000			01779nam a2200205Ia 4500
999			_c25459 _d25459
005			20220708223932.0
008			200202s9999 xx 000 0 und d
020			_a198771444
082			_aIB 339.41 WEA 2nd ed
100			_aAtkinson, A.B. (ed.)
245		0	_aWealth, income, and inequality / edited by A.B.Atkinson
250			_a2nd ed.
260			_aLondon
260			_bOxford University Press
260			_c1980
300			_a412 p.
520			_aThe readings in this first section deal with different aspects of two fundamental questions: why are we concerned about inequality and what exactly does in equality mean? These are controversial questions. Some people argue that inequality is not a matter for concern and that intervention by the state to reduce inequality cannot be justified on moral grounds. A recent example is the entitlement theory of justice of Nozick (1974). This approach, which draws on a long tradition, can basically be summarized as asserting that moral judgements must be based on the process by which a distribution is attained rather than on the final distribution itself. It is a theory based on 'historical' rather than 'end-state' principles. The justice of a distribution of income depends, in this view, on how it came about and not on any difference between Messrs. A and B. If we start from a position in which everyone is entitled to the rights and assets which they hold (justice of original holdings), and proceed from it by a series of moves (exchanges, gifts, etc.) which are considered to be just, then the distribution is morally legitimate. The key issue is of course the determination of just initial entitlements, and here the theory is less fully developed.
650			_aIncome distribution.
942			_cB _2ddc