddhi (intellect), Ahaṅkāra
(self-sense) Manas (mind) and the senses consti-
tute the apparatus by means of which the external
object is apprehended by the subject. When an
object excites the senses, the Manas arranges the
sense impressions into a percept, the self-sense
refers it to the self, and the Buddhi forms the
concept.[1] When through the sense-organ Buddhi
comes in contact with the external object and is
affected by it, it assumes the form of that object.
The force of consciousness, reflected in Buddhi

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1 " तथा बाह्येन्द्रियाण्यालोच्य मनसे समर्पयन्ति, मनश्च सङ्कल्प्याहङ्कराय,
अहङ्कारश्चाभिमत्य बद्धौ सर्वाभ्यक्षभूतायां – तदिदमुक्तम्- " पुरुषस्यार्थं
प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति " इति ।　Vācaspati Miśra :
Tattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhya-kārikā, p. 52.

thus modified, imitates the modification of Buddhi and that is apprehension. Thus in the Sāṅkhya theory, the modification of Buddhi through the senses, instead of sense-object contact, is the pre-condition of perception.

The Yoga theory of perception is akin to that of the Sāṅkhya. The Yoga also accepts the mental modification by the stimulus of the object and the reality of external objects.

Both the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga accept the two modes of perception, viz. Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa. The object first impresses one or other of the senses, and the knowledge that arises is quite vague and general. It is bare awareness and marks the Nirvikalpa stage. It becomes properly explicated later when interpreted by the Manas, and is therefore termed Savikalpa.[1] The Sāṅkhya-Yoga theory of perception as affected by means of a psychic sign and that about the nature of indeterminate and determinate perception are unlike those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

The Mīmāṃsā accepts generally the Nyāya theory of perception. According to it, perception is the means of immediate knowledge; and in it we

1 " अस्ति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
   बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं मुग्धवस्तुजम् ॥
   ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया ।
   बुद्ध्याऽवसीयते साऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ॥ "

   Vācaspati Miśra : Tattva-kaumudi, p. 46.

have the contact of sense-organ and the object and its qualities, Manas and the sense-organ and the Self and Manas.[1] The Mīmāṃsā accepts sense-contact as a condition of perceptive knowledge, and yet holds its doctrine of self-validity of knowledge. According to the Prabhākara school, in perception the rise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us as original, undivided, immediate and first-hand; the contact of senses with the objects is later on imagined to be the conditioning factor. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also prefers the view that the senses actually come in contact with their objects.[2]

Mental perception by which we become cognisant of pleasure, pain and the like, is admitted by the Mīmāṃsā.

Perception relates to objects that exist, i. e. are perceptible by senses. It cannot apprehend supersensuous objects. The Mīmāṃsā does not recognise what is described as Yogaja or transcendental perception.[3]

Mīmāṃsakas adopt the distinction of Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa perceptions. They are consi-

1 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 380.
2 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 378.
3 M. Hiriyanna : The essentials of Indian Philosophy, p. 137.

dered as two stages of perception. The Mīmāṃsā theory, however, is slightly different from that of Nyāya. Both Kumārila and Prabhākara think that both the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because we do not remember other things in relation to the percept.

In the system of Śaṅkarācārya, knowledge is divided into two kinds, viz. mediate (Parokṣa) and immediate (Aparokṣa). Pratyakṣa, which literally means 'presented to a sense' is sensory perception in its strictest sense, and thus it is only a kind of Aprokṣa knowledge. In Kavalādvaita, knowledge which gives the object directly is not equated with sensory perception, and there may be immediate knowledge not involving sense-perception.[1] We, however, find the word Pratyakṣa used in the wider sense of Aparokṣa knowledge, and thus it also means intuition or immediate knowledge not involving sense-perception. Śaṅkarācārya himself uses the word Pratyakṣa in its wider sense, when he says, " That fruit is moreover apprehended by intuition, for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, 'that thou art', a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non-transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him."[2] Thus the

1 M. Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 345.

2 " प्रत्यक्षावगमं चेदं फलम् । 'तत्वमसि' इत्यसंसायांत्मत्वप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां संसायांत्मत्वव्यावृत्तेः । " Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. iv. 14.

defining feature of perception is not the mediation of a sense-organ, but the identity between the consciousness particularised by the object and that belonging to the Pramāṇa.[1] Perceptions of outside objects are caused by the exercise of the senses, while inner perceptions of desire etc. are not caused by sense-activity.

In this system, theory of perception is moulded to suit its central conception of monism. According to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the process of perception is detailed as follows:—[2]

The inner organ stands in the middle of the body and pervades the whole body. It is pellucid like mirror When the cognizable things like the pot etc. are to be cognized, this inner organ comes out of the body through an outer organ like the eye and pervading the whole object assumes the form of that particular object. It extends at the time of assuming the form of the object of perception from the interior of the body to the external object and stands undivided between the body and the external object like the eye itself. The inner organ is thus divided into three parts, the first remaining in the body, the second extending to the object, and the third pervading the object. Being very pellucid, the inner organ consisting of

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1 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 489.

2 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī : Siddhānta-bindu, p. 132. f.

these three parts has the reflection of the consci-
ousness made manifest in it. The aspect of con-
sciousness limited by the first part of the inner
organ is called Pramātṛ, that limited by the second
part is called Pramāṇa, the means of perception,
and that limited by the third is called Pramiti or
perceptive knowledge.

Even in forms of Pratyakṣa other than sen-
sory perception, the identity of the subject con-
sciousness with the object consciousness is consi-
dered to be a condition for immediate knowledge.

Thus, according to the Advaita system, in
perception the mind comes in contact with the
external objects and becomes transformed as it
were into their forms. This transformation of the
mind (Vṛtti) removes the ignorance with reference
to that object and thereupon the steady light of
the pure consciousness (Cit) shows the object
which was so long hidden by ignorance.[1] So in
sense-perception there is actual contact between
the percipient and the object of perception. As
the internal organ goes out towards the object
and gets itself determined by it, the existence of
the object previous to the appearance of knowledge
becomes necessary. In the refutation of Buddhist
idealism, Śaṅkarācārya remarks that the non-exis-
tence of external things cannot be maintained,

1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy,
   Vol. I. p. 472.

because we are conscious of them.[1] Maintaining
that the external objects are, according to their
natures, apprehended by all means of knowledge,
he asks how it can be maintained that they are not
possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as
that about their difference or non-difference (from
atoms).[2] Thus Śaṅkarācārya accepts the reality
of outside objects on the practical plane, though,
according to him, from the transcendental point
of view everything except Brahman is only an
appearance.[3]

This empirical world, though only an appea-
rance in the transcendental sense, is distinguished
from dreams and illusions by Śaṅkarācārya. The
dreams are not real like the objects in the empiri-
cal word, since they do not fulfil the conditions
place, time and cause, and the circumstance of
non-refutation. All these have their sphere in real
things, but cannot be applied to dreams.[4] As

1 " न खल्वभावो बाह्यस्यार्थस्याध्यवसातुं शक्यते । कस्मात् । उपलब्धे: । "
Brahma-sūtra Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 28.

2 " इह तु यथास्वं सर्वैरेव प्रमाणैर्बाह्योऽर्थ उपलभ्यमान: कथं व्यतिरेकाव्य-
तिरेकादिविकल्पैर्नं संभवतीत्युच्येतोपलब्धेरेव । " Brahma-sūtra
Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 28.

3 " न च वियदादिसर्गस्याप्यात्यन्तिकं सत्यत्वमस्ति । प्रतिपादितं हि ' तद-
न्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य: ' इत्यत्र समस्तस्य प्रपंचस्य मायामात्रत्वम् । "
Brahma-sūtra Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, III. ii. 4.
Also:— " सर्वव्यवहाराणामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात्सत्यत्वोपपत्ते: । "
Brahma-sūtra Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, II. i. 14.

4 " नहि परमार्थवस्तुविषयाणि देशकालनिमित्तान्यबाधश्च स्वप्ने संभा-
व्यन्ते । " Brahma-sūtra Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, III. ii. 3.

compared with dreams, the empirical world is said
to be real, because it remains fixed and distinct.
It is so upto the moment when the soul cognizes
that Brahman is the Self of all. The world of
dreams on the other hand is daily sublated by the
waking state.[1] In the same way illusions also are
sublated,[2] and hence they are unreal. In the
opinion of Śaṅkarācārya, dream consciousness is
a form of memory[3] and {therefore different from
ordinary perceptual states. In that condition, the
soul is modified by the impressions which the
external objects have left and so it sees dreams.[4]
As compared with the ordinary perception, the
cognition of dreams is only an apparent perception.
The dreaming man, who sees manifold things, is
however, convinced upto the moment of waking
that his ideas are produced by real perception with-
out suspecting the perception to be merely an
apparent one.[5] Even though the perceptual con-

1 " प्राक्तु ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शनाद्विषदादिप्रपंचो व्यवस्थितरूपो भवति । संध्या-
श्रयस्तु प्रपंच: प्रतिदिनं बाध्यत इति । " Brahma-sūtra
Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, III. ii. 2.

2 " एवं मायादिष्वपि भवति यथायथं बाध: । " Brahma-sūtra
Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 29.

3 " स्मृतिरेषा यत्स्वप्नदर्शनम् । " Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-
bhāṣya, II. ii. 29.

4 "तद्वासनाविशिष्ट: स्वप्नान्पश्यन्मन:शब्दवाच्यो भवति । " Brahma-
sūtra Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 9.

5 " सुप्तस्य जनस्य प्राकृतस्य स्वप्न उच्चावचान्भावान्पश्यतो निश्चितमेव
प्रत्यक्षाभिमतं विज्ञानं भवति प्राक्प्रबोधात्, न च प्रत्यक्षाभासाभिप्रायस्त-
त्काले भवति । " Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
II. i. 14.

tent of the dream is illusory, its cognition is never-
theless real.[1] Thus Śaṅkarācārya connects dream
consciousness with that of the waking state, and
asserts that certain dreams predict auspicious or
inauspicious events.[2] The analysis of dreams'in
this way lends support to his main thesis about the
unreality of the empirical world, and also to the
plausibility of knowing Reality with the help of
an unreal means of knowledge like the Vedic texts.

As Śaṅkarācārya accepts Pratyakṣa in its
wider sense of immediate knowledge, and does not
restrict it to sensory perception, it is but proper
that he does not consider body to be the necessary
condition for it. Perception as conceived here is
the communion of the subject consciousness and
the object consciousness. For that body is merely
auxiliary and not 'indispensable. He asserts that
the fact that perception takes place when there is
a body, and does not take place when there is
none, does not imply that it is an attribute of the
body. Nor is it even true that the body is absolu-
tely required as an auxiliary of perception; for in
the state of dream we have manifold perceptions
while the body lies motionless.[3]

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1 " तथापि तदवगतिः सत्यमेव फलम् । " Brahma-sūtra
    Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. i. 14.

2 " प्रसिद्धं चेदं लोकेऽन्वयव्यतिरेककुशलानामीदृशेन स्वप्नदर्शनेन साध्वागमः
    सूच्यते ईदृशेनासाध्वागम इति । " Brahma–sūtra Śaṅkara-
    bhāṣya, II. i. 14.

3 " एवं सति देहे उपलब्धिर्भवत्यसति च न भवतीति न देहधर्मो भवितुमर्हति ।
    …..न चात्यन्तं देहस्योपलब्धावुपयोगोऽपि दृश्यते निश्चेष्टेऽप्यस्मिन्देहे स्वप्नं
    नानाविधोपलब्धिदर्शनात् । " Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-
    bhāṣya, III. iii. 54.

In .this system, the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception is admitted. In Nirvikalpa or indeterminate perception all determining attributes are left out of view, and mere being exclusive of all predicates is apprehended. In Savikalpa or determinate perception we have the distinction between the thing and its determining attribute i. e. class characteristic. In the opinion of Śaṅkaiācārya, the supreme Reality is devoid of all attributes, and it is realised by immediate knowledge. His conception of Nirvikalpa perception is in consonance with his principal doctrine of Nirvikalpa Brahman. In the realisation of the identity of the Self and Brahman from such Vedic texts as ' That thou art ' no difference remains between the subject and the object consciousness. We grasp the meaning of the proposition without apprehending the relation between the different parts.[1]

Śaṅkarācārya has not discussed the psychology of perception in detail, and we have often to depend on the views of his followers in this respect. Nevertheless he has employed the Pratyakṣi Pramāṇa to a considerable extent in his Bhāṣya. As mentioned before, in the course of Vāda, Pramāṇas can be used either independently or as parts of formal syllogisms. In the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya we find Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa used in both these ways.

Śaṅkarācārya has independently employed

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1 Vide Brahma–sūtra Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, IV. i. 2.

perception as means to prove certain important propositions of his system. For instance, he mainly depends upon perceptions such as " I do not know, or I do not know myself or .any body else ", for the proof of the nature of Ajñāna. As directly experienced in such perceptions Ajñāna is accepted as neither positive nor negative. According to him the perception of Ajñāna is the perception of the indefinite.

The analysis of the condition of deep sleep renders considerable data for the proof of the nature of Ajñāna by means of perception. The cognition, " I was sleeping long and did not know anything" refers to the perception of the indefinite Ajñāna during sleep. It is perceived in direct and immediate consciousness.

While discussing about the condition of sleep, Śaṅkarācārya refers to the end of sense-modification, though the life breaths are functioning. The Pramāṇa adduced by him to prove this is Pratyakṣa.[1]

The proof for the universality of Adhyāsa is its direct and immediate perception. The beginningless and endless natural superimposition, of the nature of illusory cognition, which causes agency, enjoyership etc., is, according to Śaṅkarā-

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1 " प्रत्यक्षं चैतस्वापकाले प्राणवृत्तावपरिलुप्यमानायामिन्द्रियवृत्तयः परिलुप्यन्ते प्रबोधकाले च प्रादुर्भवन्ति । " Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 23.

cārya, directly experienced by the entire world.[1]
Commenting on this statement Govindānanda re-
marks, that the direct and immediate perception
by the Sākṣin is the means for the cognition of the
entity called Adhyāsa; purporting thereby that the
other means as inference etc. are useful only for
corroboration.[2]

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita system of
Rāmānuja, knowledge directly and immediately
experienced is perception. The means to such
knowledge is Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa.

In perception, the subsidiary or attributive
consciousness (Dharmabhūta-jñāna) operates
through Manas as assisted by some organ of sense
through which it streams out towards its objects
which are already there. Rāmānuja describes the
process of knowing as starting from the soul, then
reaching the Manas, and then emerging through
the senses, meeting the outside objects. When
thus it comes into contact with an object, it assumes
the form of that object and reveals it. The logical
implication of this process of knowing is this, that
since objects are viewed as existing before they are
known, and since they depend in no way upon the

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1 " अध्यमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्व-
प्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः । " Brahma-sūtra Śāṅkara-
bhāṣya, Introduction.

2 " साक्षिप्रत्यक्षमेवाध्यासधर्मिग्राहकं मानं, अनुमानादिकं तु संभावनार्थमि-
त्यभिप्रेत्य प्रत्यक्षोपसंहारः कृतः । " Bhāṣya-ratnaprabhā
on Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, p. 25-26.

Self or the knowledge which brings them into rela-
tion with it, their reality is not relative but absolute.
Thus Rāmānuja is a staunch realist.

Perception has for its object what is distin-
guished by difference, since all knowledge, accord-
ing to Rāmānuja, points to a complex or qualified
object. Perception is of two kinds, viz. Nirvikalpa
or indeterminate and Savikalpa or determinate.[1]
A perception, which reveals the specific character
of its object without involving any direct reference
to its past associations, is called indeterminate per-
ception. It consists of the perceptual experience
when the object is cognized for the first time.[2]
Determinate perception involves a spatial and
temporal reference to past time and different places
where the object was experienced before. The
difference between the two consists in this that, in
indeterminate perception, though we apprehend
the class character of an individual object, we are
not aware that it is common to the individuals
belonging to the class; while in the determinate
perception we recognize the generic character as
common to the whole class.[3] Indeterminate per-

1 " प्रत्यक्षस्य निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदभिन्नस्य न निर्विशेषवस्तुनि प्रमाण-
   भाव: । " Rāmānuja : Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 27.

2 " अतो निर्विकल्पकमेकजातीयद्रव्येषु प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणम् । " Rāmā-
   nuja : Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 28.

3 " तत्र प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणे गोत्वादेरनुवृत्ताकारता न प्रतीयते । द्वितीयादिपिण्ड-
   ग्रहणेष्वेवानुवृत्तिप्रतीति: । " Rāmānuja : Śrī-bhāṣya,
   I. i. 1, p. 28.

ception does not involve a reference to past associa-
tions of similar things, while determinate perception
involves a reference to past association.

Rāmānuja's conception of Nirvikalpa and
Savikalpa perceptions is peculiar and deserves to
be distinguished from that accepted by other
systems of philosophy. According to Rāmānuja,
indeterminate perception is neither the apprehen-
sion of an absolutely undifferentiated object[1] or
pure being, nor the apprehension of a qualified
object and its qualifications unrelated to one
another. The psychological development involved
from the indeterminate to determinate perception
is not from the simple to the complex as in the
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣ.ka; but the complex itself, hitherto
new, ceases to be so and becomes familiar.

Savikalpa perception is distinct from Pratya-
bhijñā or recognition, even though they are similar
in some respect. In both alike a present object is
associated with the revival of a past impression;
but while in Savikalpa it is only the impression of
the attributive element that revives, in recognition
that of the particular individual also does. More-
over, recognition includes a specific reference to
the distinctions of time and place in which the
object is cognised on the two occasions.

Savikalpa perception is to be distinguished

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3 " निर्विकल्पकमपि सविशेषविषयमेव । " Rāmānuja : Śrī-bhā-
ṣya, I. i. 1, p. 27.

from memory by the fact that memory is produced
only by the rousing of the subconscious impressions
(Saṃskāras) of the mind, whereas Savikalpa
perception is produced by the subconscious impres-
sions working in association with the sense organs.

Perception is said to be of three kinds, viz.
God's perception, perception of Yogins[1] and per-
ception of ordinary persons. Rāmānuja, in his
commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, mentions intui-
tive Yogic knowledge as a separate source of
knowledge.[2] Veṅkaṭanātha holds that intuitive
Yogic knowledge should be included under percep-
tion and its separate mention is due to the fact
that Yogic perception reveals a special aspect of
perception.

Rāmānujācārya does not subscribe to the
Śaṅkarite view that indefinite ignorance is perceived
in such cognitions as 'I am ignorant, I do not know
myself, nor do I know another.'[3] He strongly
refutes the perception of any positive entity as
Avidyā, by arguing that so far as the internal Self
is concerned, there can be no difference between
the ignorance that is a mere non-existence and the

1 Rāmānuja refers to Yogic perception in his
  Śrī-bhāṣya. Vide— " स्मरणानुमानागमयोगिप्रत्यक्षादिषु काला-
  न्तरवतिनोऽपि ग्रहणदर्शनात् । " Śrī–bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 34.

2 " ज्ञानमिन्द्रियलिङ्गागमयोगजो वस्तुनिश्चय: । " Śrīmad-bhaga-
  vadgītā, Rāmānuja-bhāṣya, XV. 15.

3 " अहमज्ञो मामन्यं च न जानामित्यत्रोपपत्तिसहितेन केवलेन च प्रत्यक्षेण न
  भावरूपमज्ञानं प्रतीयते । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 86.

other ignorance which has the nature of a positive entity as is supposed by the Advaitin. In these cognitions, what is experienced is only the ignorance, which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge.[1] It is also pointed out that Brahman cannot be the witness of any kind of Avidyā, since the essential nature of Brahman is absolute self-revealing knowledge.[2] The concealment of Brahman by ignorance is also impossible. Thus according to Rāmānuja, the Avidyā as is postulated by the Advaitin cannot be proved by perception.

Rāmānuja, who holds that Brahman cannot be grasped by any other Pramāṇa except scripture, emphatically refutes the claim of Pratyakṣa for revealing Brahman. Pratyakṣa, whether it is sensory perception or introspective perception of the Yogins, is not capable of apprehending Brahman. The sensory perception is incapable because the senses cannot come in contact with the Lord, who is capable of directly perceiving all things, and is also capable of bringing them into existence.[8] Even if it is internal it can only apprehend pleasure, pain and so on, and is unable to reveal

1 " ज्ञानप्रागभाव एवाहमज्ञो मामन्यं च न जानामीत्यनुभूयत इत्यभ्युपगन्त-व्यम् । " Rāmānuja : Śri-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 86.

2 " नित्यमुक्तस्वप्रकाशचैतन्यैकस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानानुभवश्च न संभवति । स्वानुभवस्वरूपत्वात् । " Rāmānuja : Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

3 " बाह्येन्द्रियाणि विद्यमानसन्निकर्षयोग्यस्वविषयबोधजनकानीति न सर्वार्थ-साक्षात्कारनिर्माणसमर्थपरमपुरुषविशेषविषयबोधकानि । " Rāmānuja : Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

anything else without the help of sense-organs.[1]
The Yogic perception, which results from utmost
intensification of mental conception, is nothing
other than the mere remembrance of previously
experienced things; and it is therefore no separate
means of proof. So even that is not capable of
revealing Brahman.[2]

According to Madhvācārya, perception by
itself cannot help us to solve the riddle of the
universe. We must depend on scripture for the
realisation of right knowledge. Quoting from
Puruṣottama-tantra, Madhva says that the best
means of right knowledge is intuition based on
scripture, scripture alone comes next in importance,
and ordinary perception is to be reckoned as the
least in importance.[3]

In perception the senses are instumental in
knowing. They are reckoned as seven including
Manas and Sākṣin. The conception of Sākṣin is a
distinctive feature of the Dvaita system. The
sentience of the individual Self is taken to be
Sākṣin. The individual Self not only finally knows

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1 " नाप्यान्तरम् । सुखादिव्यतिरिक्तबहिर्विषयेषु तस्य बाह्येन्द्रियानपेक्षप्रवृत्य-
नुपपत्ते: । " Rāmānuja : Śrī-bhāṣya I. i. 3.

2 " नापि योगजन्यम् । भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजन्मनस्तस्य विशदावभासत्वेऽपि
पूर्वानुमतविषयस्मृतिमात्रत्वाच्च प्रामाण्यम् । " Rāmānuja : Śrī-
bhāṣya, I. i.3.

3 " शास्त्रार्थयुक्तोऽनुभव: प्रमाणं तूत्तमं मतम् ।
मध्यमं त्वागमो ज्ञेय: प्रत्यक्षमधमं स्मृतम् ॥ "
Brahma-sūtra Madhva-bhāṣya, II. i. 17.

things presented through one or other of the senses, but it can also know directly, being of the nature of sentience. The knowledge gained through this means is regarded as invariably correct. Some things like one's own Self, pain, pleasure, time and space are thus directly known; all else through one or other of the remaining senses. According to Madhva, the Self knows itself by itself. Thus the internal organ serves merely as a general aid in knowing. It is, however, an aid by itself only in respect of recollection.

● According to the system of Nimbārka perception is of two kinds external and internal. The external perception consists of the sensory perception of external objects. Nimbārka accepts the real existence of external objects for the proof of which he chiefly depends on perception as the means.[1] According to him, the theories of Buddhist idealists and of Śūnyavādins are refuted on the score of Pratyakṣa as the chief means of proof.[2]

In external perception the knowledge in each individual, by the modification of the mind, reaches the senses, and again through their modification

1 '७ एतदिव्यनेन सर्वनाम्ना प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धस्य जगत उपस्थितत्वाञ्च । "
Brahma-sūtra Nimbārka-bhāṣya, I. iv. 16.

2 " विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तस्य बाह्यार्थस्य प्रत्यक्षत उपलब्धे: । " Vedānta-kaustubha on Nimbārka-bhāṣya, p. 200.
·Also:— " वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां सर्वस्य जगत: सत्यत्वेनोपलभ्भात् । "
ibid, p. 202.

reaches the object and illuminates both the object and the knowledge. The objects are manifested through their association with knowledge and remain unmanifested without it.

The internal or the mental perception is of two kinds, ordinary (Laukika) and transcendent (Alaukika). In the case of internal perception the operation of the senses is not required, and so pleasure and pain are directly perceived by the mind. In the perception of the Self, the Self being self-luminous, the mental direction to the Self reveals its nature.

Nimbārka asserts that Brahman cannot be grasped by sensory perception, since ordinary senses are incapable of apprehending it. Scripture is the only means for the knowledge of Brahman. He, however, accepts that in the liberated condition the soul intuitively experiences indentity with the Divinity, which is not contradictory to distinction.[1] The scriptural reference that the ultimate truth cannot be perceived by the mind means either that the ultimate truth in its entirety cannot be perceived by the mind or that unless the mind is duly trained by a teacher or by the formation of right tendencies it cannot have a glimpse of the transcendent realities.

1 " मुक्त: परस्मादात्मानं भागाविरोधिनाऽविभागेनानुभवति, तस्वस्य तदा-
नीमपरोक्षतो दृष्टत्वात् । " Brahma-sūtra Nimbārka-
bhāṣya, IV. iv. 4.

Vallabhācārya does not restrict Pratyakṣa to the sensory perception. He includes in it all kinds of immediate knowledge. Thus the intuitive knowledge of the Deity is also a kind of Pratyakṣa, since it is immediate.

Ordinary perception is considered to be a Pramāṇa only conditionally and not independently. When it is endowed with the Sattva quality, then only it is to be considered as valid. If it is consi-dered as means of valid knowledge independently, illusions cannot be explained.[1]

Vallabhācārya believes in the reality of the external world. According to him the world is as real as Brahman, since they are identical. The world is an embodiment of the existence of Brahman. Brahman is not only the creator of the universe but universe itself. Though Brahman in himself is not known, he becomes known when he manifests himself through the world. That is why it is said that Brahman is manifest only through his own accord [2] Vallabhācārya supports his view about the reality of the external world by Pra-tyakṣa Pramāṇa.[3]

1 " चक्षुरादीनां प्रामाण्यमन्यमुखनिरीक्षकत्वेन । न स्वतः । भ्रमानुत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्गात् । सत्त्वसहितानामेब चक्षुरादीनां प्रामाण्यात् । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

2 " ततश्च प्रमाणबलेनाविषयः । स्वेच्छया विषयत्वेत्युक्तम् । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

3 " अस्य प्रपंचस्य नाभावः । उपलब्धेः । उपलभ्यते हि प्रपंचः । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, II. ii. 28.

Vallabhācārya believes that the Advaita assumption that an authoritative verbal testimony can become the cause of an immediate apprehension as in the illustration, 'Thou art the tenth,' is wrong. In this instance the tenth man knows himself to be the tenth by perception, since all the requirements of perception as his body etc. are fully available.[1] Hence verbal testimony has nothing to do in the case of this apprehension. According to Vallabhācārya intuitive knowledge dependent on verbal testimony amounts to a mixture of Pramāṇas and hence inadmissible.[2]

In the view of Vallabhācārya, Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa is relegated to an unimportant position, since he being a staunch follower of the Mīmāṃsā mainly depends on scripture for the support of his views.

The word Pratyakṣa, either independently or along with the word Anumāna, occurs four times in the text of the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.[3] The interpretation of these words on the part of the Bhāṣyakāras is worth noting. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka invariably interpret Pratyakṣa and Anumāna as Śruti and Smṛti respectively, and not as perception and inference. While commenting on I. iii. 28, Śaṅkarācārya remarks that perception

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1 " दशमस्त्वमसीत्यादौ प्रत्यक्षसामग्र्या बलवत्त्वादेहादे: प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । "
   Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 1.
2 " प्रमाणसंकरापत्तिश्च । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 1.
3 Vide the following Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa:—
   I. iii. 28., III. ii. 24., IV. iv. 18., and IV. iv. 20

here denotes Scripture, which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else), and inference denotes Smṛti, which, in order to be authoritative depends on something else (viz. Scripture).[1] Smṛti is called Anumāna because for its authority we have to infer the existence of an original Vedic text of the same purport.[2] Rāmānuja and Nimbārka hold the same opinion in this respect.

Madhva, however, does not seem to favour the interpretation of these words as Śruti and Smṛti. He always interprets them as perception and inference.[3]

Vallabha some times interprets Pratyakṣa and Anumāna from the Sūtra text as perception and inference,[4] some times suggests Śruti and Smṛti as an alternative interpretation,[5] while in one case he interprets the words only as Śruti and Smṛti respectively.[6]

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1 " प्रत्यक्षं श्रुति: प्रामाण्यं प्रत्यनपेक्षत्वात् । अनुमानं स्मृति: , प्रामाण्यं प्रति सापेक्षत्वात् ।" Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I.iii.28.

