000			01652nam a2200193Ia 4500
999			_c166835 _d166835
005			20220404204839.0
008			200208s9999 xx 000 0 und d
020			_a9780200000000
082			_a327.73047 GAD
100			_aGaddis, John Lewis
245		0	_aLong peace: inquiries into the history of the cold war
260			_aNew York
260			_bOxford University Press
260			_c1987
300			_a332 p.
520			_aThis book shows what happens when curiosity and serendipity combine with shameless opportunism. The curiosity grew out of my sense that an earlier and conceptually more ambitious analysis of postwar United States national security policy had nonetheless left certain questions unresolved: What exactly had Americans found threatening about Soviet behavior at the end of World War II? Did Washington really want a sphere of influence in postwar Europe, or did it not? How was it that the Truman administration endorsed, but then almost immediately backed away from, a strategy of avoiding military com mitments on the Asian mainland? Why did the United States refrain from using nuclear weapons during the decade in which it was immune to any possibility of a Soviet retaliatory attack? Did American officials really believe in the existence of an international communist "monolith"? How did Russians and Americans fall into the habit of not attempting to shoot down each other's reconnaissance satellites? And, most important, why, given the unprecedented levels of super-power tension that have existed since 1945, has World War III not occurred?
650			_aUnited States - Foreign relations
942			_cDB _2ddc