000			01541nam a2200193Ia 4500
999			_c21318 _d21318
005			20211231180426.0
008			200202s9999 xx 000 0 und d
020			_a631131663
082			_a192.08 WIT
245		0	_aWittgenstein's Lectures : Cambridge, 1932-1935
260			_aOxford
260			_bBasil Blackwell
260			_c1982
300			_a230: ill.
520			_aBabel," is a partly appreciative, but mostly critical, review (reprinted from Philosophy) of Vendler's Res Cogitans. Perhaps the most dated feature of these discussions is their total in- nocence of the possibilities of computational functionalism as a sophis- ticated philosophy of mind. Ryle rejects,-contemptuously and without serious discussion, the suggestion that "the best thinkers in their best moments are doing in their heads the sort of things that computing machines do... " (52). And his only consideration of mental representa- tion, an exciting topic in very recent philosophy of psychology, comes in his dismissive treatment of (alleged) introspectibles. Here is a nostalgia trip for Ryle's old admirers and an enticing sampler for readers as yet unacquainted with Ryle's engagingly de- flationary way of doing philosophy. But it is not a ground-breaking work; it does not really advance our understanding of thinking much beyond the stage of enlightenment that his earlier writings helped us to attain.
650			_a"Philosophy Addresses. Essays, Lectures."
700			_aAmbrose, Alice (ed.)
942			_cB _2ddc