2 " स्मृत्या स्वप्रामाण्यार्थं मूलश्रुतिरनुमीयते इत्यनुमानं स्मृति: । "
Brahma-sū Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, p. 252.

3 " महतां प्रत्यक्षात् यथदानीं तथोपर्यमपि देवादयो भविष्यन्तीति इतरेषा- मनुमानाच्च । " Madhva-bhāṣya, I. iii. 28.
Also— " विद्वत्प्रत्यक्षात् कारणाभावलिङ्गाच्च । " Madhva-bhāṣya, IV. iv. 21.

4 Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. iii. 28 and IV. iv. 18.

5 Aṇu-bhāṣya, III. ii. 24.

6 Aṇu-bhāṣya, IV. iv. 20.

Theories of erroneous perception..

In connection with the Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa it is worth while to examine the theories of erroneous perception advocated by different schools of Indian philosophy. The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy. A theory of erroneous or illusory perception is called Khyāti. There are five main Khyātis as follows:—[1] (1) Ātmakhyāti, (2) Asatkhyāti, (3) Akhyāti, (4) Anyathā-khyāti, and (5) Anirvacanīya-khyāti.

The theories called Ātmakhyāti and Asat-khyāti are advocated by Buddhists. The Mādhya-mikas or Śūnyavādins hold the Asatkhyāti view. According to this school, there is only non-being (Asat) and all perception of internal and external objects is erroneous. In the illusory perception of silver on a shell, error consists in apprehending the non-existing silver as existing on the shell, which also is a product of void.

The Vijñānavādins or the Sautrāntikas accept the theory of Ātmakhyāti. They do not admit the reality of external world. According to them, in the erroneous perception of silver on a shell, it is

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1 " आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा । अथानिर्वचनख्यातिरि-त्येतत्ख्यातिपंचकम् ॥ " Nyāya-koṣa, p. 256.

the mental idea of silver that comes out and mani-
fests as external object after being superimposed
on the shell. Here the illusory silver is of the
nature of cognition. In the opinion of the Vijñā-
navādins, the reality consists of a series of momen-
tary cognitions or perishing psychical conditions,
and these represent the Self. Hence the theory
of error advocated by this school is called
Ātmakhyāti.

The Vijñānavādin's theory of error is rooted
in his subjective metaphysics. The silver which
appears in delusion is real not as existing outside
in space, but as a mode of mind. Error consists in
regarding what is mental as material. When cog-
nitions are mistaken to be facts in the external
world, error results. What is negated by sublation
is the externality of silver. The Yogācāras also
accept the theory of Ātmakhyāti.

The Naiyāyikas accept the theory of Anya-
thā-khyāti, according to which error consists in
the apprehension of a thing as what it is not.
They maintain that in an erroneous cognition, the
attributes of one thing are superimposed on a
different thing; and so the object appears as some-
thing other than what it is. Shell, which is real,
appears as of the nature of another real thing, viz.
silver. Thus error is the apprehension of an object
as other than what it is. According to the Nyāya,
all error is subjective. What is set aside by true
knowledge is the wrong apprehension and not the

object.[1]   All erroneous apprehension has some
basis in reality; no such apprehension is really
baseless.[2]   The silver which appears is not utterly
non-existent, for it exists elsewhere and it is the
memory of it as experienced before that creates
confusion and leads us to think of the shell as silver.
This theory of Anyathā-khyāti is accepted by the
Vaiśeṣika, the Yoga and the Bhāṭṭa school of
Mīmāṃsā also.

The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā accepts[1]
the Akhyāti theory.   According to this view
the difference between the piece of shell we see
and the silver we imagine is not noticed.   Error
consists in taking a composite view of two cogni-
tions.   In the case of the shell appearing as silver,
the features common to shell and silver being
noticed, the perceiver fails to apprehend the diffe-
rence between these two things, and this gives rise
to the cognition of silver.   This cognition of silver
is a memory generated by sense impression called
up by similarity.   It gives rise to the non-appre-
hension of distinction between the shell and the
silver.   Thus the illusory perception partakes of a
dual character of remembrance and apprehension,
and as such it is different from ordinary valid
perception.   The illusory perception, however,
appears to be as real as a valid perception.   The

1 " तत्त्वज्ञानेन च मिथ्योपलब्धिनिवर्त्यते नार्थ: । " Vātsyāyana-
. bhāṣya, p. 304.

2 " क्वचित् कदाचित् कस्यचिच्च भावाभानिमित्तं मिथ्याज्ञानम् । "
. Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 305.

sublating cognition does not contradict the illusion,
but simply recognises the distinction between the
perceived and the remembered elements of the
erroneous cognition. The Prābhākara school main-
tains that all cognition, whether illusory or true is
valid at the moment of its production. The
element of apprehension involved in illusory cogni-
tions is regarded as self-valid as any other cogni-
tion. The theory of Akhyāti, being based on non-
discrimination, is also called Vivekākhyāti. The
Akhyāti theory is accepted by the Sānkhyas also.

Advaitins advocate the theory of Anirvaca-
nīya-khyāti. According to this view, the silver
cognised on the shell is neither real, nor unreal,
nor both real and unreal. The silver that appears
in delusion cannot be real, because it is not appre-
hended by all, and because it is sublated by the
cognition of shell. Nor can it be unreal, since it
is cognised. It cannot even be both real and unreal,
because two contrary characters cannot subsist in
one and the same entity. So its nature is really
Anirvacanīya or undefinable.

This undefinable silver is created by Avidyā
on account of some defect in the senses. When
the defective sense-organ comes in contact with an
object similar to silver such as shell, the mental
impressions of past cognitions of silver are revived
by the perception and thereby this unexplicable
silver is produced by Avidyā. In illusion ignorance
conceals the form of the existing object and con-
structs instead, the appearance of another object.

The non-perception of the existing form is pro-
duced by different factors such as defective sense-
organ or insufficient light. The perception of
similarity, and the revival of memory ideas caused
by it help ignorance to create the positive appea-
rance of an object. It is a temporary creation of
ignorance. The creation of an undefinable (Anir-
vacanīya) illusory object is the special feature
of Anirvacanīya-khyāti.

Śaṅkarācārya explains the world appearance,
in the light of an ordinary illusion, as the creation
of ignorance, with the ·power of concealing and
distorting reality.   According to the Advaita
Vedānta there are three orders of reality, viz. the
Pāramārthika or absolute, Vyāvahārika or of
practical ordinary experience and Prātibhāsika or
illusory.   The first one represents the absolute
truth; the other two are false impressions due to
Doṣa.   The difference between Vyāvahārika and
Prātibhāsika is that the Doṣa of the Vyāvahārika
perception is neither discovered nor removed until
salvation, whereas the Doṣa of the Prātibhāsika
reality is perceived in the world of our ordinary
experience.

The Advaita theory of error is not subjective.
Objectivity is granted to both the normal world
and the illusory object.

The theory of erroneous perception advo-
cated by Rāmānuja is called Sat-khyāti. It has
some special features of its own and it cannot be

included in the five Khyātis mentioned before.
According to Rāmānuja, there can be no explana-
rations of contradiction of knowledge involved in
illusory knowledge or consequent failure of behavi-
our suggested by it unless error is explained as
the wrongful appearance of one thing as another
He says that all the other theories of illusion
would ultimately have to accept the wrongful
apperance of one thing as another.[1]   Thus Rāmā-
nuja seems to favour the Anyathā–khyāti theory.
He, however, could not pass over the Yathārtha-
khyāti view of the senior philosophers of his school.
So by blending together the elements of these two
theories, he offers his Sat–khyāti view.

Rāmānuja believes that all knowledge is real.
So the object, appearing even in false perception,
is not illusory but real.   According to the theory
of Trivṛtkaraṇa as mentioned in the Upaniṣads or
of Pañcīkaraṇa as advocated by the later philoso-
phers, objects of the physical world are compound
substances.   The constituent elements of every
object being in every other object, everything may
become manifest in the form of every other thing.[2]
So every so-called illusion can be explained away.
In the so-called illusory silver in the shell, the
elements fire, water, earth by the mixture of which

1 " ख्यात्यन्तरवादिनां च सुदूरमपि गत्वाऽन्यथावभासोऽवश्याभ्युपगणनीय: । "
   S.ī-bhāṣya, I. i. I.

2 " यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदविदां मतम् । श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्य: सर्वस्य सर्वात्म-
   त्वप्रतीतित: ॥ " Srī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

silver is made, are also the elements by the mixture of which shell is made, so that even in shell there is something of silver and this common element really existing in shell is perceived when we take it for silver. That one thing is called silver and another shell has its reason in the relative preponderance of one or the other element. Likeness in certain respects is the indication of a partial identity of substance. When we mistake a piece of shell for silver, we notice certain features and miss others. So it is a mistake to think that some " cognitions have false things for their objects and others true ones. So what is called illusory perception of silver in the shell has a real objective basis to which it refers.

Appearance of a snake on a rope and appearance of the mirage are explained away by Rāmā-nuja from the same realistic stand-point. The case of the appearance of a conch-shell as yellow to a person with jaundiced eye is explained by him as being due to the presence of the yellow colour emanating from the bile of his eyes. Dreams are explained as creations of God, intended to produce corresponding perceptions in the minds of the dreamers, according to their actions.

Madhvācārya accepts Anyathā-khyāti theory of erroneous perception. According to the Dvaita view, we mistake the nature of the object presented to our consciousness, owing to some defect of the senses or other means of knowledge. Through that defect we do not take a full view of the object,

senses or other means of knowledge. Through that defect we do not take a full view of the object, but what we see of it recalls something like it in nature. Every case of illusion implies two positive entities, a given thing and a suggested object. Both of them are facts of experience. Thus the elements of false perception are not false.

Like the Rāmānuja's system, the doctrine of Satkhyāti is accepted in the system of Nimbārka also. According to it all cognitions are true in themselves. So the contradiction of the prior knowledge by a later one does not involve the non-existence of the former. In the Nimbārka view, the theory of Sat-khyāti means that all knowledge is produced by some existent objects. It is wrong to suppose that false or non-existent objects can produce illusions.

According to Vallabhācārya's system, erroneous cognitions are explained through the theory of Anyathā-khyāti. In the case of ordinary illusions a man mistakes one thing for another on account of some of their attributes being similar. In the same way, till there is true knowledge of the real nature of the supreme Deity, a man mistakes the world, which really is the manifest form of the Lord, for something else. After the attainment of true knowledge, however, the view-point in this respect is changed to Akhyāti.

The Anumāna.

Anumāna or inference is defined as the in-
strument of judgment or inferential knowledge.[1]
When finding smoke rising from a hill, we remem-
ber that since smoke cannot be without fire, and
thus come to the conclusion that there must also
be fire on the hill, it is an Anumāna   Here from
the knowledge of the observed mark (Liṅga) we
get the knowledge of the thing possessing it. Thus
Anumāna is the process of ascertaining, not by
perception but through the instrumentality of a
mark, that a thing possesses a certain character.

In inference what is perceived points to
something else, not perceived, with which it is
connected.[2]   The basis of inference is an observed
fact. So it is also defined as knowledge which is
preceded by perception[3] or knowledge that follows
other knowledge. Inference operates neither with
regard to things unknown, nor with regard to those
known definitely for certain; it functions only with
regard to things that are doubtful.[4]

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1 " अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 34.
2 " स्मृत्या लिङ्गदर्शनेन चाप्रत्यक्षोऽर्थोऽनुमीयते । " Vātsyāyana-
bhāṣya, p. 16.
3 " प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षस्य सम्बद्धस्य प्रतिपत्तिरनुमानम् । " Vātsyāyana-
bhāṣya, p. 127.
4 " तत्र नानुपलब्धे न निर्णीतेऽर्थे न्याय: प्रवर्तते, किं तर्हि, संशयितेऽर्थे । "
Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 3.

In the process of inference in the above illustration there is, first, the knowledge or apprehension of smoke, which is associated as a mark (Liṅga or Hetu) with the hill, which is the subject with reference to which something is inferred (Pakṣa). Secondly, there is the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) between smoke and fire as we have observed in the past. After the consideration of the mark as possessed by the subject, in relation with the invariable concomitance, there results, thirdly, the knowledge of the existence of the unperceived fire in the hill which is intended to be inferred (Sādhya). This process of inference is called consideration of the mark (Liṅga-parāmaṛśa). So Anumāna is also defined as Liṅga-parāmarśa.[1]

To make a correct inference, the following five conditions must be fulfilled:— (1) The Hetu or Liṅga must be present in the Pakṣa (Pakṣa-sattva). (2) It must be present in all other known objects similar to the Pakṣa, in having the Sādhya in it (Sapakṣa-sattva). (3) It must not be present in any such object as does not possess the Sādhya (Vipakṣa–vyāvṛtti). (4) The inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception or testimony of the Śastra (Abādhita-viṣayatva). (5) The Liṅga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible (Asatpratipakṣatva).[2]

1 " लिङ्गपरामर्शेनानुमीयतेऽतो लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् । " Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 31.

2 " तानि पंचरूपाणि । पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे सत्त्वं विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिरबाधित-विषयत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति । " Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 41.

In the process of inference apprehension of Vyāpti has a very great importance. It cannot be said that Vyāpti necessarily depends upon the relation of identity (Tādātmya) between the Liṅga and the Sādhya, nor the relation of causation (Tadutpattitva) between them, though in some cases of concomitance these relations may be existing. For the apprehension of Vyāpti, it is sufficient, that as a result of adequate observation one thing is known to accompany the other invariably, although the inner connection between them is not demonstrable.[1]   Cloven hoofs and horns furnish an example of such invariable concomitance.   ,

The process of inference includes both induction and deduction.[2]   In the apprehension of Vyāpti we have to depend upon

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1 " साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्ति: । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 34.

2 cf. "The inference of the Oriental systems was in no respect on all fours with what we call induction and deduction. It testifies neither to a passage from the general to the particular or vice versa, nor to the passage of fact into law or vice versa. The Anumāna, as inference is called, designates a knowledge ' by connection', which grasps the solidarity of two attributes of a single substance .... but which nevertheless apprehends them both simaltaneously, the one being perceived, so to speak, through the other."
P. Masson-Oursel : Comparative Philosophy, p. 145-146.   -

induction. The Nyāya method of induction can be analysed into the following steps:— (1) Observation of a relation of agreement in pre-sence (Anvaya) between two things. (2) Observation of a relation of agreement in absence (Vyati-reka) of those things. (3) Observation of absence of any contrary instances (Vyabhicārāgraha). (4) Elimination of adventitious conditions on which the relation may depend (Upādhinirāsa). (5) In-direct proof by the method of reductio ad absur-dum (Tarka). (6) Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa perception, or the intuition involved in the apprehension of the universals. Thus in the process of induction Nyāya employs all the three methods viz. enumeration, indirect proof and intuition.

Inference is said to be of two kinds, viz. Svārtha or that which resolves a doubt in one's own mind, and Parārtha or that which does so in another's.[1] In Parārtha Anumāna a man intends to demonstrate the truth of the conclusion to other men.[2] It takes the form of a syllogism. It has five members, viz. (1) Pratijñā or the proposition, (2) Hetu or the reason, (3) Udāharaṇa or the ex-planatory example, (4) Upanaya or the applica-tion, and (5) Nigamana or the statement of the conclusion.[3] Its several stages are thus expressed:-

1 " अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 37.

2 " यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पंचावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थानुमानम् । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 37.

3 " प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः । " Nyāya-sūtra, I. i. 32.

(1) The hill is fiery. (Pratijñā). (2) Because it has smoke. (Hetu). (3) Whatever has smoke has fire, e. g. the kitchen. (Udāharaṇa). (4) The hill has smoke, such as is always accompanied by fire. (Upanaya). (5) Therefore the hill is fiery. (Nigamana).

Inference for the sake of others is rather a formal exposition of the process of the movement of thought. In it the last two members are unnecessary from the stand-point of logic, though they are useful for debate. So later on the three-membered syllogism came to be recognised as a valid syllogistic form.

In inference, as a Pramāṇa, the form was never considered to be essentially important. The syllogistic form is described as Anɩmāna only by courtesy. The verbal view of logic was never accepted in Indian philosophy. It was never forgotten that the subject matter of logic is thought and not the linguistic forms in which it may find expression.[1] So the inference arrived at by a syllogism, even by dropping the third member, was considered to be valid, since the general proposition is implied in the reason. This form corresponds to enthymeme, and is found much in use in the treatises of Indian philosophy. This explains why Vāda does not necessarily require argumenta-

1. Hiriyana : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 255.

tion through the method of Five Factors of reasoning, as mentioned before.

Another classification describes inference as of three kinds, viz. Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat and Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa.[1] Pūrvavat is the inference of the effect from the cause. Śeṣavat is the inference of the cause from the effect. Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa is the inference in all cases other than those of cause and effect. This classification is given by Gautama and is accepted by other early writers of Nyāya.

The new school of logic gives still another classification of Anumāna. According to it inference is of three kinds according as its Liṅga is (1) Anvaya-vyatireki, (2) Kevalānvayi or (3) Kavala-vyatireki. The first is an inference where the invariable concomitance is observed in all instances by agreement both in presence and absence.[2] The second is arrived at through the method of agreement in presence only, as there is no negative instace of their agreement in absence; as for example the inference— 'the pot is nameable, since it is knowable.'[3] The third is arrived at by means of a Vyāpti only through the method of agreement in absence, since there is no instance of agreement in

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1 "अथ तत्पूर्वं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतोदृष्टं च । "
Nyāya-sūtra, I. i. 5.

2 " अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 40.

3 " अन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात्पटवत् । "
Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 40.

presence; as for example the inference— 'the earth is different from other elements, since it has smell.' [1]   This classification is more logical inasmuch as it is based on the nature of induction by which we get the knowledge of Vyāpti, on which the inference depends.

The Nyāya school is chiefly responsible for the systematic development of the theory of Anumāna, and its contribution to the topic is so great that other systems of Indian philosophy tacitly accept the general structure of the Nyāya theory in this respect, only occasionally suggesting innovations for harmonising it to their tenets or for making it more convenient for the proofs of their doctrines.

In the Vaiśeṣika system, the Kaṇāda-sūtras show the beginning of the logical theory of inference. In this work, the knowledge of concomitance between Hetu and Sādhya was assumed but the idea seems to be more loose than the technical Vyāpti of the Nyāya theory. [2]   The types of inferences referred to by Kaṇāda are (1) inference of non-existence of some things from the existence of some other things, (2) of the existence of some things from the non-existence of some other things, (3) of the existence of some things from the exis-

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1 " व्यतिरेकमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वात् । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 40.

2 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 304.

tence of others. Later on, however, the Vaiśeṣika
and the Nyāya devoloped hand in hand, so the
theory of inference mentioned before was the one
accepted by the combined Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

According to the Sāṅkhyas, inference is
divided into two kinds, viz. Vīta and Avīta. Vīta
inference is based on affirmative concomitance and
is sub-divided into Pūrvavat and Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa.
Avīta inference is based on negative concomitance
and corresponds to the Śeṣavat variety of the
Nyāya system.[1] The five-membered form of the
syllogism is admitted.

The Sāṅkhyas utilize the Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa
variety of inference in transcendental matters, and
thus restrict the scope of Vedic testimony consi-
derably. For instance, through such inference the
existence of supersensuous Prakṛti is postulated.
Sāṅkhyas appeal to the authority of scripture only
where not even this type of inference is possible.

The Yoga theory of inference is similar to
that of the Sāṅkhya system, and has nothing special
about it. Like the latter it accepts that inference
is the mental modification through which we cog-
nise the generic nature of objects.

The Mīmāṃsā theory about inductive gene-
ralization (Vyāpti) etc. is similar to that of the

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1 " अन्वयमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं विषायकं वीतम् । व्यतिरेकमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं
निषेधकमवीतम् । " Vācaspati Miśra ; Tattva-kaumudī,
p. 11.

Nyāya system. According to Śabara when a certain permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived. This kind of knowledge is called inference.[1] He divides inferences into two kinds, viz. Pratyakṣato-dṛṣṭa, when the invariable relation holds between objects which are perceptible, and Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa, where the relation is not apprehended by the senses, but known only as general notions. The first corresponds to the Pūrvavat and Śeṣavat varieties of Nyāya, while the second to the Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa.

As regards the number of members necessary for the explicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others, both Kumārila and Prabhākara hold that only three viz. Pratijñā, Hetu and Dṛṣṭānta are quite sufficient.

Śaṅkarācārya has not discussed the nature of Anumāna, since according to the Vedānta theory it is of very little importance in metaphysical matters. In this respect we have mainly to depend on the writers who followed his views. The Advaita theory of inference is very much similar to that of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā.

According to the Advaita view, Anumāna is a kind of means for Parokṣa or mediate knowledge.

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1 " स्वाभाविकनियतसंबन्धयो: द्वयोर्व्याप्यस्य दर्शनात् असन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे यज्ज्ञानं साऽनुमिति: । " Cinnasvāmiśāstrī : Tantrasiddhānta-ratnāvali, p. 57.

It is of the nature of a Vṛtti of the internal organ in which the Sākṣin is immanent.[1] Inference is produced by the knowledge of invariable conco- mitance, acting through specific past impressions, roused on a perceptual cognition. In this system the nature of concomitance is altogether subjective; inference has no material validity, but only subjec- tive and formal validity.[2]

The notion of concomitance being altogether subjective, the Advaita Vedānta does not empha- size the necessity of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases. Even one case of con- comitance is regarded as being sufficient for making an inference. Thus seeing the one case of appea- rance, e. g. silver in the conch-shell, to be false, we can infer that all things except Brahman are false.

As is argued by Śrī-harṣa, Advaita Vedānta does not subscribe to the Nyāya view that, for the establishment of invariable concomitance there must be a mental contact with class-concepts, whereby an affirmation of all individuals of a class without experiencing them all becomes possible. According to the Vedānta such mental contact with the class-concept need not be the basis of a

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1 M. Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 145.

2 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 473.

Vyāpti.[1] It does not recognise the Sāmānya-laksana perception at all.[2]

In the same way it is pointed out that Tarka cannot be the basis of forming Vyāpti. It may only be helpful in judging the possibilities.

Advaita Vedānta accepts only the concomitance expressed in a universal affirmative proposition. Kevalānvayi and Kevala-vyatireki inferences are not accepted in this system.[3] The classification of inferences as Svārtha and Parārtha finds its place here also. The latter type of inference has only the first three or the last three members instead of five as in Nyāya.

In Anumāna, even though the mind functions through its modification, the Pramāṇa does not give immediate knowledge. Inferential knowledge is mediated through relation with the Liṅga or reason.[4] Though mediate it is none the less knowledge just like perception, since its nature is manifestation of the object. The difference between perception and inference is that in inference there

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1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 139.

2 " मीमांसका मायावादिवेदान्तिनश्च सामान्यलक्षणं संनिकर्षं नाङ्गीचक्रुः । " Jhalkikar : Nyāya-kośa, p. 1015.

3 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 493–494.

4 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 106.

is no direct and immediate contact of the inner
organ with the inferred object; the inner organ is in
touch only with the reason or Liṅga and through
this there arises an idea in the mind which is
called inference.

Śaṅkarācārya is fully aware that inference
cannot be helpful as a means for the knowledge of
a super-sensuous entity like Brahman. He has
frequently stated that the purpose of Brahma-sūtra
is not to establish the nature of Brahman by
means of logical arguments. He asserts that the
nature of Brahman can be known through Upa-
niṣads only.[1]

The Vedānta Sūtras can claim only to in-
terpret the revealed sayings of the Upaniṣadic
texts; they do not intend to advance independent
inferences not warranted by Śruti texts. Conse-
quent on the thought and discussion of Śruti texts
and not simply due to inference and other Pra-
māṇas, there springs up the knowledge of Brah-
man.[2] Inference is welcomed and is considered
to be a serviceable instrument of knowledge, if
it is brought forward to strengthen the conclusions
of Śruti.[3]

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1 " तस्माच्छब्दमूल एवातींन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः । " Brahma-sūtra
   Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. i. 27.
2 " वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिस्तदुपासननिर्वृत्ता
   निर्वृत्ता । " Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 2.
3 " भूयैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात् । " Brahma-sūtra
   Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 2.

Bādarāyaṇa himself has asserted the futility of logical reasoning in super sensuous matters in his Sūtra:— तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यविमोक्षप्रसंगः । (II. i. 11). In commenting on this Śaṅkarācārya eloquently makes it clear, how inferential conclusions cannot come to finality. He is aware that reasoning affords permanent scope for correction of already admitted propositions,[1] but he makes it clear that only this much is not sufficient to arrive at right knowledge. Though reasoning may appear to hold good in certain cases, still with regard to the unfathomable nature of Reality, it is of no use unless it is backed up by Śruti.[2] Brahman· is neither the object of perception nor of inference; it has neither form nor sound to be seen or heard, nor any sign on account of which it is to be inferred [3] So according to Śaṅkarācārya reasoning cannot be applied to what is unthinkable; we must resort to Śruti alone to know the supersensuous.[4]

Śaṅkarācārya is fully aware that conclusions arrived at by reasoning or inference may vary

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1 " एवं हि सावद्यतर्कंपरित्यागेन निरवद्यस्तर्कः प्रतिपत्तव्यो भवति । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. i. 11.

2 " न ह्रीदमतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्म्यं मुक्तिनिबन्धनमागममन्तरेणोत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम् । " Śaṅkara–bhāṣya, II. i. 11.

3 " रूपाद्यभावादि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षगोचरः, लिङ्गाद्यभावाञ्च नानुमानादीनाम् । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. i. 11.

4 " तस्माच्छब्दमूल एवातीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः । " Śaṅkara·bhāṣya, II. i. 27.

according to the abilities of the reasoners. That
is why from the same data different conclusions are
arrived at by different logicians. As the subjective
factor influences the conclusions of reasoning, Śaṅ-
karācārya is not prepared to accept that inference
can be of any use for the knowledge Brahman.

Śaṅkarācārya points out that Anumāna has
no scope for establishing the validity of scripture.[1]
Scripture being a Pramāṇa which produces new,
uncontradicted and unambiguous knowledge is
self-valid.[2] So he declares that Upaniṣads are
valid, even though they do not enjoin actions like
other portions of the Veda.[3]

Though Śaṅkarācārya denies validity for
reasoning in mataphysical matters, he does not
thereby preclude this important means of know-
ledge from the province of philosophy. The spirit
of inquiry, the spirit of affording constant scope
for examining and re-examining the postulates in
the light of newer and newer propositions, the
spirit of constant questioning for the attainment
of truth is a principle on which philosophising
prides itself. Śaṅkarācārya, though not prepared

1 " न चानुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम् । " Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-
bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

2 " अबाधितानधिगतासंदिग्धबोधजनकत्वं हि प्रमाणत्वं प्रमाणानां तच्च स्वत
इत्युपपादितम् । " Vācaspati-miśra : Bhāmatī, p. 65.

3 " यद्यप्यन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टं, तथाप्या-
त्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वात्र तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्या-
तुम् । " Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

to give finality to reasoning, does not hamper this spirit of inquiry. He affords due scope for all means of knowledge in their proper spheres.

Śaṅkarācārya is an astute logician, as is revealed by even a superficial examination of his Bhāṣya. None can doubt his staunch faith in the revealed nature and the infallibility of the Śrutis.[1] None can also doubt his sincerity when he states that his doctrine is purely based on the authority of Upaniṣadic texts and that he thinks that he is only the interpreter of the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras, which illustrate, investigate and remove the doubts in the Vedānta texts.[2] Granting all this, there remains the fact that Śaṅkarācārya has given a new turn to the whole interpretation of the Vedānta by his genius which shows astounding logical acumen, but which is not accepted by many as a faithful interpretation.

In order to illustrate the above remarks, a few instances may be cited. The introductory part of his commentary, called Adhyāsa Bhāṣya, clearly shows his power of subtle reasoning and his ability to arrive at inferences irrefutable by severe and critical counter-reasoning. As this part is an Utsūtra Bhāṣya, a discussion not based on any Sūtra, it plausibly raises the doubt, whether the

1 " न हीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्यर्गवेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यत: संभवोऽस्ति । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

2 " यथा चायमर्थ: सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्याम: । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, Introduction.

view-point arrived at by Śaṅkarācārya is purely based on a studious interpretation of the Prasthā-natrayī or is also the outcome of his subjective cogitation.[1] The rigour of his reasoning here as well as through-out his Bhāṣya has driven his opponents to impute him with the charge of foist-ing his own view-point on the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras instread of faithfully interpreting them.

