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082			_a337.47 Val
100			_aValkenier , Elizabeth Kridl
245		4	_aSoviet union and the third world: an economic Bind
260			_aNew Delhi
260			_bAllied Publishers
260			_c1986
300			_a188 p. : ill
520			_aThis book describes how the Soviet Union's economic performance, capabilities, and the associated Marxist theory have become the Achilles heel of Moscow's relations with the Third World. Such was not the situation at the outset of Khrushchev's offensive. In 1955, the USSR challenged the West to economic competition in the former colonies, confident that it alone offered them the correct combination of guidance and aid. Twenty-five years later that confidence appears shaken, for it has become evident that Soviet economic capacity does not match Soviet political aspirations. Moreover, many Soviets recognize that their Marxist theories have failed to keep up developments in with the rapid science and international technology affecting economic relations. Khrushchev's initial assurance and uncompromisingly competitive aims have given way to moderation and a fumbling for new means and rationales in the vastly more complicated world. This study is an examination of Soviet scholarly works and polemics, as well as of official statements and statistics. It deals with the conceptual framework in which a economic range of perceptions and relationships operate; it is neither an economic analysis nor a compendium of factual data. It looks at changes in Soviet views and practices to show to what extent economic realitics have forced the Soviets to recognize that the developing countries are part of an interdependent world market in which the USSR can exercise no decisive control or leverage. It also describes the groupings in the current debate to demonstrate that no single school of thought guides the making of Soviet foreign policy. In offering a description of how economic realities have placed the Soviet Union's original politically based in a bind, the author is not chalking up points on some cold war scoreboard. Instead, the book is expected to acquaint readers with the evolution in Soviet perceptions of the outside world, which in turn might make it possible to detect nuances and discernment in Soviet policies and proposals. Granted that scholars and researchers do not make foreign policy either in Moscow or in Washington, their analyses, nevertheless, do reflect and contribute to the mental climate in which foreign policy decisions are made.
650			_aInternational economic relations.
942			_cDB _2ddc