000			01465nam a2200205Ia 4500
999			_c214081 _d214081
005			20220314231336.0
008			200208s9999 xx 000 0 und d
020			_a9780521542449
082			_a321.8 CHE
100			_aCheibub, Jose Antonio
245		0	_aPresidentialism, parliamentarism and democracy
260			_aNew York
260			_bCambridge university press
260			_c2007
300			_a202p.
365			_dUSD
520			_aThis book addresses the following question: why are presidential democracies more likely to break down than parliamentary ones? Conventional wisdom among political scientists pointS to the incentives generated by the form of government itself; the independence of the executive and legislature that defines presidentialism generates incentives that are not conducive to the consolidation of democracy. On the basis of a data set that covers all democracies between 1946 and 2002, this book demonstrates that this is not the case: the incentives generated by presidentialism are as conducive to the consolidation of democracy as the ones generated by parliamentarism. The book argues that what kills presidentialism is the fact that it exists in countries where democracies of any type are not likely to survive. This book will be of interest to academic researchers, graduates and advanced undergraduates enrolled in courses on comparative politics and political economy.
650			_aPresidents
942			_cB _2ddc