The second Pāḍa of the second Adhyāya in his Bhāṣya is also noteworthy in this connection. He has copiously quoted Upaniṣadic texts in all parts of his Bhāṣya, except this Pāda called the Tārka Pāda. Herein he does not depend on scrip-tural authority at all. This portion is purely logical. In this by means of pure reasoning he refutes the theories of antagonistic philosophers on their own grounds, by showing their internal con-tradictions. In doing this, Śaṅkarācārya proves himself superb as a logician. From his arguments we find that he is endowed with astounding power of subtle analysis and marvelous insight in funda-mental principles. He is quite an adept in using inference as a means of proof and three-membered syllogistic form as a weapon of argumentation

Rāmānujācārya did not write any work for propounding his views of logic consistent with the system of his philosophy. Some of his followers,

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1 cf. Govindānanda's attempt to prove that the
  Adhyāsa Bhāṣya is a regular part of the Bhāṣya-
  " एतेन सूत्रार्थस्पर्शित्वादध्यासग्रन्थो न भाष्यमिति निरस्तम् । "
  Bhāṣya-ratna-prabhā, p. 4.

however, have revised Gautama's logic in accord-ance with the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition.

According to the Rāmānuja school, infeɪence is the result of Parāmarśa. It is a process by which, from universal proposition, we can make an affirma-tion regarding a particular case. The principle of Vyāpti is defined as unconditional and invariable association. The spatial or the temporal co-exis-tence of the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka is not assumed. In many cases of Vyāpti spatio-temporal co-existence is observed to exist but that does not exhaust all cases, as for example, the sunset and the surging sea.[1]

A single instance is considered to be sufficient to suggest the Vyāpti.[2] But in order to remove doubts, a wide experience of concomitance is held to be indispensable for the affirmation of a general proposition. In the establishment of Vyāpti, we have to make use of both the positive and negative instances, eliminate the non–essentials and arrive at the right concomitance. This requires that the observation of many instances is indispensable for the formation of Vyāpti.

Rāmānuja logic admits the necessity of Tarka as an indispensable means of inferential

1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 226.

2 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 673.

conclusion, since it helps the process of forming inductive generalisation.

Rāmānuja's own intention regarding the types of inference that may be admitted, seems to be uncertain. From the references in Śrī-bhāṣya it appears that he divides the Anumāna into Viśeṣato-dṛṣṭa and Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa.[1] His followers, however, accept the classifications as are given by later Naiyāyikas.

The treatment of inference according to the Rāmānuja school is very much the same as that in the Nyāya system. There are, however, certain important points in which Viśiṣṭādvaita logic differs from Nyāya. One of such points is the refusal on the part of the former to accept the Kevala-vyatireki form of inference, which is admitted by the latter. Concomitance through the joint method of agreement and difference (Anvaya–vyatireki) and by pure agreement (Kevalānvayi) is admitted.[2] It is considered that the Kevala-vyatireki form of inference cannot be legitimately accepted since inference through mere negative concomitance can never lead to the affirmation of any positive character. Yāmunācārya also has rejected the Kevala-vyatireki form of inference.

Inference is always limited to those cases in

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1 " नाप्यनुमानम् । विशेषतो दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टं वा । " Rāmānuja: Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

2 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 228.

which the general proposition has been enunciated on the basis of experience derived from sensible objects. It cannot be employed for the affirmation of ultra-sensuous objects, since things which trans-cend the sense cannot be grasped by inference. As inference is based on perception, it cannot be the means of the knowledge of transcendental things. Rāmānuja rightly observes that inference, whether arrived at through the particular way of deduction or arrived at through the generic way of induction, is not the means of proving Brahman. The first type of inference is imposible to be the means because there is no knowledge of its relating to anything which is beyond the senses. There is also no such basis of inductive inference as is seen to give rise to generalisation and as is invariably associated with the Lord who is capable of directly perceiving all things and actually bringing those things into existence.[1] So like Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmā-nujācārya believes that only scripture is the means of knowing Brahman. Inference is acceptable merely for strengthening the statements of scrip-ture.[2] Following Bādarāyaṇa, Rāmānuja accepts the inconclusive nature of reasoning.

1 " नाप्यनुमानम् । विशेषतो दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टं वा । अतीन्द्रिये वस्तुनि सम्बन्वावधारणविरहान्न विशेषतो दृष्टम् । समस्तवस्तुसाक्षात्कारतन्निर्माण-समर्थपुरुषविशेषनियतं सामान्यतो दृष्टमपि न लिङ्गमुपलभ्यते । "
Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

2 " अतोऽतीन्द्रियेऽर्थे शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणम्; तदुपबृंहणायैव तर्क उपादेयः । "
Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 12.

Also— " शास्त्रैकप्रमाणत्वात् ब्रह्मणः । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3

Rāmānuja does not accept that the existence of God can be inferred, as is done by the Naiyā-yikas. The fact that the Lord is the creator of this universe cannot be made out on the basis of an inference of the cause of all causes.[1]

As regards the number of members necessary for a syllogism, the system of Rāmānuja does not insist that all the five are necessary, as is done by the Nyāya. It is regarded that only three mem- bers are sufficient. They may be either the first three or the last three. Really speaking the num- ber of members in a syllogism is not considered important. So many propositions as are necessary to make the inference convincing may be admitted.

Syllogism as an instrument of polemics is very efficiently employed by Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya. In its polemical parts, especially when he attacks the postulates of the Advaita system, he shows marvellous skill in the employment of formal syllogisms. They occur to him naturally in the course of the debate. The following may be cited as typical examples of these:— (1) That igno- rance, which is the subject of our dispute, is not capable of being removed by knowledge; because it does not possess the power of concealing the objects of knowledge. Whatever non-knowledge, is removed by knowledge, that conceals the objects

1 " यदुक्तं, सावयवत्वादिना कार्यं सर्वं जगत्, कार्यं च तदुचितकर्तृविशेषपूर्वकं दृष्टमिति निखिलजगन्निर्माणतदुपादानोपकरणवेदनचतुरः कश्चिदनुमेय इति । तदयुक्तम् । " Srī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

of knowledge, like the non-knowledge relating to the shell etc.[1] (2) That knowledge, which is acquired with the help of the means of proof, and which is the subject of our dispute, has not, for its antecedent any ignorance which is different from its own antecedent non-existence; because that possesses the character of knowledge obtained with the help of the means of proof, like the knowledge which, being derived with the help of the means of proof, proves the ignorance that is admitted by you.[2] (3) That ignorance, which has the nature of an entity, is not capable of being destroyed by knowledge; because it possesses the nature of an entity, like a pot etc.[3] (4) The earth, the mountain etc., which are the subject of our discussion, are effects; because they are made up of constituent parts, as is the case with a pot etc.[4] (5) The earth, the ocean, the mountain etc., which are the subject of our discussion, are effects; because, being themselves gross, they possess the property of being set in motion, as is the case with a pot

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1 " विवादाध्यासितमज्ञानं न ज्ञाननिवर्त्यम् । ज्ञानविषयानावरणत्वात् ।
यज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यमज्ञानं तज्ज्ञानविषयावरणं यथा शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानम् । " Srī-
bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 90.

2 " विवादाध्यासितं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावातिरिक्ताज्ञानपूर्वकं न भवति ।
प्रमाणज्ञानत्वात् । भवदभिमताज्ञानसाधनप्रमाणज्ञानवत् । " Srī-bhāṣya
I. i. 1, p. 90-91.

3 " भावरूपमज्ञानं न ज्ञानविनाश्यम् । भावरूपत्वात् । घटादिवदिति ।
Srī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 91.

4 " विवादाध्यासितं भूभूषरादि कार्यं साक्यवत्वात् घटादिवत् । " Srī-
bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

etc.[1] (6) The body, the world etc. have the individual souls, for their agents; because they possess the character of being effects, as a pot does.[2] (7) The Lord is no agent; because he has no purpose, just as the released souls.[3] (8) The distinctions of bondage and liberation and those of oneself and others are imagined by ignorance, since they are unreal, like the distinctions seen in a dream etc.[4] (9) Other bodies also are the products of my ignorance, since they are bodies, since they are effects, since they are non-sentient, or since they are products, just like this body.[5] (10) All sentient things, which are the subject of our dispute, are identical with me, since they are sentient; whatever is not identical with me is observed to be non-sentient as a pitcher.[6]

In the Śrī-bhāṣya, Rāmānuja has occasionally displayed such feats of formal logic, and has proved himself to be versatile in the employment

1 " विवादाध्यासितमवनिजलधिमहीधरादि कायं, महत्वे सति क्रियावत्वात् घटादिवत् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

2 " तनुभुवनादि क्षेत्रज्ञकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटादिवत् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

3 " ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति, प्रयोजनशून्यत्वान्मुक्तवत् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

4 " बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थाः स्वपरव्यवस्थाश्च स्वाविद्याकल्पिताः, अपारमार्थिकत्वात्, स्वप्नदृष्टव्यवस्थावदिति । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 15.

5 " शरीरान्तराण्यपि मदविद्याकल्पितानि, शरीरत्वात्, कार्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्, कल्पितत्वाद्वा, एतच्छरीरवत् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 15.

6 " विवादाध्यासितं चेतनजातमहमेव, चेतनत्वात्, यदनहम्, तदचेतनं दृष्टम्, यथा घटः । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 15.

of this important missile in the armoury of dispu-
tants. Such occasions, however, are not too many.
It must be said to the credit of Rāmānujācārya, that
he has never lost sight of the pursuit of truth, by
losing himself in the labyrinth of formal logic. He
is fully aware that logical technique is only an in-
strument for arriving at right knowledge. On the
whole, the arguments in his Bhāṣya follow the
traditional method of Vāda, wherein propositions
are proved by means of Pramāṇas independently or
through formal syllogisms.

According to Madhvācārya, inference is only
an Anupramāṇa, and as such it is only externally
instrumental in producing knowledge. Like other
Anupramāṇas, it gives knowledge only indirectly.[1]
Thus in the theory of Madhvācārya we cannot
distinguish between Pratyakṣa and Anumāna as
immediate and mediate means of knowledge. Per-
ception, inference and testimony are only the
three kinds of means of Parokṣa or mediate
knowledge.

Madhvācārya does not give much importance
to inference in knowing the important philosophical
principles. The Veda is the only means that can
be helpful in solving the riddle of the universe.
As is stated before, Madhva cites the authority of
many scriptural texts, especially the Purāṇas and
points out that inferences are quite useless to

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1 M. Hiriyanna : The Essentials of Indian Phi-
losophy, p. 197.

arrive at important philosophical conclusions, as they are indefinite.[1] Thus in the province of Brahma–jñāna, inference has very little independent scope. Inference is incapable of supplying us with new facts. At the most it can help us to test and systematize the facts obtained through other means, especially through the scriptures. That is why Anumāna is denied any independent position as a Pramāna in the system of Madhvā-cārya. If there is any doubt in reconciling the apparently contradictory statements of scriptures, Anumāna may be of some use.[2]

In his Brahma-sūtra Bhāsya, Madhva has employed inference only occasionally. The use of syllogisms is also found only in rare cases. Madhva depends more on scriptural quotations than reasoning for proving his view-point. As Madhva accepts only three Pramānas, Upamāna is considered to be a variety of inference.[3]

The Bhāsya of Nimbārka, which purports to give simply the interpretation of the Vedānta Sūtras, does not contain lengthy discussions. So inference as a means of knowledge, and syllogism as a means of

1 Vide pp. 59 to 61.
2 " प्रत्यक्षयोरागमयोर्विरोधे निश्चयाय तु ।
अनुमत्यो न स्वतन्त्राः प्रमाणपद्वीं ययुः ॥ इति पुरुषोत्तमतन्त्रे । "
Madhva-bhāsya, II. i. 18.
3 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 739.

argumentation have very little scope in this Bhāṣya.

The followers of Nimbārka have accepted the Nyāya theory of Anumāna in general and have employed it in the elucidation of their doctrines. Their theories of concomitance etc. are the same as those of the Nyāya system. The two divisions of Anumāna, viz. Svārtha and Parārtha, are admitted. Though the Nimbārkaites generally follow the Rāmānuja views about Pramāṇas, there is a difference of opinion with respect to the classification of Anumāna The followers of Nimbārka admit all the three kinds of inference, viz. Anvaya-vyatireki, Kevalānvayi and Kevala-vyatireki. In the theory of Vyāpti, they have a special point deserving notice. In addition to the well-known concomitance arising from the above three ways, represented by the three kinds of Anumānas, scriptural assertions are also regarded as cases of concomitance.[1]

Like the other Bhāṣyakāras, Nimbārka also believes that Brahman can be known only through the Vedas. Inference is of no use in achieving that purpose. The Naiyāyika tenet of inferring God from the effect, viz. the universe, is not accepted.[2]

1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, p. 427.

2 " एवं क्षित्यङ्कुरादीनां प्रसिद्धानां कार्याणामपि कार्यत्वेन लिङ्गेन न ब्रह्मानु॰ मातुं शक्यते । " Śrinivāsācārya : Vedānta-kaustubha, p. 16.

Vallabhācārya has no special point as regards the theory of Anumāna. He holds the opinion that in metaphysical matters Śāstra is the final authority and our reason cannot protest against it. He asserts that his main doctrine, that Brahman is the substratum of contradictory qualities, is proved by scriptural texts and there is no questioning it by logic.[1] Like perception, inference is not independently valid. It depends on extraneous circumstances for its validity. Like other Ācāryas, Vallabhācārya fully accepts that the nature of inferential conclusions is indefinite, and asserts that mere reasoning, unsupported by scriptural texts, has no scope in knowing the real nature of Brahman.[2]

Vallabhācā ya exhibits considerable skill in argumentation. His arguments are, however, mainly based on scriptural texts and not on inferences. Even in the polemical parts of Aṇu-bhāṣya, he takes his stand mainly on scriptural texts.

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
1 " ब्रह्म तु वेदैकसमधिगम्यं यादृशं वेदे प्रतिपाद्यते तादृशमेवेत्यसङ्कृदवोचाम । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 19.

2 " वेदोक्तेऽर्थे शुष्कतर्केण प्रत्यवस्थानमयुक्तम् । तर्कस्याप्रतिष्ठानात् । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, II. i. 11.

The Śabda.

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Śabda or verbal testimony is the next source of knowledge with which we have to deal. In the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas, this Pra-nāna bears considerable importance, because the Vedānta system is mainly based on the testimony of scriptures. Brahma-sūtra must be viewed from two aspects; it is an important philosophical treatise setting forth the system of Vedānta, but never the less it is an authoritative interpretation of the doubtful points in the Upaniṣads. This explains why Śabda is considered to be a very important Pramāna in the study of Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas.

In the Nyāya system Śabda is defined as the right knowledge, which we derive from utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful persons.[1] An absolutely truthful person is one, who possesses the direct and right knowledge of a thing, who is moved by the desire to make known to others the thing as he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it.[2] Even Mlecchas may have amidst them absolutely truthful persons whose authority may be accepted.[3]

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1 " आप्तोपदेश: शब्द: ।" Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra, I. i. 7.
2 " आप्त: खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्मा यथादृष्टस्यार्थस्य चिख्यापयिषया प्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा ।" Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 21.
3 " ऋष्यार्यम्लेच्छानां समानं लक्षणम् ।" Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, p. 21.

The trust-worthy verbal assertion may relate to the visible world (Dṛṣṭārtha) or the invisible world (Adṛṣṭārtha). The reliable words of ordinary truthful persons concerning things belonging to this world fall in the first category, while those of the Ṛṣis, which refer to heaven and such other invisible things fall in the second. If only assertions concerning visible things are considered reliable, then the Vedas would become excluded. But they cannot be so excluded, because the definition of Śabda Pramāṇa is fully applicable to them. All knowledge derived from them is valid, for they are the utterances of the infallible God. The Vedic knowledge is further conveyed through the sages who are Āptas or reliable persons, since they had intuitive perception of the truth, love for humanity and the desire to communicate their knowledge.

There is another classification, according which there are two kinds of verbal testimony, viz. Vaidika or scriptural and Laukika or secular. Scriptural testimony is perfect and infallible by its very nature, since it is the word of God. Of secular testimony, only that which proceeds from trustworthy persons is valid, but not the rest.[1] Classifying verbal testimony as Dṛṣṭārtha and Adṛṣṭārtha has reference to the nature of the objects of knowledge, and as Laukika and Alaukika

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1 " वाक्यं द्विविधम् । वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वात्सर्वमेव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं त्वाप्तोक्तं प्रमाणम् । अन्यदप्रमाणम् । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 53.

has reference to the source of the knowledge.

The verbal assertions of a trustworthy person are not in themselves sufficient to give us any knowledge of things. The understanding of their meaning is necessary in acquiring any knowledge from them. While the validity of verbal knowledge depends on its being based on the statement of a trustworthy person, its possibility depends on the understanding of the meaning of that statement. Hence the logical structure of a sentence and the relation of words in it deserve some consideration.

The Nyāya system defines a sentence as a collection of significant words, which are endowed with (1) Ākāṅkṣā or mutual interdependence to indicate the intended sense, (2) Yogyatā or compatibility to accord with the sense of the sentence and not render it futile and meaningless, and (3) Sannidhi or the utterance of words in quick succession without a long pause between them.[1]

A word is defined as a combination of significant letters. The relation of the word and its meaning is due to convention, that such and such a word should mean such an object and it is established by God.[2]

1 " अर्थप्रतिपादनद्वारा श्रोतुः पदान्तरविषयामर्थान्तरविषयां वाकांक्षां जनयतां प्रतीयमानपरस्परान्वययोग्यार्थप्रतिपादकानां संनिहितानां पदानां समूहो वाक्यम् । " Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 49.

2 " अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसङ्केतः शक्तिः । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 50.

In addition to the three conditions, viz. Ākāṅkṣā, Yogyatā and Sannidhi, some Naiyāyikas accept Tātparya as the fourth condition of verbal knowledge. Tātparya stands for the meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence. To understand the meaning of a sentence we must consider the intention of the writer or the speaker who uses it.

The import of words according to the Nyāya system is individual (Vyakti), form (Ākṛti) and genus (Jāti). The Nyāya holds that a word denotes all the three in different degrees.

The Nyāya theory accepts that the word is not eternal,[1] and it does not depend on the eternity of word for the authoritativeness of the Vedas. According to Nyāya, the authority of the Veda depends on the omniscience of God who creates it and trustworthiness of the sages who manifest it. Thus the authority of the Veda depends on the inference of the trustworthiness cf their authors.

The Vaiśeṣikas do not accept Śabda Pramāṇa, but seek to establish the validity of verbal testimony on the strength of inference, on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible person. The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, however, tacitly admit the validity of the scriptures on their own authority.

The Sāṅkhya system accepts that the Veda

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1 " आदिमत्त्वादैन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचाराञ्च । " Nyāya-sūtra, II. ii. 13.

is impersonal, and hence it is free from doubts and discrepancies, and is of self-evident validity. Being independent of human authorship, it is free from all defects. It is for this very reason that the knowledge derived from Itihāsa and the Smṛti which are based upon the Veda is regarded as right.[1] Even though the Veda is impersonal we need not consider its words to be eternal.

The authority of Kapila, the founder of this system, is accepted on the score of his remembering the revealed texts that he had studied during the previous time-cycles.[2]

The Sāṅkhyas do not accept the validity of the verbal testimony of ordinary trustworthy persons. It is not recognised in the Sāṅkhya as a seperate Pramāṇa, since it depends on perception and inference. It is the testimony of the Veda or the Smṛti that is admitted as the third independent Pramāṇa, since it gives us true knowledge about supersensuous realities which cannot be known through perception and inference.

The authority of the Vedas may not be questioned since they are Apauruṣeya or impersonal. But since the revelations of Kapila are

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1 " तच्च स्वत: प्रमाणम् । अपौरुषेयवेदवाक्यजनितत्वेन सकलदोषाशङ्का-
विनिर्मुक्तेर्युक्तं भवति । एवं वेदमूलस्मृतीतिहासपुराणवाक्यजनितमपि ज्ञानं
युक्तं भवति । " Tattva-kaumudī, p. 12.

2. " आदिविदुषश्च कपिलस्य कल्पादौ कल्पान्तराधीतश्रुतिस्मरणसंभव:. । "
Tattva-kaumudī, p. 12.

considered to be authoritative, there arises the
question of testing the authority of the revelations
of other sages who claimed similar reverence.
Sāṅkhyas argue that reason is to be applied in find-
ing out what revelations are true and what not.
Pseudo-revelations such as the scriptures of the
Buddhists, the Jainas, the materialists and others
are not authoritative, because these are not right.
This can be inferred from internal contradictions,
being devoid of any sound basis, containing asser-
tions unsupported by proofs, and being accepted
by only a few low and beastlike persons, Mlecchas
and others [1]

In the treatment of the Śabda-pramāṇa the
views of the Sāṅkhya and those of the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika are some-what similar. The Sāṅkhyas
never openly opposed the Vedas, and by their
acceptance they kept up their orthodoxy. They,
however, discarded many old dogmas and silently
ignored others.

With respect to the Śabda-pramāṇa the
treatment of the Yoga is similar to that of the
Sāṅkhya and there is nothing special about it.

In the Mimāmsā the discussion about the
nature of the Śabda-pramāṇa bears the greatest
importance, as the main doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā

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1 " अयुक्तत्वं चैतेषां विगानात् विच्छिन्नमूलत्वात्प्रमाणविरुद्धार्थाभिधानाच्च
कैश्चिदेव म्लेच्छादिभि: पुरुषापसदैः पशुप्रायैः परिग्रहाद् बोद्धव्यम् । ''
Tattva-kaumudī, p. 13.

is to establish the validity of the Vedas above all means of knowledge. The discussion relates to the question whether knowledge is presumably valid or not. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system maintains that the validity or invalidity of knowledge can be established only externally. The Mīmāṃsakas hold exactly the opposite view, viz. that knowledge by its very nature is valid. Suspicion of defects in the means and conditions, and the contradiction of it by other knowledge engender doubt and suggest the need for investigation. This doctrine of self-validity of knowledge has an important bearing on the validity of Veda.

Śabda-pramāṇa is defined as the means of knowledge that we get about things not within the purview of our perception from relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of, the words, of which they are made up.[1] It is of two kinds, viz. personal (Pauruṣeya) and impersonal (Apauruṣeya). The words uttered by men come under the first and the second denotes the Vedic words.[2] The first is valid if we are certain that their authors are not untrustworthy, and the second is valid in itself.

Mīmāṃsā has taken great pains to establish the impersonal character of Veda, since that

1 " तत्र पदश्रवणानन्तरं गृहीतपदपदार्थसङ्गतिकस्य पुंसः पदार्थस्मृतौ जातायां तैरेव पदार्थैः स्मृतैरज्ञातावाधितार्थविषयकं यद्विशिष्टवाक्यार्थज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा शाब्दी प्रमेत्युच्यते । तज्जनकः शब्दः प्रमाणम् । " Cinnasvāmī Śāstrī : Tantra-siddhānta-ratnāvali,"p. 63.

2 " अपौरुषेयं वाक्यं वेदः । " Nyāya-kośa, p. 803.

ensures its eternity and infallibility. It is poin-
ted out that in the case of the Veda there is no
tradition of divine or human authorship. Against
the view of Nyāya that the Veda is the work of
God, Mīmāṃsakas argue that God is incorporeal.
It is possible that the transmission of the Vedas
may continue from times immemorial by an unin-
terrupted tradition of teachers and pupils. Even in
the beginning of a world-epoch the creator may
remember the Vedas in the previous epoch and
teach them to the pupils. It is stated that the
Ṛṣis are not the authors of the Vedic Mantras but
they are only the seers, who are inspired with the
eternal truths. The Mīmāṃsakas even interpret
the historical references as applicable to some
universal phenomena. Thus the Veda is taken to
be infallible because it is impersonal and self-
existent. There is no possibility of any defect or
error since it had no beginning and end in time and
since it is not written by any one. As Kumārila
says, "Then too, in the case of Veda, the assertion
of freedom from reproach is very easy to put for-
ward, because there is no speaker in this case; and
for this reason the authoritativeness of the Veda
can never even be imagined."[1]

The impersonal nature of the Veda is based
on the doctrine of the eternal character of words
in general and the Vedic words in particular.
Jaimini refutes in detail the arguments advanced

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1 Kumārila-bhaṭṭa : Śloka-vārtika, English Trans.
by Gaṅgānātha Jhā, p. 31.

against the eternal character of words. He accepts that words exist for ever in an unperceived form. They are not created when they are uttered; they are made only manifest. Uttering the same word at the same time by different persons at different places does not contradict the eternal character of words, because it is possible in the case of an eternal omnipresent entity. Words do not undergo modifications, but other words are substituted for those which go out of use. The apparent decrease or increase in the volume of words is due to the sound uttered by different speakers.[1]

Both Prabhākara and Kumārila argue that the significance of words belongs to the significance of the letters themselves.[2] When a word is uttered each letter leaves behind the impressions of its significance and these combine and bring about the idea of the whole word, which has the power to denote the meaning. The potency of the word originates in the separate potencies of letters. Thus the letters are the direct cause of verbal cognition according to the Mīmāṃsā system. Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the doctrine of Sphoṭa, as is done by the grammarians.

According to the Mīmāṃsā the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal.[3] It

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1 Jaimini : Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtras, I. i. 12–17.

2 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 393.

3 " औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्ध: । " Jaimini : Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I. i. 5.

is natural and not created by convention. Words
and the objects denoted by them are both eternal
and so such relationship of words and their mean-
ings is naturally possible. If we are not able to
understand the meaning of a word, it is because
the accessories of its cognition are not accepted.

The process of understanding the meaning
of words according to the theory of Prabhākara is
called Anvitābhidhāna-vāda. This view accepts
that words denote things only as related to factors
of injunction.

Kumārila, however, thinks that words inde-
pendently express separate meanings which are
subsequently combined into a sentence expressing
one connected idea. This theory is called Abhihi-
tānvaya-vāda. The Nyāya also accepts the
Abhihitānvaya theory of acquiring the meaning
of words.

As the Mīmāṃsakas accept a permanent
relation of words and their meanings, it is impos-
sible to accept that words denote individuals. If a
word means a single individual only, there cannot
be an eternal connection between the word and its
meaning. So Mīmāṃsakas assert that words
denote classes and not individuals. Form (Ākṛti)
which is eternal is capable of relation with
eternal word.[1]

1 Kumārila-bhaṭṭa : Śloka-vārtika, English trans-
   lation by Gaṅgānātha Jhā, p. 281 f.

As is said above, verbal testimony is divided into two classes, viz. Laukika and Alaukika. Prabhākara holds that Laukika or non-Vedic verbal cognition is of the nature of inference. He does not include it in Śabda-pramāṇa. Kumārila, however, considers the non-Vedic verbal testimony also as Śabda-pramāṇa.

The Mīmāṃsā holds that the purport of Veda is action.[1] The sole use of Veda lies in directing us to some ritual. Vedas by means of their injunctions prompt men towards certain ritualistic actions by declaring that such actions are beneficial. They may also prohibit us from actions which lead to harmful effects. The part of Veda which does not contain such directions, but only gives information about already existing things would be useless. So such parts which are apparently unconnected with actions are to be interpreted as bearing on a ritual injunction. The Mīmāṃsā theory may be called ritualistic pragmatism, for according to it the value of Vedic knowledge is for ritualistic activities.[2] Dharma, for the ascertainment of which the Mīmāṃsā aims, is of the nature of action.[3]

1 " दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम् । " Śābara-bhāṣya on Jaimini-sūtra, I. i. 1.
2 Chatterjee and Datta : An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p. 369.
3 " चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः । " Jaimini : Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I. i. 2.

The Veda is the only source of the knowledge of Dharma. Perception and inference as also the other Pramāṇas are not useful in giving rise to the knowledge of Dharma, since it is beyond the apprehension through senses. They are useful in ordinary matters and for repudiating wrong views.

The Mīmāṃsakas broadly divide the Veda into (1) Vidhi or injunctions, (2) Mantra or hymns, (3) Nāmadheya or names, (4) Niṣedha or prohibitions, and (5) Arthavāda or explanatory passages.[1] All these five parts refer to action. Injunctions directly give the command or prompt a person to action. Mantras remind the performer about the details and the sequence of the action, and recall to his mind the substance, the deity and other things connected with the sacrifice. The names serve the purpose of distinguishing one ritual from another. The prohibitions are negative injunctions. The Arthavāda portion of the Veda is made up of praise, blame or legends about certain ritual, and it is accepted as an authority on Dharma, chiefly because it tends to the recognition of the excellence of the enjoined duty. It is accepted as authority only so far as it is capable of being taken along with the injunction declaring that particular ritual.

The Mīmāṃsā lays down many rules of interpretation by the help of which one can arrive at

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1 "मीमांसकास्तु विधिमन्त्रनामधेयनिषेधार्थवादभेदात्पंचविधो वेद इत्याहुः ।"
Nyāya-koṣa, p. 807.

the right purport of Vedic passages. It discusses
the auxiliary Pramāṇas by which one can decide
as to how Vedic passages may be connected with
each other as principal and subordinate. They
are six, viz. (1) Śruti or direct assertion, (2) Liṅga
or indirect implication, (3) Vākya or syntactical
connection, (4) Prakaraṇa or context, (5) Sthāna or
position, and (6) Samākhyā or name. Each pre-
ceding Pramāṇa is of greater force than the subse-
quent one.[1] The Mīmāṃsā discusses the auxiliary
Pramāṇas which decide the sequence of the details
of ritual from references in passages, at times
spread over at different places. It is explained
that the order of the performance of action is based
on six Pramāṇas, viz. (1) Śruti or direct assertion,
(2) Artha or purpose, (3) Pāṭha or sequence in
mention, (4) Sthāna or position, (5) Mukhya or the
order of the principal, and (6) Pravṛtti or the per-
formance.[2] The Mīmāṃsā has formulated the law
of nomenclature which has been divided into four
classes, as— (1) Tatprakhya or based on the
declaration, (2) Tadvyapadeśya or based on the
mention of similarity, (3) Yaugika or based on the
etymology, and (4) Vākyabheda or based on the
split of the declaration.[3] Discussion of how a

1 " श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रक-
    र्षात् । " Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, III. iii. 13. "
2 " तत्र च सहकारीणि प्रमाणानि श्रुत्यर्थपाठस्थानमुख्यप्रवृत्त्याख्यानि षट् । "
    Cinnasvāmi-śāstrī : Tantra-siddhānta-ratnāvalị,
    p. 115.
3 Gaṅgānātha Jhā : Śloka-vārtika, English trans.,
    Introduction, p. xxxi.

particular passage may signify Vikalpa or option,
Niyama or restriction of the purport, Parisaṅkhyā
or precluding a particular meaning from it occurs
in the Mīmāṃsā. All these and such other rules
are discussed as subsidiary to the elucidation of
ritual, since according to this system action is the
main purport of the Veda. Though these rules
are not very important from the philosophical
point of view, they have their special significance
in the study of the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas, since all
the Bhāṣyakāras have tacitly accepted them, and
have employed them copiously in the interpreta-
tion of scriptural authorities. Interpreting the
purpose of scriptures, according to these cannons
is recognised by Indian thinkers of different
shades of view.

The Smṛtis propounded by Manu and others
are considered authoritative. Their authority,
however, is dependent on that of the Veda. Sages
like Manu etc. being well-versed in the meaning of
the whole Veda remembered the declarations spread
over in its different branches, and put them down
in a simplified form in their books.[1] Thus the
authority of a Smṛti text is based on some Vedic
quotation. If it is not directly found, it is to be
inferred. The Smṛtis give us the knowledge of

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1 " मन्वादयो हि सर्वज्ञकल्पाः अधिगतनिखिलवेदागमरहस्या इतस्ततो विप्रकी-
र्णानि शाखान्तरगतानि वाक्यान्युद्धृत्य इदानीन्तनानां मन्दबुद्धीनामनुग्रहाय
स्मृत्वा च तांस्तानर्थान् स्वग्रन्थे उपनिबबन्धुः । " Cinnasvāmi-
śāstrī : Tantra-siddhānta-ratnāvali, p. 30.

such religious duties as are not mentioned directly
in the Veda. The Smṛtis in contradiction to the
Veda cannot be accepted as trustworthy.

The Advaita Vedānta accepts most of the
tenets of the Mīmāṃsā school as regards verbal
testimony as a means of Knowledge. A sentence
whose purport is not falsified by any other means
of knowledge is considered to be valid. The two
divisions of the Śabda–pramāṇa, viz. Laukika and
Vaidika are accepted.

Like the Mīmāṃsakas, Śaṅkarācārya believes
that the word is eternal and its significance lies in
the potency of the letters of which it is composed.
He does not accept the Sphoṭa theory of gram-
marians. He accepts the doctrine of Upavarṣa
that letters only are the word.[1] According to
Śaṅkarācārya, the letters of which a word consists,
assisted by certain order and number, have through
traditional use entered into a connection with a
definite sense. At the time when they are em-
ployed they present themselves as such to the
understanding, which, after having apprehended
the several letters in succession, finally compre-
hends the entire aggregate, and they thus unerrigly
intimate to the understanding their definite sense.[2]
Śaṅkarācārya asserts that individual letters have
their own intrinsic nature on account of which they

1 " वर्णा एव तु शब्दः इति भगवानुपवर्षः । " Brahma-sūtra
   Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. iii. 28.
2 Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. iii. 28.

are recognised as the same. So they are considered
to be eternal.   Besides it is the letters which have
got the meaning of the word, and so there is no
necessity to imagine the existence of Sphoṭa.

Acceptance of the doctrine of the eternity of
word paves the way for the proof of the theory of
the eternity of the Vedas.   The position of Śaṅka-
rācārya with respect to this point is midway bet-
ween the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. He
admits that the Veda is Apauruṣeya; but he rede-
fines that word so as to make it signify that the
eternal Veda is resuscitated by God at the begin-
ning of each Kalpa.   At that time there occur in
the mind of the creator first the Vedic words and
then corresponding to them he creates the uni-
verse.[1] In support of this theory Śaṅkarācārya
quotes from Mahābhārata, which mentions the self-
born Being as having first produced the eternal,
celestial Vedic word, which again, in its turn, pro-
duced all activities.[2] The Vedas embody the ideal
form of the universe, and so they are eternal.
What is meant by the production of this beginning-
less and endless Vedic speech is that it is being
imparted orally from the teacher to the disciple.[3]
Vedas, as a collection of words, begin to exist at

1 " प्रजापतेरपि स्रष्टु: सृष्टे: पूर्व वैदिका: शब्दा मनसि प्रादुर्बभूवु:, पश्चा-
    तदनुगतानर्थान्ससर्जति गम्यते । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. iii. 28.
2 " अनादिनिधना नित्या वागुत्सृष्टा स्वयंभुवा । आदौ वेदमयी दिव्या यत:
    सर्वा: प्रवृत्तय: ॥ " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. iii. 28.
3 " उत्सर्गोऽप्ययं वाच: संप्रदायप्रवर्तनात्मको द्रष्टव्य:, अनादिनिधनाया
    अप्यादृशस्योत्सर्गस्यासंभवात् । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. iii. 28.

the creation, and cease to exist at the universal
dissolution. This means that only the texts are
not eternal, while their significance is eternal. God,
the first promulgator of the Veda in every cycle
repeats it anew, but precisely as it was in earlier
cycles. The Bādarāyaṇa-sūtra अत एव च नित्यत्वम् (I.
iii. 29.) confirms the conclusion that the Veda is
the eternal source of the universe.[1] The Ṛgveda
tells us how the eternal speech which was dwelling
in the sages was found out by those who performed
the sacrifice. The origination of the world from
the Śabda means the actualisation of the same
words in the form of objects. The will of Saṃsāra
as a whole is eternal in spite of dissolutions and
creations. So the eternity of the Vedas is not
affected, because the names and forms of each new
creation are the same as those of the preceding
worlds that were dissolved.[2] The whole world in-
cluding the sun, the moon etc. is arranged by the
highest God on the pattern of the arrangement of
the previous world.[3] So in the period of dissolu-
tion of the universe the continuation of the Veda
is not stopped, inasmuch as there is the certainty
of the perpetual vision of the Veda by the creator.
Thus the Veda is self–existent; only it is not the

1 " अत एव नियताकृतेर्देवादेजंगतो वेदशब्दप्रभवत्वाद् वेदशब्दे नित्यत्वमपि
    प्रत्येतव्यम् । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. iii. 29.

2 " समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावपि महासर्गमहाप्रलयलक्षणायां जगतोऽभ्युप-
    गम्यमानायां न कश्चिच्छब्दप्रामाण्यादिविरोध: । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
    I. iii. 30.

3 " सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
    I. iii. 30

self-same Veda, but a series of re-issues of an eternal edition which goes back to the beginningless time. Its validity is self-evident and direct, since it constitutes the word of God.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, Brahman is the source of the great body of the scripture comprising the Ṛgveda etc., which is itself omniscient as it were. Such a body of scripture cannot originate from any one else except the omniscient Being. Śaṅkarācārya believes that the vast mass of the holy Vedic texts has originated from that great Being, even without an effort, in sport as it were, like human breath, as is declared in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.[1] Thus it may be seen that the authoritativeness of the Veda is defended on grounds other than those urged by the Mīmāṃsā system

His firm belief in the authority of the Vedas urged Śaṅkarācārya to find out a consistent view of the universe in all Upaniṣads regarded as one whole, by interpreting them in a single coherent manner. According to him the knowledge of Reality which we gain from them is uniform throughout, and is without contradiction.

Thus Śaṅkarācārya accepts the main position of the Mīmāṃsā with respect to the Veda, by assert-

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1 " अप्रयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनि:श्वासवद् यस्मान्महतो भूताद्योने: संभव: ‘ अस्य महतो भूतस्य नि:श्वसितमेतद् यदृग्वेद: ’ इत्यादि श्रुते: । ”
Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

ing that it is self-existent and eternal. As regards the purport of the Veda, however, his view is far different from that of the Mīmāṃsā. He does not accept that the purport of the Veda is action. He advances several arguments to refute the position of Jaimini and Śabara, who declare that activity being the aim of Śruti, passages which have no such aim would be useless,[1] and that the purpose of the Veda is to give the knowledge of some kind of activity.[2] He does not restrict the vilidity of Vedic texts to injunctive statements. According to him the truth revealed by the scripture is fundamental unity of Being. The only harmonious and cumulative conclusion of Upaniṣadic passages is the declaration of the nature of Brahman.[3] The words in these passages refer directly and undoubtedly to Brahman, so it would be improper to imagine that they refer to an altogether different thing, viz. action.[4]

Śaṅkarācārya points out that even the Mīmāṃsā recognises that there are certain passages in the Veda called Arthavādas, which refer to already existing things. The Mīmāṃsā system considers them valid by interpreting them as subor-

1 " आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम् । " Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I. ii. 1.
2 " दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम् । " Śābara-bhāṣya, I. i. 1.
3 " सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येणैतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनु-गतानि । " Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.
4 " न च तद्गतानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वयेऽवगम्यमाने-ऽर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता । " Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

*dinate to some action, since they serve no purpose
of their own.* So Śaṅkaıācārya asserts that the
passages declaring Brahman must be considered
equally valid as portions of Veda. Moreover as
they serve the great purpose of being helpful in
the realisation of the summum bonum of man's life
by making him free from all pains, the Upaniṣadic
passages declaring Brahman need not be considered
subordinate to action. So in the Advaita Vedānta
statements like ' Tattvamasi ' acquire an indepen-
dent logical value.

Śaṅkarācārya is prepared to concede that
action may be the purport of the Brāhmaṇa
portion of the Veda, but as regards the Upaniṣads
he firmly asserts that their main purpose is to
declare the eternal reality viz. Brahman.[1] Accord-
ing to him the teachings of the Karmakāṇḍa were
intended for inferior types of aspirants, whereas
the teachings of the Jñānakāṇḍa were intended for
superior aspirants. Karmakāṇḍa is intended for
those who are still under the spell of Avidyā, and
Jñānakāṇḍa for those that have seen the hollowness
of the activities it commends and are striving to
transcend them.[2] Thus Śaṅkarācārya gets over
the antithesis between the Jñānakāṇḍa and the
Karmakāṇḍa by assuming that they are addressed
to different classes of people.

1 " कर्मकाण्डे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्य इह तु भूतं नित्यवृत्तं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्य-
मिति । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

2 S. Dasgupta ; A history of Indian Philosophy,
Vol. I, p. 436.

Śaṅkarācārya's acceptance of such a grada-
tion of teachings is facilitated by his acceptance of
the doctrine of the relative authority of Pramāṇas.
Perception etc. which speak of diversity are con-
sidered to be invalid when they come in conflict
with the teaching of the revelation that all is one.
The primary aim of all Pramāṇas is to serve empi-
rical purposes. Common knowledge is true only
as long as the identity of oneself with Brahman is
not realised, as dreams are, until one does not
awake. In the same way the validity of all Vedic
texts is not absolute but relative. The Vedic texts
which speak of action and thus teach diversity are
only for empirical purposes. These teachings are
not true in the ultimate sense.[1] Only the Upani-
ṣadic statements that teach the unity of all beings
are true in the absolute sense. Though Śaṅkarā-
cārya accepts the doctrine of inherent self-validity
of Pramāṇas, he thus modifies it by the doctrine of
their relative authority.

In the opinion of Śaṅkarācārya scriptural
testimony is most important in metaphysical
matters. Again and again he reiterates that Brah-
man cannot be known through perception or other
means of knowledge; the fact that Brahman is the
self of all cannot be understood except by means of
Śruti passages such as— 'That thou art'.[2] The

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1 " प्राक् तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात्प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते । "
Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, Introduction.

2 " न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वं ब्रह्मण:, 'तत्त्वमसि'
इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्रमन्तरेणानवगम्यमानत्वात् । " Śaṅkara-
bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

ultimate oneness of thing taught in the Upaniṣadic texts cannot be negated by the perceptual experience of men. Inferences being dependent on perception cannot contradict the non-duality taught in the Upaniṣads. As all Vedānta passages declare the fundamental unity of Being, there is no proof to contradict it. Thus in metaphysical matters such as the nature of Brahman, Śāstra supercedes all other Pramāṇas. In this sphere perception, inference etc. may be serviceable when they do not come in conflict with the Śruti texts.[1]

In the opinion of Śaṅkarācārya the authority of perception is held to be supreme in the practical world, where even Śruti cannot supercede the facts given by perception. As regards the properties of matter etc. ordinary science is to be accepted as authoritative.

As all the Pramāṇas including the Veda are only empirically true, when the Śāstra speaks of the fundamental unity of Being, we have to accept that a false means may lead to a true end. Śaṅkarācārya accepts even this untenable position and points out many instances in life where an unreal thing indicates the real. This position does not go against his central doctrine, because all Pramāṇas including the Śāstra ultimately vanish at the reali-

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[1] न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् । किंतु श्रुत्या-
दयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणं, अनुभवावसानत्वात् भूतवस्तुविष-
यत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 2.

sation of the real nature of Ātman.[1]

Śaṅkarācārya does not give absolute validity
to Smṛtis.   They are considered valid in so far as
they conform to the Śruti.   Even though composed
by revered sages, Smṛtis cannot attain authorita-
tive status, if their statements are not based on
Śruti texts.[2]   As regards the question, which of
the conflicting Smṛtis should be accepted and
which should be rejected, he follows the view of
Jaimini.   He accepts the Smṛti which is harmoni-
ous in teaching with the Śruti, and rejects that
which comes in conflict with it.[3]

In discussing the theory of the eternal nature
of words, Śaṅkarācārya accepts that the words
denote the class and not the individual.[4]   The
relation between the words and the classes is
eternal.   The individuals have origin and destruc-
tion and not the classes.[5]

1 " न ह्यहेयानुपादेयाद्वैतात्मावगतौ   निर्विषयाण्यप्रमाणकानि च प्रमाणानि
भवितुमहॆन्तीति । "
Also:— " देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पित: ।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥ " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
I. i. 4.
2 Vide p. 89 n. 1.
3 " विप्रतिपत्तौ च स्मृतीनामवश्यकर्तव्ये ऽन्यतरपरिग्रहेऽन्यतरपरित्यागे च श्रुत्य-
नुसारिण्य: स्मृतय: प्रमाणमनपेक्ष्या इतरा: । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
II. i 1.
4 " आकृतिभिश्च शब्दानां संबन्धो न व्यक्तिभि: । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
I. iii. 28.
5 " व्यक्तिषूत्पद्यमानास्वप्याकृतीनां नित्यत्वात्त गवादिशब्देषु कश्चिद्विरोधो
दृश्यते । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. iii. 28.

Though Śaṅkaṛācārya accepts the concept of Jāti, later Advaitins like Citsukha do not accept it. Citsukha refutes the notion of class-concept on the ground that it cannot be proved either by perception or by inference. Moreover it is difficult to prove how it can be related with the individuals.

Śaṅkaṛācāryn generally accepts the various rules of interpretation evolved by the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and shows considerable skill in their application to Upaniṣadic statements without making them subservient to ritual. A few cases may be cited here as typical illustrations. In Sūtra III. iii. 44, he refers to the Jaimini-sūtra— श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात् । (III. iii. 13), and proves that the indicatory marks (Liṅga) in the Vedic texts quoted by him are of greater force than the leading subject matter (Prakaraṇa) of the portion where they occur. In Brahma-sūtra III. iii. 25, he quotes the same Jai-mini-sūtra and proves that Mantras which, either by indicatory mark (Liṅga) or syntactical relation (Vākya) or some other means of proof, are shown to be subordinate to certain sacrificial actions, cannot, because they occur in the Upaniṣads also, be connected with the Vidyās on the ground of mere proximity (Sannidhi). Proximity as a means of proof regarding the connection of subordinate matters with the principal matter is weaker than direct enunciation (Śruti).[1]

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1 " दुर्बलो हि संनिधिः श्रुत्यादिभ्य इत्युक्तं प्रथमे तन्त्रे । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, III. iii. 25.

Śankaıācārya refers to the law of nomencla-
ture discussed in the Pūrva-r.ī...āṃsā and points
out that in the meditation advised by the Vedānta
it is not applicable.   Following Bādarāyaṇa he
asserts that the cognitions intimated by all the
Vedānta texts are identical, on account of the
non-difference of injunction and so on.[1]

According to the system of Rāmānuja Śabda-
pramāṇa is defined as the instrument which pro-
duces the knowledge obtained from sentences not
uttered by an untrustworthy person or that which
is exempt from sense-errors (Karaṇa-doṣa) and
contraries (Bādhaka-pratyaya).[2]   It is classified
into two divisions, viz. Pauruṣeya and Apauruṣeya.
All the texts which depend upon the free will of
man are classed as Pauruṣeya and their authority
depends on their being trustworthy.,. The authority
of the Apauruṣeya scriptures, viz. Vedas stands un-
questioned.   They are considered to be eternal.
At every world–epoch Īśvaıa gives utterance to
them.   At the outset of a creation He evolves out
of his consciousness what past orders of the Vedas
have lain there and teaches them to Caturmukha.
This assures the eternality and the super-human
origin of the Vedas and thus there is absence of
errors and contraries.

1 " ये तु नामरूपादयो भेदहेत्वाभासास्ते प्रथम एव काण्डे ' न नाम्ना स्याद-
   चोदनाभिधानत्वात् ' इत्यारम्य परिहृताः । " Śankara-bhāṣya,
   III. iii. 1.

2 Śrīnivāsa : Yatīndramata-dīpikā, III.

The Smṛtis, the epics and the Purāṇas are considered to be authoritative, since they expound the ideas contained in the Vedas. Pañcarātra Āgamas also are accepted as valid since they owe their origin to the divine Vāsudeva.[1] Thus Rāmānuja reckons not only the Veda as revealed but also the Pañcarātra Āgama, regarding the whole of it as eventually going back to a Vedic or some equally untainted source. Thus he places the Pañcarātra Āgamas on the same footing as the Vedas.

In this respect the view of Rāmānujācārya greatly differs from that of Śaṅkarācārya. In the last Adhikaraṇa of Brahma-sūtra II. ii, Śaṅkarācārya remarks that the Bhāgavata doctrine deserves only partial acceptance, in so far as it holds that Īśvara is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe. He, however, asserts that the doctrine cannot be accepted entirely owing to the numerous contradictions in it and owing to its containing many passages contradictory to the Vedas.[2] But Rāmānuja strongly attacks this position. He defends the authority of the Pañcarātra Āgama by saying that it is the essence of the Vedas and it explains more easily their hidden purport.[3] He

1 "●अतो वेदान्तवेद्यः परब्रह्मभूतं नारायणः स्वयमेव पंचरात्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य वक्ता ...... । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. ii. 42.

2 " विप्रतिषेधश्चास्मिंश्छास्त्रे बहुविध उपलभ्यते .... वेदविप्रतिषेधश्च भवति । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 45.

3 " वेदान् .... सुरनरदुरवगाहांश्चावधार्य तदर्थयाथात्म्यावबोधि पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रं स्वयमेव निरमिमीतेति निरवद्यम् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. ii 42

quotes many taxts to support his view that the
Lord himself, being compassionate to the devotees,
has summarised the Upaniṣads in the form of
Pañcarātra Āgamas.[1]   He winds up the Adhika-
raṇa with a long discussion on the authoritative-
ness of the Bhāgavata doctrine, and argues that it
is strongly recommended in the Mahābhārata by
Vyāsa himself, the author of the Sūtras.   He
remarks that the statement that Śāṇḍilya, not
finding any satisfaction in the Śruti and Smṛti, at
last found it in this doctrine is opposed in no way
to the latter,[2] on the other hand it means a high
eulogy of them

It is very difficult to decide who of the two
Bhāṣyakāras has interpreted the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtra
विज्ञानादिभावे तदप्रतिषेध: । (II. ii. 44) correctly; and con-
sequently it is also difficult to decide whether the
Adhikaraṇa is only a refutation of the Bhāgavata
doctrine or whether it aims at establishing it.
Dr. Thibaut prefers Rāmānuja's interpretation of
the Adhikaraṇa.[3]   Dr. Belvalkar, however, thinks
that Rāmānuja's explanation lacks conviction.[4]

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1 " वेदान्तेषु यथा सारं सङ्गृह्य भगवान् हरि: ।
भक्तानुकम्पया विद्वान् सञ्चिचेष यथासुखम् ॥ Srī-bhāṣya, II. ii. 42
2 Srī-bhāṣya, II. ii. 42.
3 G. Thibaut : The Vedānta Sūtras with the
   commentary by Śankarācārya, Introduction,
   p. iii.
4 Belvalkar : Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with
   the comment of Śankarācārya, Ch. II, Q. ii.
   Notes, p. 205.

Dr. Ghate also holds the view that the opinion of Thibaut is not acceptable.[1]

According to the system of Rāmānuja, the authority of the Smṛtis is considered to be dependent on the Vedas. Smṛtis only help to clarify the purport of the Upaniṣadic sentences. The help of Smṛtis is necessary for those who are not so well-versed in the Vedic lore. But only those Smṛtis which do not contradict the Vedic doctrine are to be accepted as authoritative, while those which go against the purport of the Vedas are to be disregarded.[2] The authority of the Purāṇas and epics is also dependent on Śrutis in a similar way. It may be noted that the doctrine of Rāmānnja draws upon the Purāṇas and Pañcarātra Āgamas for support to a very large extent.

In the opinion of Rāmānuja, the Veda is the only authority for the knowledge of super-sensuous matters and Brahman can be known only through it.[3] Its veracity lies in a region beyond that which can be actually observed or understood by finite intelligence. There scripture is our only source though reason may be employed in its support.

1 Ghate : The Vedānta, p. 89.

2 Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 1.

3 " ब्रह्मणोऽत्यन्तातीन्द्रियत्वेन श्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविषयतया, ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रैक-
प्रमाणत्वात् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

Also:— " ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तराप्रज्ञातत्वां द्रढयति, तद् ब्रह्म न केनापि
प्रमाणेन व्यक्तम् । " Vedānta-dīpa, III. ii. 22.

In the system of Rāmānuja there is no necessity of considering the relative authority of different Pramāṇas, since valid Pramāṇas cannot contradict each other. The perception of diversity in the world is valid, so also is the scriptural testimony of the unity of Ātman and Brahman. These two are only to be reconciled by considering the diversity as the embodiment of the Lord. This view is supported by the Śruti text of the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa, where the world is spoken of as the body of God.[1] Here the testimony of the Vedic text must prevail; it cannot be set aside by ordinary perception. In the same way the perception of the reality of the outside world cannot be set aside by the statements of the scriptural texts which speak of its falsity. Therefore scriptures are to be interpreted in such a way that they do not come in conflict with the testimony of perceptual knowledge. Thus according to the Rāmānuja system all Pramāṇas are absolutely valid upto the end.

Śaṅkarācārya's view, that even scriptures are false in the ultimate sense and there is possibility of attaining knowledge by false means, is not subscribed by the followers of Rāmānuja. It is asserted that falsehood can never lead to truth. Only from one right knowledge we can come to another.

In the opinion of Rāmānuja all words ulti-

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1 Abhyankar : Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, Sanskrit introduction, p. 65-66.

'mately denote God.[1] They need not, on that account, be considered as synonymous, since the outward form of the denoted object is diverse, while the internal self of all is the Lord. In explaining the Vedic text concerning the creation of the name and form Rāmānuja has explained this doctrine in detail.

The principle that every word eventually signifies God helps us to understand the meaning of the Upaniṣadic statement " That thou art " according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita system. Here the word 'that' finally denotes God having the entire world as his body; and 'thou' denotes God having the individual soul as his body. Thus the whole statement declares the identity of the embodied God in both.

As regards the antithesis between the Karmakāṇḍa and the Jñānakāṇḍa, the view of Rāmānujācārya is different from that of Śaṅkarācārya. He does not consider that they are really antithetical, and maintains that the two portions of the Veda together form a single teaching intended for the same class of persons.[2] The scriptural injunc-

1 "सर्वे शब्दाः परमात्मन एव वाचकाः । " Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, p. 104.
  Also:— " इह तु सर्वावस्थावस्थयोः परमपुरुषशरीरत्वेन विदचितोस्त-त्प्रकारत्येव पदार्थत्वात् सत्प्रकारः परमपुरुषः सर्वदा सर्वशब्दवाच्य इति विशेषः । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1. p, 117.
2 " कर्मसमुच्चितात् ज्ञानादपवर्गश्रुतेः । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 5.
  Also;— Śrī-bhāṣya, III. iv. 26.

tions show what actions would be pleasing to God and what are against his command. The object of sacrifices is the worship of God and all the different deities that are worshipped in these sacrifices are but different names of God himself.[1] The Pūrva-kāṇḍa dwells upon the modes of worshipping God; and the Uttara¹āṇḍa upon the nature of God. Rāmānuja thus co-ordinates the two sections of Veda by considering them to be complementary.

As Rāmānuja gives equal importance to the Pūrvakāṇḍa and the Jñānakāṇḍa, his view is different from the Advaita view as well as the Mīmāṃsā view. Like the Mīmāṃsā he does not believe that the ultimate purport of Veda is only action. He asserts that the rule that the meaning of words is only to denote action is not binding.[2] Accordingly the doctrine that the Vedānta signifies the highest Brahman as the purport of the Jñānakāṇḍa stands uncontradicted.

The bearing of the doctrine of the co-ordination of the Jñānakāṇḍa and the Karmakāṇḍa is very great on the practical discipline of the Rāmānuja school. Actions that are taught in the Vedas are to be performed, not for obtaining fruits but for securing the grace of God. Man's actions cannot

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1 " धात्वर्थस्य यागादेरग्न्यादिदेवतान्तयामिपरमपुरुषसमाराधनरूपता समारा-धितात्परमपुरुषात्फलसिद्धिश्चेति फलमत उपपत्ते. इत्यत्र प्रतिपादयिष्यते । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 128.

2 " कार्यार्थं एव व्युत्पत्तिरिति निर्बन्धो निनिबन्धन: । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 124.

guarantee anything to him merely as their fruit but good or bad fruits are reaped in accordance with the pleasure or displeasure of God. By good actions and devotion there is an ultimate expansion of ône's intellect and finally in meditation bearing the character of devotion a man has an intuition of Reality.[1] Since the object intuited is not directly presented, the nature of Sākṣātkāra is said to be indirect in character; yet, so far as its immediacy and clearness go, it is not inferior to perceptual knowledge. This Sākṣātkāra is the means of emancipation and it is acquired through the grace of God.[2] Scriptural texts refer to the attainment of such Sākṣātkāra on the part of the sages Vāmadeva and others, who saw the one Brahman with the material and immaterial objects for its distinguishing modes.[3]

Madhvācārya refers to the Śabda-pramāṇa only as is employed in philosophical matters. He divides it into two kinds, viz. valid and invalid. The valid verbal testimony consists of scriptures, which are free from defects. These scriptures are again divided as Apauruṣeya, or those which are not the compositions of persons, and Pauruṣeya or

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1 " आपि च संराधने सम्यक्प्रीणने भक्तिरूपापन्ने निदिध्यासन एवास्य सक्षात्कार:, नान्यनेति श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यामवगम्यते । " Srī-bhāṣya, III. ii. 23.

2 " ज्ञानं च वाक्यार्थज्ञानादर्थान्तरभूतं ध्यानोपासनादिशद्धवाच्यं विशदतम-प्रत्यक्षतापन्नस्मृतिरूपं .... मोक्षसाधनमित्युक्तमस्माभि: पूर्वमेव । " Srī-bhāṣya, III. iv. 26.

3 Srī-bhāṣya, III. ii. 24.

those which are the compositions of persons. All these scriptures are included under the name Āgama or Śāstra. The Apauruṣeya scripture has absolute validity, and is considered to be infallible. The Pauruṣeya scripture may some times be fallible.

In the Apauruṣeya Śāstra, Madhva includes all the Vedic literature consisting of the four Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. In the the Pauruṣeya Śāstra he includes Mahābhārata, Rāmāyaṇa and the Pañcarātra Āgamas. Whatever scriptures are harmoneous in purport to these are considered authoritative, while others are not so.[1] Madhvācārya considers that the purport of the Veda and that of the Pañcarātra Āgamas is identical and so they are authoritative.[2] He, like Rāmānuja, shows greater leaning towards Āgamas and Purāṇas than Śaṅkara does.

Like other Bhāṣyakāras, Madhvācārya believes that Pramāṇas like perception and inference are not helpful in knowing the nature of Reality. We have to depend on scriptures in general and the Vedas in particular for the true knowledge of Brahman.

1 " ऋग्यजुः सामाथर्वा च भारतं पञ्चरात्रकम् । मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्र-
मित्यभिधीयते ॥ यच्चानुकूलमेतस्य तच्च शास्त्रं प्रकीर्तितम् । अतोऽन्यो
ग्रन्थविस्तारो नैव शास्त्रं कुवर्त्मं तत् ॥ " Madhva-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.
Also:— Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, p. 274.

2 वेदपंचरात्रयोरेक्यार्थाभिप्रायेण पंचरात्रस्यैव प्रामाण्यमुक्तम् । " Madhva-
bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

Madhvācārya gives equal importance to all the parts of Veda and considers that the hymns and the Brāhmaṇas are as useful and valid as the Upaniṣads. He does not consider that there is any antithesis between the Karmakāṇḍa and the Jñānakāṇḍa

Invalid verbal testimony as is found in pseudo-scriptures (Āgamābhāsa) consists of defects and discrepancies of many kinds. Not being capable to denote the intended meaning, denoting it in the wrong way, repeating what is obvious, not being directed to a purpose, being directed to an undesirable purpose, directing impossible means, directing more difficult means are some of the defects of verbal testimony which make it invalid.

Following Bādarāyaṇa, Nimbārkācārya also asserts that the nature of Brahman can be expressed only by a scriptural text,[1] as the signifying powers of such text directly originate from God. Perception and inference cannot be employed in super—sensuous matters.

In scriptures we hear of dualistic and monistic texts. The only way in which the claims of both these types of texts can be reconciled is by coming to a position that Brahman is at once different from and identical with the world of spirit and matter. The scriptural texts that speak of

1 " जिज्ञास्यं ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकमेव नान्यप्रमाणकम्, समस्तश्रुतीनां साक्षा-त्वरंपरया वा तत्रैव समन्वयात् ।" Nimbārka-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

duality refer to the duality that subsists between Brahman, which alone has independent existence, and souls and matter which have only a dependent existence. The scriptural texts that deny duality refer to the ultimate entity which has independent existence and which forms the basis of all kinds of existence. The texts that refer to Brahman by negations signify how it is different from all other things which are limited by material conditions.

Nimbārka does not accept the Mīmāṃsā view that the purport of Veda consists in enjoining the performance of action. According to him the goal of the performance of all duties is the attainment of emancipation. All deeds ultimately produce a desire for knowing Brahman and through it produce the fitness for the attainment of emancipation. The obligatory duties are helpful in purifying the mind and in producing a desire for true knowledge; and voluntary deeds are subservient to Brahman by producing a part of the bliss of the unity of Brahman or by producing superhuman bodies for the performer making him more fit for emancipation. Thus Nimbārkācārya subordinates the Purva-kāṇḍa to the Jñānakāṇḍa.[1]

According to this system the principle of Bhedābheda is the fundamental doctrine. Nim-bārka interprets the famous sentence "Tattvamasi" in the light of this doctrine. The word "Tat" signifies the eternal omnipresent Brahman, and

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1 Śrīnivāsa : Vedānta-kaustubha, I. i. 4.

"Tvam" refers to the individual soul whose existence depends on Brahman, and "Asi" brings out the relation between the two which is one of difference compatible with non-difference.

Nimbārka accepts the necessity of Smṛtis for the elucidation of Śrutis, but according to him the authority of Smṛtis is dependent on Vedic texts. Only those Smṛtis which are not contradictory to the Vedas are considered authoritative, the rest are invalid. Śrīnivāsa quotes from Manu and points out that all heterdox Smṛtis should be left out of consideration since they misguide the people.[1]

Vallabhācārya also asserts that the Sāstra is the final authority in metaphysical matters. The nature of Brahman as is described in the Veda must be accepted as it is, since it is known only from that source.[2] In this system the authority of scriptures stands supreme. Other Pramāṇas are useful only if they do not come in conflict with, and so far as they are in consonance with Śruti texts.

Vallabhācārya does not accept the allegorical method of interpreting Vedic texts. He believes in the literal interpretation, and asserts that every letter of Veda is to be accepted as significant, otherwise it would result in the non-belief

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1 Śrīnivāsa : Vedānta-kaustubha, II. i. 1.

2 " ब्रह्म तु वेदैकसमधिगम्यं यादृशं वेदे प्रतिपाद्यते तादृशमेवेत्यसकृदवो-वाम । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 19.

in the authenticity of the scripture as a whole. Even though the Mīmāṃsakas themselves accèpt the metaphorical interpretation of such portions of Veda as Arthavādas, he refuses to subscribe to their view.

Amongst the authoritative scriptures Vallabhācārya includes Bhāgavata also. In this system instead of Prasthānatrayī, there is Prasthānacatuṣṭaya, viz. Veda, Bhagavadgītā, Bādarāyaṇasūtra, and Śrīmadbhāgavata.[1] Each subsequent Prasthāna removes the doubt in the previous one and thus all of them together manifest the true doctrine.[2]

As Veda is authoritative in all its parts, the reconciliation of apparently contradictory texts is an important problem for Vallabhācārya. He believes that the whole of Veda consisting of the two sections, Pūrvakāṇḍa, and Uttarakāṇḍa, discusses only one topic, viz. God. On this ground he considers that the two systems of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa constitute one Śāstra and have the sole purpose of giving liberation to mankind. In this respect Vallabha, like Rāmānuja, follows the theory of Vṛttikāra.

According to Vallabhācārya, God possesses innumerable divine qualities of which Kriyā and

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1 Vide p. 63 n. 5.

2 " अतरं पूर्वसंदेहवारकं परिकीर्तितम् । " Tattavadīpa-nibandha, I. 7.

Jñāṇa are prominent. The Pūrvakāṇḍa represents the Kriyā aspect of God, while the Uttarakāṇḍa represents the Jnāna aspect, and consequently the two Kāṇḍas maintain their independence. This justifies the theory that the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā are two independent branches of one and the same science. Thus Vallabhācārya established the harmony between action and knowledge. In order to support his theory he also adduces an important argument by referring to the fact that Jaimini was a disciple of Bādarāyaṇa.[1] He considers that it is not possible for the pupil to teach a doctrine that comes into conflict with the theory of the teacher.

By the reconciliation of the Karmamārga and Jñānamārga naturally a greater stress comes to be laid upon sacrificial action. As a staunch follower of the Vedic path this is quite natural in the case of Vallabhācārya. In this connection it may be noted that he has been described by his son as Karma-mārga-pravartaka.[2] Vallabhācārya believes that the performance of sacrifices is calculated to please God, who gives the reward according to the qualifications of the performer. If he possesses the knowledge of Brahman, God appears in person and gives him gradual liberation. In the absence of knowledge, God gives the happiness of soul or the

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1 "तद्गुरुणैव व्यासेन ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रतिज्ञातत्वात् ।" Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

2 G. H. Bhatt : Journal of the Oriental Institute, I. iv. 353.

world of heaven. Vallabhācārya thus accepts the old theory of action cum knowledge in the path of Maryādā,[1] which is restricted to those who follow the ordinary orthodox method in their pursuit of liberation.

There is, however, another path which transcends all limitations. It is called Puṣṭimārga and in it one has to rely completely upon God's grace for liberation. If a person qualifies himself for the grace of God through most intense love and devotion, he may choose to show his grace to the man, and may give him liberation immediately.[2] By this theory of the two paths, viz. Maryādā-mārga and Puṣṭimārga, Vallabhācārya comes in possession of the spiritual legacy which reconciles action, knowledge and devotion.

The theory of Vallabhācārya lays more stress on the Śruti passages which describe Brahman as possessed of different attributes. The nature of God can be summarised by his attribute Saccidā-nanda. The Highest, when viewed from its aspect of Sat, and when associated with action only, is Yajñapuruṣa, who can be propitiated by actions as stated in the Brāhmaṇas. When the Highest is

1 " कर्मब्रह्मणो: क्रियाज्ञानयोर्षमिपरत्वेनैकयात् कर्तुंवाक्येषु सर्वत्र न विरोध: ।" Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 2.

2 " विहितसाधनं विनैव मोचनेच्छा पुंष्टमार्गमर्यादा ।" Aṇu-bhāṣya, IV. ii. 7.
Also:— पुष्टिमार्गोऽनुग्रहैकसाध्य: प्रमाणमार्गादि्लक्षण: ।" Aṇu-bhāṣya, IV. iv. 9.

viewed from its aspect of knowledge (Cit) and when associated with wisdom, it is Brahman, and it can be approached through Jñāna as stated in the Upaniṣads The Highest, when viewed from its aspect of bliss (Ānanda), is Kṛṣṇa, and he has to be worshipped according to the principles of Gīṭā and Bhāgavata.

Vallablācārya is also faced with the difficulty of reconciling the contradictory passages which speak of Brahman as Saguṇa and Nirguṇa respectively. He asserts that the Śruti passages which declare that the highest has no qualities mean merely that he has not the ordinary qualities. He believes that his main doctrine, that Brahman possesses extraordinary qualities and is such that in its nature even contradictory qualities are reconciled, stands unrefuted.[1]

The importance of Śabda Pramāṇa in Indian philosophy, and especially in the Vedānta system, does not deserve to be minimised. It is often argued by critics that the growth of Indian philosophical thought was stultified by the limitations set on it by an undue reverence for the authority of scriptures. Whether this objection is based on plausible reasons becomes only a debatable point, when we see that the great Ācāryas of the Vedānta

[1] " तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां वा ब्रह्म साकारमनन्तगुणपरि-
पूर्णं चेति नाव्यक्तमेवेति निश्चय: । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, III. ii. 24.

Also:— " तस्माच्छ्रुतिप्रत्यक्षै: सर्वविरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वेन ब्रह्मप्रतीतेनं
विरोध: । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, III. ii. 21.

system, viz. Śaṅkarācārya and others, upheld, the authority of scriptures and yet opened up astoundingly new avenues of thought. Here I only intend to make out that the acceptance of Śabda Pramāṇa in the way of the Āchāryas serves an important purpose in philosophical method. In admitting Śabda as a full-fledged means of knowledge, the Vedānta recognises the value of intuitive thought. In doing this it also recognises the fact that philosophical thought has a structure of its own, and in its changes it obeys the laws of that structure.[1]

In the realm of metaphysics, we arrive at a stage where it is suspected that the chain of our arguments leads us quite beyond the reach of our faculties. There we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies or probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses.[2] At such a stage the right understanding of the recorded intuitive experiences of an uninterrupted tradition of mystics is the only recourse. The importance of Śabda Pramāṇa must be viewed in this light.

Thus the Ācāryas seem to be on the right path, when they view the truths recorded in the Vedas as authoritative. To them these truths are

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1 Collingwood : An essay on philosophical method, p. 224.

2 Collingwood : An essay on philosophical method, p. 223.

the products of spiritual intuition on the part of
Ṛṣis, the seers who were able to discern the eternal
truths by raising their life spirit to the plane of
universal spirit.   Their value is acquired from
their adequacy to experience.[1]   When the Vedas
are regarded as the highest authority, all that is
meant is that the most exact of all authorities is
the authority of facts.[2]

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1 S. Radhakrishnan : An Idealist View of life,
   p. 90.
2 Cf. Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyakāras interpreting the
   word Pratyakṣa in the Sūtras as denoting Vedic
   texts. Vide, p. 88-89.

Other Pramānas.

Upamāna.

Amongst the remaining Pramāṇas Upamāna comes first, because it is accepted by three important systems of Indian philosophy. The Nyāya deals with it after perception and inference and before verbal testimony, thus indicating its relative importance as a source of knowledge. According to this system, Upamāna is the means by which we gain the knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously well-known.[1] We have such knowledge when we are told by some authoritative person that a word denotes a class of objects of a certain description and then we apply the word to some objects which fit in with that description, although we might not have seen them before. Thus the knowledge originates from the remembrance of a sentence wherein occurs a statement transferring the form of one object to another.[2] For example, hearing that a wild ox is like a cow, we guess that the animal which we find to be like the cow is the Gavaya or wild ox. Upa-

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1 " प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् । " Nyāya-sūtra, I. i. 6.
2 " अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकृतं गोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानमुपमानम् । "
Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 45.

māna consists in associating a thing unknown before with its similarity with some other known thing[1] It is the way of knowing the denotation of words, and it solves the problem of identification. Even though similarity is perceived by the visual sense, yet the association of the name in accordance with the perception of similarity and the instruction received is a separate act, and so Upamāna is considered to be a separate source of knowledge.

In Upamāna we do not count the points of resemblance but weigh them. So it is necessary that the resemblances are essential and have relation to the causal tie.[2]

The scope of this Pramāṇa is quite narrow. Yet in practice it is very useful in extending our acquaintance with language. Though Upamāna is generally rendered as analogy in English, it does not correspond to the modern argument by Analogy.[3]

The Vaiśeṣika does not accept Upamāna as an independent source of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika-sūtra does not even refer to it. Praśastapāda

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1 " संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्करणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । " Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 49.

2 " न साधर्म्यस्य कृत्स्नप्रायाल्पभावमाश्रित्योपमानं प्रवर्तते, किं तर्हि, प्रसिद्ध-साधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनभावमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, II. i. 46.

3 Hiriyanna : The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, p. 259.

holds that Upamāna is the same as faith in a trustworthy person, and hence a case of inference.[1]

The Sāṅkhya also holds that Upamāna is not an independent source of knowledge. The Sāṅkhyas argue that the instruction is verbal knowledge, and the perception of similarity is perceptual knowledge. But the final knowledge of the identification is a case of inference based on these two.[2] The Yoga view in this respect is quite similar to that of the Sāṅkhya system.

Upamāna is accepted as an independent means of knowledge by the Mīmāṃsā system. The sense in which the Mīmāṃsā accepts Upamāna is, however, quite different from that of Nyāya. According to the Mīmāṃsā, when we see a certain object and remember another, the cognition that we have of the similarity of the remembered object to the seen one is said to be due to Upamāna.[3] Śabara states that Upamāna constitutes similarity which brings about the cognition of an object not in contact with the senses, e. g. the sight of the Gavaya reminds one of the cow.[4]

1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 333 n.

2 " योऽप्ययं गवयशब्दो गोसदृशस्य वाचक इति प्रत्यय:, सोऽप्यनुमानमेव । " Vācaspati-miśra : Tattva kaumudī, p. 40.

3 " पूर्वदृष्टेऽर्थे स्मर्यमाणे यद् दृश्यमानार्थसादृश्यज्ञानं सोपमिति: । तत्करण-मुपमानम् । " Tantra-siddhānta-ratnāvali, p. 68.

4 " उपमानमपि सादृश्यमसंनिकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिमुत्पादयति यथा गवयदर्शनं गोस्मरणस्य । " Śabara-bhāṣya, I. i. 5.

Upamāna is regarded as a separate Pramāṇa, because by it we can apprehend the similarity existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is distinct from perception, since by it we cognize something which is not in contact with the senses. It is not included in inference, because an invariable concomitance cannot be used in the cognition of the similarity. It cannot also be included in verbal testimony because the know-ledge that the cow is like the wild ox does not arise from verbal testimony.

The difference between the Nyāya view and the Mīmāṃsā view is that, in the former Upamāna has for its sole object the relation between a word and its meaning, while in the latter it is accepted that reciprocal similarity is known through it.

In the science of ritual, the Mīmāṃsā em-ploys Upamāna to practical purposes. As is said by Kumārila, Upamāna is different from inference since its use lies in such cases as the Saurya sacrifice, where no concomitance of the factors of procedure, fire etc, is available and hence mere similarity cannot bring about the association of fire etc.[1]

As regards Upamāna the views of both Pra-bhākara and Kumārila are almost similar. The

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1 " भिन्नानुमानादनुमेयतोक्ता सौर्यादिवाक्यैरसहाऽपि दृष्टम् । सादृश्यतोऽन्या-दियुतं कथं नु प्रत्याययेदित्युपयुज्यते नः ॥ " Sloka-vārtika, VI. vii. 62.

only difference between them is about the notion of similarity. Kumārila regards similarity as only a quality of the two objects, while Prabhākara regards it as a distinct category.

Śankarācārya refers only to the three Pramāṇas, perception, inference and scriptural testimony. As he has not worked out a logical theory of Pramāṇs, we cannot directly ascertain his views with respect to the remaining Pramāṇas like Upamāna etc. Later writers like Dharmarājādhvarīndra formulated the theory of Pramāṇas, and recognised Upamāna, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi as independent sources of knowledge, on the basis of the Mīmāṃsā views, which were tacitly followed by the Vedāntins previous to him.[1]

According to the Advaita theory, the functioning of Upamāna requires the collocation of instruments, which consist partly of conscious and partly of material factors, and in it the cognisance of similarity with other material conglomerations gives rise to the necessary modification of the mind.

In the Advaita theory Upamāna does not play an important part, since its scope is limited. It cannot deal with such important topics as the nature of Brahman etc.[2]

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1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 471 n.

2 "उपमानादिकशक्यशक्कम् । नियतविषयत्वात् । " Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 414.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita system accepts only three Pramāṇas, viz. perception, inference and scripture. Rāmānuja himself appears to hold the view that only these three should be considered as independent Pramāṇas.[1] He is, however, aware that there is difference of opinion as regards the number of valid means of knowledge;[2] and in refuting the arguments of his opponents, he refers to other Pramāṇas also.

Vcṅkaṭaṇātha and Śrīnivāsa hold the traditional view that Ramānuja admitted only three Pramāṇas. As regards Upamāna Pramāṇa, Śrīnivāsa definitely states that his system does not accept such postulations as constituting Upamāna as a distinct means of knowledge.[3] Meghanādāri, however, considers that Rāmānuja admitted Upamāna and Arthāpatti in addition to the three. According to him Upamāna is a separate Pramāṇa, through which it is possible to have the knowledge of similarity of a perceived object with an unperceived one, when there is previously a knowledge of the similarity of the latter with the former. His interpretation of Upamāna is different from that given in the Nyāya, where it is interpreted to mean

1 " प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाख्यं प्रमाणजातम् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 98.

2 " प्रमाणसंख्याविवादेऽपि सर्वैरभ्युपगतप्रमाणानामयमेव विषय इति न केनापि प्रमाणेन निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. I, p. 29

3 Yatīndra-mata-dīpikā, I.

the association of a word with its object on the, basis of similarity.[1]

Madhvācārya accepts only three Pramāṇas and considers Upamāna to be a variety of inference.

Nimbārka also admits only three Pramāṇas and others are included in these three. According to his school, Upamāna consists of the knowledge of similarity. It may be due to perception or through a scriptural assertion of similarity. Thus a man may perceive the similarity of the face to the moon, or he may learn from the scripture that the self and God are similar in nature and in this way comprehend the similarity. Upamāna is included within the proposition of instance or illustration in an inference.

As is said before Vallabhācārya admits all Pramāṇas, according as they can be useful. As regards the definite number of authentic Pramāṇas he is indifferent. In his Aṇu-bhāṣya, we do not come across statements where Upamāna is emiployed as an independent Pramāṇa.

Arthāpatti.

Arthāpatti, which is variously rendered as implication, presumption, postulation or apparent inconsistency, is the next Pramāṇa that deserves

1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 234.

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notice.   Besides the four discussed before, this new
Pramāṇa is admitted by the Mīmāṃsā though not
by the Nyāya. According to the Mīmāṃsā Arthā-
patti is the assumption of a thing, where the cog-
nition of another thing cannot be explained without
that assumption.[1] As Kumārila says, "A case –
where, in order to avoid the contradiction (or
irrelevancy) of any object ascertained by means of
any of the six means of right notion, an unseen
object or fact is assumed – is known to be one of
Arthāpatti (apparent inconsistency)."[2]   Thus
Arthāpatti is the necessary supposition of an un-
perceived fact, which alone can explain a pheno-
menon that demands explanation.   It renders ex-
plicit what is already implicit in two truths, which
appear mutually incompatible.   Thus in the case
of a man, who is growing fat and who is observed
to fast during the day, we have to presume that he
must be eating at night.   Knowledge obtained by
Arthāpatti is distinctive because it is not reducible
to perception, inference, testimony or comparison.

Prabhākara is of the opinion that in the in-
consistency of the two observed facts there is an
element of doubt, which gives rise to Arthāpatti.
But Kumārila thinks that there is no doubt about
any of the observed facts. According to him, the
mind oscillates between two contradictory poles,

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1 " प्रमितस्यार्थस्यार्थान्तरेण विनाऽनुपपत्तिमालोच्य तदुपपत्यर्थमर्थस्य कल्पनं
यत् साऽर्थापत्ति: ।" Tantra-siddhānta-ratnāvali, p. 69.

2 Ślokavārtika, English Trans. by Gaṅgānātha
Jhā, p. 230.

both of which it accepts but cannot reconcile, and as a result arrives at the reconciliation in the presumption. Arthāpatti is thus the result of Arthānupapatti or the contradiction of the present perception with a previously acquired knowledge.[1]

Though Arthāpatti resembles a hypothesis, there is a great difference between the two. It signifies the discovery of a new fact, which is believed in as the only possible explanation, and there is an element of certainty. It does not possess the tentative or provisional character, as is done by a hypothesis.[2]

Mīmāṃsakas distinguish between two kinds of Arthāpatti, viz. Dṛṣṭārthāpatti and Śrutārthāpatti. The first is employed to explain something which is perceived, while the second is employed to explain the meanings of words heard. In the opinion of Kumārila, in the Mīmāṃsā-śāstra in all the cases, (1) where a Śruti is assumed on the ground of another Śruti, (2) when a passage is assumed to apply to a definite sacrifice through 'Power' etc., and (3) where the result etc. of a sacrifice are assumed from outside, we have Arthāpatti.[3] On the Arthāpatti Pramāṇa, the Mīmāṃ-

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1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 391-392.

2 Chatterjee & Datta : An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p. 374.

3 Śloka-vārtika, English trans. by Gaṅgānātha Jhā, p. 242.

sakas base their beliefs such as that in the survival
of the self after death or in the rewards promised
by the Veda for the performance of various rites
even though they are to be reaped in the
future life.[1]

Naiyāyikas do not accept Arthāpatti as a
separate Pramāṇa. The Nyāya explains it as con-
sisting in the presumption of a fact on the basis of
another fact, e. g. when it is asserted that ' there is
no rain when there are no clouds ', what is implied
is ' there is rain when there are clouds '.[2] Accord-
ing to Vātsyāyana, what happens in Arthāpatti is
that, on our cognising what is asserted by a sen-
tence, there arises the cognition of what is not
asserted by it. This cognition is due to the rela-
tion of opposition subsisting between what is asser-
ted and what is not asserted; and thus it is only an
inference.[3] Naiyāyikas believe that all cases of
Arthāpatti are accounted for by Kevalavyatireki
Anumāna.[4]

The difference between the Mīmāṃsā view

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1 Hiriyanna : The Essentials of Indian Philoso-
 phy, p. 141–142.
2 " यत्राभिधीयमानेऽर्थे योऽन्योऽर्थः प्रसज्यते सोऽर्थापत्तिः । यथा मेघेष्वसत्सु
 वृष्टिनं भवतीति । किमत्र प्रसज्यते ? सत्सु भवति । " Vātsyāyana-
 bhāṣya, II. ii. 1.
3 " वाक्यार्थसंप्रत्ययेनानभिहितस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यनीकभावाद् ग्रहणमर्थापत्तिरनु-
 मानमेव । " Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, II. ii. 2.
4 " इति केवलव्यतिरेकयनुमानेनैव रात्रिभोजनस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात् किमर्थमर्थाे-
 ऽर्थिः पृथक्त्वेन कल्पनीया । " Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 52.

and the Nyāya view on this point is that the for-
mer system recognises a separate Pramāṇa called
Arthāpatti to account for all kinds of presumptions
and thereby dispenses with the Kevalavyatireki in-
ference, while the latter accepts the Kevalavyati-
reki inference and repudiates Arthāpatti. In the
controversy between the Naiyāyikas and the
Mīmāṃsakas about Arthāpatti, the truth is that it
is disjunctive reasoning and is not syllogistic in the
ordinary sense of the expression.[1]

The Vaiśeṣika-sūtra does not refer to Arthā-
patti at all, while Praśastapāda includes it in infe-
rence. The Sāṅkhya system also does not recog-
nise Arthāpatti as a separate Pramāṇa, and includes
it in inference.[2] The Yoga follows the Sāṅkhya
view in this respect.

In the opinion of Madhusūdana, a follower
of the Advaita school, Arthāpatti, which is also
called Anyathānupapatti or the impossibility of ex-
plaining a thing ortherwise, is itself a means of
knowledge, which is quite authentic. He quotes a
verse which lays down that, if a fact is proved by
the absence of any other explanation, that absence
itself crushes all doubts and objections based upon
the impossibility of finding out a parallel illustra-
tion. That absence itself is the most powerful
among all means of knowledge.[3]

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1 M. Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian Philosophy,
  p. 321.
2 Vācaspati-miśra : Tattva-kaumudī, p. 15-16.
3 Madhusūdana : Siddhānta-bindu, p. 145.

In the Advaita system, Arthāpatti is used to establish certain important propositions For example, the cessation of ignorance, consequent on the perception of the significance of such scriptural texts as " That thou art " and others, is based on Arthāpatti, because the perception of Brahman destroys ignorance is a fact of one's experience and there is no other explanation of the cessation of ignorance than this.

The Advaita doctrine, that the transmigrating world is an indescribable illusion, is proved by means of Arthāpatti based on its perception and consequent sublation which cannot be explained otherwise.[1] In the same way all cases of illusion as the false silver perceived on the shell are accepted as an indescribable entity whose nature is beyond the ascertainment as real or unreal, on account of the absence of explanation of their perception and consequent sublation.

In the Visisṭādvaita system, Śrīnivāsa refers to Arthāpatti and explains it, but he includes it in Anumāna.[2] Meghanādāri, however, does not regard Arthāpatti as a case of inference. He gives it the the position of an independent source of knowledge.[3]

1 " स्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्यानिवंचनीय: प्रपञ्चविवर्त्तं इति सिद्धम् । "
   Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, p. 420
2 Śrīnivāsa : Yatīndramata-dīpikā, II.
3 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 235.

In the opinion of Veṅkaṭanātha and Śrīnī-vāsa, Rāmānuja himself does not accept Arthāpatti as a separate Pramāṇa. In his Śrī-bhāṣya, Ramā-nuja refers to Artl āpatti, but it is for explaining away the cases of Arthāpatti, advocated by the Advaita school. For example, he argues that Avidyā cannot be established by scriptural evi-dence as well as by the evidence of circumstantial presumption in relation to the interpretation of the scriptural texts as 'That thou art'.[1] For the employment of Arthāpatti there must be some Anupapatti or inappropriateness in presuming otherwise. A case of sɔ called Artlāpatti can be explained away by showing that there is no inap-propriateness in one's own assumption.[2] He proves that Avidyā is not established by means of the inappropriateness, which, in its absence, would result in relation to the teaching of unity betweeɳ the individual self and the supreme self.[3]

Sáyaṇa-Mādhva seems to be of the opinion that Rāmānuja accepteɖ Artlāɔatti as a separate Pranāɳɑ, when he remarks that being supported by inference and implication the Vedic texts, such as "Having seen that the worlds secured by action are transitory, a Bɪāhmaṇa should be disguṣted of them, considering that the uncreated cannot be

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1 " श्रुतितदर्थापत्तिभ्यामज्ञानसिद्धिरनन्तरमेव वदयते । " Śɪī-bɛāṣɟa, I. i. I, p. 91.

2 " नानुपपत्तिरपि कस्यचिद् दृश्यते । " Śɪī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 34.

3 " नाप्यैक्योपदेशानुपपत्त्या । " Śɪī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 100.

"secured by action," reveal the transitoriness of the fruit of action and the eternity of the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman.[1]

According to the system of Nimbārka, implication is taken as a species of inference and not as a separate Pramāṇa For example, the assumption, that Gods possess bodies, since their meditation on Brahman cannot be explained otherwise,[2] is not considered as Arthāpatti Pramāṇa, but is treated as a sort of inference.

In the Aṇu–bhāṣya we get references where Vallabhācārya seems to make use of Arthāpatti as an independent Pramāṇa. For example, he argues that a word denotes generality; so the convention as regards the sense of Vedic words is understood by those who are well–versed in Vedic lore. But for the association of form with generality Śabda Pramāṇa is not useful; for that a secular Pramāṇa like Arthāpatti is required.[3]

Anupalabdhi.

Anupalabdhi or non-apprehension is the sixth

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1 " कर्मफलस्य क्षयित्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलस्य चाक्षयित्वं .... इत्यादिश्रुति-भिर्नुमानार्थापत्युपबृंहितामि: प्रत्यपादि । " Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 118-119.

2 " शरीरं विना ब्रह्मोपासनानुपपत्त्या तेषामवश्यं विग्रह इत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । ' Nimbārka-bhāṣya, 1. iii. 27.

3 " संकेतग्रहस्तु वैदिक एव वेदविद्भिः कुतः । आकृतिमात्रार्थं लोकापेक्षा । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

Also:— " आकृतिश्चार्थापत्तिप्रमाणलभ्या । " S. Pāṭhaka : Bālabodhinī on Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

Pramāṇa, which is admitted by a section of the
Mīmāṃsā school though not accepted by the Nyāya
system.   Kumārila considers Abhāva or non-exis-
tence as a positive object of knowledge and accepts
Anupalabdhi as a separate means for cognising it.
He argues that the non-existence of a thing cannot
be perceived by the senses, since there is nothing
with which the senses can come into contact.   He
asserts that in the case of an object where the
aforesaid five means of knowledge do not function
towards the comprehension of the existence of the
object, we have Abhāva or negation as the sole
means of cognition.[1]   The ascertainment of the
non-existence of an object depends upon the
validity of negation as a means of cognition. When
we say, "there is no jar on the ground," we cognise
the absence of the jar by the Anupalabdhi or
Abhāva Pramāṇa.   To be valid Anupalabdhi must
be appropriate by fulfilling the circumstances
required for the functioning of other Pramāṇas.   If
a thing should have been cognised under certain
circumstances, then only its non-perception under
those circumstances is a proof of its non-existence.[2]

Prabhākara does not accept Anupalabdhi as
an independent source of knowledge.   He holds
that non-perception of a visible object in a place
is only the perception of the empty place.   This

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1 " प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते । वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभाव-
  प्रमाणता ॥ " Śloka-vārtika, V. ix. 1.

2 Chatterjee & Datta : An Introduction to Indian
  Philosophy, p. 376.

cognition of the substratum by itself is sufficient to infer the non-existence of the object that would have been perceived if it were present.[1] But this view is refuted by Kun.ārila by arguing that Abhāva or negation must be admitted as a separate category.

Even though the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts Abhāva as a separate entity of knowledge, it does not admit Anupalabdhi as an independent Pramāṇa for its cognisance. It accepts that negation is cognised by perception,[2] by means of a special kind of contact called Viśeṣaṇa–viśeṣya–bhāva because the organ of sense, say the eye, perceives only the empty space which is qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.[3]

The Sāṅkhya does not accept Anupalabdhi as a separate Pramāṇa. It accepts that the knowledge of Abhāva falls under perception,[4] since it

1 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 394.

2 " तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोध्यनुपलब्धिसहकृतेन्द्रियेणैवाभावज्ञानोपपत्तौ अनु-
पलब्धे: प्रमाणान्तरत्वासंभवात् । " Tarka-saṅgraha-dīpikā, p. 32.

3 " अभावं प्रकाशयदिन्द्रियं विशेषणविशेष्यभावमुखेनैवेति सिद्धान्त: । "
Tarka-bhāṣya, p. 54–55.
   Also:— अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभाव: संनिकर्षो घटाभाववद् भूत-
लमित्यत्र चक्षु:संयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात् । " Tarka-
saṅgraha, p. 31.

4 " अनुपलब्ध्यादीनां च प्रत्यक्षे प्रवेश इति । " Vijñāna-bhikṣu :
Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, I. 88.

does not admit Abhāva or negation as such, but interprets it in terms of the positive. The absence of a thing at a certain place is not anything distinct from a particular modification of the place itself in the form of vacancy.[1] Mere non-perception cannot prove non-existence, since it may be due to other causes, such as from excessive distance, proximity, disturbance of sense-organs, absence of mind, subtlety, intervention, concealment of the object, and intermixture with other like objects.[2]

The Yoga also does not accept Anupalabdhi as a separate Pramāṇa on the same grounds as those of the Sāṅkhya.

In the Vedānta system, Bādarāyaṇa uses the word Anupalabdhi in the Sūtras— "इतरेषां चानुपलब्ध: । " (II. i. 2), "न भावोऽनुपलब्धे: । " (II. ii. 30),"and " नित्योपलब्ध्य-नुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो वान्यथा । " (II. iii. 32). In all these there is no evidence for or against the assumption that he considered Anupalabdhi as an independent means of knowledge.

As regards the views of Śaṅkarācārya with respect to the Anupalabdhi Pramāṇa, it may be said that he accepts it as a separate means of knowledge. While commenting on Sutra II. ii. 17,

1 " न हि भूतस्य परिणामविशेषात् कैवल्यलक्षणादन्यो घटाभावो नाम । " Tattva-kaumudī, p. 16.

2 " अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् । सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानाद-भिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ " Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 7.

he wants to prove that neither Saṃyoga nor Sama-
vāya exists as an entity beyond the two objects
that are in relation. It is proving an Abhāva or
negation. So Śaṅkarācārya argues that if Sama-
vāya had been a real independent object, there is
no reason why it should not have been perceived
as such. It meets all the conditions for its percep-
tion if it had existed. But we do not perceive it,
and hence it does not exist. Thus Śaṅkarācārya
implies that for the knowledge of Abhāva a separate
means viz. Anupalabdhi is required.[1] In com-
menting on this statement, Ānandagiri remarks
that conjunction or coinherence are determined to
be non-existent, since relation as such is not any-
thing other than the two things which are related.
These relations cannot be perceived as such, and
hence as there is appropriate Anupalabdhi, it proves
the non-existence of such an entity.[2]

The Advaita doctrine that Māyā is a positive
entity is in a way indirectly related with the
acceptance of Anupalabdhi as an independent
means of knowledge. Advaitins accept that Nesci-
ence is cognised by perception. They consider
that the perceiving consciousness comprehends all

1 " तथा संबन्धिनोरेव संबन्धिशब्दप्रत्ययव्यतिरेकेण संयोगसमवायशब्दप्रत्य-
व्यहेत्वं न व्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वस्तित्वेन, इत्युपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धेरभावो
वस्त्वन्तरस्य । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 17.

2 " उपलब्धिरेव गमकतया लक्षणं यस्य तेन योग्यत्वेन प्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धिरस्त-
स्मिन्प्रमाणपञ्चकानुपपत्तिस्ततो वस्त्वन्तरस्य संबन्धव्यतिरिक्तसंबन्धस्याभावो
निश्चितः, योग्यानुपलब्धेरभावबोधितत्वात् । " Ānandagiri :
Nyāya-nirṇaya on Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, p. 447

positiv : as indefinite or specific Ajñāna, but it is
unable to comprehend a negation (Abhāva), 'for
negation is merely the absence of perception. Thus
when I say I do not know this, I perceive the inde-
finite unconsciousness with reference to that thing,
and this is not the perception of negation of the
thing. Nescience cannot be considered as ·the
absence of knowledge, since it is cognised by per-
ception and since the knowledge of negation is
obtained by Anupalabdhi according to the Advaita
school.[1]   Anupalabdhi is the means of mediate and'
not immediate knowledge.

In the Viśiṣṭādvaita system, Abhāva or Anu-
palabdhi is not accepted as an independent means
of knowledge. Srīnivāsa refers to it and remarks
that it is included in perception inasmuch as non-
existence of a thing implies its existence at some
other place or time.[2]

Rāmānuja refers to Abhāva or Anupalabdhi
many times in his Srī-bhāṣya, but that does not
mean that he accepts it as an independent Pramāṇa.
In refuting the position of Śaṅkarācārya, however,
he concedes to it the status of the sixth Pramāṇa
for the sake of discussion. For example, he argues
that objectless consciousness does not exist because
of the negative proof of non-cognition.[3]   He fur-

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1 " न तावदनुपलब्धिवादिनस्त्रोद्यमेतत् । परोक्षप्रतिभासहेतुत्वात्तस्याः । "
   Sarvadarśana–saṅgraha, p. 449.
2 Srīnivāsa : Yatīndramata-dīpikā, II.
3 " न च निर्विषया संवित् काचिदस्ति । अनुपलब्धेः । " Srī-bhāṣya,
   I. i. I, p. 35.

ther says that if, abondoning the peculiar support of the self-evident nature of consciousness, the opponent relies upon the absence of the means to prove that non-existence, then it would be well for him to stop the discussion, bearing in mind that the same non-existence is established by the negative proof of non-cognition relating to a necessarily associated thing.[1]

In the same way, while refuting Avidyā, Rāmānuja refers to Anupalabdhi as the sixth means of knowledge, as is employed by his opponent, the Advaitin, and he replies him on his own grounds. He points out that the direct perception of ignorance has not for its object the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, for that antecedent non-existence is made out with the aid of the sixth means of proof.[2] He also asserts that his objection holds good equally in the case where non-existence of knowledge is taken to be deducible by inference, and also in the case where it is taken to form the object that is to be established by the means of proof known as Abhāva (or Anupalabdhi)[3]

The followers of Nimbārka consider that it

1 " यद्येवं स्वतःसिद्धत्वविभवं परित्यज्य प्रमाणाभावेऽवरूढश्चेद्योग्यानु-
पलब्ध्येवाभावः समर्पित इत्युपशाम्यतु भवान् । " Śrī-bhāṣya,
I. i. 1, p. 35.

2 " अयं तु न ज्ञानप्रागभावविषयः । स हि षष्ठप्रमाणगोचरः । " Śrī-
bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 84.

3 " ज्ञानाभावस्यानुमेयत्वेऽभावाख्यप्रमाणविषयत्वे नेयमनुपपत्तिः समाना । "
Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 84.

is unnecessary to admit **Anupalabdhi** as a separate Pramāṇa, for according to this system negation (Abhāva) is not admitted as a separate category.. The perception of negation is considered to be nothing but the perception of the locus of the object of negation as associated with it; thus the Pramāṇa of negation in included in perception. ·

Though Vallabha does not repudiate Anupa-labdhi as a means of knowledge, he does not con-sider that it has any significance in solving philoso-phical problems.

The remaining minor Pramāṇas, viz. Sam-bhava or inclusion, and Ceṣṭā or action do not deserve any special notice, since no important system of philosophy has accepted them.

Tarka.

In Vāda, Tarka has an important part to play in resuscitating the arguments conducted by adducing Pramāṇas. Tarka facilitates the employment of Pramāṇas, and is thus very useful in the search of truth.

Śaṅkarācārya understands the word Tarka in its general sense of reasoning, and he includes in it also the process of reasoning involved in reconciling the apparently contradictory scriptural passages. He says that in the case of scriptural passages apparently contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences that involves Tarka.[1] He is, however, fully conversant with the technical aspect of Tarka, in which the Naiyāyikas use the word; and we find that the various forms of Tarka are extensively made use of by him in the course of his arguments.

As is stated before, Tarka is divided into eleven kinds, of which the modern Naiyāyikas accept only five which strictly conform to the defi-

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1 " श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्य-वृत्तिनिरूपणरूपेण क्रियते ।'" Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. i. 11.

nition of a logical contingency. Of these five,
Śaṅkarācārya *frequently* employs Pramāṇa-bādhi-
tārtha-prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum), Ana-
vasthā (regressus ad infinitum or non-finality), and
Itaretarāśrayatva or Anyonyāśrayatva (mutual
interdependence).

The illustrations of Pramāṇa-bādhitārtha-
prasaṅga variety need not be specifically men-
tioned, since they are common. In this variety
the argument always takes the form of a statement
which comes in contradiction to an abvious fact.
Anirmokṣa prasaṅga, which is frequently mentioned
by Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkarācārya is only a form of
this type of Tarka.

In establishing the intrinsic identity of cause
and effect, Śaṅkarācārya refutes the Samavāya
relation between these two entities with the help of
Anavasthā. He argues that even with the hypo-
thesis of intimate relation (Samavāya), if there has
to be assumed the relation of some sort between
the intimate relation itself on the one hand and
the intimately related objects on the other, bet-
ween this new relation and the things which it
keeps in relation again a yet new relation of some
kind has to be assumed, and so on ad infinitum,
and this would lead to the contingency of non-
finality.[1]

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1 " समवायकल्पनायामपि समवायस्य समवायिभि: संबन्धेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने तस्य
तस्यान्योन्य: संबन्ध: कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्ग: । " Śaṅkara-
bhāṣya, II. i. 18.

The Itaretarāśrayatva or Anyonyāśrayatva variety of Tarka is made use of by Śaṅkarācārya for introducing an objection against the assumption that the world is beginningless. He argues that Karman comes into existence only at a time subsequent to the creation, as being dependent upon differentiation into the body and the like; and if the differentiation into the body and the like were to be dependent upon Karman, there would arise the logical defect of mutual interdependence.[1]

Of the varieties except the five mentioned before, Śaṅkarācārya refers to Vyāghāta in II. i 14, when he raises the objection that if we assume absolute oneness, there being no manifoldness, the ordinary means of knowledge would be rendered nugatory, so also the scriptural prescriptions about Karman and the teachings about emancipation would be null and void. Śaṅkarācārya also mentions Apavāda and Utsarga,[2] but these varieties of Tarka do not involve logical contingency and hence deserve no special notice.

Madhusūdana defines Tarka as false assumption, which consists in the deduction as regards the existence of a comprehensive substance by the wrong hypothesis of a limited one. He is of the opinion that Tarka is a modification of the mind,

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1 " सृष्टयुत्तरकाले हि शरीरादिविभागापेक्षं कर्म, कर्मापेक्षश्च शरीरादिविभाग इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वं प्रसज्येत । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. i. 35.

    Also:— Vide Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. i. 36.

2 Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 31.

and it being so, the careful perusal of the Ve'ānta text, "Atman should be heard, thought of, and contemplated upon," makes it explicable as a reductio ad absurdum in the form of four-fold non-existence of the world based upon its connection of false identity with its substratum viz. Brahman.[1] He states that it is dependent on our will and so it is different from knowledge right or wrong.[2]

Rāmānuja often takes recourse, to Tarka for resuscitating his syllogisms, especially in the polemical parts of his Bhāṣya. Out of the five varieties of Tarka accepted by the modern Naiyāyikas, he frequently makes use of Pramāṇa-bādhitārtha-prasaṅga, Anavasthā and Anyonyāśraya.

The first one, which takes the form of imputing the contingency of arriving at conclusions undesirable or inconvenient to the opponent and thus proving the intended point indirectly, is most common. For example, Rāmānuja refers to the contingency of the self being indirect and inert,[3] the contingency of the absence of deliverance if Avidyā is considered to be associated with the self.[4] or the contingency of the means and ends being

1 Madhusūdana: Siddhānta-bindu, p. 199.
2 Madhusūdana: Siddhānta-bindu, p. 198.
3 " आत्मनो भिन्नत्वे घटादिवज्जडत्वानात्मत्वक्षयित्वप्रसङ्गः । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i 15.
4 " (जीवो) यदि नश्येत्, स्वरूपोच्छित्तिलक्षणो मोक्षः स्यात्, नो चेदविद्या-नाशेऽप्यनिर्मोक्षः । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 15.

ídential.[1] All these contingencies indirectly sup-
port the opposite view and thus are helpful in the
conduct of Vā la.

Anavasthā or regressus ad inflnitum is Rāmā-
nuja's favourite device for proving his own propo-
sitions. For example, he argues that the knower,
the known object, and the knowledge of conscious-
ness conditioned by them both, may themselves
be characterised as constituting the misguiding
error for the reason that they are conditioned; but
then they require another error at their root to
make them conditioned and erroneous; and thus
arises a regressus ad infinitum.[2] At another place
he argues that, if it be said that the true nature of
Brahman is concealed by some other cause than
the Avidyā, then the beginninglessness is given up
and the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum follows.[3]
In the same way he states that, if some other
knowledge that is calculated to remove Avidyā be
admitted, then, since that knowledge also is subject
to the threefold differentiation of the knower, the
thing known, and the knowledge, there would
result a regressus ad infinitum in relation to the
knower[4]

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1 " उपायोपेयगोरेक्यप्रसङ्गश्च । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 54.

2 '' द्रष्टृदृश्ययोस्तदवच्छिन्नाया दृश्येश्च काल्पनिकत्वेन मूलदोषान्तरापेक्षयाऽन-
वस्था स्यात् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 83.

3 " अज्ञानान्तरमिति चेदनवस्था स्यात् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1,
p. 87.

4 " निवर्तकज्ञानान्तराभ्युपगमे तु तस्यापि निरूपस्वाज्ज्ञानपेक्षयाऽनवस्था
स्यात् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i, 1. p. 121.

The Anyonyāśraya variety of Tarka is also frequently employed by Rā nānuja. For example. in disproving the position that the perception referring to diversity can be set aside by scriptures asserting unity, he points out that the defect in the perception cannot be made out by that same scriptural stultification of perception, for the reason that the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence would result thereby.[1] At another place in dis·cussing the implausibility of the concealment of Brahman by Avidyā, he argues that the ignorance (Avidyā), which forms the cause of con·ealment of the essential nature of Brahman, conceals Brahman, only after it is itself experienced by Brahman; and it is after thus concealing the Brahman, that it in itself becomes the object of its experience; thus there arises the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence.[2]

A few instances of Ātmāśraya variety of Tarka can be found in Srībhāṣya. For exar ple in the Pūrva–pakṣa of Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa, Rān ā-nuja argues that the individual self cannot be the agent of the assumption, which distinguishes it from Brahman, since that would lead to the fallacy of ignaratio elenchi.[3]

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1 " अनेनेव शास्त्रविरोधेन ज्ञास्यत इति चेन्न । अन्योन्याश्रयणात् । " Srī-bhāṣya. I. i. 1, p 52.

2 " किं च ब्रह्मस्वरूपतिरोधानहेतुभूतमेतदज्ञानं स्वयमनुभूतं सद् ब्रह्म तिरस्करोति, ब्रह्म तिरस्कृत्य स्वयं तदनुभवविषयो भवतीत्यन्योन्याश्रयणम् । " Srī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 87.

3 " नापि जीव:, आत्माश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात् । " Srī bhāṣya, II. i. 16.

Other minor varieties of Tarka are only rarely employed by Rāmānuja. For example, it becomes a case of Vyāghāta, when he argues that if we assume pure existence as the whole comprising all, then the God would be only a part of it, and thus all the scriptural sentences stating God to be the whole comprising all would be contradicted.[1]

Madhva does not restrict the word Tarka to mean a logical contingency. He takes the word in its broad sense of reasoning in general, and considers that its chief use is to resolve the apparent contradictions in the Śruti texts. He defines it as the cogitation to decide what sense should be accepted so that the previous and the subsequent Śruti statements may be reconciled, and he advises that other useless forms of Tarka should be avoided.[2] According to Madhva, Tarka thus takes the form of the devices to ascertain the right meaning of scriptural texts. Quoting Bṛhatsaṃhitā, he asserts that enunciation together with conclusion, repetition, novelty, purpose, eulogy and plausibility are the causes of ascertaining the purport.[3] These six constitute Tarka. In resolving the contradiction of scriptural texts, this Tarka

1 ,'' किञ्च सन्मात्रस्य सर्वात्मकत्वे अंशित्वे च ईश्वरस्य तदंशविशेषत्वात् तस्य सर्वात्मकत्वांशित्वोपदेशा व्याहन्यरन् । '' Srī-bhāṣya, II. i. 16.

2 पूर्वोत्तराविरोधेन कोऽत्राथोंऽभिमतो भवेत् । इत्याद्यमूहनं तर्कः शुष्कतर्कं तु वर्जयेत् ॥ '' Madhva–bhāṣya, I. i. 2.

3 '' उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् । अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्य निर्णये । '' Madhva-bhāṣya, I. i. 6.

is very useful. Thus Tarka is always based on
scriptural quotations; it cannot be used indepen-
dently.[1] It cannot contradict the statement of
Śruti texts; it can only be helpful in interpreting
them in such a way that they are harmonised.[2]
Thus for Madhva Tarka, Yukti and Anumāna are
synonymous.

Though rarely, we come across certain in-
stances, where Madhva employs the varieties of
Tarka in the sense of a logical contingency. He
explains the regressus ad infinitum in the two
Sūtras I. ii. 17 and II. ii. 13, both of which contain
the word Anavasthiti. Only once he has pointed
out the contingency of regressus ad infinitum inde-
pendently of the Sūtra text. He argues that in
eternal Vedic texts eternal defects should not be
assumed, on the other hand we should accept their
self-validity; otherwise there would be a regressus
ad infinitum.[3]

Madhvācārya has once referred to Anyon-
yāśraya or mutual inter-dependence. In refuting
the Buddhists, he argues that the aggregate is not
possible, since if one of the entities is assumed to

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1 " परस्परविरोधे तु वाक्यानां यत्र युक्तता । तथैवार्थ: परिज्ञेयो नावाक्या
   युक्तिरिष्यते ॥ " Madhva-bhāṣya, II. i. 17.

2 " न युक्तियोगाद् वाक्यानि निराकार्याण्यपि क्वचित् । विरोध एव वाक्यानां
   युक्तयो न तु युक्तय: ॥ " Madhva-bhāṣya, II. i. 26.
   Also:— Vide p. 61 n. 2.

3 " न हि नित्यदोषा: कल्प्या: स्वतश्च प्रामाण्यं अन्यथानवस्थिते: । "
   Madhva-bhāṣya, II. i. 3.

·be the cause, it is implausible, and if the entities are assumed to be mutually the causes of each ·other, there is mutual inter-dependence.[1]

In the Madhva-bhāṣya there are a few in stances of reductio ad absurdum. For example, Madhva argues that the soul cannot be assumed to be of the size of the body which it occupies, since it would be amenable to modification, and hence there is the contingency of its being transitory.[2] He explains the word Prasaṅga in II. iii. 32 also by reducing his argument to a reductio ad absurdum.

Nimbārka also understands the word Tarka in the sense of reasoning in general.[3] Still in many of his arguments he certainly employs the varieties of Tarka in its technical sense of a logical contingency. For example, he argues that the assumption of the non-existence of effect before production is not tenable; if we accept that, there arises the question why there is not the production of barley etc. from fire. This is nothing but an argument by reductio ad absurdum, which is mentioned as

1 " समुदायस्यैकहेतुत्वं न युज्यते, उभयहेुेकेऽप्यन्योऽयाश्रयत्वात्तदप्राप्ति:ः । " ·Madhva-bhāṣya, II. ii. 18.

2 " तत्तच्छरीरस्य तत्तत्परिणामत्वमिति न मन्तव्यं विकारित्वादनित्यत्व-प्रसक्ते: । " Madhva-bhāṣya, II. ii. 39.

3 " तर्कबलेन प्रत्यवतिष्ठने जगतो न चेतनप्रकृतिकत्वं विलक्षणत्वात् । " ·Nimbārka-bhāṣya, II. i. 4.

Yukti.[1]　It may be noted that he generally explains
the word Prasaṅga or Prasakti occuring in the
Sūtras as a logical contingency, and explains it by
means of an argument by reductio ad absurdum.[2]
Independently of any such word occuring in the
Sūtra he many times advances arguments on the
basis of logical reductio ad absurdum.

A few instances of regressus ad infinitum can
be found in the Nimbārka-bhāṣya. For example,
against the Vaiśeṣikas Nimbārka argues that, if the
atoms are assumed as possessing parts, there would
result a regressus ad infinitum.[3]　In the same way
he explains the word Anavasthiti in Sūtra II. ii. 13,
by pointing out the cogtingency of regressus ad
infinitum in proving the impossibility of the
assumption of Samavāya, which would require
another Samavāya to connect it with the related
entities.[4]

Vallabhācārya's Aṇu-bhāṣya shows that he
lays more stress on the interpretative aspect of
the Vedānta than the logical aspect; and so we

1 " यद्यसदेव कार्यमुत्पद्यते तर्हि वह्नेर्यैवायङ्कुरोत्पत्तिः कुतो नास्तीति
　　युक्तेः । " Nimbārka-bhāṣya, II. i. 17.
2 Nimbārka-bhāṣya, II. i. 1, 　　II. i. 8, 　II. i. 20,
　　II. i. 21, etc.
3 " सावयवत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । " 　　　Nimbārka-bhāṣya,
　　II. ii. 11.
4 " समवायोऽपि समवायिन्यां समवायसम्बन्धान्तरेण सम्बध्येतात्यन्तभेदसा-
　　म्यात्सोऽपि सम्बन्धान्तरेणेत्यनवस्थानात् । " Nimbārka-bhāṣya,
　　II. ii. 13.

·find that he employs logical devices of debate only
to·a limited extent. There are, however, instances
·where he makes use of some varieties of Tarka in
its technical sense of a logical contingency.

Of these there are many cases where he
reduces his argument of the from of Pramāna-
bādhitārtha-prasaṅga or reductio ad absurdum.
For example, he argues that the soul must be
accepted as beginningless, since otherwise there
would result the contingency. of repudiation of
what is done and acceptance of what is not done.[1]
At another place he points out that the investiga-
tion of the Vedānta would become useless, since
we cannot accept intuitive knowledge as its fruit;
because there would result the logical contingency
of the scriptural text enjoining pondering and
mediation being rendered futile.[2] Like other
Bhāsyakāras he often makes use of Anirmokṣa-
prasaṅga or the contingency of the impossibility of
final release.[3]

Vallabha also employs regressus ad infi-
nitum to a certain extent. For example, he inter-
prets the word Anavasthiti in Sūtra II.ii.13 by
pointing out that there would result a regressus ad
infinitum in the assumption of Samavāya, since a
thing which is related would require another entity

1 " कृतहान्मकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गश्च । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, II. i. 36.
2 " मनननिदिध्यासनविधीनामानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । " Aṇu-bhāṣya,
    I. i. 1.
3. Aṇu-bhāṣya, II. ii. 7, II. ii. 8, II. ii. 9.

like Samavāya to connect it with the related things. [1]
Similarly he argues that the Buddhist assumption
of Vāsanā or subliminal impressions is impossible,
since if we assume those impressions as beginning-
less, there would result the contingency of regress-
us ad infinitum, like the blind being led by the
blind.

There are a few instances of the contingency
of mutual interdependence (Anyonyāśraya) occur-
ing in Anubhāṣya. For example, Vallabhācārya
argues that disgust of the world etc. would result
after the purification of the mind by performing
actions dedicated to God consequent on the know-
ledge of Brahman. But this is impossible without
the investigation of the Vedānta, and hence there
would result the mutual interdependence of the
disgust of the world etc. and the investigation of
the Vedānta. [3] At another place, he argues that
Karman is impossible before the evolution, and if
it is assumed as taking place after evolution, there
would result the contingency of mutual interdepen-
dence, and refutes the objection by stating that
Karman is beginningless. [4]

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1 " यथा सम्बन्धिनि सम्बन्धान्तरापेक्षेवं समवायस्यापि । तथा सत्यनव-
स्थिति: । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, II. ii. 13.

2 " अनादित्वे त्वन्धपरम्परान्यायेनाप्रतिष्ठेव । " Aṇu-bhāṣya,
II. ii. 30.

3 " इदं च वेदान्तविचारव्यतिरेकेण न भवतीत्यन्योन्याश्रय: । " Aṇu-
bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

4 " पश्चात्त्वन्योन्याश्रय इति चेत्र । अनादित्वात् । " Aṇu-bhāṣya,
II. i. 35.

Nigrahasthānas.

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In Vāda or the dialectical method adopted by the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas, imputation of proper Nigrahasthānas is a regular feature, especially in the polemical parts. According to his logical acumen, a Bhāṣyakāra takes every opportunity to drive his opponent to the point of a Nigrahasthāna.

Śaṅkarācārya, being a very clever logician, is thoroughly successful in demolishing the doctrines of his opponents by pointing out their fallacies, which form the various Nigrahasthānas in Vāda. It may be objected against Śaṅkarācārya's method as is seen in the second Pāda of the second Adhyāya, that it is nothing but a sort of Vitaṇḍā. This objection, however is not tenable, since he never refutes a view-point only for the sake of refutation, but for establishing his own doctrine. In the very beginning of the Pāda, he makes it quite clear that, as the determination of the sense of the Vedānta passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, he has at first, by means of such determination established his own position. This task, according to him, is more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others.[1]

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1 " निर्णयस्य च सम्यग्दर्शनार्थत्वात्तन्निर्णयेन स्वपक्षस्थापनं प्रथमं कृतं, तद्धर्म्यहितं परपक्षप्रत्याख्यानादिति । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 1.

Amongst the Nigrahasthānas, Hetvābʰāsas' or fallacies of reason bear an important part. In the course of arguments, Śaṅkarācārya quickly dis- covers the fallacious reasons adduced by the Oppo- nents and points them out in a clear-cut way. This may be illustrated by citing typical instances.

There are many cases where the reason adduced is found to be Anaikāntika or inconclusive. For example, in refuting the Sāṅkhya he points out that the three constituents of matter, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas must be accepted as depending on the conjunction of several antecedents, since the reason, viz. being limited which is adduced in the syllogism is Anaikāntika.[1]

The fallacy of contradictory reason (Virud- dha Hetu) is pointed out by Śaṅkarācārya several times. For example, he argues that activity, which is adduced as a reason for matter being the cause of universe, is contradictory, since it also proves the contrary doctrine that the matter is governed by a sentient being on account of the very same reason viz. activity.[2]

A typical illustration of an Asiddha or un- proved reason may be cited from amongst the

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1 तदेतत्परिमितत्वं सांख्यीयराद्धान्तालोचनेनानैकान्तिकमिति दूषयति । " Vācaspati-miśra: Bhāmatī, p. 416.

2 " तस्मात्प्रवृत्तेरपि चेतनाधिष्ठानसिद्धिरिति 'सावितत: प्रवृत्तेश्च' इत्ययमपि हेतु: सांख्यीयो विरुद्ध एवेत्युक्तं वक्ष्यमाणा । " Vācaspati-miśra: Bhāmatī, p. 417.

several cases of this fallacy pointed out by Śaṅka-
rācārya. For example, he asserts the implausibi-
lity of maintaining that all outward and inward
effects are endowed with the nature of pleasure,
pain and dullness, because pleasure etc. are known
as inward states, while objects of senses as sound
etc. are known as being of a different nature, and
as being the operative causes of pleasure etc. Thus
it is pointed out that the reason, viz. being endowed
with pleasure, pain etc., is such that it is yet to be
proved and hence futile.[1]

In a syllogism, the Dṛṣṭānta or illustration
must be such that it is already indubitably esta-
blished. If it is not so, the syllogism becomes
inconclusive. In refuting the Sāṅkhya position,
Śaṅkarācārya points out this defect by saying
that the illustration of milk and water that is
adduced is no illustration, because it is not an indu-
bitably established fact but a matter falling under
the category of what is yet to be proved.[2]

Of the remaining Nigrahasthānas, imputation
of Pratijñāhāni or surrendering the accepted pro-
position is more frequent. In refuting the assump-
tion of an inactive conscious Puruṣa and active
inert matter co-operating to evolve the universe,

1 " अन्वयानुपपत्तेश्चेति च शब्देन हेतोरसिद्धि समुच्चिनोति । "
Brahma-sūtra Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 1.
2 " तस्मात्साध्यपक्षनिक्षिप्तत्वात्पयोऽम्बुवदित्यनुपन्यास: । " Śaṅkara-
bhāṣya, II. ii. 3.

Śaṅkarācārya refers to Abhyupeta-hāna, which is
the same as Pratijñā-hāni. He points out that
there ensues the defect of abandoning the accepted
position, for there is the Sāṅkhya assumption of the
Pradhāna (matter) spontaneously putting forth its
activity, and the assumption further, that the Puruṣa
does not originate the activity.[1]

In refuting the Buddhist tenet that Ākāśa is
non-substantial, Śaṅkarācārya imputes the Nigraha-
sthāna called Abhyupagama-virodha, which is the
same as Pratijñā-virodha or self—contradiction. He
argues that the Buddhist, who maintains that
Ākāśa is mere absence of limitation, will have
thereby to run counter to another of his dogmas,
viz. " Ākāśa is the substratum of the wind. "[2]

Śaṅkarācārya is aware that, if he goes on
refuting the same doctrines again and again, he
would be open to the fault called Punarukta or
repeating one-self, which constitutes a Nigraha-
sthāna. So in the beginning of the second Pāda
of the second Adhyāya he states that in the refuta-
tion he had done before he had endeavoured to
show that the interpretations of the Sāṅkhya etc.
are altogether fallacious, and then makes it clear

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1 " अभ्युपेतहानं तावद् दोष आपतति । प्रधानस्य स्वतंत्रस्य प्रवृत्त्यभ्युपगमात्
पुरुषस्य च प्रवर्तकत्वानभ्युपगमात् । "   Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
II. ii. 7.

2 " अपि चावरणाभावमात्रमाकाशं मन्यमानस्य सौगतस्य स्वाभ्युपगमविरोधः
प्रसज्येत । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 24.

that henceforth he is going to refute their argu-
ments in an independent manner without any refe-
rence to the Vedānta texts.[1]　Thus he avoids the
fault of Punarukta.

The origin of the Vāda method adopted by
the Bhāṣyakāras may be traced partly to the dia-
lectical nature of the Bādarāyaṇa Sutras.　In the
text of the Brahma-sūtra itself, there occur the
references of Pratijñā-hāni, Anavasthā, Itaretarā-
śrayatva, and such other technical terms as are
specially connected with the devices of debate.　In
this connection the Sutra – स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ।,[2] occuring
twice in the Brahma-sūtra typically illustrates the
truth of the above statement.　These two Sūtras
give rise to arguments ultimately reducible to the
Nigrahasthāna called Niranuyojyānuyoga or censur-
ing the non-censurable.　It is an accepted rule of
philosophical discussion that when a contingency
and its explanation is similar in the case of both
the sides of a controversy, then neither of them
should be questioned with respect to the decision
of the topic in a particular way.[3]　In Sūtra
II. i. 10, Śaṅkarācārya argues that all the difficulties
raised by the Sāṅkhyas apply to both the views,

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1 " तेषां यद् व्याख्यान तद् व्याख्यानाभासं न सम्यग्व्याख्यानमित्येतावत्पूर्वं
ॠतम् । इह तु वाक्यनिरपेक्ष: स्वतन्त्रस्तद्युक्तिप्रतिषेध: क्रियत इत्येष
विशेष: । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 1.

2 Brahma-sūtra, II. i. 10 & II. i. 29.

3 " यश्चोभयो: समो दोष: परिहारोऽपि वा सम: । नैक: पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्ता-
दुनर्थविचारणे ॥ " Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, p. 438.

and cannot, therefore, be urged against either only.'
But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily
be accepted, Śaṅkarācārya states that he is streng-
thened, by the outcome of the discussion, in the
opinion that the alleged difficulties are not real.[1]
In Sūtra II. i. 29, he remarks that in his opponent's
theory also, there arises the same contingency as
his own, and that ought not to be, therefore, pressed
against just one of the opposing theories only.[2]

Rāmānujācārya also is well-versed in the
various devices of controversy, and in the course of
arguments he quickly resolves the positions of his
opponents by pointing out some Nigrahasthāna or
other, which ensures the implausibility of the argu-
ments advanced by them. As Hetvābhāsas occupy
an important place amongst logical fallacies, Rāmā-
nuja takes recourse to them to a very great extent,
and thus proves himself an astute debater proficient
in the subtleties of logic.

According to Śrīnivāsa, the Hetvābhāsas are
divided into five varieties, viz. (1) Asiddha,
(2) Viruddha, (3) Anaikāntika or Savyabhicāra,
(4) Prakaraṇasama or Satpratipakṣa, and (5) Kālā-
tyayāpadiṣṭa or Bādhita.[3] Thus the Viśiṣṭādvaita

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1 " एते दोषाः साधारणत्वान्नान्यतरस्मिन्पक्षे चोदयितव्या भवन्तीत्ययदोषता-
मेनैषां द्रढयति । अवश्याश्रयितव्यत्वात् । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
II. ii. 10.

2 " इति स्वपक्षेऽपि समान एष दोषः । समानत्वाच्च नान्यतरस्मिन्नेव पक्ष
उपक्षेप्तव्यो भवति । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, II. ii. 29.

3 Śrīnivāsa : Yatīndramata-dīpikā, II.

system generally follows the Nyāya classification of Hetvābhāsas.

Amongst the numerous cases of Hetvābhāsas pointed out by Rāmānuja in his Śrī-bhāṣya, the mention of Anaikāntikatva or Savyabhicāra is quite frequent. For example, he asserts that the assumption that, on account of the absence of origination, other modifications are also negated in relation to consciousness, is unreasonable; because such reasoning is inconclusive, as it holds good in the case of antecedent non—existence also.[1]   At another place he points out that Avidyā, which is accepted by the opponent as unoriginated and yet the seat of a variety of modifications and also ending at the origination of true knowledge, is untenable; because in its case the reasoning is too wide and inconclusive.[2]

Rāmānuja many times points out the fallacy of contradictory reason (Viruddha Hetu). For example, he argues that, in establishing the ignorance accepted by the Advaitin, the reason adduced in the syllogism proves also that other ignorance, which is not acceptable to him, and it is thus a case of the fallacy of Viruddha Hetu.[3]   By the

1 " यद्यस्या अनुपपत्या विकारान्तरनिरसनं तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । प्रागभावे
   व्यभिचारात् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 36.

2 " तथा च भवदभिमताऽविद्याऽनुपपन्नैव विविषविकारास्पदं तत्त्वज्ञानोदया-
   दन्तवती चेति तस्यामनैकान्त्यम् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 15.

3 " अज्ञानेप्यनभिमताज्ञानान्तरसाधनेन विरुद्धत्वाद्धेतो: । " Śrī-bhāṣya,
   I. i. 1, p. 89.

bye in the same syllogism, he points out that, if the reason does not form the means of proving that other ignorance, then it becomes a case of Anaikāntika Hetu.[1]

Instances of the fallacy of Asiddha Hetu may also be cited from Śrī-bhāṣya. For example, Rāmānuja points out that the absence of any subsequent stultification of scriptural knowledge of Brahman after it is actually produced, forms a case of Asiddha Hetu.[2]

Rāmānuja does not restrict himself to the imputation of the fallacies of reason only. He often points out the defects in the concomitance by showing that the illustration is not apt. For example, he points out that the illustration in the syllogism intended to prove positive ignorance is deficient in regard to the Hetu, because the light of the lamp-flame, which is cited as an illustration, does not really possess the power of illuminating such things as were unknown before.[3] At another place, he shows that the illustration of grass etc. for proving the evolution of non-intelligent matter is defective; since grass etc. does not evolve, if it is not acted upon by an intelligent being.[4]

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1 " तत्राज्ञानान्तरासाधनं हेतोरनैकान्त्यम्" Śrī- bhāṣya, I.i.1, p. 89.

2 " पश्चात्तनबाधादर्शनं चासिद्धम् ।" Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 55.

3 " दृष्टान्तश्च साधनविकलः । प्रदीपप्रभाया अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वाभावात् ।" Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 1, p. 89.

4 " तृणादेः प्राज्ञानधिष्ठितस्य परिणामाभावाद् दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः ।" Śrī-bhāṣya, II. ii. 8.

Amongst the other Nigrahasthānas, Rāmā-
nuja frequently employs Pratijñā-virodha. For
example, he argues that, if it is assumed that
matter is produced by the three qualities Sattva,
Rajas, and Tamas, then the statement goes against
the Sāṅkhya's own tenet, that matter is the primal
cause, and it also goes against the accepted num-
ber of the constituents of the universe.[1] When-
ever Rāmānuja reminds the objector that it is not
his accepted tenet, he intends to drive him to Pra-
tijñā-virodha. For example, in the Pūrvapalṣa of
Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa, as regards the alternative
that the distinction amongst the souls must be
natural, he points out that it cannot be so, since it
is not the accepted tenet of the objector.[2]

Sometimes he makes use of the Nigraha-
sthāna called Pratijñā-hāni. For example, he points
out that, if the quality 'I' is assumed not to con-
tinue to persist in the state of final realease, then
final release would, in other words, come to mean
the enunciation of the destruction of the self.[3]
Here Rāmānuja obviously intends to allude to
Pratijñā-ḷāni.

Rāmānuja sometimes imputes Matānujñā,
which consists in pointing out that the objector

1 " अनन्तरे कल्पे प्रधानं कारणमिति स्वाभ्युपगमविरोध: , स्वाभ्युपेतसङ्ख्या-
   विरोधश्च । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 29.
2 " न तावत्स्वाभाविक: अनभ्युपगमात् । " Śrī-bhāṣya, II. i. 15.
3 " तथा सत्यात्मनाश एवापवर्ग: प्रकारान्तरेण प्रतिज्ञात: स्यात् । " Śrī-
   bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 49.

has admitted the opposite view-point. For ex·
ample, he argues that, if knowership belongs by
nature to Brahman itself, his own view must find
acceptance with the objector.[1] A statement like,
"You have come to my path" invariably shows the
imputation of Matānujñā.[2]

The foregoing illustrations show that Rāmā-
nuja does not stick to the distinction made by
Pariśuddhi that certain Nigrahasthānas only should
be urged in Vāda, while others should not.

Conducting Vāda by taking the stand on
logical arguments is hardly a strong point with
Madhvācārya. So in his Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣya we
come across the employment of the devices of debate
only occasionally. From amongst the Nigraha-
sthānas he sometimes urges against the opponent
Pratijñā-hāni only. In refuting the Buddhist he
points out that, if it is assumed that the effect is
produced after the cause is destroyed, the state-
ment that it is an effect is surrendered [3] At
another place, he argues that, if any entity other
than Brahman is assumed to be eternal, there
would result the surrendering of the statement

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1 " ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैव ज्ञातृत्वेऽस्मदीय एव पक्ष: परिगृहीत: स्यात् । " Śrī-
  bhāṣya, I. i. 1, p. 121.

2 " ब्रह्मण इति चेत् — आगतोऽसि मदीयं मागम् । " Śrī-bhāṣya,
  II. i. 15.

3 " कारणे विनष्टे कार्यमुत्पद्यते चेत्तत् कार्यमिति प्रतिज्ञाहानि: । "
  Madhva-bhāṣya, II. ii. 21.

that Brahman created all this.[1] It may be noted that, in the latter instance, Pratijñā-hāni is mentioned in the Sūtra itself.

Though the Bhāṣya of Nimbārka is intended only to explain the meaning of the Vedānta Sūtras, he does not hesitate to enter into logical subtleties, when occasion demands. For example, in an argument against the finality of logical reasoning, he urges against the opponent the fallacy Satpratipakṣa. He points out that, if it is inferred on strong grounds that matter is the origin of the universe, then in the same way by similar inference the contradictory doctrine can be very well proved, and thus there would result the Hetvābhāsa called Satpratipakṣa.[2]

Of the other Nigrahasthānas, Nimbārka frequently refers to Pratijñā-virodha or Abhyupagama-virodha. For example, against the Sāṅkhya, he argues that, if it is assumed that the Puruṣa urges activity, there would result the contradiction of the absence of activity on the part of the Puruṣa.[3] At another place he argues against the Buddhist that, if it is assumed that an effect is produced without a cause, then the assumption that

1 " ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्य नित्यत्वे इदं सर्वमसृजतेति प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । " Madhva-bhāṣya, II. iii. 6.

2 " इत्तरं वेदविरुद्धं प्रामाणिके अगलकारणेऽनुमिते तु ताद्दृशेन तर्केण सत्प्रतिपक्षसंभवात् । " Nimbārka-bhāṣya, II. i. 11.

3 " तथात्वे निष्क्रियत्वाभ्युपगमविरोधः । " Nimbārka-bhāṣya, II. ii. 7.

consciousness originates from four causes, viz. the organs of sense, the co-operating cognitions like light, the consequent psychical modification, and the basis of cognition viz. the object, would be contradicted.[1] In the interpretation of Upaniṣadic passages also, he points out Pratijñā-virodha. For example, he argues that if Brahman is intended to be denoted by the sentence that Brahman is beyond the scope of words, then there would result the contradiction of the assumption, since its denotation by words would be proved thereby.[2]

Either for proving his point or for refuting the arguments of his opponents, Vallabhācārya depends more on the rules of Mīmāṃsā than the logical devices of debate. Never-the-less in Anubhāṣya we find that these devices are employed to a certain extent.

We come across some cases where, against the objector, he urges Nigrahasthānas in the form of fallacies of reason. For example, he argues that the inference that matter is the primal cause is contradicted by arriving at the contrary conclusion by means of the very same reason.[3] Here he

1 " असति हेतौ कार्योत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमे चतुर्ष्यों हेतुभ्य. इन्द्रियालोकमनस्कार-विषयेभ्यो विज्ञानोत्पत्तिरित्यस्याः प्रतिज्ञायां बाध: स्यात् । " Nimbārka-bhāṣya, II. ii. 21.

2 " शब्दाविषयं ब्रह्मेति वाक्यस्य वाच्यं ब्रह्माभिप्रेतं न वेति । आद्ये वाच्यत्व-सिद्धेर्वाच्यत्वप्रतिज्ञाभङ्ग: । " Nimbārka-bhāṣya, I. i. 4.

3 " तस्मात्कारणत्वेन प्रधानं नानुमातव्यम् । अन्यथोपपत्त्या बाधितमेवानु-मानम् । " Anu-bhāṣya, II. ii. 1.

intends to impute the Hetvābhāsa, called Satpratipaksa.[1]

➤ In the Samanvayādhikaraṇa, he asserts that the word Samanvaya must be interpreted as being the efficient cause, and not as harmonised inter-pretation of Vedānta texts, since it is given as a reason which is already proved. This shows that he has in his mind the urging of the fallacy of Asiddha-hetu, if the latter interpretation of the word is accepted.[2]

Other Nigrahasthānas are also employed by Vallabhācārya occasionally. For example, in his argument refuting the nature of God as inferred by Naiyāyikas and others, he points to Pratijñā-virodha. He states that, if it is assumed that God has a substratum when he creates the universe, there arises the fallacy of contradicting the accepted position, as well as the contingency of regressus ad infinitum.

Some times we find him urging Pratijñāhāni. For example, he points out that the Buddhist can-

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1 " इति द्विधानुमानरूपा याऽन्यथाप्रतिषत्तिस्तया सांख्यानुमानस्य सत्प्रतिपक्ष-दोषघटितत्वादित्यर्थ: । " S. Pathak : Bāla-bodhini Com. on Aṇu-bhāṣya, p. 200.

2 " तत्कथं सिद्धवद्धेतुत्वेन निर्देश: । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 3.

3 " स नाधिष्ठित एव किंचित्करोतीति ईश्वरेऽप्यधिष्ठानमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । तस्मिन्नकल्प्यमाने मतविरोधोऽनवस्थासंभवश्च । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, II. ii. 39.

not assume the sublation of ignorance and its
effects, since according to his doctrine there is
nothing besides these. If he assumes that such
sublation is possible, he is open to the fallacy of
Pratijñā-hāni.[1]

A few instances of Matānujñā also can be
cited from Aṇu-bhāsya. For example, against the
Sāṅkhya he argues that, if Puruṣa is considered to
be principal and matter as subsidiary, then the
Sāṅkhya virtually gives up his own doctrine, and
admits the truth of the Vedānta doctrine of Brah-
man being the primal cause.[2]

Vallabhācārya is aware that in order to steer
clear of the fault of Punarukta, he has to avoid
repeating unnecessary arguments. He knows that
if a thing is to be proved, it can be done by even
one reason; but if it is untenable it cannot be pro-
ved by hundreds of reasons.[3] So in order to
explain away the repetition in the Sūtras, as well
as in his Bhāṣya, he states that reasons are added
for explaining the different aspects of a point.[4]

1 " द्वितीये – अविद्यातत्कार्यातिरिक्तपदार्थाङ्गीकारः कर्तव्यो भवेद्येन चाम्यु-
पगमहानिः । " S. Pathak : Bāla-bodhinī Com. on
Aṇu-bhāṣya, p. 208.

2 " पुरुषस्याङ्गित्वे ब्रह्मवादप्रवेशो मतहानिश्च । " Aṇu-bhāṣya,
II. ii. 8.

3 " साधकत्व एकेनापि तत्सिद्धेः । असाधकत्वे शतेनाप्यसिद्धेः । " Aṇu-
bhāṣya, I. i. 9.

4 " रूपभेदार्थं हेत्वन्तराणि । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, I. i. 9.

In commenting on the Sūtra - स्वपक्षदोषाच्च।
(•II. i. 10.) he like other Bhāṣyakāras urges the
Nigrahasthāna called Niranuyojyānuyoga,

Vallabhācārya generally follows the tradi-
tional method of Vāla. But while refuting the
Advaita theory, he sometimes goes besides the
point and engages himself in harsh words against
Śaṅkarācārya. In some of these cases his attack
does not keep the high level of Vāda, but deterio-
rates to the level of mere abuse. For example, his
tirade against Śaṅkarācārya in II. i. 14, II. ii. 8,
II. ii. 26 etc is unwarranted. His brushing aside
the Mādhyamika doctrine, as well as the doctrine
of Māya simply by remarking that, it is an incohe-
rent talk,[2] does not do credit to his power of subtle
analysis exhibited elsewhere.

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1 " तत्त्व – ययोरेव समो दोष: परिहारस्तयो: सम: । नैक: पर्यनुयोक्त-
व्यस्तादृगर्थंबिचारणे ।। इत्यादिन्यायेन पर्यनुयोगाभाव: । " S. Pathak:
Bālabodhinī, on Aṇu-bhāṣ,a, p. 193.

2 " माध्यमिकस्तु मायावादिवदसंबद्धभाषित्वादुपेक्ष्य इति न निराःक्रियत
भावार्येण । " Aṇu-bhāṣya, II. ii. 31.

Conclusion

In the foregoing chapters tne methodology of the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas is set forth by means of a general survey of the different constituents that are helpful in conducting Vāda. In this chapter, I intend to offer certain general observations by way of a critical estimate of their methodology. This is done by taking into account the salient features of the epistemological develop-ment envisaged in the Bhāṣyas and interpreting the significance of the attitude of the Bhāṣyakāras towards the philosophical and mystical tradition before them, and by giving an estimate of the special traits of their proficiency in handling the technique of controversy.

In the first instance it is worth-while to note that the advent of the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas shows quite a developed stage in Indian philosophy. It is accepted on all hands that well-developed system of philosophy cannot come into existence without a critically established epistemology. By the time when the Vedānta Bhāṣyas were written, this criti-cal stage in philosophy had already been passed through.

Before the time of the Brahma-sūtra Bhā-ṣyas, the Nyāya thinkers had developed formal

logic and had almost perfected it as a science of rea-
soning. Along with the Vaiśeṣikas, the atomic phy-
sicists, they presented a tolerably coherent world-
view. The Sāṅkhyas, on the other hand, advo-
cated a world-view which presented matter as a
principle evolving under the influence of spirit,
and tried to explain psychological phenomena as
a stage in the evolution of matter. On this the
Yoga system based its tenets of mental control,
supplying the principle of God over and above
the spirit and the evolving matter. The Mīmāṃsā
discussed word and its meaning, critically exa-
mined the functions of language and laid down
rules for the interpretation of fixed texts. This
philosophic activity was not restricted only to
the orthodox fold. Amongst the heterdox systems,
the Bauddhas developed four main philosophical
schools, who in their own way lent a hand for the
development of Indian logic and metaphysics. In
the same way the Jainas and many other minor
heterdox schools developed philosophical thoughts
in their circles.

All these heterogeneous philosophical activi-
ties inevitably engendered anomalies and contradic-
tions, and that was also the basis of developing
for each school epistemology to remove these ano-
malies and contradictions. Epistemology as a
critical review of what is known can put in its
appearance only when anomalies and contradic-
tions arise in what we know, and when subjective
and logical consciousness has grown enough to be

able to discover such anomalies and contradictions. At the time of the advent of the Vedānta Bhāṣya-kāras, Indian philosophy was passing through this developed stage, wherein epistemology received full attention at the hands of different philosophers.

The works of the Vedānta Bhāsyas do not bear comparison with those of the Greek or medieval European philosophers, since the philosophic development on the Indian side was far too advanced as compared with the Greek or European philosophy upto the end of the middle ages. The Greek mind was dogmatic without any critical estimate of what it knew. The medieval European philosophy is also marked by conspicuous absence of epistemic criticism, because the thinkers of this period were more for theology than for philosophy, and were therefore not for inquiries, but for accepting without inquiry what was contained in the versions of the Bible.[1]

But in India, before the Brahma-sūtra Bhāsyas, sufficient thought had taken place in the subject of epistemology, and many controversies were raised around the topic of valid means of knowledge, the nature of valid knowledge, and whether knowledge was valid of itself or required some extraneous means to prove it valid. Already these topics received critical considerations in the Nyāya system. Other systems also played their

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1 H. Bhattacharya : The principles of philosophy, p. 28.

part in moulding the epistemological principles
evolved by the Nyāya　In the Mīmāṃsā, writers
like Kumārila-bhaṭṭa discussed at length the nature
of valid knowledge, the means of valid knowledge
and the self-validity of knowledge. The subtle
analysis and the critical spirit with which these
topics are handled by Kumārilabhaṭṭa prove that
the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyakāras had a rich heritage
of epistemological thought on which they could
go further.

The Vedānta systems set forth by the Bhā-
ṣyakāras fully availed themselves of the epistemo-
logical theories evolved and established by different
systems of philosophy. The Nyāya gave an im-
petus to the thorough investigation of the theory of
Pramāṇas, which later on gained valuable contribu-
tions from the Mīmāṃsā system. The Mīmāṃsakas
by their subtle criticism made the conceptions of
Pramāṇas more definite. They revalued the con-
ception of the Śabda-pramāṇa and brought it to a
greater prominence. They also set forth Upamāna
in a new light and distinguished Arthāpatti and
Anupalabdhi as separate Pramāṇas, though the
Naiyāyikas merged these two into Anumāna and
Pratyakṣa respectively.

The Naiyāyikas accepted extraneous vali-
dity of knowledge. The Sāṅkhyas, on a more
penetrating analysis, came to the conclusion that
both validity of knowledge cannot rest on any ex-
traneous circumstance, but both these must be

accepted as dependent on knowledge itself. The Mīmāṃsā developed the theory still further and by, analysis and criticism came to the conclusion that knowledge is self-valid, though its invalidity must be established extraneously.

The Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyakāras presuppose all these epistemological developments. Some of these developments might have begun when Bāda-rāyaṇa Sūtras themselves were formulated. In this connection it may be significantly noted that Śaṅ-karācārya designates Bādaṛāyaṇa as well-versed in Grammar, Mīmāṃsā and Logic.[1] There is, how-ever, no doubt that all these epistemological deve-lopments had already taken place before the advent of the Bhāṣyaṭāras. They have taken full advantage of these and have employed them as subservient to the formulation of their theories.

Amongst the epistemological principles of the Vedānta system, the position of the Śabda-pramāṇa deserves special notice. In the opinion of all the Ācāryas, metaphysical principles cannot be grasped by means of perception, since it is of the nature of sense-object contact, and hence con-ditioned by the limitations of the senses. Inference also is not helpful in this respect, since the forma-tion of concomitance and the cognition of the

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1 " तत्र पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञेनाचार्येण वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मावगतिपरत्वदर्शनाय वाक्याभास्युक्त्यामांसप्रतिपत्तयः पूर्वपक्षीकृत्य निराक्रियन्ते । " Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 5.

.Hetu, which give rise to the inference, are based on perception. So they consider that in knowing the highest reality only scriptural authotity is useful. Other Pramāṇas like perception etc. have only a limited scope in philosophical matters. The significance of the prominen : given to Śabda-pramāṇa by Bādarāyaṇa and his Bhāṣyakāras deserves to be interpreted on the background of the views held by other systems.

The heterdox systems of the Buddhists, the Jainas, and the Cārvākas revolted against the authority of the Vada, and followed the guidance of their teachers. Thus they disregarded the intuitive utterances of bygone sages of the Upni-ṣads and broke themselves off from traditional philosophy.

The four orthodox systems except the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta accept the authority of scripture, but that acceptance dose not possess a strong conviction about the truth of the Vedic contents. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system gave more importance to observation, inference and reasoning and thus its method was particularly suitable for the development of an empirical science like the atomic physics of the Vaiśeṣikas. Though suffi-ciently analytical, the method was not free from empirical data, and hence not quite suitable as a philosophical method. In spite of the critical reasonings and formal syllogisms of the Nyāya, and the penetrating classifications of categories

of the Vaiśeṣika, this twin system was found to be metaphysically barren. The reason of it lies in the fact that it lacked the flight of creative intui-' tion that raises the human mind above the condi- tions of ordinary knowledge and makes it able to grapple with the problem of constructing metaphy- sical theories on a higher plane.

To a certain extent the same thing may be said about the Sāṅhya system. Its allegiance to the scriptures, which represent the recorded expe- riences of mystics and philosophers, appears to be stronger than that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; but here also observation, analysis and inference have a stronger hold than intuition. The Sāṅkhyas showed only lip allegiance to the Veda and kept their orthodoxy, but followed the philosophical tenets of the founder Kapila, who is credited with perfect knowledge, and perhaps whose intuitive genius must have struck the doctrine of evolution.

The Yoga system stands in peculiar posi- tion in comparison with other schools of philosophy. Epistemologically its contribution lies in its attempt to seek conditions, which would make an individual fit for mystical experiences on ever higher and higher planes. As an ethical force and a personal discipline the importance of its contribution can never be minimised. In the province of meta- physics, however, the system could achieve very little, since it chiefly intended to teach the methods of physical and mental control to the religious aspirant.

The Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta stand quite apart from other systems in their attitude towards the intuitive experiences recorded in the sayings of ancient seers. With full faith and reverence, both these systems look up to the Veda, which according to them epitomises the record of such experiences. They strongly upheld the authority of scriptures in the face of severe attacks on the part of heterdox philosophies, and developed suitable epistemology to support the doctrine of the impersonal character and the infallibility of the Veda.

Recognition of the authority of the scriptures in the field of supersensuous entities like Dharma or religious duty and Brahman or supreme reality forms an important contribution to the epistemological principles on the part of these two systems. Though the Sāṅ hyas recognised the authority of scriptures, they left very little scope for it, as they recognised Sāmā iyatodṛṣṭa Anumā ia, which could prevail in supersensuous matters. The Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta, however, insisted that the Veda alone can be the means of knowledge in such matters.

By the time of the formulation of the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta Sūtras the theory of Pramāṇas seems to have been sufficiently developed. Such technical words as Pratyakṣa and Anumāna must have been the common words of philosophical parlance. But these two systems do not restrict the words to the senses in which they are used in the Nyāya terminology. They have purposely

widened the meanings of these two terms so as to
extend them to trancendental matters. Knowledge
of Dharma which is the purpose of the Mīmāṃsā
and knowledge of Brahman which is the purpose of
the Vedānta are both held to be beyond the range
of the ordinary means of knowledge. These sys-
tems believed that intuitive knowledge is the only
means to know transcendental facts. Its immediacy
vouchsafes for its validity, and thus strikes a very
great similarity with perception. Thus the religi-
ous and philosophical experiences of ancient in-
spired sages are accepted to be a higher form of
Pratyakṣa giving insight into the trancendental
realm of religion as well as metaphysics.

As the Mīmāṃsā viewed the Śruti as a higher
kind of Pratyakṣa, an impersonal revelation of the
Veda to the seers, the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras designated
Vedic texts by the word Pratyakṣa.[1]   In the same
way the Smṛtis or the sayings of comparatively
modern sages in the tradition of ancient inspired
seers came to be held on par with Anumāna.[2] This,
however, does not mean that the Mīmāṃsā denies

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1 " प्रत्यक्षोपदेशाश्चमसानामव्यक्तः शेषे । " Mīmāṃsā-sūtra,
   III. vi. 34.
   Also:— " देशमात्रं वा प्रत्यक्षं ह्यर्थकर्म सोमस्य । " Mīmāṃsā-
   sūtra, III. vi. 16.

2 " अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात् प्रमाणमनुमानं स्यात् । " Mīmāṃsā-sūtra,
   I. iii. 2.
   Also:— " विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम् । " Mīmāṃsā-
   sūtra, I. iii. 3.

Pratyakṣa and Anumāna, in their ordinary senses.[1] It only revises the conceptions of Pratyakṣa and Anumāna, and suggests that in the supersensuous matters, the Śruti serves the purpose of immediate experience, while Smṛti serves the purpose of inference..

The Vedānta carries this process further and applies the conception to philosophy. It instils a new meaning into these notions by shifting the emphasis from action to knowledge. It 'has been already pointed out how the words Pratyalṣ1 and Anumāna denote Śruti and Smṛti in the Brahma-sūtra also. But in the Jaimini Sūtras, the word Śruti generally refers to a B.āhmaṇa text, while in the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras it generally refers to an Upaniṣadic text.

On account of the shifting of emphasis on Upaniṣadic texts, which represent the recorded intuitive experiences of mystics and creative philosophers, the speculative aspect of philosophy gains due recognition. The critical and speculative sides of philosophy are complementary to each other. In the Vedānta this fact is clearly recognised. In the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas, mystical and philosophical traditions gain their proper significance in critical philosophy, and save their systems from barren hair-splittings and logical labyrinths. The

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1 " सस्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमनिमित्तं विद्यमानो-पलम्भात् । " Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I. i. 4.

significance of this revaluation of the Śabda-pra-
māṇa is very great, since it forms an important
contribution to epistemology on the part of the
Vedānta.

This explains why Bādarāyaṇa introduces
Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa and Tarkāpratiṣṭhānādhi-
karaṇa in his work. All the Ācāryas are at one to
hold that Veda is the only source that can give the
right knowledge of Brahman. Other Pramāṇas
are only limited in scope; their province is restricted
to worldly matters.

In enunciating the Veda as the only means
of the knowledge of Brahman, the Ācāryas dis-
parage only the ordinary perception based on
sense-object contact and the ordinary process of
inference from observed facts. In recognising the
Veda as the only means, they do not preclude
Anubhava, the higher kind of Pratyakṣi, or a sort
of intuition. Śaṅkarācārya rightly states that reality
is realised at the end of direct intuition.[1] Accord-
ing to Śaṅkarācārya, self-knowledge is inseparable
from self-existence. It seems to be the only true
and direct knowledge behind all that we have; all
else is inferential. He says that self-knowledge,
which is neither logical nor sensuous, is the presup-
position of every other kind of knowledge. It alone
is beyond doubt, for it is the essential nature of

1 " अनुभवावसानत्वाद् भूतवस्तुविषयस्य । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya,
   I. i. 4.

him who denies it.[1] It is the object of the notion of self, and it is known to exist on account of its immediate presentation.[2] It cannot be proved, since it is the basis of all proof. Śaṅkarācārya's conception of Sākṣin bears ample evidence to show how much he valued intuitive experience.

The doctrine that Brahman is synonymous with knowledge signifies the same way of thinking. Brahman, which symbolises absolute reality, means also holy knowledge, intuitive wisdom. Intuitive wisdom becomes personified as the first principle of the universe. He, who knows it, knows the essence of the cosmos. The acceptance of the authority of the Vedas is an admission that intuitive insight is a greater light in the abstruse problems of philosophy than logical understanding.[3] So, Śaṅkārācārya regards Anubhava or integral experience as the highest kind of apprehension.

Rāmānuja also believes that intuitive knowledge is an essential attribute of reality. According to him, the individual self, that stands in the relation of an attribute to the highest reality, is the knower. Madhva considers that Anubhava is the only immediate Pramāṇa. So the Veda and other authoritative scriptures are asserted as Pramāṇa,

1 " य एव हि निराकर्ता तदेव तस्य स्वरूपम् । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 4. & II. iii. 7.

2 " अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धे: । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

3 S. Radhakrishnan : An idealist view of life, p. 128.

since they form the bulk of the experience of the
seers. Other sources of knowledge viz. perception
in the form of self-object contact and inference are
only Anu-pramāṇas. Nimbārka and Vallabhācārya
also give due importance to intuitive knowledge of
great seers. In raising Bhāgavata to the status of a
Prasthāna, Vallabhācārya implies that intuitive ex-
perience must always be taken into account in
solving ultimate philosophical problems.

Taking into account the mystical experiences
of earlier seers in an attempt at presenting a syste-
matic rational philosophy has one more strong sup-
port in the fact that they present more or less a
harmonious conception of reality. As Śaṅkarācārya
says, the views expressed in different Vedānta
passages agree in holding the conscious Atman
or Brahman as the cause of the world, just as the
eyes of different men agree in having the same
knowledge regarding colour. The concensus of
opinion in this respect is certainly a powerful
argument.[1]

Taking a clue from this statement of Śaṅka-
rācārya we may investigate the characteristics of
Brahman, occurring again and again in the Upani-
ṣads and presented in the first Adhyāya of the
Brahma-sūtra by way of resolving the doubts in
ambiguous passages. The Sūtras present the con-
ception of Brahman in a thoroughly rational form,

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1 " महत्त्व प्रामाण्यकारणमेतद् यद् वेदान्तवाक्यानां चेतनकारणत्वे समान-
गतित्व, चक्षुरादीनामिव रूपादिषु । " Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I. i. 10.

and barring some slight differences of opinion, all the Bhāṣyakāras hold similar views in this respect. The Vedānta designates Brahman as Ekamevā-dvitīya, and says that its nature is Cit. It is said to be Bhūman or theoretically prefect, and Sākṣin or the basis of all thought. It is Sat or the thing-in-itself, and Māyin or the basis of all appearance. It is essentially Ānandamaya or of the nature of bliss These characteristics of Brahman speak volumes about the rationality of the Vedānta metaphysics.

Modern metaphysics solely dependent on logic speaks about reality in somewhat similar terms. It presents reality as specifically one, wherein plurality is not possible. Its essence is said to be experience, and it is endowed with theoretical perfection. Even though thought has plurality, it is accepted that it can very well perish in unity. Reality is considered as the thing–in–itself, and is said to be the basis of error. It is also rationally associated with happiness.[1]

In connection with the Śabda-pramāṇa one more point of some significance deserves notice. By the time the philosophical systems were formulated, the Veda had branched off into many schools, and in the domain of religion they presented somewhat different pictures of one and the same ritual. Philosophy, which aims at search of truth, cannot

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1 F. Bradley : Appearance and Reality, Book II, pp. 119 f.

tolerate such heterogeneous presentation of one
and the same thing. As a thoroughly rational
system, the Vedānta recognises that the truth can
only be one; in philosophical investigation there is
no scope for alternatives and exceptions. So the
Vedānta accepts that all cognitions about meta-
physical matters must be considered as identical
and be harmoniously interpreted so as to give an
integrated picture about a spiritual experience. In
Upaniṣad, belonging to different Vedas or to diffe-
rent Śākhās of the same Veda, meditations or cog-
nitions of Brahman are described, under the same
name but with differences in detail. With respect
to this, the Vedānta lays down that the cognitions
or the meditations of Brahman, taught by all the
Vedānta texts, are identical on account of the non-
difference of injunction etc.[1] This sort of rational
harmonisation of the nature of reality marks an
important step in methodology. Though, in the
opinion of some scholars, the third Pāda of the
third Adhyāya has very little of philosophical im-
portance,[2] its significance in the process of metho-
dological development is noteworthy.

The individual Bhāṣyakāras have in their
own way contributed to the development of the
Vedāntic conception of Śabda-pramāṇa, epitomis-
ing the intuitive realisation of reality. Śaṅkarācārya
considers that the immediate cognitions of reality

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1 " सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् । "   Brahma-sūtra,
   III. iii. 1.
2 Ghate : The Vedānta, p. 134.

as recorded in the Upaniṣads must be accepted as uncontradicted experiences and hence they are the most valid means of knowing Brahman. He throws the Karmakāṇḍa portion in the background, even though as Śruti it must be considered as the record of the religious experiences of the seers. Śaṅkarācārya suggests that the Karmakāṇḍa portion is less significant in the realisation of the highest reality since it aims at a wordly goal.

Śaṅkarācārya's contribution to this conception lies in another direction also. He recognizes that an individual aspirant can aspire to gain the same immediate experience as is obtained by the Upaniṣadic seers. Anubhava or the personal experience of reality is the highest means for the knowledge of Brahman. The intuitive experiences of the seers lead to Atmānubhava. Thus Śaṅkarācārya brings Anubhava to the same level of Upaniṣadic revelation. Śaṅkarācārya's doctrine that the ordinary worldly perception becomes sublated by the higher intuition of reality fully depends on the widened conception of Vedic revelation. Thus Śaṅkarācārya justifies himself in asserting that the world, though it is an object of experience and is capable of phenomenal treatment, is yet unreal like a dream, since it is followed by contradiction.[1]

Rāmānujācārya approaches the problem in a

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1 " अनुभूतोऽप्ययं लोको व्यवहारक्षमोऽपि सन् । असद्रूपो यथा स्वप्न उत्तर-क्षणबाधतः ॥ " Śaṅkarācārya : Aparokṣānubhūti, 56.

different way. Like Śaṅkarācārya, he does not throw the Pūrvakāṇḍa in the background completely. He recognizes the importance of religious action in the realisation of the Supreme self. Devotion and concentration on the highest Lord are more sublime modes of religious action. According to Rāmānuja, sacrificial ritual loses all its essence, if it is not animated with devotion. All actions are for the sake of the worship of God. So he wants that religious actions should be sublimated into pure devotion, which ultimately culminates into the realisation of the highest Brahman

Rāmānujācārya gives the highest authority to the mystical experiences recorded in the Śruti; but side by side he recognizes that works like the Pañcarātra Āgamas also must be given the same status as the Veda, because in them he finds the highest sort of divine inspiration. The realisation of divinity by the Vaiṣṇava devotees is considered by him to be on the same level as that of the Vedic seers. Apart from the sectarian attitude, which is noticeable in the Pañcarātra Āgamas, their inclusion in the sacred revelations cannot be seriously objected to.

The same may be said about Madhvācārya, who includes Purāṇas in the Śāstra, and about Nimbārka and Vallabha, who give Bhāgavata a special prominence amongst the sacred scriptures

The tendency to take into account later mystics along with the ancient Vedic seers may be

:considered welcome in a way. But this tendency is marred by the fact that works like the Pu.āṇas and the Āgamas, which record their spiritual experiences, contain enormous material which has no concern with spiritual realisation. An attempt to glean a real integrated intuitive experience of the highest reality from these works becomes a very difficult task even for the great Ācāryas like Rāmānuja. Some of the quotations from non-Vedic scriptural sources occurring in the Śrī-bhāṣya, Madhva-bhāṣya etc. bear testimony to the above remarks.

The Vāda method is peculiarly suitable as a philosophical method. The most important criterion of an ideal philosophical method is that it should offer ample scope for a free movement of thought in all directions, so that it may be able to investigate all avenues of inquiry with reference to a particular hypothesis. The Vāda method satisfies this condition, since it offers unlimited scope for the establishment and refutation of theories under consideration by taking sides (Pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigraha), and arguing out the merits and the demerits of the views put forth by the opposing sides by means of all relevant arguments.

The purpose of Vāda is investigation of truth, and establishing it in the form of a plausible theory. All the Ācāryas have kept this thing before their mind, and each of them has a constructive theory to offer in his Bhāṣya. The establishment of the theory is achieved by setting forth its

different features, side by side with the demolition of the theories contradicting it, and replying to the objections against it.

In Vāda the free movement of thought in all directions is facilitated by the employment of Tarka. Tarka is helpful by bringing in all possible alternatives for investigation in the light of different valid means of knowledge. It helps the thorough analysis of the problem under discussion, and thus facilitates logical criticism.

The Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyakāras have availed themselves of the opportunity supplied by Tarka in different degrees. Śaṅkarācārya, in dealing with a topic, generally sets forth all possible aspects in which it may be decided, and supplies relevant arguments from all those different points of view. He follows this method throughout his Bhāṣya. Rāmānuja also emulates this good point of Śaṅka-rācārya's method, especially in the earlier part of his Bhāṣya. Vallabhācārya achieves a degree of excellence in some of the earlier Adhikaraṇas. As regards the Bhāṣyas of Madhva and Nimbārka it may be remarked that they are satisfied only with giving a literal interpretation of the Sūtras and supporting their own theories occasionally. They do not avail themselves of making use of Tarka to such an extent that it may be helpful in giving a thorough investigation of all the different aspects of a particular topic.

The Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyakāras are aware

that the success of their Vāda method depends on
the systematic adducing of valid means of know-
ledge. They know that in order to systematise
free movement of thought adducing of Pramānas
is quite necessary. Free movement of thought
becomes purposeful only if it ends in a valid cog-
nition. So by means of Pramānas, the Bhāṣyakāras
give a purposive direction to the conduct of the
investigation. Thus the Pramāṇas form the most
important plank of the methodology of the
Bhāsyas.

In Vāla the discussion is generally carried
on by adducing Pramāṇas through formal syllo-
gisms one after another (Pañcāvayavopapanna),
even though adducing of Pramānas independent of
them is allowed. The significance of this feature
lies in the fact that it makes the discussion logi-
cally faultless. Logical faults which would have
remained otherwise undetected are easily made
manifest by the employment of formal syllogisms.
This employment of syllogisms, however, is not a
compulsory condition for the conduct of Vāda,
since the Nyāya itself recognises that the main
basis of the search of truth is Pramāṇas and not
logical devices.

In respect of this feature also, the Bhāṣya-
kāras show individual specialities. Śankarācārya
presents a happy string of three-membered syllo-
gisms through-out his Bhāṣya, and especially in
the polemical part he excels in their logical sub-

tlety. Though certainly an ingenious logician, he does not revel in logical formalities in the way they were developed in the later school of Nyāva. Rāmānuja also is an astute logician and his syllogisms manifest the same clarity of thought as that of Śaṅkarācārya, though sometimes he presents them in an excessively formal way. About Madhvācārya there is nothing special to note, since he rarely argues by advancing sustained syllogisms. Nimbārka sometimes presents a brilliant syllogism, but he has less opportunity to do so, since he aims at giving only a literal interpertation of the Sūtras. In Vallabha's Aṇu-bhāṣya we find the use of syllogisms, expressed in terse laconic style. They lack the happy clarity of those of Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya.

All the Bhāṣyakāras have kept the high level of philosophical discussion, and have hardly allowed the Vāda to degenerate into the lower kinds of debate, viz. dispute and wrangling. In Vāda, Chala or verbal play and ambiguity, and Jāti or deceptive arguments on the basis of similarity are not allowed. Chala and Jāti form the characteristics of Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā, and they do not conduce to the search of truth. All the Bhāṣyakāras are aware of this fact, and so we rarely come across instances of Chala and Jāti in the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas.

The last feature of the Vāda method is allowing the imputation of Nigrahasthānas or logical clinchers. In methodology the signifi-

cance of Nigrahasthānas lies in their usefulness in testing the validity of the Pramāṇas adduced and the inferences drawn. We have seen how efficient'y the Bhāṣyakāras have employed this important device in the conduct of Vāda.

It may be argued that great philosophers like Śaṅkarācārya and others should have better presented their systems by means of independent treatises instead of by means of commentaries on the Brahma-sūtra. The argument has apparently, a strong ground for its plausibility, since a Bhāṣyakāra is bound down by the text of the Sūtras. This naturally sets a limit on the free scope of presenting a philosophical system. In this connection we have to take into account many considerations, which go against the above objection. Firstly, it may be pointed out that, though a Bhāṣyākāra is bound down by the text of the Sūtra, he is free to introduce relevant digressions, wherever he thinks fit. Secondly, the Sūtras provide ample scope for a thorough consideration of an issue, because they are multifaced (Sarvato-mukha) and thus suggest possible alternatives for discussion. Thirdly, the Bhāṣyakāras, by commenting on the Brahma-sūtra, have derived full benefit of the reverence with which the Sūtra was viewed as an authoritative work. Moreover, like independent treatises, the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas are fairly systematic, since the Sūtra work itself was an avowed attempt at systematisation.

In the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas, the second

Pāda of the second Adhyāya, which is called
Tarka-pāda, can be distinguished from other Pā-
das by the nature of its contents and their presen-
tation. So from the point of view of methodology,
it deserves special notice. The Sūtras in this Pāda
manifestly show that they are intended to refute
theories which denounce or flout scriptural autho-
rity, whether openly like the Buddhists and the
Jainas or surreptitiously like the Vaiśeṣikas and
the Sāṅkhyas. As there is a difference of opinion
about the number of valid Pramāṇas, and as many
of the systems tend to refuse scriptures the status
of a valid Pramāṇa more authoritative than others,
it becomes incumbent on the Vedāntin to meet
the opponents on their own grounds. It appears
that the Sūtrakāra intended that these antagonistic
theories should be refuted on the score of pure
reasoning. In this Pāda the Bhāṣyakāras are ex-
pected to depend only on perception and inference,
which are accepted as valid means of proof by
almost all the antagonistic theories.

When we examine the Bhāṣyas from this
point of view, we find that only Śaṅkarācārya fully
satisfies the above expectation. He alone refutes
the antagonistic theories merely by reasoning and
not by appealing to scriptural authority. Even
Rāmānuja does not rigidly follow the dictum of
employing only Tarka in this Pāda. For example,
in Sūtra II. ii. 3 he quotes from Drāmidācārya,
Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā and, in Sutra II. ii. 39
also he quotes the sacred texts from Upaniṣads,

Bhāgavadgītā, and Purāṇas. As regards the ano-
maly in Utpattyasambhavādhikaraṇa, it is already
discussed, and it is pointed out that instead of
refuting a rival theory, Rāmānuja seeks to establish
his own theory by means of an Adhikaraṇa in this
Pāda, which is specially designed for refutation.

It is possible to raise a similar objection
against Śaṅkarācārya also, since at the end of Raca-
nānupapattyadhikaraṇa, he tries to explain his
own view-point instead of restricting himself only
to refutation. This objection, however, is not
tenable, since it can be satisfactorily replied to by
saying that it is only a relevant digression, which is
allowed or even welcome in a Bhāṣya. In doing this
he has not gone against the spirit of Tarkapāda.

The method followed by the Bhāṣyakāras
must be distinguished from the dialectics as is
understood in Western philosophy. Dialectics as an
art of debate is associated with the Socrates of the
Platonic dialogues. As conceived by Plato himself,
dialectic is the science of first principles which
differs from other sciences by dispensing with
hypotheses and is consequently the "Coping-stone
of sciences" – the highest, because the clearest and
hence the ultimate sort of knowledge. Aristotle
distinguishes between dialectical reasoning, which
proceeds syllogistically from opinions generally
accepted, and he holds that dialectical reasoning
is a process of criticism, wherein lies the path to
the principles of all inquiries. Modern philoso-

phers like Kant and Hegel use the word dialectic in a more specialised and technical sense, which serves no analogy to the method followed by the Bhāṣyakāras.

It may be said that the method of the Bra-hma-sūtra Bhāṣyas is somewhat akin to that of Platonic dialogues. In the Platonic dialectic there is first the statement of the problem, then the for-mulation of the hypothesis, next the discussion of its implications and consequences, and finally the confrontation with undisputed axioms or facts.[1] Thus the method of Platonic dialectic is exactly scientific. In comparison with the four steps of Platonic dialectic, the five Aṅgas of an Adhikaraṇa bear a very great similarity. They serve the very same purpose in the investigation of truth, and are also perfectly scientific.

There are, however, some points of difference between the Platonic dialectic and the series of Adhikaraṇas in a Bhāṣya treatise. In the Platonic dialogues there is dramatic element, which makes them completely informal. So also Plato often employs myths and parables to illuminate his arguments. The situations and the literary adorn-ments show the human touch, and the conversation often moves to a dramatic close.[2] In the Brahma-

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1 A. Koyre': Discovering Plato, Eng. translation
   by Rosenfield, p. 15 n.
2 H. Cushman : A Beginner's History of Philoso-
   phy, Vol. I, p. 128.

sūtra Bhāṣyas we never find such informal approach to philosophical problems. The Bhāṣyakāras proceed in a rigorously logical way and do not occupy themselves in literary flourishes. So also dramatic element is totally absent in the Bhāṣyas.

Secondly Plato, in the informal way in which the dialogues proceed, is not concerned with establishing some of his own propositions, but seems to be more prone to demolish the propositions of his opponents. Some of his dialogues do not lead to a definite conclusion but indirectly serve a philosophical purpose, which consists in negating the false propositions of the interlocutors. This sort of thing is never found in the Brahma–sūtra Bhāṣyas. Establishing a proposition is the chief concern of the Ācāryas; demolishing the doctrines of the opponents is considered only a subordinate achievement on their part.

The dialogues of Plato do not necessarily possess a fixed plan of argument. One thread and then another is followed, and in many dialogues no decision whatever is reached. The dialogues must always be taken as artistic products in which philosophical experiences are idealised. The Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyas, on the other hand, are more rigorous in their structure. They have a fixed plan of argument, and from one Adhikaraṇa to the other there runs a thread which links the previous one to the subsequent. Thus the whole set of Adhikaraṇas is expected to set forth in detail the particular philosophical system, or at least to give the exposition of its main tenets.

The peculiarity of Plonic dialectic is that it gradually ceases to be simply an art of conversa-tion and becomes a real method and science. Plato shows us that, passing from the statements of the particular sciences, we must destroy the hypotheses on which these sciences are founded in order to attain a more general knowledge. Ascending by the destruction of successive hypotheses to more and more general sciences, we come at last to a region in which we pass from ideas to ideas without the intervention of any particular or hypothetical ele-ment. And then we come to the foundation of all science, which is at the same time the foundation of the universe, namely, 'the Good, the intelligible sun.[1] Thus in the case of Plato, the dialectic itself becomes a philosophical principle. The Vedānta philosophers do not ascribe such a high place to the method itself. Their ultimate principle, the reality in the form of Brahman is not realised as an inevi-table result of a series of dialectics, but is realised as immediate knowledge.

Having carefully gone through the five major Bhāṣyas on the Brahma-sūtra, I have come to the conclusion that the key to their methodology lies in the proper evaluation of their basic position that realisation of the highest reality is identical with integrated self-experience, and the way to sucn experience lies through the guidance of the ancient and indigenous tradition of mystics and intuitive

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1 J. Wahl : The philosopher's way, p. 312-313.

philosophers, and not through intricacies of logic and mutually interdependent arguments. In order to substantiate this thesis I have given the exposition of the various constituents of Vāda, the outward form of the method of the Bhāṣyas, and attempted to set these constituents in their proper place. In this connection I have stressed the importance of the Śabda Praṁāṇ ṁ.

The foregoing account of the Bhāṣya methodology bears testimony to the fact that the Vāda method adopted by the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣyakāras serves the purpose of an ideal philosophical method on the score of the following considerations: (1) It affords ample scope for free movement of thought in all directions, in a systematic and purposive way. (2) It ensures valid conclusions by the employment of Pramāṇas and formal logic, and the imputation of Nigrahasthānas. (3) It keeps the high level necessary in a philosophical discussion aiming at search of truth by precluding deceptive tricks of argumentation. (4) It takes into account both the speculative and the critical aspects of philosophy by harmonising them by means of due recognition of scriptural testimony. (5) By the acceptance of the authority of scriptures it derives full benefit of the tradition of mystical and philosophical thought. (6) As a scientific philosophic method, it is thoroughly analytical and critical, as well as non-empirical and a priori.

I conclude with the fitting words of Madhu-
sūdana Sarasvatī – " Whatever excellence is found
in this composition belongs to my preceptor, not to
me indeed. Whatever is not exquisite here is mine
only; not of my preceptor indeed. "[1]

1 P. M. Modi : Translation of Siddhānta-bindu,
   p. 147-148.

APPENDIX

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